ML18095A702

LER 90-042-00:on 901220,SWS Through Wall Leak on Inlet Pipe to Component Cooling Pump Room Cooler Occurred.Caused by Equipment Failure & Internal Corrosion.Carbon Steel Pipe Will Be Painted for protection.W/910118 Ltr

ML18095A702
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/18/1991
From:	LABRUNA S, POLLACK M J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-90-042, LER-90-42, NUDOCS 9101280154
Download: ML18095A702 (6)

Text

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Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 90-042-00 January 18, 1991 Report is being submitted pursuant to the Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR This Licensee Event requirements of the 50. 7 3 (a} ( 2} ( i} ( B}

• of discovery.

This report is required within thirty (30) days MJP:pc Distribution 9101280154 910118 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S F'DR The Energy People Sincerely yours, S. LaBruna General Manager -Salem Operations 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 NllC ........ U.I. NUCLEAll llEOULATOllY COloSlll*ION . APf'l'OVED OMI NO. 31110-0104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER) EXPlllEI:

I/JI/II FACILITY NAME 111 Salem Generating Station -Unit 2 I DOCK!T ....-111 121 I ,_YK l;r! 0 I 6 I 0 I 0 I 0 I 311 11 1 I OF 01 5 TITLI "I Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 Entry; 21 Service Water Header Inoperable Due To Equipment Failure IVENT OATH (II LEA NUMllEll Ill llEl'ORT DATE (71 OTHEll F_ACILITIEI INVOLVED Ill MONTH QAY YEAR YEAR ft tt MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMU DOCKET NUMIERISJ l I 2 2 I o 9 o 91 o OPERATING THll REPORT 11 IUIMITTEO PUAIUANT TO THE llEQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFll §:* (Ch<<:lc OM or mon of 1M followlttf}

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--llD.731oll21UUI llD.731*11211*1 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LEA 1111 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA COOE M. J. Pollack -LER Coordinator COMPLETE ONE_ LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DEICRIHD IN THll llEl'OllT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC-TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I MONTH DAY Y&lAR IUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 EXPECTED I l YES (If Yft. ccmpl*N EXPECTED SUBMISSION OATEJ SUIM1$SION DATE 1151 rxi NO I ASITRACT IUmlr ro 1400 JPOC*. I.e .* *PPf'OKlmaNly fiftHn rlngl**ll>><*

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/inft) 1111 On 12/20/90, a Service Water (SW) System through wall leak on the inlet pipe to the No. 21 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Room Cooler (upstream of the 21SW128 cc Pump Room Cooler SW Inlet Valve) occurred.

Subsequently, No. 21 SW Header was isolated to stop the leak. With No. 21 SW Header inoperable, two (2) groups of Containment Fan Coil Units (i.e., Nos. 21 and 22 CFCUs) and the No. 21 Containment Spray (CS) Pump Room Cooler are made inoperable (i.e., no SW cooling flow). With No. 21 CS Pump Room Cooler inoperable, the No. 21 CS Pump is considered inoperable.

Since Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 Action b could not be met, with two (2} groups of CFCUs and one CS Pump inoperable, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered. Also, with both high head safety injection pumps inoperable, the Technical Specification

3. 5. 2 Action Statements do not apply. One of the train*s had been declared inoperable solely due to an inoperable emergency power supply (maintenance of 2B Diesel Generator);

therefore, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.5 applied. No. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) was inoperable due to inoperability of the No. 21 SW header and No. 21 CCP*was declared inoperabie due to inoperability of the 2B Diesel Generator.

Per the Technical Specification Action Statements, a Unit shutdown was initiated.

The root cause of this event is attributed to equipment failure. The 21 CC Pump Room Cooler through wall SW leakage was the result of external corrosion.

The 21 CC Pump Room Cooler SW leak was repaired in accordance with the ASME Code. A detailed inspection of the. SW Room Cooler piping was conducted.

Recommendations made are being addressed.

NRC Form 3116 19-831 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generatfng Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:.

Westinghouse

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Water Reactor LER NUMBER 90-042-00 PAGE 2. of 5 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text*as (xxl IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:*

• Technical Specification Action Statement entered; 21 Service Water Header Inoperable Due To Equipment Failure Event Date: 12/20/90 Report Date: 1/18/91 This* report was initiated' by Incident Report No.90-971. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% -Unit Load 1150 MWe No. 2B Diesel Generator (DG) (EK} cleared and tagged in support of maintenance DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On December 20, 1990 at 1442 hours0.0167 days <br />0.401 hours <br />0.00238 weeks <br />5.48681e-4 months <br />, a Service Water (SW) System {Bii through wall leak on the i.nlet pipe. to the No. 21 Component Cooling (CC) Pump Room Cooler (ups'tream of th.e 21SW128 CC Pump Room Cooler SW Inlet Valve) occurred.

Subsequently, No *. 21 SW Header was isolated to stop the leak. With No. 21 SW Header inoperable, two (2) groups of Containment Fan Coil Units (i.e., Nos. 21.and 22 CFCUs) {BK) and the No. 21 Containment Spray (CS) Pump Room Cooler were declared inoperable

(:Le., no SW cooling flow)*. With No. 21 CS Pump Room Cooler inoperable, the No *. 21 CS Pump is considered inoperable (see Analysis section).

Since Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 Action b conditional requirements could not be met, with two (2) groups of CFCUs and one cs Pump Technical' Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered. Also, with both trains of .Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) {BQ} inoperable (i.e., both high head safety injection pumps) the Technical Specification

3.5.2 Action

Statements do not apply. One of the trains had been declared inoperable solely due to an inoperable emergency power supply (maintenance of 2B Diesel Generator);

therefore, Technical Specification Action Statement applied. No. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump (CCP) was inoperable due to inoperability of the No. 21 SW header and No. 21 CCP was declared inoperable due to inoperability of the 2B Diesel* G.enerator

.(DG) {EKI. Per the requirements of Techriical Specification Action Statements 3.7.1.2.a.b (see Analysis section), 3.0.3, and 3.0.5, a Unit shutdown was initiated.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was notified

. **-""' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 90-042-00 PAGE 3 of 5 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) of the Technical Specification Action Statement entries and the initiation of the Unit shutdown at 1521 hours0.0176 days <br />0.423 hours <br />0.00251 weeks <br />5.787405e-4 months <br /> on 12/20/90 in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.72{b) (l){i) {A). Upon identification of the leak, the No. 21 SW Header was isolated and a rubber patch was clamped to stop the leak. This allowed the header to be functional, but not op.erable since this arrangement was not analyzed.

The header was returned to service by the ins.tallation of a blank flange (in with the ASME Code for Class 3 piping). *Technical Specification Action Statements 3.7.1.2.a.b, 3.0.3, and 3.0.5 were subsequently exited, at 2038 hours0.0236 days <br />0.566 hours <br />0.00337 weeks <br />7.75459e-4 months <br /> on December 20, 1990. A Unit load increase was then initiated.

Unit load had been reduced to 25% reactor power when the Action Statement had been exited. Technical Specification Action Statement

3.0.3 states

"When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition of Operation.

Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual specifications." Technical Specification Action Statement

3.0.5 states

"When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable solely because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power source is inoperable it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of its applicable limiting Condition for Operation, provided:

(1) its corresponding normal or emergency power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all of its redundant system(s), subsystem(s), train(s), component{s) and device{s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification.

Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in: 1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, 2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. This specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6."

I I. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 LER NUMBER 90-042-00 PAGE 4 of 5 The root cause of this event is attributed to equipment failure. The 21 CC Pump Room Cooler through wall SW leakage was the result of external corrosion.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The CFCUs and the Containment Spray System either independently or in combinations are designed to ensure that containment depressurization and cooling are.available in the event of a LOCA. Acceptable combinations include 100% availability of either system or three (3) CFCUs and one (1) Containment Spray Header. ' The room coolers, in conjunction with the once through ventilation system, are designed to limit the ambient temperature at vital pumping equipment.

This helps assure long-term and reliable operation of the vital equipment.

Based upon PSE&G Engineering Evaluation S-C-ABV-NEE-0504E, "Engineering Evaluation on the Effect An Inoperable Room Cooler Has on the Operability of Vital Pumps", operability of the vital pumps is affected by the availability of associated Room Coolers. Therefore, with a Room Cooler inoperable the vital pumps in that room are considered inoperable.

With 21 SW Header out of service, the No. 21 CS Pump Room Cooler is inoperable thereby making the 21 CS Pump inoperable.

As stated previously, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the requirements of Technical Specification 3.6.2.3 Action b could not be met. Only one complete group of two (2) CFCUs (i.e., Nos. 23 and 25 CFCUs) and one (1) Containment Spray Header (i.e., No. 22 CS Pump) would have been operable in the event of a design base accident.

No. 24 CFCU although available during accident conditions, would not have been available during a Blackout condi tio.n. Its emergency power supply DG (No. 2B) was cleared and tagged in support of maintenance activities.

Technical Specification 3.4.11.1 Action c was entered (and fully complied with) since the SW leak was coming from ASME Code Class 3 pipe. Technical Specification 3.4.11."1.

states: "The structural integrity of ASME Code Class l, 2 and 3 components shall be maintained in accordance with Specification 4.4.11.1." Technical Specification 3.4.11.1 Action c states: c. "With the structural integrity of any ASME Code Class 3 component(s) not conforming to the above requirements, restore the structural integrity of the affected component(s) to within its limit or isolate the affected component(s) from service." The No. 21 CC Pump Room Cooler through wall SW leak resulted in the spraying of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (MDAFW) Pumps.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 2 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

DOCKET NUMBER 5000311 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 90-042-00 Subsequently, they were declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.7.1.2.a Action b was entered. It states: PAGE 5 of 5 "With two auxiliary feedwater pumps inoperable be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />." Both MDAFW Pumps were successfully inspected, meggered and tested for operability.

On December 20, 1990, No. 21 MDAFW Pump and No. 22 MDAFW Pump were declared operable at 1719 hours0.0199 days <br />0.478 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.540795e-4 months <br /> and 2057 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.826885e-4 months <br />, respectively.

Due to the entry into Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3, this event is reportable in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). CORRECTIVE ACTION: The 21 CC Pump Room Cooler SW leak was repaired in accordance with the ASME Code. Upon completion of the repair, Technical Specification 3.4.11.1 Action c was exited. A detailed inspection (by System Engineering]

of all SW p1p1ng to ECCS Room Coolers was conducted.

This inspection included removal of insulation from the Room Cooler piping (both Salem Units). A total of 308 spools inspected.

No additional leaks were identified; however, due to evidence of undesirable external corrosion, seven (7) spools will be replaced/repaired (2 for Unit 1 and 5 for Unit 2). Replacement/repair of the spools is scheduled.

Additionally, the SW pipe inspections will be expanded to include SW pipe associated with ECCS pump Lube Oil Coolers (both Units). With the removal of the pipe insulation, the carbon steel pipe will be painted for protection and ease of surveillance.

In addition, a detailed weekly walkdown, by System Engineering, of this pipe has been initiated to provide early identification of SW leakage. This compliments routine Operations Department operator observation, of Room Cooler areas, performed each shift. An ongoing program, at Salem Generating Station, for the upgrade of Service Water System p1p1ng is continuing.

The scope of this program included replacement of the Room Cooler SW pipe prior to the discovery of the subject leak. MJP:pc SORC Mtg.91-004 General Manager -Salem Operations