ML053560119

IA-05-055, Order (Effective Immediately) Prohibiting Involvement in NRC-Licensed Activities (NRC Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08(DRS)) (NRC Investigation Report No. 3-2002-006)

ML053560119
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	01/04/2006
From:	Virgilio M NRC/EDO
To:	Goyal J - No Known Affiliation
Starkey D
Shared Package
ML053560084	List: ML053560119
References
3-2002-006, BL-01-001, IA-05-055, IR-02-008 IA-05-055
Download: ML053560119 (17)

See also: IR 05000346/2002008

Text

January 4, 2006

IA-05-055

Prasoon Goyal

[Home Address Deleted

Under 10 CFR 2.390(a)]

SUBJECT: ORDER (EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY) PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT IN

NRC-LICENSED ACTIVITIES (NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT

NO. 50-346/2002-08(DRS)) (NRC INVESTIGATION REPORT NO. 3-2002-006)

Dear Mr. Goyal:

The enclosed Order Prohibiting Involvement in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Licensed Activities (Order) is being issued because you engaged in deliberate misconduct as

defined in 10 CFR 50.5, Deliberate Misconduct, by deliberately providing incomplete and

inaccurate information. The incomplete and inaccurate information concerned the licensees

October 17, 2001, supplemental response to NRC Bulletin 2001-001, Circumferential Cracking

of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles.

The matter was investigated by the NRCs Office of Investigations (OI) and the results were

documented in OI Report No. 3-2002-006. The OI investigation results were provided to the

U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for its review.

The OI investigation report documented that you concurred in the licensees September 4,

2001, and October 17, 2001, responses to the Bulletin. Prior to the licensees issuance of its

September 4, 2001, response to Bulletin 2001-001, you expressed concerns to FENOC

management and staff regarding the completeness and accuracy of licensees response with

regard to the licensees past and future ability to conduct a complete inspection of the reactor

pressure vessel head due to equipment limitations and physical impediments. However, the OI

investigation did not find that you expressed concerns regarding the incomplete and inaccurate

characterization in the October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin with regard to

the 1996 reactor pressure vessel head inspection and cleaning, an effort that you conducted.

Your actions caused the licensee to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and

Accuracy of Information, and caused you to be in violation of 10 CFR 50.5. Therefore, we

determined an Order prohibiting your involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one

year was appropriate.

The enclosed Order prohibits your involvement in all NRC-licensed activities for a period of one

year effective immediately. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202 you must submit an answer to

this Order within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Your answer may request a

P. Goyal -2-

hearing. However, since this enforcement action is being proposed prior to the DOJ completing

its review of the OI investigation results, consideration may be given to extending your time to

answer the Order, when good cause is shown. The Order also requires you to immediately

cease your involvement in NRC-licensed activities, if you are involved with an NRC licensee on

the date of the Order, to provide a copy of the Order to the NRC licensee, and to inform the

NRC of the name, address, and telephone number of that licensee at that time. Additionally, for

a period of one year, after the one-year period of prohibition has expired, you are required,

within 20 days of your acceptance of your first employment offer involving NRC-licensed

activities or becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, to provide notice to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the

name, address, and telephone number of the employer or the entity where you are, or will be,

involved in the NRC-licensed activities.

Pursuant to Section 223 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, any person who

willfully violates, attempts to violate, or conspires to violate, any provision of this Order shall be

subject to criminal prosecution as set forth in that section. Violation of this Order may also

subject the person to civil monetary penalty.

A copy of this letter and its enclosure is being sent to FENOC, the operator of Davis-Besse.

Questions concerning this Order should be addressed to Michael R. Johnson, Director, Office

of Enforcement, who can be reached at (301) 415-2741.

This letter will be maintained by the Office of Enforcement in an NRC Privacy Act system of

records, NRC-3, Enforcement Actions Against Individuals. The NRC-3 system notice, which

provides detailed information about this system of records, can be accessed from our Web site

at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/foia/privacy-systems.html.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs document system (ADAMS), accessible from

the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your

response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so

that it can be made available to the public without redaction. If personal privacy or proprietary

information is necessary to provide an acceptable response, then please provide a bracketed

copy of your response that identifies the information that should be protected and a redacted

copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request withholding of such

material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that you seek to have

withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g., explain why the

disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy or provide the

information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for withholding confidential

commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is necessary to provide an

acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described in 10 CFR 73.21.

P. Goyal -3-

The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select

What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Martin J. Virgilio

Deputy Executive Director for Materials,

Research, State, and Compliance Programs

Office of the Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure: As Stated

cc w/encl: Gary Leidich, President, FENOC

P. Goyal -3-

The NRC also includes significant enforcement actions on its Web site at www.nrc.gov; select

What We Do, Enforcement, then Significant Enforcement Actions.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Martin J. Virgilio

Deputy Executive Director for Materials,

Research, State, and Compliance Programs

Office of the Executive Director for Operations

Enclosure: As Stated

cc w/encl: Gary Leidich, President, FENOC

ML053560119

OFC OE RIII:DRA OGC

NAME DStarkey GGrant LChandler (SBrock for)

DATE 12/21/05 12/15/05 12/20/05

OFC OE:DD OE:D DEDMRS

NAME JLuehman MJohnson MVirgilio

DATE 12/21/05 12/23/05 12/29/05

P. Goyal -4-

DISTRIBUTION:

ADAMS (PARS)

SECY

OCA

L. Reyes, EDO

W. Kane, DEDR

M. Johnson, OE

J. Luehman, OE

C. Nolan, OE

D. Starkey, OE

J. Caldwell, RIII

G. Grant, RIII

M. Satorius, RIII

S. West, RIII

L. Chandler, OGC

B. Jones, OGC

S. Brock, OGC

J. Dyer, NRR

D. Holody, Enforcement Coordinator, RI

C. Evans, Enforcement Coordinator, RII

K. OBrien, Enforcement Coordinator, RIII

K. Fuller, Enforcement Coordinator, RIV

F. Bonnett, Enforcement Coordinator, NRR

Resident Inspector

H. Bell, OIG

G. Caputo, OI

E. Brenner, OPA

J. Schlueter, OSTP

R. Paul, RIII:OI

J. Ulie, RIII:OI

M. Janicki, RIII:OI

J. Gavula, RIII

N. Hane, RIII:OI

C. Lipa, RIII

C. Weil, RIII

K. Lambert, RIII

M. Phillips, RIII

J. Strasma, RIII:PA

R. Lickus, RIII

J. Lynch, RIII

OEWEB

OEMAIL

OAC3

E:\Filenet\ML053560119.wpd

[7590-01-P]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

In the Matter of )

) IA-05-055

Prasoon Goyal )

)

ORDER PROHIBITING INVOLVEMENT IN

NRC-LICENSED ACTIVITIES

(EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY)

I

Mr. Prasoon Goyal was previously employed, at times relevant to this Order, as a Senior

Engineer at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Davis-Besse) operated by FirstEnergy

Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or licensee). The licensee holds License No. NPF-3

which was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to

10 CFR Part 50 on April 22, 1977. The license authorizes the operation of Davis-Besse in

accordance with the conditions specified therein. The facility is located on the licensee's site

near Oak Harbor, Ohio.

II

On August 3, 2001, the NRC issued Bulletin 2001-001, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor

Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles, (Bulletin). In the Bulletin, the NRC requested that

all holders of operating licenses for pressurized water nuclear power reactors (PWR), including

FENOC for the Davis-Besse facility, provide information to the NRC relating to the structural

integrity of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration nozzles at their respective

facilities. The information requested from the licensees included the extent of RPV head

-2-

penetration nozzle leakage and cracking that had been found to date, a description of the

inspections and repairs undertaken to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, and the basis

for concluding that a licensees plans for future inspections would ensure compliance with

applicable regulatory requirements. The NRC also required that all Bulletin addressees,

including FENOC, submit a written response to the NRC in accordance with the provisions of

10 CFR 50.54(f). That regulation provides, in part, that upon request of the NRC, an NRC-

licensee must submit written statements, signed under oath or affirmation, to enable the NRC to

determine whether the license should be modified, suspended, or revoked.

On September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, the licensee provided written responses to

the Bulletin. Additionally, the licensee met with the NRC staff on numerous occasions during

October and November of 2001 to provide clarifying information. Based, in part, on the

information provided by FENOC in its written responses to the Bulletin and during meetings with

the NRC staff, the NRC staff allowed the licensee to continue operation of the Davis-Besse

facility until February 2002, rather than requiring FENOC to shut the unit down to perform

inspections by December 31, 2001, as provided in the Bulletin.

On February 16, 2002, FENOC shut down Davis-Besse for refueling and inspection of control

rod drive mechanism (CRDM) RPV head penetration nozzles. Using ultrasonic testing, the

licensee found cracks in three CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles and on March 6, 2002, the

licensee discovered a cavity in the RPV head in the vicinity of CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3.

The cavity measured approximately 5 to 7 inches long, 4 to 5 inches wide, and penetrated

through the 6.63 inch-thick low-alloy steel portion of the RPV head, leaving the stainless steel

cladding material (measuring 0.202 to 0.314 inches-thick) as the sole reactor coolant system

-3-

(RCS) pressure boundary. A smaller cavity was also found near CRDM Penetration Nozzle

No. 2.

The licensee conducted a root cause evaluation and determined, contrary to the earlier

information provided to the NRC, that the cavities were caused by boric acid from the RCS

released through cracks in the CRDM RPV head penetration nozzles. The root cause

evaluation found that the licensee conducted limited cleaning and inspections of the RPV head

during the Twelfth Refueling Outage (12RFO) that ended on May 18, 2000. However, neither

the limited RPV head cleaning nor the resultant inspections during 12RFO were sufficient to

ensure that the significant boric acid deposits on the RPV head were only a result of CRDM

flange leakage, as supposed, and were not a result of RCS pressure boundary leakage.

On March 6 and March 10, 2002, the licensee provided information to the NRC concerning the

identification of a large cavity in the RPV head adjacent to CRDM Penetration Nozzle No. 3.

The NRC conducted an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) inspection at Davis-Besse from

March 12 to April 5, 2002, to determine the facts and circumstances related to the significant

degradation of the RPV head. The results of the AIT inspection were documented in NRC

Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-03, issued on May 3, 2002. A follow-up Special Inspection

was conducted from May 15 to August 9, 2002, and on October 2, 2002, the NRC issued the

AIT Follow-up Special Inspection Report No. 50-346/2002-08 documenting ten apparent

violations associated with the RPV head degradation.

On April 22, 2002, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) initiated an investigation at Davis-

Besse to determine, among other matters, whether FENOC and individual employees at the

Davis-Besse facility failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC in its

-4-

September 4, October 17, and October 30, 2001, responses to the Bulletin and during

numerous conference calls and meetings in violation of 10 CFR 50.9 and 10 CFR 50.5(a)(2).

The OI report (No. 3-2002-006) was issued on August 22, 2003. A copy of the OI report was

provided to the U. S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Office of the United States Attorney,

Northern District of Ohio for review. The matter remains under continued Federal investigation.

Mr. Goyal, through the performance of his engineering duties, through his direct involvement in

the licensees 1996 RPV head inspection and cleaning activities, and through oral and written

communications with other FENOC employees was aware of the results of previous RPV head

inspections.

• Mr. Goyal was the engineer responsible for performing the 1996 reactor head inspection

during the Tenth Refueling Outage (10RFO). During a sworn, transcribed interview with

OI, Mr. Goyal stated that he could not see the top of the RPV head during 10RFO due

to the limited access through the mouseholes and the accumulation of boric acid on the

RPV head.

• Mr. Goyal wrote Potential Condition Adverse to Quality Report (PCAQR) 96-0551

documenting that the accumulation of boric acid on the head and the size of the

mouseholes limited the extent of the inspection. Mr. Goyal documented in PCAQR

96-0551, in part:

Since the boric acid deposits are not cleaned it is difficult to distinguish

whether the deposits occurred because of the leaking flanges or the

leaking CRDM.

-5-

This PCAQR is the quality document which recorded the boric acid deposit

on the RV head. The deposits were discovered during the visual inspection

of the RV head performed through the mouseholes utilizing a video camera.

The extent of the inspection was limited to approximately 50 to 60% of the

head areas because of the restrictions imposed by the location and sized of

mouseholes. The inspection showed varying sizes of boric acid mounds

scattered in various areas of head. It is extremely difficult to develop an

estimate of the amount of boric acid deposit because of the deposit scatter

and limited inspection.

• Mr. Goyal authored a White paper, distributed to other Davis-Besse staff on

May 8, 1996, that discussed control rod drive nozzle cracking within the nuclear power

industry. Mr. Goyal documented in the White paper, in part:

All plants, except Davis-Besse and Arkansas Nuclear 1, have large access

holes in the skirt area of the service structure to view/clean the entire head.

Davis-Besses access is limited to about 50 percent of the head area.

Several FENOC employees, including Mr. Prasoon Goyal, were responsible for the information

provided to the NRC by FENOC in response to the Bulletin.

III

Prasoon Goyal was employed by FENOC as a senior engineer in the Design Basis Engineering

organization at Davis-Besse at the time the responses to the Bulletin were developed and

transmitted to the NRC. Mr. Goyal was a design engineer and the individual who reviewed the

licensees 1996 inspection of the CRDM flanges, and conducted the licensees inspection of the

RPV head and CRDM nozzles during 10RFO.

Mr. Goyal reviewed the October 17, 2001 supplemental response to the bulletin. On

-6-

October 17, 2001, Mr. Goyal concurred as Design Basis Engrg - Mech [Design Basis

Engineering - Mechanical] in the issuance of the licensees October 17, 2001 supplemental

response to the Bulletin.

Item 1.d of the Bulletin requested each pressurized water reactor (PWR) licensee, including

FENOC for Davis-Besse, to provide a description of the RPV head penetration nozzles and

RPV head inspection (including type, scope, qualification requirements, and acceptance

criteria) that were performed at PWRs in the 4 years preceding the date of the Bulletin, and the

findings resulting from the inspections. The licensees were requested to include a description

of any limitations (insulation or other impediments) to accessibility of the bare metal of the RPV

head for visual examinations.

On September 4, 2001, FENOC submitted its written response to the Bulletin for Davis-Besse.

On October 17, 2001, FENOC submitted a supplemental response to the Bulletin for

Davis-Besse and included information not provided in the September 4, 2001, response with

regard to RPV inspections and cleaning conducted during 10RFO. Attachment 1 to the

licensees October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin stated under the section

entitled, Summary, in part:

In May 1996, during a refueling outage, the RPV head was inspected. No

leakage was identified, and these results have been recently verified by a

re-review of the video tapes obtained from that inspection.

The October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the Bulletin also stated under the section

entitled, Previous Inspection Results, in part:

-7-

The inspections performed during the 10th, 11th, and 12th Refueling Outage

(10RFO, conducted April 8 to June 2, 1996; 11RFO, conducted April 10, to

May 23, 1998; and, 12RFO, conducted April 1 to May 28, 2000) consisted of

a whole head visual inspection of the RPV head in accordance with the

DBNPS Boric Acid Control Program pursuant to Generic Letter 88-05, Boric

Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in

PWR Plants. The visual inspections were conducted by remote camera

and included below insulation inspections of the RPV bare head such that

the Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDM) nozzle penetrations were

viewed. During 10RFO, 65 of 69 nozzles were viewed, during 11RFO, 50 of

69 nozzles were viewed, and during 12RFO, 45 of 69 nozzles were viewed.

Information included under Column 6 of Attachment 2 of the licensees October 17, 2001,

supplemental response stated, in part, that 24 nozzles have a flange leak evident. Note 1 on

the same table stated, in part:

In 1996 during 10 RFO, the entire RPV head was inspected. Since the

video was void of head orientation narration, each specific nozzle view could

not be correlated.

The licensees October 17, 2001, supplemental response was materially incomplete and

inaccurate in that the licensee did not view the stated number of RPV head penetration nozzles

during the referenced outages, and the licensee believed that only five RPV head control rod

drive mechanism flanges were leaking instead of the 24 RPV head control rod

drive mechanism flanges noted in the response. Mr. Goyal was aware that the licensees

October 17, 2001, supplemental response was materially incomplete and inaccurate and

concurred on the response, thereby allowing it to be submitted to the NRC.

Based on the above information, the NRC concludes that Mr. Goyal had sufficient knowledge of

the condition of the RPV head and the limitations experienced during the RPV head inspections

conducted during 10RFO, and notwithstanding that knowledge, he deliberately provided

-8-

materially incomplete and inaccurate information, when on October 17, 2001, he concurred on

the licensees October 17, 2001, supplemental response to the NRC.

The information provided by the licensee under oath in the Bulletin supplemental response was

material to the NRC because the NRC used the information, in part, to allow FENOC to operate

Davis-Besse until February 2002 rather than requiring the plant to shut down by December 31,

2001, to conduct inspections of the head as discussed in Item 3.v.1. of the Bulletin.

Based on the above information, Mr. Prasoon Goyal, while employed by the licensee, engaged

in deliberate misconduct by deliberately providing incomplete or inaccurate information that he

knew was not complete and accurate in all material respects to the NRC, a violation of

10 CFR 50.5(a)(2). Mr. Goyals actions also placed FENOC in violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The

NRC determined that these violations were of very high safety and regulatory significance

because they involved a pattern of deliberate documentation of inaccurate or incomplete

information that was required to be submitted to the NRC. Had the NRC been aware of this

incomplete and inaccurate information, the NRC would likely have taken immediate regulatory

action to shut down the plant and require the licensee to implement appropriate corrective

actions.

IV

The NRC must be able to rely on the licensee and its employees to comply with NRC

requirements, including the requirement to provide information and maintain records that are

complete and accurate in all material respects. Mr. Goyals deliberate actions raise serious

-9-

doubt as to whether he can be relied upon to comply with NRC requirements and to provide

complete and accurate information to the NRC.

Consequently, I lack the requisite reasonable assurance that licensed activities can be

conducted in compliance with the Commission's requirements and that the health and safety of

the public will be protected if Mr. Goyal is permitted to be involved in NRC-licensed activities.

Therefore, the public health, safety and interest require that Mr. Goyal be prohibited from any

involvement in NRC-licensed activities for a period of one year effective immediately.

Additionally, Mr. Goyal is required to notify the NRC of his first employment in NRC-licensed

activities for a period of one year following the prohibition period.

V

Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202,

10 CFR 50.5, and 10 CFR 150.20, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT EFFECTIVE

IMMEDIATELY:

1. Mr. Prasoon Goyal is prohibited for one year from the date of this Order from engaging

in NRC-licensed activities. The NRC considers NRC-licensed activities to be those

activities that are conducted pursuant to a specific or general license issued by the

NRC, including those activities of Agreement State licensees conducted pursuant to the

authority granted by 10 CFR 150.20.

2. If Mr. Goyal is currently involved with another licensee in NRC-licensed activities, he

must immediately cease those activities, and inform the NRC of the name,

-10-

address and telephone number of the employer, and provide a copy of this Order to

the employer.

3. For a period of one year after the one-year period of prohibition has expired, Mr. Goyal

shall, within 20 days of acceptance of his first employment offer involving NRC-licensed

activities or his becoming involved in NRC-licensed activities, as defined in Paragraph

IV.1 above, provide notice to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, of the name, address, and telephone

number of the employer or the entity where he is, or will be, involved in NRC-licensed

activities. In the notification, Mr. Goyal shall include a statement of his commitment to

compliance with regulatory requirements and the basis why the Commission should

have confidence that he will now comply with applicable NRC requirements.

The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above

conditions upon demonstration by Mr. Goyal of good cause.

VI

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, Prasoon Goyal must, and any other person adversely

affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this

Order within 20 days of the date of this Order, consideration may be given to extending the

response time for submitting an answer as well as the time for requesting a hearing, for good

cause shown. A request for extension of time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a

statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. Unless the

-11-

answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation,

specifically admit or deny each allegation or charge made in this Order and shall set forth the

matters of fact and law on which Mr. Goyal or other person adversely affected relies and the

reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing

shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings

and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director,

Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the

Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the

Regional Administrator, NRC Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4352, and to

Mr. Goyal if the answer or hearing request is by a person other than Mr. Goyal. Because of

continuing disruptions in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested

that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either

by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov

and also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to

301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the Mr. Goyal

requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest

is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.

If a hearing is requested by Mr. Goyal or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the

Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is

held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be

sustained.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), Mr. Goyal, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the

time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate

-12-

effectiveness of the Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate

effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded

allegations, or error.

In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which

to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section V above shall be effective immediately

and final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an

extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in

Section V shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/RA/

Martin J. Virgilio

Deputy Executive Director for Materials,

Research, State, and Compliance Programs

Office of the Executive Director for Operations

Dated this 4th day of January 2006