ML15210A750

Proposed Relief Request Associated with the Common Emergency Service Water (ESW) System Piping

ML15210A750
Person / Time
Site:	Peach Bottom
Issue date:	07/29/2015
From:	David Helker Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
RR I4R-56
Download: ML15210A750 (37)

Text

200 Exelo1' Way K*_ *melt SQL are. PA I:J3L' 8 www.exelorcorp.com Exelon Generation 10 CFR 50.55a July 29, 2015 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-44 and DPR-56 NRC Docket Nos. 50-277 and 50-278

Subject:

Proposed Relief Request associated with the Common Emergency Service Water (ESW) System Piping Attached for your review and approval is a proposed alternative in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) concerning a through-wall leak identified in the common unit Emergency Service Water (ESW) system piping at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3. This relief applies to the fourth 10-year lnservice Inspection (ISi) interval. The fourth interval for Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS), Units 2 and 3, began on November 5, 2008, and will conclude on November 4, 2018. The fourth 10-year ISi interval complies with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section XI, 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda.

As noted in the attached relief request, on May 3, 2015, a through-wall leak was discovered in a segment of the ESW system that is common to Unit 2 and Unit 3. The next scheduled time at which a repair can be performed without a dual unit shutdown is during the PBAPS, Unit 2, refueling outage which is scheduled for October 2016. In order to prevent an unwarranted Unit 2 shutdown during the upcoming Unit 3 refueling outage, we are requesting your review and approval by September 21, 2015.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Proposed Relief Request associated with the Common Emergency Service Water (ESW) System Piping July 29, 2015 Page2 There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Stephanie J.

Hanson at (610) 765-5143.

Respectfully, David P. Helker Manager - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Attachment:

Relief Request 14R-56 cc: USNRC Region I, Regional Administrator USNRC Senior Resident Inspector, PBAPS USNRC Project Manager, PBAPS R. R. Janati, Pennsylvania Bureau of Radiation Protection S. T. Gray, State of Maryland

ATTACHMENT PEACH BOTTOM ATOMIC POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 PROPOSED RELIEF REQUEST ASSOCIATED WITH THE COMMON EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER (ESW) SYSTEM PIPING RELIEF REQUEST I4R-56

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 1 of 7)

1. ASME CODE COMPONENTS AFFECTED Code Class: 3 Examination Category: D-B Item Number: D2.10 Design Pressure and Temperature: 150 psig and 100°F Maximum Operating Pressure: 58 psig Maximum Operating Temperature: 92°F (governed by river temperature)

Piping Size: 12 Piping thickness: 0.375

Description:

This relief request is associated with the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS),

Units 2 and 3, common Emergency Service Water (ESW) system piping adjacent to valve MO-2-33-2972 (see Enclosure 1).

2. APPLICABLE CODE EDITION AND ADDENDA The current edition for the Inservice Inspection (ISI) interval is the ASME Section XI, 2001 Edition through 2003 Addenda. Code Case N-513-3 (Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping Section XI, Division 1) with the associated Regulatory Guide 1.147, Revision 17 condition has been applied to address acceptability of a through-wall leak in the affected piping.

3. APPLICABLE CODE REQUIREMENT Code Case N-513-3 Section 2(h) states:

Repair or replacement shall be performed no later than when the predicted flaw size from either periodic inspection or by flaw growth analysis exceeds the acceptance criteria of 4, or the next scheduled outage, whichever occurs first.

NRC Regulatory Guide 1.147, (Inservice Inspection Code Case Acceptability, ASME Section XI, Division 1) dated August 2014, contains the following provision regarding Code Case N-513-3:

The repair or replacement activity temporarily deferred under the provisions of this Code Case shall be performed during the next scheduled outage.

4. REASON FOR REQUEST On May 3, 2015, during routine operator rounds, a pinhole leak was identified in a vertical run of 12" piping on the ESW system.

ESW is a safety-related support system which is common to PBAPS, Units 2 and 3 (see ). The system consists of two independent loops (A and B), with one 100% capacity pump per loop. Cooling water is pumped from the Conowingo Pond, which is the normal (primary) heat sink, and is discharged back to the pond subsequent to heat removal from essential components. Each ESW pump is capable of aligning supply and return flow paths to

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 2 of 7) an emergency heat sink (Emergency Cooling Towers) during a Loss of Conowingo Pond special event.

Each ESW pump is also designed to supply cooling water to selected essential equipment during a design basis accident (DBA) or transient. Both pumps start upon receipt of a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), or whenever any diesel generator starts. In accordance with the acceptance criteria in the surveillance tests for the In-Service Testing program, during the most limiting conditions possible per Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2 (i.e., 92 °F river temperature and 98.5' river level) the combined minimum accident flow rate required by components dependent upon the ESW cooling water is 3133 gpm. This flow rate is based on the worst-case accident scenario for each heat exchanger and is representative of ESW system balanced flow with 100% flow to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) unit coolers and the diesel generator coolers. This flow is sufficient to mitigate the consequences of a design basis accident on one unit while bringing the other unit to a safe shutdown condition.

The piping pinhole leak is located very close to the ceiling of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Sump Room. This section of piping is part of the main ESW header that provides ESW flow to the Unit 2 ECCS room coolers. However, it is physically connected to common piping which also provides flow to the Unit 3 ECCS room coolers and to the common Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). The piping under review is line class 33HB-12", which is carbon steel, ASTM A106 Gr. B, 12", with a wall thickness of 0.375". The minimum allowable wall thickness for this piping was determined to be 0.063" (see Enclosure 2).

This location was evaluated for repair by branch connection, weld overlay, and pipe sleeve. It was determined that none of those options could be performed due to the proximity of the leak to the structural penetration. As shown in Enclosure 1, closing valves MO-2-33-2972, MO-3 3972, HV-0-33-507B, and HV-0-33-509 would isolate this location to allow pipe replacement.

Removal of this section of piping results in loss of capability of the B subsystem of ESW to supply cooling to these three heat loads (i.e., Unit 2 ECCS room coolers, Unit 3 ECCS room coolers, and EDGs) via the normal flow path. However, MO-2-33-2972 currently has through-valve leakage resulting in an inability to isolate the location and perform the repair. Additionally, it was determined that a freeze seal would not be effective for isolating this flaw location since the freeze seal location is not an adequate seismic boundary for a DBA seismic event. Also, the pipe temperature as a result of the freeze seal would be below the nil-ductility temperature and therefore, piping capability could not be assured if a DBA event were to occur. The MO-2 2972 valve is currently scheduled for replacement in the PBAPS Unit 2 refueling outage (P2R21) in 2016. In order to isolate the flaw with the MO-2-33-2972 valve leak-through, two additional valves (HV-2-33-502 and HV-2-33-517) would need to be closed. This results in an entry into a Unit 2 TS 3.7.2 shutdown statement due to the loss of both ESW subsystems to provide cooling to the Unit 2 ECCS room coolers. Per Code Case N-513-3 and Regulatory Guide 1.147, Revision 17, repair/replacement is required to be performed during the next scheduled outage. As this piping is considered to be common to both units, the next scheduled outage is the PBAPS Unit 3 outage scheduled to begin in September 2015. Isolating this location during the Unit 3 outage will result in a TS Required shutdown of Unit 2 in order to isolate the leak. With Unit 3 already shutdown for its refueling outage, this condition would result in a non-desirable dual unit shutdown of the PBAPS station. A dual unit shutdown is significant from a grid reliability viewpoint. In addition, a plant shutdown of Unit 2 would result in additional personnel radiological exposure and an unwarranted plant transient. Therefore, it is desirable to perform this repair during the next scheduled Unit 2 refueling outage in October 2016 to avoid an unscheduled Unit 2 outage during the September 2015 Unit 3 refueling outage.

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 3 of 7)

There are no other known leaks in the ISI Class 3 segments of the ESW system.

5. PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE AND BASIS FOR USE Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) is requesting approval to defer replacement of the leaking pipe spool until the Unit 2 outage in Fall 2016 in order to avoid an unwarranted shutdown of Unit 2. As discussed previously, a repair cannot be performed during the upcoming Unit 3 outage, scheduled for September 2015, without a dual unit shutdown.

Shutdown of Unit 2 results in an unnecessary plant transient, additional personnel radiological exposure and a potential adverse effect on electrical grid stability. Therefore, Exelon proposes to repair the flaw by pipe replacement and to replace valve MO-2-33-2972 during the Unit 2 refueling outage currently scheduled for October 2016.

Leakage Analysis:

The leakage rate was originally identified as 18 ml/min, equivalent to 0.0048 gpm.

Based on the leak rate and the known standby system pressure of 45 psig, the size of the pinhole orifice was computed to be approximately 0.0064". With an ESW system pump in operation, the maximum operating pressure in the system is 58 psig. Based on the computed orifice size, it is anticipated that the leak rate during operation of a pump would increase to 0.009 gpm, or 34 ml/min.

The flaw area has been re-inspected since performance of the original Ultrasonic Test (UT) and no changes have been identified in the degraded area. A review of the operator logs was performed for re-inspection of the leak as required by ASME Code Case N-513-3. The highest identified leakage through the flaw during re-inspections at both system standby and operating conditions was 44 ml/min. There have been no significant changes in leakage considering the standby mode (non-safety related service water) and the safety related ESW mode.

As discussed in Enclosure 2, the as-found condition of the pinhole leak does not adversely impact the ability of the piping to perform its intended safety function. Ample flow is available for the ESW system to meet the minimum safety related flow requirements for the EDGs and ECCS systems. Recent testing has shown that the ESW system flow rate was measured to be 3824 gpm from the A ESW pump alone and 3851 gpm for the B ESW pump alone. The ESW minimum required system flow rate at maximum river temperature of 92 °F, is 3133 gpm, which results in a 691 gpm flow margin when compared to the measured pump flow.

A leak rate limit of 5 gpm or 18,927 ml/min has been conservatively established. Given that the maximum safety-related leakage currently identified on the ESW system is 44 ml/min (0.0117 gpm), there is substantial margin remaining in the allowable leakage of the system.

An analysis was performed that supports that the pipe will continue to perform its safety function until the Unit 2 October 2016 outage. Based on a review of historical PBAPS-specific corrosion data, the corrosion rate for the leak was determined to be 12 mils per year (mpy) in each direction, or a total diameter growth of the flaw of 24 mpy. Based on the corrosion rate, the through-wall flaw is expected to increase by 34 mils before the

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 4 of 7) start of the Unit 2 outage, for a final hole diameter of 0.0404, which will ensure that any postulated increases in leakage will remain well below the 5 gpm leakage limit.

Structural Integrity Analysis:

Code Case N-513-3 was used to evaluate continued operation without repair. This evaluation is provided in Enclosure 2. This evaluation provided in Enclosure 2 for the as-found flaw dimensions as well as the predicted flaw in October 2016 demonstrates that the piping will remain structurally sound and safe for continued operation through the proposed period of operation. As determined in Enclosure 2, the calculated stress intensity factors (SIFs) for normal/upset and emergency/faulted conditions were well below the allowable fracture toughness both at the time of discovery of the flaw on May 3, 2015 as well as what is projected to be the flaw in October 2016. Similarly, the calculated axial flaw SIF was also shown to be well below the allowable fracture toughness. The calculations performed in the evaluation utilized the maximum design pressure of the piping, 150 psi, as the anticipated load. This provides additional conservativism given that the maximum operating pressure expected is 58 psi.

Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) was performed in the vicinity of the pinhole and an area with a diameter of 0.75" surrounding the pinhole was identified to be below minimum allowable wall thickness (see Enclosure 2). Based on the flaw characterization, the failure mode appears to be under-deposit corrosion influenced by microbial activity. As required by ASME Code Case N-513-3, shear wave UT was performed around the area of the flaw and it was verified that there are no crack-like indications present. UT was also performed around the area surrounding the leak.

From this inspection, it was identified that the size of the area surrounding the flaw that is below 87.5% of nominal wall thickness (i.e., 0.328) is 4.60 x 5.30. The surrounding band area was also inspected with 100% scanning coverage as required by ASME Code Case N-513-3. A total of 36 measurements were reported, the results of which showed that 35 of the 36 measurements were below 87.5% of nominal wall thickness, but only the leak area was identified below the minimum wall thickness. The NDE report from UT examination of the surrounding band area is included in Enclosure 2.

Enclosure 2 includes an ASME Code Case N-513-3 analysis using a flaw size of 0.75.

As discussed above, the corrosion rate for the leak was determined to be 12 mpy in each direction, or a total diameter growth of the flaw of 24 mpy. Based on the corrosion rate, the area that is below minimum wall thickness is expected to grow by 34 mils before the start of the next Unit 2 refueling outage resulting in a flaw size of 0.784.

Based on the geometry of the flaw characterization depicted in Enclosure 2, additional flaw growth that could occur until October 2016 was analyzed using a conservative, bounding flaw size of 1.5 in the axial and circumferential directions (i.e., double the current flaw size of 0.75). Using a bounding flaw size of 1.5 in place of the 0.75 flaw size used in Enclosure 2 yields results that are well within the acceptance limits of ASME code requirements. Therefore, from a structural integrity perspective, there is reasonable assurance that the piping will remain operable and within all system limits until the proposed time for repair/replacement.

Corrosion analysis was also performed on surrounding and similar piping. Of the five areas inspected as extent of condition as required by ASME Code Case N-513-3, none have an expected life below nine years based on a low reading of 0.134.

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 5 of 7)

Summary:

Exelon is requesting a proposed alternative in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2) on the basis that a shutdown of Unit 2 during the upcoming Unit 3 refueling outage would result in a hardship without a compensating increase in the level of quality or safety. Because the leak exists on piping that is considered as common to both Units 2 and 3, Code Case N-513-3 requires the leak to be repaired in the next refueling outage (which would be the upcoming Unit 3 refueling outage scheduled to begin in September 2015). However, by doing so, the isolation points to perform the work on this common piping would result in isolation of the Unit 2 ECCS unit coolers, which would result in a 12-hour TS-required Unit 2 shutdown. Since the clearance, tagging and maintenance evolutions would take significantly more time than the TS Required Action shutdown time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, it is appropriate to seek relief to allow the leak repair to occur during the next scheduled Unit 2 refueling outage (October 2016). A Unit 2 shutdown during the Unit 3 refueling outage is unwarranted due to the hardship of an unnecessary Unit 2 plant transient, additional personnel radiological exposure and a potential adverse effect on electrical grid stability for no compensating increase in the level of quality or safety. The assurance of quality and safety in the extended period of time between September 2015 and October 2016 is based on: 1) the small size of the indication, 2) the results of the Code Case N-513-3 evaluation which demonstrates the structural integrity of the pipe, 3) the large capacity of the current flow margin, 4) the flaw growth analysis demonstrating that the flaw will not grow beyond any current acceptance criteria, and 5) Code Case N-513-3 required daily leak check and UT flaw examination every 30 days. Based on this, there is reasonable assurance that this leak will not exceed any system leakage limits, nor will the structural integrity of the piping be challenged prior to startup from the Unit 2 refueling outage in October 2016.

6. DURATION OF PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE This relief request will be applied through the current PBAPS, Unit 2 operating cycle and refueling outage currently scheduled to begin October 2016. In addition, if system leakage exceeds 5 gpm, this relief request will no longer be applied.

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 6 of 7)

Enclosure 1

Relief Request I4R-56 Concerning the Common Emergency Service Water System Piping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(2)

(Page 7 of 7)

Enclosure 2 N-513-3 Evaluation including the Nondestructive Examination Sheets

TE 2494904-03 B ESW Pin Hole Leak Page 1of3

Title:

Perform Code Case N-513 evaluation to support Operability.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This evaluation was prepared in accordance with Exelon procedure CC-AA-309-101, revision 14, Engineering Technical Evaluations.

A technical task risk/rigor assessment was performed for this activity in accordance with HU-AA-1212, revision 6. Risk rank was determined to be '1' with a medium consequence (C. 7, Safety System Loss), 1 human performance risk factor (H.10, Group Think), and 1 process risk factor (P.3, Fast Track). Therefore, per table 5.1 of attachment 5 to HU-AA-1212 existing process reviews are adequate.

This conclusion was discussed with Jeff Chizever, Manager PEDM on 05/05/2015.

An impact review per CC-AA-102, revision 28 was performed and it was concluded that procedure revisions are not required. However, the Raw Water Program is impacted by this evaluation. Assignments 2494904-04 and 2494904-05 have been created for the program manager to incorporate any changes into the Raw Water Program.

Safety Classification:

This evaluation is associated with safety-related equipment and therefore the evaluation is classified as safety-related. This technical evaluation will be submitted to Records Management for retention.

REASON FOR EVALUATION/SCOPE:

An Emergency Service Water (ESW) piping leak was discovered in the Unit 2 Reactor Building Sump room. The leak is directly below the Unit 2 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) room floor, upstream of M0-2-33-2972 which is located in the RBCCW room. The leakage was approximately 30 DPM at the time of discovery.

The presence of this leak warrants an evaluation in accordance with ASME Code Case N-513-3 (Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping, Mandatory Appendix I) in order to allow the associated piping to remain operable until a permanent A S M E S e c t i o n X I C o d e repair can be completed.

DETAILED EVALUATION; Engineering has performed an analysis of the degraded areas in accordance with ASME Code Case N-513-3. This piping is 12-inch diameter, 0.375 inch wall thickness carbon steelpiping,A-106grade Bas shown in Peach Bottom specification M-300 (Piping Materials) and P&ID M-315, sheets 4 and 5 for 33HB class pipe. The design pressure is 150 psig and the design temperature is 100°F. As shown on attached pages 13 and 14, the areas found to be less than the minimum wall thickness value of 0.063 inch are approximately 0. 7 5 inch in the axial and circumferential directions.

TE 2494904-03 B ESW Pin Hole Leak Page 2 of 3 In accordance with CC N-513-3, the pipe circumference at the location of the flaw was examined volumetrically to characterize the length and depth of all flaws in the pipe section. The results of the circumferential examination show that there are no other flaws in the area that are below the minimum wall thickness and need to be considered in this evaluation. Additionally, shear wave UT performed around the area of the flaw verified that there are no crack-like indications present. See the completion remarks for work-order activity C0257348-06 for documentation of this result.

Forces, moments, and stresses for the subject piping were extracted from reference 5 between node points 201 and 206. They are shown on pages 9 to 12 of the attachment.

The approach to the evaluation methodology included in CC N-513-3 is to compute a static fracture toughness factor, Klc for the circumferential and axial flaw evaluations.

For this evaluation, as shown on attached page 2, the value of Klc is 37.111 ksi*in0.5. The evaluation then computes the stress intensification factors, Kl for the circumferential and axial flaws for the various design modes (normal/upset and emergency/faulted) and then compares them to the previously calculated value for Klc. If Kl is less than or equal to Klc then the acceptability of the through wall flaw is demonstrated. The following is a summary of the results of the attached CC N-513-3evaluation.

Klc = 37.111 ksi*ino.5 Kl Circ. Normal/Upset= 5.036ksi*ino.5 < 37.111 ksi*ino.5, therefore acceptable.

Kl Circ. Erner. /Fault= 4.426 ksi*in0.5 < 37.111 ksi*in°* 5, therefore acceptable.

Kl Axial= 7.643ksi*ino.5 < 37.111 ksi*in°.5, therefore acceptable.

For simplification, the maximum safety factor of 2. 7 for Normal/Upset was used in the computation of a 11 Kl Axial, and the maximum safety factors for either the membrane or bending stress was used for the Ki Circ. Normal/Upset and Erner. /Faulted computations.

Additionally the subject location was evaluated for the effect of thin wall on the normal piping stress and compared to the established design allowable stress for the piping. In this comparison, the allowable stress of 17, 100 psi for the piping material (A-106, Grade B) was used. The results of this portion of the analysis, shown on attached pages 5 through 7, demonstrate that a uniform pipe wall thickness of 0.063 inch is acceptable to provide adequate structural integrity for the design basis loadings.

CONCLUSIONS/FINDINGS:

This evaluation of the discovered min-wall area indicates that the size of the flaw and the surrounding wall thickness is acceptable for continued operation of the associated ESW system piping within the requirements of ASME Code Case N-513-3.

REFERENCES:

'*

TE 2494904-03 B ESW Pin Hole Leak Page 3 of 3

1. ASME Code Case N-513-3, Evaluation Criteria for Temporary Acceptance of Flaws in Moderate Energy Class 2 or 3 Piping

2. ASME B31.1,Power Piping, 1967

3. ASME Section XI, Rules for In-Service Inspection of Nuclear Power Plant Components, 2001 Edition plus addenda through and including 2003

4. Crane Technical Paper 410, Flow of Fluids

5. PBAPS Calculation 33-32, rev. lB, Pipe Stress Analysis - ESW System Unit 2 RBCCW Room

6. Technical Evaluation Al 998930-01, Request Min Wall

7. PBAPS Specification M-300, Piping Materials, Instrument Piping Standards & Valve Classifications

8. P&ID M-315, sh. 4 & 5, Emergency Service Water And High Pressure Service Water Systems ATIACHMENfS:

Pages 1-8: ASME Code Case N-513-3Evaluation Pages 9-12: Excerpts from calculation 33-32 Pages 13-14: NDE Report Page 15: Cale 33-32 page 19, Stress ISO Prepared By: Ken Hudson /Atf 05/05/2015 Reviewed By: Doug Lord Ck:J.6L- 05/05/2015 Reviewer Comments:

Performed independent review of this technical evaluation and concur that the piping system remains acceptable for continued operation with the identified flaw.

r" Approved By: Jeff Chizever, Manager PEDM 05/06/2015

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment I of 1..5 Planar Flaw Evaluation in ferritic l!iJ!ini: IAW Code Case N-513-3 PBAPS ESW Min Wall "B" ESW (IR 2494904-03}

Definitions:

Flaw depth a= 0.312 in Pipe wall thickness t= 0.375 in Maximum assumed circumferential flaw length: l= 0.750 in Pipe outside diameter: D= 12.75 in Mean pipe radius: R-.!Cl

- 2 R= 6.19 in 4

Piping bending moment of inertia: I= 1t[D -(D-2t}4J I= 279.34 in"4 64 Flaw half-angle per Figure l, N-513: 0=....L 0= 0.061 rad 2*R Unit definition for kips: 1 kip = 1000 lbf Unit definition for psi: 1 ksi = 1000 psi PiJ!ini: Loads <Moments Increased hI 25% for Uncertainties}:

Maximum operating pressure: OP= 150.00 psi Maximum operating pressure axial force: P0 p = n(.Jf-t)2 *OP Pop= 16964.60 lbs Axial load on pipe for Normal/Upset condition forces: Pnu= 109.00 lbs Axial load on pipe for Emergency/Faulted condition forces: Pnf= 261.60 lbs Total axial load on pipe, including pressure from piping analysis for normal/upset condition forces: Pn = Pop+Pnu Pn= 17073.60 lbs Total axial load on pipe, including pressure from piping analysis for emergency/faulted condition forces: Pr= Pop+Pnr Pf= 17226.20 lbs Applied bending moment on the pipe from piping analysis Mn= 2206.25 ft-lbf for normal/upset condition (SRSS(MA, MB, MC) for WfOl +SEISOB)

Applied bending moment on the pipe from piping analysis Mf= 4328.02 ft-lbf for emergency/faulted condition (SRSS(MA, MB, MC) for WfOl +SEISSS)

Pipe thermal expansion stress from piping analysis: Pe= 0.000 ksi

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment

_z__of~

Circumferential Flaw Evaluation Usina: N-513 Pil!ini: Material Prol!erties (Ref. ASME B31.1}:

Young's Modulus: E= 27850 ksi Poisson's Ratio: µ= 0.30 E'= (FJ(l-µ2) E'= 30604.40 ksi Material Prol!erties for Flaws l!er H-4000:

2 From ASME XI C-8322 11c = 45 in*lbf/in Allowable Fracture Toughness, Klc: Kie= 37.111 ksi*in°.s Klc = ((J1c

• E') I (1000 lbflkip))o.s N-513 Al!l!endix I Circumferential Flaw eguations:

Accurate between 5 and 20. Conservative over 20. Rlt= 16.500 Acceptable 2 3 Am= -2.02917 + 1.67763*(R/t) - 0.07987*(R/t) + 0.00176*(R/t)

Am= 11.81 2 3 Bm = 7.09987 - 4.42394*(R/t) + 0.21036*(R/t) - 0.00463*(R/t)

Bm= -29.42 2 3 Cm= 7.79661+5.16676*(R/t) - 0.24577*(R/t) + 0.00541 *(R/t)

Cm= 50.44 Fm= 1.0 + Am*(9ht) 1.s + Bm*(9ht)2.s + Cm*(9hr) 3.s Fm= 1.03 2 3 Ab= -3.26543 + 1.52784*(R/t) - 0.072698*(R/t) + 0.001601 l *(R/t)

Ab= 9.34 2 3 Bb = 11.36322 - 3.91412*(R/t) + 0.18619*(R/t} - 0.004099*(R/t)

Bb= -20.94 2 3 Cb= -3.18609 + 3.84763*(R/t} - 0.18304*(R/t) + 0.00403*(R/t)

Cb= 28.57 1 2 3 Fb = 1.0 + Ab*(9ht) .s + Bb*(9ht} .s + Cb*(9ht} .s Fb= 1.02

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment

~of~

A1mlied Stress Intensitt Factor2 Kl2 for Circumferential Flaw:

N-513 Aooendix I requires that the flaw depth in the H-7300 stress intensity equations be changed to the flaw half-length, c:

Maximum assumed circumferential flaw length: l= 0.75 in Flaw half-length, c = 1/2: c= 0.38 in Note: Units are converted automatically.

Normal/Uuset Condition:

I K Im= ( 2. 7

• Pn ) *K*C 2*K*R*t

( rs . Fm Kim= 3.536 ks'1-ln

. o.s I I K1b= (2.3*Mn

!!*R *t 2 +~. ) (K*C *Fb rs K1b=

. o.s 1.501 ks'1-ln I

K1 =Kim +Kib K1= 5.036 ksi-inU..:J Therefore, K1< Kie: Acceptable Emeri,:encIIFaulted Condition:

K 1m = ( 1.B*P1 ) * ( K*C )°'* *Fm Kim= 2.378 ks'1-ln

. 0.5 2*K*R*t I I I K lb = ( 1.6

• M 2 1

+ Pe ) . ( 1! . c ) . Fb ks'1-lD

. 0.5

!!* R *t Kib = 2.048 I

ks'1-m. 0.5 K1 =Kim +Kib K1= 4.426 Therefore, K1< Kie: Acceptable

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment A_of~

Axial Throui:;h-walll Flaw Evaluation Using N-513 Stress Intensitt Factor3 Kl2 for an axial flaw subject to the boundini:; condition:

Axial flaw length: l= 0.75 in Flaw half-length, c = V2: c= 0.375 in Maximum operating pressure: OP= 150 psi Safety Factor for norrnaVupset conditions from C-2622: SF= 2.7 N-513 Aooendix I assigned flaw shape parameter for a throu2h-wall flaw: Q= 1.00 A.= c/(R*t) 05 A.= 0.246 Therefore, O<l.<5: Acceptable Note: Units are converted automatically F = 1.0 + 0.072449*A. + 0.64856*A.2 - 0.2327*A.3 + 0.038154*A.4 - 0.0023487*A.s-(r F= 1.054 K =SF* OP*R. 7t*c *F K1= 7.643 ks'1-lll

. o.s I t Q Therefore, K1< Kie: Acceptable END OF ASME CODE CASE N-513-3 EVALUATION

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment

~of_l2_

Code Minimum Wall Rec uirement Based on ASME ill ND-3640:

Joint efficiency factor: E= 1.00 Corrosion allowance used: A= 0.00 in Maximum allowable stress for pipe material from Section II, Part D: S= 17.10 ksi y= 0.40 Design Pressure: PD= 150 psi Minimum ASME pipe wall thickness required, not including any corrosion allowance.

I I PD*D t = +A tm = 0.056 in m 2* (S*E+PD* y)

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment

~ofJ_.5_

Minimum Wall Thickness Evaluation@ 0.063 inch Thickness Outside diameter of pipe: D= 12.75 in As analyzed pipe wall thickness: t= 0.375 in Allowable pipe wall thickness - Code minimum: t1 = 0.063 in (Use trial and error until satisfying modified stresses below)

Design inside pipe diameter: d=D-2*t d= 12.00 in New inside pipe diameter: dl = D-2*tl dl = 12.624 in As analyzed Section Modulus: Z=0.()1)82 D4_;d4 Z= 43.829 in3 4 d 4 New Section Modulus: Zl = 0.@82 D - l Zl= 7.927 in3 D

Design Pressure: Pd= 150 lpsig Maximum Pressure: Pm= 150 psig ME101 Ou out Stress Summarv - Innut from Calculation 33-32. Revision lB:

Design Pressure Stress: SPd= 1164 psi Maximum Pressure Stress: SPm= 1164 psi Equation 11 Stress: Eqn 11 = 1336 psi Equation 12B Stress: Eqn 12B = 1751 psi Equation 12C Stress: Eqn 12C = 0 psi Equation 120 Stress: Eqn 12D= 2262 psi Equation 13 Stress: Eqn 13 = 0 psi Equation 14 Stress: Eqn 14= 1336 psi

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment 1_ofJ5_

ME101 Modified Stresses Allowable Stress Equation 11 Stress = (F.qn 11-SPd )*-+Pd*Wti}-

Z D _ 8540 psi 17,100 Zl 4*tl Equation 128 Stress =(Eqn 12B-SPrn)* ii +Pm* {4~t1) = 10835 psi 20520 Equation 12C Stress= (Eqn 12C-SPrn)* ii+ Pm* (4~t1) = NIA psi NIA Equation 12D Stress :(Eqn 12D-SPrn)* i +Pm*~=

1 4 t1 13660 psi 41040

Technbical Evaluation 2494904-03 Attachment

_K__ofl5___

Evaluation Ingot Data From Calculation 33-32 Rev 1B1 Node Points 201-206 Fa Fb Fe Ma Mb Mc Mr PSis Weight 848 255 56 70 346 424 551.72 Thermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 OBE 109 210 227 672 693 735 1213.28 SSE 261 505 546 1613 1662 1763 2910.70 s Allows Pressures 1164 Equ.11 s 1336 17,100 Equ.12bs 1751 20,520 Equ.12ds 2262 41,040 Equ.13s NIA

33-32 WTOl STRESSES AND LOCAL FORCES AND MOMENTS ME101/N9 EXELON/824 (PM1107) 05/25/12 PM1107 PAGE 67/

ELEMENT TYPE/TITLE LOCAL FORCES (LB) LOCAL MOMENTS (FT-LB) STRESS (PSI STRESS FLEX. FLEX. CODE FROM .75IM/Z INT . FAC. IN OUT AND TO FA FB FC MA MB MC (I) PLANE PLANE CLASS 198 TNGT -1055 -56 -56 70 459 -539 189. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 201 ~~~~ @) 56 @._ ..@:> ~ .~if,i . 14 7. ,: 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 201 TNGT ... ~ -848 -56 -56 .. ~; 7~ *.* 346 -424 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 206 B r . .-:"~-*: j=--~~~... ~ 424 56 ..,2&_ ~1~-~. -70 ..{* -115 --- - _._ . 1.000 1.000 1.000 206 B BEND *:t_ ,..!:p i.~** ..,,.-1:r

." -424 56 i::;- 56 -115 190 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 206 M \~*** ~=' 175 -~ 55 -56 2.862 9 . 359 9.359

..

-* ~

206 M BEND \5; *. * *~,_ -175 56 -7 > -72 -21 43. 2.862 9 . 359 9.359 B31S73 206 E '-~-~-~ ~,4: ~ -56 -56 *t*:_;1i* . 31 -. -13 301 ... . . 173. ' 2.862 . 9.359 9.359, 206 E TNGT *:-,.~ 56 -184 -31 ' . ~ 301 .,~. _80. ' I l '. 000 - 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 207 -56 -402 31 333 326 124. 1.000 1.000 1.000 207 TNGT 402 -56 -56 -333 31 -326 181. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 208 -484 56 56 333 81 212 156. 1.000 1.000 1.000 '2!

171 TNGT -2459 -69 -72 90 -44 121 68. 2.172 1.000 1. 000 B31S73 g 209 2807 69 72 -90 290 -358 125. 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 209 211 211 216 B 216 B TNGT TNGT BEND

-2807 3137

-4054 4139 4

-72 72

-53 53 42

-69

-42 69 42 53 90

-90 330

-330 330 358

-582 883

-918

-560 290

-523

-605 560

-918 125.

341.

486.

299.

643 .

1. 000 2 . 172 2.172

1. 000 2.862 1.000 1.000

1. 000

1. 000 9 . 359

1. 000 B31S73

1. 000

1. 000 B31S73 1.000 9.359 B31S73 t(')

0 216 M 53 -112 -53 139 573 995 661. 2.862 9.359 9.359 iCD 216 M 216 E BEND -53

-42 112

-236 -53 53 -139 480

-573 250

-995 1204 661.

754.

2.862 2.862 9.359 9.359 9.359 B31S73 9.359 a

216 E TNGT 42 -236 -53 -480 250 1204 351. 1.000 1. 000 1.000 B31S73 221 -42 253 53 480 - 241 -1245 459. 1.696 1.000 1.000 221 TNGT 42 -253 -53 -480 241 1245 459. 1 . 696 1.000 1. 000 B31S73 223 -42 338 53 480 -197 -1491 420. 1.000 1.000 1.000 223 TNGT 42 602 -53 -480 197 1491 420. 1.000 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 226 -42 -449 53 480 -117 -704 229. 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 226 TNGT 42 449 -98 -480 117 704 229. 1.000 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 231 B -42 -137 98 480 183 193 146. 1.000 1. 000 1.000 231 B BEND 42 -27 166 -480 266 7 313. 2.862 9 . 359 9.359 B31S73 231 M -70 - 11 -81 91 - 656 -12 378. 2.862 9.359 9.359 231 M BEND 70 11 Bl -91 656 12 378. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 231 E -142 42 4 -423 -567 - 18 404. 2 . 862 9.359 9.359 Attachment to:

Page q of t?

33-32 SEISDE STRESSES AND LOCAL FORCES AND MOMENTS ME101/N9 EXELON/824 (PM1107) 05/25/12 PM1107 PAGE 349/

ELEMENT TYPE/TITLE LOCAL FORCES (LB) LOCAL MOMENTS (FT-LB) STRESS (PSI STRESS FLEX. FLEX. CODE FROM INT . FAC. IN OUT AND TO FA FB FC MA MB MC (I) PLANE PLANE CLASS

.:

198 TNGT 109 168 104 469 841 1073 384. 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 B31S73 201  :~::~\* . ~- 1.§8 __.._....:_ 1_04 +* y - --- ~ ~ .___@~ . ~*;;; ~~6-'-- 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 201 TNGT . . . . ti *,..\.,

• ~ 1' 108 @]) 1.000 B31S73

'206 B ___,,. l!'_. ~L"'~~. SL ~ 94 1.000 206 B BEND *~ <,.; 56 '* *, 98 427 122 402. ~ 2.862 9 . 359 9.359 B31S73 206 M_ _ _ __ .~.

~~~~:'<>****~

' ~ J . - t***

., 109 .. , 31 ......._;;,; ~-,,__, 284 194 ,431. ,J. 2.862 K" 9.359 9 , 359 206 M BEND 109 31 184 ... -' 67;2 284 431. 2 . 862 9.359 9 . 359 B31S73

__?06 E 98 56 ....... . 184

• 607 .~, 356 414. 2.862 9.359 9.359 206 E TNGT ~ < 5lL _ t?-f);'I_ ".:\' 607 - 356 176 i\ 193. 1.000 ,. 1 . 000 1.000 B31S73

~--'-

~

207 99 58 607 1190 158 358. 1 . 000 1 . 000 1.000 207 TNGT 58 99 231 1190 607 158 522. 1. 000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 208 58 99 231 1190 982 48 599. 1. 000 1.000 1.000 171 TNGT 508 155 165 541 781 581 483. 2.172 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 209 508 155 165 541 1135 318 345. 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 209 TNGT 508 151 140 541 318 1135 345. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 z0 211 508 151 140 541 600 1433 713. 2.172 1 . 000 1 . 000  ::s 211 TNGT 534 466 138 922 481 1045 639. 2.172 1 . 000 1.000 B31S73

'fn 216 B 216 B 216 M BEND 534 237 231 466 120 135 138 492 492 922 922 565 468 667 572 667 468 474 327.

703.

533.

1.000 2.862 2.862 1.000 9.359 9 . 359 1.000 9.359 B31S73 9.359

.

0 c.

216 M BEND 231 135 492 565 572 474 533. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 0

216 E 120 237 492 236 554 560 470. 2.862 9.359 9.359 0

216 E TNGT i 221 105 105 242 242 500 500 236 236 554 553 560 579 219.

282.

1 . 000 1 . 696 1 . 000 1.000 1 . 000 B31S73 1.000 a 221 TNGT 100 244 504 236 553 579 282. 1.696 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 223 100 244 504 236 695 692 269 . 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 223 TNGT 89 167 508 236 695 692 269. 1. 000 1. 000 1.000 B31S73 226 89 167 508 236 1324 446 377. 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 226 TNGT 81 134 319 236 1324 446 377. 1.000 1. 000 1.000 B31S73 231 B 212 104 369 211 879 348 258. 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 231 B BEND 277 318 212 211 390 861 553. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 231 M 400 131 212 379 386 991 645. 2 . 862 9.359 9.359 231 M BEND 400 131 212 379 386 991 645. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 231 E 318 277 212 589 230 817 590. 2.862 9.359 9.359 Attachment to:

Page _.i......;10:::...___ of /5

33-32 SEISME STRESSES AND LOCAL FORCES AND MOMENTS ME101/N9 EXELON/024 (PM1107) 05/25/12 PM1107 PAGE 304/

ELEMENT TYPE/TITLE LOCAL FORCES (LB) LOCAL MOMENTS (FT-LB) STRESS (PSI STRESS FLEX. FLEX. CODE FROM INT. FAC. IN OUT AND TO FA FB FC MA MB MC (I) PLANE PLANE CLASS 190 TNGT 403 2019 2575 921. 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 B31S73

~, ~~:

• -- . ~ "T' *** ..

201 ... ...'.i,~:~'o.; ~ .403 . ~*. 711. 1. 000 1.000 1. 000

,,

201 TNGT 260 @. 254 1126 1662 1763 * ~'i.~* 711. 1. 000 1. 000 1. 000 B31S73 206 B 1~~ .227 352 1311 1026 293 ,~-.!}::. 450.

• 1.000 0 1.000 1.000' 206 B BEND 135 - 236 442

• 13i1 1026 *r ~293 ,  ;* 965. 2.062 9.359 9.359 B31S73

,...,. '1t:~ -~f .;.

2QLM 261 _._.._7~ .!52 __:;__..:,_~.. - 601 _ _:,4 ____'465 -:-~ ___10.3.5. _~~~ 2,_0_62 ~. 9 .-~59 __ ~ 9_.359.

206 M BEND 75 "' 442 ( ** 1613____ 601 *.*. 465  :{' ~ 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 -z:

206 E 135 . ., 442 . -.,,., . 145§ .:. 055  ;. 423 ,,.. 994. 2.062 9.359 . 9.359 0

s 206 207

~ TNG'!'.. -~ ~

' 139 139

---£

. @6

• 1456 1456 855 2855 L 423 379

-*" 463.

859.

' .1. 000 1.000

1. 000 1.000

1. 000 B31S73 1.000 '3

~

~

207 TNGT 139 230 554 2855 1456 379 1253. 1. 000 1.000 1. 000 B31S73 0 200 171 TNGT 139 1220 238 372 554 395 2855 1299 2357 1875 115 1395 1438.

1159.

1.000 2.172 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 an 209 1220 372 395 1299 2724 763 820. 1.000 1.000 1. 000 0 209 211 TNGT 1220 1220 362 362 337 337 1299 1299 763 1440 2724 3440 828.

1712.

1.000 2.172

1. 000

1. 000 1.000 B31S73 1.000 ~~

rf<

211 TNGT 1201 1110 330 2212 1155 2507 1533. 2.172 1.000 1.000 B31S73 216 B 1201 1118 330 2212 1122 1601 785. 1.000 1.000 1.000 216 B BEND 569 289 1180 2212 1601 1122 1686. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 216 M 553 323 1180 1355 1372 1137 1279. 2.862 9.359 9.359 216 M BEND 553 323 1180 1355 1372 1137 1279. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 216 E 209 569 1180 567 1329 1344 1127. 2.862 9.359 9.359 216 E TNGT 252 581 1201 567 1329 1344 525. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 221 252 581 1201 567 1326 1390 678. 1.696 1.000 1.000 221 TNGT 239 586 1209 567 1326 1390 678. 1.696 1.000 1.000 B31S73 223 239 506 1209 567 1669 1662 644. 1.000 1.000 1.000 223 TNGT 215 401 1219 567 1669 1662 644. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 226 215 401 1219 567 3178 1071 905. 1.000 1.000 1.000 226 TNGT 195 321 765 567 3178 1071 905. 1.000 1.000 1.000 B31S73 231 B 510 249 886 507 2110 835 619. 1.000 1.000 1.000 231 B BEND 665 762 509 507 935 2067 1328. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 231 M 961 315 509 900 927 2378 1547. 2.862 9.359 9.359 231 M BEND 961 315 509 900 927 2370 1547. 2.862 9.359 9.359 B31S73 231 E 762 665 509 1414 553 1961 1416. 2.862 9.359 9.359 Attachment to:

Page - of J5

33-32 ALL STRESS ANALYSIS ME101/N9 EXELON/824 (PM1107) 05/25/12 PM1107 PAGE 553 CODE B31S73 THERMAL NON-REPEATED SUSTAINED LOAD OCCASIONAL LOAD EXPANSION ANCHOR MOV ELEMENT LEVEL B LEVEL C LEVEL D FROM TYPE EQN 11 EQN 12 EQN 12 EQN 12 EQNS 13/14 EQN ***

TO TITLE PD/4T CALC ALLOW PD/4T CALC ALLOW CALC ALLOW CALC ALLOW CALC ALLOW CALC ALLOW PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI PSI 141 BEND 776 1115 15000 776 2453 18000 0 0 4327 36000 0 0 0 0 151 M 1039 15000 2619 18000 0 0 4831 36000 0 0 0 0 151 M BEND 776 1039 15000 776 2619 18000 0 0 4831 36000 0 0 0 0 156 922 15000 2725 18000 0 0 5248 36000 0 0 0 0 156 TNGT 335 382 15000 335 962 18000 0 0 1775 36000 0 0 0 0 161 CHK-2-33-513 529 15000 1257 18000 0 0 2276 36000 0 0 0 0 161 TNGT 776 1132 15000 776 2463 18000 0 0 4325 36000 0 0 0 0 171 1599 15000 3503 18000 0 0 6169 36000 0 0 0 0 171 TNGT 1164 1432 15000 1164 2115 18000 0 0 3071 36000 0 0 0 0 176 1317 15000 1737 18000 0 0 2326 36000 0 0 0 0 176 TNGT 527 609 15000 527 832 18000 0 0 1145 36000 0 0 0 0 z 181 604 15000 822 18000 0 0 1128 36000 0 0 0 0 0

s 181 CMPT 0 0 15000 0 0 18000 0 0 0 36000

~

0 0 0 0 186 M0-2972 0 15000 0 18000 0 0 0 36000 0 0 0 0 n

181 191 TNGT 527 641 632 15000 15000 527 863 843 18000 18000 0

0 0

0 1175 1138 36000 36000 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 0..,

a.

191 198 TNGT 1164 1360 1353 15000 15000 1164 1757 1736 18000 18000 0

0 0

0 2313 2274 36000 36000 0

0 0

0 0

0 0

0 n0

~

198 TNGT 1164 1353 15000 1164 20 +/-_. _

'"J*

18000 0 0 2274 36000 0 0 0 0 S'

201 TNGT

~~

~.}-

. ..ll.il

_ 1311 1311 15000 1164 1607 10000 r o 0 2021 36000

• 0  :;i 0 0 ~- 0 a

~O ~, j_

-~

20 L!!_ -- ..!-!!.! 1226 15000 ~ 1413 . 18000 ~ ~ '. _o 1675 36000 0 .Jc .0 ,._ 0 206 B BEND *.,, 1164 1297 15000 1164 1699 18000 0 *~ 0 ~ 36000 ,**. -0 1"1 0 ~ 0 0 206 M 1207 15000 1638 1-8000 0 ~.Q ... ,. 2241. , 360,00 - 0 ,,.; 0. 0 I. 01 206 M BEND ,,,;i-* ,,, 1164 1207 15000 1164 1638 18000 0 0 2241 3 6000 0 0 0 0 206 E ._,_..._ ~ 15000 . 175L 18000 0 0 2331 .. 36000 0 0 0 0 206 E TNGT

" ..-;

~164

- .1244 ~ f

.. 15000 __1164 1437 18000 . 0 L 0 1707. 36000 . 0, .,) Q Q .IJ. o, 207 1288 15000 1646 18000 0 0 2147 36000 0 0 0 0 207 TNGT 993 1174 15000 993 1696 18000 0 0 2427 36000 0 0 0 0 208 1150 15000 1749 18000 0 0 2587 36000 0 0 0 0

• EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE IN EQUATION 13, EQUATION 14 USED Attachment to:

• • EXCEEDED ALLOWABLE Page j2 of JS

TE 2494904-03 RAW WATER CORROSION Attachment

~ ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION REPORT FORM Page 13 of 15 NOE SUPPORT GROUP

- ExelonGeneration.

WORK ORDER # C0257348-06 STATION I UNIT PBAPS UNIT2 EXAM AREA WELD STRAIGHT MEASUREMENT / RESULTS EXAM LOCATION ID# IS0-2-33-17 ( X-ONE) [ l [ xl PIPE NOMINAL WALL .375" EXAM POSITION HORIZ VERT Grid BANDA BAND B BANDC PIPE MINIMUM WALL ( X-ONE) "

.

.063" [ X] 0.268 0.3S3 0.270 12"

.

PIPE DIA. ROOM Sump Room 2 0.327 0.307 0.264 INSTRUMENT: Mfgr: Ol~m~us Model: 38DL Plus Serial : 140875705 3 0.249 0.276 0.206 SPECIAL GRIDING: NIA 4 0.247 " 0.136 0.180 SEARCH UNIT: Mfgr: Panametrics S/N: 810220 Make: 0799 s 0.27S II 0.10S *0.034 Size : .434" Frequency: 5 Mhz 6 0.168 " 0.2S4 0.289 0.248

.

Couplant: Humex I 04165 Reference Block: 0002812581 7 0.2S6 " 0.300 CALIBRATION TIMES: Initial: 10:30 Final: 14:30 Other: N/A 8 0.288 0.1S1 0.2SS THERMOMETER: 0002834215 Due 6/5/ 15 CAL TEMP 80° COMP TEMP 70° 9 0.303 " 0.266 0.124

" 0.248

.

DRAWING ( If Applicable ) 10 0.280 0.300 IS0-2-33-17 Leak Uestream of M0-2972 11 0.294 0.24S 0.297 12 0.30S " 0.24S 0.273

• A thru wall leak was identified on IS0-2-33-17 upstream of M0-2972.

Mapping was performed as per ASME Code Case N-S13-3. Although the low in CS is a thru wall leak, the lowest recordable reading of the leak was found to be .034" for continuous monitoring purposes .

See Attached Page For ISO Bar.

COMMENTS:

Grid location CS was identified as below En ineerin Min. Wall criteria. See attached lso bar.

Material : A-106 GR. B Carbon Steel. Calibration Examination Perormed in Accordance with ER-AA-33S-004 REV . 7 Actual Meas.

Reference Min Wall Acee lance Criteria er A 1998930-E01

.500" .500"

.300" .300" James Martin / Ill 5/4/ 15 n/a n/a .200" .200" NA DATE NAME I LEVEL DATE .100" .100" Page 1 of 2

TE 2494904-03 Attachment

- Exelon Generation . ULTRASONIC EXAMINATION PHOTO SHEET Page 14 of 15 NOE SUPPORT GROUP IS0-2-33-17 Leak Upstream of M0-2972 Engineering Minimum Wall Thickness= .063'

.750" l

AXIAL

.750" Lm(a)= .750" Lm(c)= .750" Isobar out .328" 5.30" 4.60" COMMENTS: Area below Engineering Minimum Wall Thickness is .750" rounded, with the area below .328" approximately 4.6" x 5.30" .

5/4/15 n/a n/a DATE NAME / LEVEL DATE Page 2 of 2

.... .................................... _...

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'-t S" lb TE 2494904-03 Attachment Page 15of15

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• SER'llCf WATER :

(!Ne A/PJO\*---

, .J I - '-"' \V I -1~"' k5" I -- IJIJSo----- ~911 l..v.I I

3

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Planar Flaw Evaluation in ferritic l!il!ing IA W Code Case N-513-3 PBAPS ESW Min Wall "B" ESW (IR 2494904-03}

Definitions:

Flaw depth a= 0.312 in Pipe wall thickness t= 0.375 in Maximum assumed circumferential flaw length: I= l.500 in Pipe outside diameter: D= 12.75 in Mean pipe radius: R= D-t R= 6.19 in 2

Piping bending moment of inertia: I= 4

!t[D -(D-2t)4J I= 279.34 inA4 64 Flaw half-angle per Figure I, N-513: 8= 2*R 0= 0.121 rad Unit definition for kips: l kip= 1000 lbf Unit definition for psi: l ksi = 1000 psi Pil!ing Loads (Moments Increased b:y: 25% for Uncertainties}:

Maximum operating pressure: OP= 150.00 psi Maximum operating pressure axial force: Pop =1t(.lf-t}2 *OP Pop= 16964.60 lbs Axial load on pipe for Normal/Upset condition forces: Pnu= 109.00 lbs Axial load on pipe for Emergency/Faulted condition forces: Pnf= 261.60 lbs Total axial load on pipe, including pressure from piping analysis for normal/upset condition forces: Pn = Pop+Pnu Pn= 17073.60 lbs Total axial load on pipe, including pressure from piping analysis for emergency/faulted condition forces: Pr= Pop+Pnr Pf= 17226.20 lbs Applied bending moment on the pipe from piping analysis Mn= 2206.25 ft-I bf for normal/upset condition (SRSS(MA, MB, MC) for WTOl+SEISOB)

Applied bending moment on the pipe from piping analysis Mf= 4328.02 ft-I bf for emergency/faulted condition (SRSS(MA, MB, MC) for WTOI +SEISSS)

Pipe thermal expansion stress from piping analysis: Pe= 0.000 ksi Page 1 of _L

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Circumferential Flaw Evaluation Using N-513 Pil!ing Material ProJ!erties {Ref. ASME B31.1}:

Young's Modulus : E= 27850 ksi Poisson's Ratio: µ= 0.30 2

E'= (E/(1-µ ) E'= 30604.40 ksi Material ProJ!erties for Flaws J!er H-4000:

2 From ASME XI C-8322 11c = 45 in*Ibf/in 5

Allowable Fracture Toughness, Kic: K1c = 37.111 ksi*in°*

05 Kic = W1c

• E') I (1000 lbtlkip))

• N-513 Al!l!endix I Circumferential Flaw eguations:

Accurate between 5 and 20. Conservative over 20. Rlt= 16.500 Acceptable Am = -2.02917 + I .67763*(R/t) - 0.07987 *(R/t) + 0.00 I 76*(R/t) 2 3 Am= 11.81 Bm = 7.09987 - 4.42394*(R/t) + 0.21036*(R!t}" - 0.00463*(R!t)3 Bm= -29.42 Cm = 7 .79661 + 5. l 6676*(R/t) - 0.24577*(R/t) + 0.00541 *(R/t) 2 3 Cm= 50.44 Fm = 1.0 + Am*(8!7t/ 5 + Bm*(8/7t) 2.s + Cm*(8/7t) 3 *5 Fm= 1.08 Ab = -3.26543 + l .52784*(R/t) - 0.072698*(R/t) + 0.0016011 *(R/t) 3 2

Ab= 9.34 Bb = 11.36322 - 3.91412*(R/t) + 0. 18619*(R!t}2 - 0.004099*(R/t) 3 Bb= -20.94 Cb= -3.18609 + 3.84763*(R/t) - 0. 18304*(R/t) + 0.00403*(R/t) 2 3 Cb= 28 .57 Fb = 1.0 + Ab*(8/7t) 1.5 + Bb*(817t)2'5 + Cb*(8/7t) 3*

5 Fb= 1.07 Page 2 of_!_

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation A1mlied Stress Intensity Factor, KI, for Circumferential Flaw:

N-513 Appendix I requires that the flaw depth in the H-7300 stress intensity equations be changed to the flaw half-length, c:

Maximum assumed circumferential flaw length: I= 1.50 in Flaw half-length, c = 1/2: c= 0.75 in Note: Units are converted automatically.

Normal/U(!set Condition:

I Kim = ( 2.7. P,, } (lr. c )o.s . Fiii 5

Krm= 5.249 ksi-in° 2

• Jr*R

• t I I K lb = (2.3*M,,2 + p) (

e

• J[

• C

)°"5

• F b Krb= 2.207 ksi-in°s Jr*R *t I

Kr= Kim +K1b K1= 7.456 ksi-inu*'

Therefore, K1< Klc: Acceptable Emergency/Faulted Condition:

Kim= ( 1.8 pf ) . (Jr* c )°' . F111 5

Kim= 3.531 ksi-in°*

2*Jr*R*t I I I K lb = ( 1.6

• M ., 1 + Pe ) . ( Jr . c ) . Fb 5 Jr*R-*t K1b= 3.012 ksi-in° I

kSI-In

.. 0.5 K1 = Krm +K1b K1= 6.543 Therefore, K1< Klc: Acceptable Page 3 of _1__

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Axial Through-walll Flaw Evaluation Using N-513 Stress Intensity Factor, KI, for an axial flaw subject to the bounding condition:

Axial flaw length: l= 1.50 in Flaw half-length, c = 1/2: C= 0.75 in Maximum operating pressure: OP= 150 psi Safety Factor for normal/upset conditions from C-2622: SF= 2.7 N-513 Appendix I assigned flaw shape parameter for a through-wall flaw: Q= 1.00

/... = c/(R *t>° 5 'A.= 0.492 Therefore, O<'A.<5: Acceptable Note: Units are converted automatically F = 1.0 + 0.072449*1.. + 0.64856*/... 0.2327*1.. + 0.038154*1..

2 3 4 5

- - 0.0023487*/...

(r F= 1. 167 K =SF* OP*R. 7t*c *F k SI-In

.. 0.5 K,= 11.974 I t Q Therefore, K1 < Kie: Acceptable END OF ASME CODE CASE N-513-3 EVALUATION Page 4 of _j__

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Code Minimum Wall Reguirement Based on ASME Illi ND-3640:

Joint efficiency factor: E= 1.00 Corrosion allowance used: A= 0.00 m Maximum allowable stress for pipe material from Section II, Part D: S= 15.00 ksi y= 0.40 Design Pressure: PD= 150 psi Minimum ASME pipe wall thickness required, not including any corrosion allowance.

PD tm= 0.063 in t = (

111 ) +A 2* S*E+P*y Pages of_!___

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Minimum Wall Thickness Evaluation @ 0.063 inch Thickness Outside diameter of pipe: D= 12.75 in As analyzed pipe wall thickness: t= 0.375 in Allowable pipe wall thickness - Code minimum: ti= 0.063 in (Use trial and error until satisfying modified stresses below)

Design inside pipe diameter: d = D-2*t d= 12.00 in New inside pipe diameter: di =D-2*tl di= 12.624 in 4 4

• 3 As analyzed Section Modulus: Z=O 0982 D -d Z= 43.829 In

. D 4 d 4

• 3 New Section Modulus: Zl = 0 0982 D - l ZI= 7.927 In

. D Design Pressure: Pd= 150 psig Maximum Pressure: Pm= 150 psig ME101 Out11ut Stress Summary

• In11ut from Calculation 33-32 1 Revision lB:

Design Pressure Stress: SPd= 1164 psi Maximum Pressure Stress: SPm= 1164 psi Equation 11 Stress: Eqn 11 = 1336 psi Equation 128 Stress: IEqn 120 = 1751 psi Equation I 2C Stress: IEqn 12c = 0 psi Equation 12D Stress: Eqn 12D = 2262 psi Equation 13 Stress: Eqn 13 = 0 psi Equation 14 Stress: Eqn 14 = 1336 psi Page 6 of _j__

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation MElOl Modified Stresses Allowable Stress Equation 11 Stress = (Eqn 11-SPd)

• k+Pd * ~= 8540 psi 17,100 Zl 4

• tl Equation 128 Stress= (Eqn 12B-SPm)* ii+ Pm* ( 4 ~t1) = 10835 psi 20520 Equation 12C Stress =(Eqn 12C-SPm)

• k+Pm -~ = NIA psi NIA Zl 4

• tl Equation l2D Stress :(E.qn 120-SPm)*k+ Pm-~= 13660 psi 41040 Zl 4*tl Page 7 of ___!.___

ENCLOSURE 2 1.5 inch Through Wall Flaw Evaluation Evaluation In~ut Data From Calculation 33-32 Rev lB, Node Points 201-206 Fa Fb Fe Ma Mb Mc Mr PSls Weight 848 255 56 70 346 424 551.72 Thermal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00 OBE 109 210 227 672 693 735 1213.28 SSE 261 505 546 1613 1662 1763 2910.70 s Allows Pressures 1164 Equ.11 s 1336 17,100 Equ. 12b s 1751 20,520 Equ.12d s 2262 41,040 Equ.13 s NIA Prepared 8 y:

~ /kl~ Hudson OJ-23-201.5 Date Reviewed By: 1/ z.3/z.o 1.r Doug Lord Date Page 8 of _i__

Configuration of the tmin flaw at time of discovery. ..... ,. ~_ . ....... ..

... m z

0 r r-

.J 0

en l c:

a

• - -- I t m

~

J I

I J

I* ~

0.75" Assumed f5" configuration of the flaw in October 2016