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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                            NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
                                              REGION III
2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
                                2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210
LISLE, IL 60532
                                        LISLE, IL 60532-4352
-4352  August 3, 2012
                                            August 3, 2012
    Mr. Larry Meyer
Mr. Larry Meyer
Site Vice President
Site Vice President
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC
6610 Nuclear Road
6610 Nuclear Road
Two Rivers, WI  54241
Two Rivers, WI 54241
SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
SUBJECT:        POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2
  NRC INTEGRATED
                NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2012003 AND
INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/201
                05000301/2012003
2003 AND 05000301/201
Dear Mr. Meyer:
2003 Dear Mr. Meyer:
On June 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated
  On June 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed
inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents
an integrated inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.  The enclosed report documents the inspection findings
the inspection findings, which were discussed on June 26, 2012, with you and members of your
, which were discussed
staff.
on June 26, 2012 , with you and members of your staff. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.  The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
Two NRC-identified
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
findings and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance were
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
identified
personnel.
during this inspection
Two NRC-identified findings and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance were
. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements
identified during this inspection.
.  The NRC is treating these violations as non
These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating
-cited violations (NCVs)
these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the
, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of these NCV s, you should provide a response
If you contest the subject or severity of these NCVs, you should provide a response within
within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, DC
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a
20555-0001, with a
copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III,
copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
- Region III, 2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector
-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555
Office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting
-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.  In addition, if you disagree with the cross
aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of
-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional
 
Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.
  L. Meyer -2-  In accordance with
 
10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the
L. Meyer                                    -2-
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)
component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).
ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
(the Public Electronic Reading Room).
                                            Sincerely,
                                            /RA/
                                            Michael A. Kunowski, Branch Chief
                                            Branch 5
                                            Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 05000266
corrective actions were to revise the calculation to use the accurate data.
corrective actions were to revise the calculation to use the accurate data.
AnalysisThe inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using IMC
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish a routine testing
0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment
procedure to demonstrate that the air flows for the G-01 and G-02 rooms would keep
0609.04, "Phase
room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable temperatures when the EDGs
1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Tables
were carrying design basis accident loads was a performance deficiency warranting
3b and 4a , for the Mitigating S
further review. Using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated
ystems Cornerstone, dated January
December 24, 2009, the inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor
10, 2008.  The inspectors answered "No" to all of the questions in the Mitigating Systems column of Table
because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for design
4a; therefore, the finding screened as having very low safety significance (Green).  The licensee entered this issue
control. Specifically, it adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective to
into the CAP as AR01750276.  The licensee's corrective actions include
ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable
d performance of air flow measurements on the fan units, creation of a preventive maintenance requirement for
consequences.
taking periodic flow measurements, and assessment of the identified issue through a condition evaluation.
The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance
:  The inspectors determined that the failure to establish
Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and
a routine testing procedure
Characterization of Findings, Tables 3b and 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone,
to demonstrate that the air flows for
dated January 10, 2008. The inspectors answered No to all of the questions in the
the G-01 and G-02 rooms would keep room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable temperature
Mitigating Systems column of Table 4a; therefore, the finding screened as having very
s when the EDG
low safety significance (Green). The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as
s were carrying design basis accident loads was a performance deficiency warranting further review.  Using IMC
AR01750276. The licensees corrective actions included performance of air flow
0612, Appendix
measurements on the fan units, creation of a preventive maintenance requirement for
B, "Issue Screening," dated December 24, 2009, the inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated with the
taking periodic flow measurements, and assessment of the identified issue through a
Mitigating
condition evaluation.
Systems Cornerstone attribute for design control.  Specifically, it adversely affected the
This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance,
Mitigating
decision-making. Specifically, the licensee did not use conservative assumptions
System Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.
regarding the verification of the proper air flow through the SR gravity dampers in the
This finding has a cross
EDG G-01 and G-02 rooms (H.1(b)). The inspectors reviewed the licensees causal
-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making. Specifically, the licensee did not use conservative assumptions regarding the verification of the proper air flow through the SR gravity dampers in the EDG G-01 and G-02 rooms (H.1(b)). The inspectors reviewed the licensee
assessment and found that this assessment was consistent with their assessment of the
's causal assessment and found that this
condition.
assessment
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," requires, in part,
was consistent with their assessment of the condition.
that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that
Enforcement: Title 10
components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in
CFR 50, Appendix
accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and
B, Criterion
acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to this, on
XI, "Test Control," requires, in part, that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which
March 29, 2012, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to establish a routine
incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to this, on  
testing procedure to demonstrate that the air flows for EDGs G-01 and G-02 ventilation
March 29, 2012, the inspectors identified that
systems would keep the room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable
the licensee failed to establish
temperatures when the EDGs were carrying design basis accident loads. Because this
a routine testing procedure  
violation was of very low safety significance, and it was entered into the licensees CAP
to demonstrate
                                          14                                      Enclosure
that the air flows for EDGs G-01 and G-02 ventilation systems would keep the room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable temperature
 
s when the EDG
      (as CR1750276), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2
s were carrying design basis accident loads. Because this violation was of very low safety significance, and it was entered into the licensee's CAP
      of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000266/2012003-01; 05000301/2012003-01;
15 Enclosure (as CR1750276
      Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation System Testing).
), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section
1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)
2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV
  .1  Other Outage Activities
05000266/2012003
  a. Inspection Scope
-01; 05000301/2012003
      The inspectors evaluated outage activities for an unplanned Unit 2 outage that began on
-01; Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation System Testing).
      June 27, 2012, and continued through the end of the inspection period. The outage
1R20 Outage Activities
      occurred as a result of a turbine control system malfunction that resulted in a turbine
.1  (71111.20)
      load reject which terminated when the reactor operators inserted a manual reactor trip.
  a. Other Outage Activities
      The inspectors reviewed activities to ensure that the licensee considered risk in
The inspectors evaluated outage activities for an
      developing, planning, and implementing the outage schedule.
unplanned Unit 2 outage that began on June 27, 2012, and continued through the
      The inspectors observed or reviewed the reactor shutdown and cooldown, outage
end of the inspection period
      equipment configuration and risk management, electrical lineups, selected clearances,
. The outage occurred as a result of a turbine control system malfunction that resulted in a turbine load reject which terminated when the reactor operator
      control and monitoring of decay heat removal, control of containment activities,
s inserted a manual reactor trip.
      personnel fatigue management, startup and heatup activities, and identification and
  The inspectors reviewed activities to ensure that the licensee considered risk in  
      resolution of problems associated with the outage.
developing, planning, and implementing the outage schedule.
      This inspection constituted one other partial outage sample as defined in
Inspection Scope
      IP 71111.20-05.
The inspectors observed or reviewed the reactor shutdown and cooldown, outage equipment configuration and risk management, electrical lineups, selected clearances, control and monitoring
  b. Findings
of decay heat removal, control of containment activities, personnel fatigue management, startup and heatup activities, and identification and resolution of problems associated with the outage.
      No findings were identified.
This inspection constituted one other partial outage sample as
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
defined in  
  .1  Surveillance Testing
IP 71111.20-05. b. No findings
  a. Inspection Scope
were identified.
      The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether
Findings 1R22 Surveillance Testing
      risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety
.1  (71111.22)
      function, and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural
  a. Surveillance Testing
      and TS requirements:
The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether risk-significant systems
      *      PAB ventilation TS-87 system monthly test (routine);
and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety function , and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural and TS requirements:
      *      TDAFW quarterly pump and valve test (Unit 1) (inservice testing);
Inspection Scope
      *      instrument air valves quarterly SR (Unit 2) (containment isolation valve); and
  PAB ventilation TS
      *      reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate (Unit 2) (RCS).
-87 system monthly test
      The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated
(routine); TDAFW quarterly pump and valve test (Unit
      records to determine the following:
1) (inservice testing)
      *      did preconditioning occur;
;  instrument air valves quarterly SR (Unit
      *      were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel
2) (containment isolation valve); and reactor coolant system (RCS) leak rate (Unit
              or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
2) (RCS). The inspectors observed  
                                              15                                      Enclosure
in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated records to determine the following:
 
  did preconditioning occur
      *      were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and
;  were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;
              consistent with the system design basis;
 
      *      plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
16 Enclosure  were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and consistent with the system design basis;
      *      as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was
  plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
              in accordance with TSs, the FSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
  as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was
      *      measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
in accordance with TSs, the  
      *      test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable
F SAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;
              prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
  measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
      *      test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;
  test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable  
              tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other
prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;
              applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored
  test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability; tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored where used;
              where used;
  test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
      *      test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
  test equipment was removed after testing;
      *      test equipment was removed after testing;
  where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in accordance with the applicable version of Section
      *      where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in
XI, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, and reference values were consistent with the system design basis;
              accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of
  where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed  
              Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, and reference values were consistent with
with an adequate operability evaluation or the SSC was declared inoperable;
              the system design basis;
  where applicable for SR instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
      *      where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed
  where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
              with an adequate operability evaluation or the SSC was declared inoperable;
  prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems  
      *      where applicable for SR instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting
encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
              data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;
  equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the performance of its safety functions;
      *      where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical
and  all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and  
              contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;
dispositioned in the CAP.
      *      prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems
Documents reviewed are listed in the  
              encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;
Attachment to this report.
      *      equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the
This inspection constituted
              performance of its safety functions; and
one routine surveillance testing sample, one inservice testing sample, one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection sample, and
      *      all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and
one containment isolation valve sample as defined in IP
              dispositioned in the CAP.
71111.22, Sections
      Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
-02 and -05. b. No findings were identified.
      This inspection constituted one routine surveillance testing sample, one inservice testing
Findings Cornerstone: Emergency Prepar
      sample, one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection sample, and one
edness  1EP6 Drill Evaluation
      containment isolation valve sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.
.1  (71114.06)
  b. Findings
  a. Emergency Preparedness Observation
      No findings were identified.
The inspectors evaluated the response to a declaration of an alert condition on  
      Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
April 25 to 26, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification, Inspection Scope
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
 
  .1  Emergency Preparedness Observation
17 Enclosure notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The licensee declared the alert after exhaust gasses from an EDG were inadvertently taken back into the EDG room during a test. The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the control room and technical support center (TSC) to determine whether the
  a. Inspection Scope
event classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. No deficiencies were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report
      The inspectors evaluated the response to a declaration of an alert condition on
. This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP
      April 25 to 26, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,
71114.06-05. b. No findings
                                                16                                      Enclosure
were identified.
 
Findings 2. RADIATION SAFETY Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
      notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The licensee
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and MitigationThis inspection constituted a partial sample as defined in IP 71124.03
      declared the alert after exhaust gasses from an EDG were inadvertently taken back into
-05.  (71124.03)
      the EDG room during a test. The inspectors observed emergency response operations
.1 Engineering Controls
      in the control room and technical support center (TSC) to determine whether the event
a.  (02.02) An unresolved item
      classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in
(URI) was documented in NRC Integrated  
      accordance with procedures. No deficiencies were identified. Documents reviewed are
Inspection  
      listed in the Attachment to this report.
Report (IR) 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002
      This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.
, concerning
  b. Findings
additional information that was
      No findings were identified.
needed by the
2.   RADIATION SAFETY
inspectors to assess the licensee's
      Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
TSC ventilation system filter testing program. Supplemental calculations and  
2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)
reviews were performed by the licensee, and the additional information was reviewed by the inspectors. Specifically, selected procedures, system design calculations, plant configuration drawings, and related licensee documentation were reviewed.  
      This inspection constituted a partial sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.
The inspectors completed these reviews to verify that the licensee's program and its implementation met the requirements of  
  .1  Engineering Controls (02.02)
10 CFR 20.1701 and
  a. Inspection Scope
were consistent with NRC guidance
      An unresolved item (URI) was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report (IR)
. Inspection Scope
      05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, concerning additional information that was
b. Findings Non-Compliance With 10
      needed by the inspectors to assess the licensees TSC ventilation system filter testing
CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in the Technical Support Center During a Design
      program. Supplemental calculations and reviews were performed by the licensee, and
-Basis Accident Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1701, "Use of Process or Other Engineering Controls."  The inspectors identified that the licensee
      the additional information was reviewed by the inspectors. Specifically, selected
failed to establish adequate high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filter testing procedures for ensuring that radiological airborne hazards would be minimized and the habitability of the TSC
      procedures, system design calculations, plant configuration drawings, and related
would be maintained under accident conditions. Specifically, the licensee failed to  
      licensee documentation were reviewed. The inspectors completed these reviews to
ensure engineering controls
      verify that the licensees program and its implementation met the requirements of
that were in place to minimize
      10 CFR 20.1701 and were consistent with NRC guidance.
the concentration of radioactive material in air in the TSC were maintained in accordance with the design bases.
  b. Findings
 
      Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive
18 Enclosure DescriptionThe inspectors identified that
      Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in
, for an extended period of time, the licensee did not validate that the removal efficiencies
      the Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident
in the TSC  
      Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)
ventilation filter design bases were
      and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1701, Use of Process or Other Engineering
being achieved.  Specifically, testing of the TSC ventilation HEPA
      Controls. The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to establish adequate high
and charcoal filters did not demonstrate
      efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filter testing procedures for ensuring that
that filter
      radiological airborne hazards would be minimized and the habitability of the TSC would
performance was in compliance with the design criteria.
      be maintained under accident conditions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure
The design bases for the TSC ventilation system HEPA filter was 99 percent for particulate radioactive material
      engineering controls that were in place to minimize the concentration of radioactive
removal efficiency. T
      material in air in the TSC were maintained in accordance with the design bases.
he licensee's surveillance test acceptance criterion was95
                                                17                                    Enclosure
percent. In addition, the design basis for the charcoal filter laboratory  
 
analysis was 95
Description: The TSC is an onsite emergency response facility intended to support plant
perce nt removal efficiency of radioactive iodine. The surveillance test
operations under emergency conditions. The TSC ventilation system is designed to
required 80 percent. Consequently, there was no assurance that the installed TSC ventilation equipment would perform at its designed radioactive material removal capacity, thereby minimizing the radiological exposures to the occupants of the TSC during postulated accidents.
remove radioactive material from the air, thereby minimizing the radioactive material
: The TSC is an onsite emergency response facility intended to support plant operations under emergency conditions.  The TSC ventilation system is designed to remove radioactive material from the air
entering the TSC during postulated accident scenarios.
, thereby minimizing the radioactive material entering the TSC during postulated accident scenarios.
The inspectors identified that, for an extended period of time, the licensee did not
  AnalysisThe inspectors reviewed IMC
validate that the removal efficiencies in the TSC ventilation filter design bases were
0612, Appendix
being achieved. Specifically, testing of the TSC ventilation HEPA and charcoal filters did
B, "Issue Screening," dated December 24, 2009, and found no similar examples. However, the inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with
not demonstrate that filter performance was in compliance with the design criteria. The
the program and process attribute of exposure control of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective
design bases for the TSC ventilation system HEPA filter was 99 percent for particulate
of ensuring the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure radiation and radioactive material.  Specifically, by testing the installed emergency ventilation system filters to removal efficiencies less than their design
radioactive material removal efficiency. The licensees surveillance test acceptance
criteria, the licensee did not validate that the TSC ventilation system was capable of performing its design function and minimize worker exposures to airborne radioactive materials.  :  The inspectors determined that the failure to establish testing criteria in accordance with the system design bases was a performance deficiency consistent
criterion was95 percent. In addition, the design basis for the charcoal filter laboratory
w it h I MC 0612 , "Power Reactor Inspection Reports
analysis was 95 percent removal efficiency of radioactive iodine. The surveillance test
."  The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to meet the requirements of 10
required 80 percent. Consequently, there was no assurance that the installed TSC
CFR 20.1701 to use installed process equipment to reasonably minimize the level of airborne radioactive materials. The  
ventilation equipment would perform at its designed radioactive material removal
capacity, thereby minimizing the radiological exposures to the occupants of the TSC
during postulated accidents.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish testing criteria in
accordance with the system design bases was a performance deficiency consistent
with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The inspectors determined that the
licensee failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1701 to use installed process
equipment to reasonably minimize the level of airborne radioactive materials. The
performance deficiency was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and
correct and was indicative of current performance, in that, the licensee had recent
opportunities to self-identify and correct the issue, including when performing recent
technical reviews for NRC license amendment submittals for license renewal, alternate
source term, and extended power uprate.
The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated December 24,
2009, and found no similar examples. However, the inspectors determined that the
finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program and process
attribute of exposure control of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone and
adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of
worker health and safety from exposure radiation and radioactive material. Specifically,
by testing the installed emergency ventilation system filters to removal efficiencies less
than their design criteria, the licensee did not validate that the TSC ventilation system
was capable of performing its design function and minimize worker exposures to
airborne radioactive materials.
The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety
Significance Determination Process, (SDP) and was determined to be of very low safety
significance (Green) because it was not an as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA)
planning issue, there was no overexposure or potential for overexposure, and the
licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The licensee documented this
issue in its corrective action program. Corrective actions included revising applicable
procedures and based on actual historical filter testing efficiencies, calculating that the
TSC ventilation system was capable of maintaining a radiological habitability of less than
5 Rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the design-basis
accidents.
                                          18                                        Enclosure
 
      The inspectors identified that the most significant contributor to the finding was a
      cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources. Specifically, the
      licensee failed to ensure that the TSC ventilation filter testing protocol assured
      compliance to the systems designed margins in that the TSC ventilation filter testing
      acceptance criteria were established independent of the system design requirements
      (H.2(a)).
      Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 20.1701 requires that licensees use, to the extent practical,
      process or other engineering controls (e.g., containment, decontamination, or ventilation)
      to control the concentration of radioactive material in air. Contrary to the above, as of
      January 19, 2012, the licensee failed to ensure that effective engineering controls were
      implemented to control the concentration of radioactive material in air in the TSC in
      accordance with the facilitys design bases. Because the issue was of very low safety
      significance and has been entered into the licensees CAP (as CR01752498), the
      violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
      Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000266/2012003-02; 05000301/2012003-02;
      Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive
      Material in Air and Ensure that Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in
      the Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident). This NCV closes
      URI 05000266/2012002-05; 05000301/2012002-05, TSC Filter Testing May Be
      Inadequate," in Section 4OA5.2.
4.    OTHER ACTIVITIES
      Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
      Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
      Physical Protection
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1  Unplanned Scrams with Complications
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with
      Complications performance indicator (PI) for Units 1 and 2, for the third quarter 2011
      through the second quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported, PI
      definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document
      99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, dated
      October 2009, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative
      logs, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the
      submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees CAP to determine if any
      problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator
      and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this
      report.
      This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as
      defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                              19                                        Enclosure
 
.2    Reactor Coolant System Leakage
  a.  Inspection Scope
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS Leakage PI for Units 1 and 2,
      for the third quarter 2011 through the second quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy
      of the PI data reported, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI
      Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
      Revision 6, dated October 2009, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees
      operator logs, RCS leakage tracking data, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated IRs
      to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees
      CAP to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or
      transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in
      the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system leakage samples as defined in
      IP 71151-05.
  b.  Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3    Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity
  a. Inspection Scope
      In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS
      specific activity PI for Units 1 and 2 for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter
      2011. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the
      NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
      Revision 6, dated October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The
      inspectors reviewed the licensees RCS chemistry samples, TS requirements, CRs,
      event reports, and NRC integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The
      inspectors also reviewed the licensees CAP to determine if any problems had been
      identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were
      identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician
      obtain and analyze an RCS sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
      to this report.
      This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system specific activity samples as
      defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                  20                                    Enclosure
 
.4    Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
  a. Inspection Scope
      In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the
      occupational radiological occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth
      quarter 2011. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI
      Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
      Revision 6, dated October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The
      inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of the PI for occupational radiation safety
      to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess
      the adequacy of the licensees PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed
      with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and the results of
      those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed electronic personal dosimetry
      dose rate and accumulated dose alarms and dose reports and the dose assignments for
      any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were
      potentially unrecognized occurrences. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of
      numerous locked high and very-high radiation area entrances to determine the
      adequacy of the controls in place for these areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the
      Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted one occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as
      defined in IP 71151-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.5    Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
      Radiological Effluent Occurrences
  a. Inspection Scope
      In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the
      radiological effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual radiological
      effluent occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter 2011. The
      inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02,
      Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, dated
      October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The inspectors
      reviewed the licensees CAP and selected individual reports generated since this
      indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored,
      uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite
      dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of
      associated offsite dose calculations for selected dates to determine if indicator results
      were accurately reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees methods for
      quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent dose. Documents
      reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This inspection constituted one Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite
      Dose Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in
      IP 71151-05.
                                                21                                      Enclosure
 
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)
.1  Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
  a. Inspection Scope
      As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of
      this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities
      and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees CAP at
      an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective
      actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed
      included: identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was
      commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance
      issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes,
      extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and
      adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective
      actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.
      Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations
      are included in the Attachment to this report.
      These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute
      any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an
      integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in
      Section 1 of this report.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
  a. Inspection Scope
      In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific
      human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of
      items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through
      inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.
      These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant
      status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection
      samples.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                                22                                      Enclosure
 
.3  Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the process used to identify,
    document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but
    were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds
    (OWAs) on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for
    potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant
    transients or accidents.
    The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of OWAs. The documents
    listed in the Attachment to this report were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the
    inspection procedure. The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational
    challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges
    at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into the CAP, and proposed or
    implemented appropriate and timely corrective actions which addressed each issue.
    Reviews were conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the
    possibility of an Initiating Event, if the challenge was contrary to training, required a
    change from long-standing operational practices, or created the potential for
    inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally, all temporary modifications were
    reviewed to identify any potential effect on the functionality of Mitigating Systems,
    impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was
    not designed. Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and
    operator aids or tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also
    assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified OWAs.
    This review constituted one operator workaround annual inspection sample as defined in
    IP 71152-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
.4  Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate
    Modifications
  a. Inspection Scope
    The inspectors reviewed items entered in the licensees CAP and identified various
    corrective action item reports identifying problems with the modification turnover process
    of extended power uprate (EPU) modifications installed during recent refueling outages.
    The inspectors elected to review this practice as a selected issue follow-up item.
    This review constituted the completion of one in-depth problem identification and
    resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05, completing the partial sample referenced
    previously in integrated IR 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002.
  b. Findings
    Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications
                                                23                                      Enclosure
 
    Introduction: During the inspectors review of the licensees partial turnover process, the
    inspectors identified a URI associated with the process.
    Description: The inspectors selected the licensees partial turnover process as a
    selected issue follow-up due to the potential inadequacies associated with the process.
    As previously identified in IRs 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008, and
    05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, the inspectors identified problems and
    violations associated with the licensees partial turnover process where systems had
    been partially turned over and declared operable, and it was later discovered that
    portions of the modification were not tested prior to being placed in-service. With the
    additional identification of problems associated with the partial turnover process
    referenced in CRs in Integrated IRs 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, the
    inspectors were concerned that additional systems may be subject to similar issues as a
    result of the partial turnover process. At the completion of the first quarter inspection
    period, the inspectors were awaiting the requested documentation from the licensee to
    complete their review of this issue.
    During the second quarter, the inspectors received portions of the requested
    documentation. The issue is unresolved pending review of the portions of the previously
    requested documentation (URI 05000266/2012003-03; 05000301/2012003-03, Partial
    Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications).
.5  Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Licensed Operator Respirator Qualifications And
    Control Room Staffing
  a. Inspection Scope
    During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors found recent
    corrective action items documenting repetitive occurrences associated the licensed
    operator respirator qualifications. These CRs related to AR01670172 which
    documented a condition where shift staffing was challenged due to having expired
    licensed operator respirator qualifications. The inspectors questioned the licensees
    evaluation of the CR regarding the conclusions reached. Specifically, the inspectors
    noted that the individual was credited with watch-standing during the period of expired
    qualifications and that the procedures for the annual requirements conflicted. The
    licensee entered the inspectors concerns in the CAP as AR01747333 and AR1772196.
    The licensee was able to demonstrate through timed entries and door logs that control
    room staffing was not compromised due to the expired respirator qualification.
    Additionally, the licensees corrective actions created a report to track licensed operator
    respirator qualifications as well as initiated a procedure change requests to more clearly
    document licensed operator watch-standing requirements and clarify the definitions for
    annual requirements.
    This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as
    defined in IP 71152-05.
  b. Findings
    No findings were identified.
                                                24                                      Enclosure
 
4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1  Unit 2 Planned Downpower to Repair Switchyard Hotspot
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the plants response to a planned downpower on Unit 2. Unit 2
      was taken offline while remaining critical on April 21, 2012, to allow repair of two hot
      spots on two phases of a disconnect switch in the switchyard. The repairs were
      successful and the unit was placed back online on April 22, 2012. Documents reviewed
      are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.2  Alert Declared Due To Toxic Gas
  a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the plants response to an Alert on April 25 to 26, 2012, that
      was declared during a special maintenance run of the G-02 EDG. During the EDG run,
      exhaust fumes entered the adjacent air compressor room, a vital area, and the levels of
      toxic gas from these fumes exceeded Occupational Safety and Health Administration
      (OSHA) limits. The EDG was immediately secured and the room ventilated. The
      licensee corrected the system configuration problem that caused the inleakage and re-
      performed the run. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
      This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
.3  Failure of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Coupling
  a. Inspection Scope
      On May 21, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plants response to the failure of the
      Unit 1 TDAFW pump coupling and related unplanned entry into a 72-hour limiting
      condition for operation action statement. The inspectors reviewed the repair and other
      activities the licensee performed to be able to return the pump to service within the
      allowed completion time. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this
      report.
      This event follow-up review constituted one sample defined in IP 71153-05.
  b. Findings
      No findings were identified.
                                              25                                        Enclosure


performance deficiency was reasonably within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct and was indicative of current performance
.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 05000301/2011-004-00 and
, in that , the licensee had recent opportunities to self
  05000301/2011-004-01, Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due to
-identify and correct the issue
  Source Range
, including when performing recent technical reviews for NRC license amendment submittals for license renewal, alternate source term, and extended power uprate. 
  Introduction: A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) was self-revealed when an
The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix
  unplanned reactor trip occurred as a result of the failure of a source range detector
C, "Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination
  during low power physics testing. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate
Process ," (SDP) and was determined to be of very low safety
  operating experience and incorporate it into preventive maintenance programs to
significance (Green) because it was not a
  periodically replace aging electrical subcomponents in nuclear instrumentation systems
n as-low-as-is-reasonably
  and a subsequent age-related failure resulted in initiating a plant transient.
-achievable (ALARA) planning issue, there was no
  Description: On June 13, 2011, during the performance of beginning of life (BOL) low
overexposure or potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose
  power physics testing, and with reactor power decreasing due to inserting reactor control
was not compromised.
  rods to obtain test data, power decreased below the setpoint that actuates and
  The licensee documented this issue in its corrective action program
  automatically places source range monitoring (SRM) instrumentation in service. When
.  Corrective actions
  SRMs were actuated, channel 2N31 experienced a failure of the associated high voltage
included revising applicable procedures and based on actual historical filter testing efficiencies, calculating that
  power supply. This failure satisfied the SRM high flux reactor trip logic and resulted in
the TSC ventilation system was capable of maintaining a radiological habitability of less than
  an automatic reactor trip.
5 Rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the design
  Subsequent review by the licensee determined that the failure was due to age-related
-basis accidents. 
  degradation and that the most likely cause of the failure was because the output filter
 
  capacitors were degraded. The licensee indicated that the recent failures were
19 Enclosure The inspectors identified that the most significant contributor to
  experienced on power supplies manufactured in the 1970s, and that the date codes on
the finding was
  the capacitors in the subject units was also from the 1970s. Additionally, the licensee
a cross-cutting aspect in the area of
  noted that many of the components used in the construction of the related units were
human performance
  40 years old.
, resources.
  The licensees root cause analysis identified historical operating experience as early as
Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure that the TSC ventilation filter
  1992, which reflected the need to periodically repair or replace power supplies; and that
testing protocol assured compliance to the system's designed margins in that the TSC ventilation filter testing acceptance criteria were established independent of the system design requirements (H.2(a)).  Enforcement
  in 1998, Westinghouse provided a recommendation to replace power supplies; or at a
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
  minimum, replace filtering capacitors every 10 years. In 1998, the licensee made a
:  Title 10 CFR 20.1701 requires that licensees use, to the extent practical, process or other engineering controls (e.g., containment, decontamination, or
  decision not to incorporate the vendor recommendations into the preventive
ventilation) to control the concentration of radioactive material in air.
  maintenance program.
Contrary to the above, as of January 19, 2012, the licensee failed to
  The licensee concluded that the root cause could be attributed to life cycle management
ensure that effective engineering
  and preventive maintenance program deficiencies. The corrective action to prevent
controls were implemented to control the concentration of radioactive material in air
  recurrence was related to the life cycle management plan for the nuclear instruments.
in the TSC in accordance with the facility's design bases
  The inspectors considered that this action was adequate to address concerns related to
.  Because the issue was of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensee's CAP (as CR01752498
  the nuclear instruments. The inspectors reviewed the issue with the licensee with
), the violation is
  respect to subcomponent aging management. The licensee had indicated that
being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
  subsequent to this event and industry reviews, it had expanded the subcomponent aging
(NCV 05000266/2012003
  management program. The licensee provided evidence which demonstrated that a
-02; 05000301/2012003
  program for subcomponent aging and management was in the final stage of
-02; Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to
  development, and that the program was reviewing several categories of subcomponents
Control the
  consisting of over 4,000 items. Additionally, the program was looking at single point
Concentration of
  vulnerabilities and risk prioritization of reviews. The inspectors concluded that this
Radioactive
  program appeared to approach subcomponent aging management systematically and
Material in
  would provide a strong barrier to preclude similar failures in the future.
Air and Ensure that Radiological
  Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to incorporate operating experience
Airborne Hazards Would B e Minimized in the Technical Support Center
  related to aging of electrical subcomponents specific to nuclear instrument source range
During a Design-Basis Accident).  This NCV closes
                                              26                                    Enclosure
URI 05000266/2012002
 
-05; 05000301/2012002
monitors into preventive maintenance programs was a performance deficiency
-05 , "TSC Filter Testing May Be Inadequat e ," in Section 4OA5.2.
warranting further review. The finding was determined to be more than minor in
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Physical Protection
accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification.1  (71151) a. Unplanned Scrams with Complications
Screening, dated December 24, 2009, because the finding was associated with the
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with Complications performance indicator
Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, the
(PI) for Units
availability and reliability of the nuclear instruments was degraded to a point where an
1 and 2, for the third quarter 2011 through the second quarter 2012
instrument failure caused a reactor trip, an event that adversely affected the cornerstone
.  To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported, PI definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document
objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge
99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline," Revision
6, dated October 2009 , were used.  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator narrative logs, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated
IRs to validate the accuracy of the submittals.  The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's CAP to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data
collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.  Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report. Inspection Scope
This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications sample
s as defined in IP
71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings 
20 Enclosure .2 a. Reactor Coolant System Leakage
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the
RCS Leakage PI for Units
1 and 2, for the third quarter 2011 through the second quarter 2012.  To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, dated October 2009 , were used.  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's operator logs, RCS leakage tracking data, CRs, event reports
, and NRC integrated
IR s to validate the accuracy of the submittals.  The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's CAP to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
to this report.
Inspection Scope
This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system leakage sample
s as defined in
IP 71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings .3 a. Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity
In the first quarter
of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS specific activity PI for Units 1
and 2 for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter
2011.  The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the
NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, dated October
2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported.  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's RCS chemistry samples, TS
requirements, CRs, event reports, and NRC
integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the submittals.  The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's CAP to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were identified.  In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician obtain and analyze a
n RCS sample.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope
This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system specific activity samples as
defined in IP
71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings   
21 Enclosure .4 a. Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
In the first quarter
of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the occupational radiological occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter 2011.  The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline," Revision 6, dated October
2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported.  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's assessment of the PI for occupational radiation safety
to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported.  To assess the adequacy of the licensee's PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and the results of those reviews.  The inspectors independently reviewed electronic personal dosimetry
dose rate and accumulated dose alarms and dose reports and the dose assignments for any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were
potentially unrecognized occurrences.  The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of numerous locked high and very
-high radiation area entrances to determine the adequacy of the controls in place for these areas.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope
This inspection constituted one occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as defined in IP
71151-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings .5 a. Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Effluent Occurrences
In the first quarter
of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the radiological effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual radiological
effluent occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter
2011.  The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document
99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline," Revision
6, dated October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported.  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's CAP and selected individual reports generated since this indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored, uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite dose.  The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of associated offsite dose calculations for selected dates to determine if indicator results
were accurately reported.  The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's methods for quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and
determining effluent dose.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope
This inspection constituted one Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite
Dose Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined i
n IP 71151-05. 
22 Enclosure b. No findings were identified.
Findings 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1  (71152) a. Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program
As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensee's CAP at an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention
was being given to timely corrective actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed.  Attributes reviewed included:  identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes, extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective
actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.  Minor issues entered into the licensee's CAP as a result of the inspectors' observations are included in the
Attachment to this report. 
Inspection Scope These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute any additional inspection samples.  Instead, by procedure they were considered an integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in Section 1 of this report.
b. No findings were identified.
Findings .2 a. Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews
In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow
-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's CAP.  This review was accomplished through inspection of the station's daily condition report packages.
Inspection Scope These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors' daily plant status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection samples. b. No findings were identified.
Findings 
23 Enclosure .3 a. Annual Sample:  Review of Operator Workarounds
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's implementation of the process used to identify, document, track, and resolve operational challenges.  Inspection activities included, but were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds
(OWAs) on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant transients or accidents.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of OWAs.  The documents listed in the Attachment to this report
were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the inspection procedure.  The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges
at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into the
CAP, and proposed or implemented appropriate and timely corrective actions which addressed each issue.  Reviews were conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the possibility of an Initiating Event, if the challenge was contrary to training, required a change from long
-standing operational practices, or created the potential for inappropriate compensatory actions.  Additionally, all temporary modifications were reviewed to identify any potential effect on the functionality of Mitigating Systems, impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was not designed.  Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and operator aids or tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified OWA s. This review constituted one operator workaround
annual inspection sample
as defined in
IP 71152-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings .4 a. Selected Issue Follow
-Up Inspection:
Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications
The inspectors review ed items entered in the licensee's CAP
and identified various corrective action item reports identifying problems with the modification turnover process of extended power uprate (EPU) modifications installed during recent refueling outages.  The inspectors elected to review this practice as a selected issue follow
-up item. Inspection Scope This review constituted the completion of one
in-depth problem identification and resolution sample
as defined in IP
71152-05, completing the partial sample referenced previously in
integrated
IR 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002
. b. Findings Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications
 
24 Enclosure Introduction
:  During the inspectors' review of the licensee's partial turnover process, the inspectors identified
a URI associated with the process. 
DescriptionDuring the second quarter, the inspectors received portions of the requested documentation.  The issue is unresolved pending review of the portions of the previously requested documentation (URI 05000266/2012003-0 3; 05000301/201200 3-0 3, Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications
). :  The inspectors selected the licensee's partial turnover process as a selected issue follow
-up due to the potential inadequacies associated with the process.  As previously identified in
IR s 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008
, and 05000266/2012002
; 05000301/2012002, the inspectors identified problems and violations associated with the licensee's partial turnover process where systems had
been partially turned over and declared operable, and it was later discovered that
portions of the modification were not tested prior to being placed in
-service.  With the additional identification of problems associated with the partial turnover process referenced in
CRs in Integrated IRs 05000266/2012002
; 05000301/2012002, the inspectors were concerned that additional systems may be subject to similar issues as a result of the partial turnover process.
  At the completion of the first quarter inspection period, the inspectors were awaiting the requested documentation from the licensee to complete their review of this issue
. .5 a. Selected Issue Follow
-Up Inspection:  Licensed Operator Respirator Qualifications
And Control Room Staffing
During a review of items entered in the licensee's CAP, the inspectors found recent
corrective action items documenting repetitive occurrences associated the licensed operator respirator qualifications.  These CRs related to AR01670172 which documented a condition where shift staffing was challenged due to having expired licensed operator
respirator qualifications.  The
inspectors questioned the licensee's evaluation of
the CR regarding the conclusions reached.  Specifically, the inspectors noted that the individual was credited with watch
-standing during the period of expired qualifications and that the procedures for the annual requirements conflicted.  The licensee entered the inspectors' concerns in the CAP as AR01747333 and AR1772196. 
The licensee was able to demonstrate through timed entries and door logs that control room staffing was not compromised due to the expired respirator qualification.  Additionally, the licensee's corrective actions created a report to track licensed operator respirator qualifications as well as initiated a procedure change requests to more clearly document licensed operator watch
-standing requirements and clarify the definitions for annual requirements.
Inspection Scope
This review constituted one in
-depth problem identification and resolution sample as defined in IP
71152-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings 
25 Enclosure 4OA3  Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
.1  (71153) a. Unit 2 Planned Downpower to Repair Switchyard Hotspot
The inspectors reviewed the plant's response to a planned downpower on Unit
2.  Unit 2 was taken offline while remaining critical on April
21, 2012, to allow repair of two hot spots on two phases of a disconnect switch in the switchyard.  The repairs were successful and the unit was placed back
online on April 22, 2012.  Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report.
Inspection Scope
This event follow
-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP
71153-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings .2 a. Alert Declared Due To Toxic Gas
The inspectors reviewed the plant's response to a
n Alert on April
25 to 26, 2 012, that was declared during a special maintenance run o
f the G-02 EDG.  During the EDG run, exhaust fumes entered the adjacent air compressor room, a vital area
, and the levels of toxic gas from these fumes exceeded Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) limits.  The EDG was immediately secured and the room ventilated.
  The licensee corrected the system configuration problem that caused the inleakage and re
-performed the run.  Documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment to this report. Inspection Scope
This event follow
-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP
71153-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings .3 a. Failure of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Coupling
On May 21, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plant's response to the failure of the Unit 1 TDAFW pump coupling and related unplanned entry into a 72
-hour limiting condition for operation action statement.  The inspectors reviewed the repair and other activities the licensee performed to be able to return the pump to service within the allowed completion time.  Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment
to this report. Inspection Scope
This event follow
-up review constituted one sample defined in IP
71153-05. b. No findings were identified.
Findings 
26 Enclosure .4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report s (LER s) 05000301/2011-004-00 and 05000301/2011-004-01, Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due to Source Range
Introduction
: A Green NCV of 10
CFR 50.65(a)(3) was self
-revealed when a
n unplanned reactor trip occurred as a result of the failure of a source range detector during low power physics testing. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate operating experience and incorporate it into preventive maintenance programs to periodically replace aging electrical subcomponents in nuclear instrumentation systems and a subsequent age
-related failure resulted in initiating a plant transient.
DescriptionSubsequent review by the licensee determined that the failure was due to age
-related degradation and that the most likely cause of the failure was because the output filter capacitors were degraded.  The licensee indicated that the recent failures were experienced on power supplies manufactured in the 1970's
, and that the date codes on the capacitors in the subject units was also from the 1970's.
Additionally, the licensee noted that many of the components used in the construction of the related units were
40 years old.
: On June 13, 2011, during the performance of beginning of life (BOL) low  
power physics testing, and with reactor power decreasing due to inserting reactor control rods to obtain test data, power decreased below the setpoint that actuates and automatically places source range monitoring (SRM) instrumentation in service. When  
SRMs were actuated
, channel 2N31 experienced a failure of the associated high voltage power supply. This failure satisfied the SRM high flux reactor trip logic and resulted in an automatic reactor trip.
The licensee's root cause analysis identified historical operating experience as early as  
1992 , which reflected the need to periodically repair or replace power supplies; and that in 1998, Westinghouse provided a recommendation to replace power supplies
; or at a minimum , replace filtering capacitors every 10
years. In 1998
, the licensee made a decision not to incorporate the vendor recommendations into the preventive maintenance program.
The licensee concluded that the root cause could be attributed to life cycle management and preventive maintenance program
deficiencies. The corrective action to prevent recurrence was related to the life cycle management plan for the nuclear instruments. The inspectors considered that this action was adequate to address concerns related to the nuclear instruments. The inspectors reviewed the issue with the licensee with respect to subcomponent aging management. The licensee had indicated that subsequent to this event and industry reviews, it had expanded the subcomponent aging management program. The licensee provided evidence which demonstrated that a program for subcomponent aging and management was in the final stage of development, and that the program was reviewing several categories of subcomponents consisting of over 4,000 items. Additionally, the program was looking at single point vulnerabilities and risk prioritization of reviews. The inspectors concluded that this program appeared to approach subcomponent aging management systematically and would provide a strong barrier to preclude similar failures in the future.
Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to incorporate operating experience related to aging of electrical subcomponents specific to nuclear instrument source range
27 Enclosure monitors into preventive maintenance programs was a performance deficiency warranting further review. The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC
0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix
B, "Issue Screening," dated December
24, 2009, because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, the availability and reliability of the nuclear instruments was degraded to a point where an instrument failure caused a reactor trip, an event that adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge  
critical safety functions during power operations.
critical safety functions during power operations.
The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using IMC
The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using IMC 0609,
0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment
Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening
0609.04, Phase
and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, dated
1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Table
January 10, 2008. The inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to both
4a for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, dated January 10, 2008.  The inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor event and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions
the likelihood of a reactor event and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions
would not be available; therefore, the issue screened as having very low safety significance (Green).
would not be available; therefore, the issue screened as having very low safety
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's root cause analysis
significance (Green).
.  The licensee considered the issue a legacy issue related to the 1998 decision to ignore 1992 operating experience and a 1998 vendor recommendation to replace power supplies at 10
The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause analysis. The licensee considered
-year intervals.  Because the adverse decision occurred in 1998
the issue a legacy issue related to the 1998 decision to ignore 1992 operating
, the licensee concluded that
experience and a 1998 vendor recommendation to replace power supplies at 10-year
no crosscutting aspect occurred.  However, the inspectors noted that the licensee continued to amass internal and external operating experience from 1998 to 2011, including a 2010 NRC
intervals. Because the adverse decision occurred in 1998, the licensee concluded that
-identified trend of source range monitoring failures as documented in IR 05000266/2010002; 05000301/2010002, Section
no crosscutting aspect occurred. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee
4OA2.3, "Semiannual Trend," and that a rigorous and thorough evaluation of these issues could have precluded the most recent failure.  Therefore, the inspectors determined that the issue had a crosscutting aspect
continued to amass internal and external operating experience from 1998 to 2011,
in the area of corrective action program, evaluation/extent of condition.  Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate related nuclear instrument failure rate
including a 2010 NRC-identified trend of source range monitoring failures as
s such that the resolutions addressed the causes and extent of conditions for age
documented in IR 05000266/2010002; 05000301/2010002, Section 4OA2.3,
-related failures of electrical subcomponents (P.1(c)).
Semiannual Trend, and that a rigorous and thorough evaluation of these issues could
EnforcementBecause this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the licensee's CAP (as root cause evaluation
have precluded the most recent failure. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the
(RCE) 01660378-02), this violation is being
issue had a crosscutting aspect in the area of corrective action program,
:  Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) states, in part, that preventive maintenance activities shall be evaluated at least every refueling cycle and take into account, where practical, industry
evaluation/extent of condition. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate
-wide operating experience.  Contrary to this requirement, the licensee failed to evaluate its preventative maintenance activities to take into account a Westinghouse Infogram, dated August 8, 1998, that recommended replacement of power supplies every 10 years, and other industry
related nuclear instrument failure rates such that the resolutions addressed the causes
-wide operating experience issued since 1998 related to the replacement of
and extent of conditions for age-related failures of electrical subcomponents (P.1(c)).
aging electrical subcomponents.  This failure resulted in electrical subcomponents of a source range monitor not being replaced sin
Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) states, in part, that preventive maintenance
c e
activities shall be evaluated at least every refueling cycle and take into account, where
the 1970s.  A failure of one of these subcomponents resulted in a trip of the Unit 2 reactor on June 13, 2011.
practical, industry-wide operating experience. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee
   
failed to evaluate its preventative maintenance activities to take into account a
28 Enclosure treated as an NCV, consistent with
Westinghouse Infogram, dated August 8, 1998, that recommended replacement of
Section 2.3.2 of the NRC enforcement Policy (NCV 05000266/2012003
power supplies every 10 years, and other industry-wide operating experience issued
-04; 05000301/2012003
since 1998 related to the replacement of aging electrical subcomponents. This failure
-04, Failure to Incorporate Industry Operating Experience Into Preventive Maintenance Programs for Nuclear Instrumentation).
resulted in electrical subcomponents of a source range monitor not being replaced since
This event follow-up review constituted
the 1970s. A failure of one of these subcomponents resulted in a trip of the Unit 2
one sample as defined in IP
reactor on June 13, 2011.
71153-05. 4OA5 .1 Other Activities
Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the
The URI described a condition where additional information was needed by the inspectors to assess the licensee's program when determining an individual's radiological dose of record.  This item was discussed and closed by
licensees CAP (as root cause evaluation (RCE) 01660378-02), this violation is being
NCV 05000266/2012
                                            27                                      Enclosure
002-06, "Determining an Individual's
 
Dose of Record With Discrepant TLD/ED
      treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC enforcement Policy
Data Inputs." (Closed) URI 05000266/2011005
      (NCV 05000266/2012003-04; 05000301/2012003-04, Failure to Incorporate Industry
-02; 05000301/2011005
      Operating Experience Into Preventive Maintenance Programs for Nuclear
-02, Determining an Individual's Dose of
      Instrumentation).
Record with Discrepant TLD/ED Data Inputs
      This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.
.2 a. (Closed) URI 05000266/2012002
4OA5 Other Activities
-05; 05000301/2012002
.1  (Closed) URI 05000266/2011005-02; 05000301/2011005-02, Determining an
-05 , TSC Filter Testing May Be Inadequate
      Individuals Dose of Record with Discrepant TLD/ED Data Inputs
The URI described a condition where
      The URI described a condition where additional information was needed by the
additional information was
      inspectors to assess the licensees program when determining an individuals
needed by the
      radiological dose of record. This item was discussed and closed by
inspectors to assess the licensee'
      NCV 05000266/2012002-06, Determining an Individuals Dose of Record With
s TSC ventilation system filter testing program.  This item was closed and discussed in Section 2RS3 by NCV 05000266/2012003
      Discrepant TLD/ED Data Inputs.
-02; 05000301/2012003-02 , "Non-Compliance
.2  (Closed) URI 05000266/2012002-05; 05000301/2012002-05, TSC Filter Testing May Be
with 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in the Technical Support Center During a Design
      Inadequate
-Basis Accident."
  a. Inspection Scope
Inspection Scope
      The URI described a condition where additional information was needed by the
.3 a. Temporary Instruction
      inspectors to assess the licensees TSC ventilation system filter testing program. This
(TI)-2515/182 - Review of the Industry Initiative to Control
      item was closed and discussed in Section 2RS3 by NCV 05000266/2012003-02;
      05000301/2012003-02, Non-Compliance with 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the
      Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne
      Hazards Would Be Minimized in the Technical Support Center During
}}
}}

Revision as of 00:08, 12 November 2019

IR 05000266-12-003, 05000301-12-003; 04/01/2012 - 06/30/2012; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; Post-Maintenance Testing; In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation; and Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Dis
ML12216A393
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/03/2012
From: Michael Kunowski
NRC/RGN-III/DRP/B5
To: Meyer L
Point Beach
References
IR-12-003
Download: ML12216A393 (50)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000266/2012003

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

August 3, 2012

Mr. Larry Meyer

Site Vice President

NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

6610 Nuclear Road

Two Rivers, WI 54241

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2012003 AND

05000301/2012003

Dear Mr. Meyer:

On June 30, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated

inspection at your Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents

the inspection findings, which were discussed on June 26, 2012, with you and members of your

staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

Two NRC-identified findings and one self-revealing finding of very low safety significance were

identified during this inspection.

These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. The NRC is treating

these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the

Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the subject or severity of these NCVs, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a

copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III,

2443 Warrenville Road, Suite 210, Lisle, IL 60532-4352; the Director, Office of Enforcement,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector

Office at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting

aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of

the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional

Administrator, Region III, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Point Beach Nuclear Plant.

L. Meyer -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael A. Kunowski, Branch Chief

Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000266; 05000301

License Nos.: DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000266/2012003 and 05000301/2012003;

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos.: 05000266; 05000301

License Nos.: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report No.: 05000266/2012003; 05000301/2012003

Licensee: NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: Two Rivers, WI

Dates: April 1, 2012, through June 30, 2012

Inspectors: S. Burton, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Thorpe-Kavanaugh, Resident Inspector

R. Krsek, Senior Resident Inspector (Kewaunee)

M. Phalen, Senior Health Physicist

V. Myers, Health Physicist

T. Bilik, Senior Reactor Engineer

V. Meghani, Reactor Inspector

A. Dahbur, Senior Reactor Engineer

M. Learn, Reactor Engineer

J. Bozga, Reactor Engineer

C. Zoia, Operations Engineer

Approved by: Michael A. Kunowski, Branch Chief

Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ......................................................................................................... 1

REPORT DETAILS .................................................................................................................... 4

Summary of Plant Status ........................................................................................................ 4

1. REACTOR SAFETY .................................................................................................... 4

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01) ............................................................ 4

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04) ...................................................................... 6

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05) ................................................................................. 7

1R06 Flooding (71111.06) .......................................................................................... 7

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11) .................................... 8

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12) .............................................................. 9

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13) ........10

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15) ...............11

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18) .........................................................................11

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19) ..............................................................12

1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20) ............................................................................15

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22) .......................................................................15

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06) ...............................................................................16

2. RADIATION SAFETY .................................................................................................17

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03) ....................17

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES ...................................................................................................19

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151) .......................................................19

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152) ............................................22

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153) ...............25

4OA5 Other Activities .................................................................................................28

4OA6 Management Meetings .....................................................................................29

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations ...........................................................................29

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION............................................................................................. 1

Key Points of Contact ............................................................................................................. 1

List of Items Opened, Closed and Discussed ......................................................................... 2

List of Documents Reviewed .................................................................................................. 3

List of Acronyms Used...........................................................................................................15

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000266/2012003, 05000301/2012003; 04/01/2012 - 06/30/2012; Point Beach Nuclear

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Post-Maintenance Testing; In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and

Mitigation; and Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

This report covers a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

baseline inspections by regional inspectors. Two Green NRC-identified findings and one Green

self-revealing finding were identified during this inspection. The findings were considered

non-cited violations (NCVs) of NRC regulations. The significance of most findings is indicated

by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609,

Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may

be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program

for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in

NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. NRC-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

  • Green. A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of

10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) was self-revealed when an unplanned reactor trip of Unit 2 occurred

on June 13, 2011, as a result of the failure of a source range detector during low power

physics testing. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate operating

experience and incorporate it into its preventive maintenance program to periodically

replace aging electrical subcomponents in nuclear instrumentation systems and a

subsequent age-related failure resulted in initiating a plant transient. The licensee

entered this issue into the corrective action program, and corrective actions to prevent

recurrence were initiated.

The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with Inspection

Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue

Screening, dated December 24, 2009, because the finding was associated with the

Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, the

availability and reliability of the nuclear instruments was degraded to a point where an

instrument failure caused a reactor trip, an event that adversely impacted the

cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and

challenge critical safety functions during power operations. The finding has a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of corrective action program, evaluation/extent of

condition. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate related nuclear

instrument failure rates so that the resolutions addressed the causes and extent of

conditions for age-related failures of electrical subcomponents (P.1(c)).

(Section 4OA3.4)

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

  • Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated

non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," because

the licensee failed to establish routine testing procedure that demonstrated room

temperatures would be maintained. Specifically, on March 29, 2012, the inspectors

identified that the licensee failed to establish routine testing procedure that demonstrated

1 Enclosure

the air flows for emergency diesel generators G-01 and G-02 ventilation systems would

perform adequately to ensure that the room temperatures would be maintained. The

licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program, and corrective actions

included performance of air flow measurements on the fan units, creation of a preventive

maintenance requirement for taking periodic flow measurements, and assessment of the

identified issue through a condition evaluation.

The finding was determined to be more than minor in accordance with Inspection

Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated December 24, 2009. The

inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor because it was associated

with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for design control. Specifically, it

adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability

of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. This

finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision-making.

Specifically, the licensee did not use conservative assumptions regarding the verification

of the proper air flow through the safety-related gravity dampers in the emergency diesel

generators G-01 and G-02 rooms (H.1(b)). (Section 1R19)

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

  • Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated

non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1701. Specifically, the inspectors identified

deficiencies, as of January 19, 2012, in the licensees testing program for assuring that

the technical support center (TSC) ventilation system was in compliance with the

systems design basis. The licensees TSC high efficiency particulate air and charcoal

filter efficiencies were not tested to the design criteria. The licensee documented this

issue in its corrective action program and the corrective actions included revising

applicable procedures. In addition, the licensee performed a calculation to show

that the TSC ventilation system was capable of maintaining a radiological habitability of

less than 5 Rem total effective dose equivalent for the duration of the design base

accidents. The calculation was based on actual historical filter testing efficiencies.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program and

process attribute of exposure control of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone

and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of

worker health and safety from exposure radiation and radioactive material. Specifically,

inappropriately testing installed emergency ventilation system filters designed to

mitigate workers radiation exposures did not validate that the TSC ventilation system

was capable of performing its intended design function of minimizing worker exposures

to airborne radioactive materials. The finding was assessed using the occupational

radiation safety significance determination process and was determined to be of very

low safety significance (Green) because it was not an as-low-as-is-reasonable-

achievable planning issue, there was no overexposure or potential for overexposure,

and the licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The inspectors

determined that the most significant contributor to the finding was a cross-cutting aspect

in the area of human performance, resources. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure

that the TSC ventilation filter testing protocol assured compliance to the systems

designed margins (H.2(a)). (Section 2RS3)

2 Enclosure

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No violations were identified.

3 Enclosure

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 was at 100 percent power throughout the entire inspection period with the exception of

brief downpowers to conduct planned maintenance and surveillance activities.

Unit 2 was at 100 percent power for the majority of the period with the exception of two planned

downpowers and one forced outage. Unit 2 was downpowered on April 20, 2012, to

approximately 15 percent power for switchyard work and on June 18, 2012, for routine auxiliary

feedwater system testing. On June 27, 2012, the unit was tripped due to a turbine control

system malfunction and remained shut down until the end of the inspection period.

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Summer Seasonal Readiness Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees preparations for summer weather

for selected systems, including conditions that could lead to an extended drought. The

inspectors reviews focused specifically on the following plant systems:

  • component cooling water (CCW); and
  • primary auxiliary building (PAB) ventilation.

During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant specific design features and the

licensees procedures used to mitigate or respond to adverse weather conditions.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and

performance requirements for systems selected for inspection, and verified that operator

actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific procedures. The inspectors also

reviewed corrective action program (CAP) items to verify that the licensee was

identifying adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into

the CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one seasonal adverse weather sample as defined in

Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4 Enclosure

.2 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Condition - Solar Magnetic Disturbances

a. Inspection Scope

Since solar magnetic disturbances were forecast in the vicinity of the facility for

April 23, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the licensees overall preparations/protection for

the expected weather conditions. On April 23, 2012, the inspectors walked down the

offsite power system, in addition to the licensees emergency alternating current (AC)

power systems, because their safety-related (SR) functions could be affected or required

as a result of solar magnetic flares. The inspectors evaluated the licensees

preparations against the sites procedures and determined that the staffs actions were

adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design

features and the licensees procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather

conditions. Additionally, inspection activities included a review of the FSAR, the

licensees adverse weather procedures, daily monitoring of the off-normal environmental

conditions, and that operator actions specified by plant-specific procedures were

appropriate to ensure operability of the facilitys systems. The inspectors also reviewed

a sample of CAP items to verify that the licensee identified adverse weather issues at an

appropriate threshold and dispositioned them through the CAP in accordance with

station corrective action procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

to this report.

This inspection constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition

sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Condition - Severe Thunderstorm Watch

a. Inspection Scope

Since thunderstorms with potential tornados and high winds were forecast in the vicinity

of the facility for June 17, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the licensees overall

preparations/protection for the expected weather conditions. The inspectors reviewed

the actions taken by the licensee in response to the adverse weather condition while the

associated meteorological tower was out of service. The inspectors reviewed the

potential impact of the adverse weather conditions on SR equipment, in addition to the

licensees emergency AC power systems. The inspectors evaluated the licensees

preparations against the sites procedures and determined that the licensees actions

were adequate. During the inspection, the inspectors focused on plant-specific design

features and the licensees procedures used to respond to specified adverse weather

conditions. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and

indications for those systems required to control the plant. Additionally, the inspectors

reviewed the FSAR and performance requirements for systems selected for inspection,

and verified that operator actions were appropriate as specified by plant specific

procedures. The inspectors also reviewed a sample of CAP items to verify that the

licensee identified adverse weather issues at an appropriate threshold and dispositioned

them through the CAP in accordance with station corrective action procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

5 Enclosure

This inspection constituted one readiness for impending adverse weather condition

sample as defined in IP 71111.01-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Quarterly Partial System Walkdowns

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walkdowns of the following risk-significant

system:

  • Unit 2 safety injection (SI) system B, during surveillance testing on the opposite

train; and

following maintenance.

The inspectors selected this system based on its risk significance relative to the Reactor

Safety Cornerstones at the time it was inspected. The inspectors attempted to identify

any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially

increase risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures, system

diagrams, FSAR, Technical Specification (TS) requirements, outstanding work orders

(WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of ongoing work activities on redundant

trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have rendered the systems

incapable of performing their intended functions. The inspectors also walked down

accessible portions of the system to verify system components and support equipment

were aligned correctly and operable. The inspectors examined the material condition of

the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there

were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the licensee had properly

identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events

or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the CAP

with the appropriate significance characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted two partial system walkdown samples as defined in

IP 71111.04-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

6 Enclosure

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Routine Resident Inspector Tours (71111.05Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted fire protection (FP) walkdowns which were focused on

availability, accessibility, and the condition of firefighting equipment in the following

risk-significant plant areas:

  • fire zone 187 (monitor tank room);
  • fire zone 596 (Unit 2 façade);
  • fire zone 151 (SI pump room); and
  • fire zone 318 (cable spreading room).

The inspectors reviewed areas to assess if the licensee had implemented an FP

program that adequately controlled combustibles and ignition sources within the plant,

effectively maintained fire detection and suppression capability, maintained passive FP

features in good material condition, and implemented adequate compensatory measures

for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable FP equipment, systems, or features in

accordance with the licensees fire plan. The inspectors selected fire areas based on

their overall contribution to internal fire risk as documented in the plants Individual Plant

Examination of External Events with later additional insights, their potential to impact

equipment which could initiate or mitigate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants

ability to respond to a security event. Using the documents listed in the Attachment to

this report, the inspectors verified that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their

designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers

were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and fire

doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition. The

inspectors also verified that minor issues identified during the inspection were entered

into the CAP. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four quarterly fire protection inspection samples as defined in

IP 71111.05-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flooding (71111.06)

.1 Internal Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed selected risk important plant design features and licensee

procedures intended to protect the plant and its SR equipment from internal flooding

events. The inspectors reviewed flood analyses and design documents, including the

FSAR, engineering calculations, and abnormal operating procedures (AOPs) to identify

licensee commitments. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee drawings to identify

areas and equipment that may be affected by internal flooding caused by the failure or

7 Enclosure

misalignment of nearby sources of water, such as the fire suppression or the circulating

water systems. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective action documents

with respect to past flood-related items identified in the CAP to verify the adequacy of

the corrective actions. The inspectors performed a walkdown of the following plant area

to assess the adequacy of watertight doors and verify drains and sumps were clear of

debris and were operable, and that the licensee complied with its commitments.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one internal flooding sample as defined in IP 71111.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On May 21, 2012, the inspectors observed a crew of licensed operators in the plants

simulator during licensed operator requalification examinations to verify that operator

performance was adequate, evaluators were identifying and documenting crew

performance problems, and that training was being conducted in accordance with

licensee procedures. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

  • licensed operator performance;
  • crews clarity and formality of communications;
  • ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
  • prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
  • correct use and implementation of abnormal and emergency procedures;
  • control board manipulations;
  • oversight and direction from supervisors; and
  • ability to identify and implement appropriate TS actions and Emergency Plan

actions and notifications.

The crews performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations and successful critical task completion requirements. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator requalification program

simulator sample as defined in IP 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

8 Enclosure

.2 Resident Inspector Quarterly Observation of Heightened Activity or Risk (71111.11Q)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 20 and 21, 2012, the inspectors observed activities in the control room during

the high risk activity of a Unit 2 downpower to 15 percent to secure one train of main

feedwater (FW). This was an activity that required heightened awareness or was related

to increased risk. The inspectors evaluated the following areas:

  • licensed operator performance;
  • crews clarity and formality of communications;
  • ability to take timely actions in the conservative direction;
  • prioritization, interpretation, and verification of annunciator alarms;
  • correct use and implementation of procedures;
  • control board manipulations; and
  • oversight and direction from supervisors.

The performance in these areas was compared to pre-established operator action

expectations, procedural compliance, and task completion requirements. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly licensed operator heightened activity/risk

sample as defined in IP 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

.1 Routine Quarterly Evaluations (71111.12Q)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated degraded performance issues involving the following

risk-significant system:

The inspectors reviewed events, such as where ineffective equipment maintenance had

resulted in valid or invalid automatic actuations of engineered safeguards systems, and

independently verified the licensee's actions to address system performance or condition

problems in terms of the following:

  • implementing appropriate work practices;
  • identifying and addressing common cause failures;
  • scoping of systems in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the maintenance rule;
  • characterizing system reliability issues for performance;
  • charging unavailability for performance;
  • trending key parameters for condition monitoring;

9 Enclosure

  • verifying appropriate performance criteria for structures, systems, and

components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2), or appropriate and adequate

goals and corrective actions for systems classified as (a)(1).

The inspectors assessed performance issues with respect to the reliability, availability,

and condition monitoring of the system. In addition, the inspectors verified maintenance

effectiveness issues were entered into the CAP with the appropriate significance

characterization. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one quarterly maintenance effectiveness samples as defined

in IP 71111.12-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

.1 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluation and management of plant risk for the

maintenance and emergent work activities affecting risk-significant and SR equipment

listed below to verify that the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to

removing equipment for work:

  • risk management of 345-kilovolt (kV) output breaker hotspot with increasing

outside air temperatures;

  • risk management with CCW heat exchanger C inoperable but available;

inoperable week of April 26; and

  • risk management with Unit 1 TDAFW pump and gas turbine generator

out-of-service.

These activities were selected based on their potential risk significance relative to the

Reactor Safety Cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that

risk assessments were performed as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and were accurate

and complete. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors verified that the

plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the scope

of maintenance work, discussed the results of the assessment with the licensee's

probabilistic risk analyst or shift technical advisor, and verified plant conditions were

consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed TS requirements and

walked down portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk

analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

These activities constituted four maintenance risk assessments and emergent work

control samples as defined in IP 71111.13-05.

10 Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functional Assessments (71111.15)

.1 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following operability issues:

  • control room board deficiencies and abandoned in-place modifications;
  • containment fan cooler unit closed drain valves (Unit 2);
  • SI with non-conservative gas void acceptance criteria;
  • cable spreading room.

The inspectors selected these potential operability issues based on the risk significance

of the associated components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical

adequacy of the evaluations to ensure that TS operability was properly justified and the

subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized increase in

risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the

appropriate sections of the TSs and FSAR to the licensees evaluations to determine

whether the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures

were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures

in place would function as intended and were properly controlled. The inspectors

determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the

evaluations. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed a sampling of corrective action

documents to verify that the licensee was identifying and correcting any deficiencies

associated with operability evaluations. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted four completed and two partial operability samples as defined

in IP 71111.15-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18)

.1 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following modification(s):

  • main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) curtains (permanent);
  • EDG exhaust (temporary) (partial); and

11 Enclosure

  • 480-volt temporary power to 1B-42 loads (temporary).

The inspectors reviewed the configuration changes and associated 10 CFR 50.59 safety

evaluation screening against the design basis, the FSAR, and the TSs, as applicable, to

verify that the modification did not affect the operability or availability of the affected

systems. The inspectors, as applicable, observed ongoing and completed work

activities to ensure that the modifications were installed as directed and consistent with

the design control documents; the modifications operated as expected; post-modification

testing adequately demonstrated continued system operability, availability, and reliability;

and that operation of the modifications did not impact the operability of any interfacing

systems. As applicable, the inspectors verified that relevant procedure, design, and

licensing documents were properly updated. Lastly, the inspectors discussed the plant

modification with operations, engineering, and training personnel to ensure that the

individuals were aware of how the operation with the plant modification in place could

impact overall plant performance. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to

this report.

This inspection constituted two completed temporary modification samples, one partial

temporary modification sample, and one permanent plant modification sample as

defined in IP 71111.18-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

.1 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following post-maintenance testing (PMT) activities to verify

that procedures and test activities were adequate to ensure system operability and

functional capability:

  • PMT of PAB ventilation following low flow switch replacement (Units 1 and 2);
  • PMT of EDG room exhaust fan testing (Units 1 and 2);
  • PMT of EDG G-01 starting air compressor;
  • PMT of EDG modification (Unit 2);
  • PMT of main generator output breaker disconnects following hotspot repair

(Unit 2); and

  • PMT of main steam dump 2MS 2052 to condenser dump control valve (Unit 2).

These activities were selected based upon the SSCs ability to impact risk. The

inspectors evaluated these activities for the following (as applicable): the effect of testing

on the plant had been adequately addressed; testing was adequate for the maintenance

performed; acceptance criteria were clear and demonstrated operational readiness; test

instrumentation was appropriate; tests were performed as written in accordance with

properly reviewed and approved procedures; equipment was returned to its operational

status following testing (temporary modifications or jumpers required for test

12 Enclosure

performance were properly removed after test completion); and test documentation was

properly evaluated. The inspectors evaluated the activities against TSs, the FSAR,

10 CFR Part 50 requirements, licensee procedures, and various NRC generic

communications to ensure that the test results adequately ensured that the equipment

met the licensing basis and design requirements. In addition, the inspectors reviewed

corrective action documents associated with PMTs to determine whether the licensee

was identifying problems and entering them in the CAP, and that the problems were

being corrected commensurate with their importance to safety. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted seven post-maintenance testing samples as defined in

IP 71111.19-05.

b. Findings

Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation Damper Testing

Introduction: The inspectors identified an issue of very low safety significance (Green)

and associated non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI,

"Test Control," because the licensee failed to establish a routine testing procedure to

demonstrate that the air flows for the ventilation systems in the G-01 and G-02 EDG

rooms were sufficient to keep room temperatures maintained at or below the design

basis. The licensee entered this issue into its CAP for evaluation and development of

corrective actions.

Description: The TS 3.8.1 required, in part, that independent and redundant sources of

power be provided to the Engineered Safety Feature Systems. This was met through

each safeguard bus having a normal offsite power source and a standby emergency

power source (EDG). There were two EDGs (G-01 and G-02) that supplied power to the

Train A buses. These diesels were considered operable when the diesel room

temperature was less than 115 degrees Fahrenheit with the EDG carrying design basis

accident loads. For the room temperature to be maintained, three of the four gravity

operated louvers must be opened.

Based on this information, the inspectors reviewed the acceptance criteria for the gravity

operator louvers and found none. In response, the licensee stated the gravity louvers

had to open freely; however, a specified amount was not necessary. Additionally, the

licensee stated that the gravity operated louvers did not have specific acceptance criteria

established to ensure air flows were met and that, instead, the fan motors were used to

determine air flows. The inspectors then questioned the licensee regarding the ability to

accurately predict fan air flow outputs based on the fan motors. Also, the inspectors

questioned what additional monitoring was performed on the fans to ensure that there

was no degradation of the fan blades, no friction on the bearings, or that no bypass flow

was occurring, as well as how the test was performed in a consistent manner. The

licensee provided that there was no periodic testing to ensure air flows.

On March 29, 2012, the licensee initiated CR01750276 in response to the inspectors

concerns regarding the louvers in the G-01 and G-02 EDG rooms. Specifically, the CR

identified that air flows had not been routinely taken to ensure that adequate air flow

requirements were met. At the conclusion of the inspection period, the licensees

corrective actions included performance of air flow measurements on the fan units,

13 Enclosure

creation of a preventive maintenance requirement for taking periodic flow

measurements, and assessment of the identified issue through a condition evaluation.

Additionally, the inspectors noted that the licensee had taken air flow measurements on

the fans in 1998 and 2007, but had not established acceptance criteria and routine

testing. The inspectors noted differences between the 1998 and 2007 data obtained,

and that the licensee had used the lesser-conservative data from these tests to support

the design calculation. The inspectors questioned the use of non-conservative data

values in the design calculations for the maximum temperatures in the EDG rooms to

support operability. This concern was captured in CR1769204. The licensees planned

corrective actions were to revise the calculation to use the accurate data.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish a routine testing

procedure to demonstrate that the air flows for the G-01 and G-02 rooms would keep

room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable temperatures when the EDGs

were carrying design basis accident loads was a performance deficiency warranting

further review. Using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated

December 24, 2009, the inspectors determined that this finding was more than minor

because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute for design

control. Specifically, it adversely affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective to

ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable

consequences.

The inspectors determined the finding could be evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance

Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and

Characterization of Findings, Tables 3b and 4a, for the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone,

dated January 10, 2008. The inspectors answered No to all of the questions in the

Mitigating Systems column of Table 4a; therefore, the finding screened as having very

low safety significance (Green). The licensee entered this issue into the CAP as

AR01750276. The licensees corrective actions included performance of air flow

measurements on the fan units, creation of a preventive maintenance requirement for

taking periodic flow measurements, and assessment of the identified issue through a

condition evaluation.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance,

decision-making. Specifically, the licensee did not use conservative assumptions

regarding the verification of the proper air flow through the SR gravity dampers in the

EDG G-01 and G-02 rooms (H.1(b)). The inspectors reviewed the licensees causal

assessment and found that this assessment was consistent with their assessment of the

condition.

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," requires, in part,

that a test program be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that

components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in

accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and

acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. Contrary to this, on

March 29, 2012, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to establish a routine

testing procedure to demonstrate that the air flows for EDGs G-01 and G-02 ventilation

systems would keep the room temperatures at or below the maximum allowable

temperatures when the EDGs were carrying design basis accident loads. Because this

violation was of very low safety significance, and it was entered into the licensees CAP

14 Enclosure

(as CR1750276), this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2

of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000266/2012003-01; 05000301/2012003-01;

Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation System Testing).

1R20 Outage Activities (71111.20)

.1 Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated outage activities for an unplanned Unit 2 outage that began on

June 27, 2012, and continued through the end of the inspection period. The outage

occurred as a result of a turbine control system malfunction that resulted in a turbine

load reject which terminated when the reactor operators inserted a manual reactor trip.

The inspectors reviewed activities to ensure that the licensee considered risk in

developing, planning, and implementing the outage schedule.

The inspectors observed or reviewed the reactor shutdown and cooldown, outage

equipment configuration and risk management, electrical lineups, selected clearances,

control and monitoring of decay heat removal, control of containment activities,

personnel fatigue management, startup and heatup activities, and identification and

resolution of problems associated with the outage.

This inspection constituted one other partial outage sample as defined in

IP 71111.20-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

.1 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the test results for the following activities to determine whether

risk-significant systems and equipment were capable of performing their intended safety

function, and to verify testing was conducted in accordance with applicable procedural

and TS requirements:

  • PAB ventilation TS-87 system monthly test (routine);
  • TDAFW quarterly pump and valve test (Unit 1) (inservice testing);
  • instrument air valves quarterly SR (Unit 2) (containment isolation valve); and

The inspectors observed in-plant activities and reviewed procedures and associated

records to determine the following:

  • did preconditioning occur;
  • were the effects of the testing adequately addressed by control room personnel

or engineers prior to the commencement of the testing;

15 Enclosure

  • were acceptance criteria clearly stated, demonstrated operational readiness, and

consistent with the system design basis;

  • plant equipment calibration was correct, accurate, and properly documented;
  • as-left setpoints were within required ranges; and the calibration frequency was

in accordance with TSs, the FSAR, procedures, and applicable commitments;

  • measuring and test equipment calibration was current;
  • test equipment was used within the required range and accuracy; applicable

prerequisites described in the test procedures were satisfied;

  • test frequencies met TS requirements to demonstrate operability and reliability;

tests were performed in accordance with the test procedures and other

applicable procedures; jumpers and lifted leads were controlled and restored

where used;

  • test data and results were accurate, complete, within limits, and valid;
  • test equipment was removed after testing;
  • where applicable for inservice testing activities, testing was performed in

accordance with the applicable version of Section XI, American Society of

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code, and reference values were consistent with

the system design basis;

  • where applicable, test results not meeting acceptance criteria were addressed

with an adequate operability evaluation or the SSC was declared inoperable;

  • where applicable for SR instrument control surveillance tests, reference setting

data were accurately incorporated in the test procedure;

  • where applicable, actual conditions encountering high resistance electrical

contacts were such that the intended safety function could still be accomplished;

  • prior procedure changes had not provided an opportunity to identify problems

encountered during the performance of the surveillance or calibration test;

  • equipment was returned to a position or status required to support the

performance of its safety functions; and

  • all problems identified during the testing were appropriately documented and

dispositioned in the CAP.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one routine surveillance testing sample, one inservice testing

sample, one reactor coolant system leak detection inspection sample, and one

containment isolation valve sample as defined in IP 71111.22, Sections -02 and -05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

.1 Emergency Preparedness Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the response to a declaration of an alert condition on

April 25 to 26, 2012, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in classification,

16 Enclosure

notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The licensee

declared the alert after exhaust gasses from an EDG were inadvertently taken back into

the EDG room during a test. The inspectors observed emergency response operations

in the control room and technical support center (TSC) to determine whether the event

classification, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in

accordance with procedures. No deficiencies were identified. Documents reviewed are

listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one sample as defined in IP 71114.06-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation (71124.03)

This inspection constituted a partial sample as defined in IP 71124.03-05.

.1 Engineering Controls (02.02)

a. Inspection Scope

An unresolved item (URI) was documented in NRC Integrated Inspection Report (IR)

05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, concerning additional information that was

needed by the inspectors to assess the licensees TSC ventilation system filter testing

program. Supplemental calculations and reviews were performed by the licensee, and

the additional information was reviewed by the inspectors. Specifically, selected

procedures, system design calculations, plant configuration drawings, and related

licensee documentation were reviewed. The inspectors completed these reviews to

verify that the licensees program and its implementation met the requirements of

10 CFR 20.1701 and were consistent with NRC guidance.

b. Findings

Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive

Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in

the Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident

Introduction: The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green)

and associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1701, Use of Process or Other Engineering

Controls. The inspectors identified that the licensee failed to establish adequate high

efficiency particulate air (HEPA) and charcoal filter testing procedures for ensuring that

radiological airborne hazards would be minimized and the habitability of the TSC would

be maintained under accident conditions. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure

engineering controls that were in place to minimize the concentration of radioactive

material in air in the TSC were maintained in accordance with the design bases.

17 Enclosure

Description: The TSC is an onsite emergency response facility intended to support plant

operations under emergency conditions. The TSC ventilation system is designed to

remove radioactive material from the air, thereby minimizing the radioactive material

entering the TSC during postulated accident scenarios.

The inspectors identified that, for an extended period of time, the licensee did not

validate that the removal efficiencies in the TSC ventilation filter design bases were

being achieved. Specifically, testing of the TSC ventilation HEPA and charcoal filters did

not demonstrate that filter performance was in compliance with the design criteria. The

design bases for the TSC ventilation system HEPA filter was 99 percent for particulate

radioactive material removal efficiency. The licensees surveillance test acceptance

criterion was95 percent. In addition, the design basis for the charcoal filter laboratory

analysis was 95 percent removal efficiency of radioactive iodine. The surveillance test

required 80 percent. Consequently, there was no assurance that the installed TSC

ventilation equipment would perform at its designed radioactive material removal

capacity, thereby minimizing the radiological exposures to the occupants of the TSC

during postulated accidents.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to establish testing criteria in

accordance with the system design bases was a performance deficiency consistent

with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports. The inspectors determined that the

licensee failed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1701 to use installed process

equipment to reasonably minimize the level of airborne radioactive materials. The

performance deficiency was reasonably within the licensees ability to foresee and

correct and was indicative of current performance, in that, the licensee had recent

opportunities to self-identify and correct the issue, including when performing recent

technical reviews for NRC license amendment submittals for license renewal, alternate

source term, and extended power uprate.

The inspectors reviewed IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening," dated December 24,

2009, and found no similar examples. However, the inspectors determined that the

finding was more than minor because it was associated with the program and process

attribute of exposure control of the occupational radiation safety cornerstone and

adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of

worker health and safety from exposure radiation and radioactive material. Specifically,

by testing the installed emergency ventilation system filters to removal efficiencies less

than their design criteria, the licensee did not validate that the TSC ventilation system

was capable of performing its design function and minimize worker exposures to

airborne radioactive materials.

The finding was assessed using IMC 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance Determination Process, (SDP) and was determined to be of very low safety

significance (Green) because it was not an as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA)

planning issue, there was no overexposure or potential for overexposure, and the

licensees ability to assess dose was not compromised. The licensee documented this

issue in its corrective action program. Corrective actions included revising applicable

procedures and based on actual historical filter testing efficiencies, calculating that the

TSC ventilation system was capable of maintaining a radiological habitability of less than

5 Rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) for the duration of the design-basis

accidents.

18 Enclosure

The inspectors identified that the most significant contributor to the finding was a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, resources. Specifically, the

licensee failed to ensure that the TSC ventilation filter testing protocol assured

compliance to the systems designed margins in that the TSC ventilation filter testing

acceptance criteria were established independent of the system design requirements

(H.2(a)).

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 20.1701 requires that licensees use, to the extent practical,

process or other engineering controls (e.g., containment, decontamination, or ventilation)

to control the concentration of radioactive material in air. Contrary to the above, as of

January 19, 2012, the licensee failed to ensure that effective engineering controls were

implemented to control the concentration of radioactive material in air in the TSC in

accordance with the facilitys design bases. Because the issue was of very low safety

significance and has been entered into the licensees CAP (as CR01752498), the

violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000266/2012003-02; 05000301/2012003-02;

Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the Concentration of Radioactive

Material in Air and Ensure that Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in

the Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident). This NCV closes

URI 05000266/2012002-05; 05000301/2012002-05, TSC Filter Testing May Be

Inadequate," in Section 4OA5.2.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and

Physical Protection

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Unplanned Scrams with Complications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Unplanned Scrams with

Complications performance indicator (PI) for Units 1 and 2, for the third quarter 2011

through the second quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy of the PI data reported, PI

definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Document

99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, dated

October 2009, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees operator narrative

logs, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the

submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees CAP to determine if any

problems had been identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator

and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this

report.

This inspection constituted two unplanned scrams with complications samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

19 Enclosure

.2 Reactor Coolant System Leakage

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS Leakage PI for Units 1 and 2,

for the third quarter 2011 through the second quarter 2012. To determine the accuracy

of the PI data reported, PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 6, dated October 2009, were used. The inspectors reviewed the licensees

operator logs, RCS leakage tracking data, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated IRs

to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees

CAP to determine if any problems had been identified with the PI data collected or

transmitted for this indicator and none were identified. Documents reviewed are listed in

the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system leakage samples as defined in

IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity

a. Inspection Scope

In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the RCS

specific activity PI for Units 1 and 2 for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter

2011. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the

NEI Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 6, dated October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The

inspectors reviewed the licensees RCS chemistry samples, TS requirements, CRs,

event reports, and NRC integrated IRs to validate the accuracy of the submittals. The

inspectors also reviewed the licensees CAP to determine if any problems had been

identified with the PI data collected or transmitted for this indicator and none were

identified. In addition to record reviews, the inspectors observed a chemistry technician

obtain and analyze an RCS sample. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment

to this report.

This inspection constituted two reactor coolant system specific activity samples as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

20 Enclosure

.4 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the

occupational radiological occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth

quarter 2011. The inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Revision 6, dated October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The

inspectors reviewed the licensees assessment of the PI for occupational radiation safety

to determine if indicator related data was adequately assessed and reported. To assess

the adequacy of the licensees PI data collection and analyses, the inspectors discussed

with radiation protection staff, the scope and breadth of its data review and the results of

those reviews. The inspectors independently reviewed electronic personal dosimetry

dose rate and accumulated dose alarms and dose reports and the dose assignments for

any intakes that occurred during the time period reviewed to determine if there were

potentially unrecognized occurrences. The inspectors also conducted walkdowns of

numerous locked high and very-high radiation area entrances to determine the

adequacy of the controls in place for these areas. Documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one occupational exposure control effectiveness sample as

defined in IP 71151-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Radiological Effluent Occurrences

a. Inspection Scope

In the first quarter of 2012, the inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the

radiological effluent Technical Specification/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual radiological

effluent occurrences PI for the fourth quarter 2010 through the fourth quarter 2011. The

inspectors used PI definitions and guidance contained in the NEI Document 99-02,

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 6, dated

October 2009, to determine the accuracy of the PI data reported. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees CAP and selected individual reports generated since this

indicator was last reviewed to identify any potential occurrences such as unmonitored,

uncontrolled, or improperly calculated effluent releases that may have impacted offsite

dose. The inspectors reviewed gaseous effluent summary data and the results of

associated offsite dose calculations for selected dates to determine if indicator results

were accurately reported. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees methods for

quantifying gaseous and liquid effluents and determining effluent dose. Documents

reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This inspection constituted one Radiological Effluent Technical Specification/Offsite

Dose Calculation Manual radiological effluent occurrences sample as defined in

IP 71151-05.

21 Enclosure

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems (71152)

.1 Routine Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As part of the various baseline inspection procedures discussed in previous sections of

this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities

and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees CAP at

an appropriate threshold, that adequate attention was being given to timely corrective

actions, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Attributes reviewed

included: identification of the problem was complete and accurate; timeliness was

commensurate with the safety significance; evaluation and disposition of performance

issues, generic implications, common causes, contributing factors, root causes,

extent-of-condition reviews, and previous occurrences reviews were proper and

adequate; and that the classification, prioritization, focus, and timeliness of corrective

actions were commensurate with safety and sufficient to prevent recurrence of the issue.

Minor issues entered into the licensees CAP as a result of the inspectors observations

are included in the Attachment to this report.

These routine reviews for the identification and resolution of problems did not constitute

any additional inspection samples. Instead, by procedure they were considered an

integral part of the inspections performed during the quarter and documented in

Section 1 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Daily Corrective Action Program Reviews

a. Inspection Scope

In order to assist with the identification of repetitive equipment failures and specific

human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of

items entered into the licensees CAP. This review was accomplished through

inspection of the stations daily condition report packages.

These daily reviews were performed by procedure as part of the inspectors daily plant

status monitoring activities and, as such, did not constitute any separate inspection

samples.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

22 Enclosure

.3 Annual Sample: Review of Operator Workarounds

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees implementation of the process used to identify,

document, track, and resolve operational challenges. Inspection activities included, but

were not limited to, a review of the cumulative effects of the operator workarounds

(OWAs) on system availability and the potential for improper operation of the system, for

potential impacts on multiple systems, and on the ability of operators to respond to plant

transients or accidents.

The inspectors performed a review of the cumulative effects of OWAs. The documents

listed in the Attachment to this report were reviewed to accomplish the objectives of the

inspection procedure. The inspectors reviewed both current and historical operational

challenge records to determine whether the licensee was identifying operator challenges

at an appropriate threshold, had entered them into the CAP, and proposed or

implemented appropriate and timely corrective actions which addressed each issue.

Reviews were conducted to determine if any operator challenge could increase the

possibility of an Initiating Event, if the challenge was contrary to training, required a

change from long-standing operational practices, or created the potential for

inappropriate compensatory actions. Additionally, all temporary modifications were

reviewed to identify any potential effect on the functionality of Mitigating Systems,

impaired access to equipment, or required equipment uses for which the equipment was

not designed. Daily plant and equipment status logs, degraded instrument logs, and

operator aids or tools being used to compensate for material deficiencies were also

assessed to identify any potential sources of unidentified OWAs.

This review constituted one operator workaround annual inspection sample as defined in

IP 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate

Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed items entered in the licensees CAP and identified various

corrective action item reports identifying problems with the modification turnover process

of extended power uprate (EPU) modifications installed during recent refueling outages.

The inspectors elected to review this practice as a selected issue follow-up item.

This review constituted the completion of one in-depth problem identification and

resolution sample as defined in IP 71152-05, completing the partial sample referenced

previously in integrated IR 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002.

b. Findings

Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications

23 Enclosure

Introduction: During the inspectors review of the licensees partial turnover process, the

inspectors identified a URI associated with the process.

Description: The inspectors selected the licensees partial turnover process as a

selected issue follow-up due to the potential inadequacies associated with the process.

As previously identified in IRs 05000266/2011008; 05000301/2011008, and

05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, the inspectors identified problems and

violations associated with the licensees partial turnover process where systems had

been partially turned over and declared operable, and it was later discovered that

portions of the modification were not tested prior to being placed in-service. With the

additional identification of problems associated with the partial turnover process

referenced in CRs in Integrated IRs 05000266/2012002; 05000301/2012002, the

inspectors were concerned that additional systems may be subject to similar issues as a

result of the partial turnover process. At the completion of the first quarter inspection

period, the inspectors were awaiting the requested documentation from the licensee to

complete their review of this issue.

During the second quarter, the inspectors received portions of the requested

documentation. The issue is unresolved pending review of the portions of the previously

requested documentation (URI 05000266/2012003-03; 05000301/2012003-03, Partial

Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications).

.5 Selected Issue Follow-Up Inspection: Licensed Operator Respirator Qualifications And

Control Room Staffing

a. Inspection Scope

During a review of items entered in the licensees CAP, the inspectors found recent

corrective action items documenting repetitive occurrences associated the licensed

operator respirator qualifications. These CRs related to AR01670172 which

documented a condition where shift staffing was challenged due to having expired

licensed operator respirator qualifications. The inspectors questioned the licensees

evaluation of the CR regarding the conclusions reached. Specifically, the inspectors

noted that the individual was credited with watch-standing during the period of expired

qualifications and that the procedures for the annual requirements conflicted. The

licensee entered the inspectors concerns in the CAP as AR01747333 and AR1772196.

The licensee was able to demonstrate through timed entries and door logs that control

room staffing was not compromised due to the expired respirator qualification.

Additionally, the licensees corrective actions created a report to track licensed operator

respirator qualifications as well as initiated a procedure change requests to more clearly

document licensed operator watch-standing requirements and clarify the definitions for

annual requirements.

This review constituted one in-depth problem identification and resolution sample as

defined in IP 71152-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

24 Enclosure

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 Unit 2 Planned Downpower to Repair Switchyard Hotspot

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plants response to a planned downpower on Unit 2. Unit 2

was taken offline while remaining critical on April 21, 2012, to allow repair of two hot

spots on two phases of a disconnect switch in the switchyard. The repairs were

successful and the unit was placed back online on April 22, 2012. Documents reviewed

are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Alert Declared Due To Toxic Gas

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the plants response to an Alert on April 25 to 26, 2012, that

was declared during a special maintenance run of the G-02 EDG. During the EDG run,

exhaust fumes entered the adjacent air compressor room, a vital area, and the levels of

toxic gas from these fumes exceeded Occupational Safety and Health Administration

(OSHA) limits. The EDG was immediately secured and the room ventilated. The

licensee corrected the system configuration problem that caused the inleakage and re-

performed the run. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this report.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Failure of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Coupling

a. Inspection Scope

On May 21, 2012, the inspectors reviewed the plants response to the failure of the

Unit 1 TDAFW pump coupling and related unplanned entry into a 72-hour limiting

condition for operation action statement. The inspectors reviewed the repair and other

activities the licensee performed to be able to return the pump to service within the

allowed completion time. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment to this

report.

This event follow-up review constituted one sample defined in IP 71153-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

25 Enclosure

.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 05000301/2011-004-00 and

05000301/2011-004-01, Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due to

Source Range

Introduction: A Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) was self-revealed when an

unplanned reactor trip occurred as a result of the failure of a source range detector

during low power physics testing. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately evaluate

operating experience and incorporate it into preventive maintenance programs to

periodically replace aging electrical subcomponents in nuclear instrumentation systems

and a subsequent age-related failure resulted in initiating a plant transient.

Description: On June 13, 2011, during the performance of beginning of life (BOL) low

power physics testing, and with reactor power decreasing due to inserting reactor control

rods to obtain test data, power decreased below the setpoint that actuates and

automatically places source range monitoring (SRM) instrumentation in service. When

SRMs were actuated, channel 2N31 experienced a failure of the associated high voltage

power supply. This failure satisfied the SRM high flux reactor trip logic and resulted in

an automatic reactor trip.

Subsequent review by the licensee determined that the failure was due to age-related

degradation and that the most likely cause of the failure was because the output filter

capacitors were degraded. The licensee indicated that the recent failures were

experienced on power supplies manufactured in the 1970s, and that the date codes on

the capacitors in the subject units was also from the 1970s. Additionally, the licensee

noted that many of the components used in the construction of the related units were

40 years old.

The licensees root cause analysis identified historical operating experience as early as

1992, which reflected the need to periodically repair or replace power supplies; and that

in 1998, Westinghouse provided a recommendation to replace power supplies; or at a

minimum, replace filtering capacitors every 10 years. In 1998, the licensee made a

decision not to incorporate the vendor recommendations into the preventive

maintenance program.

The licensee concluded that the root cause could be attributed to life cycle management

and preventive maintenance program deficiencies. The corrective action to prevent

recurrence was related to the life cycle management plan for the nuclear instruments.

The inspectors considered that this action was adequate to address concerns related to

the nuclear instruments. The inspectors reviewed the issue with the licensee with

respect to subcomponent aging management. The licensee had indicated that

subsequent to this event and industry reviews, it had expanded the subcomponent aging

management program. The licensee provided evidence which demonstrated that a

program for subcomponent aging and management was in the final stage of

development, and that the program was reviewing several categories of subcomponents

consisting of over 4,000 items. Additionally, the program was looking at single point

vulnerabilities and risk prioritization of reviews. The inspectors concluded that this

program appeared to approach subcomponent aging management systematically and

would provide a strong barrier to preclude similar failures in the future.

Analysis: The inspectors determined that the failure to incorporate operating experience

related to aging of electrical subcomponents specific to nuclear instrument source range

26 Enclosure

monitors into preventive maintenance programs was a performance deficiency

warranting further review. The finding was determined to be more than minor in

accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue

Screening, dated December 24, 2009, because the finding was associated with the

Initiating Events Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance. Specifically, the

availability and reliability of the nuclear instruments was degraded to a point where an

instrument failure caused a reactor trip, an event that adversely affected the cornerstone

objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge

critical safety functions during power operations.

The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated using IMC 0609,

Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening

and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, dated

January 10, 2008. The inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to both

the likelihood of a reactor event and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions

would not be available; therefore, the issue screened as having very low safety

significance (Green).

The inspectors reviewed the licensees root cause analysis. The licensee considered

the issue a legacy issue related to the 1998 decision to ignore 1992 operating

experience and a 1998 vendor recommendation to replace power supplies at 10-year

intervals. Because the adverse decision occurred in 1998, the licensee concluded that

no crosscutting aspect occurred. However, the inspectors noted that the licensee

continued to amass internal and external operating experience from 1998 to 2011,

including a 2010 NRC-identified trend of source range monitoring failures as

documented in IR 05000266/2010002; 05000301/2010002, Section 4OA2.3,

Semiannual Trend, and that a rigorous and thorough evaluation of these issues could

have precluded the most recent failure. Therefore, the inspectors determined that the

issue had a crosscutting aspect in the area of corrective action program,

evaluation/extent of condition. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate

related nuclear instrument failure rates such that the resolutions addressed the causes

and extent of conditions for age-related failures of electrical subcomponents (P.1(c)).

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) states, in part, that preventive maintenance

activities shall be evaluated at least every refueling cycle and take into account, where

practical, industry-wide operating experience. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee

failed to evaluate its preventative maintenance activities to take into account a

Westinghouse Infogram, dated August 8, 1998, that recommended replacement of

power supplies every 10 years, and other industry-wide operating experience issued

since 1998 related to the replacement of aging electrical subcomponents. This failure

resulted in electrical subcomponents of a source range monitor not being replaced since

the 1970s. A failure of one of these subcomponents resulted in a trip of the Unit 2

reactor on June 13, 2011.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance and it was entered into the

licensees CAP (as root cause evaluation (RCE) 01660378-02), this violation is being

27 Enclosure

treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC enforcement Policy

(NCV 05000266/2012003-04; 05000301/2012003-04, Failure to Incorporate Industry

Operating Experience Into Preventive Maintenance Programs for Nuclear

Instrumentation).

This event follow-up review constituted one sample as defined in IP 71153-05.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 (Closed) URI 05000266/2011005-02; 05000301/2011005-02, Determining an

Individuals Dose of Record with Discrepant TLD/ED Data Inputs

The URI described a condition where additional information was needed by the

inspectors to assess the licensees program when determining an individuals

radiological dose of record. This item was discussed and closed by

NCV 05000266/2012002-06, Determining an Individuals Dose of Record With

Discrepant TLD/ED Data Inputs.

.2 (Closed) URI 05000266/2012002-05; 05000301/2012002-05, TSC Filter Testing May Be

Inadequate

a. Inspection Scope

The URI described a condition where additional information was needed by the

inspectors to assess the licensees TSC ventilation system filter testing program. This

item was closed and discussed in Section 2RS3 by NCV 05000266/2012003-02;

05000301/2012003-02, Non-Compliance with 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the

Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That Radiological Airborne

Hazards Would Be Minimized in the Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis

Accident.

.3 Temporary Instruction (TI)-2515/182 - Review of the Industry Initiative to Control

Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks

a. Inspection Scope

Leakage from buried and underground pipes has resulted in ground water contamination

incidents with associated heightened NRC and public interest. The industry issued a

guidance document, NEI 09-14, Guideline for the Management of Buried Piping

Integrity, (ADAMS Accession No. ML1030901420), to describe the goals and required

actions (commitments made by the licensee) resulting from this underground piping and

tank initiative. On December 31, 2010, NEI issued Revision 1 to NEI 09-14, Guidance

for the Management of Underground Piping and Tank Integrity, (ADAMS Accession

No. ML110700122), with an expanded scope of components which included

underground piping that was not in direct contact with the soil and underground tanks.

On November 17, 2011, the NRC issued TI-2515/182, Review of the Industry Initiative

to Control Degradation of Underground Piping and Tanks, to gather information related

to the industrys implementation of this initiative.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees programs for buried pipe, underground piping,

and tanks in accordance with TI-2515/182 to determine if the program attributes and

completion dates identified in Sections 3.3 A and 3.3 B of NEI 09-14, Revision 1, were

28 Enclosure

contained in the licensees program and implementing procedures. For the buried pipe

and underground piping program attributes with completion dates that had passed, the

inspectors reviewed records to determine if the attribute was in fact complete and to

determine if the attribute was accomplished in a manner which reflected good or poor

practices in program management.

Based upon the scope of the review described above, Phase I of TI-2515/182 was

completed.

b. Observations

The licensees buried piping and underground piping and tanks program was inspected

in accordance with Paragraphs 03.01.a through 03.01.c of TI-2515/182, and was found

to meet all applicable aspects of NEI 09-14, Revision 1, as set forth in Table 1 of the TI.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Management Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting Summary

On June 26, 2012, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Meyer and

other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was

considered proprietary.

.2 Interim Exit Meetings

Interim exits were conducted for:

  • the Review of the Industry Initiative to Control Degradation of Underground

Piping and Tanks (TI-2515/182) with Program Engineering Supervisor,

Mr. E. Schmidt, and other members of the licensee staff on May 1, 2012. The

licensee confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was

considered proprietary; and

  • the inspection results of the unresolved item with Mr. J. Petro, Acting Licensing

Manager, on June 12, 2012.

The inspectors confirmed that none of the potential report input discussed was considered

proprietary. Proprietary material received during the inspection was returned to the licensee.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

29 Enclosure

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

E. Schmidt, Program Engineering Supervisor

A. Watry, Buried Pipe Engineer

B. Scherwinski, Licensing

B. Hennessy, Licensing Supervisor

J. Petro, Acting Licensing Manager

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

M. Kunowski, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5

1 Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000266/2012003-01; NCV Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation

05000301/2012003-01 System Testing (Section 1R19)05000266/2012003-02; NCV Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the

05000301/2012003-02 Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That

Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in the

Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident

(Section 2RS3)05000266/2012003-03; URI Partial Turnover of Extended Power Uprate Modifications05000301/2012003-03 (Section 4OA2.4)05000266/2012003-04; NCV Failure to Incorporate Industry Operating Experience Into

05000301/2012003-04 Preventive Maintenance Programs for Nuclear

Instrumentation (Section 4OA3.4)

Closed

05000266/2012003-01; NCV Failure to Establish Emergency Diesel Generator Ventilation

05000301/2012003-01 System Testing (Section 1R19)05000266/2012003-02; NCV Non-Compliance With 10 CFR 20.1701 to Control the

05000301/2012003-02 Concentration of Radioactive Material in Air and Ensure That

Radiological Airborne Hazards Would Be Minimized in the

Technical Support Center During a Design-Basis Accident

(Section 2RS3)

05000301/2011-004-00 LER Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due

to Source Range (Section 4OA3.4)

05000301/2011-004-01 LER Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due

to Source Range (Section 4OA3.4)05000266/2012003-04; NCV Failure to Incorporate Industry Operating Experience Into

05000301/2012003-04 Preventive Maintenance Programs for Nuclear

Instrumentation (Section 4OA3.4)05000266/2011005-02; URI Determining An Individuals Dose Of Record With Discrepant

05000301/2011005-02 TLD/ED Data Inputs (Section 4OA5.1)05000266/2012002-05; URI TSC Filter Testing May Be Inadequate (Section 4OA5.2)05000301/2012002-05

2 Attachment

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspector reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

- 2011 Summer Readiness Package; May 24, 2011

- 2012 Summer Readiness Package; May 24, 2012

- AOP-13C; Severe Weather Conditions; Revision 26

- AOP-31; Solar Magnetic Disturbance Alert Response; Revision 0

- AR01675202; Solar Disturbance

- AR01675213; FRCC And NERC On A Solar Flare That May Impact Earth 8/5 Strong Solar

Activity

- AR01725580; 2012 Site Excellence Plan: Engineering (Improved Margin)

- AR01728251; Summer Readiness Period Action Items

- AR01749094; AOP-13C Severe Weather Conditions Requires Emergent Changes

- AR01757855; OI 155 Chemical Treatment of SW/Potential Impact On U2 B RCP

- AR01764102; HX38 Condenser Summer Readiness Issue

- AR01767718; Solar Magnetic Disturbance Impact On 1X-03 Is Unknown

- AR0176879; AOP-13B Number Used In 1996 Almost Reused Document

- AR01776849; F52-Q303, 345KV Breaker Tripped Open From Lightning Strike

- ARP 1-PPCS-008; Priority Alarm Met Tower Unit 1; Revision 2

- ARP 2-PPCS-008; Priority Alarm Met Tower Unit 2; Revision 2

- BG AOP-13C; Severe Weather Conditions; Revision 14

- DBD-20; 345 KVAC System; Revision 8

- Email From J. Schweitzer; Subject: NERC Communication Release: Major Solar

Disturbance On The Way?; August 4, 2011

- EPMP 6.0; Alert And Notification System (ANS); Revision 10

- EPMP 9.0; Equipment Important To Emergency Preparedness; Revision 1

- FSAR Section 7.5; Operating Control Stations; UFSAR 2010

- FSAR Section 8.0; Introduction To The Electrical Distribution Systems; UFSAR 2010

- FSAR Section 8.1; 345K VAC Electrical Distribution System (345 kV); UFSAR 2010

- ICP 06.003-2; Meteorological System Calibration; Revision 1

- ICP 06.055; Meteorological Tower Instrumentation 6 Month Calibration Procedure; Revision 5

- Log Entries Report; January 24 To April 23, 2012

- National Weather Service Hazardous Weather Outlook; June 18, 2012

- Needs Assessment Worksheet For TRR 01675202; September 27, 2011

- NOAA Space Weather Scales; March 1, 2005

- NP 2.1.5; Electrical Communications, Switchyard Access And Work Planning; Revision 21

- NRC Information Notice No. 90-42: Failure Of Electrical Power Equipment Due To Solar

Magnetic Disturbances; June 19, 1990

- ODI.104; Solar Magnetic Disturbance Alert Response; Revision 00

- OI 35B; Electrical Equipment General Information; Revision 17

- OP-AA-102-1002; Seasonal Readiness; Revision 0

- PB MR 91-161; System 345kV; June 20, 1991

- PBN Seasonal Readiness Report; 2012 Winter Readiness Concerns/Issues; April 2012

3 Attachment

- PBNP System Engineering Summer Readiness Review; Component Cooling Water;

February 15, 2012

- PBNP System Engineering Summer Readiness Review; HVAC Rs And NR;

February 21, 2012

- PBNP System Engineering Summer Readiness Review; Service Water; February 21, 2012

- PJM; Weather And Environmental Emergencies; November 1, 2011

- Safety Logs; June 17, 2012

- Station Log; June 17, 2012

1R04 Equipment Alignment

- CL 13E Part 1; Auxiliary Feedwater Valve Lineup Turbine-Driven Unit 1; Revision 45

- CL 7A; Safety Injection System Checklist Unit 2; Revision 31

- Drawing 018974; Safety Injection System; Revision 53

- Drawing 018975; Safety Injection System; Revision 54

- Drawing 018976; Safety Injection System; Revision 47

- OI 129; SI System Fill And Vent Unit 2; Revision 6

1R05 Fire Protection

- DBD-T-40; Fire Protection/Appendix R; Revision 9

- Drawing 290583; Fire Protection For Site Plan; Revision 11

- Drawing 290585; Fire Protection For Turbine Building, Aux Building, And Containment,

Elev. 8-0; Revision 21

- Drawing 290587; Fire Protection For Turbine Building, Aux Building, And Containment;

Revision 11

- Drawing 290590; Fire Protection For Turbine Building, Aux Building, And Containment,

Elev. 44-0; Revision 09

- Drawing 290600; Fire Protection For Turbine Building, Aux Building, And Containment,

Elev. 66-0; Revision 06

- Duke Engineering And Services Fire Area Analysis Summary Report; Fire Area: A01-B

PAB 26 Elevation - Monitor Tank Area (FZ 187); August 8, 2005

- Duke Engineering And Services Fire Area Analysis Summary Report; Fire Area: A01-H Unit 2

Façade; August 8, 2005

- FEP 4.6; Façade Unit 2; Revision 8

- FOP 1.2; Potential Fire Affected Safe Shutdown Components; Revision 21

- OM 1.1; Conduct Of Plant Operations, PBNP Specific; Revision 40

- OM 3.1; Operations Shift Staffing Requirements; Revision 16

- OM 3.27; Control Of Fire Protection & Appendix R Safe Shutdown Equipment; Revision 44

1R06 Flood Protection

- AR01633384; IER1 11-1 Unanalyzed Challenge From Non-Seismic Int Flooding

- AR01752182; Draft NEI Flood Walkdown Document Not Available

- AR01762831; Water Entering SEI-06211 During Water Intrusion

- AR01762834; U1 Façade Southwest Corner Significant Water Entry

- AR01763180; U1 Façade Elevator Pit Flooded - Again

- AR01763259; 1P-10A Cubicle Had Accumulated Ground Water

- AR01763352; RE-113 PAB Area Monitor HI Alarm From Spiking

- AR01765294; Groundwater Intrusion Into The 1P-10A RHR Cubicle

- AR01765466; Schedule Scrub Results Concerning Unit 2 RCP Seal Issues

4 Attachment

- AR01765723; Groundwater Intrusion Into The 1P-10A RHR Cubicle

- AR01767771; Plugging Elevator Sump Drains Not The Right Thing To Do

- CE 01633384-01; Six Bulk Storage Tanks In PAB Not Contained In Dikes Or Rooms

- Floodable Volume Of The -19 Ft Elevation; Completed April 1, 2011

- FSAR Section 10.2; Auxiliary Feedwater System (AF); UFSAR 2010

- FSAR Section 6.2; Safety Injection System (SI); UFSAR 2010

- FSAR Section 9.2; Residual Heat Removal (RHR); UFSAR 2010

- NPC-27204; Letter From S. Burstein, Western Electric Power Company, To G. Lear, NRC;

Subject: Docket Nos. 50-266 And 50-301, Flooding Resulting From Non-Category I Failure,

Point Beach Nuclear Plant - Units 1 And 2; February 17, 1975

- NPC-28670; Letter From C. W. Fay, Western Electric Power Company, To H. R. Denton,

NRC; Subject: Docket Nos. 50-266 And 50-301, Final Resolution Of Generic Letter 81-14,

Seismic Qualification Of Auxiliary Feedwater System, Point Beach Nuclear Plant - Units 1

And 2; April 26, 1985

- POD 01633384; Unanalyzed Challenge From Non-Seismic Internal Flooding (Monitor Tanks

And Waste Distillate Tanks); Revision 0

- Station Log; May 8-12, 2012

- TAR 01633384; Unanalyzed Challenge From Non-Seismic Internal Flooding (Monitor Tanks

And Waste Distillate Tanks); Revision 0

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

- AR01747380; Simulator Reliability Below Expectations

- AR01748808; Simulator PPCS Stopped Functioning During LOI Training

- AR01748875; Nuclear Oversight Finding: Management Oversight Of Simulator

- FP-T-SAT-73; Licensed Operator Requalification Program Examinations; Revision 8

- NARS Form For Training Evolution; May 21, 2012

- OM 1.1; Conduct Of Plant Operations, PBNP Specific; Revision 40

- OP 3A Unit 2; Power Operation To Hot Standby Unit 2; Revision 7

- OP-AA-100-1000; Conduct Of Operations: Revision 6

- PBNP LOCT Cycle 12C Schedule; Revision 2

- Simulator Differences List; Cycle 12C; May 21, 2012

1R12 Maintenance Rule Effectiveness

- ACE 01670189-02; Erratic Operation Displayed During Performance Of IT-08A Cold Start Of

Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump And Valve Test (Unit 1); Revision 1

- RCA For AR1173557-02; Unit 2 Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (2P-29-T) Casing

Leak Identified During Start Of IT-09A; Completed July 6, 2010

- RMP 9044-1; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Terry Turbine Overhaul; Revision 11

- System Health Report; Unit 1 Auxiliary Feedwater; January 1 To March 31, 2012

- System Health Report; Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater; January 1 To March 31, 2012

- Thomas Series 54 Couplings; Installation Instruction

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

- 2-SOP-CC-001; Component Cooling System; Revision 22

- AOP-9B Unit 1; Component Cooling System Malfunction; Revision 22

- AR01731219; Thermography Reading For 2F52-142 Breaker Limited Users

- AR01737362; While Performing IT-805, 2CC-726C Leaked By 85 Gal In 5 Min.

- AR01748666; Valve Is Difficult To Operate

5 Attachment

- AR01748700; Cross Unit CC Leakage During The Performance Of IT 805

- AR01766439; Request Review Of HX-12C Operability

- Calc No. 97-0118; Capacity To Achieve Cold Shutdown In Both Units With One CCW Pump

And Two CCW Heat Exchangers; April 27, 2011

- CCW Surge Tank Level, Units 1 And 2, 1LI-6188; March 25 To March 27, 2012

- CE 01748700-01; Component Cooling Leakage Occurred During Performance Of IT 805;

April 4, 2012

- Drawing 018982; Auxiliary Coolant System, Unit 1; Revision 42

- EOP-1.3 Unit 1; Transfer To Containment Sump Recirculation - Low Head Injection;

Revision 47

- FSAR Appendix A.6; Shared System Analysis; UFSAR 2008

- FSAR Section 9.1; Component Cooling Water (CC); UFSAR 2010

- Hypothetical Risk Management Worksheet, Units 1 And 2; April 26, 2012

- IT 805; Component Cooling Water System Valves U-2; Completed March 26, 2012

- Log Entries Report; Various Dates February 23 To March, 26, 2012

- NP 10.3.7; On-Line Safety Assessment; Revision 26

- OP 2B; 345 kV Transmission System Impacts Upon PBNP Station Operations; Revision 4

- PB - 2F52-142 Unit 2 Generator Breaker A Phase Monitoring Plan

- PB032221-11; Letter From L. Gundrum, NRC, To R. Grigg; Subject: Issuance Of

Amendments Re: Technical Specification Changes For Revised System Requirements To

Ensure Post-Accident Containment Cooling Capability (TAC Nos. M96741 And M96742);

July 9, 1997

- POD 01766439; Request Review Of HX-12C Operability; Revision 0

- PRA 5.14; Component Cooling Water System Notebook; Revision 0

- Responses To NRC Questions; Received June 12, 2012

- Risk Management Worksheets, Units 1 And 2; April 21-28, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 1; April 3, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 1; Various Dates February 22 To March 26, 2012

- Station Log; April 12, 2012

- Station Log; February 3, 2012

- TLB-9; Component Cooling Water Surge; ID W 685-J-114, Tank 1(2)T-12; Revision 3

- Trend Display 3; CCW Temp; March 26, 2012

1R15 Operability Evaluations

- AR01165060; Gas Void - Negligible Void Found At 2SI-V14

- AR01165062; ECs Possibly Not In Correct Status

- AR01166814; Gas Void - Negligible, Smaller Void Found At 2SI-V14

- AR01657344; 1P-29-T Governor Valve Stem Steam Leak

- AR01667491; Voiding In U2 RHR Core Deluge Line (A Train)

- AR01670550; 1P-29 Gov. Shaft Has Increased Steam Leakage

- AR01680372; Very Small Void Found At 2SI-V14

- AR01684317; PB2 Inside Containment Gas Void UT Results

- AR01693921; Small Gas Voids Found, PB2 LHSI Train A

- AR01701509; CFC Fan Motor Cooler Condensate Drain Valve Position

- AR01705654; Very Small Gas Voids, PB2 Inside Containment

- AR01712999; Operability Concern: U2 CFC Accident Fan Cooler Drn Vlvs

- AR01714813; Very Small Gas Voids, PB2 Inside Containment

- AR01716079; Wires Inside U-1 Control Boards Not Spared Correctly

- AR01723005; 1C-03 Horizontal Wireway PL-A Cannot Close

- AR01723012; C-02 Riser 32 Train Separation Wireway PB22 Missing Cover

6 Attachment

- AR01723019; C-02 Remove Sound Powered Headphone Permanently Wired In

- AR01723362; 1C-004 Internal Risers 7 & 9 Have Large Openings In Wireways

- AR01723700; Lift Wires And Remove Minalites For CS-2130 Abandonment

- AR01734709; Verification Of Wire Terminations For 1C-04 MOB-42 And 43

- AR01745582; 2012 Mid-Cycle: Safety - Extension Cords In CR >90 Days

- AR01747782; Gas Void Accept. Criterion For 1-IC-SI-D11 Non-Conservative

- AR01749161; Review Of Overall Control Room ARs

- AR01750355; QC Inspection points Not Included In Work Tasks

- AR01768931; TDAFWP Coupling Ejected Pieces During Run

- AR01769140; Flush Required On 1P29 TDAFWP Prior To Return To Service

- AR01769277; Pump Holddown Bolt In Southwest Corner Not Tight

- AR01769697; Coupling For 1P-29 Did Not Come With Full Set Of Bolting

- AR01769990; Small SW Leak Found

- AR01770001; Drain Trap Union Leaking

- AR01770007; 1P-29 Turb. Outboard Bearing Temperatures During IT-8A

- AR01770266; TDAFW Pump Mission Time In DBD-P-54 Questioned By NRC

- AR01770327; Cable Spreading Room Temperature Out Of Spec High

- AR01770729; Low Margin On VNCSR Creates Elevated Risk

- AR01770731; Suspected Leak By Causing Elevated Temperature In CSR

- AR01771841; 1P-29-T TDAFW Turbine Bolting Changes

- AR01772353; Condition Adverse To Quality - 1P-29-T

- AR01772594; Replace Shim Packs On The 1P-29-T Coupling

- AR01772637; Replace East Hold Down Studs On 1P-29-T

- AR01772640; Correct 1P-29-T Exhaust Flange Misalignment

- AR01774453; DY0C RMP Is Quarantined

- AR01774906; Old Abandoned AFW Cables Are Not Properly Spared

- AR01774944; Performance Of IT 16 Can Increase CSR Temperature

- AR01775121; Planned Maintenance Outages On Sirens K-004, K-005,K-006

- AR01775202; Unexpected Alarm HP Feedwater Heater SA Or B High Or Low

- AR01775325; EPRI Issued NDE Alert Letter Based On North Anna OE

- AR01775418; Simulator Scenario Programs Not Working Properly

- AR01775425; Change In Stroke Open Time For 2CV-1296

- Basis For Immediate Operability (CR01712999); December 6, 2011

- Drawing 171951; Containment Vent Fan Motor Base And Motor Cooling Coil Housing;

Revision 09

- Drawing 275461; Service Water System; Revision 13

- Drawing 332894; Fan Motor Cooler; Revision 3

- Drawing 335353; 24x66 Containment Fan Coolers With Supply Lower Left; Revision 3

- Drawing 35476; Unit 2 Heating And Ventilation Containment Area 11 Plan El. Above 66-0;

Revision 08

- Drawing 35477; Unit 2 Heating And Ventilation Containment Area 11 Plan El. 46-0;

Revision 05

- Drawing 35478; Unit 2 Heating And Ventilation Containment Area 11 Plan El. 21-0;

Revision 03

- Drawing 35480; Unit 2 Heating And Ventilation Containment Area 11 Sections; Revision 06

- Drawing 35481; Unit 1 And 2 Heating And Ventilation Containment Areas 7 And 11;

Revision 07

- EC 276517; 1P-029-T Coupling Alignment Review For WO 342825; Revision 9; May 23, 2012

- Email From N. Reckelberg To B. Beltz; Subject: CFC Motor Cooler Question; June 5, 2012

7 Attachment

- Engineering Evaluation No. EC 276517; 1P-029-T Coupling Alignment Review For

WO 342825

- FSAR Section 6.3; Containment Air Recirculation Cooling System (VNCC); UFSAR 2010

- NRC Inspection Question No. 1; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 10; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 11; June 1, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 2; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 3; June 1, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 4; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 5; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 6; June 1, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 7; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 8; May 31, 2012

- NRC Inspection Question No. 9; June 1, 2012

- OI 155; Chemical Treatment Of Service Water For Mussels; Revision 34

- Operator Rounds; June 18-19, 2012

- PI-AA-100-1008; Condition Evaluation; Revision 3

- POD 01712999; Operability Concern: U2 CFC Accident Fan Cooler Drn Vlvs; Revision 0

- POD 01770327; Cable Spreading Room Temperature Out Of Spec High; Revision 0

- POD For CR 1771762; NRC Questions On G01/G02 Tornado Missile Temp Modification

- POD For CR1772353; Condition Adverse To Quality - 1P-29-T; Revision 0

- SCR 2011-0324; Revise 1/2-SOP-VNCC-001 Through 004, 1/2W-1A1 Through 1/2W-1D1

Accident Fan Recirculation Unit Draining, Filling And Venting Procedures; November 27, 2011

- SCR 2012-0089; 1P-29 Turbine Driven Aux Feed Pump Turbine Alignment; May 23, 2012

- TAR 01667491; Voiding In U2 RHR Core Deluge Line (A Train); Revision 0

1R18 Plant Modifications

- AOP-13C; Severe Weather Conditions; Revision 26

- AR01728544; PSS Design Functions Not Considered In Modification

- AR01752847; 2MS-380B IA Leak

- AR01763193; 1CS-3124 And 1CS-3125 Comp. Actions For AOP-13C

- AR01763196; 2CS-3124 And 2CS-3125 Comp. Actions For AOP-13C

- AR01763206; Cold Weather Actions - AOP-13C Guidance

- AR01779751; 2Q12 Green NCV - G01/G02 Room Fan And Damper Test Control

- B 3.7.2; MSIVs And Non-Return Check Valves; Unit 2 - Amendment No. 245

- B 3.7.3; MFIVs, MFRVs, And MFRV Bypass Valves; Unit 2 - Amendment No. 245

- CE For AR01752847-01; Air Leak Fount on 2MS-380B

- CRN 262425; Revise Cold Weather Strategy; Revision 2

- CRN 262894; Manufacturers Recommended Minimum Ambient Temperature For Hiller

Actuator Components Is -20°F; Revision 0

- Design Input Consultation Forms; EC 276081 Temporary Instrument Air Leak Repair

Upstream Of 2MS-380B; Various Dates April 9 To April 16, 2012

- Drawing 084854; Main & Reheat Steam System; Revisions 01 And 51

- EC 273303; Provide Temp Power To Select 1B-42 Loads; Revision 1; October 6, 2011

- EC 276081; Instrument Air Leak At 2MS-280B Temporary Repair Of Air Line Leak

- FP-E-MOD-03; Temporary Modifications; Revisions 9 And 10

- Modification Classification; Install Temp Mod On 2MS-02017 Per EC 276081; Completed

April 13, 2012

- Modification Classification; Provide Temp Power To Select 1B-42 Loads, Per EC 273303;

Completed September 28, 2011

8 Attachment

- MR No. 96-014-B; MSIV Control Solenoid Replacement; October 7, 1998

- PC 49 Part 4; Auxiliary Building Miscellaneous And Facades; Revision 27

- SCR 2011-0207-01; EC 273303; Provide Temporary Power To Select 1B-42 Loads;

February 1, 2012

- SCR 2012-0057; Install Temp Mod On 2MS-00380B Per EC 276081; April 12, 2012

- Station Logs; Various Dates April 6 To June 12, 2012

- Temp Mod Extension; Install Temp Mod On 2MS-02017 Per EC 276081; Completed

April 13, 2012

- WO Package 40155064 01; 2MS-380B IA Leak

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

- 0-SOP-G02-001; Maintenance Operation For EDG G-02; Completed April 26, 2012

- AR01722333; VNDG-04178-M / Replace Broken Motor Operator

- AR01750276; G-01 And G-02 Diesel Room Air Flow NRC Concern

- AR01753241; VNPAB Inoperable Due To FS-3297

- AR01769204; Calculation 2005-0054 Rev. 2 Potential Non-Conservatism

- B 3.8.1; AC Sources - Operating; January 18, 2010; June 1, 2009; January 19, 2008;

May 31, 2007; Unit 1-Amendment No. 215, Unit 2-Amendment No. 220; Unit 1-Amendment

No. 201, Unit 2-Amendment No. 206

- Calc 2005-0054; Control Building GOTHIC Temperature Calculation; Revisions 1 And 2

- CE 1750276-01; NRC Concern With Proper Air Flow In G-01 And G-02 Diesel Rooms

- EN47896; Licensed Operating Supervisor Tested Positive For A For-Cause Test For Alcohol;

May 3, 2012

- IT 08A; Cold Start Of Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feed Pump And Valve Test (Quarterly) Unit 1;

Revision 65

- NARS Forms; April 25, 2012

- NP 10.3.7; On-Line Safety Assessment; Revision 27

- PBTP 157; G01/G02 Diesel Room Exhaust Fan Flow Measurement; Completed July 6, 2007

- PBTP-249; EDG Stack Test; Completed April 30, 2012

- PdMA Report 360458 0W-012B-M MCE; MCE Testing On 02/09/2010 For 0W-012B-M,

G-01 Room Exhaust Fan Motor; February 9, 2010

- PdMA Report 360458 0W-012C-M MCE; MCE Testing Of 0W-012C-M; February 22, 2010

- RMP 9044-1; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Terry Turbine Overhaul; Revision 28

- Station Log; Various Dates From April 8 To April 27, 2012

- TAR 1766629; Review G-01 Operability Versus Gravity Louvers; Revision 0

- Troubleshooting Log For AR176931176931 May 23, 2012

- TS 81; Emergency Diesel Generator G-01 Monthly; Completed May 20, 2012

- TS 87; Primary Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Monthly Checks; Completed

April 10, 2012

- WO 40106974; 2F52-142 A Phase - Output Side Bolded Connection Hot

- WO Package 00342825-16; 1P-029-T Contingency Work Order To Overhaul If Required -2C

- WO Package 00360458-01; W-012B-M, MCE Analyze Motor (2 B52-329H/2B-32)

- WO Package 00360459-01; W-012C-MCE Analyze Motor (2 B52-328M/2B-32)

- WO Package 40070360 01; 2MS-02052-O Replace Actuator

- WO Package 40110297 07; K-004A Inspect And Maintain Diesel Air Start Compressor

1R20 Unplanned Outage

- 2F3201 Forced Outage Critical Path; June 27, 2012

- 2F32HS Forced Outage Issues And Actions

9 Attachment

- Daily Status Report; June 29, 2012

- EN 48053; Unit 2 Manual Reactor Actuated Due To Indications Of 100% Load Rejection;

June 27, 2012

- NP 5.3.3; Incident Investigation And Post-Trip Reviews; Completed June 27, 2012

- OP 3A Unit 1; Power Operation To Hot Standby Unit 1; Revision 9

- OP 3B; Reactor Shutdown; Revision 43

- PBNP Outage Status Report; June 29, 2012

- PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment And Fire Condition; Unit 2; June 29, 2012

- PBNP Unit 2; Forced Outage List; As Of June 29, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 1; June 27 To 28, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 2; June 27, 2012

- Station Log; June 27 To June 29, 2012

1R22 Surveillance Testing

- 3.3.3; Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation; Unit 1 - Amendment No. 215, Unit 2 -

Amendment No. 220; Unit 1 - Amendment No. 201, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

- 3.4.13; RCS Operational Leakage; Unit 1 - Amendment No. 223, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 229;

And Unit 1 - Amendment No. 201, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 206

- 3.6.3; Containment Isolation Valves; Unit 1 - Amendment No. 201, Unit 2 - Amendment

No. 206; Unit 1 - Amendment No. 231, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 236

- AOP-1B; Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction; Revision 20

- AR01681115; Air Fitting Leak

- AR01752323; Increased Leakoff From Unit 2 B RCP #2 Seal

- AR01753068; AOP-1B, RCP Malfunction, Entered Due To Hi RCP Seal Leakage

- AR01753241; VNPAB Inoperable Due To FS-3297

- AR01754554; AOP-1B Entry Due To Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Problems

- AR01755405; Momentary 2P-1B Seal Flow Low Alarm

- AR01762008; 2P-001B Seal Performance During Fan Starts

- Control Room Log - Modes 1-3, Unit 2; April 5 To 8, 2012

- FSAR Section 1.3; General Design Criteria; UFSAR 2010

- FSAR Section 4.1; Reactor Coolant System - Design Basis; UFSAR 2008

- FSAR Section 6.5; Leakage Detection Systems; UFSAR 2008

- IT 115; Instrument Air Valves (Quarterly) Unit 2; Completed May 18, 2012

- NP 10.3.78; On-Line Safety Assessment; Revision 27

- OI 55; Primary Leak Rate Calculation; Performed March 16, 2012

- OM 3.26; Use Of Dedicated / Assigned Operators; Revision 15

- Operational Decision Making; Increased 2P-1B, RCP, No. 2 Seal Leakage Transients;

Revised April 13, 2012

- Station Log; April 6 To 7, 2012; May 18, 2012

- Station Log; April 8, 2012

- TS 87; Primary Auxiliary Building Ventilation System Monthly Checks; Completed

April 10, 2012

1EP6 Emergency Preparedness

- EN 47863; Alert Declared Due To Toxic Gas Build Up Following An Emergency Diesel

Generator Test Run; April 25, 2012

- EPIP 1.1; Course Of Actions; Revision 63

- EPIP 1.2; Emergency Classification; Revision 50

- EPIP 1.2.1; Emergency Action Level Technical Basis; Revision 8

10 Attachment

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

- AR01696182; Lack Of 50.59 Screening For EPU LOCA Dose Calculations

- AR01724172; Discrepancy In F-13 Filter Efficiency Tested In HPIP 11

- AR01779750; 2Q12 Green NCV - TSC Ventilation Filter Testing

- Calculation No. 129187-M-0112; Technical Support Center Direct Shine Dose Due To A Loss

Of Coolant Accident Following Extended Power Up-Rate And Using Alternative Source Term

Methodology; Revision 1

- Calculation No. 13612; Power/RP, PR-001; Calculate The Doses And Dose Rates In The

Technical Support Center Due To Intake And In-Leakage Following A LOCA, Assuming 4 Inch

Deep Activated Charcoal Beds Are Installed; May 19, 1980

- HPIP 11.50; Filter Testing; Revisions 20 And 21

- HPIP 11.52; HEPA (High Efficiency Particulate Absolute) And Charcoal Filter Administrative

Control; Revisions 3 And 4

- HPIP 11.54; Control Room F-16 Filter Testing; Revisions 17 And 18

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

- 1Q/2012 Performance Indicators; Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Units 1 And 2

- 2Q/2011 Performance Indicators; Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Units 1 And 2

- 3Q/2011 Performance Indicators; Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Units 1 And 2

- 4Q/2011 Performance Indicators; Reactor Coolant System Leakage, Units 1 And 2

- Gamma Spectrum Analysis; Sample Date February 29, 2012

- H33; Performance Indicator Reporting; Revision 11

- Log Entries Report; Various Dates From April 9, 2011 To March 14, 2012

- Monthly Effluent Release Offsite Dose Summary; December 2011

- NEI 99-02; Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline; Revision 6;

October 2009

- NP 5.2.16; NRC Performance Indicators; Completed March 28 And March 2, 2012

- QF-0445; NRC/INPO/WANO Data Collection And Submittal Forms; 3rd Quarter 2011

- QF-0445; NRC/INPO/WANO Data Collection And Submittal Forms; 4th Quarter 2011

- ROP Parent Process Data Review, Unit 1; 2nd Quarter 2011 To 1st Quarter 2012

- RPIP 1013; Occupational Radiation Safety Performance Indicators; Revision 5

- RPIP 3332; Dose Equivalent Iodine-131; Revision 10

- RPIP 3382; Reactor Coolant Sample Preparation And Analysis; Revision 13

- RPIP 4521; Monthly Effluent Release Offsite Dose Calculations; Revision 7

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

- ACE 01670172; Licensed Operator Had Expired Respirator Qualifications

- ANSI N18-1-1971; Selection And Training Of Nuclear Power Plant Personnel; March 8, 1971

- ANSI/ANS-3.4-1996; Medical Certification And Monitoring Of Personnel Requiring Operator

Licenses For Nuclear Power Plants; February 7, 1996

- AR01670172; Challenge To Shift Staffing Due To Expired Respirator Quals

- AR01747094; Documentation Error For Proficiency Watch

- AR01747333; Alignment Question With Proficiency Watch Procedures

- AR01761339; Med- Changes Made To Respiratory Protection Program

- AR01763219; Individual Did Not Show Up For Fit Tests

- AR01764968; Operations Respiration Qual Check Shortcomings

- AR01765896; Individual Respirator Fit Tested Not IAW Procedure

- AR01772196; Definition Of Annual In Site Programs Needs Review

11 Attachment

- AR01772226; Four Watch Restrictions Due To Respirator Fit Test Inserts

- AR01772307; CR 01764968 Completed With Incomplete Actions

- AR01779753; 2Q12 NRC URI - Modification Turnover Process

- ES-605; License Maintenance, License Renewal Applications, And Requests For

Administrative Reviews And Hearings

- FPER; Fire Protection Evaluation Report; Revision 12

- FSAR Section 11.4; Radiation Protection Program; UFSAR 2010

- NP 1.1.4; Use And Adherence Of Procedures; Revision 27

- NP 2.1.1; Conduct Of Operations; Revision 13

- NP 4.2.32; Respiratory Protection Program; Revision 7

- NRC Information Notice 95-23; Control Room Staffing Below Minimum Regulatory

Requirements; April 24, 1995

- NRC Information Notice 97-66; Failure To Provide Special Lenses For Operators Using

Respirator Or Self-Contained Breathing apparatus During Emergency Operations;

August 20, 1997

- NUREG/CR-6838; Technical Basis For Regulatory Guidance For Assessing Exemption

Requests From The Nuclear Power Plant Licenses Operator Staffing Requirements Specified

In 10 CFR 50.54(m); February 2004

- OM 1.1; Conduct Of Plant Operations, PBNP Specific; Revision 36

- OM 3.1; Operations Shift Staffing Requirements; Revision 16

- OM 3.10; Operations Personnel Assignments And Scheduling; Revision 31

- OM 3.9; Watchstation Status Checks And Watchstander Turnover Guides; Revision 17

- OP-AA-100-1000; Conduct Of Operations; Revision 1

- Operations Department Clock Reset - Yellow Sheet, CAP 01670172; Completed

July 25, 2011

- PBN IS TP; Training Program Description; Revision 14

- PBN LOC TPD; Training Program Description; Completed September 12, 2011

- Plateau Curricula Status List; As Of May 9, 2012

- Unit Staff Qualifications 5.3; Unit - Amendment No. 211, Unit 2 - Amendment No. 216

- WO Package 40118739-01; Verify Operators Respiratory Qualifications

4OA3 Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

- 0-SOP-G02-001; Maintenance Operation For EDG G-02; Completed April 26, 2012

- 1ICP 10.046; Check Of Rod Control System Redundant Power Supplies; Revision 1

- 2F3201 Forced Outage Critical Path; June 27, 2012

- 2F32HS Forced Outage Issues And Actions

- 2-SOP-19KV-001; Transformers 2X-01/2X-02 Outages And Electrical Operations; Completed

April 11, 2012

- ACE 01640098-01; AFI In The Area Of Equipment Reliability During January 2011 INPO E&A;

Revision 3

- Agenda For Operations Burden Review Meeting; May 30, 2012

- AR01640098; 2011 INPO Eval AFI ER.2-1: PMS Of Some Electrical Components

- AR01724425; Controller Not Controlling At Set Flow Rate

- AR01743615; Increase In Operations Requested Emergent PCRS

- AR01752251; Control Room Deficiencies Changed From White To Yellow

- AR01757638; Unanticipated Axial Flux Response During Load Swing

- CE For AR01750489; Progress On INPO AFI ER.2-1; April 12, 2012

- Daily Status Report; June 29, 2012

- EC 274720; 2F52-142; A And C Phase Grid Side Jumpers

12 Attachment

- EN48053; Unit 2 Manual Reactor Actuated Due To Indications Of 100% Load Rejection;

June 27, 2012

- EN47896; Licensed Operating Supervisor Tested Positive For A For-Cause Test For Alcohol;

May 3, 2012

- ER.2-1 Strength Plan

- Incident Investigation And Post-Trip Reviews; Completed June 27, 2012

- NARS Forms; April 25, 2012

- Nextera Energy Life Cycle Management Plan; November 26, 2012

- NP 2.1.4; Operator Burdens; Revision 14

- NPM 2012-0111; Internal Correspondence From D. Weber; Subject: Operator Burden Review

Board Meeting Minutes; April 4, 2012

- OI 38; Circulating Water System Operation; Revision 56

- OP 1C; Startup To Power Operation Unit 2; Revision 24

- OP 3A Unit 1; Power Operation To Hot Standby Unit 1; Revision 9

- OP 3B; Reactor Shutdown; Revision 43

- OP-AA-108; Oversight And Control Of Operator Burdens; Revision 0

- Open POD List; Indicator OX-14; April 2012

- PBNP Outage Status Report; June 29, 2012

- PBNP Shutdown Safety Assessment And Fire Condition; Unit 2; June 29, 2012

- PBNP Subcomponent PM Optimization Charter; April 10, 2012

- PBNP Unit 2 Forced Outage List; As Of April 17, April 19, 2012

- PBNP Unit 2; Forced Outage List; As Of June 29, 2012

- PFNP U2 cycle 32 F52-142 Repair Mode; April 13, April 17, 2012

- POD; May 2, 2012

- Response to NRC Questions Received; Dated June 11, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 1; June 27 To 28, 2012

- Safety Monitor, Unit 2; June 27, 2012

- Station Log; April 19 To April 21, 2012

- Station Log; June 27 To June 29, 2012

- Station Log; Various Dates From April 8 To April 27, 2012

- Unit 2 Planned Outage Shift Coverage; Begins April 19, 2012

- Westinghouse Simulator Handbook; Summary Of Protection Grade Interlocks; Revision 1107

- WO 40106974-01; Unit 2 345 KV Output Breaker; April 12, 2012

4OA5 Other Activities

- AR01380059; NEI Buried Piping Initiative; January 11, 2010

- AR01660378; 2N-31 SRNI HVPS Failed High

- AR01687256; June 13 Unit 2 Rx Trip LER/PI Data Needs Revision

- AR01762573 Buried And Underground Piping And Tanks Inspection; May 2, 2012

- ENG-ER-AA-102; Buried Piping Program Manager Qualification Guide; Revision 1

- ER-AA-102; Buried Piping Program; Revision 3

- ER-AA-102-1000; Buried Piping Examination Procedure; Revision 1

- LER 05000301/2011-004-00; Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due To

Source Range Detector Failure; July 25, 2011

- LER 05000301/2011-004-01; Automatic Reactor Trip During Startup Physics Testing Due To

Source Range Detector Failure; October 13, 2011

- LR-AMP-018-BSMON; Buried Services Monitoring Program Basis Document For License

Renewal; Revision 0

- PBNP Buried Piping Inspection Plan; Revision 1

- PBSA-12-21; Quick Hit Assessment Report; March 29, 2012

13 Attachment

- Program Health Report; Buried Piping; January 1 To March 31, 2012

- Program Health Report; Cathodic Protection; January 1 To March 31, 2012

- RCA 01660378; Unit 2 Reactor Trip Due To 2N31 High Level Trip; July 26 And July 14, 2011

- SEM 8.0; Buried Services Monitoring Program; Revision 0

14 Attachment

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

AC Alternating Current

ADAMS Agencywide Document Access Management System

AFW Auxiliary Feedwater

ALARA As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable

AOP Abnormal Operating Procedure

ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers

BOL Beginning Of Life

CAP Corrective Action Program

CCW Component Cooling Water

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CR Condition Report

DRP Division of Reactor Projects

EDG Emergency Diesel Generator

EPU Extended Power Uprate

FP Fire Protection

FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report

FW Feedwater

HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air

IP Inspection Procedure

IR Inspection Report

kV Kilovolt

LER Licensee Event Report

MFIV Main Feedwater Isolation Valve

MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve

NCV Non-Cited Violation

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NFPA National Fire Protection Association

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

OWA Operator Workaround

PAB Primary Auxiliary Building

PARS Publicly Available Records System

PI Performance Indicator

PMT Post-Maintenance Testing

RCS Reactor Coolant System

RHR Residual Heat Removal

SDP Significance Determination Process

SI Safety Injection

SR Safety-Related

SRM Source Range Monitor

SSC Structure, System, and Component

SW Service Water

TDAFW Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater

TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent

TI Temporary Instruction

TS Technical Specification

TSC Technical Support Center

URI Unresolved Item

WO Work Order 15 Attachment

L. Meyer -2-

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS)

component of NRC's Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS).

ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html

(the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael A. Kunowski, Branch Chief

Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 05000266; 05000301

License Nos.: DPR-24; DPR-27

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000266/2012003 and 05000301/2012003;

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

DISTRIBUTION:

See next page

DOCUMENT NAME: PTBH 2012003.docx

Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII

NAME MKunowski:rj

DATE 08/03/12

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Letter to L. Meyer from M. Kunowski dated August 3, 2012

SUBJECT: POINT BEACH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2

NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000266/2012003 AND

05000301/2012003

DISTRIBUTION:

Silas Kennedy

RidsNrrDorlLpl3-1 Resource

RidsNrrPMPointBeach

RidsNrrDirsIrib Resource

Chuck Casto

Cynthia Pederson

Steven Orth

Jared Heck

Allan Barker

Carole Ariano

Linda Linn

DRPIII

DRSIII

Patricia Buckley

Tammy Tomczak

ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov

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