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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532-4352  
                            NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
March 26, 2015  
                                              REGION III
EA-15-026  
                                    2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210
                                          LISLE, IL 60532-4352
                                          March 26, 2015
EA-15-026
Ms. Barbara A. Nick
President and CEO
Dairyland Power Cooperative
3200 East Avenue S.
P.O. Box 817
La Crosse, WI 54602-0817
SUBJECT: LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL
              STORAGE INSTALLATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT
              07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
Dear Ms. Nick:
On December 15, 2014 through December 18, 2014, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facility in Genoa,
Wisconsin, with continued in-office review through February 24, 2015. The purpose of the
inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that activities
were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection results were
discussed with members of your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on
December 18, 2014, and during a telephone discussion with members of your staff on
February 24, 2015. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.
During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license related
to public health and safety. Additionally, the staff examined your compliance with the
Commissions rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these
areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative
records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent violations of NRC requirements were
identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the
NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations
involved the failure to ensure emergency response staffing levels satisfied the La Crosse
Emergency Plan as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(2),
failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for
review prior to implementation as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), and failure to conduct
emergency drills and exercises at the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan as
required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).


B. Nick                                            -2-
Ms. Barbara A. Nick President and CEO Dairyland Power Cooperative
Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, the NRC is not issuing an
enforcement action for these inspection findings at this time. The circumstances surrounding
these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective
corrective action were discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on
February 24, 2015.
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:
(1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within
30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or
(3) request Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public
observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the
conference. Please contact Wayne Slawinski at 630-829-9820 within ten days of the date of
this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. A PEC should be held within
30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the
Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 07200046/2014001(DNMS) and
05000409/2014008(DNMS); EA-15-026, and should include, for the apparent violations:
(1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent
violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full
compliance was or will be achieved. In presenting your corrective actions, be aware that the
promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil
penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, Suggested
Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action, may be useful in
preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at:
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/in96028.html. Your
response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence
adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within
the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will
proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your
perspective on the apparent violations and any other information that you believe the NRC
should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a
pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that
violations have occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be
conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The
topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine
whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information
related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken
or planned to be taken.


3200 East Avenue S.
B. Nick                                          -3-
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an
attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for
resolving conflicts using a third party neutral. The technique that the NRC has decided to
employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the
mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR,
they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no
power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up
misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the
issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict
Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral
third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you
are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in
the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be
advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
In addition to the apparent violations for which escalated enforcement action is being
considered, the NRC determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements
occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The
violations involved the failure to: submit an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b); have an adequate
program in place to ensure augmentation of emergency response capabilities was available to
implement Emergency Plan actions required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2); and have an emergency
classification system within implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
classification system within the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). These
violations are being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC
Enforcement Policy.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
NRCs Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not
include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made
publicly available without redaction.


P.O. Box 817
B. Nick                                      -4-
La Crosse, WI  54602-0817
Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this
SUBJECT: LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL
inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.
STORAGE INSTALLATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT  07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)  
                                            Sincerely,
Dear Ms. Nick:
                                            /RA/
                                            Julio F. Lara, Acting Director
On December 15, 2014 through December 18, 2014, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear
                                            Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facility in
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409
Genoa, Wisconsin, with continued in-office review through February 24, 2015.  The purpose of the
License No. DPR-45
inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that activities were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection results were discussed with members of your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on
Enclosure:
December 18, 2014, and during a telephone discussion with members of your staff on
IR Nos. 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
February 24, 2015.  The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President
            L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager
            D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
            W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
            R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson
              J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
              S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
              G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
              P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,
                Wisconsin Department of Health Services


During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license relate
B. Nick                                            -4-
d to public health and safety. Additionally, the staff examined your compliance with the
Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this
Commission's rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these
inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.
areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative
                                                Sincerely,
records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.  
                                                /RA/
                                                Julio F. Lara, Acting Director
                                                Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409
License No. DPR-45
Enclosure:
IR Nos.: 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President
              L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager
              D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
              W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
              R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson
                J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission
                S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
                G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
                P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,
                  Wisconsin Department of Health Services
DISTRIBUTION w/encl:                                    Jim Clay
Darrell Roberts                                          Carmen Olteanu
Marlayna Vaaler                                          Carol Ariano
Patrick Louden                                          Paul Pelke
                                                        MCID Branch
ADAMS Accession Number:
DOCUMENT NAME: LACBWR 2014001.docx
    Publicly Available          Non-Publicly Available      Sensitive        Non-Sensitive
To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" =
Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy
OFFICE      RIII-DNMS          C RIII-DNMS                RIII-EICS            RIII-DNMS
NAME        MLearn:ps ML WJS      ROrlikowksi WJS for RSkokowski RS *1          JLara
              for
DATE        3/20/2015            3/20/2015              3/26/2015            3/26/2015
*1 - OE, NMSS & NSIR reviewed and concurred via e-mail from C. Faria on 3/26/2015
                                    OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent violations of NRC requirements were identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the
          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC's website at
                          REGION III
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.  The apparent violations involved the failure to ensure emergency response staffing levels satisfied the La Crosse Emergency Plan as required by Title 10 of the
Docket No.:         072-00046; 050-00409
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(2), failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan
License No.:        DPR-45, General License (ISFSI)
that reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), and failure to conduct
Report No.:        IR 07200046/2014001(DNMS)
emergency drills and exercises at the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan as
                    IR 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).   
Licensee:          Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)
B. Nick - 2 -  
Facility:          La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (ISFSI)
  Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, the NRC is not issuing an enforcement action for these inspection findings at this time. The circumstances surrounding these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective
Location:          Genoa, WI
corrective action were discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on
Dates:              On-site Inspection: December 15-18, 2014
February 24, 2015. 
                    Telephone Exit Meeting: February 24, 2015
Inspectors:        Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer
                    Wayne J. Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist
Approved by:        Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief
                    Materials Control, ISFSI, and
                    Decommissioning Branch
                    Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
                                                                Enclosure


                                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either: (1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within 30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or 
                            LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR
(3) request Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR).  If a PEC is held, it will be open for public
                                    NRC INSPECTION REPORT
observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the  
                  07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
conference.  Please contact Wayne Slawinski at 630-829-9820 within ten days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. A PEC should be held within  30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.  
A routine inspection of licensed activities associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel at the
La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)
was conducted from December 15 through December 18, 2014 including in office review
through February 24, 2015 The inspection consisted of interviews of site personnel, onsite
walkdowns, and reviews of: emergency preparedness and fire protection; surveillance and
maintenance activities; environmental monitoring; and quality assurance activities related to the
ISFSI.
The inspectors identified three apparent violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) section 50.54(q) concerning the licensees: failure to ensure emergency response staffing
levels as required by the La Crosse Emergency Plan, failure to submit changes to the
Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for review prior to implementation, and failure to conduct emergency drills and exercises
in accordance with the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan.
The inspectors also identified three Severity Level IV non-cited violations concerning the
licensees: failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by
10 CFR 72.30(b), failure to have an adequate program in place for emergency staff
augmentation to ensure Emergency Plan actions could be accomplished as required by
10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and failure to have an emergency classification system within their
implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system of the
Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
                                                  2


                                          Report Details
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as "Response to the  
1.0    Away from Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (IP 60858)
Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 07200046/2014001(DNMS) and  
1.1    Review of Emergency Plan Program from ISFSI Activation until Emergency Plan
05000409/2014008(DNMS);
      Revision 34 Issuance (Revisions 31-33)
EA-15-026," and should include, for the apparent violations:  (1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent
    a. Inspection Scope
violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the  
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees compliance with the Emergency Plan and
corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full
      associated Emergency Planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and 72. The
compliance was or will be achieved. In presenting your corrective actions, be aware that the  
      inspectors reviewed staffing changes following fuel movement to the independent spent
promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, "Suggested Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action," may be useful in  
      fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors reviewed changes to the
preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at: 
      Emergency Plan Revision 31. The inspectors reviewed adherence to Emergency Plan
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/in96028.html. Your response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will
      requirements for exercises and drills.
proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.  
    b. Observations and Findings
      Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements
      On June 20, 2011, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Emergency Plan
      was updated to Revision 31. The revision to the LACBWR Emergency Plan added
      provisions for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) that had not yet
      been loaded with casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The previous revision of the
      Emergency Plan (Revision 30) had solely focused on the non-operating reactor plant
      and associated spent nuclear fuel that had been contained within the fuel element
      storage well.
      On July 12, 2012, the licensee moved their first Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) to the
      ISFSI pad. Between June and September 2012, the licensee successfully loaded all fuel
      assemblies into dry casks and transferred each of those casks to the ISFSI onsite
      storage pad. The fifth and final cask was successfully placed on the pad on
      September 19, 2012.
      Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow
      and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
      appendix E of this part...
      The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section 1.1 Plant Emergency Response
      Organization provided the authority and responsibility for Emergency Plan activation to
      the Operations Shift Supervisor. Section 1.1 defined minimum emergency plan staffing
      as an Operations Shift Supervisor, an Operator, a Security Shift Supervisor, and the
      security force. Additionally, the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section A.1.3.8,
      Augmented ISFSI Emergency Response Organization, states that On-shift ISFSI
      personnel can implement the Emergency Plan without assistance from others.
      The licensee maintained continuous operations staff coverage including an Operations
      Supervisor and an Operator onsite while fuel was maintained in the Fuel Element
      Storage Well (FESW) throughout the spent fuel assembly storage campaign which
      culminated on September 19, 2012.
                                                3


On September 20, 2012, the operations department staffing was reduced at the site
If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your
without a corresponding change to the Emergency Plan. Specifically, the operations
perspective on the apparent violations and any
department was not staffed during backshifts and weekends as required by Emergency
other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that
Plan Section 1.1. Moreover, radiation protection technician staffing was not maintained
violations have occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be
during backshifts, weekends and whenever radiological work did not occur at the plant.
As a result, backshift and weekend staffing was limited to site security personnel.
The operations personnel were trained to perform radiological surveys whenever health
physics staff were not onsite and consequently provided the emergency plan required
assessment capability while onsite. In contrast, the security staff had not been trained to
conduct radiation surveys. As a result of the staffing changes, radiological assessment
capability was limited only to weekday day shifts. Therefore, radiological assessment
capability required by the Emergency Plan was diminished because radiological survey
qualified staff were not continuously onsite. Consequently, during backshift and
weekends the licensee's ability to assess radiological conditions, evaluate emergency
preparedness event entry criteria (action level thresholds) and declare timely EALs was
degraded. Given their staffing changes, the licensee was unable to implement the
Emergency Plan without offsite assistance from others as required by Emergency Plan
Section A.1.3.8.
Following discussions with NRC staff on October 26, 2012, continuous operations
staffing was reinstated at the site. However, on October 29, 2012, the licensee
implemented Revision 32 to the Emergency Plan following an inadequate effectiveness
review by both the onsite and offsite safety review committees, at which time continuous
operations staff coverage was again terminated for backshifts and weekends. During
the October 26 - 29 transitional period between Revisions 31 and 32, the licensee
trained and qualified its security staff in basic radiological assessment capabilities
related to ISFSI operations, as the revised emergency plan delegated certain emergency
response functions to the Security Shift Supervisor when other qualified staff was not
onsite. The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program under
CAR 2013-005.
An AV was identified, from September 20 until October 26, 2012, for the failure to
maintain staffing at minimum levels prescribed by the LACBWR Emergency Plan
Revision 31, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to
follow Emergency Plan Section 1.1 and Section A.1.3.8 which specifies minimum
staffing requirements to ensure the Emergency Plan may be implemented without offsite
assistance.
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-01;
05000409/2014008-01; Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements)
Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC Approval
10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(3) states that, the licensee may make changes to its emergency
plan without NRC approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis
demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.
                                            4


conducted to obtain information to assist t
10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(4) further states that, the changes to a licensee emergency plan
he NRC in making an enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken
that reduce the effectiveness of the plan may not be implemented without prior
or planned to be taken. 
approval by the NRC. A reduction in effectiveness means a change in the emergency
B. Nick - 3 -
plan that reduces the capability to perform an emergency planning function which
  In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an attempt to resolve this issue.  ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts using a third party neutral.  The technique that the NRC has decided to  
includes assessment capability.
employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the  
On October 29, 2012, the licensee made changes to their Emergency Plan through
"mediator") works with parties to help them reach resolution.  If the parties agree to use ADR,  
issuance of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 32. The LACBWR Emergency
they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no
Plan, Revision 31 established requirements for emergency response to ISFSI events
power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues.  Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at
while maintaining emergency response to non-operating reactor plant events. The
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regul
licensee revised the plan to reduce the emergency response requirements for the
atory/enforcement/adr.html.  The Institute on Conflict Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral
LACBWR plant following movement of all irradiated fuel from the plant facility to the
third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.
onsite ISFSI.
Specifically, among other changes, the revised Emergency Plan removed twelve plant
Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in
related events and retained three ISFSI related events. Additionally, the revision
the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.  You will be
eliminated the Alert classification, reduced the frequency of emergency exercises from
advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.
annually to biennially, and eliminated 1 hour staff augmentations requirements. The
In addition to the apparent violations for which escalated enforcement action is being
licensee evaluated the change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the
considered, the NRC determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements  
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and determined that the changes did not
occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.  The violations involved the failure to:  submit an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.
decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b); have an adequate
During the NRC review of Revision 32, NRC staff identified that the changes made in
program in place to ensure augmentation of emergency response capabilities was available to implement Emergency Plan actions required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2); and have an emergency
Revision 32 reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, as defined
classification system within implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee eliminated plant EAL events related to radiological
classification system within the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). These
releases including effluent releases because they reasoned that spent fuel was removed
violations are being treated as non-cited violatio
from the plant and therefore the radiological source term that remained at the plant could
ns, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  
not create a significant consequence to the public. The licensee acknowledged in their
evaluation that, although the spent fuel was moved to the ISFSI, a potential for adverse
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its
radiological conditions during plant decommissioning and dismantlement activities
enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the
existed. Since there were ongoing decommissioning and dismantlement operations
NRC's Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.  To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made  
periodically conducted in the plant and liquid collection systems and the plant ventilation
publicly available without redaction.  
systems remained in operation, the NRC determined that releases of radioactive
B. Nick - 4 -
materials were possible. Therefore, the removal of these event types equated to a
  Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this inspection.  Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.  
reduction in effectiveness which required NRC approval.
  Sincerely, 
The NRC staff also identified that an adequate technical evaluation or basis was not
provided by the licensee to eliminate the Alert classification, reduce exercise
frequencies, and reduce staffing augmentation times.
NRC staff identified that the licensee removed reactor plant related requirements from its
Emergency Plan although decommissioning was not complete and licensed radioactive
material was present in the plant.
The NRC communicated to the licensee in telephone conversations on
December 19, 2012, and January 24, 2013, that Revision 32 of the Emergency Plan
reduced its effectiveness and that the changes made by the licensee to the plan were
not consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee documented
the issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-004 on January 24, 2013.
                                          5


  /RA/ 
As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed a quantitative analysis of the
Julio F. Lara, Acting Director Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
dispersion of the remaining LACBWR plant nuclide inventory in order to justify the
changes made in Revision 32. Following the completion of the analysis, the licensee
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409 
submitted Revision 33 of the Emergency Plan for NRC approval on August 6, 2013. On
License No. DPR-45
April 14, 2014, Revision 34 was submitted for approval in response to NRCs inquiry
Enclosure: 
about the elimination of the Alert classification. NRC staff found that the licensee had
IR Nos. 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)  
not justified removal of the Alert classification in Revision 32 and 33. Revision 34 was
subsequently approved by the NRC on September 18, 2014.
During the period of December 19, 2012 through September 18, 2014, the licensee
failed to implement corrective actions to regain compliance with Revision 31. Instead,
the licensee continued to implement Revision 32 even though it had not been approved
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The NRC discussed the need to restore
compliance with an acceptable Emergency Plan in telephone conversations with the
licensee on December 19, 2012, January 24, 2013, August 20, 2013, and
December 4, 2013. The licensee documented the issue in CAR 2013-004 dated
January 24, 2013, and CAR 2013-022 dated December 27, 2013, and initiated actions
for approval of the Emergency Plan by the NRC as discussed above. Actions were not
taken by the licensee in the interim nearly two year period between Revision 31 and
Revision 34 to fully restore compliance with Revision 31. The corrective actions were
closed following the submission of Revision 34 for NRC approval.
An AV was identified, because the license made changes to their emergency plan that
reduced the effectiveness of the plan and implemented these changes on
October 29, 2012, without prior approval by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 072000046/2014001-02;
05000409/2014008-02; Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC
Approval)
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Emergency Plans" - Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as
Required by the Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E of this part...
Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Section E.2.2.1, Plant Emergency Plan
Exercises, states that to ascertain the necessary level of familiarity with emergency
plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, plant exercises
will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and emergency capability of
the LACBWR/DPC. Additionally, Section E.2.3 Drills, states that A drill is a
supervised instruction aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular
operation. Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise. Drills will be evaluated as
described in Subsection 2.5 of this Section. The types and frequency of drills is as
follows: fire drills will be conducted annually medical emergency drills will be
conducted annually health physics drills will be conducted annually.
                                            6


      The inspectors identified that the licensee conducted a plant emergency exercise in
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President  L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager  D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
      2010, however, failed to perform a plant emergency exercise in 2011, 2012, and 2013.
W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
      The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform fire drills in 2011 and
R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
      2012; a medical drill in 2013; and a valid health physics drill in 2012. The health physics
      activity in 2012 credited as a drill was not a supervised instruction that tested, developed
      and maintained skills because it did not involve radiological conditions that necessitated
      an action, did require emergency plan implementation, and was not observed or
      critiqued.
      An AV was identified, in that between 2011 and 2013, the licensee failed to follow their
      Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). Specifically, the licensee failed
      to perform emergency exercises and drills in accordance with the LACBWR Emergency
      Plan, Revision 31 Sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.3 respectively.
      Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement
      decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-03;
      05000409/2014008-03; Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
      Emergency Plan)
      The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program under CAR 2013-
      002. Following the issuance of Revision 34 to emergency plan, the licensee was no
      longer required by its plan to conduct plant (non-ISFSI) emergency exercises. The
      licensee performed ISFSI facility related emergency exercises in 2012 and 2014, in
      accordance with the Emergency Plan.
    c. Conclusion
      The inspectors identified three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's
      failure to maintain Emergency Plan staffing, submit changes to the Emergency Plan that
      reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation, and conduct
      emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the
      Emergency Plan.
1.2    Review of Emergency Plan Program since Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance
    a. Inspection Scope
      On September 18, 2014, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan,
      Revision 34. The revision removed all event types associated with the plant (Non-ISFSI)
      and associated processes and programs supporting these event types. The licensee
      revised their implementing procedures, processes, and programs following the approval
      of Revision 34.
      The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of the ISFSI biennial emergency
      preparedness exercise. The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, implementing
      procedures, and the exercise scenario with the exercise objectives and expected
      sequence of events. The inspectors reviewed the proposed exercise scenario to
      understand its scope and evaluate its adequacy to ensure the licensee could
      demonstrate their emergency response capabilities. The inspectors observed the pre-
      exercise briefing, the exercise, and the licensees formal post-exercise self-assessment.
                                                  7


   Through document reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors also assessed the licensees
cc w/o encl:  T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson  J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wiscons
  fire protection program for its effectiveness to support safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.
in Public Service Commission  S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection, 
Wisconsin Department of Health Services
 
B. Nick - 4 -
  Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this inspection.  Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.
  Sincerely, 
 
  /RA/ 
Julio F. Lara, Acting Director Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409 License No.  DPR-45
Enclosure: 
IR Nos.: 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)
 
cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President  L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager
D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
 
cc w/o encl:  T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson  J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wiscons
in Public Service Commission  S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition
G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa
P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,  Wisconsin Department of Health Services
DISTRIBUTION w/encl
: Darrell Roberts
 
Marlayna Vaaler
Patrick Louden
Jim Clay Carmen Olteanu
 
Carol Ariano
Paul Pelke MCID Branch
ADAMS Accession Number:  DOCUMENT NAME: LACBWR 2014001.docx  Publicly Available  Non-Publicly Available
Sensitive  Non-Sensitive To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" = Copy with attach/encl  "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII-DNMS C RIII-DNMS  RIII-EICS  RIII-DNMS  NAME MLearn:ps ML WJS
for ROrlikowksi WJS for RSkokowski RS *1 JLara DATE 3/20/2015 3/20/2015 3/26/2015 3/26/2015
*1 - OE, NMSS & NSIR reviewed and concurred via e-mail from C. Faria on 3/26/2015
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 
Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
  Docket No.:  072-00046; 050-00409
License No.:  DPR-45, General License (ISFSI)
 
  Report No.:  IR 07200046/2014001(DNMS)
IR 05000409/2014008(DNMS) 
 
  Licensee:  Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)
 
  Facility:  La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (ISFSI)
  Location:  Genoa, WI
 
  Dates:  On-site Inspection:  December 15-18, 2014    Telephone Exit Meeting: February 24, 2015
Inspectors:  Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer    Wayne J. Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist
  Approved by:  Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief
Materials Control, ISFSI, and
  Decommissioning Branch
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
 
2  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
  LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR NRC INSPECTION REPORT  07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS) 
A routine inspection
of licensed activities associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel at the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)
was conducted from December 15 through December 18, 2014 including in office review through February 24, 2015  The inspection consisted of interviews of site personnel, onsite walkdowns, and reviews of: emergency preparedness and fire protection; surveillance and
maintenance activities; environmental monitoring; and quality assurance activities related to the
 
ISFSI. 
The inspectors identified three apparent violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) section 50.54(q) concerning the licensee's: failure to ensure emergency response staffing
levels as required by the La Crosse Emergency Plan, failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) for review prior to implementation, and
failure to conduct emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan.
 
The inspectors also identified three Severity Level IV non-cited violations concerning the
licensee's: failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b), failure to have an adequate program in place for emergency staff augmentation to ensure Emergency Plan actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classificati
on system of the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
 
 
3  Report Details
 
1.0 Away from Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (IP 60858)
1.1 Review of Emergency Plan Program from ISFSI Activation until Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance (Revisions 31-33)
a. Inspection Scope
  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's compliance with the Emergency Plan and associated Emergency Planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and 72.  The
inspectors reviewed staffing changes following fuel movement to the independent spent
fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad.  The inspectors reviewed changes to the
Emergency Plan Revision 31.  The inspectors reviewed adherence to Emergency Plan
requirements for exercises and drills. 
b. Observations and Findings
  Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements 
On June 20, 2011, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Emergency Plan
was updated to Revision 31.  The revision to the LACBWR Emergency Plan added
provisions for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) that had not yet
been loaded with casks containing spent nuclear fuel.  The previous revision of the
Emergency Plan (Revision 30) had solely focused on the non-operating reactor plant and associated spent nuclear fuel that had been contained within the fuel element
storage well.
 
 
On July 12, 2012, the licensee moved their first Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) to the
ISFSI pad.  Between June and September 2012, the licensee successfully loaded all fuel assemblies into dry casks and transferred each of those casks to the ISFSI onsite storage pad.  The fifth and final cask was successfully placed on the pad on
September 19, 2012. 
 
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, "a holder of a license under this part- shall follow
and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E of this part..."
The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section 1.1 "Plant Emergency Response Organization" provided the authority and responsibility for Emergency Plan activation to
the Operations Shift Supervisor.  Section 1.1 defined minimum emergency plan staffing as an Operations Shift Supervisor, an Operator, a Security Shift Supervisor, and the security force.  Additionally, the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section A.1.3.8,
"Augmented ISFSI Emergency Response Organization," states that "On-shift ISFSI
personnel can implement the Emergency Plan without assistance from others."
  The licensee maintained continuous operations staff coverage including an Operations Supervisor and an Operator onsite while fuel was maintained in the Fuel Element Storage Well (FESW) throughout the spent fuel assembly storage campaign which
culminated on September 19, 2012. 
4  On September 20, 2012, the operations department staffing was reduced at the site without a corresponding change to the Emergency Plan.  Specifically, the operations
department was not staffed during backshifts and weekends as required by Emergency Plan Section 1.1.  Moreover, radiation protection technician staffing was not maintained
during backshifts, weekends and whenever radiological work did not occur at the plant.  As a result, backshift and weekend staffing was limited to site security personnel. 
 
The operations personnel were trained to perform radiological surveys whenever health
physics staff were not onsite and consequently provided the emergency plan required assessment capability while onsite.  In contrast, the security staff had not been trained to conduct radiation surveys.  As a result of the staffing changes, radiological assessment
capability was limited only to weekday day shifts.  Therefore, radiological assessment
capability required by the Emergency Plan was diminished because radiological survey
qualified staff were not continuously onsite.  Consequently, during backshift and weekends the licensee's ability to assess radiological conditions, evaluate emergency preparedness event entry criteria (action level thresholds) and declare timely EALs was
degraded.  Given their staffing changes, the licensee was unable to implement the
Emergency Plan without offsite assistance from others as required by Emergency Plan
 
Section A.1.3.8.
Following discussions with NRC staff on October 26, 2012, continuous operations staffing was reinstated at the site.  However, on October 29, 2012, the licensee implemented Revision 32 to the Emergency Plan following an inadequate effectiveness review by both the onsite and offsite safety review committees, at which time continuous operations staff coverage was again terminated for backshifts and weekends.  During the October 26 - 29 transitional period between Revisions 31 and 32, the licensee trained and qualified its security staff in basic radiological assessment capabilities related to ISFSI operations, as the revised emergency plan delegated certain emergency response functions to the Security Shift Supervisor when other qualified staff was not onsite.  The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-005.
An AV was identified, from September 20 until October 26, 2012, for the failure to
maintain staffing at minimum levels prescribed by the LACBWR Emergency Plan
Revision 31, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).  Specifically, the licensee failed to
follow Emergency Plan Section 1.1 and Section A.1.3.8 which specifies minimum staffing requirements to ensure the Emergency Plan may be implemented without offsite assistance.
 
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRC's enforcement decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-01; 05000409/2014008-01; Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements)
Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC Approval
10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(3) states that, "the licensee may make changes to its emergency
plan without NRC approval only if the lic
ensee performs and retains an analysis demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan." 
5  10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(4) further states that, "the changes to a licensee emergency plan that reduce the effectiveness of the plan- may not be implemented without prior
approval by the NRC."  A reduction in effectiveness means a change in the emergency plan that reduces the capability to perform an emergency planning function which includes assessment capability.
 
 
On October 29, 2012, the licensee made changes to their Emergency Plan through
issuance of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 32.  The LACBWR Emergency
Plan, Revision 31 established requirements for emergency response to ISFSI events while maintaining emergency response to non-operating reactor plant events.  The licensee revised the plan to reduce the emergency response requirements for the
LACBWR plant following movement of all irradiated fuel from the plant facility to the
 
onsite ISFSI. 
 
Specifically, among other changes, the revised Emergency Plan removed twelve plant related events and retained three ISFSI related events.  Additionally, the revision
eliminated the "Alert" classification, reduced the frequency of emergency exercises from annually to biennially, and eliminated 1 hour staff augmentations requirements.  The
licensee evaluated the change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and determined that the changes did not decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. 
 
During the NRC review of Revision 32, NRC staff identified that the changes made in
Revision 32 reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, as defined
by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).  The licensee eliminated plant EAL events related to radiological releases including effluent releases because they reasoned that spent fuel was removed from the plant and therefore the radiological source term that remained at the plant could
not create a significant consequence to the public.  The licensee acknowledged in their evaluation that, although the spent fuel was moved to the ISFSI, a potential for adverse
radiological conditions during plant decommissioning and dismantlement activities existed.  Since there were ongoing decommissioning and dismantlement operations periodically conducted in the plant and liquid collection systems and the plant ventilation
systems remained in operation, the NRC determined that releases of radioactive
materials were possible.  Therefore, the removal of these event types equated to a
reduction in effectiveness which required NRC approval. 
 
The NRC staff also identified that an adequate
technical evaluation or basis was not provided by the licensee to eliminate the Alert classification, reduce exercise
frequencies, and reduce staffing augmentation times.    
 
NRC staff identified that the licensee removed reactor plant related requirements from its Emergency Plan although decommissioning was not complete and licensed radioactive material was present in the plant. 
 
The NRC communicated to the licensee in telephone conversations on
December 19, 2012, and January 24, 2013, that Revision 32 of the Emergency Plan 
reduced its effectiveness and that the changes made by the licensee to the plan were not consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).  The licensee documented the issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-004 on January 24, 2013. 
6  As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed a quantitative analysis of the dispersion of the remaining LACBWR plant nuclide inventory in order to justify the
changes made in Revision 32.  Following the completion of the analysis, the licensee submitted Revision 33 of the Emergency Plan for NRC approval on August 6, 2013.  On
April 14, 2014, Revision 34 was submitted for approval in response to NRC's inquiry
about the elimination of the "Alert' classification.  NRC staff found that the licensee had
not justified removal of the Alert classification in Revision 32 and 33.  Revision 34 was
subsequently approved by the NRC on September 18, 2014.
 
  During the period of December 19, 2012 through September 18, 2014, the licensee failed to implement corrective actions to regain compliance with Revision 31.  Instead,
the licensee continued to implement Revision 32 even though it had not been approved
in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).  The NRC discussed the need to restore
compliance with an acceptable Emergency Plan in telephone conversations with the licensee on December 19, 2012, January 24, 2013, August 20, 2013, and December 4, 2013.  The licensee documented the issue in CAR 2013-004 dated
January 24, 2013, and CAR 2013-022 dated December 27, 2013, and initiated actions
for approval of the Emergency Plan by the NRC as discussed above.  Actions were not
taken by the licensee in the interim nearly two year period between Revision 31 and Revision 34 to fully restore compliance with Revision 31.  The corrective actions were closed following the submission of Revision 34 for NRC approval. 
  An AV was identified, because the license made changes to their emergency plan that
reduced the effectiveness of the plan and implemented these changes on
October 29, 2012, without prior approval by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). 
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRC's enforcement decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 072000046/2014001-02;
05000409/2014008-02; Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC
 
Approval)
Title 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Emergency Plans" - Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, "a holder of a license under this part- shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E of this part..."
 
Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Section E.2.2.1, "Plant Emergency Plan
Exercises," states that "to ascertain the necessary level of familiarity with emergency
plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, plant exercises will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and emergency capability of the LACBWR/DPC."  Additionally, Section E.2.3 "Drills," states that "A drill is a
supervised instruction aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular
operation.  Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise.  Drills will be evaluated as
described in Subsection 2.5 of this Section.  The types and frequency of drills is as
follows:  fire drills will be conducted annually- medical emergency drills will be conducted annually- health physics drills will be conducted annually."
7  The inspectors identified that the licensee conducted a plant emergency exercise in 2010, however, failed to perform a plant emergency exercise in 2011, 2012, and 2013. 
The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform fire drills in 2011 and 2012; a medical drill in 2013; and a valid health physics drill in 2012. The health physics activity in 2012 credited as a drill was not a supervised instruction that tested, developed
and maintained skills because it did not involve radiological conditions that necessitated
an action, did require emergency plan implementation, and was not observed or
critiqued.
 
An AV was identified, in that between 2011 and 2013, the licensee failed to follow their Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).  Specifically, the licensee failed
to perform emergency exercises and drills in accordance with the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.3 respectively.
 
Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRC's enforcement decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-03; 
05000409/2014008-03; Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
 
Emergency Plan)
The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program under CAR 2013-002.  Following the issuance of Revision 34 to emergency plan, the licensee was no
longer required by its plan to conduct plant (non-ISFSI) emergency exercises.  The
licensee performed ISFSI facility related emergency exercises in 2012 and 2014, in
accordance with the Emergency Plan.
 
c. Conclusion
 
The inspectors identified three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's
failure to maintain Emergency Plan staffing, submit changes to the Emergency Plan that
reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation, and conduct emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the
Emergency Plan.
 
1.2 Review of Emergency Plan Program since Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance
a. Inspection Scope
  On September 18, 2014, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan,
Revision 34.  The revision removed all event types associated with the plant (Non-ISFSI)
and associated processes and programs supporting these event types.  The licensee
revised their implementing procedures, processes, and programs following the approval of Revision 34. 
The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of the ISFSI biennial emergency
preparedness exercise.  The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, implementing
procedures, and the exercise scenario with the exercise objectives and expected
sequence of events.  The inspectors reviewed the proposed exercise scenario to understand its scope and evaluate its adequacy to ensure the licensee could demonstrate their emergency response capabilities.  The inspectors observed the pre-exercise briefing, the exercise, and the licensee's formal post-exercise self-assessment. 
8  Through document reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors also assessed the licensee's fire protection program for its effectiveness to support safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.  
 
b. Observations and Findings
  Review of 2014 ISFSI Emergency Exercise Performance 
Section 8.3 of the LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan requires the licensee to perform a
biennial exercise to demonstrate emergency response capabilities and effectiveness of the licensee's Emergency Plan.  The scenario for the December 16, 2014, exercise involved a simulated tornado striking the ISFSI.  Following an initiating event, the cask
was simulated to be damaged creating potential for a damaged confinement boundary. 
The licensee implemented appropriate, timely, and necessary actions to address the
simulated event.  The licensee correctly classified the event, made timely notifications, augmented personnel onsite as needed, conducted adequate radiological monitoring, and ensured the safety of personnel.  Exercise participants maintained control
throughout the scenario, starting with a prompt recognition of the initiating event and
through recovery discussions.  Throughout the exercise, the licensee's staff
communicated well with all involved parties and demonstrated knowledge of the Emergency Plan.  During the post-exercise critique, the licensee adequately evaluated its emergency response and management capability.
 
The licensee's fire protection program was assessed through reviews of periodic fire drill
records and applicable fire protection program documents.  The scenarios were
reviewed to determine whether they were realistic and met drill objectives.  The inspectors did not identify any un-analyzed combustibles stored or located within the
ISFSI. 
Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, "A standard emergency classification and action level scheme- is used by the nuclear facility."  The inspectors reviewed EPP-20.01, 'ISFSI Emergency Conditions," Revision 3.  The procedure defines conditions that constitute an emergency at the ISFSI and provides
guidance for determining when emergency conditions at the ISFSI should be classified
as an ALERT which would require activation of the Emergency Plan and implementation of Emergency Plan Procedures.  Within the procedures an emergency is classified based on specific information contained in Attachment 1, "ISFSI Emergency Events." 
Specifically, Attachment 1 provides both quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring
declaration of an Alert under the event type "Potential Damage to Loaded Cask
Confinement Boundary."  Specifically, Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert when any one of the following qualitative conditions are observed:  A VCC has moved out of its normal position on the ISFSI Pad, or VCC damage to the top or sides of cask
with concrete debris found nearby, or tornado driven missile has impacted a VCC, or a
VCC has tipped over on the ISFSI Pad or has fallen off the ISFSI Pad, or  50% of VCC inlets and outlets are blocked.  Additionally Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert
when any one of the following quantitative conditions are observed: >500R/hr before reaching the Isolation Zone Fence, or Measured dose rate at the Isolation Zone Fence 
9  exceeds the tag value in EPP-20.04 or  40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, or  50 mRem/hr
on top of VCC, or  200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.
The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Table 4.1 "ISFSI Emergency
Events," and identified that the Emergency Plan only contained quantitative criteria
requiring declarations of an Alert under the event type "Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary."  Specifically, Table 4.1 requires declaration of an Alert when any one of the following quantitative (measured) conditions are identified:  40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, OR  50 mRem/hr on top of VCC, OR  200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.
 
The inspectors determined that the licensee's implementing procedures and associated
emergency action level scheme were not in alignment with the licensee's Emergency Plan emergency action level scheme.  Specifically, the implementing procedures contained qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert that are not
contained within the Emergency Plan.  The inspectors noted that while most of the
qualitative criteria was indicative of a potential event at the ISFSI which could lead to the
quantitative criteria being exceeded, there was potential for an over classification of an event.  For example, during a heavy snow fall, the lower vents of the VCC could be blocked by snow, which would require declaration of an Alert according to the licensee's
implementing procedures.  In contrast the licensee's design basis evaluation demonstrates that the lower vents can be blocked for an indefinite amount of time
without any safety impact or associated increase in dose rate.
 
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
classification system within their Emergency Plan, and therefore this was a violation of
 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
 
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under CAR 2014-022 and initiated actions for revision of the procedure.
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement.  The inspectors determined that the failure to have an
emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency Plan was a violation of more than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples
of Minor Issues," example 4h.
 
 
The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to make a significance determination.  The inspectors determined
that requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) "Emergency Classification System" is a
Planning Standard.  The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the
Green Finding example in IMC 0609 Table 5.4-1, "The EAL classification process would
result in an over-classification causing an unnecessary emergency declaration." Specifically, the licensee's implementing procedures contained additional qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert for a "Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary" when not required by the emergency plan.
 
 
  10 The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that "a licensee ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases."  The inspectors determined that the
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation.   
 
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, "A standard emergency classification and action level
scheme- is used by the nuclear facility."  Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to utilize a standard classification and action level scheme.  Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing
procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
 
Plan.  Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. 
(NCV 07200046/2014001-04; 05000409/2014008-04; Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan)
Staff Augmentation Capability not in accordance with Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, "a holder of a license under this part- shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in appendix E of this part..."
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, "On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response activities and offsite support and response activities are specified."
 
The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Section 3.3, "ISFSI Event Response
Surveillance" states:  "A Response Surveillance is required following off-normal, accident
or natural phenomena events.  The NAC-MPC Systems in use at an ISFSI shall be inspected within 4 hours after the occurrence of an off-normal, accident or natural phenomena event in the area of the ISFSI.  Following a natural phenomena event, the
ISFSI shall be inspected to determine if movement or damage to the CONCRETE
CASKS has resulted in unacceptable site boundary dose rates." 
Through interviews with licensee staff, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to have a staffing augmentation program in place to ensure that the actions specified in
Emergency Plan Section 3.3 could be met.  Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological protection
staff could respond to the site within 4 hours of an event to adequately characterize the
site boundary dose rates.   
11  The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an adequate program in place to ensure augmentation of response capabilities is available to ensure Emergency Plan
actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under
CAR 2014-025 and initiated actions to implement a staffing augmentation program. 
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement.  The inspectors determined that the failure to have a staffing
mechanism in place to ensure emergency plan compliance was a violation of more than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," example 4h.
 
 
The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance
Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to risk inform the significance determination.  The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the Degraded Planning Standard Function example in IMC 0609 Table 5.2-1, "Staffing
processes would permit a shift to go below Emergency Plan minimum staffing
requirements, but there were no actual instances in which such shortage occurred."
Specifically, the licensee's staffing program could not ensure response capabilities were available to timely implement Emergency Plan actions; however, there were no actual instances of emergencies where this occurred.
 
The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning
Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that "a licensee ability to meet or implement any regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases."  The inspectors determined that the
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation of
 
10 CFR 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2). 
 
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, "On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
 
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to ensure timely augmentation of response capabilities is available.  Specifically, the inspectors identified
that the licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological
protection staff could respond to the site within 4 hours of an event to adequately
characterize the site boundary dose rates.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. 
(NCV 07200046/2014001-05; 05000409/2014008-05; Staff Augmentation Capability not
in accordance with Emergency Plan)
 
12  c. Conclusion
 
The inspectors identified two severity level IV violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and failed to have adequate staffing
programs to ensure compliance with requirements contained within the Emergency Plan
and therefore this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
The licensee demonstrated the ability to conduct an emergency exercise and assess their performance during a formal critique.  Fire protection requirements were met
regarding the conduct of drills and controlling combustibles in and around the ISFSI.   
1.3 Surveillance and Maintenance
 
a. Inspection Scope
  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's surveillance and maintenance program
associated with dry fuel storage to verify compliance with the applicable regulations, the License, and TS.  The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad, observed daily surveillance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed select documents.  The
inspectors reviewed several records of daily temperature checks and radiological
 
surveys performed since the last NRC inspection. 
b. Observations and Findings
b. Observations and Findings
  The inspectors conducted a walk down of the ISFSI pad and observed qualified
  Review of 2014 ISFSI Emergency Exercise Performance
licensee staff perform daily surveillances of the casks including temperatur
  Section 8.3 of the LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan requires the licensee to perform a
e monitoring
  biennial exercise to demonstrate emergency response capabilities and effectiveness of
and inlet and outlet vent screen checks to ensure they were free of  
  the licensees Emergency Plan. The scenario for the December 16, 2014, exercise
significant blockage or damage.  The inspectors also evaluated the general condition of the ISFSI pad. The inspectors note d that temperature logs indicated that the casks operated
  involved a simulated tornado striking the ISFSI. Following an initiating event, the cask
as designed with no abnormalities.  The inspectors found that the licensee performed and documented the surveillance activities as required by TS and
  was simulated to be damaged creating potential for a damaged confinement boundary.
site procedures.
  The licensee implemented appropriate, timely, and necessary actions to address the
  I n addition, the inspectors performed independent radiation surveys of the casks, and general ISFSI area.  The result s were bounded by the radiological postings and consistent with the licensee's radiological surveys. 
  simulated event. The licensee correctly classified the event, made timely notifications,
  No findings of significance were
  augmented personnel onsite as needed, conducted adequate radiological monitoring,
identified.
  and ensured the safety of personnel. Exercise participants maintained control
  c. Conclusion
  throughout the scenario, starting with a prompt recognition of the initiating event and
  The licensee implemented its surveillance and maintenance program in accordance with applicable regulations, the License, and TS. 
  through recovery discussions. Throughout the exercise, the licensees staff
 
  communicated well with all involved parties and demonstrated knowledge of the
1.4 Environmental Monitoring
  Emergency Plan. During the post-exercise critique, the licensee adequately evaluated
a. Inspection Scope
   its emergency response and management capability.
  The inspectors reviewed the licensee's annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for
  The licensees fire protection program was assessed through reviews of periodic fire drill
2012 and 2013.  The inspectors also reviewed semi-annual radiological survey results 
  records and applicable fire protection program documents. The scenarios were
13  performed by the licensee in 2013 and 2014. This review evaluated whether the licensee complied with the off-site dose requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 72.104.
  reviewed to determine whether they were realistic and met drill objectives. The
 
  inspectors did not identify any un-analyzed combustibles stored or located within the
b. Observations and Findings
  ISFSI.
  The licensee performed environmental radiological monitoring as required for the ISFSI. The survey results indicated that the licensee was well under the limits of
  Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan
10 CFR 72.104.  These results were verified by the inspectors performing independent
  10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level
radiation surveys of the ISFSI
  scheme is used by the nuclear facility.
No findings of significance were identified.  
  The inspectors reviewed EPP-20.01, ISFSI Emergency Conditions, Revision 3. The
c. Conclusion
  procedure defines conditions that constitute an emergency at the ISFSI and provides
  The licensee established and maintained its environmental monitoring program in accordance with applicable 10 CFR Part 20, 50, and 72 regulations, the License, and
  guidance for determining when emergency conditions at the ISFSI should be classified
 
  as an ALERT which would require activation of the Emergency Plan and implementation
TS.    
  of Emergency Plan Procedures. Within the procedures an emergency is classified
1.5 Quality Assurance
  based on specific information contained in Attachment 1, ISFSI Emergency Events.
 
  Specifically, Attachment 1 provides both quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring
a. Inspection Scope
  declaration of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded Cask
 
  Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert
The inspectors verified through document reviews and conduct of interviews whether
  when any one of the following qualitative conditions are observed: A VCC has moved
changes were appropriately controlled and done in accordance with QA requirements.
  out of its normal position on the ISFSI Pad, or VCC damage to the top or sides of cask
Corrective action reports from 2013 and 2014 were reviewed to determine whether the licensee effectively identified, resolved, and prevented problems.  Additionally, the inspectors reviewed safety review committee and operations review committee
  with concrete debris found nearby, or tornado driven missile has impacted a VCC, or a
documents to assess the onsite safety culture and whether issues were being identified
  VCC has tipped over on the ISFSI Pad or has fallen off the ISFSI Pad, or 50% of VCC
and addressed. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of financial assurance
  inlets and outlets are blocked. Additionally Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert
documentation that is required to be submitted to the NRC.  
  when any one of the following quantitative conditions are observed: >500R/hr before
b. Observations and Findings
  reaching the Isolation Zone Fence, or Measured dose rate at the Isolation Zone Fence
 
                                              8
The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during 2012, 2013, and  
2014.  A review of CRs written during 2012, 2013, and 2014 indicated that the licensee
was effectively identifying and correcting facility issues. Safety review committee and operations review committee meetings were conducted at regular intervals since the previous inspection and issues were being addressed through the Corrective Action
 
Program (CAP).  
 
Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
Federal Register Notice 76FR35512, dated June 17, 2011, included a new rulemaking requirement that affected Part 72 licensees. The Federal Register documented a
 
change to 72.30(b) which required Part 72 licensees to submit to the NRC for review and  
approval an ISFSI decommissioning funding plan.  The final rule made changes to the financial assurance requirements for Part 72 licensees to provide greater consistency with similar decommissioning requirements in the 10 CFR Part 50 regulations.  Financial
assurances are financial arrangements provided by the licensee to ensure funds for 
14  decommissioning will be available when needed. The effective date of the new rule was December 17, 2012. The new rule required licensees to submit a decommissioning funding plan to the NRC by the effective date of the rule. Contrary to this, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan until March 23, 2013.  
10 CFR 72.30(b), Financial Assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning," states
that, "Each holder of- of a license under this part must submit for NRC review and
approval a decommissioning funding plan-"
 
Contrary to the above, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding
plan by December 17, 2012.
 
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensee's corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 07200046/2014001-06; 05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan) 
The licensee submitted the ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Report on March 23, 2013.  (NCV 07200046/2014001-06; 05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit
Decommissioning Funding Plan)
c. Conclusion
  The licensee implemented its CAP in accordance with the applicable regulations and site QA requirements.  Through the CAP, issues were effectively identified and corrected by the licensee.  A violation of very low safety significance was identified for the licensee's
failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by
 
10 CFR 72.30(b).
   
2.0 Exit Meeting
The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Peters and other members of  
your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on December 18, 2014, and during a
teleconference on February 24, 2015. The licensee acknowledged the results presented
and did not identify any of the potential report input as proprietary in nature.
 
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED
*L. Peters, Genoa Manager *D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
*J. Henkelman, Quality Assurance Specialist
*R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor *E. Martin, QA Manager *W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
*M. Mo, Security Manager
 
* Persons present at the exit meeting on February 24, 2015
INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED
60858 Away From Reactor ISFSI Inspection Guidance
ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened  07200046/2014001-01;
05000409/2014008-01
AV Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements 
 
07200046/2014001-02;
 
05000409/2014008-02
AV Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Without NRC Approval
07200046/2014001-03;
 
05000409/2014008-03
 
AV Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
Emergency Plan
 
07200046/2014001-04;
 
05000409/2014008-04
NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan 
07200046/2014001-05;
 
05000409/2014008-05


  NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with  
exceeds the tag value in EPP-20.04 or  40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, or  50 mRem/hr
Emergency Plan  
on top of VCC, or  200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and
outlets of VCC.
The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Table 4.1 ISFSI Emergency
Events, and identified that the Emergency Plan only contained quantitative criteria
requiring declarations of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Table 4.1 requires declaration of an Alert
when any one of the following quantitative (measured) conditions are identified:
  40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, OR  50 mRem/hr on top of VCC, OR  200 mRem/hr
average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.
The inspectors determined that the licensees implementing procedures and associated
emergency action level scheme were not in alignment with the licensees Emergency
Plan emergency action level scheme. Specifically, the implementing procedures
contained qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert that are not
contained within the Emergency Plan. The inspectors noted that while most of the
qualitative criteria was indicative of a potential event at the ISFSI which could lead to the
quantitative criteria being exceeded, there was potential for an over classification of an
event. For example, during a heavy snow fall, the lower vents of the VCC could be
blocked by snow, which would require declaration of an Alert according to the licensees
implementing procedures. In contrast the licensees design basis evaluation
demonstrates that the lower vents can be blocked for an indefinite amount of time
without any safety impact or associated increase in dose rate.
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an emergency classification
system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency
classification system within their Emergency Plan, and therefore this was a violation of
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under
CAR 2014-022 and initiated actions for revision of the procedure.
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have an
emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to
the emergency classification system within their Emergency Plan was a violation of more
than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples
of Minor Issues, example 4h.
The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency
Preparedness Significance Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC
Enforcement Policy to make a significance determination. The inspectors determined
that requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classification System is a
Planning Standard. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the
Green Finding example in IMC 0609 Table 5.4-1, The EAL classification process would
result in an over-classification causing an unnecessary emergency declaration.
Specifically, the licensees implementing procedures contained additional qualitative
criteria that would require declaration of an Alert for a Potential Damage to Loaded
Cask Confinement Boundary when not required by the emergency plan.
                                          9


07200046/2014001-06;
The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning
05000409/2014008-06
Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan  
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any
   
regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the
2 Closed  07200046/2014001-04;  
effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the
05000409/2014008-04  
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation.
10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level
scheme is used by the nuclear facility.
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to utilize a standard
classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing
procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
Plan.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-04; 05000409/2014008-04; Emergency Plan Implementing
Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan)
Staff Augmentation Capability not in accordance with Emergency Plan
10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and
maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in
appendix E of this part...
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Section 3.3, ISFSI Event Response
Surveillance states: A Response Surveillance is required following off-normal, accident
or natural phenomena events. The NAC-MPC Systems in use at an ISFSI shall be
inspected within 4 hours after the occurrence of an off-normal, accident or natural
phenomena event in the area of the ISFSI. Following a natural phenomena event, the
ISFSI shall be inspected to determine if movement or damage to the CONCRETE
CASKS has resulted in unacceptable site boundary dose rates."
Through interviews with licensee staff, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to
have a staffing augmentation program in place to ensure that the actions specified in
Emergency Plan Section 3.3 could be met. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the
licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological protection
staff could respond to the site within 4 hours of an event to adequately characterize the
site boundary dose rates.
                                          10


NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in Accordance with Emergency Plan
The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an adequate program in place
to ensure augmentation of response capabilities is available to ensure Emergency Plan
actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under
CAR 2014-025 and initiated actions to implement a staffing augmentation program.
The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted
screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have a staffing
mechanism in place to ensure emergency plan compliance was a violation of more than
minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of
Minor Issues, example 4h.
The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance
Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to risk inform the
significance determination. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to
the Degraded Planning Standard Function example in IMC 0609 Table 5.2-1, Staffing
processes would permit a shift to go below Emergency Plan minimum staffing
requirements, but there were no actual instances in which such shortage occurred.
Specifically, the licensees staffing program could not ensure response capabilities were
available to timely implement Emergency Plan actions; however, there were no actual
instances of emergencies where this occurred.
The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning
Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to
Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any
regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the
effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the
violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation of
10 CFR 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency
response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident
response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of
response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response
activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.
Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to ensure timely
augmentation of response capabilities is available. Specifically, the inspectors identified
that the licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological
protection staff could respond to the site within 4 hours of an event to adequately
characterize the site boundary dose rates.
Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 07200046/2014001-05; 05000409/2014008-05; Staff Augmentation Capability not
in accordance with Emergency Plan)
                                          11


07200046/2014001-05;
    c. Conclusion
      The inspectors identified two severity level IV violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the
      licensee's failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing
      procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency
      Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and failed to have adequate staffing
      programs to ensure compliance with requirements contained within the Emergency Plan
      and therefore this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).
      The licensee demonstrated the ability to conduct an emergency exercise and assess
      their performance during a formal critique. Fire protection requirements were met
      regarding the conduct of drills and controlling combustibles in and around the ISFSI.
1.3    Surveillance and Maintenance
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees surveillance and maintenance program
      associated with dry fuel storage to verify compliance with the applicable regulations, the
      License, and TS. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad, observed daily
      surveillance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed select documents. The
      inspectors reviewed several records of daily temperature checks and radiological
      surveys performed since the last NRC inspection.
    b. Observations and Findings
      The inspectors conducted a walk down of the ISFSI pad and observed qualified
      licensee staff perform daily surveillances of the casks including temperature
      monitoring and inlet and outlet vent screen checks to ensure they were free of
      significant blockage or damage. The inspectors also evaluated the general condition
      of the ISFSI pad. The inspectors noted that temperature logs indicated that the
      casks operated as designed with no abnormalities. The inspectors found that the
      licensee performed and documented the surveillance activities as required by TS and
      site procedures. In addition, the inspectors performed independent radiation surveys
      of the casks, and general ISFSI area. The results were bounded by the radiological
      postings and consistent with the licensee's radiological surveys.
      No findings of significance were identified.
    c. Conclusion
      The licensee implemented its surveillance and maintenance program in accordance with
      applicable regulations, the License, and TS.
1.4    Environmental Monitoring
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors reviewed the licensees annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for
      2012 and 2013. The inspectors also reviewed semi-annual radiological survey results
                                                12


05000409/2014008-05
      performed by the licensee in 2013 and 2014. This review evaluated whether the
      licensee complied with the off-site dose requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 72.104.
    b. Observations and Findings
      The licensee performed environmental radiological monitoring as required for the ISFSI.
      The survey results indicated that the licensee was well under the limits of
      10 CFR 72.104. These results were verified by the inspectors performing independent
      radiation surveys of the ISFSI
      No findings of significance were identified.
    c. Conclusion
      The licensee established and maintained its environmental monitoring program in
      accordance with applicable 10 CFR Part 20, 50, and 72 regulations, the License, and
      TS.
1.5    Quality Assurance
    a. Inspection Scope
      The inspectors verified through document reviews and conduct of interviews whether
      changes were appropriately controlled and done in accordance with QA requirements.
      Corrective action reports from 2013 and 2014 were reviewed to determine whether the
      licensee effectively identified, resolved, and prevented problems. Additionally, the
      inspectors reviewed safety review committee and operations review committee
      documents to assess the onsite safety culture and whether issues were being identified
      and addressed. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of financial assurance
      documentation that is required to be submitted to the NRC.
    b. Observations and Findings
      The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during 2012, 2013, and
      2014. A review of CRs written during 2012, 2013, and 2014 indicated that the licensee
      was effectively identifying and correcting facility issues. Safety review committee and
      operations review committee meetings were conducted at regular intervals since the
      previous inspection and issues were being addressed through the Corrective Action
      Program (CAP).
      Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
      Federal Register Notice 76FR35512, dated June 17, 2011, included a new rulemaking
      requirement that affected Part 72 licensees. The Federal Register documented a
      change to 72.30(b) which required Part 72 licensees to submit to the NRC for review and
      approval an ISFSI decommissioning funding plan. The final rule made changes to the
      financial assurance requirements for Part 72 licensees to provide greater consistency
      with similar decommissioning requirements in the 10 CFR Part 50 regulations. Financial
      assurances are financial arrangements provided by the licensee to ensure funds for
                                                  13


NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with
      decommissioning will be available when needed. The effective date of the new rule was
Emergency Plan
      December 17, 2012. The new rule required licensees to submit a decommissioning
      funding plan to the NRC by the effective date of the rule. Contrary to this, LACBWR had
      not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan until March 23, 2013.
      10 CFR 72.30(b), Financial Assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning, states
      that, Each holder of of a license under this part must submit for NRC review and
      approval a decommissioning funding plan
      Contrary to the above, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding
      plan by December 17, 2012.
      Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was
      entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a
      NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
      (NCV 07200046/2014001-06; 05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit Decommissioning
      Funding Plan)
      The licensee submitted the ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Report on March 23, 2013.
      (NCV 07200046/2014001-06; 05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit
      Decommissioning Funding Plan)
    c. Conclusion
      The licensee implemented its CAP in accordance with the applicable regulations and site
      QA requirements. Through the CAP, issues were effectively identified and corrected by
      the licensee. A violation of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees
      failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by
      10 CFR 72.30(b).
2.0    Exit Meeting
      The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Peters and other members of
      your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on December 18, 2014, and during a
      teleconference on February 24, 2015. The licensee acknowledged the results presented
      and did not identify any of the potential report input as proprietary in nature.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                                  14


07200046/2014001-06;
                                SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
05000409/2014008-06 NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
                          PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED
 
*L. Peters, Genoa Manager
3  LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
*D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System ADR  Alternate Dispute Resolution
*J. Henkelman, Quality Assurance Specialist
AV  Apparent Violation
*R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
CAP  Corrective Action Program
*E. Martin, QA Manager
CAR  Corrective Action Report
*W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations CoC  Certificate of Compliance DNMS  Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
*M. Mo, Security Manager
EA  Enforcement Action
* Persons present at the exit meeting on February 24, 2015
EAL  Emergency Action Level
                              INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED
FESW  Fuel Element Storage Well ICR  Institute of Conflict Resolution IMC  Inspection Manual Chapter
60858                Away From Reactor ISFSI Inspection Guidance
IR  Inspection Report
                        ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
Opened
LACBWR La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor NRC  United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PEC  Predecisional Enforcement Conference
07200046/2014001-01;        AV    Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing
TS  Technical Specification
05000409/2014008-01                Requirements
VCC  Vertical Concrete Cask 
07200046/2014001-02;        AV    Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Without
4  LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
05000409/2014008-02                NRC Approval
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
07200046/2014001-03;        AV    Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
05000409/2014008-03                Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-04;        NCV    Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in
05000409/2014008-04                accordance with Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-05;        NCV    Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with
05000409/2014008-05                Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-06;        NCV    Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
05000409/2014008-06
                                                                                    Attachment


effort.  Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
Closed
07200046/2014001-04; NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in
05000409/2014008-04      Accordance with Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-05; NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with
05000409/2014008-05      Emergency Plan
07200046/2014001-06; NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan
05000409/2014008-06
                                    2


  10 CFR 72.212 Report; Revision 4 2014 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Package
                            LIST OF ACRONYMS USED
72.48-OP-99-5.01; ISFSI VCC heat Removal Monitoring System; Revision 0
ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
72.48-RE-13-01; revise ISFSI Fire Protection Procedures; Revision 0
ADR    Alternate Dispute Resolution
72.48-RE-2013-05; ACP-12.03, ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System; Revision 0 ACP-02.13; Operations Safety Review Committee; Revision 20 ACP-02.14; Safety Review Committee; Revision 18
AV    Apparent Violation
ACP-07.06; 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
CAP    Corrective Action Program
ACP-12.03; ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System Monitoring; Revision 1
CAR    Corrective Action Report
ACP-16.0; Corrective Action Program; Revision 24 CAR 2013-004; Emergency Plan Submittal to USNRC; dated January 24, 2013 CAR 2013-005; EAL Responses at ISFSI; dated January 24, 2013
CFR   Code of Federal Regulations
CAR 2013-007; ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Plan; dated February 25, 2013
CoC    Certificate of Compliance
CAR 2013-021; Emergency Plan Exercise; dated November 20, 2013
DNMS  Division of Nuclear Materials Safety
CAR 2013-022; Emergency Plan Audit Issues; dated December 27, 2013
EA    Enforcement Action
CAR 2014-022; Action Level is not Consistent for EPP Declaration; dated December 18, 2014 CAR 2014-023; EAL Entry Basis not Clear; dated December 18, 2014 CAR 2014-024; Subjective Deactivation Criteria; dated December 18, 2014
EAL    Emergency Action Level
CAR 2014-025; Process or Program to Ensure 4 hours RPT Response Time; dated
FESW  Fuel Element Storage Well
ICR    Institute of Conflict Resolution
IMC    Inspection Manual Chapter
IR    Inspection Report
ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation
LACBWR La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor
NRC    United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PEC    Predecisional Enforcement Conference
TS    Technical Specification
VCC    Vertical Concrete Cask
                                        3


  December 18, 2014  
                                  LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
CAR 2014-026; SRC Membership did not Include Off-Site Individual; dated December 18, 2014 Decommissioning Funding Plan for ISFSI; March 12, 2013 Emergency Exercise and Drill Records; 2011-2012  
The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list
does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that
selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection
effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or
any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.
10 CFR 72.212 Report; Revision 4
2014 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Package
72.48-OP-99-5.01; ISFSI VCC heat Removal Monitoring System; Revision 0
72.48-RE-13-01; revise ISFSI Fire Protection Procedures; Revision 0
72.48-RE-2013-05; ACP-12.03, ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System; Revision 0
ACP-02.13; Operations Safety Review Committee; Revision 20
ACP-02.14; Safety Review Committee; Revision 18
ACP-07.06; 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations
ACP-12.03; ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System Monitoring; Revision 1
ACP-16.0; Corrective Action Program; Revision 24
CAR 2013-004; Emergency Plan Submittal to USNRC; dated January 24, 2013
CAR 2013-005; EAL Responses at ISFSI; dated January 24, 2013
CAR 2013-007; ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Plan; dated February 25, 2013
CAR 2013-021; Emergency Plan Exercise; dated November 20, 2013
CAR 2013-022; Emergency Plan Audit Issues; dated December 27, 2013
CAR 2014-022; Action Level is not Consistent for EPP Declaration; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-023; EAL Entry Basis not Clear; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-024; Subjective Deactivation Criteria; dated December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-025; Process or Program to Ensure 4 hours RPT Response Time; dated
December 18, 2014
CAR 2014-026; SRC Membership did not Include Off-Site Individual; dated December 18, 2014
Decommissioning Funding Plan for ISFSI; March 12, 2013
Emergency Exercise and Drill Records; 2011-2012
Environmental Dosimetry Data; 2013-2014
EPP-20.01; ISFSI Emergency Conditions; Revision 3
EPP-20.02; ISFSI Organization and Operations during Emergencies; Revision 4
EPP-20.03; ISFSI Communications Systems; Revision 3A
EPP-20.04; ISFSI Emergency Dose Rate Assessment and Survey; Revision 2A
EPP-20.06; ISFSI Emergency Radiation Monitoring; Revision 3
Fire Protection Training and Drill Records; 2012-2014
FPP-20.04; ISFSI Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 3
HSP-20.06; Radiation Surveys; Revision 33
ISFSI Emergency Preparedness Training Slides
ISFSI Fire Protection Training Slides
ISFSI Outer Isolation Zone Fence Surveys; 2013-2014
ISFSI Quality Assurance Training Slides
LACBWR Emergency Plan; Revision 31
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 32
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 33
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 34
                                                    4


Environmental Dosimetry Data; 2013-2014
LACBWR Possession Only License; Amendment 72
EPP-20.01; ISFSI Emergency Conditions; Revision 3
Operations Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014
EPP-20.02; ISFSI Organization and Operations during Emergencies; Revision 4
Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 27
EPP-20.03; ISFSI Communications Systems; Revision 3A EPP-20.04; ISFSI Emergency Dose Rate Assessment and Survey; Revision 2A EPP-20.06; ISFSI Emergency Radiation Monitoring; Revision 3
Radiation Protection Orientation Slides
Fire Protection Training and Drill Records; 2012-2014
Retrievability Strategy
FPP-20.04; ISFSI Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 3
Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014
HSP-20.06; Radiation Surveys; Revision 33 ISFSI Emergency Preparedness Training Slides ISFSI Fire Protection Training Slides
TPP-08; Fire Protection Training Procedure; Revision 14
ISFSI Outer Isolation Zone Fence Surveys; 2013-2014
TPP-20; ISFSI General Employee Training; Revision 0
ISFSI Quality Assurance Training Slides
VCC Dose Surveys; 2013-2014
LACBWR Emergency Plan; Revision 31
                                              5
LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 32 LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 33 LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 34
5  LACBWR Possession Only License; Amendment 72 Operations Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014 Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 27 Radiation Protection Orientation Slides  
Retrievability Strategy  
Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014  
TPP-08; Fire Protection Training Procedure; Revision 14  
TPP-20; ISFSI General Employee Training; Revision 0 VCC Dose Surveys; 2013-2014
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 14:51, 31 October 2019

IR 07200046/2014001 & 05000409/2014008; 12/15-18/2014; Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-NRC Inspection Report
ML15085A562
Person / Time
Site: La Crosse  File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date: 03/26/2015
From: Julio Lara
Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
To: Nick B
Dairyland Power Cooperative
References
EA-15-026 IR 2014001, IR 2014008
Download: ML15085A562 (24)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000409/2014008

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

March 26, 2015

EA-15-026

Ms. Barbara A. Nick

President and CEO

Dairyland Power Cooperative

3200 East Avenue S.

P.O. Box 817

La Crosse, WI 54602-0817

SUBJECT: LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL

STORAGE INSTALLATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT

07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

Dear Ms. Nick:

On December 15, 2014 through December 18, 2014, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facility in Genoa,

Wisconsin, with continued in-office review through February 24, 2015. The purpose of the

inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that activities

were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection results were

discussed with members of your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on

December 18, 2014, and during a telephone discussion with members of your staff on

February 24, 2015. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.

During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license related

to public health and safety. Additionally, the staff examined your compliance with the

Commissions rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these

areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative

records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent violations of NRC requirements were

identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the

NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations

involved the failure to ensure emergency response staffing levels satisfied the La Crosse

Emergency Plan as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(2),

failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for

review prior to implementation as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), and failure to conduct

emergency drills and exercises at the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan as

required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).

B. Nick -2-

Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, the NRC is not issuing an

enforcement action for these inspection findings at this time. The circumstances surrounding

these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective

corrective action were discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on

February 24, 2015.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:

(1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within

30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or

(3) request Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public

observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the

conference. Please contact Wayne Slawinski at 630-829-9820 within ten days of the date of

this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. A PEC should be held within

30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the

Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 07200046/2014001(DNMS) and

05000409/2014008(DNMS); EA-15-026, and should include, for the apparent violations:

(1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent

violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the

corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full

compliance was or will be achieved. In presenting your corrective actions, be aware that the

promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil

penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, Suggested

Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action, may be useful in

preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/in96028.html. Your

response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence

adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within

the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will

proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your

perspective on the apparent violations and any other information that you believe the NRC

should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a

pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that

violations have occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be

conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The

topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine

whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information

related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken

or planned to be taken.

B. Nick -3-

In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an

attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for

resolving conflicts using a third party neutral. The technique that the NRC has decided to

employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the

mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR,

they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no

power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up

misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the

issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict

Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral

third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you

are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in

the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be

advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In addition to the apparent violations for which escalated enforcement action is being

considered, the NRC determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements

occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The

violations involved the failure to: submit an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b); have an adequate

program in place to ensure augmentation of emergency response capabilities was available to

implement Emergency Plan actions required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2); and have an emergency

classification system within implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency

classification system within the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). These

violations are being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRCs Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not

include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made

publicly available without redaction.

B. Nick -4-

Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this

inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Julio F. Lara, Acting Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409

License No. DPR-45

Enclosure:

IR Nos. 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President

L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager

D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor

W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer

R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson

J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission

S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition

G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa

P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,

Wisconsin Department of Health Services

B. Nick -4-

Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this

inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Julio F. Lara, Acting Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409

License No. DPR-45

Enclosure:

IR Nos.: 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President

L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager

D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor

W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer

R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson

J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission

S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition

G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa

P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,

Wisconsin Department of Health Services

DISTRIBUTION w/encl: Jim Clay

Darrell Roberts Carmen Olteanu

Marlayna Vaaler Carol Ariano

Patrick Louden Paul Pelke

MCID Branch

ADAMS Accession Number:

DOCUMENT NAME: LACBWR 2014001.docx

Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" =

Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE RIII-DNMS C RIII-DNMS RIII-EICS RIII-DNMS

NAME MLearn:ps ML WJS ROrlikowksi WJS for RSkokowski RS *1 JLara

for

DATE 3/20/2015 3/20/2015 3/26/2015 3/26/2015

  • 1 - OE, NMSS & NSIR reviewed and concurred via e-mail from C. Faria on 3/26/2015

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No.: 072-00046; 050-00409

License No.: DPR-45, General License (ISFSI)

Report No.: IR 07200046/2014001(DNMS)

IR 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

Licensee: Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)

Facility: La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (ISFSI)

Location: Genoa, WI

Dates: On-site Inspection: December 15-18, 2014

Telephone Exit Meeting: February 24, 2015

Inspectors: Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer

Wayne J. Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist

Approved by: Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief

Materials Control, ISFSI, and

Decommissioning Branch

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR

NRC INSPECTION REPORT

07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

A routine inspection of licensed activities associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel at the

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)

was conducted from December 15 through December 18, 2014 including in office review

through February 24, 2015 The inspection consisted of interviews of site personnel, onsite

walkdowns, and reviews of: emergency preparedness and fire protection; surveillance and

maintenance activities; environmental monitoring; and quality assurance activities related to the

ISFSI.

The inspectors identified three apparent violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) section 50.54(q) concerning the licensees: failure to ensure emergency response staffing

levels as required by the La Crosse Emergency Plan, failure to submit changes to the

Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) for review prior to implementation, and failure to conduct emergency drills and exercises

in accordance with the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan.

The inspectors also identified three Severity Level IV non-cited violations concerning the

licensees: failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by

10 CFR 72.30(b), failure to have an adequate program in place for emergency staff

augmentation to ensure Emergency Plan actions could be accomplished as required by

10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and failure to have an emergency classification system within their

implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system of the

Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

2

Report Details

1.0 Away from Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (IP 60858)

1.1 Review of Emergency Plan Program from ISFSI Activation until Emergency Plan

Revision 34 Issuance (Revisions 31-33)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees compliance with the Emergency Plan and

associated Emergency Planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and 72. The

inspectors reviewed staffing changes following fuel movement to the independent spent

fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors reviewed changes to the

Emergency Plan Revision 31. The inspectors reviewed adherence to Emergency Plan

requirements for exercises and drills.

b. Observations and Findings

Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements

On June 20, 2011, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Emergency Plan

was updated to Revision 31. The revision to the LACBWR Emergency Plan added

provisions for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) that had not yet

been loaded with casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The previous revision of the

Emergency Plan (Revision 30) had solely focused on the non-operating reactor plant

and associated spent nuclear fuel that had been contained within the fuel element

storage well.

On July 12, 2012, the licensee moved their first Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) to the

ISFSI pad. Between June and September 2012, the licensee successfully loaded all fuel

assemblies into dry casks and transferred each of those casks to the ISFSI onsite

storage pad. The fifth and final cask was successfully placed on the pad on

September 19, 2012.

Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow

and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section 1.1 Plant Emergency Response

Organization provided the authority and responsibility for Emergency Plan activation to

the Operations Shift Supervisor. Section 1.1 defined minimum emergency plan staffing

as an Operations Shift Supervisor, an Operator, a Security Shift Supervisor, and the

security force. Additionally, the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section A.1.3.8,

Augmented ISFSI Emergency Response Organization, states that On-shift ISFSI

personnel can implement the Emergency Plan without assistance from others.

The licensee maintained continuous operations staff coverage including an Operations

Supervisor and an Operator onsite while fuel was maintained in the Fuel Element

Storage Well (FESW) throughout the spent fuel assembly storage campaign which

culminated on September 19, 2012.

3

On September 20, 2012, the operations department staffing was reduced at the site

without a corresponding change to the Emergency Plan. Specifically, the operations

department was not staffed during backshifts and weekends as required by Emergency

Plan Section 1.1. Moreover, radiation protection technician staffing was not maintained

during backshifts, weekends and whenever radiological work did not occur at the plant.

As a result, backshift and weekend staffing was limited to site security personnel.

The operations personnel were trained to perform radiological surveys whenever health

physics staff were not onsite and consequently provided the emergency plan required

assessment capability while onsite. In contrast, the security staff had not been trained to

conduct radiation surveys. As a result of the staffing changes, radiological assessment

capability was limited only to weekday day shifts. Therefore, radiological assessment

capability required by the Emergency Plan was diminished because radiological survey

qualified staff were not continuously onsite. Consequently, during backshift and

weekends the licensee's ability to assess radiological conditions, evaluate emergency

preparedness event entry criteria (action level thresholds) and declare timely EALs was

degraded. Given their staffing changes, the licensee was unable to implement the

Emergency Plan without offsite assistance from others as required by Emergency Plan

Section A.1.3.8.

Following discussions with NRC staff on October 26, 2012, continuous operations

staffing was reinstated at the site. However, on October 29, 2012, the licensee

implemented Revision 32 to the Emergency Plan following an inadequate effectiveness

review by both the onsite and offsite safety review committees, at which time continuous

operations staff coverage was again terminated for backshifts and weekends. During

the October 26 - 29 transitional period between Revisions 31 and 32, the licensee

trained and qualified its security staff in basic radiological assessment capabilities

related to ISFSI operations, as the revised emergency plan delegated certain emergency

response functions to the Security Shift Supervisor when other qualified staff was not

onsite. The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program under

CAR 2013-005.

An AV was identified, from September 20 until October 26, 2012, for the failure to

maintain staffing at minimum levels prescribed by the LACBWR Emergency Plan

Revision 31, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to

follow Emergency Plan Section 1.1 and Section A.1.3.8 which specifies minimum

staffing requirements to ensure the Emergency Plan may be implemented without offsite

assistance.

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-01;05000409/2014008-01; Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements)

Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC Approval

10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(3) states that, the licensee may make changes to its emergency

plan without NRC approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis

demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.

4

10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(4) further states that, the changes to a licensee emergency plan

that reduce the effectiveness of the plan may not be implemented without prior

approval by the NRC. A reduction in effectiveness means a change in the emergency

plan that reduces the capability to perform an emergency planning function which

includes assessment capability.

On October 29, 2012, the licensee made changes to their Emergency Plan through

issuance of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 32. The LACBWR Emergency

Plan, Revision 31 established requirements for emergency response to ISFSI events

while maintaining emergency response to non-operating reactor plant events. The

licensee revised the plan to reduce the emergency response requirements for the

LACBWR plant following movement of all irradiated fuel from the plant facility to the

onsite ISFSI.

Specifically, among other changes, the revised Emergency Plan removed twelve plant

related events and retained three ISFSI related events. Additionally, the revision

eliminated the Alert classification, reduced the frequency of emergency exercises from

annually to biennially, and eliminated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> staff augmentations requirements. The

licensee evaluated the change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the

requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and determined that the changes did not

decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

During the NRC review of Revision 32, NRC staff identified that the changes made in

Revision 32 reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, as defined

by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee eliminated plant EAL events related to radiological

releases including effluent releases because they reasoned that spent fuel was removed

from the plant and therefore the radiological source term that remained at the plant could

not create a significant consequence to the public. The licensee acknowledged in their

evaluation that, although the spent fuel was moved to the ISFSI, a potential for adverse

radiological conditions during plant decommissioning and dismantlement activities

existed. Since there were ongoing decommissioning and dismantlement operations

periodically conducted in the plant and liquid collection systems and the plant ventilation

systems remained in operation, the NRC determined that releases of radioactive

materials were possible. Therefore, the removal of these event types equated to a

reduction in effectiveness which required NRC approval.

The NRC staff also identified that an adequate technical evaluation or basis was not

provided by the licensee to eliminate the Alert classification, reduce exercise

frequencies, and reduce staffing augmentation times.

NRC staff identified that the licensee removed reactor plant related requirements from its

Emergency Plan although decommissioning was not complete and licensed radioactive

material was present in the plant.

The NRC communicated to the licensee in telephone conversations on

December 19, 2012, and January 24, 2013, that Revision 32 of the Emergency Plan

reduced its effectiveness and that the changes made by the licensee to the plan were

not consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee documented

the issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-004 on January 24, 2013.

5

As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed a quantitative analysis of the

dispersion of the remaining LACBWR plant nuclide inventory in order to justify the

changes made in Revision 32. Following the completion of the analysis, the licensee

submitted Revision 33 of the Emergency Plan for NRC approval on August 6, 2013. On

April 14, 2014, Revision 34 was submitted for approval in response to NRCs inquiry

about the elimination of the Alert classification. NRC staff found that the licensee had

not justified removal of the Alert classification in Revision 32 and 33. Revision 34 was

subsequently approved by the NRC on September 18, 2014.

During the period of December 19, 2012 through September 18, 2014, the licensee

failed to implement corrective actions to regain compliance with Revision 31. Instead,

the licensee continued to implement Revision 32 even though it had not been approved

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The NRC discussed the need to restore

compliance with an acceptable Emergency Plan in telephone conversations with the

licensee on December 19, 2012, January 24, 2013, August 20, 2013, and

December 4, 2013. The licensee documented the issue in CAR 2013-004 dated

January 24, 2013, and CAR 2013-022 dated December 27, 2013, and initiated actions

for approval of the Emergency Plan by the NRC as discussed above. Actions were not

taken by the licensee in the interim nearly two year period between Revision 31 and

Revision 34 to fully restore compliance with Revision 31. The corrective actions were

closed following the submission of Revision 34 for NRC approval.

An AV was identified, because the license made changes to their emergency plan that

reduced the effectiveness of the plan and implemented these changes on

October 29, 2012, without prior approval by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 072000046/2014001-02;05000409/2014008-02; Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC

Approval)

Title 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Emergency Plans" - Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as

Required by the Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and

maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Section E.2.2.1, Plant Emergency Plan

Exercises, states that to ascertain the necessary level of familiarity with emergency

plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, plant exercises

will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and emergency capability of

the LACBWR/DPC. Additionally, Section E.2.3 Drills, states that A drill is a

supervised instruction aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular

operation. Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise. Drills will be evaluated as

described in Subsection 2.5 of this Section. The types and frequency of drills is as

follows: fire drills will be conducted annually medical emergency drills will be

conducted annually health physics drills will be conducted annually.

6

The inspectors identified that the licensee conducted a plant emergency exercise in

2010, however, failed to perform a plant emergency exercise in 2011, 2012, and 2013.

The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform fire drills in 2011 and

2012; a medical drill in 2013; and a valid health physics drill in 2012. The health physics

activity in 2012 credited as a drill was not a supervised instruction that tested, developed

and maintained skills because it did not involve radiological conditions that necessitated

an action, did require emergency plan implementation, and was not observed or

critiqued.

An AV was identified, in that between 2011 and 2013, the licensee failed to follow their

Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). Specifically, the licensee failed

to perform emergency exercises and drills in accordance with the LACBWR Emergency

Plan, Revision 31 Sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.3 respectively.

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-03;05000409/2014008-03; Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the

Emergency Plan)

The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program under CAR 2013-

002. Following the issuance of Revision 34 to emergency plan, the licensee was no

longer required by its plan to conduct plant (non-ISFSI) emergency exercises. The

licensee performed ISFSI facility related emergency exercises in 2012 and 2014, in

accordance with the Emergency Plan.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors identified three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's

failure to maintain Emergency Plan staffing, submit changes to the Emergency Plan that

reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation, and conduct

emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the

Emergency Plan.

1.2 Review of Emergency Plan Program since Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance

a. Inspection Scope

On September 18, 2014, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan,

Revision 34. The revision removed all event types associated with the plant (Non-ISFSI)

and associated processes and programs supporting these event types. The licensee

revised their implementing procedures, processes, and programs following the approval

of Revision 34.

The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of the ISFSI biennial emergency

preparedness exercise. The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, implementing

procedures, and the exercise scenario with the exercise objectives and expected

sequence of events. The inspectors reviewed the proposed exercise scenario to

understand its scope and evaluate its adequacy to ensure the licensee could

demonstrate their emergency response capabilities. The inspectors observed the pre-

exercise briefing, the exercise, and the licensees formal post-exercise self-assessment.

7

Through document reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors also assessed the licensees

fire protection program for its effectiveness to support safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.

b. Observations and Findings

Review of 2014 ISFSI Emergency Exercise Performance

Section 8.3 of the LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan requires the licensee to perform a

biennial exercise to demonstrate emergency response capabilities and effectiveness of

the licensees Emergency Plan. The scenario for the December 16, 2014, exercise

involved a simulated tornado striking the ISFSI. Following an initiating event, the cask

was simulated to be damaged creating potential for a damaged confinement boundary.

The licensee implemented appropriate, timely, and necessary actions to address the

simulated event. The licensee correctly classified the event, made timely notifications,

augmented personnel onsite as needed, conducted adequate radiological monitoring,

and ensured the safety of personnel. Exercise participants maintained control

throughout the scenario, starting with a prompt recognition of the initiating event and

through recovery discussions. Throughout the exercise, the licensees staff

communicated well with all involved parties and demonstrated knowledge of the

Emergency Plan. During the post-exercise critique, the licensee adequately evaluated

its emergency response and management capability.

The licensees fire protection program was assessed through reviews of periodic fire drill

records and applicable fire protection program documents. The scenarios were

reviewed to determine whether they were realistic and met drill objectives. The

inspectors did not identify any un-analyzed combustibles stored or located within the

ISFSI.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level

scheme is used by the nuclear facility.

The inspectors reviewed EPP-20.01, ISFSI Emergency Conditions, Revision 3. The

procedure defines conditions that constitute an emergency at the ISFSI and provides

guidance for determining when emergency conditions at the ISFSI should be classified

as an ALERT which would require activation of the Emergency Plan and implementation

of Emergency Plan Procedures. Within the procedures an emergency is classified

based on specific information contained in Attachment 1, ISFSI Emergency Events.

Specifically, Attachment 1 provides both quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring

declaration of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded Cask

Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following qualitative conditions are observed: A VCC has moved

out of its normal position on the ISFSI Pad, or VCC damage to the top or sides of cask

with concrete debris found nearby, or tornado driven missile has impacted a VCC, or a

VCC has tipped over on the ISFSI Pad or has fallen off the ISFSI Pad, or 50% of VCC

inlets and outlets are blocked. Additionally Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following quantitative conditions are observed: >500R/hr before

reaching the Isolation Zone Fence, or Measured dose rate at the Isolation Zone Fence

8

exceeds the tag value in EPP-20.04 or 40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, or 50 mRem/hr

on top of VCC, or 200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and

outlets of VCC.

The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Table 4.1 ISFSI Emergency

Events, and identified that the Emergency Plan only contained quantitative criteria

requiring declarations of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded

Cask Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Table 4.1 requires declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following quantitative (measured) conditions are identified:

40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, OR 50 mRem/hr on top of VCC, OR 200 mRem/hr

average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.

The inspectors determined that the licensees implementing procedures and associated

emergency action level scheme were not in alignment with the licensees Emergency

Plan emergency action level scheme. Specifically, the implementing procedures

contained qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert that are not

contained within the Emergency Plan. The inspectors noted that while most of the

qualitative criteria was indicative of a potential event at the ISFSI which could lead to the

quantitative criteria being exceeded, there was potential for an over classification of an

event. For example, during a heavy snow fall, the lower vents of the VCC could be

blocked by snow, which would require declaration of an Alert according to the licensees

implementing procedures. In contrast the licensees design basis evaluation

demonstrates that the lower vents can be blocked for an indefinite amount of time

without any safety impact or associated increase in dose rate.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an emergency classification

system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency

classification system within their Emergency Plan, and therefore this was a violation of

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under

CAR 2014-022 and initiated actions for revision of the procedure.

The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted

screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have an

emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to

the emergency classification system within their Emergency Plan was a violation of more

than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples

of Minor Issues, example 4h.

The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency

Preparedness Significance Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC

Enforcement Policy to make a significance determination. The inspectors determined

that requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classification System is a

Planning Standard. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the

Green Finding example in IMC 0609 Table 5.4-1, The EAL classification process would

result in an over-classification causing an unnecessary emergency declaration.

Specifically, the licensees implementing procedures contained additional qualitative

criteria that would require declaration of an Alert for a Potential Damage to Loaded

Cask Confinement Boundary when not required by the emergency plan.

9

The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning

Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to

Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any

regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the

effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the

violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level

scheme is used by the nuclear facility.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to utilize a standard

classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the

licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing

procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency

Plan.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-04;05000409/2014008-04; Emergency Plan Implementing

Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan)

Staff Augmentation Capability not in accordance with Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and

maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency

response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident

response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response

activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Section 3.3, ISFSI Event Response

Surveillance states: A Response Surveillance is required following off-normal, accident

or natural phenomena events. The NAC-MPC Systems in use at an ISFSI shall be

inspected within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the occurrence of an off-normal, accident or natural

phenomena event in the area of the ISFSI. Following a natural phenomena event, the

ISFSI shall be inspected to determine if movement or damage to the CONCRETE

CASKS has resulted in unacceptable site boundary dose rates."

Through interviews with licensee staff, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to

have a staffing augmentation program in place to ensure that the actions specified in

Emergency Plan Section 3.3 could be met. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the

licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological protection

staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately characterize the

site boundary dose rates.

10

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an adequate program in place

to ensure augmentation of response capabilities is available to ensure Emergency Plan

actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under

CAR 2014-025 and initiated actions to implement a staffing augmentation program.

The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted

screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have a staffing

mechanism in place to ensure emergency plan compliance was a violation of more than

minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of

Minor Issues, example 4h.

The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance

Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to risk inform the

significance determination. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to

the Degraded Planning Standard Function example in IMC 0609 Table 5.2-1, Staffing

processes would permit a shift to go below Emergency Plan minimum staffing

requirements, but there were no actual instances in which such shortage occurred.

Specifically, the licensees staffing program could not ensure response capabilities were

available to timely implement Emergency Plan actions; however, there were no actual

instances of emergencies where this occurred.

The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning

Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to

Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any

regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the

effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the

violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation of

10 CFR 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency

response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident

response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response

activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to ensure timely

augmentation of response capabilities is available. Specifically, the inspectors identified

that the licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological

protection staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately

characterize the site boundary dose rates.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-05;05000409/2014008-05; Staff Augmentation Capability not

in accordance with Emergency Plan)

11

c. Conclusion

The inspectors identified two severity level IV violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the

licensee's failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing

procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency

Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and failed to have adequate staffing

programs to ensure compliance with requirements contained within the Emergency Plan

and therefore this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

The licensee demonstrated the ability to conduct an emergency exercise and assess

their performance during a formal critique. Fire protection requirements were met

regarding the conduct of drills and controlling combustibles in and around the ISFSI.

1.3 Surveillance and Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees surveillance and maintenance program

associated with dry fuel storage to verify compliance with the applicable regulations, the

License, and TS. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad, observed daily

surveillance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed select documents. The

inspectors reviewed several records of daily temperature checks and radiological

surveys performed since the last NRC inspection.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors conducted a walk down of the ISFSI pad and observed qualified

licensee staff perform daily surveillances of the casks including temperature

monitoring and inlet and outlet vent screen checks to ensure they were free of

significant blockage or damage. The inspectors also evaluated the general condition

of the ISFSI pad. The inspectors noted that temperature logs indicated that the

casks operated as designed with no abnormalities. The inspectors found that the

licensee performed and documented the surveillance activities as required by TS and

site procedures. In addition, the inspectors performed independent radiation surveys

of the casks, and general ISFSI area. The results were bounded by the radiological

postings and consistent with the licensee's radiological surveys.

No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The licensee implemented its surveillance and maintenance program in accordance with

applicable regulations, the License, and TS.

1.4 Environmental Monitoring

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for

2012 and 2013. The inspectors also reviewed semi-annual radiological survey results

12

performed by the licensee in 2013 and 2014. This review evaluated whether the

licensee complied with the off-site dose requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 72.104.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee performed environmental radiological monitoring as required for the ISFSI.

The survey results indicated that the licensee was well under the limits of

10 CFR 72.104. These results were verified by the inspectors performing independent

radiation surveys of the ISFSI

No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The licensee established and maintained its environmental monitoring program in

accordance with applicable 10 CFR Part 20, 50, and 72 regulations, the License, and

TS.

1.5 Quality Assurance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified through document reviews and conduct of interviews whether

changes were appropriately controlled and done in accordance with QA requirements.

Corrective action reports from 2013 and 2014 were reviewed to determine whether the

licensee effectively identified, resolved, and prevented problems. Additionally, the

inspectors reviewed safety review committee and operations review committee

documents to assess the onsite safety culture and whether issues were being identified

and addressed. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of financial assurance

documentation that is required to be submitted to the NRC.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during 2012, 2013, and

2014. A review of CRs written during 2012, 2013, and 2014 indicated that the licensee

was effectively identifying and correcting facility issues. Safety review committee and

operations review committee meetings were conducted at regular intervals since the

previous inspection and issues were being addressed through the Corrective Action

Program (CAP).

Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

Federal Register Notice 76FR35512, dated June 17, 2011, included a new rulemaking

requirement that affected Part 72 licensees. The Federal Register documented a

change to 72.30(b) which required Part 72 licensees to submit to the NRC for review and

approval an ISFSI decommissioning funding plan. The final rule made changes to the

financial assurance requirements for Part 72 licensees to provide greater consistency

with similar decommissioning requirements in the 10 CFR Part 50 regulations. Financial

assurances are financial arrangements provided by the licensee to ensure funds for

13

decommissioning will be available when needed. The effective date of the new rule was

December 17, 2012. The new rule required licensees to submit a decommissioning

funding plan to the NRC by the effective date of the rule. Contrary to this, LACBWR had

not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan until March 23, 2013.

10 CFR 72.30(b), Financial Assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning, states

that, Each holder of of a license under this part must submit for NRC review and

approval a decommissioning funding plan

Contrary to the above, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding

plan by December 17, 2012.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit Decommissioning

Funding Plan)

The licensee submitted the ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Report on March 23, 2013.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit

Decommissioning Funding Plan)

c. Conclusion

The licensee implemented its CAP in accordance with the applicable regulations and site

QA requirements. Through the CAP, issues were effectively identified and corrected by

the licensee. A violation of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees

failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by

10 CFR 72.30(b).

2.0 Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Peters and other members of

your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on December 18, 2014, and during a

teleconference on February 24, 2015. The licensee acknowledged the results presented

and did not identify any of the potential report input as proprietary in nature.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

14

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED

  • L. Peters, Genoa Manager
  • D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor
  • J. Henkelman, Quality Assurance Specialist
  • R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor
  • E. Martin, QA Manager
  • W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer
  • M. Mo, Security Manager
  • Persons present at the exit meeting on February 24, 2015

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

60858 Away From Reactor ISFSI Inspection Guidance

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

07200046/2014001-01; AV Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing

05000409/2014008-01 Requirements

07200046/2014001-02; AV Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Without

05000409/2014008-02 NRC Approval

07200046/2014001-03; AV Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the

05000409/2014008-03 Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-04; NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in

05000409/2014008-04 accordance with Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-05; NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with

05000409/2014008-05 Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-06; NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

05000409/2014008-06

Attachment

Closed

07200046/2014001-04; NCV Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in

05000409/2014008-04 Accordance with Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-05; NCV Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with

05000409/2014008-05 Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-06; NCV Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

05000409/2014008-06

2

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ADR Alternate Dispute Resolution

AV Apparent Violation

CAP Corrective Action Program

CAR Corrective Action Report

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

CoC Certificate of Compliance

DNMS Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

EA Enforcement Action

EAL Emergency Action Level

FESW Fuel Element Storage Well

ICR Institute of Conflict Resolution

IMC Inspection Manual Chapter

IR Inspection Report

ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LACBWR La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

NRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PEC Predecisional Enforcement Conference

TS Technical Specification

VCC Vertical Concrete Cask

3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

10 CFR 72.212 Report; Revision 4

2014 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Package

72.48-OP-99-5.01; ISFSI VCC heat Removal Monitoring System; Revision 0

72.48-RE-13-01; revise ISFSI Fire Protection Procedures; Revision 0

72.48-RE-2013-05; ACP-12.03, ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System; Revision 0

ACP-02.13; Operations Safety Review Committee; Revision 20

ACP-02.14; Safety Review Committee; Revision 18

ACP-07.06; 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

ACP-12.03; ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System Monitoring; Revision 1

ACP-16.0; Corrective Action Program; Revision 24

CAR 2013-004; Emergency Plan Submittal to USNRC; dated January 24, 2013

CAR 2013-005; EAL Responses at ISFSI; dated January 24, 2013

CAR 2013-007; ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Plan; dated February 25, 2013

CAR 2013-021; Emergency Plan Exercise; dated November 20, 2013

CAR 2013-022; Emergency Plan Audit Issues; dated December 27, 2013

CAR 2014-022; Action Level is not Consistent for EPP Declaration; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-023; EAL Entry Basis not Clear; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-024; Subjective Deactivation Criteria; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-025; Process or Program to Ensure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> RPT Response Time; dated

December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-026; SRC Membership did not Include Off-Site Individual; dated December 18, 2014

Decommissioning Funding Plan for ISFSI; March 12, 2013

Emergency Exercise and Drill Records; 2011-2012

Environmental Dosimetry Data; 2013-2014

EPP-20.01; ISFSI Emergency Conditions; Revision 3

EPP-20.02; ISFSI Organization and Operations during Emergencies; Revision 4

EPP-20.03; ISFSI Communications Systems; Revision 3A

EPP-20.04; ISFSI Emergency Dose Rate Assessment and Survey; Revision 2A

EPP-20.06; ISFSI Emergency Radiation Monitoring; Revision 3

Fire Protection Training and Drill Records; 2012-2014

FPP-20.04; ISFSI Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 3

HSP-20.06; Radiation Surveys; Revision 33

ISFSI Emergency Preparedness Training Slides

ISFSI Fire Protection Training Slides

ISFSI Outer Isolation Zone Fence Surveys; 2013-2014

ISFSI Quality Assurance Training Slides

LACBWR Emergency Plan; Revision 31

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 32

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 33

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 34

4

LACBWR Possession Only License; Amendment 72

Operations Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014

Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 27

Radiation Protection Orientation Slides

Retrievability Strategy

Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014

TPP-08; Fire Protection Training Procedure; Revision 14

TPP-20; ISFSI General Employee Training; Revision 0

VCC Dose Surveys; 2013-2014

5

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