ML18057A627

Proposed Tech Specs Incorporating Automatic Closure of Mfiv on Containment High Pressure or Steam Generator Low Pressure

ML18057A627
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	12/07/1990
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18057A625	List: ML18057A623 ML18057A627
References
NUDOCS 9012130037
Download: ML18057A627 (34)

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-ENCLOSURE 1 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 ---------------TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER. ISOLATION ', *' PROPOSED CHANGED PAGES Decefuber 7, 19QO' 3 Pages TABLE 3.16.l Engineered Safety Features Svstem Initiation Instrument Setting Limits : Functional Unit 1. High Containment Pressure 2. Pressurizer Low Pressure 3. Containment High Radiation

4. Low Steam Generator Pressure

• 5. SIRW Low-Level Switches 6. Engineered Safeguards Pump Room Vent -Radiation Monitors Channel Setting Limit a. Safety Injection 3.70 -4.40

b. Containment Spray c. Containment Isolation

d. Containment Air Cooler DBA Mode e. Main Feedwater Safety Injection Containment Isolation I I Psia 111 for Nominal Operating:

Pressures < 1900 Psia ' 1593 Psia 121 for Nominal Operating Pressures 1900 Psia s 20 R/h a. Steam Line Isolation > 500 Psia b. Main Feedwater i 500 Psia Pl Recirculation Actuation Engineered Safeguards Pump Room Isolation s Above _Tank Bottom s 2.2 x 10 6 CPM 111 May be bypassed below 1600 psia and is automatically reinstated above 1600 psia. 121 May be bypassed below 1700 psia and is automatically reinstated above 1700 psia. 131 May be bypassed below 550 psia and is automatically reinstated above 550 psia. 141 By closing both the main feedwater r.egul.ating valve and bypass valve. 3-75 TSPR9006 Amendment \ ** ,, e I Table 3.17.3 Instrument Operating Conditions for Isolation Functions Minimum Minimum Permissible Operable Degree of Bypass . No Functional Unit Channels Redundancy Conditions 1 Containment Isolation

a. Containment High 2 ca,c) 1 During Leak Test Pressure b. Containment High 2<c> 1 none Radiation

c. Manua 1 1 none none 2 Steam Line Isolation

a. Low Steam Gen 2/Steam<c>

1 Below 550* psia Pressure Gen b. Manual I/Steam none none Gen c. Containment High 2 ca,c) 1 During Leak Test Pressure 3. Main Feedwater Isolation<d>

a. Low Steam Generator 2/Steam<c>

1 Below 550 psia Pressure Gen b. Manual I/Steam None None Geri . c. Containment High 2 ca,c) 1 During Leak Test High Pressure (a) Right and left actuation circuits each have 2 channels. (b) Bypass automatically reinstated above 550 psia. (c) One of the inoperable channels must be in the tripped position. (d) By closing both main feedwater regulating valve and bypass valve. 3-80 Amendment No. TSPR9006 r;". TABLE 4.1.2 Minimum Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Engineered Safety Feature Instrumentation .controls (Contd) Channel Description

13. Safety Injection Tank Level and Pressure Instruments

14. Boric Acid Tank Level Switches 15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing System 16. Main Steam Isolation Valve Circuits 17. SIRW Tank Temperature Indication and* Alarms 18. Low-Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 19. Safety Injection Bottle Isolation Valves 20. Safety Injection Miniflow Valves CV-3027, 3056 21. Main Feedwater Isolation NOTES: Surveillance Function a. Check b. Ca 1 ibrate a. Test a. Check 1-a. Check b. Test 131 a. Check b. Ca 1 ibrate a. Check a. Check a. Check a. Check Freguenc)!

s R R D s R M R p p p R Surveillance Method a. *verify that level and pressure indication is between independent high high/low alanns for level and

b. Known pressure and different i a 1 pressure app 1 i ed to pressute and leve 1 sensors. I i a. Pump tank below low-level alann point to verify switch \operation.

a. Observe temperature recorders for proper readings.

a. Compare four independent pressure indications.

b. 'Signal to relay adjusted with test device to veri,fy MSIV circuit logic. ' a. 'compare independent temperature readouts.

b. Known resistance applied to indicating loop. a. Observe valve is open with air supply isolated.

a. Ensure each valve open by observing valve position inditation and valve itself. Then lock open breakers and control: power key switches.

a. Verify valves open and HS-3027 and 3056 positioned to ! maintain them 0 pen. I a. Verify main feedwater regulating valve and.bypass valve both close on a simulated CHP Signal and on a simulated S/G Low Pressure Signal.

of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 5(b), Table 4.1.1. (2)A 11 monthly tests will be done on only one channe 1 at a time to prevent protect ion system actuat iori. (3)Calibration of the sensors is perfonned during calibration of Item 7(b), Table 4.1.1, (4)Required when PCS is >1500 psia. 4-8 Amendment No. UI, 1111; U0. TSPR9006 .. , !.. 4 .. ---------

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ENCLOSURE 2 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION*

EXISTING PAGES WITH PROPOSED CHANGES MARKED 7, 1990 3 Pages -------

• 11 ... ., ...... .... ct ot1 .. -'<<)O

-0 CJ> I:"' ".... TAii.ir ].16 .1 ......... e.retr Peature* fJJ*tem Initiation lnetnmetat Belthl!I tl*lt*

1. * .... a.tat-.& ....... I. fr111a1 ... a..ta11Jae J. um..-i __ , ..... llilldl* '* '* -..........

.... '* ........ ..,.. ... ... .............. , ...... '--. Cllmlli9el Bettly Ll*lt ** lafetr l*JecUe111

1. 70-lt .lto Psig ** C..tal-.a\

8pre.J ** Contal.-ent l*l*tl* t. Coatal..t Air Cooler DBI Mode e.. /IJ111h Fi1ti->T.-a.I:s-ol0Ti.-{¥) (ll llllf*tr 111,Jectl* ?. 1550 hla tor ._lnal Operating --.... l*l*t** b. ,.._, rroJJi,:,.. l"I) llMlrnlatl* Aet*U* ............ , ..... ... ..... l*l*tloa ............ c 1900Pal* . ?. 1591 Patal2J tor ._lnal Operating ........... ?. 1900 .... !. 20 I/la ,. 500 .... (J) .?, S'OO f.s1"t:a(':J !, 2'f-llldl (-6 AboN Yaal lotto. . !. 2.2 a 10 5 Cfll ........ .,,, 111 .. ,. lfeo ,.1 ....... *omUeallr relaatate4 a1Mtw 1'80 ,. *** (I)., .. 1111. nl W* I,_ ,.1. _. la --tleau, rel*taW alMn* lTOO ,.1 ** IJ._ '9 lttr 111 .. I*° ,.1 .... I* -'<<Wet.leallr relutat.94 at.ow 550 pela. {I/) S 'f bo-l'h rJ.A. ,,,,,,_,n/ntJ,,,,Pl'°.- 110/,,t.. tlHld by,*.3r y111/r1L

• s e .. v l* i ,. ,e \ -

,; 11:111i-- hniui'ble OpuUl.e DICNe ot Bnua llo Punct1oml Ullit Chan*la ,..,..,,,,., Coaditiou -1 I.alation

a. ll1P 2 Ca,c) 1 Dlr1lll Leak Ten Pre*ftft b. Coat*1meat mp 2(c) 1 Rldiat1on

c. 1 2 Stea L1ae Ieolat1on

&. Lav Steaa Ga 2/Staa(c) 1 B9lov ° .. ia ('b) Preewre a. b. *Maau*l l/Staa Bo* .,_ a. c. C. t1>t'UN;. __ -,-J..(o..,a) . I (),,,.,,;. Le.*k. P>1A1>uM-. !3. (d) CL. J.. ow S "no.n G ...,.. p.......,UM_ ea .... I NONI'. b. fJ1 I 1-S7UMr1 6.., c... C I (a) Richt &DI! left actuatioll eirmiu wll !aft 2 w.-1 ** ('b)* tnu* reimtate4 &bow° .-sa. .. ( c) o.. ot tm cmmael* mn 'be 1D tm vtpp.t poaitioa. (d) 6'f a/01'1N6 ho-#, +.k rmo1;,/*d1Uor.,. Ht>11/07iti11 0no' l !-80 . . .... .. <Jwtnel Deacrlptlan U. Safety Injection Tank Level and Preaaure lnatnmente Vt. Boric Acid rant Level Swltcbea 15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing Syst* 16. Main Ste* Iaolatlon Valve Clrculte 17. SIIW Tank *ruperature lndlcatlon and Alana 18.

• Low-Preanre Safety Injection flow r.c.trol Valve CV-3006 19. Safety Injection Bottle 1801atlan Valv .. 20. Safety Injection Mlnlflov Valv .. CV-3027, 3056 /1101il TABLE 4.1.2 Mlnilnim Frequencies for Checks, Calibrations and Testing of Engineered Safety Feature lnatru11entatlon Controls (Contd) Surveillance Function Frequency

a. a.eek s b. Calibrate R a. Teat R a. <Jleclt D a. <2leck s b. Teat(]) R a. Qaeck M b.

R a. a.eek p a. <Jleck p a. Check p Surveillance Method a. Verify that level and pressure Indication la between independent high hlgh/lov alal"llS for level and pressure.

b. lnovn pressure and differential pressure applied to pressure and level sensors. a. Puap tanlt below lov-level alani point to verify switch operation.

a. Observe recorders for proper readings.

a. Compare four independent pressure Indications.

b. Signal to meter relay adjusted vltb test device to verify MSIV circuit logic. a. Collpare Independent temperature readouts.

b. ICnovn resistance applied to Indicating loop. a. Observe valve la open with air supply Isolated.

• • Ensure each valve open by observing valve f:ltlon Indication and valve Itself. lben .
• It open breaker* and control power ltey switches.

a. Verify valvea open and HS-3027 and 3056 poaltioned to .. tntaln 1 Q..., J/...,i£'( .-,Glit

,,,o/.c .. -.cJ oo?'holo.r x::' o.... C11Psu*-I-"'-. 0 Cltwtlil*"T'id .....,. /o"41P>.44ou1Jl,. .$/G,...,o/

• ' (l)Callbratlon of the aensors ts perfonned during calibration of It* 5(bJ, Yable 4.1.l. * : (2)All 11e>nthly teata will be done on only one channel at a ti.Ille to prevent protection system actuation.
• *(3)Callbratlon of the senaora la perfol'lllld during calibration of Item 7(b), Table 4.1.l. (4)Required tlben PCS la > 1500 psla. TSP0289-0025-NL04 4-8 Amendment No. U, _,, MarGla 23, 1 990 I

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ENCLOSURE 3 Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 ---------< ----TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS CHANGE REQUEST MAIN FEEDWATER ISOLATION RESULTS OF PALISADES MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK ANALYSIS FOR THE STEAM GENERATOR REPLACEMENT PROJECT December 7, 1990 ---------- 1

• ASEA BROWN BOVERI July 21-,--1990-

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*-NT-90-0975 Mr. R. J. Gerling Palisades Nuclear Plant Consumers Power Company 27780 Blue Starr Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043-9530

Subject:

Results of Palisades Main Steam Line Break Analysis for the Replacement Steam Generator Project

References:

(1) William G. Dove, Jr. letter NT-89-1188, dated October 30, 1989, Revised Palisades MSLB Containment Analysis Proposal (Proposal No. 89-244-AUC). (2) William G. Dove, Jr. letter NT-90-0244, dated May 31, 1990, Completion of MSLB Phase 0 Analysis for the SG Replacemenf Effort. (3)_ William G .. Dove, Jr. letter NT-90-1007, dated July *24, 1990, Transmittal of MSLB and SGTR Input Data for Palisades Replacement Steam Generator Analyses. (4) R. J. Gerling (CPCo) letter dated July 23,1990, Acceptance of Input Data used for Palisades MSLB and SGTR Analyses. Attachments: (1) Summary of Replacement Steam Generator Full Scope Analysis. (2) Results of Analysis: Sequence of Events and Plots. _

Dear Bud:

This letter transmits the final results of the Palisades Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) Analysis for the Replacement Steam Generator (RSG) Project. This "Full Scope" effort was originally proposed in Reference (1) performed in accordance with the NRC's Standard Rev1ew Plan, Sections 6.2.1.1.A and 6.2.1.4. The primary objective the analysis was to determine containment peak pressure and compare the results with the design containment pressure of 55 psig, in response to a double-ended MSLB. Per Reference (1), a Main Steam Line Break was initiated from five different power levels with offsite power available. Once the worst peak containment pressure case was determined, a loss of offsite power case was run to verify that the worst single failure had been selected for the five base cases. In although originally proposed as an option in Reference (1), ABB C-E also selected the peak containment temperature case and determined the temperature response when crediting an 8% re-evaporation fraction allowed by the NRC for Environmental Equipment Qualification (EEQ). ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power Combustion Engineering Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Road Post Office Box 500 Windsor. Connecticut 06095-0500 Telephone (203) 688-1911 Fax (203) 285-9512 Telex 99297 COMBEN WSOR -------- .. . I , ** Mr. R. J. Gerling July 27, 1990 ------As--described-with-in-; -th-e-peaR 1fress-ure results of all Main Steam Line Break cases analyzed fell below the design value of 55 psig. In addition, the base case single failure of the loss of two containment spray pumps with offsite power available was verified.to be limiting when a comparable case, with an assumed Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), was found to produce less severe containment pressure and temperature results. The EEQ case showed a reduction in peak containment temperature of approximately 16 deg-F when re-evaporation was credited. Consequently, the peak containment temperature from this fell well below the currently accepted peak EEQ temperature of 407.47 deg-F. This transmittal provides an overview of the overall MSLB "full scope" effort. Provided as Attachments (1) and (2} are the overall summary of the analysis ana the detailed results, respectively. This is the end product of an effort which began with the Phase 0 analysis of Reference (2} during which much of the ground breaking was completed. Since Reference (2) provided a detailed summary of the sensitivity of peak pressure to various plant and containment initial conditions, this document will concentrate primarily on the final "full scope" cases described within, and simply reference that document where appropriate. Per the ground rules of Reference (l); all significant data used in this analysis has reviewed by CPCo during different phases of the analysis. This input data was summarized in Reference (3) and accepted for use in Reference (4). At this point, a significant effort has been made to independent 1 y verify the input and. output of the cases described within. This has included various mass and energy balances, -performed via spread sheet -calculations, and also additional checks -using the CONTRANS code, all of which will be in the recorded calculations to be provided to CPCo. Completion of this quality assurance effort will now consist of wrapping up the recorded calculation and completing other miscellaneous internal. documentation. It has been a pleasure to work with CPCo over the last several months on both the replacement and original steam generator projects. Per our discussions, the quality assured recorded calculation(s) of all full sc.ope results and a DRAFT of the FSAR write-up of the MSLB analysis, for your review, are expected sometime in August. If any questions arise, please do not hesitate to call *ither me at {203)-285-3445 or Mike Gancarz at (203)-285-4600. cc: A. B. Spinell G. C. Bischoff M. J. Gancarz M. c. Janke R. Taylor T. Duffy Very truly yours, William G. Dove, Jr. Supervisor, Operations Analysis (Director, Western Division) w/o enclosure (ABB C-E Windsor) w/o enclosure (ABB C-E Windsor) (ABB C-E Windsor) (ABB C-E RSSM) w/o enclosure (CPCo)

• .. --------------. --------------------------

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• ATTACHMENT ( 1) Summary of Replacement Steam Generator Full Scope Analysis -*-----*--------*---*

Per the requirements of Reference (1), the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) "Full Scope" analysis has been completed. The purpose of this analysis was to demonstrate that the peak nment_ r-esulting---from th-is -event-doe*s ---not**exceed--thEf Palisades -peak containment design pressure of 55 psig. _As outlined in Reference (1), five base MSLB cases were run at the power levels of 102%, 75%, 50%, 25%, and 0%. Although past ABB C-E in-house analyses have shown that having offsite power available is the most limiting for the MSLB containment events (primarily due to greater primary to secondary heat transfer with the primary coolant pumps running), an additional loss of offsite power (LOOP) case was run for the limiting peak containment pressure case (75% power) to verify this assumption. Also, per CPCo's request, an environmental equipment qualification (EEQ) run was made of the limiting peak containment temperature case (102% power). The results of this analysis, performed with the NRC approved SGNIII coupled primary/secondary plant and containment code, showed peak containment pressure to remain below 55 psig for all cases. While the specific case by case results for this "full scope" analysis are shown in Table 1, this is the end product of a multi-faceted effort which began with the Phase 0 analysis documented in Reference (2), the findings of which lead to analyses performed for the original steam generators (Ref. 4). References (2) & (4) summarize in detail the findings which showed the need for a plant fix to initiate main feedwater regulating valve closure on containment high pressure, thereby limiting the amount of main feedwater available for release to containment. Reference (2) also provides the results of a parametric study which showed the sensitivity of peak containment pressure to various plant and containment initial conditions. With the majority of ground breaking done in the above analyses, the intent of this "full scope" effort was to utilize the findings of References (2) & (4)

• to revise past generalized over-conservatisms, such as a universally applied large volumetric expansion factor and full primary and secondary, latent metal heat, and produce a more realistic (but yet conservatively biased per SRP guidelines) set of final cases. Also used for this final set of cases was CPCo's main feedwater flow algorithm (CPCo reference EA-P-SOW-90-002-01) which was incorporated into the SGNill code during a CPCo visit to ABB C-E. This algorithm accounted for "feedwater spiking" by diverting the correct flow to each steam generator based on each generator's pressure.

It also initiated closure of the main feedwater regulating valves based on the containment high pressure trip signal (CHPS). Normally the main pumps are ramped back; however, the pumps-remain at full speed foi this analysis in the event that the pump speed controller is in the manual mode and not automatic. The entire MSLB effort was structured to allow CPCo to be actively involved in all aspects of the analysis including input data reviews and various output comparisons with their CONTEMPT code. The result of working in this close fashion was a very precise, plant specific analysis. From a quality assurance standpoint, the fact that CPCo was the primary reviewer of the Reference (3) input data package, allowed the independent review process to progress in a smooth orderly fashion. As stated above, some of the generalized over-conservative assumptions used in the past were modified. However, the outline of Refer,ence (1), together with that stated in subsequent meetings with the NRC, mandated that this analysis follow the NRC's Standard Review Plan (Sections 6.2.1.1.A and 6.2.1.4). For completeness, the followi_f!g _wUJ_state_the-major -f!equi-rements-of-those-------------------gutdeli nes--a-nd tiow-eact\ was addressed by ABB C-E. SRP Section 6.2.1.1.A Requirement Sub-section 11.e 1. The analysis should be based on the most severe single active failure. 2. The analysis should be based on a spectrum of power levels and break sizes. SRP Section 6.2.1.4 Regyirement Sub-section 11.1 1. The sources of energy which should be considered are: a. Affected SG metal. b. Vessel tubing. c. Feedwater line metal. d. Steam line metal. e. Affected SG-water. --f. Affected SG feedwater prior to closure of isolation valves in feedwa.ter line. g. Unaffected SG steam prior to isolation valve closure in cross-over lines. h. Primary coolant to affected SG during blowdown.

2. The MSLB should be analyzed for a spectrum of break sizes and power levels from hot standby to 1021 of full power. How Addressed in Analysis CPCo determined this to be a failure of an electrical component causing the loss of two containment spray pumps with offsite power available.

ABB C-E confirmed this by running a LOOP case. The assumption not to assume a failure of an MSIV or MFW regulating valve was verified with per NRC SER, dated Feb. 28, 1986. The full scope analysis focused on five different power levels (102%, 751, SOS, 251, and OS). Per SRP Section 6.2.1.4, with no liquid entrainment in the blowdown, the break size selected should result in the maximum release rate. Since critical flow out the break (based on the flow restrictor area) produced a single -phase steam discharge, no additional break studies were required. How Addressed in Analysis All inventory related energies were including that in the steam and feedwater lines to the isolation valves. All metal energies were considered except that of the steam lines, which for dry steam conditions have a very low heat transfer . coefficient and empty within the first 10 seconds. This assumption was approved as part of ABB C-E's containment methodology. See response to Section Item #2. How Addressed in Analysis -------SRP Section 6.2.1.4 Regyirement Sub-section 11.2 --------L The ma_s_s_ releasif_r-ates should be ----------calculated using the Moody model or one that is demonstrated to be equally conservative.

2. Calculations of heat transfer to water in the affected SG should be based on nucleate boiling. 3. The sources of mass release to be considered are: a. Affected SG water. b. Affected SG feedwater line inventory.

c. Affected SG feedwater prior to closure of the isolation valves in the feedwater lines. d. Affected SG steam. e. Unaffected SG steam prior to closure of the isolation valves in the SG cros$-over lines. 4. A single active failure in the steam or feedwater line isolation provisions or feedwater pumps should be assumed. 5. Feedwater flow to the affected SG should be calculated based on the diversion of flow from the other SG(s). 6. Aftei feedwater isolation, the unisolated feedwater line mass should be added to the affected steam generator.

7. An acceptable computer code for calculating mass and energy releases for MSLBs is the SGN I II code. As stated in Reference (3), the CRITCO flow correlation was used since it was demonstrated to be slightly more conservative than Moody. This is part of the SGNIII methodology All cited sources of mass release were considered per Ref. (3). Although these failures were not considered, CPCo obtained NRC approval for this assumption, _ reference SER, dated Feb. 28, 1986. CPCo's main feedwater flow algorithm, documented in CPCo reference EA-P-SDW-90-002-01, addressed this item. This volume was calculated by CPCo and incorporated into the SGNIII code. The SGNIII coupled primary/secondary and containment code was used for all mass and energy release rates as well as the calculation of containment pressure and temperature.

Table 1 provides a sununary of the case results. As shown, the 75S power ,case was shown to produce the highest peak containment pressure, while the 1021 power case produced the highest peak containment temperature. This non-linearity can be attributed to the trade-off between the higher steam generator inventory at lower power levels versus the corresponding reduction in main feedwater flow added to the ruptured steam generator. This same trade-off, along with the energy levels of the initial S/G inventories, can be used to explain why the DI power case has a higher peak pressure than the 25S and SOI cases. The peak pressures calculated for the final cases fell a couple __ _ ------tha-t--of-the-boundtng-Phase o-ca-su--prTmarlly-aue -tcf tile folTowlng changes. I. Initial containment pressure reduced from 16.0 psia to 15.7 psia per Technical Specification Limit.

• 2. Step function containment sprays used which initiate approximately a half minute earlier than that assumed in prior analyses, per Ref (3). 3. The installation of CPCo's Main Feedwater flow algorithm into SGNIII with the valve closure time decreased from 30 seconds to 22 seconds. 4. The use of realistic volumetric expansion multipliers based on actual manufacturing tolerances and more precise pressure and temperature
• additions.

These were applied to all inventories, resulting in less available discharge mass. 5. The *use of more realistic primary and secondary heat capacities (HCp's), based on conservative heat conduction equations, versus including all met!ll for heat transfer to the affected steam generator.

6. Crediting steam flow to the turbine prior to reactor trip. 7. Correcting the break area seen by the intact unit to the flow restrictor area versus the actual break area.

• 8. In addition, the SG tube to secondary UA factor (based on information provided from input to SGNllI was conservatively to be cons is tent for a 11 power 1 eve ls for the fu 11 scope effort. Due to a subtle code input shortcoming, this value was not explicitly used for the filial 102i Phase O case (# AHZJ) of Reference (2) .. Although the correct value was input, a code option was in-advertently unchanged which allowed the code to override the intended value and instead use a more realistic, less conservative steady state value which it calculated for the given power level. Since for low power levels the SGNIII code
• uses the actual input value, the correct UA value was used for the zero power case. This _inconsistency in the Phase 0 cases was most likely the primary reason that the zero power case was more limiting than ro2i power case for that Ref. (2-) effort. As also shown in Table 1, the LOOP case at 75i power produced results appreciably lower than the corresponding case with offsite power available.

Although this test was not performed for each case, the 75i power case showed that crediting the coastdown of the primary coolant pumps resulted in less primary to secondary heat transfer which extended the blowdown time. This

• consequently allowed the containment heat ramoval devices more time in which to remove energy which resulted in a lower peak pressure and temperature.

The final case run was that for environmentalequipment qualification.* The peak containment temperature, 102i power case was run crediting 8" re-evaporation of wall condensate. This is allowed by NUREG-0588 and its successor Regulatory Guide 1.89 specifically for this purpose. Per CPCo's request, this was run for 10, 000 seconds and showed a reduct ion tn _ app.roximatel.v--16----

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degrees

--since -CPto-,-s currently reported peak EEQ containment temperature is 407.74 deg-F, this run quantified the actual margin for the replacement steam generator units. Attachment (2) provides plots of containment pressure and temperature versus time for the cases listed in Table 1. Also provided is a sequence of events table of the limiting 751 power case. As discussed with CPCo, the FSAR write-up will include plots of containment pressure and temperature versus time and a sequence of events only for the limiting containment pressure case. Also included will be a spread sheet calculation of the mass and energy balance performed for that case. As mentioned earlier, mass and energy balance checks were performed for all cases and will be included in the quality assured recorded calculation(s) be provided to CPCo. (, TABLE 1 RESULTS OF *FULL SCOPE* REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATOR MSLB ANALYSIS CASEI DESCRIPTION POWER LEVEL AU1W BASE CASE 102CMI AUUO BASE CASE 75CMt AUUX BASE CASE 50CMt AUVH BASE CASE 2SCMI AUWH BASE CASE OCMt BAZH LOOP 75CMt ADJF EE0(3) 102CMt (1) PEAK CONTAINMENT PRESSURE (2) PEAK CONTAINMENT TEMPERATIJRE (3) 8CMt REEV APORA TION CREDITED PEAK PRESSURE PEAK TEMPERATlJRE (PSIG) (OEG-F) 52.29 400.35 (2) 52.45 (1) 396.74 50.80 393.08 48.46 390.22 51.03 388.87 42.91 371.21 52. 12 384.18 Attachment contents: ATTACHMENT (2) Results of Analysis 1. Sequence of Events for Limiting 75% Power Case 2. Containment Pressure and Temperature Plots versus time for: -102%, 75%, 50%, 25%, & 0% Base Cases -75% Power Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP) Case -102% Power Equipment Environmental Qualification (EEQ) Case _ _ . e SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK, PALISADES REPLACEMENT STEAM GENERATOR TIME (SECONDS) EVENT PESCRIPTION SETPOINT I VALUE 0.0 Double-ended Main Steam Line Break occurs 0.01 AFAS signal generated manual trip 1.64 Reactor Trip Signal on Containment High 3.7 psig Pressure 2.01 Containment High Pressure Signal (CHPS) 4.3 psig MSIS: MSIV closure signal sent

• HFW Reg. Valve closure signal sent CSAS: Containment Fans/Sprays Systems actuation signals sent 3.64 Turbine Trip (TAVs Shut) 4.01 HSIVs Shut (Slowdown from Intact SG is Terminated) 5.01 Auxiliary Feedwater flow begins to. 200 gpm affected steam generator 5.31 Three Containment Fan Coolers Start 25.01 HFW Reg. Valves shut (Hain Feedwater flow terminated) 34.96 . Containment Spray Flow (1 pump) begins Containment Peak Temperature Reached 396.74 deg-F 57.00 Containment Spray Fl ow ( 1 pump) 1978.90 gpm reaches maximum flow 168.58 Containment Peak Pressure Reached 52.45 psig 194.00 Slowdown of Affected Steam Generator Essentially Complete FINAL RUN: 102% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 0 80 120 160 200 TIME (SECONDS) 420 400 380 360 340 '"" &a. I 320 C> l&.I o* 300 -w (k'. 280 ::::> .... < 260 Q'.'. l&.I 0.. :J 240 l&.I 220 200 180 . 160 140 .FINAL RUN: 1 02% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 0 80 120 160 TIME (SECONDS) 200 240 l ! . I FINAL RUN: 75% POW*ER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 40 .. ,.... (.') ll1 fl. -L-' 30 rr ::::> ll1 ll1 .... Q.. 20 10 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS)

FINAL RUN: 75% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 400 380 360 340 " . &a. .. I 320 0 w 0 300 ........ ... ;r 280 ::::> r-260 Ck: w 0.. 240 Lt.I t-220 200 UJO 160 140 0 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS) FINAL RUN: 25% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 4'0 .. -C> -en* n. ......, w 30 (k'. ::> en en I.a.I or= IL 20 10 0 80 120 160 . 200 240 TIME (SECONDS) FINAL RUN: 25% POWER . CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 ... 400 380 360 340 ""' \ I 320 C> ..... 0 300 -.... :' 280 :::> t-260 0:: ..... IL . 240 ..... .... 220 200 180 . 160 140 0 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS) FINAL 50% POWER* . CONT, .NMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 4.0 . . ,.... -Cl> CL "'-J w 30 0:: ::> . VI VI &a.I IL 20 10 : ! 0 40 80 12.0 160 . 200 240 TIME (SECONDS) ' FINAL RUN: 50% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. .. FINAL RUN: 0% POWER CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME .. 50 40 .. " C> 111 n. -... 30 r' ::> 111 111 .... It: Q. 20 10 0 40 80 120 160 200 240 TIME (SECONDS) FINAL RUN: 0% POWER CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIWE 420 400 380 360 340 ,...., I 320 0 &a.I o* 300 -w er 280. ::> .... 260 . ik'. &a.I IL :l 24'0 &a.I ._ 220 200 180

• 160 14'0 0 80 120 160 200 TIME (SECONDS)

' 1 . \ FINAL RUN:75-% POWER(LOOP) <... * . CONTAINMENT PRESSURE VS. TIME 50 .. " (!) .. VI Q. .... , .... 30 rr ::> VI VI I.a.I DI: IL . 20 10 0 100 200 . 300 TIME (SECONDS) FINAL RUN:75% POWER(LOOP) CONTAINMENT TEMPERAnJRE VS. TIME 420 380 360 340 ". I 320 C> Lal 0 300 -L6I rr 280 :::> < 260 Iii: LaJ CL 240 LaJ ... 220 200 180 160 140 0 100 200 300 TIME (SECONDS) -w a: :::> en en w a: a.. .... z w z -< .... z 0 0 60 50 40 30 20. 10 . 0 !' PALISADES MSLB SG ANALYSIS 102% POWER, 8% REEVAPORATION EEQ CASE . .1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000

• TIME, SEC (Thousands}

PALISADES MSLB SG ANALYSIS I: I' I 102% POWER, 8% REEVAPORATION EEQ CASE \, -. 400 380 360 I 340 <!J w c 320 -.. w 300 a: :::> t-280 *C ll: u.J 260 240 w 1-. I-220 z w 200 z 180 . -< *I-z 160 0 0 140 120 100 .1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 TIME, SEC (Thousands}}}