ML061460356

OI Interview Transcript of Witness, Dated 01/15/2004, Pages 1-183

ML061460356
Person / Time
Site:	Salem, Hope Creek
Issue date:	01/15/2004
From:	NRC/OI
To:
References
1-2003-051F, FOIA/PA-2005-0194, NRC-1295
Download: ML061460356 (184)

Text

Official Transcrnpt of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3

4 OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS 5 INTERVIEW 6 ___- _ _ _ x 7 IN THE MATTER OF:

8 INTERVIEW OF Case No.

9 _--M 1-2003-051F 10 (CLOSED) 11 - - - - -

--- - - - - - - - x 12 Thursday, January 15, 2004 13 14 Salem Hope Creek Resident's 15 Office 16 17 The above-entitled interview was conducted 18 at 1:13 p.m.

19 BEFORE:

20 Special Agent EILEEN NEFF 21 Senior Project Engineer SCOTT BARBER 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON. D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com

2 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 (1:13 p.m.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Today's date is 4 January 15, 2004. The time is approximately 1:13 p.m.

5 Speaking is Special Agent Eileen Neff, U.S. NRC Region 6 I, Office of Investigations.

7 Also present from Region I Division of 8 Reactor Projects is Senior Project Engineer Scott 9 Barber.

10 What follows will be an interview with 11 I

A 12 That is correct.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- who is currently 14 employed as a t Hope Creek.

15 The subject matter of this interview pertains to the 16 safety conscious work environment. has been 17 advised that he is not the subject of any 18 investigation. _<I, 19 And I also should add that this interview 20 is taking place at the Resident's Office at Salem and 21 Hope Creek.

22 Before I go any further, I'd like, to place 23 you under oath. Okay, if you would raise your right 24 hand.

25 Do you swear that the testimony that you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

3 1 are about to provide is the truth, the whole truth, 2 and nothing but the truth so help you God?

3 I do.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What I would 5 like to do is ask you to give some identifying 6 information for the record. Your date of birth and 7 social security number please?

8 _&

L 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, and your home 10 address?

11 110---7Wzr, ,W - ..

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12 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Thank you.

14 Education, a summary of your education please?

1.

15 I _ -- M_

16 dMINOM N; .

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17 va- INIMM 18 i9boo -1 go 1109, 19 MWAVal 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And when did 21 you start here?

22 I -v -

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As a 4 24 r , mmwin _ -7 IA

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25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when did you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCR 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N."

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4 1 start the licensing training?

2 Ljolidd I IMMMMIMA 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So you were 4 licensed what? About a year and one-half or so later?

15 Actually about three years 6 later.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: LAnd 8

9 That's correct.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Let's talk 11 about thee shifts that you've been working on and 12 supervise.d by.

13 Who have been your shift -- as a _S who 14 have been your I guess on the Hope i5 Creek side, we're calling them --

16 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- it's* right?

18 -- they're all the same position.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

21 .That would be -I- think I 22 started off with (phonetic). Then I had 23 (phonetic). And now I have 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who did you have for 7DC-1 25 the longest period of time?

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5 1

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And currently 3 it's -

4 That's correct.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long now?

6 3 A week.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, that' s the 8 recent switch around.

9 Shifts shuffle, yes.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is your shift still -

11 - are you B?

12 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And how long 14 did you work with then? So 2001, at some 15 point until --

16 Until 2002, I guess. He was 17 only there for about a year I guess, somewhere around 18 there.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: About a year? Okay.

20 A year before he was promoted?

21 Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so the bulk of 23 it is-- ..

24 (Whereupon, the foregoing 25 matter went off the record at NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

WARHINMT N rc: ?nmS-37O1 www.nealraross.com

6 1 1:15 p.m. and went back on the 2 record at 1:18 p.m.)

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're back on 4 the record. It's approximately 1:18 p.m. I just 5 wanted to do a check of the tape. We seem to have had 6 a break in a tape over there.

7 But basically what you were saying was the 8 bulk of your experience as an ,has been 9 supervised b since approximately 2002?

10 That's correct.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Until about a week 12 ago it changed and it became Okay.

13 What I'd like to do is ask you in general 14 -- and this is, again, it's about the very broad topic 1s of the safety conscious work environment in that you 16 can consider as part of that people's ability to raise 17 concerns, how those concerns are handled, what are 18 people's comfort levels with doing that.

19 All the way up through and including 20 decision making in terms of production on site.

21 And what I'd like to do is probably go 22 with concern raising, okay? And we'll talk about what 23 you've observed. And let's go back to -- let's go 24 from 2001 forward, from the time you've been an 4 25 You've been onsite since right?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.N.W.

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7 1 Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, let's go back 3 all the way. And we'll just say have you noticed any 4 changes in the work environment in that time frame?

5 And if so, where have you noticed any changes?

6 All right. You have to be 7 more specific on what you mean by --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about in terms of 9 raising concerns.

10 Raising concerns?

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take you 12 personally?

13 I've never had a problem 14 raising a concern. From until now, I can raise a 15 concern at any time.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you ever had 17 hesitancy or reason to hesitate prior to raising a 18 concern?

19 I can honestly say that the 20 only thing that would make me. not raise a concern is 21 if I thought they ain't going to do anything about it 22 anyhow. Other than that, no, I have no concerns about 23 raising a concern.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So just in terms of 25 how effective it would be -- how effectively it would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

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.8 1 be addressed is what you would --

2 That' s the only thing I could 3 see where anybody would say, you know, all right, I've 4 told them, that's enough.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. What 6 about examples of that? What are the kinds of things 7 you've had to raise in the past?

8 I mean I don't know. Bravo 9 Diesel, now that's more of a industrial safety issue.

10 But it was handled very poorly. And 11 people just kept raising their concern and they 12 continued to raise their concern until they forced 13 them to do it anyhow.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was the 15 issue?

16 We had a CO leak in a diesel 17 room.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Carbon 19 monoxide-20 IYes.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What's the time frame 23 for this?

24 D This was last year. And we 25 dropped one guy. He came out and threw up, fell down.

NEAL R. GROSS LIF COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

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9 1 And before the guy got to the hospital, they started 2 running it again.

3 And then we had another guy, they ran the 4 diesel again a couple of weeks later, this is when 5 they had a problem with one of the -- I believe the 6 fuel injector -- made us run it again.

7 But anyhow, ran it again, one of the 8 supervisors was down there observing it. When he got 9 home, he called in. He goes, "Man, I don't know 10 what's wrong, but I passed out driving in my car."

11 He goes, "I've never fallen asleep at the 12 wheel before. But all of a sudden I woke up and I'm 13 going down the road and my hands are in my lap like 14 this."

15 Could you attribute it to the diesel? He 16 certainly did when he called in.

17 Later on, you know, I don't know what 18 happened. It wasn't such a big concern.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you mean it 20 wasn't such a big concern? On whose part?

21 Well, they're like, "Well, you 22 don't know that that's what made him pass out or, you 23 know, he" --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

25 -- "could have been just NEAL R. GROSS'.

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

10 tired. He's working nights. Blah, blah, blah."

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about the fellow 3 who got sick? Who is --

4 6 They took him to the hospital.

S They treated them. And sent him back. And he was 6 fine.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What kind of 8 treatment?

9 j I don't know.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But I mean 11 he was -- was he -- okay, but was there some 12 diagnosis or something that said yes, you've been 13 exposed to carbon monoxide?

14 X I don't think you can. I 15 don't know if you can.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, well 17 I didn't know. I mean that's why I was asking.

18 I don't know. I know nothing 19 on that.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 But then they wanted to run it 22 again. I was like, "Look, you've just dropped two 23 people. What are you doing?"

24 "Run it in scuba."

25 "No, that's not safe. I'm walking around NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

1 in a scuba suit to run a diesel."

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had that ever been 3 suggested before?

4 No. "Well, we deemed it safe.

5 And if you don't do it, you are insubordinate."

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where is it coming 7 from?

8 That came from 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: ad 10 you to run it in the--

11 Scuba.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- self-contained 13 breathing apparatus is what we're talking about?

14 That's correct.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you hear that?

16 Were you present for that? Or how did you hear that?

17 That was what came out of the 18 meeting. 1told that right to 19 (phonetic). "We deemed this safe. And if you don't 20 run it, we're deeming you insubordinate."

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Safe with scuba gear?

22 X Yes, right.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he tell you --

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were you 25 actually at the meeting and heard this --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

. . .......

12 1 _I just heard now.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, I'm 3 sorry. I missed that.

4 It was from 6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I see.

7 Okay.

8 But that was -- "and you will 9 run it in scuba." Ran safe -- we didn't want to fix 10 the diesel. We didn't want to take the time, don't 11 want to over the LCO time. And then we found out, oh 12 no, you won't run over. You can actually fix it 13 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

14 So you're not going to overrun your LCO 15 time. But the only reason we found out it wasn't 16 going to exceed the LCO time was they were looking at 17 the outage that was coming up and saying, "Oh, well we 18 can't fit it in the schedule."

19 Oh, but we could fix the diesel in 36 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. Well why the hell didn't you fix it three 21 weeks ago then when you were dropping people? Because 22 it was production.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What exactly would 24 they have had to do to fix it?

25 Shut down.

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13 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It would have been 2 the power go off line?

3 Well, in their interpretation, 4 if it exceeded past the 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, you have to shut 5 down.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, you have the 7 window there.

8 Right. So they didn't want to 9 take that chance so, hey, we're cheaper than shutting 10 down, so --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So to be accurate 12 here, how long of a delay did they cause in this 13 decision to repair it? How long were you waiting for 14 this to --

15 Months.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- when it was 17 obvious to you that it should have been repaired --

18 Months.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Months?

20 No w Yes.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were there more than 22 two people who were made sick in that time frame?

23 There were many people 24 complaining about sore eyes, sore throat, and --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Documented NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

14 1 complaints?

2 Documented complaints. We had 3 safety meetings and everything else, screaming up and 4 down. But, hey, "We deem it safe."

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But -- and was this -

6 7 And we are monitoring for CO 8 and we are not seeing any CO levels in the Bom.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were those complaints 10 -- the sore eyes and the sore throats, were those 11 complaints and the length of time that those 12 complaints had been existing, was that brought to the 13 attention of

,14 I would know at all what 15 But yes, I'm pretty sure it was.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you think at the 17 time he recommended wearing the scuba gear he had a 18 full understanding --

19 Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- of the problem 21 there?

22 Yes.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now why would you say 24 that? How do you base that?

25 From most of the decisions I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

15 1 saw come out of mouth.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

3 I had no faith in him.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What goes into 5 that? What other decisions do you cite?

6 SAP implementation, some of 7 the decisions I saw on maintenance. was 8 well aware and it was well documented what was going 9 on with the Bravo diesel.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

11 Our management was well aware.

12 1 had supervisors looking at me going, "I don't want 13 to run this. I don't believe we're going to run this 14 again."

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Run it with the scuba 16 gear?

17 Yes. "Find a reason for me 18 not to run it."

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what happened?

20 We ran it again. Ran it in 21 scuba.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With the gear?

23 Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: For how long?

25 For another one-hour run.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

16 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And then it was --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does the 3 operator have to be in there the entire time for that?

4 No.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Just 6 periodically?

7 Ye 8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And was 9 there ever a situation where someone was asked to go 10 in there that wasn't qualified with the gear, with the 11 SCVA? Did that ever come up to your knowledge?

12 I believe we're all qualified, 13 we're all certified to wear the scuba. Now had we 14 ever worn it before for real? No.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Did 16 anybody express any concerns with -- I mean I've heard 17 __

18 M Fundamentally what happened 19 was, (phonetic) told them that he would be 20 comfortable wearing a scuba because he had had to wear 21 one previously. Not for running the diesel. But that 22 was one of the things they were all trained on being 23 the fire protection guys when they first got hired 24 here.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

17 1 ,So they were -- he was more 2 adept.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 And he said he would be 5 comfortable wearing a scuba.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 Well, they stretched that into 8 hey, the union is okay with it. It's like, "No, that 9 ain't what we said."

10 But by that time, this shift had left, the 11 next shift comes in, and they tell them the story, 12 "oh, yes, well the union is okay with it."

13 They don't know, "What do you mean, it's 14 okay with them?"

15 "It's not okay." But they were made to 16 run it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you say they, 18 where is that coming from? Where was your shift 19 manager on this issue?

20 Shift manager at the time, I 21 know that my direct supervisor, the 22 0NIMM didn't want "to run it.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

24 (phonetic). He 25 wasn't comfortable running it. I know a lot of people NEAL R. GROSS t COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

18 1 were not comfortable but were following orders.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know where 3 your shift manager fell on that?

4 P No. I don't.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What shift 6 were you on at that time?

7 _ Bravo.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Under 10 2002? I guess it could have been 11 Yes it could have been.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, I'm sorry. This

13. is 2003. So it was -right?

14 I think it was-15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you're not sure 16 what he position was on it?

17 No.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. But up to the 19 CRS level, they weren't comfortable with doing that?

20 No, I don't think anybody --

21 no.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So at this point, 23 after it has been suggested to wear the scuba gear, it 24 was run one more time after for about an hour?

25 -Yes.

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19 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And they ran it with 2 the gear on?

3 Yes.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Any more incidents?

5 Any more sicknesses?

6  : No, because right after that, 7 they realized they could fix it and they fixed it.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In that 36-hour time 9 frame?

10 Yes.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now in 36 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, normally aren't the diesel LCOs 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />?

13 Right.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So was there 15 some target that you had to like plan it for like half 16 the LCO length? Is that where that comes from?

17 I don't know. No, it was 18 planned for 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I 20 just wondered if there was something there --

21 But before that, it was said 22 that they couldn't get it in within the 72-hour 23 window.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, I see.

25 Okay.

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20 1 So it would have been, "Hey, 2 you're going to shut down."

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What changed that?

5 The timing?

6 The outage. They were 7 planning the outage. And the outage window was less 8 than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for the thing. And somebody looked at 9 it and said, "Well, can't we fix this in less than 10 that?"

11 And, "Oh yes, sure."

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So then they didn't 13 have to plan it?

14 Then they said, "Oh, well if 15 we can fix it then, I guess we can fix it now."

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, do you follow 17 that okay?

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I do. I 19 guess I still have a few questions. You may not know 20 the answers but one thing that is kind of interesting 21 about that is it sounds like at least the people that 22 were planning the outage work to fix the problem knew 23 that the work could be done within --

24 They didn't at first.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

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21 1 They didn't at first. And 2 then they did some looking into it and said, "Yes, you 3 can."

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 5 they knew -- did they know where the leak was?

6 Oh, yes. We knew where the 7 leaks were.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it was 9 just a matter of trying to find out what kind of 10 replacement parts, that type of thing --

11 12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and how 13 long was it going to take --

14 And how much disassembly --

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

16 - you had to do to actually 17 put the headers back on.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, okay.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you had similar 20 problems with this diesel or any other one in -- since 21 then?

22 We do have CO leaks on some of 23 the diesels. Now we do more -- we more closely 24 monitor. We make the guys wear a CO monitor when they 25 go in rooms. 7C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. So the problem 2 hasn't gotten to the extent that it did --

3 -swf--SsNo.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- in 2003?

S Bravo was bad.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Now you'd 7 mentioned as somebody whose -- some of 8 the decisions that you questioned. And you said SAP 9 was part of that?

10 0901. Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you threw out 12 another one, too.

13 R P No, you just --

14 0 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You said 15 maintenance.

16 Maintenance --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Maintenance, I see.

18 -- yes, you see --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was 20 for a while.

21 Yes, and as soon as he did, it 22 seemed like their performance went straight down.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And how so? How do 24 you measure that?

25 Rework. It seemed like there

-. 7 -

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23 1 was a lot more rework than what we were used to?

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What would cause 3 that?

4 MI don't know.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Rework on the same 6 issues?

7 On the same issue, you know, 8 you get it fixed and you get it back. And now it 9 busts again.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was there anything 11 that you observed that was being done differently 12 under than before?

13 Not specifics, no.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But you noticed --

15 It was my impressions -- yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- there was a lot of 17 reworks at that point?

18Yes.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about now?

20 It's hard to say. These guys 21 just got an opportunity. And I've been rather 22 impressed by the way they handle themselves.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, we're talking 24 without names but are your talking about 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

24 1No.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or somebody else?

3 They're not really -- their 4 impact I wouldn't see as much as I would see our new 5 plant manager -- what is his name now -- what is his 6 name --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who replaced -- you 8 mean the 9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER:

10 , M:: .

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The new 12:

13 Yes. He is. Yes, he's 14 impressed me so far.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: As?

16 He seems to -- I got the very 17 real impression that in the V years, it was 18 more an impression of run it until it breaks and 19 somebody shuts you down. And I get the impression out 20 of it's broke, let's fix it. -7 21 I mean he walked into the Control Room and 22 looked at 13 LPRNs bypassed and went, "What is that?"

23 "I don't know. It's been like that for a 24 while."

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he say?

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t ' ' IN rds 'n-H n- .- y-.. --

25 1 Well, no it ain't." And he 2 started getting them fixed.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More proactive in 4 fixing --

5 _Absolutely.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the equipment?

7 Absolutely.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How would it be that 9 he could be effective at that and not 10 Because I don't think he 11 wanted to be. It's cheaper to run. It's easy to run.

12 "Hey, I'll explain why it broke later." I don't think 13 he was very proactive at it.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're looking at 15 cost effectiveness?

16 Oh, yes, production over all 17 else.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were there 19 any other examples of that? You mentioned maintenance 20 kind of in a general way. You mentioned SAP.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: SAP. How does that -

22 _

23 SAP implementation was the 24 worst thing I ever saw at this place. It was just 25 unsafe. It was ridiculous. It wasn't ready.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

26 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: SAP is pretty broadly 2 applied on the site so where specifically?

3 Right. But it ran our tagging 4 through SAP. SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

5 1 We dropped TRIS, went to SAP, 6 and it was just implemented so poorly that the only 7 reason we didn't hurt somebody through the first 8 outage with SAP was strictly on the back of the COs 9 and the NEOs coming back all the time saying, "This 10 isn't right. This is wrong. Why did SAP swap these 11 numbers around?"

12 "Oh, because it's programmed to do that."

13 And we implemented it so poorly that we 14 were just -- the only reason we didn't hurt somebody 15 was pure luck.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, it sounds like 17 you were on top of it, too. This is --

18 The COs --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- work clearance 20 model, right?

21 -- and the NEOs, right -- were 22 way -- I think we were all pretty much very alert at 23 the time to say, "All right, we know that SAP isn't 24 built for this. So there is going to be some problems 25 with it."

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

27 1 So they were very vigilant at making sure 2 everything was right when it hit because SAP wasn't 3 ready for --

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you said --

5 -- and I personally told 6 it wasn't ready.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was the 8 response?

9 "Well, this is my baby and 10 we're going to make SAP work."

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that a quote?

12 That's a quote to me, 13 personally to me.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That SAP was his baby 15 and it was going to be made to work?

16 Right. "This is my baby and 17 we're going to make this work."

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was he getting an 19 understanding of where the concerns were in terms of 20 safety, personal safety?

21 It was pretty clear out of my 22 mouth. "This isn't safe. We're going to hurt 23 somebody." y7 e 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he ever explore 25 that or have any kind of a --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

28 1 7 I don't think he cared.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms 3 of -- from what the EOs and the COs were seeing, did 4 you raise that to somebody to get that addressed and 5 fixed?

6 I think we --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean I understand 8 what you're saying with Were you 9 getting any assistance elsewhere?

10 Yes. You could turn to your 11 other -- but they were all -- we were all doing the 12 same thing. We were all trying to make it work 13 because it was the only thing we had.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And it effected 15 everybody.

16 You took the one --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All at once?

18 -- and gave us the other. And 19 said, "Make it work. Here you go. Chuck a duck."

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long did that go 21 on? What kind of, you know, struggle there?

22 That was a struggle for a 23 little while. That was -- I think we got through most 24 of the hurdles. -7 25 I mean when you implement anything there NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

29 1 is going to be new challenges. I just don't think it 2 was an acceptable amount of challenges we put on the 3 operating crews at that time.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What made the 5 struggle end? Was it that you worked out the kinks?

6 We worked out the kinks?

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or did you get some 8 assistance?

9 We worked out the kinks.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You got to the end of 11 __

12 And, you know, working with 13 other people, calling them up, "Hey, how do I fix 14 this? How do I straighten this out? Hey, we got a 15 problem with this. This is changing these numbers on 16 us for no apparent reason."

17 "Oh, yes, we know why that does that."

18 So you had to work through that.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You worked through it 20 all?

21 Right.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would you 23 say that most of the problems were fixed by the end of 24 the outage or was there still a lot of problems to be 25 sorted out?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

{odor ')3AAA<<' 1A1AQ:WIIKI<TrM n rn 'nnnr-17ni AArrner~eo

30 1 Many of them were fixed during 2 an outage, yes.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. I 4 mean, you know, you kind of mentioned that whenever 5 you start a new system, there are going to be 6 challenges.

7 Certainly.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, I mean 9 how do you judge something like that? How do you 10 judge whether, you know, a certain amount of 11 challenges is, you know, a reasonable amount? And 12 this is just way too many.

13 I mean was it a situation where every tag 14 out had a problem with it? Or was it, you know --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We were joking it was 16 about one out of three.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: One out of 18 three?

19 And that was way too many.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Out of how many tag 21 outs overall?

22 Oh, I don't know, 600.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So maybe 200 24 may have had problems, something like that?

25 There was some problem in one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

'5 31 1 shape or form on way too many tag outs for that 2 outage.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 4 any tagging events that were traceable back to the SAP 5 implementation during the outage?

6 I don't know how many they've 7 got documented. Most of the time -- I would figure 8 most of the time people just fixed them. If you --

9 "Hey, I found this problem with this tag out."

10 "All right. I'11 go back and fix it.

11 Hold on."

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Otherwise, there 13 might be a notification written?

14 Maybe. I wouldn't doubt if 15 you found some notifications on SAP especially from 16 the first outage you hit.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, this was rolled 18 out in mid to late 1999, right?

19 I would figure.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So then I think it 21 hit the outage in the first part of 2000, RF09?

22 That sounds familiar. That 23 seems right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about since that 25 time when -- did you iron it out mostly during that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

32 1 outage? Or --

2 During that outage.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- or were you 4 dealing with this for a long time after?

5 Like I said, most of the kinks 6 were fixed in one shape, form, or another, in that 7 outage. I mean there's still -- there's always going 8 to be SAP challenges. It's not really built for that.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're hearing a bit 10 that it's awkward to deal with, difficult to get 11 results from --

12 Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- difficult actions 14 to track all the way through it.

15 Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But in terms of the 17 work clearance module where you have potential effect 18 on both personnel safety and configuration control --

19 Yes 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: - are you seeing 21 issues with it there since that time frame?

22 M Not that many any more. I 23 think we solved most of the problems. Remember at the 24 time, we were the first place to actually get the 25 thing to work. -p' NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

33 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The first plant that 2 it was applied in, right?

3 Yes. To get it to work. I 4 mean we went to -- I think it was Peach Bottom I 5 visited. And they went with the new TRIS Plus instead 6 of SAP --

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

8 -- because I was talking to 9 the guy. I'm like, "Hey, that-looks like our" --

10 And he's like, "Oh, yes, this is the new 11 TRIS."

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Enhance TRIS.

13 Right. Whatever. And it's 14 like, "Oh wow," I said, "we went to SAP."

15 He's like, "Oh, we threw that crap out.

16 We couldn't make that thing work. So -- "

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The -- I guess what 18 you have to wonder is how much of that problem is 19 being relayed to senior management that you were 20 having with the SAP and how much of a response were 21 you getting and help in dealing with it?

22 was it.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He was it? He was 24 your senior management at that point.

25 Yes NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

34 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And was that the only 2 position you got from him on that was, "This is my 3 baby and it's --

4 W "We're going to make it work."

5 That was it.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 7 you if a number of you expressed concerns that he 8 would have been more inclined to listen? Or was it 9 just to the point where it just 10 Now I don't want it to sound 11 like I really have a hard spot for I just 12 don't think he did a very good job. I really just 13 don't. And no, I don't think if he had his mind set 14 he would listen. No, I don't.

15 I saw maintenance arguing about that group 16 he brought in. I don't even remember what the heck 17 the name of those guys were. But he brought in his 18 own little maintenance group.

-19 And everybody was complaining about them.

20 I don't know why. They were saying they weren't that 21 good.

22 They were arrogant. They were this. They 23 were that. I don't know. But they were complaining 24 about them. And he -- that was his baby. He was 25 going to stick with them.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

35 1 Now I don't know the whole deal about it.

2 But I know that he --

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever 4 get the impression, you know, you said he did talk to 5 you directly on that one item. Did you ever get the 6 impression in anything he said that he was getting 7 pressure from above --

18 No.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- or froma h

10 11 n th No.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- anywhere 13 in the company,--

14 I No.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- that yes, 16 we have to implement this, you know --

17 No.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- we've 19 been told that --

20 No, as a matter of fact, I got 21 more of the impression that it was something he wanted 22 to make work. -

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Like a 24 feather in his cap kind of thing?

25 Yes. That was definitely the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

36 1 impression I got was this is what I want. And I'm 2 going to make it work.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did he give you 4 reasons for that? I mean did he say --

5 No.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- that it had 7 positives to it that just hadn't been applied yet?

8 No. As a matter of fact, I 9 told him SAP has some neat tools in it. And it has 10 some serious advantages in it. But the way it's being 11 implemented is bad.

12 This chuck and duck, hey, go ahead and see 13 if you can make that work. I'll be over here when 14 you're done. It was not the way to be doing it.

15 It was definitely -- we weren't trained 16 properly. We didn't have the proper systems. We 17 didn't have the proper safeguards where we said okay, 18 when a tag out comes out, it's ready for you to go to 19 the field and do it. Instead it was --

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 21 any attempt --

22 We were not very comfortable 23 with it.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 25 any attempt to -- because it was a new system and it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

37 1 was challenging to implement as you described it to 2 try and provide extra help from the company -- either 3 from SAP or from within the company like technical 4 experts either on shift or who were readily available 5 so that if you ran into a problem, you could get 6 something fixed right away?

7 We had one guy at Hope Creek 8 who was more like a contact. And that was 9 It was like, "Yes, hey, I'm having a SAP problem 10 here."

11 And he would call around and figure out 12 what was going on. Or you could call Information 13 Services, you know, IT and, "Hey, what am I seeing 14 here?"

15 I still have problems with it. I mean the 16 other day I had a problem. I'm sitting there and I 17 had my menu set up for writing tag outs, you know, I'm 18 thinking, write the tag out, boom, zipper it to that, 19 boom, do this, right?

20 I go home one day and I'm like my menus 21 are gone. I call up IT. I'm like, "Hey, why is all 22 my menus gone?"

23 "Oh, SAP does that sometimes. It just 24 wipes out your menus. You've got to start again."

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not the answer you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

38 1 were hoping for.

2 That was the answer I got.

3 I'm like what? "Yes, sometimes when it reconfigures, 4 it just says okay, that's it. Your menus are gone.

5 Aid you start again."

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The first time you 7 ran into that was just the other day though?

8 Yes, it was I guess like two 9 weeks ago, three weeks ago. I'm like, "Oh."

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about in terms of 11 raising concerns, this is one. I mean it sounds like 12 it was a pretty big issue. And you took it directly 13 to So apparently you were comfortable at 14 that point in doing that?

15 Right. As I've said, I never 16 had a problem raising a concern.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about after? Did 18 you feel any adverse effects after you raised the 19 concern?

20 ,.No.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How about anybody 22 else? Were other people raising concerns at that 23 point in time --

24 Sure.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- about the system?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1111 OWMICt AKflin A%/r WAI

39 1 Yes.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFV: Did you hear or 3 witness any retaliation for somebody saying, look, 4 this isn't working. It isn't being implemented 5 correctly and it's causing problems?

6 Not first hand. No.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, would 8 they have ever discussed it with you secondhand where 9 they said hey, you know, remember some of the problems 10 I had? Well, I mentioned to this person. And as a 11 result of that, this happened to me? Was there any of 12 that going on?

13 No, no.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Rumors?

16 No. Not really.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You say not 18 firsthand. But what did you hear indirectly?

19 - I maybe might have heard once 20 or twice, you know, the same response that I got when 21 I raised it. "Hey, we're going to make this work."

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Involving A l7§W 23 24 Oh, yes.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or somebody else?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

40 1 NV" 2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So would 3 some of your peers, other 4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or people in 5 different positions --

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- saying --

7 Different positions.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what level?

10 - _ ,It j would have been an 11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

12 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You think he raised 14 the issues and it went to and got the same 15 response?

16 Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did anybody--- did 18 this have -- does that have an effect on the 19 individuals at your level and at th level in terms 20 of raising concerns to or anybody at the 21 senior management level?

22

• wV ds -WMA-W!gone.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understood. But at 24 that point in time, and for that issue, did the 25 concerns that had to get raised get raised? Or did NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

41 1 that response have an effect on that? Did you see it 2 have an effect in terms of people raising concerns 3 about the SAP?

4 1aAbout SAP? I think you could 5 still raise the concern. I know I would. But your 6 expectation for results might be a little lower.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about for 8 other issues?

9 For other issues?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see that kind 11 of response have an effect on raising issues?

12 Let's just say maybe not SAP 13 but the diesel had big effects.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What we were talking 15 about before?

16 Yes.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Run it and run it in 18 scuba gear?

19 Yes.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And in what way?

21 What kind of an effect did you see on that?

22 There were a lot of pissed off 23 people.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

25 . There was a lot of pissed off NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

42 1 people. People don't -- I don't think so much the 2 raising the concerning issue but the cooperation and 3 the teamwork aspect just falls apart.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What do they take 5 away from that? What are you hearing?

6 i Well, what I'm hearing is just 7 pure fact. You ain't looking out for my safety? I'm 8 not going to give you 100 percent. You know what I'm 9 saying? If you're not looking out for me, I'm not 10 looking out for you.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's pretty negative 12 all the way around then?

13 Oh, it was.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The end result.

15 It was. For a period of time 16 after that, it was borderline hostile on shift.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see some 18 improvement after a period of time?

19 I'm starting to see 20 improvement now.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What does that 22 got to do with?

23 I believe that has to do a lot 24 with 25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. New NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS vrn Pwron; mel roin a%/;: hmw

43 1 management?

2 New management. I think a lot 3 has to do with I mean 4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

5 - w -

6 Yes 7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you think of 8 in terms of supporting safety-related issues?

9 I don't know if he was--I 10 don't know if he was a strong leader.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you see him have 12 some amount of control over the decision making?

13 I d say I saw him get run over 14 more than -- he was a strong guy at one time. But I 15 just don't think -- I don't think people stood up to 16 "I don't know why.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that who was 18 running over?

19 71 I'm pretty sure. I know he 20 did on one occasion on me.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was that?

22 I'm sure you've heard about 23 it. It's the IPTE, the reactivity incident last 24 March..

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: March? I heard about NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

44 1 the incident. I don't know so much about your role.

2 And I don't think Scott does either. Can we hear it 3 from your point of view?

4 I Yes, made a decision.

5 He didn't know what he was talking about. And I got 6 thrown in the penalty box.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's pretty 8 succinct. Can we get some more detail?

9 Bottom line.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can we get a little 11 more detail on that?

12 I'm sure you guys have heard 13 all about by now. There was an IPTE. Then the crew 14 that was doing the IPTE trained on it the night 15 before. The next day they briefed it.

16 Well, I'm the _ that day.

17 I'm told, "on, we're going to brief you separately.

18 There's an IPTE going on. You're going to get a 19 separate brief."

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: From who? Who told 21 you?

22 From my shift supervisor.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so that's O 24 tg.

25 ." No, V I was actually NEAL R. GROSS - ._

~~~~~. . _A__.

.._

45 1 working with another shift at that time.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And who was that?

3 And that would have been

• 4 _

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 Okay, so there is an IPTE 7 going on. Well, what it was we were shutting down 8 because there was a bolt stuck in the bypass valve.

9 And it wouldn't allow it to go closed. So we were 10 shutting down.

11 Well, with the bypass stuck closed, I'm 12 sure you understand, then hey, once I shut down, I'm 13 going to start depressurizing and I ain't going to 14 stop depressurizing until I close the MSIVs. Okay?

15 So IPTE was established to commence this.

16 So my brief was, you are going to need to 17 monitor level, monitor power. This guy's going to be 18 controlling level. And this guy's going to be 19 bringing down pressure, okay?

20 "In this instance, your power could go up

21. and you need to be ready to range up on the IRMs."

22 You know, that makes sense, you know. I got one guy 23 messing with level. I got one guy messing with 24 pressure. I'm in the IRM ranges here.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who gave you the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

46 1 briefing?

2 3 Okay? So, okay. It's all reasonable to me, 4 okay? So no problem. These guys start bringing down 5 pressure. He's bringing down the pressure, get a 6 level perturbation, power comes up.

7 Does a little ranging up. Goes from --

8 the final charts I think said 6-1/2 to 13, 13-1/2.

9 Well, I'm ranging up on the IRMs and as soon as I see 10 -- well I see power going up and I'm like, "Hey, you 11 guys got to stop. You're giving me a power spike 12 here. I'm seeing the power increase.

13 "I'm calling off my levels. I'm ranging 14 up on the IRMs."' I had to range four IRMs one range 15 up. And the others I didn't even move. Okay?

16 So I've stopped the evolution. I've 17 returned the plant back to its pre-transient level in 18 accordance with my abnormal and my alarm response 19 followed by my procedures. Now there was problems 20 with the IPTE. And the guy on pressure crossed the 21 pressure jack in a pressure set. So there was 22 problems with the IPTE and the execution of it.

23 So the next day, the guy running levels --

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When did 25 this happen?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND A"E., N.W.

47 1 t March time frame.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was this 3 like on a weekend or during the week or what?

4 I don't know. It might have 5 been a weekend because -- no, I think it was -- I 6 don't know. I really don't remember what day it was.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 So the next day, the guy 9 running level, the guy running pressure, the CRS, and 10 the OS are in what we call the penalty box. You're 11 delimited. You go out to training and you sit out 12 there and get beat on for a couple of days.

13 Well, it gets explained to me by the Ops 14 manager at the time why I'm not in the penalty box.

15 "Well, E you weren't part of the IPTE. Your 16 actions were in accordance with all the procedures and 17 you're not part of this problem."

18 Okay. A couple of days later, I pull 19 plant critical --

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was --

21 22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. He 23 gave you the explanation that you weren't part of the 24 problem.

25 ri I wasn't part of the problem.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

48 1 He assessed my situation. And didn't feel I needed to 2 go to the penalty box. Go out and be delimited.

3 Okay.

4 So these guys go out. I pull plant 5 critical. The next day, "Hey I You need not come 6 to work tomorrow. You're in the penalty box."

7 "For what? For who?"

8 "Well, you should have taken both shows 9 through shutdown."

10 "For what?"

11 "Because the IPTE said to."

12 "Well, I wasn't part of the IPTE."

13 "Well, yes you were."

14 "Well, no I wasn't. I wasn't in the 15 training. I wasn't in the brief. How am I subject to 16 what is in the IPTE?"

17 Well you're the 11 18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this 19 again?

20 Well, actually it was many 21 people in line. Well, I came -- well, I finally came 22 to the conclusion was looked 23 at the actions taken and said, "Okay, yes, we have a 24 problem with the IPTE. We have a problem because the 25 IPTE said any reactivity addition must switch to shut NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

49 1 down."

2 But nobody on the crew knew it said that.

3 The RO who would have taken them wasn't even included 4 in it. Wasn't included in the training the night 5 before.

6 So they dealt with that situation. But 7 they hadn't tol 8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That you had been 9 excluded?

10 That the extent of the 11 transient. So when saw in the thing hey 12 we had a power excursion here. Well, then it became 13 a big bashing. And INPO was called in to do an 14 evaluation. And everything.

15 Three weeks later, I walk away. I still 16 don't know why I should have taken both switches to 17 shutdown. I hate to say it but the APRMs SCRAM set 18 points 15, a conservative number is 14. We never got 19 to 14. So there's nothing driving me to take the 20 other switch there.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But they're saying 22 that other people --

23 The IPTE 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- who weren't a part 25 of it, the IPTE trained to do differently. What was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

50 1 the level?

2 Didn't train to do it 3 differentlyy. They never knew it was in there.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, they didn't even 5 mention it to the people that you didn't train with?

6 a_ Yes.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So all three people 8 who were hLandling controls, the other two and you, 9 nobody kneitW?

10 7Nobody knew.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Per the IPTE?

12 Per the IPTE that determined -

13 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was responsible 15 for briefing everybody here?

16 1 Exactly -- why didn't any --

17 why didn't the person that wrote the IPTE, the manager 18 of it, the oversight of it, none of those people got 19 delimited and sent to the penalty box. I did. Why?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Do you know that for 21 sure? I mean --

22 Yes, I was in the penalty box.

23 We were all in the penalty box together.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Oh, I see, I see.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Didn't you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

51 1 say--

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would 3 another manager be in the penalty box?

4 There would have been two or 5 three other people in the penalty box. The person who 6 approved it. The person that managed it.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, right.

8 All these people in accordance 9 with the procedure that had to prove this procedure to 10 say it was good to go.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you would have 12 been made aware had they been penalized for doing 13 this?

14 Well, I -- let's put it this 15 way, if they included the9 in the brief for the 16 training, which would have been me or 17 (phonetic), whoever would have been playing 9at the 18 time, and said, "Hey, you, knbw, we're going, to be 19 doing this, we're going to be doing this."

20 "Hey, what's the -termination criteria?

21 How much power am I expecting to see?"

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

23 "Oh, termination criteria is 24 any reactivity." It probably would have been, you 25 know, that is not very reasonable. I'm in the IRM NEAL R. GROSS X COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1123 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

52 1 ranges here. He's messing with pressure. And he's 2 messing with level. You're going to see power move.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Wasn't --

4 didn't you say earlier that 5 were "put in the penalty box"?

6 Yes.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, 8 weren't they responsible for doing the IPTE brief?

9 Not by procedure. They're 10 part of the crew. They can't give the brief.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, the OS 12 can't do that?

13 No, actually if you read the 14 procedure, somebody above the OS must give that?

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Above or --

16 Above 17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- outside 18 the organization?

19 Above them.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 Somebody above them had to be 22 involved. Well, we had a manager -- let's see -- if 23 they threw the people that really deserved to be in 24 the penalty box or if they wanted to stop what was 25 actually truly the problem, it shouldn't have been the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

53 1 three guys in the front. It should have been the four 2 guys in the back room going, "Whew, couldn't have 3 taken a SCRAM there."

4 But we were the easiest people to blame.

5 Have you ever seen -- as a matter of fact, I got three 6 weeks of that. You see the little blocks we have on 7 the way in, you know, hell is execution and -- I came 8 away from that going, "Yes, that's a block of deferral 9 of blame."

10 "Oh, it's not my fault. It had to be the 11 guy in the middle."

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How was it above 13 then that should have done that briefing?

14 15 I don't know. By the procedures, it's pretty 16 hard to find somebody above the OS that should have 17 been giving the briefing or should have been in 18 control of that procedure.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that way 20 its typically done though? I mean I've seen a number 21 of--

22 For IPTEs, yes. That's the 23 way it is supposed to be.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 Are we doing it like that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

54 1 You know, I think since our little incident, I think 2 there's been more of a highlighted, whoa, how should 3 we be -- are we doing IPTEs right.

4 Here's the part that really --

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Isn't there 6 something in the briefing that requires you to read 7 all the precautions limitations to the group? I mean 8 as a part of the briefing?

9 Oh, yes.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And I would 11 assume that --

12 But that wasn't precautions 13 limitations. That's termination criteria.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, so that 15 wasn't --

16 It's not precaution --

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- it wasn't 18 covered in -- was it -- I guess --

19 Let's say one guy that says he 20 mentioned that, nobody else heard it.

21 (Whereupon, the foregoing 22 matter went off the record 23 briefly and went back on the 24 record at 2:01 p.m.)

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It's approximately NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

55 1 2:01 p.m. And you were talking about how the briefing 2 was conducted. Just that last statement.

3 The last statement is one 4 person did say they mentioned that the termination 5 criteria was any reactivity addition must switch to 6 shutdown. Nobody else associated with the IPTE knew 7 that it existed period.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So whatever 9 that -- whoever that individual was said I did say it 10 but no one could remember it?

11 Right.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it made 13 his or her statement suspect.

14 I I don't know if it's suspect.

15 I wasn't involved. I don't know if he said it or not 16 because I wasn't there.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just before we got on 18 to that you said here's something that --

19 That really fried my bacon?

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. What was 21 that?

22 A couple of weeks later, after 23 I get out of the penalty box, I get relimited or 24 whatever it is called. We have another IPTE. We go 25 through the brief.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS Dn-2 0LJUrr at1 AbIl AlIt Lf %AB

56 1 well, isn' t it very similiar to the last 2 IPTE I ended up in the thing. And the termination 3 criteria is any kind of reactivity adIdition, return 4 the reactor to pre-transient level. I'hat is exactly 5 what I did. And I looked at the guy viho threw me in 6 the penalty box. "How can you give th:is to me? This 7 is baloney."

_ --

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is t1__

9 Yes. 'How can you look me in 10 the eye and give me this when this is exactly what I 11 did?"

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did he say?

13 "Well, I thi3,nk that is the 14 acceptable response."

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He thinks what was 16 documented in --

17 That IPTE, to return the 18 reactor to pre-transient level --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was the acceptable --

20 - - was the acce]ptable response 21 to a reactivity addition. Which is <a -- it is the 22 right thing to do.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did yeDu grieve this?

24 , What's to gri eve? I didn't 25 get any punishment.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

57 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, isn't there --

2 I mean --

3 There was no negative 4 connotation with me going to the penalty box in their 5 eyes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's -- in their 7 eyes, why would they call it the penalty box if it's 8 not --

9 We call it the penalty box 10 because you're off shift.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, I mean they --

12 OA We call it, that's our name.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- the negative 14 connotation is you've been removed from shift.

15 I've been removed from shift.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you were 17 retrained.

18 Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That indicates that 20 you were lacking something.

21 C7 You will never, ever get them 22 to admit that. That that's a negative connotation.

23 You just won't.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Probably not 25 to you.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

58 1 Well, it is to me.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They might 3 tell us that.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's a negative --

5 the negative connotation is you were treated 6 differently in that you were removed from your 7 regularly scheduled shift and you were returned for --

8 what kind of a period of time?

9 Three weeks.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 11 any--

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So when you say 13 what's to grieve, it seems to me that there is 14 something there to grieve.

15 Grieve what?

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, that would be 17 on your record, right? That you were --

18 No, it won't be on my record.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- remediated?

20 Because they -- I'll tell you 21 why it won't be on my record.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Just explain that 23 because I'm a little confused on that one.

24 i It won't be on my record 25 because I'll tell you right now, there ain't one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

59 1 supervisor on shift or one control room operator that 2 can tell you what I did wrong.

3 As a matter of fact, one of the reasons 4 the investigation came to a halt or let's not say a 5 halt but let's say okay, we're going to stop here, 6 we've got all the information we need is because every 7 CO when they were asking them, well, what would you 8 have done? I'd have done the same thing.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Investigation by 10 whom?

1I - Well, we did our own with INPO 12 assist. You know?

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How many people all 14 altogether were remediated in the way that you were?

15 16 17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He's the STA?

18 god. .s 19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

21 44 IAHI - t i2  ?!I and the 22 last one?

23 24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

25 or z-treamYes.

r-;- .r NEAL R. GROSS I __

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60 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: NCO?

2 No, he was -- I believe he was 3 the.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. All right. So 5 __

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Could I ask 7 a question? I want to explore this remediation aspect 8 again. When you are taken off shift and put into 9 training, do you get some sort of -- I mean either 10 from an overtime standpoint or shift differential, if 11 you were to compare your pay for the period of time 12 had you continued with your normal work activities to 13 what you end up getting spending three weeks in 14 training, there's no difference?

15 Actually, I made money. I 16 made more money.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How so?

18 Because there's penalties 19 involved in taking me off shift. There's penalties 20 included in the contract. You didn't give me 21 sufficient notice. You took me off shift. So the 22 days I stayed home that I would normally be scheduled, 23 you're going to pay me.

24 And you changed my shift without proper 25 notice, you're going to pay me a penalty.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

61 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay so those are 2 built-in protections for you by the union.

3 That's correct.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And when I asked you 6 if you've grieved this, you looked at me like what's 7 to grieve. And maybe that's why. You had built-in 8 protections.

9 It's not a suggestion that you should 10 have. I'm trying to understand --

11 No, what I'm saying is --

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- if there was this 13 much flack around that situation --

14 -- there is nothing to grieve 15 __

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- and it was that 17 unjust in terms of the actions that were taken on 18 people who were not properly briefed, how does that 19 play out, you know? How did that get resolved? And 20 that's what I'm trying to understand.

21 See, that was the thing. They 22 didn't take my bonus.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 _ They didn't take my money.

25 I'm actually getting paid more.

. A NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

62 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFFt It's not on file.

2 It's not a negative. It's not a black mark.

3 I haven't seen an evaluation 4 since.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

6 0-;MBut now if I see that in my 7 evaluation, now we're going to go to grievance. And 8 then it will be like if you write this in here that I 9 didn't meet whatever standard, you'd better show me 10 the standard.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you get 13 like an appraisal of some sort or evaluation?

14 Annual, yes.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you 16 already get yours for 2003?

17 No, I just said I haven't got 18 since that --

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you get 20 like a mid year?

21 We used to. I don't know what 22 they're doing now. I think it's just annuals anymore.-

23 We used to do quarterlies. And then we did semi-24 annuals. And I think we're down to annuals now.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Were those -

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- rondo A Mr% A%IC KI LAI

63 1 - the ones that you did when you were getting 2 quarterly and mid-year, were they written or were they 3 just verbal?

4 Written.

S SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 6 whatever they said you were able to read or you could 7 read it first?

8 Yes.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

10 And you were expected to sign 11 it.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And who does 13 those for you?

14 -

15 16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Either one?

17 Either or?

18 Well, any of them --

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

20 Can do -- what it usually ends 21 up you have four Cos and say six --

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: NEOs?

23 JIM NEOs. And you've got three 24 supervisors. So they split them up. These three are 25 yours. These three are yours. These four are yours.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

64 1 There you go.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All 3 right. So you haven't seen yours yet so you don't if 4 it's going to be in there or not?

5 No.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 7 it will be in there?

8 I would not be surprised if 9 there's mention of it in it. And then we'll have a 10 discussion because personally my supervisors have 11 already expressed to me, "I don't know what you did 12 wrong. I know you went to the penalty box."

13 We were getting calls from other companies 14 because we sent it out. Boom. These guys messed up.

15 They did this. They did this. Then we get calls from 16 the other companies going, "All right we've read it.

17 What did they do wrong? We don't get it."

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is that right?

19 That's correct. We have --

20 well, one of the guys who used to work here. And he 21 called up. He's like, "Okay, I've read the whole 22 thing. What did they do wrong?" 7C 23 And they tried to explain it to him and he 24 goes, "Okay, well what did they do wrong?"

25 But there was a problem with the IPTE NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

65 1 execution. I shouldn't have ended up in the penalty 2 box for it. But now if you read the INPO web site, 3 your failed to take the mode switch in accordance 4 with our expectations. Well, I don't operate by 5 expectations. I operate by procedure. It was bad.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But wasn't 7 it actually in the procedures and just no one -was 8 aware of it? I mean --

9 It was an IPTE.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But isn't 11 that "part of the procedures" -- doesn't that, in 12 fact, become the procedure?

13 That becomes the procedure 14 they are operating by. But it's like any other 15 procedure you are doing. If have an EO out in the 16 field doing some procedure and he makes a mistake and 17 he effects reactivity in some way, I still respond in 18 accordance with my procedures. Not by what he's 19 doing.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I 21 understand.

22 I should have been made aware 23 that that was in the IPTE.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 But since I didn't sign on the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

66 1 IPTE, I don't know about the IPTE, I'm not responsible 2 for it.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Should you 4 even have been on the boards that day if you didn't 5 get the appropriate briefing?

6 No, I shouldn't have.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you 8 raise that as an issue? Did you say, "I really 9 shouldn't even be doing this. I didn't get the 10 training. I didn't get the briefing?"

11 No -- which is the only thing 12 I can actually say where maybe some of it sits in my 13 house is okay, I assumed that my supervisors, the 14 briefing they gave me with, "Hey, power is going to 15 come up a little bit on you here." Well, as a matter 16 of fact, it was, "The power is going to come up on you 17 kind of rapidly here. So you need to be ready to 18 range up on the IRMs."

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So they knew 20 that was going to happen?

21 Oh, yes. But if you read the 22 INPO web site, it says unexpected power rise. You 23 can't tell me I'm going to have to range up on the 24 IRMs and call it unexpected. Okay, now to the 25 magnitude -- 7C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

67 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It said that 2 -- it said that in the IPTE also? It said expect the 3 power increase?

4 0 You know what? Three weeks 5 later, I still haven't read the whole IPTE.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 a I've got excerpts of it here.

8 This is what it said. Okay, it took me two weeks to 9 finally figure out what I did -- what the termination 10 criteria was. It was like, "Hey, hey, what did I do 11 wrong? I can't get it."

12 And it was like -- on the second week, 13 they were like, "Oh, well the IPTE said any power 14 rise, you need to" --

15 I'm like, "Well, thank you. Now I know 16 why you are saying I should have scrammed it."

17 SPECIAL-AGENT NEFF: But when it came out 18 later, it says to do just what you did.

19 Well, when my procedures tell 20 me to do what I did. And then when a new IPTE came 21 out, the termination criteria is changed to what I 22 did. 3:

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I guess I'm 24 a little'confused. And maybe I don't understand the 25 sequence that well.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4Mend nU^M~ Beid AKIM AllU AI IA

68 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We're as confused as 2 you are, '

3 Oh, you have no idea. I was 4 so hostile for weeks.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When -- the 6 way I would expect, and you can correct me where my 7 misunderstanding is is if you are doing "an IPTE",

8 let's see, what does that stand for? Infrequently 9 performed task or evolution, right?

10 Infrequently performed task or 11 evolution, yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The premise 13 is is because it's unusual, you don't do it that 14 often, that you do a lot more up front planning and 15 briefing --

16 Yes.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- which I 18 would think would also entail having copies of the 19 full test or evolution with all the steps. And be in 20 a position to share them with the people that had a 21 role to play so that they, at their leisure, could 22 review that and know what things apply to them.

23 Hi All that's true.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, so was 25 that, in fact, do you think that happened? Whatever NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

69 1 that was either that same day or the night before when 2 it was done on the simulator?

3 Well, let me see if I can make 4 this clearer. I wasn't there. I don't know. I don't 5 know what they did.

6 They all were pretty much -- they all --

7 from what I understand, what happened the night before 8 was they showed up, said the procedure was junk, threw 9 it out and rewrote it.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 And then they did more of a 12 validation of what they -- their procedure they wrote 13 than actually training on it.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So they were 15 revising the IPTE procedure that they had brought in -

16 .

17 j The night before.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- to kind 19 of like do a verification or validation it would work.

20 Yes.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And revised 22 _

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How did they do that?

24 You'd have to ask somebody 25 that was there that night.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

70 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did they run that in 2 the simulator?

3 Yes, they did.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what point? When 5 they came back and said it was junk? Or --

6 No.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- after they got it 8 revised?

9 I They called in the shift that 10 was actually going to be there but they only called in 11 two Ros. And they needed three for the training.

12 There was some finger pointing on that, 13 too. It's like why didn't you call in three? If you 14 are going to do an IPTE on something that's going to 15 effect reactivity, maybe you should have called the 16 guy that was going to do water.

17 Maybe you should have called the guy that 18 was going to pressure. And the guy that was going to 19 run the reactor. A lot of finger pointing. "oh, I 20 didn't say only call in two."

21 "No, it wasn't me."

22 "It wasn't me." So --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Finger pointing at 24 who?

25 Amongst the OSs. Who said NEAL R. GROSS -

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

71 1 two? Who said three?

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was on when they 3 ran it in the simulator?

4 5 _ And the RO was played by a trainer.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The third RO that was 7 needed?

8 Yes 9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

10 Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they ran the IPTE 12 through the simulator one time? Or more?

13 I wasn't there.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you hear?

15 I I heard they went to run it 16 and said, "This isn't going to work." They started 17 trying to work through rewriting a new -- the 18 procedure they had --

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

20 -- arguments, differences of 21 opinion, one supervisor walked out.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

23 walked out. And 24 took over the IPTE training.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

.- ."A.._.

...... ..... A ._^,o^

1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

n,....r.... ....... A

72 1 l Mbothered by?

2 .n I don't know.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What did you 4 hear on that?

5 I just heard they were arguing 6 on operational differences. And I guess 7 wasn't happy with the way it was being run, walked out 8 of the simulator. Said, "I've had enough."

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, let me 10 -- let's back up to that a little bit. All right?

11 And just talk about that for a moment.

12 In some respects, that's the kind of thing 13 we're talking about. All right? Now I don't know --

14 again, I know you weren't there, but it's where the 15 shift is in a position where they are going to do 16 something. They feel uncomfortable with it. They 17 have a concern with it.

18 They want to feel that they can raise the 19 concern to someone with some decision-making authority 20 and say we have these concerns.

21 Okay.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And that the 23 concerns will be at least --

24 Addressed?

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

73 1 considered, yes, and addressed in some way. And it 2 almost appears -- and I know you don't know -- but it 3 almost appears that maybe had a concern 4 there, raised it t --

5 6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: --

7 conjecture but raised it. And then just said, "Hey, 8 we can't do this or whatever. It's not workable.

9 It's, you know, it's going to have to be rewritten."

10 And that's assumptions but --

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, 12 exactly. That's what I was saying, it was conjecture.

13 But then for whatever reason, he's just, "Okay, I'm 14 going to wash my hands of this."

15 And then he has some differences. The 16 next day, he's forced to be involved with the issue.

17 Oh, he probably -- I think he 18 came back later on that night to -- "All right, I'll 19 calm down," you know? But I know he did stomp out.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was anything altered 22 in terms of the procedures that they were going to be 23 using? Did they make any corrections or alterations?

24 Oh, yes, it was majorly 25 altered. They rewrote it.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

74 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

2 _ Fundamentally that's what it 3 says. You can go read the INPO web site. They 4 rewrote the procedure. That's why it wasn't a 5 training. It was a validation. They didn't train on 6 anything. They rewrote a procedure then did a 7 validation.

8 The original thing was they were going to 9 come down, SCRAM, close the MSIVs and end up on the 10 back panels of hipsie ricksie (phonetic).

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what 12 changed that?

13 I guess they wanted to do it 14 a different way.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who would 16 have made that decision? I mean if --

17 I guess those guys in that 18 room that night. Those guys, 19 I wasn't there.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 You would have to ask somebody 22 that was there. Hi .

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Understood. Right.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, we got 25 that.

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It- A klr Act IC M %A

75 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: But I guess I have 2 one more question on the -- you're saying that they 3 did -- if I have the order right -- they had a 4 procedure. They -- not trained on it but they 5 validated it in the simulator and still had concerns?

6 They had a procedure.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

8 They had concerns, didn't 9 think it was going to work. So they rewrote a new 10 procedure.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did they then go back 12 13 And validated that -- instead 14 of training on it, they validated it and, "All right, 15 I think if we do this, this will work. And do this."-

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you validate 17 that? Did they go back to the simulator?

18 No, they just stayed -- they 19 did this all in the simulator. None of this was at 20 the plant.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

22 This was all at the simulator.

23 So they rewrote the procedure right there. And had 24 time to do it one time. "You're out. Come in the 25 next day and do it."

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76 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where was the time 2 pressure on that? Why have time for that one time?

3 Because we had to shut down.

4 We had a bypass valve stuck open. And we had to shut 5 down and fix it. You know we had operational 6 challenges. And they wanted to get it done.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, was 8 there any risk in staying - - maintaining the status 9 quo? What power were you at before this evolution 10 started?

11 When I came in, I'm trying to 12 remember what we were in power. See, it was right 13 after we started up. That was the thing. When we 14 start it up, we opened up the bypass values, you know, is and then when you load the generator and all the 16 bypass valves go closed, one didn't close.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 18 you put the turbine on.

19 Yes.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Putting the 21 generator on. The generator was put on and you 22 expect to pick up load, expect the bypass values to 23 close down as the generator is starting to pick up 24 load, is that correct?

25 That's what I'm thinking -- I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4 Gus1 DLR-rC 1 ac kJr%- At~IC k1AA

77 1 don't remember --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you' re --

3 you've got to be low, like 15 to 30 percent, in that 4 range somewhere? -

5 When I got there, we were six 6 and one-half --

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 I -- seven percent.

9 'SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 10 you were lower.

II SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you had your 12 excursion, how high did you go?

13 A If you look at the charts, it 14 looks like we went from peak to peak six and one-half 15 to thirteen and one-half. And it was an initial drop.

16 We were sitting at about eight, drop, came up, settled 17 out.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What 19 actually caused the reactivity addition? Was it --

20 M The reactivity addition was 21 truly caused by the amount of amount of water he was 22 throwing at it when we had the pressure perturbation -

23 24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 -- drove level down. When the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

78 1 PO tried to recover level --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 you had that cold water 4 rushing in.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 - cold water, reactivity 7 comes shooting up --

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So it 9 was the cold water addition. It wasn't -- it didn't 10 have to do with like there wasn't a void collapse-type 11 issue?

12 Well, void sweeping.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 You just shot a bunch of cold 15 water in there.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right, okay.

17 And you drop level down in 18 here. And now level is coming up. And I've got a 19 whole bunch more cold water in so --

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 21 that's where the excursion came from?

22 ~That's where- the excursion 23 came from.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. What 25 -- once -- let's -- I want to just jump ahead for just NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

79 1 a quick moment. Once that happened and you guys got 2 stabilized, big picture, what happened from then on?

3 I mean did you -- where was the plant taken? Was the 4 plant left there? Or was it taken -- continued the 5 cold shut down? What happened from then on out?

6 First -- well, let's make sure 7 we get this right. First we had a little 8 perturbation.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

10 Just a little one. Then we 11 had the one that dropped it to six and one-half up to 12 thirteen and one-half and the back out.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 NO We stopped. OS called the 15 boil and such. And then the decision was made to come 16 down with pressure set slowly, you know, one pound per 17 minute, one pound per second, you know, dip. And we 18 just brought pressure down that way.

19 And then when got down in power and 20 pressure, we just switched to shut down. And don't 21 you know as soon as mode switch went to shut down, the 22 bypass valve closed.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It did? And 24 what was that attributed to?

25 A& Well, it jiggled. And I guess maw.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

80 it jiggled the bolt out of the way of the disk and it 2 went closed. When they opened it up, they found the 3 bolt matched up.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, okay.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What happened next?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Because you 7 are in hot shut down then, right?

8 Right, we're starting to cool 9 down.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 11 then you just cool down from there on out?

12 a_ j Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was the bolt 14 retrieved at that time? Or was it retrieved when the 15 plant was cold?

16 j It was retrieved in 17 maintenance afterwards.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All 19 right. So all the knowledge you have about the bolt 20 being there was after the fact.

21 2That's correct.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It was in 23 hindsight looking back on what happened?

24 That's correct.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1iiV RHnnf I'I Ann AVF N-W-

81 1 didn't --

2 ~ At the time all we knew was 3 bypass valve was stuck open. And when we hit mode 4 switch to shut down, that bypass valve went closed.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When it went closed, 7 was there any consideration given to going back up in 8 power?

9 That would be a decision made 10 way above me.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 12 any rumblings to that effect?

13 AA -Well,actually there was 14 rumblings that didn't want us to shut i5 down with it stuck open.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Didn't want to shut 17 down in the first place?

18 Right.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about in terms 20 of consideration to going back up in power once it 21 shut?

22 SPEI AI AGE I didn't --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you hear anything 24 about it?

25 II -- hear anything about that.

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82

1. SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you learn 2 about i not wanting to shut down when it 3 was stuck?

4 All I -- you know, rumor.

5 That him and argued pretty hard.

6 And let's say I don't know how much is true, how much 7 is a lie, how much is rumor.

8 But more than one person has expressed 9 that the reason this got blown completely out of 10 proportion was because was pissed off at 11 for shutting down in the first place.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So the fall out from 13 that when you had the excursion was --

14 Blown out of proportion.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And the remediation 16 and -- that's what you are attributing it to?

17 Right, bringing in INPO and 18 raising -- I mean I know I was way close to the 19 incident. But, I mean, there was a lot -- I mean the 20 REs were like we're classifying it like a three or a 21 four. There's nothing here. It's designed to do 22 this. This is what we're designed to do.

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What did you hear --

24 did you have any firsthand knowledge of what 25 position was at this time frame on --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS vwI nonn; IQI mamn ADIS &lus

83 1 SPECIAL AG NoT 2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- any of the 3 decisions?

4 5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the 6 concerns that you were hearing?

7 The only thing we heard was --

8 the only thing we knew for a pure fact was that 9 were mad that they were not 10 told immediately of what had occurred at Hope Creek.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You mean in regard to 12 the excursion?

13 e _ Yes.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: found 15 that out later when he was looking at --

16 Right.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- records.

18 - At the start up reports or 19 what that SORC (phonetic).

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. After the 21 fact?

22 I. After the fact.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who should 24 have told him that? I mean --

25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS A. 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

84 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, so 2 somebody way above your level, right?

3es.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Above 5 too? I mean would there have been an 6 expectation that call them? Or would it be 7 expected he'd call the AO?

8 I don't know. I don't know if 9 he should have called him.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Was 11 there any kind of long-term repercussions in this? I 12 mean was there anything that was like put out on this 13 within the station regarding the incident?

14 _ We did have -- " stood in 15 front of us and gave us a lecture on what happened.

16 The story has changed now. There's altering. More of 17 well, there was an IPTE problem now. And the guys at 18 the panels really didn't do a bad job. They actually 19 let us get out to here on our little map of blame.

20 And we brought it back in.

21 And he gave us a full explanation. And 22 it's much more sugar-coated than the version that 23 ended up at INPO. Or not sugar coated but the blame 24 is deferred a little bit.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you feel NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

85 1 like you were in some way blamed for the event?

2 Yes.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did the 4 other operators feel that way?

5 Yes.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did they 7 deserve it?

8 Somewhat.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What aspect?

10 I was -- from what I 11 understand, we shouldn't have been on the jack at the 12 time. There was a misunderstanding. And allowing the 13 jack and pressure set to cross was a bad thing. They 14 shouldn't have done that. And so there was some 15 things.

16 Everybody that was at this brief should 17 have known when to shut down, when to stop, when to 18 halt.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. What 20 happened when the pressure set and the jack crossed 21 each other?

22 Well, one took control and 23 drove pressure down. And when pressure went down, 24 then he tried to close it back up. When he closed it 25 back up, levels shot down. It got worse.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

86 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Isn't --

2 help me understand this because it's been a while 3 since I've looked at the way that the controls work.

4 But what I remember is if you were put on the jack, 5 you have the bypass valves in manual.

6 And you put a demand cycle in. You say I 7 want the valves to be open some amount. And you don't 8 really necessarily know what that is. You just know -

10 Oh, yes, you know what it is.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, you 12 have a signal there. But you just maybe raise it or 13 lower it or do something. And you know either you 14 want the valve to open or shut, right? It's some 15 small amount usually, right?

16 Yes.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And with the 18 pressure set, what you're referring to is the valves 19 are in automatic, you have a set point like 800 or 850 20 or 750, some pressure.

21 orrect.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And you put 23 that in and whatever the inputs are, primary or 24 secondary-wise, the bypass valves will modulate open 25 or closed to maintain that pressure.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

87 1 That is correct.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, now 3 what -- if the valve is in one mode or the other, how 4 can the other mode take control? I missed that.

5 If you drop the pressure down 6 with the jack --

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

8 - - below the pressure set set

.9 point --

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 then your pressure set 12 isn't controlling no more. And then if you take --

13 you've taken it down there, now you're starting a 14 lower pressure set, you took that back in control.

15 Somehow he ended up -- and besides we weren't supposed 16 to be on that jack when we were critical anyhow.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that --

18 was that something you learned after the fact? Or was 19 that --

C.

20 Ofh That was something we learned 21 after the fact. -- C..

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. But 23 at the time, was there any precaution or any, you 24 know, procedure that said hey you are supposed to 25 operate this way or that way. And what you were doing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 11vt pIrin;F mi Amn AVF NW

88 1 was inconsistent with that?

2 AM Well, actually what they had 3 was when we were shutting down, yes, it was the 4 shutdown before that, we were operating on pressure 5 set. And pressure set at low power is wrong. So tap, 6 tap, all right, there goes level. They thought they 7 would have better control with the jack.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

.9 Because see you are correct.

10 Now we're coming down in power and low power ranges.

11 You're sitting there and you're saying to yourself, 12 "Okay, I want pressure- here, okay?" So I lower 13 pressure set down to here and bypass valves open up.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

15 When you get bypass valves to 16 open up, as pressure comes down, right, you still have 17 pressure coming down, the bypass valves start closing 18 down, well, that brings pressure -- when you get these 19 coming down, you are going to have pressure set out 20 and all the bypass valves go closed.

21 You want to come down again, you open them 22 all back up again. And you set that same level 23 transient going on again.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

25 Now if you NEAL R. GROSS -

COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

89 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's like a 2 step change is what you're describing?

3 Right. You're step changing.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You make a 5 step change --

6 9SvMsr Riht.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and.then 8 pressure kind of will lag behind it.

9 Right. But now let's say you 10 get the pressure -- you open it up with the jack.

11 You've said, "I want this much demand coming out of 12 the steam."

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

14 That much steam demand is 15 coming out. And you slowly watch pressure decay away.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So it's 17 more even.

18 W Ot's more of a linear loss of 19 steam so you're going to be able to control it a 20 little bit better so you get less swings in the level 21 control.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 IThat was the theory.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yet that 25 would --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

90 1 I suck at drawing stuff, don't 2 I?

3 (Laughter.)

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That would -

5 6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You made a good 7 point. I could follow it.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, but 9 that would -- actually that would make an argument for 10 using a jack. Because you could set --

11 Vv~w-wow:Yes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- a small 13 demand --

14 That's why they did that.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- and say, 16 you know, have one valve I don't know, five percent 17 open or ten percent open and just leave it there.

18 - , Set a cool down rate.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Right.

20 And associate it with --

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And then 22 just set your feed or what have you 23 Right. B t 24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- to kind 25 of --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS I-^ , o , a . .11

....................

91.

1 But we weren't supposed to do 2 that when we were critical.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 And there's guidance for that.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

6 So 7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But that was 8 something that was learned after the fact?

9 After the fact. Nobody --

10 was under the impression that we were going to 11 do pressure set until we were sub-critical. And then 12 -- until we were shut down. And I guess somehow the 13 information got flip flopped and --

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. All 15 right. Was there any malfunctions that you were aware 16 of with --

17 Yes, there was malfunctions 18 associated with that.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there?

20 There was challenges on that.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

22 On the -- I guess there's a 23 potentiometer in the system that wasn't proper, wasn't 24 right, and would give you erroneous signals.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

92 1 any way--

2 -Andit was discovered after --

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- a 4 contributor -- was that a contributor to what 5 happened?

6 Yes, it -- from what I 7 understand, yes it was.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 9 there may have been something that didn't behave 10 properly during the event that exacerbated, that made 11 it worse or whatever.

12 Oh, yes, it's never just one 13 thing.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

15 When something goes wrong, 16 it's never just one thing. You can always deal with 17 one.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Was that something 19 known to be a problem as you entered into that? Or 20 was that something that came to light as you got into 21 your --

22 We knew we had problems with 23 the AC control. I don't know if they knew exactly 24 what it was. I was -- like I said, I wasn't part of 25 that part of the -- that was that section. Mine was NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 41~z7 t2Ufn%=1 ALM MICr KIn IAd I

93 1 in front of me with the reactor.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: All right. Are you 3 aware of why or what the concerns were that 4 'had in terms of shutting down with the valve 5 stuck open?

6 Actually, anted 7 to keep running from what I understood. wanted 8 to shut it down.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, in terms of 10 shutting down, not shutting down is what I meant. But 11 his -- where he was coming from, do you understand --

12 do you know what he was articulating?

13 Yes, production.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: He wanted to keep it 15 running?

16 That was my impression. Can 17 I say that absolutely? No.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Anything 19 further on that Scott?

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I did have 21 a question. I can't think of what it is now.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Let's take a quick 23 break because I need to test this again, okay? We'll 24 go off the record. It's about 2:34 p.m.

25 (Whereupon, the foregoing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

94 1 matter went off the record at 2 2:34 p.m. and went back on the 3 record at 2:34 p.m.)

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're back on.

5 It's about 2:34 p.m.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I just was

-7 saying it just seemed like this whole thing was salt 8 and peppered with a lot of different issues.

9 There was quite a few issues 10 associated with this. What upsets me about it is 11 people outside of Operations that really didn't have 12 a real good background, or feel of it was making 13 decisions effecting careers and people and equipment. d 14 And I walked away with a very bad taste in 15 my mouth because I couldn't say anything. I mean I 16 got bullshit answers that made no goddamn sense. And 17 I'm sitting there going -- I told them, I said, "Look 18 my abnormal tells me to stop the power rise and return 19 the reactor back to its pre-transient level. That's 20 what my thing says."

21 And I told him to stop. I told him to 22 stop. And I told him to bring level up slowly. And 23 that was controlling my power. You can't control 24 power by pressure level. You can only control power 25 by rise. Where the hell does it say that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

95 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that argument 2 with?

3 That wa 4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: With 5 But your comment before was that people outside of 6 Operations were making these decisions that effected 7 careers and equipment. Were you talking about while 8 the events were unfolding and while you were going 9 through it? Or were you --

10 No, I'm talking about the post 11 -

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- talking about 13 after the fact?

14 j The fallout.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you got your 16 penalty box --

17 Right.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- assessments --

19 Correct.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- and other.

21 Yes.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Wel 24 is not outside ops. He is --

25 No, but he -- my impression NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS an^.n r, *,fl tno s.,, ..... ,, *J Is,

...............

96 1 was -- and it's a pretty good one, that and 2 t didn't feel I did anything wrong.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

4 Or I wouldn't have not ended 5 up in the penalty box for the first week of it.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

7 Because I -- perfect example, 8 I didn't end up in the penalty box for a week 9 afterwards. Everybody else went right immediately in 10 there.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 I didn't end up for a week.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In fact you were 14 excused at first?

15 Oh, yes. And I pulled 16 critical. I started the plant back up. It's not 17 like, you know, and then somebody down the road made 18 a decision, no, he still has to go, too.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where do you see that 20 coming -- who made that decision? If your impression 21 is that it wasn't from 22 -I would say it would have to 23 be level. Because I'm 24 sure ~thought I was in the penalty box.

25 I know he thought I was in there.

7ka NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 41117 ouensrec ^10AknM\lC hi M

97

1. SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And prior to 2 discussing this whole incident is where you said that 3 you had a disagreement with where came 4 down on you personally on this incident. Is that 5 where you're going?

6 This is-what I do know, I know 7 my shop steward tol when said --

8 explained to him why I was in the penalty box and, you 9 know, or why these guys were pulled off shift.

10 And my shop steward looked at him, he 11 goes, "Oh yes, well the* wasn't pulled off shift.

12 He just pulled critical."

13 - oes, "Don't tell me that."

14 "Oh, yes, he's still at the plant right 15 now."

16 "Don't tell me that."

17 Then I'm out.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was that the 22 same day or a different day that they -- was it right 23 away that you found out oh you're in the penalty box?

24 I don't know. It's hard to 25 remember exactly when it happened. But it was like NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS j1q1 awnnrl Sl Afll A%,= M sw

98 1 within a day or two after I went to the penalty box.

2 He was not aware that I did not go to the penalty box 3 immediately.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

5 He was under the impression I 6 went.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But I mean 8 the action that to quote, "Put you in the penalty box" 10 I don't know.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 1I don't know. I just remember 13 coming back going, "Hey, God, that was 14 hilarious."

15 "What?"

16 "I just told you weren't in the 17 penalty box. He goes, "Don't tell me that. Don't 18 tell me that."'

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not so hilarious for 20 you, as it turns out.

21 You know there were parts of 22 me that was very uncomfortable for not going to the 23 penalty box immediately because I was part of the 24 crew. I wasn't happy about going. But I was like 25 man, I was part of the crew, you know.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

99 1 But that got explained to me why I didn't 2 go. And then also that was invalid.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you are talking 4 about when you got your explanation from 5 Exactly.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- on that. And you 7 see that, the actions taken against the crew you see 8 as -- because the crew went against what 9 wanted to do? He wanted you not to shut down?

10 Not so much the crew but --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Not the crew but in 12 talking about the shift as a whole, management?

13 I'm not saying -- I don't know 14 -- what I did tell you earlier was that the rumor was 15 those two went at -- and him went at it over 16 shutting down or not, shutting down when the bypass 17 valve was open. That is a rumor.

18 And then the impression would be given 19 that, "Hey, it went bad, I'm going to make you look 20 bad."

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. That's what 22 your take away is from that?

23 Right. You blew -- and blew 24 it out of proportion.

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At any point, did the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1VA7 RIInnF IRMANn AVF NW

100 1 argument -- what you learned about the argument 2 between at that point, because our 3 understanding is wasn't even onsite at 4 this point in time --

5 Right exactly.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- that it was 7 between 'J But at any point in time, 8 was there a discussion of not whether to shut down or 9 to continue to raise power but how to shut down? Did I10 the issue ever become how to shut down?

11 I don't know.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Had you ever heard 13 anything like that?

14 No.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You sort of 16 described that when you were talking about what the 17 crew was doing when they were validating procedure.

18 LI Right, now the crew, there was 19 a crew --

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They were 21 trying to figure out how to shut down.

22 Right. That' s correct.

23 Iwas not involved in that?

I #_

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Would he 25 have had any knowledge of that?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4a Dof r C 101 AbKr%AIC KI %AI

101 1 I don't believe he would have.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Let 3 me ask another question. You may or may not know the 4 answer to it but it relates to, you know, one of the 5 things we've heard in doing this review is that, you 6 know, there's a -- the way the industry is operating 7 today over the last two, three years, maybe more, is 8 different than the way it was seven, eight, ten years 9 ago because of cost pressures. You know, that you 10 have to be competitive, there's a lot of cost 11 pressures.

12 I agree with that.

.13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Have you 14 either in this incident or in other incidents or just 15 in day-to-day operations been exposed to things where 16 you felt like okay, well the reason we're doing this 17 this way now, today, as compared to, you know, years 18 ago, maybe slightly different, maybe greatly 19 differently, is because of the cost pressures.

20 Is there anything that would stand out in 21 your mind? I mean like in this incident, did you feel 22 like oh the reaso wants to stay up is, you 23 know --

24 Production.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

102 1 production, cost --

2w~w Sure.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: --

4 pressures, things like that. I mean does that -- is 5 that like part of the daily dialogue or is it just 6 something you infer? Or how do you get that kind of 7 message?

8 -Well, I mean once told 9 me that he is tired of -- the impression he gets is 10 the union always is safety, safety, safety. And the 11 management is always production, production, 12 production. And they're always butting heads.

13 And I think that comes -- on my 14 maintenance, we were -- me and 'were -- or our 15 resident were just discussing that online maintenance 16 is a product of competitive marketplace. And I'm 17 starting to question the feasibility of it.

18 I mean we saw online maintenance coming in 19 throughout the industry. And you saw outage times 20 dramatically drop. Now, take a look at the 21 statistics. Last year outage time is up 114 percent.

22 Outage times in the first half of this year -- oh, 23 well -- or no, the last half of last year, 38 percent 24 up. This year they're up again.

25 Now Davis-Besse skews the whole thing NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

103 1 because they're just all done. But the statistics are 2 not looking good for is this working. But yes there's 3 decisions made now that are production based.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you have 5 examples of something where you feel like it really 6 stands out? I mean you kind of mentioned that --

7 Well, the Bravo diesel we 8 talked about -- discussing earlier.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

10 This one where the rumor is 11 the discussion was production versus run with a bypass 12 valve open.

13 Examples of -- I'm sure you've heard this 14 one a million times since you're doing this. The off 15 gas flow rate incident.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

17 I'm sure you've heard about it 18 a million times.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Same time frame?

20 2003 March area?

21 Somewhere -- actually yes, I 22 think it was like -- because when it first hit, I was 23 in the penalty box.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

25 I was sitting in the penalty NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

104 1 box when they're like, "Hey, off gas flow rate just 2 took off out past the FSAR limits."

3 "You know, we'll give it enough time for 4 Engineering to evaluate."

5 What the heck is that? No. No, no, no, 6 no, no, no. You know what? You take the action, then 7 you give Engineering the --

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was the 9 action they should have taken?

10 You do not operate above that 11 level. I think it was 75 SCFM.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: There's a procedure 13 for it?

14 There's a procedure for it.

15 It's in the FSAR.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does that --

17 does off gas flow vary linearly with power? Or does 18 it -- or is it something that it's either like a go, 19 no go. It's based on whatever in leakages and you --

20 It's definitely based on 21 leakage and it does vary, you know, somewhat. But it 22 shouldn't have taken off to where it did.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 And when you have a bottom 25 line limit, I don't care what your excuse is, when you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

105 1 have a line, you don't cross it. You take the 2 actions, then you evaluate. "Hey, look, I'm getting 3 here, I'm getting here, I'm getting here. Got to this 4 line, we've got to do this. Shut it down. Forget 5 it."

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Kind of like 7

8 Take the conservative action.

9 You want to preach conservative decision making, you 10 reach the line that you shouldn't have crossed.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 You are across it. You have 13 no reason to be here. Do the right thing.

14 Just recently feed pump. "Oh, we've got 15 vibes too high. We need to drop to 95 percent and 16 take that thing out. Back it down. Do what the 17 procedure says."

18 "Oh, we'll let Engineering evaluate it."

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When was that?

20 1 This was just recently. A 21 couple months. -

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is it your 23 impression in these instances that are -- where the 24 actions aren't very timely or there is, you know, 25 postponement or stalling --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

106 1 iW It's irrelevant of time. It's 2 irrelevant of time. The bottom line is you have a 3 procedure. You follow the procedure. You have a 4 rule. You follow the rule.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I was under 6 __

7 You have to take the hit, 8 that's fine.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

10 As long as you have a 11 defendable decision.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I was under 13 the impression that for the off gas situation, there 14 was no action. It just said do not exceed it. But it 15 didn't say if you exceed it, do this. It just says do 16 not--

17 Do not operate above this 18 level.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

20 So you'd better get it below 21 the level.

22 *SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you would 23 interpret that to mean --

24 Shut her down.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

107 1 Back it off.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And if I 3 were to--

4 Come down in power --

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- if I were 6 to say, "Okay if you take -- let's say you want to 7 take the unit offline" --

8 _a" Yes.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- I would 10 say, "Okay, well do you have the ability to diagnose 11 and find where the leak is?" Is it?

12 Yes.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Why is that?

14 Because we can send gases down 15 those lines at any time and find the leak. You're 16 right. It would impede the amount -- ability to find 17 a leak.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, it's 19 not down the line, right? Isn't it a leak into the 20 condenser from anywhere?

21 From anywhere, that's correct.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you're 23 talking about gases down the line like it's through 24 off gas.

25 Right.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

108 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But, in 2 fact, it was really a leak -- it's an in-leakage to 3 the condenser.

4 And that's all fine. What's 5 the rule say? What's the law say? What does it say?

6 You don't come up with an excuse later on saying, 7 "Hey, well, we need to."

8 "No, do what you're told."

9 And then figure out, "Hey, figure out how 10 to fix it."

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, how 12 would you --

13 Get to follow it.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- if you 15 would have been on shift at the time, what --

16 I'd have done the same thing 17 li.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Which was 19 what?

20 Shut it down. We shouldn't be 21 operating here.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, he 23 didn't though. He didn't shut down.

24 No. He recommended to his 25 supervisor who said, "No."

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109 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. And 2 the justification for that was what?

3 "Want to give time to 4 Engineering to evaluate this. And we're going to 5 start looking for the leaks. We've got to have some 6 leak putting this much air into the off gas system."

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Wasn' t there 8 some of that -- wasn't that already ongoing? I mean 9 something like this --

10 (Whereupon, the foregoing 11 matter went off the record 12 briefly and went back on the 13 record at 2:49 p.m.)

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, we're on Tape 15 2, side A. It's approximately 2:49 p.m.

16 What you were indicating 4 , is that you 17 just don't understand if you have a rule that you want 18 -- it should be followed. You don't want to -- you 19 don't see there's a way around it.

20 And in this case, it was hold off and let 21 Engineering evaluate it. But you saw it more as a 22 rule --

23 Right.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- we won't operate 25 above this level. You were above the level, it should NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE_ N-W

110 1 be a shut down.

2 Yes. It should be. We did 3 what we had to do to maintain production.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. What about any 5 other instances that you see were the maintain 6 production above everything else? Do you have any 7 other examples?

8 Feed pump.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The feed pump? You 10 said that was a recent one. What -- how recent?

11 Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You said a couple of 13 months.

14 A couple of months.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What season?

16 Reed pump? Oh, I guess it 17 would be fall. Feed pump vibrations came up above the 18 norm set point. And they came above the set point 19 level, our book and procedures said, "Hey, guys, we 20 got to back out feed pump. Back it out until the 21 alarm clears."

22 "No."

23 "No? The procedure says you get to 11 24 mills, back it down until the alarm clears."

25 "No, we're going to give Engineering a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

ill 1 chance. Because we don't know if that's a valid 2 alarm. No other alarms are up around it."

3 "Okay."

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who said, 5 "oNo?"

6 Supervisors, CRS.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who were you dealing 8 with?

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Why though?

10 I mean why? What's --

11 Because he was trying to 12 validate the alarm, okay? Only one alarm is in.

13 Okay? So if you're seeing this rise in mills on one 14 vibration point, you should be able to collate that.

15 Someplace else there'B going to be some vibrations 16 felt.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. He's 18 doubting the indications?

19 Doubting the indications.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 But then he got information 22 from Engineering, you know, "It's a-valid signal.",

23 "Okay, let's take the action." I 24 "Yes, but we don't know" -- and they 25 hemmed and they hawed and they put it off and they NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RH~nF IMI Amn A%/= M*I

112 1 refused to do it.

2 Come down to the plate, it was actual 3 reading. And it was a displacement, I believe, it was 4 the pump.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 6 it's a bearing vibration?

7 It's not a bearing vibration.

8 It was a pump displacement.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Pump 10 displacement?-

11 In other words, the pump was 12 shifting.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Like a 14 thrust bearing?

15 Yes, like a thrust bearing 16 indication.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

18 'And we were gaining mills.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you had a valid 20 alarm?

21 We had a valid alarm.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long did it take 23 to get there? To recognize that?

24 I don't remember the exact 25 time frame, how long. I know --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

113 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was this all 2 on one shift? Or was it over a period of days?

3 _ Period of days.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You know 5 what, let me turn those ringers off.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, I don't know how 7 you--

8 Okay, I was wondering like 9 ,where is that coming from?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you control 11 that station there?

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Actually, 13 those are all off.

14 So anyhow, it was a -- but it 15 upset quite a few people because they're like just do 16 what you're supposed to do. You have a procedure.

17 You've hit the set point. Shut it down.

18 You've only got to go to 95 percent.

19 Hell, we're in the middle of starting it up. And it's 20 really not going to be a big production deal. They 21 were just too -- they didn't want to do it.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So that was 23 the Control Room Supervisor? And was the OS also --

24 you said he was --

25 Everybody was aware of it. I NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

114 1 got an explanation from 2 on why we were not backing that thing out.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And what was that?

4 Giving Engineering time to 5 evaluate it. We're not really sure it's really valid.

6 And then it's --

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever 8 like ask them in kind of a quizzical manner -- it 9 sounds you were kind of frustrated by this.

10 But, I mean, did you ever just say, "Is 11 there some reason why you guys don't want to take the 12 unit down in power or why you don't want to follow the 13 procedure?" I mean --

14 Oh, they got asked that by so 15 many people that week. "Why don't you just -- "

16 "It's not going to hurt you. Just do it."

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: They just 18 don't want to talk to They don't want to talk 19 to Hutton.

20 Actually I think was 21 aware of it. I don't know where all the decision-22 making process was on that. All I know is we had a 23 valid point and we were told not to do our alarm 24 response.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

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115 1 Not to follow the procedure.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: September? October?

3 November? When was that?

4 -} I don't know. But I'm sure 5 you can probably find out.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: One other 7 thing that's kind of puzzled me with this off gas 8 issue and this vibration issue.

9 Yes, I told you you heard them 10 before.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In looking 12 at these things and just thinking about how things 13 progress and, you know, and mentioning that, you know, 14 it's probably not likely a step change, if we go back 15 to off gas and off gas say maybe runs 20 to 40 SCFM 16 normally --

17 . Yes, 18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- it didn't 19 change from 40 to greater than 75 in like a minute.

20 I mean this is something that took place over some 21 period of time. Whether it was --

22 It wasn't a long period of 23 time. -ll 24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- minutes, 25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br />, days, whatever.

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116 1 I'd say days.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, days.

3 Isn't there some guidance on the part of Operations 4 Management or Engineering that says okay if there is 5 a trend in the plant where you're sitting there and 6 you take all these logs and you go God, I wonder why 7 I take all these logs. And you record all these 8 readings.

9 And all of a sudden, you start seeing the 10 readings come up. You're like okay, I read this, this 11 reading --

12 a Yes, I would. Here's the 13 other side of that coin. Turning from vibration, now 14 off gas was well monitored and hey, this is abnormal 15 early.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, was 17 there notification that was written early on? Do you 18 know?

19 I'm pretty sure it was.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

21 I'm pretty sure there was.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So 23 when it first started coming up to --

24 Yes. Now on the other hand, 25 the pump turbine vibes is not something you would NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE. N.W.

117 1 routinely -- well, you don't have any readings on it.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You don't?

3 No.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You just 5 have an alarm, that's it?

6 i Right, that's correct.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What about 8 a computer point?

9 You have a computer point.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 So, yes, you might glance at 12 it and, you know, and hey, there's the thing -- and 13 one of the problems was I think it alarmed at the same 14 point it was, "Back it out."

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, you mean 16 there's no margin.

17 There's no margin.

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So when you 19 get to the alarm point, you're already in trouble as 20 far as your ability to diagnose and troubleshoot the 21 problem?

22 Correct.

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

24 I believe that was the case at 25 the time.'

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118 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

2 Now post that incident, the 3 vibration level has been raised to I believe it was 4 like 20, 22.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Twenty or 6 twenty-two mills?

7 Yes.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what was 9 it before?

10 It was of displacement. It 11 wasn't of vibes.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. But 13 what --

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Eleven did you say?

15 It was eleven. It's much 16 higher now.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. You 18 mean when you got the alarm or whatever?

19 What they did was they went in 20 and said okay, yes, we can take this kind of -- and it 21 shouldn't have been 11, it should be at 20.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 Okay? So the set point has 24 now been raised. Okay?

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHonpF MISANn AVF NW

119 1 presumably the --

2 M So 11 is now acceptable and 3 now 20 isn't.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes and 5 there's appropriate justification?

6 And there's appropriate 7 justification for why that is.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 v  ! Of course, then again --

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

11 -- we also get answers like 11 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for MSIVs to go closed.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh you mean 14 for this plant -- the recent plant trip?

15 Yes.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Eleven 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br />?

18 Eleven to twelve hours is what 19 we were told the MSIVs would stay closed.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In what? In 21 training?

22 Yes. That was an Engineering 23 evaluation.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: To fully go 25 closed? Or to come off their open seat?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4§3i DUfl2C M 1I A&If AtIC MI %Al

120 1 Come off their open seat.

2 They would remain open 11 to 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. But 4 it took 32 5 Thirty-four minutes.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Thirty-four, 7 okay.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there 9 any repercussions from that event?

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're indicating 11 what? That maybe you don't agree with the Engineering 12 evaluation in the feed pump issue?

13 Oh, no, I'm sure it's 14 absolutely -- as a matter of fact, Engineering came 15 down and explained it directly to me. And all of them 16 really made sense.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They all seemed 18 reasonable?

19 Seemed reasonable.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I couldn't tell 21 because you tagged it with the comment --

22 No, I'm just laughing because 23 we've been joking about it all day. About the --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

25 - - you know, you get 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br /> NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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121 1 in 34 minutes. I guess we got an explanation that we 2 didn't ask the right question. Well, what question 3 was that? We asked when would the MSIVs go closed.

4 But, yes, it's a joke.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about any other 6 incidents since -- in recent months?

7 In recent months? I mean well 8 the feed pump is recent. The feed pump is very 9 recent.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes. Apart from the 11 feed pump.

12 W Where what? What would you 13 want to know?

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were you were 15 pointing to were incidents where you questioned, 16 basically questioned the decision making in keeping 17 things online. And questioning the procedures that 18 are not applied when they should have been.

19 And then there's some time --

20 I've got one where hey, the supervisor actually 21 listened.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

23 _ Where they went to do -- went 24 and used common sense. I'm not -- and they were --

25 common sense they're right.

7 (

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122 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Supervisor at what 2 level? CRS?

3 4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was involved 5 here?

6 7 . W 8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: s 9

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: f 11 Yes. We entered the AB for--

12 AB in six for dry well floor drain leakage. Increased 13 .15 in a 24-hour period. And it says, "Okay, boom, 14 you got to the .15. You must contact, boom, these 15 five people."

16 And it was four or five o'clock in the 17 morning. And they're like, "Oh, we'll wait until 18 eight or nine o'clock."

19 I'm like, "Look, you just got smacked 20 around. The NRC just told you you're not following 21 your procedures. You have no excuse for not -- for 22 being here and not doing this."

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What time frame is 24 this?

25 kAbout a couple of weeks ago.

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123 1 We just exited that AB --

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

3 W -- this week. Today. We've 4 been in for two weeks now. So it was in the last 5 couple week time frame when we entered the AB.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

7 - I said, "You entered the AB.

8 You've acknowledged you entered the AB. You need to -

9 - and I understand it's early in the morning. And I'm 10 sure these people don't want to be woke up.

11 "But you have a procedure. And these 12 people expect a phone call when you end up in these 13 ABs. And these are the people that you are told by 14 procedure to contact.

15 "And if the wrong cat walks in here and 16 says you entered it at 4:00 and these people didn't 17 get a call until 8:00, you're going to get smacked 18 around. You're going to -- there's going to be 19 negative repercussions for you not following your 20 procedure for four hours."

21 All right. Boom, buzzed them all. But 22 they were going to hold off. Using-common sense, you 23 know, what's the Vice President of Operations going to 24 do for dry well floor drain leakage coming up to .15 25 in a 24-hour period? Nothing.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

124 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Were they holding off 2 on the decision-making operationally? Or just 3 contacting these people.

4 N

• Just contacting these people.

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, so they were 6 doing what they had to do. It was they weren't going 7 to 8 Well, actually no. The AB 9 says you enter. And when you entered it because you 10 had this condition --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

12 -- you do the actions. And 13 the actions were contact these people.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, it 15 doesn't sound like there was any other actions other 16 than contact them.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Contact them.

18 ARight, that's all there was.

19 There was five people you needed to contact. Common -

20 21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: There wasn' t 22 anything about like going to find the leak or assess 23 the location of leakage or --

24 I These people need to be 25 notified that you have --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

125 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It was just 2 notifications --

3 dry well floor drain 4 leakages --

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- then but they were 6 holding off?

7 coming up.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 Normal daytime you'd do it, 10 but hey -- four o'clock in the morning, three o'clock 11 in the morning, whatever it was, common sense and 12 courtesy would say hey, eight o'clock. But when 13 you're going to be getting smacked around for 14 procedure compliance, somebody walks in and says you 15 entered at 4:00.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes.

1.7 This cat did not know until 18 ten.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Procedure compliance.

20 You did not --

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

22 l - comply with your complete 23 procedure for four, five, six hours. Why?

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In this case you 25 pointed that out them and they made the calls?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

126 1 They made the calls.

2 "You're right. Okay. I'll" -- I guess 3 they paged them all. Now some of them didn't call 4 back but that's -- "Hey, you did your part. You 5 followed your procedure." Defendable position.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You know 7 going back to the feed pump vibrations, you know, you 8 raised some interesting points about, you know, about 9 the procedure telling the shift to take certain 10 actions. And there being a delay in trying to get 11 Engineering involved and what have you.

12 Is that a standard thing? I mean is it 13 your impression that when a limit is exceeded or 14 approached or when there's something that mandates 15 some action, is it like a default position on the part 16 of the Control Room Supervisor and the OS that they're 17 going to say, "Well, let's call Engineering. Let's 18 get Engineering involved,"

19 I mean is that like an automatic, first 20 out of the box answer? Or is it -- or was it, "Now we 21 really don't know if that's a valid indication because 22 it's the only thing" -- I mean I guess I'm asking for 23 your judgment.

24 Because you're on shift. You see what 25 they see. They have a lot of redundant indicators.

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127 1 There's a lot of information that's available if you 2 want to get to it?

3 A I've seen in the last year or 4 two a lot more emphasis on Engineering evaluation than 5 I have seen in the past.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What's your 7 assessment of that? Is that a good thing or a bad 8 thing? Is it being used as an excuse to keep the 9 plant up more? Or is it that no, we really want to 10 involve Engineering. We want them to feel a sense of 11 ownership for the equipment. I mean what --

12 I -- there are some times I 13 get the impression -- and again, it's an impression, 14 that they are driven in the direction that would 15 maintain the plant in a running condition.

16 An evaluation on a -- say an AK400 JTSE 17 chiller, you know? Hey, we got a million trips on 18 this JTSE chiller. Is it operable? Is it available?

19 You know, "Well, all right. Give me an 20 evaluation that says this is running. This is 21 operable."

22 Even though -- so you get a CR, "Hey, if 23 it's shut down more than eight hours, now it's inop."

24 Why should you have to operate like that?

25 Why do I have to have that challenge to me? That, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1VVi nAc 101 AKIln A%IC Ae a..

12 8 1 "Oh, if I had to shut down the AK403 for for more than 2 eight hours, not it's inop?"

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So your 4 sense is it seems to be more as --

5 You know my evaluation?

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- a way to 7 extend the production to keep the plant op? To keep 8 running?

9 - To start it up. And, you 10 know, "Okay, we're getting an evaluation today on 11 YDLSRMs (phonetic) operable. I haven't seen it.

12 Don't know. But we know it's not operating right. We 13 know it spikes on period. We know it happens all the 14 time. But now it's going to be operable?" What?

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Wasn't that 16 a situation where there was a whole raft of 17 surveillance and additional testing that was done on 18 the instrument itself?

19 Basically from the detector, not including 20 the detector, but starting at the detector, putting 21 some sort of input signal in and tracing it out to the 22 input actuating device, whether it be the meter or 23 the, you know, if there is a trip function or alarm or 24 whatever, and all that stuff checks out. So it 25 implicates the detector.

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129 1 No, it's not the detector.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's not the 3 detector? So the detector's been tested?

4 Everything been looked at. We 5 don't know what the problem is. And we can't figure 6 it out. Bottom line. We are bringing in somebody 7 else. We are spending the money to bring somebody 8 else in to tell us it's EMI.

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: From where?

10 No one knows?

11 Well, we don't -- we have 12 actually today thrown up our hands and said, "We can't 13 figure this out. We don't know why it's doing it."

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: When you say 15 we, are you saying --

16 The organization.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: The station 18 __

19 Yes.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- as a 21 whole?

22 es.

.1Y 23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But do you 24 think they've made efforts, good faith efforts to try 25 and tell what the cause of the problem is?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

130 1s 2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. So if 3 you were running the organization, you'd feel 4 comfortable with justifying whatever was done?

5 _I would feel comfortable that 6 I've done everything. I've exhausted my resources to 7 say whether this will work or not. And to find the 8 problem of why it's spiking all the time.

9 I haven't seen justification for it being 10 operable yet because it still spikes. And I mean it 11 spikes. Off scale. Wait a few second. Come on back 12 down.

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about your 15 comment that in the past year or two, there's this 16 emphasis on Engineering evaluations? How did it work 17 before that emphasis was there?

18 I would be more apt to believe 19 that we were Ops driven, you know, Ops made decisions.

20 Now I think we don't make a decision without 21 Engineering being in it.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: At what level would 23 you have seen that?

24 I don't understand your 25 question.

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13 1 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When you are saying 2 that you were Ops driven with the decisions being 3 made, at what level are you talking about? CRS? OS?

4 Above them?

5 Pretty much. CRS, OS.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So right on the 7 shift, shift management level?

8 Yes. But I truly believe they 9 ask for it more than in the past.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They're asking for 11 the Engineer involvement?

12 Yes.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: More than you did in 14 the past?

15 Yes 16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you get 17 the sense, and I don't know if you have had the 18 opportunity to participate or see this firsthand or 19 maybe you just know secondhand, that -.- like if 20 there's situations like this that come up where there 21 is something that's exceeded or some unusual 22 condition, is there a bias on the part of maybe 23 Operations management to say, "Well, we don't really 24 know if this is valid."

25 Let's take the vibration thing. "But NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS

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132 1 we're not so sure. We don't know if it's that, you 2 know, critical. We don't see other changes."

3 I mean is there a -- some sort of attempt 4 to try and kind of like bias Engineering to make a 5 decision one way or another? To say, you know, make 6 the decision in the manner that gives us the most 7 production?

8 Or, I mean in watching those interactions, 9 do you get that? Or do you just get these are the 10 facts. This is what we know. Go off and do an 11 independent review. And come back with whatever the 12 right answer is, whether it's good or bad for 13 production.

14 It would be hard for me to say 15 that we influenced Engineering to make a decision to 16 say positive production.

17 But it would be even harder for me to say, 18 with the amount of times that they come back in the 19 production side of it, not to say that they didn't 20 feel the influence.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In recent 22 times, have they made any decisions that have resulted 23 in taking the unit off line? Or delineating it?

24 I mean other than like some of these more 25 high-level decisions, which it appears the new plant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCR1BERS 4 cDuf once l fii Able MP W

133 1 manager has made regarding when to take the unit off 2 or whether to take it off, has there been times when 3 Engineering very specifically said, "Oh yes, we did 4 this review on this issue. And it's not good. It 5 doesn't look right. It doesn't look like they're 6 operable. You'-re going to have to take actions to 7 shut the unit down. We'll have to go fix it."?

8 "That doesn't look right.

9 We're going to need to fix it". You know I know they 10 did. But I can't remember exactly what the --

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We'll go off the 12 record briefly, okay? 3:10 p.m.

13 (Whereupon, the foregoing 14 matter went off the record at 15 3:10 p.m. and went back on the 16 record at 3:10 p.m.)

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Back on. Still 3:10 18 p.m.

19 I'm sure they did. I haven't 20 -- the specific instance but I know -- I know in my 21 gut I know there's one there sitting there where they 22 went. "Nope, you need to take a look at this." I 23 can't remember what it was. I'm sure they have.

_7 Cor 24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you think 25 there might have been at least one instance where that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

134 1 happened?

2 Yes.

4--

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How about 4 the number of times that they said, "No, keep, you 5 know, it's not an issue. It's not a problem. Keep 6 running."

7 v---rs>SsOh, yes.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that --

9 Oh, yes.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- is that ii the standard .answer? Or --

-12 o I get -- I mean I can roll 13 examples out if you want them. I mean -- "Hey, you 14 need to trip the circ water pump when you reached 215 15 degrees in the motor.",, h 16 "Well, we're at 215."

17 "Well, you get 230."

18 "All right. We're at 230.".

19 "245."

20 "All right, we're at 245."

21 "270.

22 You go, "All right."

23 And they give you full explanations on why 24 they did this. "Oh, yes, well, the wrapping around 25 the wires, that doesn't break down until 245 degrees."

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135 1 "We're at 245."

2 "270."

3 Then what the hell was 245?

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're saying 5 their explanations do not well justify --

6 Sometimes their justifications 7

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- with the 9 indications.

10 right, you start asking 11 questions like, you know -- here's another one nobody 12 is really comfortable with where we sit there and go, 13 "Oh, throw your T-RAC (phonetic) safety relief 14 values."

15 How many do we have at high temperature 16 right now?

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I couldn't 18 tell you. Two?

19 Si 9 How many did we have before we 20 shut down?

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Three?

22 How many did we have before I.

23 last outage? About three or four, okay? How many 24 times did we raise T-mod (phonetic) the temperature 25 indication back up? A.,

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13 6 1 Right. You're sitting in three of four T-2 mods deep. You know, "Hey, I'm at 270 now."

3 "Okay, that's good." You know, where is 4 the justification for these things?

5 You know, hey, you know --

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, 7 doesn't the temporary mod, doesn't that have that in 8 it? I mean it's supposed to have a safety evaluation, 9 right?

10 Oh, yes.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you ever 12 read them?

13 Sometimes. This one was -- we 14 evaluated that it -- we've seen from Peach Bottom that 15 these target RACe are unreliable at 268 degrees. And 16 you have a potential for it to open up.

17 You know, you read them. You go, "All 18 right. I'm still not comfortable at 215 degrees. I'm 19 still not comfortable at 235 degrees." You know, when 20 has it blown by too much?

21 You know, "The torus is getting warm.

22 When is this thing going to open up on me?"

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there --

24 do they consider that? Do they ever consider like how 25 much -- like actual run time? Or things like that?

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137 1 Does that come into play?

2 I don't know if it does or 3 doesn't. I mean you'd have to ask an engineer. I 4 don't know.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You keep 6 logs on that though, right?

7 What's that? Our actual run 8 time?

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes. For 10 taurus cooling?

11 I For torus cooling, we -- let's 12 see--

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You have a 14 special log?

15 We have -- for torus cooling, 16 do we have -- torus blow down.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You don' t 18 have to keep track of how long you run --

19 An RHR pump?,

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, for 21 torus cooling, you don't have to record the start time 22 and stop time?

23 233 Sure.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And then --

25 In the narrative logs.

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138 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Oh, is that 2 right?

3 Yes.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But there's 5 not a special log for that?

6 For torus cooling? Not that 7 I remember.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, well 9 that would be unusual. Because most plants have an 10 assumption in their accident analysis that says RHR 11 doesn't run more than one percent of the time for 12 torus cooling. So if you work out the hours, one 13 percent is 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> basically. So you don't run more 14 than 87 hours0.00101 days <br />0.0242 hours <br />1.438492e-4 weeks <br />3.31035e-5 months <br /> a year on torus cooling.

15 Oh.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But the only 17 way to know that is to keep track of it. So --

18 I don't know. Because I don't

.19 remember.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay, I mean 21 there would be a potential ramification of having the 22 SRVs that leak too much.

23 Oh, I know.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You'd have 25 to run some torus cooling surveillance.

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139 I think we all know that.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

3 But we've had -- I mean so 4 that they evaluated good.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: How high do 6 temperatures get? You said they get to 260-si ome 7 degrees?

8 I don't remember how high.

9 No, I think it got jacked up to 260 degrees at one 10 time. Damn, I'm trying to remember what did it get up 11 to. Because we were like three T-mods into it.

12 I came in the log at 220, so it went to 13 225. Got jacked out of there to 230, 235. So I'd say 14 it ended up 235 or 240 --

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

16 -- is a good round number to 17 where it got up to. Because it shot up three T-mods.

18 And I think they only raised it like five degrees each 19 T-mod.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay. Okay.

21 So, and then at 235 degrees, 22 I'm sitting there going, "Oh please, don't open up."

77C 23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: We don't 24 know this. And we've kind of covered a lot of 25 territory. We've talked about a lot of different NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS s2no2 0ownc II &Kin AMrIC MW

140 1 events and issues.

2 And we've discussed a lot of nuances in 3 the way the plant the works and all that. And the way 4 the organization interacts with different departments.

5 In considering some of that and thinking 6 back on it, and again, this may be firsthand, it may 7 be secondhand, things you've heard, do you still feel 8 like there have been things that have come up where 9 people felt free to raise issues without feeling like 10 there's going to be some kind of consequence, you 11 know?

12 I said that in the beginning, 13 yes, I have no problem with raising a concern. I 14 don't feel there is a consequence for raising a 15 concern.

16 The only thing I could possibly imagine is 17 raising a concern with a low expectation of 18 resolution.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you feel 20 that that same feeling would exist with someone who 21 wasn't in the union. I mean you kind of have the 22 union to protect you, right? I mean the union has 23 rules --

24 [ Yes.

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- you're NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1123 RHOnF IRI ANn AVF NW

141 1 unified --

2 That I understand.

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- you know 4 and yet maybe a CRS or an OS, they're first line 5 supervisors or second line or whatever, they don't 6 have that protection.

7 That's correct.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So --

9 And yes, the answer to that 10 question is yes. There's more than one supervisor at 11 one time said, "Go ahead, tear into them because 12 (inaudible) you know?"

13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Has it been 14 on some of these issues we've talked about?

15 There's some. As a matter of 16 fact, I did mention one where, you know, "Find me a 17 reason to not run this."

18 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That was the 19 diesel one?

20 Yes. "Find me a reason. I 21 don't want to run it either." Jc 22 But they don't have the -- hey, I totally 23 believe that the reason I ended up in the penalty box 24 is because somebody didn't have the testicular 25 fortitude to look up and say, "No, this is wrong. No, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 4-21b'3 OUnU "em AkIv ac C 1 AI

142 1 you' re wrong."

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about other 3 situations where they may hesitate at that level to 4 raise concerns? What other ones --

5 I don't know if they -- don't 6 get me wrong. I don't know if it's they hesitate.

7 But once the decision is made, I don't think they have 8 the ability to challenge. Or they're not a team 9 player.

10 And I've heard that on many occasions from 11 the supervisors. "Yes, you got to go along or you're 12 not a team player. And your advancement is done."

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So they won't push 14 back?

15 4 Not very hard. Very, very --

16 pick your battles kind of situation. Yes, I have had 17 more than one like that. "You've got to have the 18 union with protection because they can say the things 19 I'm not allowed to say." 76 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Now do you see that 21 crossing over into areas that -- one that you threw 22 out as an example was where they didn't stick up for 23 you in terms of that discipline. Or remediation if 24 you don't want to call it discipline.

25 They weren't sticking up for you and your NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

143 1 position in that when they -- clearly they told you 2 they didn't see you as liable for part of that 3 problem.

4 At one point. Then all of a 5 sudden now I was.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, right. But 7 what about in terms of its effect on the safe 8 operations of the plant? If they have a concern, can 9 they push that? Do they push that?

10 I would love to be able to say 11 -- as a matter of fact, I will say that I certainly 12 hope that nobody would put nuclear safety second to 13 their career. I would like to believe that everybody 14 in that control room, if nuclear safety was an issue, 15 would right off say, "No, I'm not doing this."

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You say you would 17 love to say. Are you in a position or have you 18 observed anything to the contrary?

19 (inaudible) 20 -- of our license.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right.

22 jj So that would make me question 23 what they would do. But I would think, I truly 24 believe that most everybody in there, when faced with 25 a decision on nuclear safety, would do the right

. S'C NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ingi RHmnnF II ANf AVF. N.W.

144 1 thing.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, you 3 know, what's interesting is we've covered a lot of 4 these issues and a lot of the incidents. And some 5 have nuclear safety elements, some don't.

6 And I'm sure that for each person 7 involved, they have their own opinion on whether 8 something is a nuclear safety issue or not. Or 9 whether it has reached the threshold.

10 And they might answer the question that we 11 asked the same way you did where yes, they would feel 12 free to raise it as a nuclear safety issue.

13 But, you know, in some of these instances, 14 like you mentioned off gas, there are things that are 15 "potentially nuclear safety issues." And maybe 16 they're significant, maybe they're not.

17 And maybe has somebody knowledge than you 18 do or that I do and they could make a better judgment 19 about it.

20 But aren't all these things, and these 21 interactions, aren't these challenges that are really 22 kind of going unanswered, I mean that people are 23 saying, "Hey, I had this concern, I had this issue.

24 And, you know, it didn't get addressed."

25 Or it was, you know, I think you said once NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

145 1 a decision is made, you know, no one can, you know, no 2 one can push it any further or they just get viewed as

-3 not being a team player.

4 Isn't that --

5 I'm talking one person.

6 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Aren't those 7 -- I mean aren't some of those maybe borderline 8 nuclear safety issues? You know, you could argue they 9 are or they aren't, depending on how you happen to I 10 feel that day?

11 I mean (inaudible) yes, you kind of 12 indicated maybe that was.

13 I Oh, yes. And thank God I was 14 in the penalty box. Hey, starting up diesel. You 15 know, it might be nuclear safety or industrial safety.

16 But we would have had a go if it was -- I was told to 17 push that button. I put it off.

18 The guy that told me find a reason not to 19 start it, I found a reason. But the bottom line was 20 I wasn't going to start it anyhow.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let me ask 22 you something.

23 We were going to absolutely 24 get me relieved. X ,

25 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: All right.

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146 1 Here's the question.

2 S Here's the thing. And I'm 3 sure you've heard about this incident.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Before we get there, 5 did you identify the individual on that already?

6 , What's that?

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When we talked about 8 the diesels? Who told you to find a reason not to 9 start it?

10 Yes.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who was that?

12 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. Your 14 okay?

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Let's not --

16 I don't want to give up on that. I want to stay with 17 that for a minute. And we'll come back to yours. Let 18 me just ask a follow up.

19 If you were to say to your supervisor or 20 to someone in power, let's say n the control 21 room, you say, "I want, you know, I want you to do 22 that." -j 23 And you say, "No, get me a relief."

24 And then he says, "Okay, I'll do that."

25 And you say, "Okay, now that you're going NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS vAwn RPHnn ImIiAhn Avt/ m W

147 1 to get me relief, I'm going to go right to the phone.

2 I'm going to call OSHA up. And I'm going to tell them 3 what happened."

4 What do you think would happen in those 5 instances? You're directing me to do something you 6 believe is unsafe from an industrial safety 7 standpoint.

8 Or, conversely, it's a -- what you 9 perceive to be a nuclear safety issue. Maybe it's the 10 off gas issue. You're in the control room. You know 11 the NRC. "Fine, get me a relief. And as soon as I 12 get out of here, I'm calling the NRC."

13 What do you think would happen under those 14 circumstances?

15 I don't know if I was very 16 scared of that. But I don't know.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did you ever 18 consider that? I mean -- or --

19 Did I consider it? Yes, I 20 watched it. And I'm sure you heard about it, too.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But there's 22 a big difference in you making that --

23 I watched what happened with 24 You think I'm not going to sit there and say, 25 "Whew, it's going to get ugly."?

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148 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Did he call 2 the NRC?

3 No. It wasn't an NRC -- it 4 was a -- I'm sure you heard about it.

5 got told by "You're not to operate by--

6 you're not to be working operating the plant by 7 Historian (phonetic), the computer program that gives 8 us all our" --

9 He said, "Okay, then I'm not signing on 10 the computer. You don't want me to use Historian to 11 operate the plant, I ain't looking at. Not going to 12 get distracted."

13 Then two days later when a supervisor 14 says, "I want you to train me this on Historian," he's 15 like, "Hey, I'm not touching Historian."

16 And I guess they got into a brouhaha, and 17 they both locked butt. Said, "Hey, I'm not doing it."

18 "I've told you to do it. And I'm the 19 supervisor. And you'll do what I tell you."

20 "I've been told by your boss's boss that 21 I'm not to be on here. And I'm not doing it."

22 Escorted him off site and took his license.

23 We got into it. And it wa 24 at the time. He came out because I was in training at 25 the time. He came out to explain to us, you know, if NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W

149 a supervisor tells you what to do, you're going to do 2 it. It's like (inaudible) 3 I answer to you guys because you've given 4 me a license. I have taken my responsibilities of 5 protecting the health and welfare of the general 6 public from you guys. So I answer to you. But I also 7 answer to them.

8 And these guys come up with this stuff, 9 you know, "You'll do whatever your supervisor tells 10 you. "

11 "No, I still have to have the questioning 12 attitude." And if I think it's wrong, I'm not going 13 to do it.

14 Well, was under the 15 impression that hey, if your boss tells you to do 16 something, that's his role. You do it or you get the 17 hell out of the control room. Yes, yes, yes.

18 You can't have it both ways. Because 19 we've had guys say, "I'm not going to do it. This is 20 wrong. I've been told not to do it. And I'm not 21 doing it," -- gets escorted off the site.

22 The guy tells his supervisor, "Hey, this 23 is wrong, bad things are going to happen if you do 24 this."

25 "I told you to do it," does it, he gets in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

150 1 trouble.

2 So no matter what happens, if the 3 supervisor's wrong, I'm getting in trouble. I'm 4 putting my job in jeopardy every time the supervisor 5 is wrong. I mean that's the way he wants that pie.

6 It ain't worth it.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They gave no weight 8 in that situation to the fact that had 9 directed to do something different?

10 No. They escorted him 11 offsite, took his license.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because it was the 13 first -- the next line supervisor who was giving him 14 the order?

15 Yes, escorted him offsite.

16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Was there --

17 what happened with him?

18 He had to go through a 19 remediation plan and eventually he got his license 20 back. But it was such a brouhaha, that the union 21 pulled every off shift rotation off shift. It was so 22 wrong, we said, "All right, fundamentally screw you.

23 We're all coming back off shift. And you can work 24 your workweek by your goddamn self. We're not helping 25 you no more.

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151 1 "All the voluntary off shift rotations we 2 used to do, no. We're all back on shift. See you."

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And what 4 happened with that? Was there any attempt to try and 5 cajole the people who went off shift back to work?

6 Oh, of course. But no, "We're 7 not doing it. Up yours. We'll do it when we're on 8 shift. You want us to do this work week work? Assign 9 it to me when I'm on shift."

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How long di 11 stay out?

12 Six weeks. I don't remember 13 exactly the length of time of his penalty box. I know 14 __

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you stay off 16 shift?

17 j What's that?

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Away from the work 19 week stuff for that amount of time, too? Did the rest 20 of the union?

21 Oh, yes, because as a matter 22 of fact, we're just getting back on it now. And that 23 was a while ago. That was almost two years ago. And 24 we're just getting back on where we're starting to 25 fill the off shift rotations again.

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152 1 But yes, you can't have it both ways. Do 2 whatever your supervisor tells you. Or have a 3 questioning attitude. Like my incident, "You ranged 4 up on the IRMs, I you should have been taking 5 notice to shut down."

6 My supervisor told me point blank, "you're 7 power is going to be coming up on you. Range up on 8 the IRMs." What am I supposed to do?

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you --

10 II'll give you another example.

11 "Open that RACs 12 valve."

13 "You're sure that downstream line is 14 totally filled and vented?"

15 "I've checked it out. That downstream 16 line is filled and vented."

17 "You sure about that? I'm not sure I 18 should be opening that valve, I haven't heard 19 from (inaudible) yet."

20 "I'm telling you to open that valve. I'm 21 telling you right now to open that valve."

22 "All right."

23 Boom, the RACs pumps go away. gets 24 counseled. It's like how do you end up in the 25 discipline process for doing exactly what your boss NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

153 1 told you. But he's going to. And he did. Because he 2 followed the instructions of his supervisor, 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is this after the 4 incident?

5 No, it was actually before.

6 It was one of the ones we used for! Okay, 7 he's wrong because he opened the valve because his 8 supervisor told him to. Even though he told his 9 supervisor not to do this.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What was 11 response to that?

12 "Oh, that's good input."

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What happened to 14 15 I'm sure he got the same thing 16 that " got. I don't know. They don't have to share 17 that with us.

.8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right. You don't 19 know the details.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is it your 21 perception, though, that if there is some sort of 22 discipline of any sort or some remediation, that the 23 supervisors get the, you know, equivalent or, you 24 know, some amount of it?

25 The answer to me was, "I don't NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. NW.

154 1 owe you an explanation."

2 Because I asked when I went to the penalty 3 box, "Why in the hell am I sitting in the penalty box 4 with all these guys and arenit 5 in here with me?"

6 "I don't owe you an explanation."

7 "Okay. You're right. You don't" 8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Who said 9 that?

10 "I don't owe you an 11 explanation for what I do to those people."

12 "You're right. You don't."

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Which leaves you with 14 I don't know if anything happened to them at all.

15 Right, right. And I don't 16 care. It really doesn't matter that much to me. It's 17 just, you know, the perception is to everybody else 18 these are the five guys that are messed up.

19 Oh, hey, these are the three people who 20 set them up.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 22 they got some disciplinary action or some --

23 I don't know.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- some 25 counseling or something?

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155 1 I don't know.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you bring out all 3 the incidents you wanted to? There was -- you were 4 going to go somewhere before when we were talking 5 about (inaudible).

6 Oh, I don't know. I don't 7 know how many years ago this was. Raising power when 8 we had a tripped feed water heater. Nobody saw the 9 feed water heater was tripped after a lightning 10 strike.

11 And the ROs going, "Look, I got way too 12 much power here for where I am. Something is wrong."

13 They called the RE. The RE's like, "Oh, 14 yes, it's all right. Oh, yes, xenon bowl, xenon 15 roll."

16 "No, we're way too high in power. We need 17 to stop and take a look at this."

18 "No, no, we can keep on going."

19 "All right. I'm telling you," three times 20 he told him, "We're way too high in power. There's 21 something wrong here."

22 Now, granted the valves were right here.

23 He had a big mess of valves and little red and green 24 lights. But nobody saw that the fuel water heater had 25 isolated. Extraction team (inaudible) isolated. And NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

156 1 we were actually making more power than we should have 2 been at that time by sending cold water to the 3 reactor.

4 But the man told him several -- three 5 times, "Whoa, something's wrong." And they continued 6 to want him to start up.

7 Final red warning because he started the 8 reactor up. When he's sitting there saying, "It is 9 wrong."

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does this 11 stuff -- when there is this discussion, does this get 12 logged? Is there something that says -- basically 13 provides a record that says, I'm going to put a 14 recommendation in my logs that I -- or put a note in 15 my logs that I discussed this with you?

16 There's fact finder notes.

17 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And it says 18 __

19 And sometimes we put it in the 20 logs. And sometimes we write a notification.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is there any 22 kind of repercussions if you write in the logs? Like 23 if you feel like something is not right or you feel 24 like there is -- you have some concern about 25 something, and you write a note in the log, and you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

157 1 say -- you tell the supervisor and they still want to 2 proceed, just like we were describing, you say, "Okay, 3 I'll do it but I'm going to write a note in the logs 4 first," do you get a lot of -- do they give any kind 5 of --

6 You know what, I want to make 7 this perfectly clear. You get a group of ten people 8 together everyday for years on end, you're going to 9 have a conflict. Sooner or later, you're going to 10 have a conflict.

11 Do I think that you're going to get two 12 people mad at each other for a short period of time 13 because he's going to put something in the logs?

14 Sure.

15 But do I thing it's going to be long-term 16 repercussions for it? No. We're all men. We all get 17 over that kind of stuff.

18 Is there going to be any repercussions for 19 it? Probably not. I would hope not.

20 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: See I would 21 think that the supervisor, if he's directing you to do 22 something, he or she is directing you to do something, 23 and you're saying -- and it's against your better 24 judgment and you put something in the logs, what that 25 really means is if there's some consequence, that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

158 they're saying, "I'll take the hit for whatever happens."

3 i You're so naive. You're so Mo ., il 4 naive..

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.

6 That's naive.

7 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is it?

8 Yes. The man told me to range 9 up on the IRMs. I got sent to the penalty box for not 10 taking them other switches to shutdown.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And you 12 don't think --

13 . And he told me power was going 14 to come up.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And you 16 don't think --

17 He told me I was going to be 18 briefed separately.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- that's 20 unfair? You think that that's fair?

21 No, I don't. But that's why 22 I'm saying you are naive. He didn't take the hit. I 23 took the hit. ---

--- rC 24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, he 25 took a hit, too, right?

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

159 1 - , He took a hit, too. But you 2 just told me I should be absolved because you did 3 exactly what your supervisor said.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But didn't 5 you tell me if it comes up on your performance 6 appraisal or your --

7 Oh, we're going to go. But --

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So you feel 9 that way, too.

Usi 10 I do.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

12 13 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

14 But it isn't like that.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I'm not 16 saying how it should be. Or how --

17 Well, you're saying how it 18 should be. It ain't like that.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- how it 20 should be but this is how it really is.

21 This is life.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 Yes. And it is funny, it is 24 funny because one of the guys I went to initial I42

.1 25 license with, when the -incident hit, of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

160 1 course, it's going to be a big, hot topic of 2 conversation in the room.

3 And one of the supervisor-trainees at the 4 time looked at me and goes, "Well, I would expect if 5 I gave you an order, and you said, 'I think this 6 is wrong. We shouldn't be doing this.' And I tell 7 you, 'You will do it.' And you follow my order, 8 you're clear. You're covered. I took the weight."

9 I said, "Right. 9that ain't the way 10 it works. You're naive."

11 This hit -- all right, I came back to, 12 after I got back on shift. I said, "Hey what 13 do you think of that stupid statement you made in 14 training?"

15 He goes (inaudible) 16 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you think 17 in hindsight, do you think "061 do 18 you think they could have said something on your 19 behalf or did say something on your behalf to say, 20 "Look, this is what happened. We told to" --

21 Do you mind a quote with foul 22 language in it?

23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Go ahead.

24 INPO sitting there, 25 giving the evaluation on the final report on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS l 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

161 1 my incident. looks ata 2 the INPO guy, he goes, "You know what? After I go 3 through all this stuff, you know what I figured out?"

4 says, "No, what?"

5 "We fucked Bottom line, we fucked 6 him. He got blind-sided, he got told to do the wrong 7 stuff, he asked the right questions, and followed the 8 right procedures, and we fucked him."

9 "Oh, you can't say that. You can't say 10 that."

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who took that 12 position?

13 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: No, no, no, who said, 15 "You can't say that."?

16 he Bar evaluator of 17 the incident.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF:

19 20 No, he's our-21 - he's PS's guy. The was with him.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And he says, 23 "You can't say that."?

24 h, you can't say that. He 25 is part of this.",

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

162 1 It's like, "No, we screwed him. We 2 screwed him royal."

3 So yes, stood up.

4 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes, but 5 that's at the end. What about --

6 No, he stood up through the 7 whole -- pretty much, I can't --

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What about -

9 10 thoug

-- set me up, I 11 can't blame him for the fact finding part of it 12 because he pretty much, "He did exactly what I told 13 him to do," through the whole thing. "He did exactly 14 what he was told to do."

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: So he --

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: It came down on you 17 anyway? It still landed on you.

18 Oh, he don't have any choice.

19 I mean it wasn't like he said, going to go to 20 the penalty box." He's in the penalty box, too.

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Everybody

. -A.

22 gets painted with the same brush.

23 A_ ,Exactly.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You' re under 25 the same umbrella. You were involved.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

163 1 e~wa7Right.

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Whether you 3 had nothing to do with what the outcome was --

4 Pretty much.

5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: -- you're 6 all painted with the same brush.

7 ~Yes.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Good. I had some 10 follow up questions for you on that. We were talking 11 about people's ability to raise concerns. And what 12 you think they would do onsite.

13 Are you aware of any other situations? A 14 lot earlier we described a situation involving SAP 15 where it was -- at least to your knowledge rumored --

16 that at the OS level someone who criticized SAP had 17 been retaliated-against. But that's --

18 A No, I didn't say he was 19 retaliated against. I just said he raised a concern.

20 Nothing happened. I don't know if he was retaliated 1t:

21 against. I know it was not received warmly.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I thought we were 23 going to -- was there any adverse effects? I mean 24 that's the same thing. We're looking at any adverse 25 actions taken against somebody.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

164 1 And you had said not firsthand but this is 2 something that you had heard about.

34 -A Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're going back 5 there in '99/2000 time frame. Anything since?

6 Anything more recent in terms of someone who pushes a 7 concern where -- whether it happened or not, are you 8 hearing that type of --

9 Pushes a concern and gets 10 retaliated against?

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, you raise a 12 concern and you get retaliated against.

13 Not really.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Can't think of 15 anything?

16 No, not off the top of my 17 head. I know if -- I have -- how can I put this.

18 Same thing that told me. They don't owe us an 19 explanation on their decision making.

20 But I'm certain it has been expressed to 21 me that you're not a team player with the management 22 guys, amongst the management guys. So I don't know if 23 they are as apt to bring up a concern as union guys 24 who have protection.

25 It's been expressed to me on more than one NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

165 1 occasion that there are some people they need to keep 2 in the union because they are people that do bring up 3 concerns. They are loud. And they need that because 4 sometimes they don't have as much voice.

5 They have to be careful of what they say.

6 As what we can say because we do have union 7 protection.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're hearing 9 this from -- at the--

10 Supervisors.

11 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- CRS, OS level?

12 CRS level, OS level, 13 certainly.

14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Who -- at the CRS and 15 OS level, who do you hear it from that have this 16 concern about challenges, as you say, challenging 17 decisions that have been made?

18 - I've just been told.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You already 20 mentioned one, so --

21 Which one was that?

22 23 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.

24 Yes, he did mention it once.

25 But I mean I've heard it a couple of times.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

166 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: But do guys 2 like -- or women like 3 I mean are they saying that because, you know, you 4 talk about this incident with the feed pump and the 5 vibes. Is there some reason why they feel like they 6 can't follow procedure? Are they --

7 :I don't know what they're --

8 why they --

9 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do they come 10 to you and say, you know, or maybe not come to you but 11 do you overhear them talking to somebody and they say, 12 "Yes, I'd like to take the unit offline. I'd like to 13 follow procedure. But I'd get hammered in my 14 performance appraisal if I did that."?

15 - Oh, please, I mean they're all 16 concerned about their performance appraisal. But 17 again, I'm going to stress that when it comes to 18 nuclear safety, I would hope that their performance 19 appraisal would fall second, third, fourth. I would -

20 -I would -- I just would--

21 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER -BARBER: What would 22 happen if that pump failed and it started a transient 23 that we ended up -- it ends up being some big, big 24 industry event? I mean how do you track back that 25 decision and then -- that led to all these other NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

167 1 complications?

,X;^as -

2 Yes es. I mean --

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: You know, 4 and there are a lot of things that are like that.

5 Where it's a small incident here.

6 Do you know what they'd jerk 7 it all the way back to? An incident where we had a 8 power perturbation. Do you know where they drug it 9 all the way back to?

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: What?

11 Derating the aux boiler.

12 That's where our little evaluator drug it all the way 13 back to. The root cause of the whole thing was 14 derating the aux boiler.

15 And you're sitting there saying, "How does 16 derating the aux boiler causing a power perturbation 17 in a reactor?"

18 Well, that's what they drug it back to.

19 "Well, we couldn't run on seals because your aux 20 boiler couldn't handle the seals. So we were afraid 21 it wouldn't handle the seals. So we had to come up 22 with this IPTE, which caused this, which caused that, 23 which caused that."

24 You can always drag it back to something.

25 I would hope -- I have faith that most guys, if NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

168 1 challenged, would do the right thing.

2 But do I have confidence that they would 3 absolutely be absolutely sure that they had their 4 ducks in a row before they did anything, oh, yes.

5 Would they second guess themselves, yes, they would.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What about your 7 comment on -- where management -- where from the CRS 8 and OS level, I think to capture you accurately, what 9 you were saying is that they see that there are 10 certain people they need to keep in the union --

11 :Ys 12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- to have a voice 13 there. And it's --

14 It's a good thing to have them 15 in the union because they are loud and they are not 16 intimidated and they will bring up concerns.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And they're 18 protected.

19 They have the protection to be 20 able to do that. And it's a good thing to have a 21 voice through them.

22 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Is it just that 23 they're noting that it's a good thing that you have 24 people who are vocal and happen to be within the 25 union? Or is this --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

169 1 e~s.

2 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- some sort of a 3 strategy that says, "No, we're not going to promote 4 you to the CRS level."

5 WOh, no.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: "We're keeping you 7 here because we need you here."

8 I don't think it is a 9 strategy. But it's a good thing to have them.

10 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Noted as a good 11 thing?

12 :1 Right. Hey, you know, those 13 guys here, he ain't going to be intimidated. And he's 14 going to let them know what's bad.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And at the CRS and OS 16 levels?

17 Andhe doesn't have to take --

18 right -- and he doesn't have to take the tiff I would 19 take if I raised it, being a CRS.

20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you're saying 21 that's something that's been observed, noted, and 22 commented on?

23 Yes.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That they have the 25 comfort level of knowing you can do that through the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE. N.W.

170 1 union here?

2 _ Yes.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Because then they 4 don't have to deal with it?

5 Well, not deal with it. The 6 repercussions, they're not viewed as not being a team 7 player.

8 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have you seen 9 situations where, you know, they've handed off an 10 issue in that way? And say, "Here, you run with it 11 because you'll be safer."?

12 No, I don't know about safer.

13 You can be more vocal. You can shake people up.

14 Sure, I mean --

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, it seems that 16 in some way they're feeling limited. But if the --

17 Yes, they certainly are.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- union can be more 19 vocal --

20 They certainly are.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- and they can shake 22 people up --

23 And I don't think you'll find 24 one management guy that won't say -- one CRS or OS 25 that won't say, "Yes, the union can be more vocal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7

vit Dutinc Gci Akim wa ti ki

17 1 1 about it because they have a little bit more 2 protection."

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Well, what kind of 4 issues? What issues do you offer as examples of that?

5 When they do that?

6 I don't know, maintenance, 7 scheduling, you know, what do you want fixed, concerns 8 we have with the plant, you know, normal everyday 9 stuff.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Do you feel 11 that that is something that is routinely done? To 12 rely on the union to raise issues in place of the 13 supervisors? Or is it just on certain things?

14 Certain things.

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is it more 16 of the stuff that's kind of like more of a thorn in 17 their side? Either pet issues --

18 Pet peeves.

-19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Yes.

20 Equipment performance problems, things like that?

21 1' Yes.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Anything 23 stand out, I mean other than the things you've already 24 mentioned? Any other?

25 Not particularly. I mean --

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

172 1 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: I mean you 2 talked about SRVs, you talked about feed pump 3 vibration or, I'm sorry, displacement. What are some 4 of the other things you mentioned?

5 And one of the reasons z 6 is so impressive, he walks in, he goes, "Why are you 7 having to deal with that?" He's really being 8 proactive about everything. "Why do you have to deal 9 with that? Why is that bus like that? Why do you 10 have all these LDERMs (phonetic) like that?"

11 (inaudible) Yes.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: So you see a change 13 there?

14 I do see a change there.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: In the action.

16 And it's positive.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: A positive change.

18 How about in terms of the situations that you would 19 question, operability decisions, or in the range of 20 conservative decision making, have you seen situations 21 where shifts at the OS level, the CRS level, NCOs 22 would be more aggressive?  %,

-

23 And have that flipped around or pressed 24 back from senior management? Or, you know, I'm 25 looking at AOM, OM, and above level. Can you think of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS ii2i RHonF IRI Ann AVF NW

173 1 any situation in which you, as a shift, were going to 2 take a more aggressive action and you've had senior 3 management or at least from --

4 Somebody step in and say, "No, 5 you're not."?

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Yes, somebody step in 7 and question that. And push back on that. Or have 8 you reconsider that and take a less conservative 9 approach? Or make a quicker operability and declare 10 something inoperable quicker? Or more quickly on the 11 shift?

12 Not off the top of my head.

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You can't think of 14 anything?

15 No, not off the top of my 16 head, no. Where they would step in and say --

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I mean I guess what 18 I'm getting at is you're portraying a number of 19 instances where it's, you know, the question would be 20 the push is coming from the production side. Have you 21 seen that from --

22 The inverse? Where they say, 23 "No, whoa, slow down."?

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Right, right.

25  ; Well, I mean this last outage, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

174 1 we stayed down and we fixed a lot of stuff. And we 2 took it further down than we expected to. We expected 3 to only come down so far. And we had a CRD -- not a 4 CRD, a core spray check valve fail, 5 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Now is the 6 one you just went through? Or you're currently in?

7 1Just went through.

8 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

9 . Not the one we're in now.

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In December?

11 The one before this.

12 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: In December?

13 December.

14 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: That was the 15 one for the -- there was some secondary pipe or 16 something that had a leak on it?

17 - We had a couple of thing that 18 brought us down.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

A20 yes, it was a steam seal 21 evaporator line --

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

23 -- that brought us down.

24 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Okay.

25 _ But we were going to come down NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

175 1 so far, hang out, have stops waiting. But it ended up 2 that the core spray check valve failed. And we had --

3 they made a decision. "Hey, take her all the way 4 down. Get in there and fix it."

5 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And you stayed down 6 longer than had been planned?

7 Exactly. And we fixed a lot 8 of stuff. PPC for the feed pumps. We got the check 9 valve for core spray. We got -- there was quite a few 10 little items, little nagging questions sitting out 11 there that got fixed. And I mean it was impressive.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Surprising?

13 It was just better. It was 14 better.

15 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Better than what 16 typically got fixed in an outage?

17 _ Right. More typically it 18 would be hey, we're down, we're up, let's go. That 19 was the impression I was getting. I mean -- and the 20 impression I was getting was it was going to get 21 worse. -IC 22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Does that 23 kind of feedback --

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: I'm sorry. The 25 impression you were getting when?

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176 It was going -- well,, we were training on how to do quick turnaround.

J1 3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

4 Like the turnarounds we were 5 doing weren't quick enough. We need to get faster 6 getting back up.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Put a time frame on 8 that for me.

9 What do you mean?

10 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: He' s talking 11 about December.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: When that impression 13 was.

14 That was the beginning of the 15 year when we started taking a couple SCRAMs and we 16 were taking too long to get down and then get back up.

17 So we're talking -- well, we had December, we had --

18 what was the one before that? April?

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're talking 20 December '02 into early '03?

A.

21 Well, what are we in? 04? So 22 it would be April '03 --

23 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

24 -- time frame. So --

25 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: The impression, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

177 1 you're saying there was that you were going to be down 2 shorter and shorter.

3 Right.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And this past one 5 that you had in December --

6 Right.

7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- you're offering it 8 as an example of doing it differently.

9 Exactly. Hey, we got some 10 real challenges to the operating crew here and we need 11 to fix them.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

13 And we are going to do. And 14 we take the hit now or we take the hit later. All 15 right. And they chose to do it now. And I was 16 impressed by it.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: They?

18 Our management team as in 19 20 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Did you do something 21 to that, Scott? You might have got cut off.

22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.

23 But yes, it's -- I got to give 24 them the credit. I mean it was refreshing to see them 25 and say, "Hey, look, we have problems," instead of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 7C 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

178 1 patch, work, go.

2 I'd like to say it's the Davis-Besse 3 mentality we got when we hired all their ex-4 management. And run it until it breaks and somebody 5 shuts you down.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You're talking about 7 the prior senior management team that was in place?

8 Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That would be former 10 (phonetic), former 11 We had -- well, we ha 12 (phonetic), we hadh 13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF; Yes, that's what I 14 need you to -- I can't make an assumption who you're 15 talking about. So who is the former Davis-Besse 16 management team?

17 18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.

19 I don't know where 20 came from. But when ame in, he 9 21: filled in a lot of positions with Davis-Besse people.

22 And it just seemed like the attitude changed to run 23 until you drop.

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay.'

25 And it went right through NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

179 1 And it was just like, oh, it was bad. And 2 it wasn't that good.

3 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: F was in 4 place in that time period.

51 Mg-w X Yes.

6 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: And he's still in 77 place now.

8 Yes.

9 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: How do you see him?

10 Is he similar mind set? Or any changes there?

11 He's -- in my realm, he's 12 gone. I mean he's off in Engineering someplace and I 13 don't deal with him anymore. But, I mean, he was part 14 of the--

15 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Is that a 16 good thing or a bad thing? Or does it matter? I mean 17 how did you feel about dealing with him on operational 18 issues when he was the 19 Just when he had 20 incident, I right off the bat didn't like his 21 opinions. But I mean-- and he was definitely part of 22 the regime that seemed to drag us down.

23 Don't get me wrong. I understand some 24 things. But you have to understand where I come from.

25 And when I got here in

• until '95, '96, Hope Creek NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

180 1 was one of the best in the nation, constantly rated 2 well.

3 Now it can't seem to get out of the poops.

4 There might be a little bit of frustration in that.

5 That I'm sitting here looking at, you know, at that 6 period of time when we brought in and we 7 progressed through Salem.

8 He was working on Salem but he was 9 dragging down Hope Creek. It just seemed like Hope 10 Creek just did not seem to -- we didn't improve.

11 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Could some 12 of that have been the plant itself? I mean --

13 No 14 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: What were the actions 15 -

16 It was the same.

17 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- that he 18 It runs the same.

19 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: It's 20

-20 years old now.

21 Ww 22 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: And back 23 then, it was 10 years old. Well, a lot of plants 24 start having problems around the 15- to 20-year point 25 with equipment performance.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

181 QVA_

1 See, and that's --

2 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: Well, I'm 3 asking because, you know, that could have been part of 4 it or maybe it was all human factors, management, that 5 type of thing.

6 And I truly believe it was, 7 you know, hey, we can put this off, we can put that 8 off, we can put this off. I mean we burned ourselves 9 a couple of times with, "Hey, yes, I evaluate we don't 10 need to do this anymore."

11 "Yes you do, your diesels are now inop.

12 Give me that back."

13 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Where the running 14 until it breaks mentality --

15 woos Yes.

16 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: -- is what you said 17 came in with. -- excuse me --

18 ! SPEAKER: Sorry to interrupt.

19 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: That's all right.

20 We'll go off the record.

21 (Whereupon, the foregoing 22 matter went off the record 23 briefly.)

24 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: We just had a brief 25 interruption. Basically 1 is needed back on NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.

~~

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,^^^a^^.*.eMn0U&1frf1, r% usI- 27n4 .^^:na~n~eP

182 1 shift. So I think we were pretty much wrapping it up.

2 The idea is if you have anything to add, you can 3 contact myself or you can contact Scott.

4 Oka S SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Or the residents 6 here. Whatever is easier for you.

7 All right.

8 SPECTAL AGENT NEFF: And I think that we 9 pretty much covered everything. Do you have anything 10 that you think we either didn't cover or we need to 11 hear?

12 I think we have to give the 13 opportunity to these new guys who just came in to 14 actually work with us. I do believe we hit rock 15 bottom. And we're bouncing back I think.

16 I'm impressed by the new guys we got in 17 here And we'rt.- -m...ing to see what happens. T don't -

18 - vant to makr: aure that it's clear that I have no 19 concern about raising concerns. If I have one, I will 20 raise it, you know? That's about it.

21 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. And I think 22 that's pretty clear from your testimony. You know 23 both that you see positive aspects to the environment 24 recently. And also that you would raise concerns.

25 Yes.

NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE.. N.W.

183 1 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Scott, do you have 2 anything further?

3 SR. PROJECT ENGINEER BARBER: No.

4 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay. I just have 5 some closing questions for you.

6 Okay-7 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Have I or any other 8 NRC representative offered you any promises or reward 9 or threat-:ened you in any manner in exchange for 10 today's information?

11No.

12 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okay, have you 13 appeared here voluntarily and freely?

14 i Well, you asked me to come.

5 . SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: You understood it was 16 --

17 l NO, I'm fl. 1- -- yes.

18 SPECIAL AGENT NEFF: Okeq . All riqht. We iS j; have nothing further to add to it. And the tine is 2C a 11 approximately 3:57 p.m. We'll go off the record. I

2,1- thank you for this large chunk of your time today.

22 Okay.

23 (Whereupon, the foregoing matter was 24 concluded at 3:57 p.m.)

25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.