Information Notice 1985-23, Inadequate Surveillance and Postmaintenance and Postmodification System Testing: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF INSPECTION | OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT | ||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23: INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE | |||
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION | |||
AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING | |||
AND POSTMODIFICATION | |||
SYSTEM TESTING | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
: | : | ||
All nuclear power reactor facilities | All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a | ||
holding an operating | |||
license (OL) or a | |||
permit (CP). | construction permit (CP). | ||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
: This information | : | ||
This information notice is to alert addressees of several instances pertaining | |||
to improper system modifications, inadequate postmodification system testing, and inadequate surveillance testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear | |||
power facility. | |||
It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this | |||
to | notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required. | ||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
: | |||
On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four | |||
of Circumstances: | |||
On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four | |||
Rosemont differential pressure transmitters that control the closing of four | |||
valves | isolation valves of the upper-head injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the | ||
original Barton reverse-acting differential pressure switches were replaced | |||
with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of | |||
1984). As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining | |||
of | of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set | ||
point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing | |||
was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference | |||
the | leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by | ||
the postmodification test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable. | |||
The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that | |||
supplies pressurized nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator into | |||
the | the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant | ||
accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI | |||
isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated; | |||
however, the UHI isolation valves would not have closed when the water in the | |||
8503210461 | |||
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted. As a result, nitrogen gas could have been | |||
the | injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA. | ||
Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi- cated that the peak cladding temperature of 2200'F most likely would have been | |||
exceeded and that the worst-case increase in containment pressure could have | |||
resulted in exceeding the design pressure by 2 psi. | |||
A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for | |||
closing the UHI isolation valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the | |||
use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for | |||
the | closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point | ||
occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer | |||
misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians. Because | |||
the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The | |||
calibration error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel | |||
were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving the | |||
incorrect installation of the differential pressure transmitters. The conse- quences of this event would be the early isolation of the UHI water accumulator | |||
LOCA, resulting | during a design-basis LOCA, resulting in less water being delivered to the | ||
in | vessel than assumed in the analysis. | ||
A completely unrelated event involved the inoperability of two of the four | |||
overpower delta temperature reactor protection channels at McGuire Unit 2. | |||
This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two | |||
affected channels responded contrary to that expected. This event was caused | |||
because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower | |||
delta temperature input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure | |||
that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing | |||
delta temperature | |||
system provides protection | |||
for decreasing | |||
temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance | temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance | ||
tests only verified that protection | tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for | ||
would be provided for increasing | |||
tempera-ture, but not for decreasing | |||
temperature. | |||
This defect was left undetected | |||
for | |||
an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant | |||
startup. Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate | |||
of the required | testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required | ||
jumpers. | |||
The above examples illustrate the need for thorough reviews and detailed | |||
and postmaintenance | attention to plant surveillance and postmaintenance and postmodification tests, to ensure that they accomplish the required verification of system function. | ||
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice; | |||
however, if you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the | |||
Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical | |||
contact listed below. | |||
Dieor | |||
Divis of Emergency Preparedness | |||
and 'ngineering Response | |||
Office of Inspection and Enforcement | |||
Technical Contacts: I. Villalva, IE | |||
(301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII | |||
(404) 221-5533 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices | |||
Attachment 1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
IE INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
Information Date of | |||
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to | |||
85-22 Failure Of Limitorque Motor- 3/21/85 All power reactor | |||
Operated Valves Resulting facilities holding | |||
From Incorrect Installation an OL or CP | |||
Of Pinon Gear | |||
85-21 Main Steam Isolation Valve 3/18/85 All PWR facilities | |||
Closure Logic holding an OL or CP | |||
Motor-Operated | 85-20 Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85 All power reactor | ||
Due To Hammering Effect facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
85-19 Alleged Falsification Of 3/11/85 All power reactor | |||
Certifications And Alteration facilities holding | |||
Of | Of Markings On Piping, Valves an OL or CP | ||
And Fittings | |||
Containment | 85-10 Posstensioned Containment 3/8/85 All power reactor | ||
Sup. 1 Tendon Anchor Head Failure facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
84-18 Failures Of Undervoltage 3/7/85 All Westinghouse | |||
Output Circuit Boards In The PWR facilities | |||
Westinghouse-Designed Solid holding an OL or CP | |||
State Protection System | |||
83-70 Vibration-Induced Valve 3/4/85 All power reactor | |||
Sup. 1 Failures facilities holding | |||
an OL or CP | |||
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 3/1/85 All power reactor | |||
holding | Solenoid Valves facilities holding | ||
an OL or CP | |||
85-16 Time/Current Trip Curve 2/27/85 All power reactor | |||
holding | Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens- facilities holding | ||
Allis Molded Case Circuit an OL or CP | |||
Breaker | |||
85-15 Nonconforming Structural 2/22/85 All power reactor | |||
holding | Steel For Safety-Related facilities holding | ||
Use an OL or CP | |||
License | OL = Operating License | ||
Permit}} | CP = Construction Permit}} | ||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} | ||
Revision as of 02:37, 24 November 2019
SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23: INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE
AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
construction permit (CP).
Purpose
This information notice is to alert addressees of several instances pertaining
to improper system modifications, inadequate postmodification system testing, and inadequate surveillance testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear
power facility.
It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this
notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four
Rosemont differential pressure transmitters that control the closing of four
isolation valves of the upper-head injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the
original Barton reverse-acting differential pressure switches were replaced
with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of
1984). As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining
of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set
point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing
was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference
leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by
the postmodification test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.
The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that
supplies pressurized nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator into
the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI
isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;
however, the UHI isolation valves would not have closed when the water in the
8503210461
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted. As a result, nitrogen gas could have been
injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.
Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi- cated that the peak cladding temperature of 2200'F most likely would have been
exceeded and that the worst-case increase in containment pressure could have
resulted in exceeding the design pressure by 2 psi.
A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for
closing the UHI isolation valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the
use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for
closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point
occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer
misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians. Because
the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The
calibration error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel
were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving the
incorrect installation of the differential pressure transmitters. The conse- quences of this event would be the early isolation of the UHI water accumulator
during a design-basis LOCA, resulting in less water being delivered to the
vessel than assumed in the analysis.
A completely unrelated event involved the inoperability of two of the four
overpower delta temperature reactor protection channels at McGuire Unit 2.
This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two
affected channels responded contrary to that expected. This event was caused
because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower
delta temperature input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure
that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing
temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance
tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for
an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant
startup. Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate
testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required
jumpers.
The above examples illustrate the need for thorough reviews and detailed
attention to plant surveillance and postmaintenance and postmodification tests, to ensure that they accomplish the required verification of system function.
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice;
however, if you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the
Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical
contact listed below.
Dieor
Divis of Emergency Preparedness
and 'ngineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: I. Villalva, IE
(301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII
(404) 221-5533 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
85-22 Failure Of Limitorque Motor- 3/21/85 All power reactor
Operated Valves Resulting facilities holding
From Incorrect Installation an OL or CP
Of Pinon Gear
85-21 Main Steam Isolation Valve 3/18/85 All PWR facilities
Closure Logic holding an OL or CP
85-20 Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85 All power reactor
Due To Hammering Effect facilities holding
85-19 Alleged Falsification Of 3/11/85 All power reactor
Certifications And Alteration facilities holding
Of Markings On Piping, Valves an OL or CP
And Fittings
85-10 Posstensioned Containment 3/8/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Tendon Anchor Head Failure facilities holding
84-18 Failures Of Undervoltage 3/7/85 All Westinghouse
Output Circuit Boards In The PWR facilities
Westinghouse-Designed Solid holding an OL or CP
State Protection System
83-70 Vibration-Induced Valve 3/4/85 All power reactor
Sup. 1 Failures facilities holding
85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 3/1/85 All power reactor
Solenoid Valves facilities holding
85-16 Time/Current Trip Curve 2/27/85 All power reactor
Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens- facilities holding
Allis Molded Case Circuit an OL or CP
Breaker
85-15 Nonconforming Structural 2/22/85 All power reactor
Steel For Safety-Related facilities holding
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit