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| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555January 14, 1993NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 93-05: LOCKING OF RADIOGRAPHY EXPOSUREDEVICES | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY |
| | |
| | COMMISSION |
| | |
| | ===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS=== |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICE NO. 93-05: LOCKING OF RADIOGRAPHY |
| | |
| | EXPOSURE DEVICES |
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| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All Nuclear Regulatory Commission industrial radiography licensees | | : |
| | All Nuclear Regulatory |
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| | Commission |
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| | industrial |
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| | radiography |
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| | licensees |
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| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| This information notice is intended to: (a) alert licensees that the lockingmechanisms on certain industrial radiography exposure devices can be lockedwith the sealed source in the exposed position; and (b) emphasize theimportance of ensuring that the source is secure in a shielded position beforemoving the device. We expect that licensees will review this notice,distribute it to responsible staff, and consider actions, if appropriate, toverify that the source is properly secured at the conclusion of radiographicoperations. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constituteany new NRC requirements, and no written response is required. | | This information |
| | |
| | notice is intended to: (a) alert licensees |
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| | that the locking mechanisms |
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| | on certain industrial |
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| | radiography |
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| | exposure devices can be locked with the sealed source in the exposed position; |
| | and (b) emphasize |
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| | the importance |
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| | of ensuring that the source is secure in a shielded position before moving the device. We expect that licensees |
| | |
| | will review this notice, distribute |
| | |
| | it to responsible |
| | |
| | staff, and consider actions, if appropriate, to verify that the source is properly secured at the conclusion |
| | |
| | of radiographic |
| | |
| | operations. |
| | |
| | However, suggestions |
| | |
| | contained |
| | |
| | in this notice do not constitute |
| | |
| | any new NRC requirements, and no written response is required.Description |
| | |
| | of Circumstances |
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| | Case 1: A radiographer |
| | |
| | was overexposed |
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| | in an incident involving |
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| | a disconnected |
| | |
| | source when he failed to conduct a survey after each exposure.After investigating |
| | |
| | the incident, it was discovered |
| | |
| | that the radiographer |
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| | had approached |
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| | the device without a survey instrument, locked the device, disassembled |
| | |
| | the source guide tube, and left the drive controls connected before moving the device from one location to another. The radiographer |
| | |
| | had incorrectly |
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| | assumed that in locking the exposure device, he had secured the source in a shielded position. |
| | |
| | In fact, the sealed source remained in the guide tube because the pigtail had disconnected |
| | |
| | from the drive cable. The radiographer's |
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| | error was further compounded |
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| | when the drive cable was not removed before moving the device, which would have allowed him to identify the absence of the source pigtail within the shielded assembly.Case 2: A radiographer |
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| | was performing |
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| | radiographic |
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| | exposures |
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| | of welds on a series of pipelines |
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| | that were located approximately |
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| | 6.1 meters (20 feet) above ground. The radiographer |
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| | used a 1.8-meter |
| | |
| | (6-foot) guide tube with collimator |
| | |
| | and a 7.6-meter |
| | |
| | (25-foot) |
| | control cable. The radiographer |
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| | hung the device from the pipeline to perform the work with the control cables hanging down to the ground. After an exposure, the radiographer |
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| | retracted |
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| | the source, placed the control cables on the ground, and used a hydraulic |
| | |
| | lift to get to the camera.9301080120 |
| | L4'6 fD C fe -2?- 0A Ik Cct |
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| | IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 Because the camera was suspended |
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| | above the lift, the radiographer |
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| | had to move the camera to reach the locking mechanism. |
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| | He moved the camera by grasping the control cables with his right hand and locking the camera with his left hand. He continued |
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| | with his left hand to disconnect |
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| | the guide tube from the camera. At this point, he noticed that the sealed source was protruding |
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| | approximately |
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| | 10 centimeters |
| | |
| | (4 inches) from the camera port. (Note: His alarming ratemeter |
| | |
| | did not sound because it was not turned on. This violation of 10 CFR 34.33, which can result in a civil penalty, is addressed |
| | |
| | in Information |
| | |
| | Notice 91-49: "Enforcement |
| | |
| | of Safety Requirements |
| | |
| | for Radiographers"). |
| | |
| | Reenactments |
| | |
| | of the incident showed that when the radiographer |
| | |
| | turned the device, the crank handle could drag on the ground, exposing the sealed source.The radiographer |
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| | was then able to lock the device over the drive cable, with the sealed source protruding |
| | |
| | approximately |
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| | 10 centimeters |
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| | (4 inches).Analysis of the locking mechanism |
| | |
| | after the event did not identify any obvious defects with the mechanism. |
| | |
| | Tests performed |
| | |
| | showed that the device could still be locked with the source in the exposed position.NRC Evaluation: |
| | The findings in both of these cases raised concern among NRC staff that, under certain conditions, radiographers |
| | |
| | could have false confidence |
| | |
| | in the locking mechanisms. |
| | |
| | If exposure devices can lock when the source is outside of the shielded position, then radiographers |
| | |
| | could incorrectly |
| | |
| | believe that they are protected |
| | |
| | from exposure when, in fact, the source is not in its fully shielded position. |
| | |
| | We are also concerned |
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| | that exposure devices are moved while the drive cables are still connected. |
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| | To evaluate the effectiveness |
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| | of the locking mechanism |
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| | on radiography |
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| | exposure devices and to determine |
| | |
| | whether radiographers |
| | |
| | commonly move the devices with drive cables still connected, NRC inspectors |
| | |
| | observed licensee equipment |
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| | tests and interviewed |
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| | radiography |
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| | personnel. |
| | |
| | ===From the data collected, we determined=== |
| | that a majority of exposure devices can be locked when the source is in a variety of positions, rather than only when the source pigtail is properly seated, with the source in the fully shielded position. |
| | |
| | Many source pigtails include a "locking ball," designed to prevent the source from moving forward when the lock is engaged; however, our observations |
| | |
| | show that some exposure devices may be locked both when the source is not fully retracted |
| | |
| | and while the drive cable is seated under the locking pin, thereby circumventing |
| | |
| | the locking-ball |
| | |
| | feature. This may result in a source being positioned |
| | |
| | where it is not fully shielded.Many radiographers |
| | |
| | acknowledged |
| | |
| | to NRC inspectors |
| | |
| | that they often leave drive cables connected |
| | |
| | when moving an exposure device from one location to another at temporary |
| | |
| | job sites. In addition, some acknowledged |
| | |
| | leaving the guide tube connected. |
| | |
| | One licensee stated that this practice had resulted in a source being forced out of the exposure device while the device was carried to a new location at a temporary |
| | |
| | job site. This licensee noted that the device was locked at the time, but the source had not been fully retracted |
| | |
| | before locking the device. |
| | |
| | Attachment |
| | |
| | 1 IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICES Information |
| | |
| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-04 93-03 92-84 92-72 Investigation |
| | |
| | and Re-porting of Misadministra- tions by the Radiation Safety Officer Recent Revision to 10 CFR Part 20 and Change of Implementa- tion Date to January 1, 1994 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants Employee Training and Shipper Registra-tion Requirements |
| | |
| | for Transporting |
| | |
| | Radioactive |
| | |
| | Materials Emergency |
| | |
| | Response Information |
| | |
| | Require-ments for Radioactive |
| | |
| | ===Material Shipments Uranium Hexafluoride=== |
| | Cylinders |
| | |
| | -Deviations |
| | |
| | in Coupling Welds Implementation |
| | |
| | Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective |
| | |
| | Action Guides and Pro-tective Actions for Nuclear Incidents Implementation |
| | |
| | of the Deliberate |
| | |
| | Misconduct |
| | |
| | Rule 01/07/93 01/05/93 12/17/92 10/18/92 08/24/92 08/12/92 05/12/92 05/08/92 92-62 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | medical licensees. |
| | |
| | All byproduct, source, and special nuclear material licensees. |
| | |
| | All Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Com-mission Medical Licensees. |
| | |
| | ===All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory=== |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | Licensees. |
| | |
| | ===All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory=== |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | Licensees. |
| | |
| | All fuel cycle licensees. |
| | |
| | All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors, non-power |
| | |
| | reactors and materials |
| | |
| | licensees |
| | |
| | author-ized to possess large quantities |
| | |
| | of radioactive |
| | |
| | material.All Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | Licensees. |
| | |
| | 92-58 92-38 92-37 Attachment |
| | |
| | 2 IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION |
| | |
| | NOTICES Information |
| | |
| | Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-04 93-03 93-02 Investigation |
| | |
| | and Re-porting of Misadministra- tions by the Radiation Safety Officer Recent Revision to 10 CFR Part 20 and Change of Implementa- tion Date to January 1, 1994 Malfunction |
| | |
| | of A Pres-surizer Code Safety Valve Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic |
| | |
| | Equipment |
| | |
| | ===Manufactures=== |
| | by Liberty Technologies |
| | |
| | Unexpected |
| | |
| | Restriction |
| | |
| | to Thermal Growth of Reactor Coolant Piping Potential |
| | |
| | Failures of Emergency |
| | |
| | Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blockage 93-01 01/07/93 01/05/93 01/04/93 01/04/93 12/24/92 12/23/92 12/17/92 12/18/92 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | medical licensees. |
| | |
| | All byproduct, source, and special nuclear material licensees. |
| | |
| | All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Nuclear Regulatory |
| | |
| | Commission |
| | |
| | Medical Licensees All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-86 92-85 92-84 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants 88-23, Supp. 4 Potential |
| | |
| | for Gas Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection Pumps during A Design Basis Accident OL = Operating |
| | |
| | License CP = Construction |
| | |
| | Permit |
| | |
| | K)IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 Discussion: |
| | All licensees |
| | |
| | are reminded of the importance |
| | |
| | of ensuring that the sources used in radiography |
| | |
| | exposure devices are properly secured and fully shielded before moving the device. Radiographic |
| | |
| | exposure devices manufactured |
| | |
| | and new equipment |
| | |
| | acquired by licensees |
| | |
| | after January 10, 1992, must meet new design requirements |
| | |
| | in 10 CFR 34.20. These require that, among other safety features, the device must automatically |
| | |
| | secure the source assembly when it is cranked back into the fully shielded position within the device. However, many radiographic |
| | |
| | exposure devices currently |
| | |
| | in use do not include the newer safety features, and licensees |
| | |
| | are not required to use devices that comply with 10 CFR 34.20 requirements |
| | |
| | until after January 10, 1996. Certaih radiogiraphv |
| | |
| | exposure devices still in use today may be able to be locked with the source in the exposed position.Experience |
| | |
| | has shown that when an older exposure device is in use, the locking mechanism |
| | |
| | is not an indicator |
| | |
| | that the source is fully retracted |
| | |
| | and secured.The use of engineered |
| | |
| | safety features, like the lock mechanism, MUST BE coupled with a proper survey (10 CFR 34.43) AND use of an alarm ratemeter (10 CFR 34.33), to prevent the unintentional |
| | |
| | exposure of personnel. |
| | |
| | Surveys must be sufficient |
| | |
| | to detect a change in exposure readings taken at the source tube outlet, to determine |
| | |
| | whether the source is fully retracted |
| | |
| | to a shielded position (10 CFR 34.43). Alarm ratemeters |
| | |
| | serve as an additional |
| | |
| | warning method. Additionally, it is recommended |
| | |
| | that radiographers |
| | |
| | disassemble |
| | |
| | the source guide tube, remove the drive controls, and install the safety plugs or covers, before moving the radiography |
| | |
| | exposure device to another location.The failure to do so has been identified |
| | |
| | as a contributing |
| | |
| | factor in the unintended |
| | |
| | exposure of personnel, as well as in incidents |
| | |
| | where radiographers |
| | |
| | failed to notice that the source was not retracted |
| | |
| | into the device.Sealed sources for radiography |
| | |
| | are capable of delivering |
| | |
| | significant |
| | |
| | exposures to radiography |
| | |
| | personnel |
| | |
| | and to members of the general public, when handled by individuals |
| | |
| | who are inattentive |
| | |
| | to radiation |
| | |
| | safety procedures. |
| | |
| | It is recommended |
| | |
| | that all workers understand |
| | |
| | the consequences |
| | |
| | of improperly |
| | |
| | handling radiographic |
| | |
| | devices, and that workers be encouraged |
| | |
| | to use necessary precautions |
| | |
| | when working with these devices. |
| | |
| | IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 No written response is required by this information |
| | |
| | notice.questions |
| | |
| | about this matter, please contact the appropriate |
| | |
| | office or the personnel |
| | |
| | listed below.If you have any NRC regional ( Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial |
| | |
| | and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Gary Shear, Region III (708) 790-5620 Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Charles Cain, Region IV (817) 860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS (301) 504-2514 Attachments:. |
| | |
| | 1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information |
| | |
| | Notices Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices |
| | |
| | IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 No written response is required by this information |
| | |
| | notice. If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about this matter, please contact the appropriate |
| | |
| | NRC regional office or the personnel |
| | |
| | listed below.Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial |
| | |
| | and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical |
| | |
| | contacts: Gary Shear, Region III (708) 790-5620 Charles Cain, Region IV (817) 860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS (301) 504-2514 Attachments: |
| | 1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information |
| | |
| | Notices Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices* = see Drevious concurrence |
| | |
| | OFC IMOB I E NMSS I N IMOB EIMABe n NAME *SMoore/sm/11 |
| | *EKraus *CJones *JGlenn DATE 11/30/92 10/19/92 12/08/92 12/09/92 OFC SCDB I E IMOB IMOB l El IMNS IMNS NAME *CHaughney |
| | |
| | *KRamsey *FCombs *JGreeves |
| | |
| | *RECunningham |
| | |
| | DATE 12/10/92 1 01/05/93 1 12/08/92 01/06/93 01/07/93 C: COVER E: COVER & ENCL.N: NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: 93-05.IN DOCUMENT NAME: |
| | IN 93-January , 1993 No written response is required by this information |
| | |
| | notice. If you have any questions |
| | |
| | about this matter, please contact the appropriate |
| | |
| | NRC regional office or the personnel |
| | |
| | listed below.Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial |
| | |
| | and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical |
| | |
| | Contacts: Gary Shear, 708-790-562C |
| | |
| | Region III Charles Cain, Region IV 817-860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS 301-504-2514 Attachments: |
| | 1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information |
| | |
| | Notices Issued NRC Information |
| | |
| | Notices* -caP nyVauiniiC |
| | |
| | anlnlnrranra |
| | |
| | -Fe F 9- y ... _OFC IMOB I E NMSS I Nj IMOB I E IMAB lNAME *SMoore/sm/l1 |
| | *EKraus *CJones *JGlenn nATr IllnQ/I2 1 1 12n iog 12/08/92 12/09/92 Unsu I II-IU ---v -S ~ ~ ~ ~ --r~OFC SCDB I E IMOB , IM0B I E IMNS _ NS NAME *CHaughney |
| | |
| | KRamsey K 4 *FCombs y Aves ham DATE 12/10/92 I/ E 91q 3 ,f 12/8/92 I / ____ 3 I_ _ / __ __ a :_ I C: COVER E: COVER & LNCL.N: NU WLI OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: G:LOCKING.SWM |
| | |
| | IN 92-December , 1992 No written response is required by this information |
| | |
| | notice.questions |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances==
| | about this matter, please contact the appropriate |
| Case 1: A radiographer was overexposed in an incident involving adisconnected source when he failed to conduct a survey after each exposure.After investigating the incident, it was discovered that the radiographer hadapproached the device without a survey instrument, locked the device,disassembled the source guide tube, and left the drive controls connectedbefore moving the device from one location to another. The radiographer hadincorrectly assumed that in locking the exposure device, he had secured thesource in a shielded position. In fact, the sealed source remained in theguide tube because the pigtail had disconnected from the drive cable. Theradiographer's error was further compounded when the drive cable was notremoved before moving the device, which would have allowed him to identify theabsence of the source pigtail within the shielded assembly.Case 2: A radiographer was performing radiographic exposures of welds on aseries of pipelines that were located approximately 6.1 meters (20 feet) aboveground. The radiographer used a 1.8-meter (6-foot) guide tube with collimatorand a 7.6-meter (25-foot) control cable. The radiographer hung the devicefrom the pipeline to perform the work with the control cables hanging down tothe ground. After an exposure, the radiographer retracted the source, placedthe control cables on the ground, and used a hydraulic lift to get to thecamera.9301080120 L4'6 fD C fe -2?- 0AIkCct
| |
|
| |
|
| IN 93-05January 14, 1993 Because the camera was suspended above the lift, the radiographer had to movethe camera to reach the locking mechanism. He moved the camera by graspingthe control cables with his right hand and locking the camera with his lefthand. He continued with his left hand to disconnect the guide tube from thecamera. At this point, he noticed that the sealed source was protrudingapproximately 10 centimeters (4 inches) from the camera port. (Note: Hisalarming ratemeter did not sound because it was not turned on. This violationof 10 CFR 34.33, which can result in a civil penalty, is addressed inInformation Notice 91-49: "Enforcement of Safety Requirements forRadiographers").Reenactments of the incident showed that when the radiographer turned thedevice, the crank handle could drag on the ground, exposing the sealed source.The radiographer was then able to lock the device over the drive cable, withthe sealed source protruding approximately 10 centimeters (4 inches).Analysis of the locking mechanism after the event did not identify any obviousdefects with the mechanism. Tests performed showed that the device couldstill be locked with the source in the exposed position.NRC Evaluation:The findings in both of these cases raised concern among NRC staff that, undercertain conditions, radiographers could have false confidence in the lockingmechanisms. If exposure devices can lock when the source is outside of theshielded position, then radiographers could incorrectly believe that they areprotected from exposure when, in fact, the source is not in its fully shieldedposition. We are also concerned that exposure devices are moved while thedrive cables are still connected.To evaluate the effectiveness of the locking mechanism on radiography exposuredevices and to determine whether radiographers commonly move the devices withdrive cables still connected, NRC inspectors observed licensee equipment testsand interviewed radiography personnel. From the data collected, we determinedthat a majority of exposure devices can be locked when the source is in avariety of positions, rather than only when the source pigtail is properlyseated, with the source in the fully shielded position. Many source pigtailsinclude a "locking ball," designed to prevent the source from moving forwardwhen the lock is engaged; however, our observations show that some exposuredevices may be locked both when the source is not fully retracted and whilethe drive cable is seated under the locking pin, thereby circumventing thelocking-ball feature. This may result in a source being positioned where itis not fully shielded.Many radiographers acknowledged to NRC inspectors that they often leave drivecables connected when moving an exposure device from one location to anotherat temporary job sites. In addition, some acknowledged leaving the guide tubeconnected. One licensee stated that this practice had resulted in a sourcebeing forced out of the exposure device while the device was carried to a newlocation at a temporary job site. This licensee noted that the device waslocked at the time, but the source had not been fully retracted before lockingthe device.
| | office or the personnel |
|
| |
|
| Attachment 1IN 93-05January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-0493-0392-8492-72Investigation and Re-porting of Misadministra-tions by the RadiationSafety OfficerRecent Revision to10 CFR Part 20 andChange of Implementa-tion Date toJanuary 1, 1994Release of PatientsTreated with TemporaryImplantsEmployee Trainingand Shipper Registra-tion Requirements forTransporting RadioactiveMaterialsEmergency ResponseInformation Require-ments for RadioactiveMaterial ShipmentsUranium HexafluorideCylinders -Deviationsin Coupling WeldsImplementation Date forthe Revision to the EPAManual of ProtectiveAction Guides and Pro-tective Actions forNuclear IncidentsImplementation of theDeliberate Misconduct Rule01/07/9301/05/9312/17/9210/18/9208/24/9208/12/9205/12/9205/08/9292-62All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medicallicensees.All byproduct, source, andspecial nuclear materiallicensees.All Nuclear Regulatory Com-mission Medical Licensees.All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Licensees.All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Licensees.All fuel cycle licensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors,non-power reactors andmaterials licensees author-ized to possess largequantities of radioactivematerial.All Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Licensees.92-5892-3892-37 Attachment 2IN 93-05January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to93-0493-0393-02Investigation and Re-porting of Misadministra-tions by the RadiationSafety OfficerRecent Revision to10 CFR Part 20 andChange of Implementa-tion Date toJanuary 1, 1994Malfunction of A Pres-surizer Code SafetyValveAccuracy of Motor-Operated Valve DiagnosticEquipment Manufacturesby Liberty TechnologiesUnexpected Restrictionto Thermal Growth ofReactor Coolant PipingPotential Failures ofEmergency Core CoolingSystems Caused byForeign Material Blockage93-0101/07/9301/05/9301/04/9301/04/9312/24/9212/23/9212/17/9212/18/92All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission medicallicensees.All byproduct, source, andspecial nuclear materiallicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Medical LicenseesAll holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.92-8692-8592-84Release of PatientsTreated with TemporaryImplants88-23,Supp. 4Potential for GasBinding of High-Pres-sure Safety InjectionPumps during A DesignBasis AccidentOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
| | listed below.If you have any NRC regional Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial |
|
| |
|
| K)IN 93-05January 14, 1993 Discussion:All licensees are reminded of the importance of ensuring that the sources usedin radiography exposure devices are properly secured and fully shielded beforemoving the device. Radiographic exposure devices manufactured and newequipment acquired by licensees after January 10, 1992, must meet new designrequirements in 10 CFR 34.20. These require that, among other safetyfeatures, the device must automatically secure the source assembly when it iscranked back into the fully shielded position within the device. However,many radiographic exposure devices currently in use do not include the newersafety features, and licensees are not required to use devices that complywith 10 CFR 34.20 requirements until after January 10, 1996. Certaihradiogiraphv exposure devices still in use today may be able to be locked withthe source in the exposed position.Experience has shown that when an older exposure device is in use, the lockingmechanism is not an indicator that the source is fully retracted and secured.The use of engineered safety features, like the lock mechanism, MUST BEcoupled with a proper survey (10 CFR 34.43) AND use of an alarm ratemeter(10 CFR 34.33), to prevent the unintentional exposure of personnel. Surveysmust be sufficient to detect a change in exposure readings taken at the sourcetube outlet, to determine whether the source is fully retracted to a shieldedposition (10 CFR 34.43). Alarm ratemeters serve as an additional warningmethod. Additionally, it is recommended that radiographers disassemble thesource guide tube, remove the drive controls, and install the safety plugs orcovers, before moving the radiography exposure device to another location.The failure to do so has been identified as a contributing factor in theunintended exposure of personnel, as well as in incidents where radiographersfailed to notice that the source was not retracted into the device.Sealed sources for radiography are capable of delivering significant exposuresto radiography personnel and to members of the general public, when handled byindividuals who are inattentive to radiation safety procedures. It isrecommended that all workers understand the consequences of improperlyhandling radiographic devices, and that workers be encouraged to use necessaryprecautions when working with these devices.
| | and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical |
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| |
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| IN 93-05January 14, 993No written response is required by this information notice.questions about this matter, please contact the appropriateoffice or the personnel listed below.If you have anyNRC regional( Richard E. Cunningham, DirectorDivision Industrial andMedical Nuclear Safety, NMSSGary Shear, Region III(708) 790-5620Technical contacts:Charles Cain, Region IV(817) 860-8186Scott Moore, NMSS(301) 504-2514Attachments:.1. List of Recently2. List of RecentlyIssued NMSS Information NoticesIssued NRC Information Notices
| | Contacts: |
| | Gary Shear, Region III 708-790-5620 |
| | \m Charles Cain, Region IV 817-860-8186 cott Moore, NMSS 01-504-2514 Attachments: |
| | 1. List of Recently Issued NHSS Information |
|
| |
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| IN 93-05January 14, 1993 :93-05.INDOCUMENT NAME:
| | Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NR nformation |
| IN 93-January , 1993 : G:LOCKING.SWM
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| IN 92-December , 1992 : G:LOCKING.SWM
| | Notices OFC HQ IEI M A INI -AIEI AB IA NAME ro I _I ______I____/_ |
| | I_____DATE ii /o30/92 10/19/92/A/ I/92\6 I,9I1/92 OFC SCDB IM Io IIi I MNS IMNS NAME CH ge KRamsey = Uo X xJGreeves |
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| }} | | ===RECunninghim=== |
| | DATE It/la /92 j9/ /92 81I _2 /_/92 //92_C: COVER E: COVER & ENCL.N: NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: G:LOCKING.SWM}} |
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| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Locking of Radiography Exposure DevicesML031080041 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
01/14/1993 |
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From: |
Cunningham R E NRC/NMSS/IMNS |
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To: |
|
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References |
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FOIA/PA-2015-0150 IN-93-005, NUDOCS 9301080120 |
Download: ML031080041 (9) |
|
Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 January 14, 1993 NRC INFORMATION
NOTICE NO. 93-05: LOCKING OF RADIOGRAPHY
EXPOSURE DEVICES
Addressees
All Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
industrial
radiography
licensees
Purpose
This information
notice is intended to: (a) alert licensees
that the locking mechanisms
on certain industrial
radiography
exposure devices can be locked with the sealed source in the exposed position;
and (b) emphasize
the importance
of ensuring that the source is secure in a shielded position before moving the device. We expect that licensees
will review this notice, distribute
it to responsible
staff, and consider actions, if appropriate, to verify that the source is properly secured at the conclusion
of radiographic
operations.
However, suggestions
contained
in this notice do not constitute
any new NRC requirements, and no written response is required.Description
of Circumstances
Case 1: A radiographer
was overexposed
in an incident involving
a disconnected
source when he failed to conduct a survey after each exposure.After investigating
the incident, it was discovered
that the radiographer
had approached
the device without a survey instrument, locked the device, disassembled
the source guide tube, and left the drive controls connected before moving the device from one location to another. The radiographer
had incorrectly
assumed that in locking the exposure device, he had secured the source in a shielded position.
In fact, the sealed source remained in the guide tube because the pigtail had disconnected
from the drive cable. The radiographer's
error was further compounded
when the drive cable was not removed before moving the device, which would have allowed him to identify the absence of the source pigtail within the shielded assembly.Case 2: A radiographer
was performing
radiographic
exposures
of welds on a series of pipelines
that were located approximately
6.1 meters (20 feet) above ground. The radiographer
used a 1.8-meter
(6-foot) guide tube with collimator
and a 7.6-meter
(25-foot)
control cable. The radiographer
hung the device from the pipeline to perform the work with the control cables hanging down to the ground. After an exposure, the radiographer
retracted
the source, placed the control cables on the ground, and used a hydraulic
lift to get to the camera.9301080120
L4'6 fD C fe -2?- 0A Ik Cct
IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 Because the camera was suspended
above the lift, the radiographer
had to move the camera to reach the locking mechanism.
He moved the camera by grasping the control cables with his right hand and locking the camera with his left hand. He continued
with his left hand to disconnect
the guide tube from the camera. At this point, he noticed that the sealed source was protruding
approximately
10 centimeters
(4 inches) from the camera port. (Note: His alarming ratemeter
did not sound because it was not turned on. This violation of 10 CFR 34.33, which can result in a civil penalty, is addressed
in Information
Notice 91-49: "Enforcement
of Safety Requirements
for Radiographers").
Reenactments
of the incident showed that when the radiographer
turned the device, the crank handle could drag on the ground, exposing the sealed source.The radiographer
was then able to lock the device over the drive cable, with the sealed source protruding
approximately
10 centimeters
(4 inches).Analysis of the locking mechanism
after the event did not identify any obvious defects with the mechanism.
Tests performed
showed that the device could still be locked with the source in the exposed position.NRC Evaluation:
The findings in both of these cases raised concern among NRC staff that, under certain conditions, radiographers
could have false confidence
in the locking mechanisms.
If exposure devices can lock when the source is outside of the shielded position, then radiographers
could incorrectly
believe that they are protected
from exposure when, in fact, the source is not in its fully shielded position.
We are also concerned
that exposure devices are moved while the drive cables are still connected.
To evaluate the effectiveness
of the locking mechanism
on radiography
exposure devices and to determine
whether radiographers
commonly move the devices with drive cables still connected, NRC inspectors
observed licensee equipment
tests and interviewed
radiography
personnel.
From the data collected, we determined
that a majority of exposure devices can be locked when the source is in a variety of positions, rather than only when the source pigtail is properly seated, with the source in the fully shielded position.
Many source pigtails include a "locking ball," designed to prevent the source from moving forward when the lock is engaged; however, our observations
show that some exposure devices may be locked both when the source is not fully retracted
and while the drive cable is seated under the locking pin, thereby circumventing
the locking-ball
feature. This may result in a source being positioned
where it is not fully shielded.Many radiographers
acknowledged
to NRC inspectors
that they often leave drive cables connected
when moving an exposure device from one location to another at temporary
job sites. In addition, some acknowledged
leaving the guide tube connected.
One licensee stated that this practice had resulted in a source being forced out of the exposure device while the device was carried to a new location at a temporary
job site. This licensee noted that the device was locked at the time, but the source had not been fully retracted
before locking the device.
Attachment
1 IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-04 93-03 92-84 92-72 Investigation
and Re-porting of Misadministra- tions by the Radiation Safety Officer Recent Revision to 10 CFR Part 20 and Change of Implementa- tion Date to January 1, 1994 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants Employee Training and Shipper Registra-tion Requirements
for Transporting
Radioactive
Materials Emergency
Response Information
Require-ments for Radioactive
Material Shipments Uranium Hexafluoride
Cylinders
-Deviations
in Coupling Welds Implementation
Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective
Action Guides and Pro-tective Actions for Nuclear Incidents Implementation
of the Deliberate
Misconduct
Rule 01/07/93 01/05/93 12/17/92 10/18/92 08/24/92 08/12/92 05/12/92 05/08/92 92-62 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
medical licensees.
All byproduct, source, and special nuclear material licensees.
All Nuclear Regulatory
Com-mission Medical Licensees.
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Licensees.
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Licensees.
All fuel cycle licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors, non-power
reactors and materials
licensees
author-ized to possess large quantities
of radioactive
material.All Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Licensees.
92-58 92-38 92-37 Attachment
2 IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
NOTICES Information
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-04 93-03 93-02 Investigation
and Re-porting of Misadministra- tions by the Radiation Safety Officer Recent Revision to 10 CFR Part 20 and Change of Implementa- tion Date to January 1, 1994 Malfunction
of A Pres-surizer Code Safety Valve Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic
Equipment
Manufactures
by Liberty Technologies
Unexpected
Restriction
to Thermal Growth of Reactor Coolant Piping Potential
Failures of Emergency
Core Cooling Systems Caused by Foreign Material Blockage 93-01 01/07/93 01/05/93 01/04/93 01/04/93 12/24/92 12/23/92 12/17/92 12/18/92 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
medical licensees.
All byproduct, source, and special nuclear material licensees.
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
Medical Licensees All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-86 92-85 92-84 Release of Patients Treated with Temporary Implants 88-23, Supp. 4 Potential
for Gas Binding of High-Pres- sure Safety Injection Pumps during A Design Basis Accident OL = Operating
License CP = Construction
Permit
K)IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 Discussion:
All licensees
are reminded of the importance
of ensuring that the sources used in radiography
exposure devices are properly secured and fully shielded before moving the device. Radiographic
exposure devices manufactured
and new equipment
acquired by licensees
after January 10, 1992, must meet new design requirements
in 10 CFR 34.20. These require that, among other safety features, the device must automatically
secure the source assembly when it is cranked back into the fully shielded position within the device. However, many radiographic
exposure devices currently
in use do not include the newer safety features, and licensees
are not required to use devices that comply with 10 CFR 34.20 requirements
until after January 10, 1996. Certaih radiogiraphv
exposure devices still in use today may be able to be locked with the source in the exposed position.Experience
has shown that when an older exposure device is in use, the locking mechanism
is not an indicator
that the source is fully retracted
and secured.The use of engineered
safety features, like the lock mechanism, MUST BE coupled with a proper survey (10 CFR 34.43) AND use of an alarm ratemeter (10 CFR 34.33), to prevent the unintentional
exposure of personnel.
Surveys must be sufficient
to detect a change in exposure readings taken at the source tube outlet, to determine
whether the source is fully retracted
to a shielded position (10 CFR 34.43). Alarm ratemeters
serve as an additional
warning method. Additionally, it is recommended
that radiographers
disassemble
the source guide tube, remove the drive controls, and install the safety plugs or covers, before moving the radiography
exposure device to another location.The failure to do so has been identified
as a contributing
factor in the unintended
exposure of personnel, as well as in incidents
where radiographers
failed to notice that the source was not retracted
into the device.Sealed sources for radiography
are capable of delivering
significant
exposures to radiography
personnel
and to members of the general public, when handled by individuals
who are inattentive
to radiation
safety procedures.
It is recommended
that all workers understand
the consequences
of improperly
handling radiographic
devices, and that workers be encouraged
to use necessary precautions
when working with these devices.
IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 No written response is required by this information
notice.questions
about this matter, please contact the appropriate
office or the personnel
listed below.If you have any NRC regional ( Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial
and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Gary Shear, Region III (708) 790-5620 Technical
contacts: Charles Cain, Region IV (817) 860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS (301) 504-2514 Attachments:.
1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
Notices Issued NRC Information
Notices
IN 93-05 January 14, 1993 No written response is required by this information
notice. If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact the appropriate
NRC regional office or the personnel
listed below.Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial
and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical
contacts: Gary Shear, Region III (708) 790-5620 Charles Cain, Region IV (817) 860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS (301) 504-2514 Attachments:
1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
Notices Issued NRC Information
Notices* = see Drevious concurrence
OFC IMOB I E NMSS I N IMOB EIMABe n NAME *SMoore/sm/11
- EKraus *CJones *JGlenn DATE 11/30/92 10/19/92 12/08/92 12/09/92 OFC SCDB I E IMOB IMOB l El IMNS IMNS NAME *CHaughney
- KRamsey *FCombs *JGreeves
DATE 12/10/92 1 01/05/93 1 12/08/92 01/06/93 01/07/93 C: COVER E: COVER & ENCL.N: NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: 93-05.IN DOCUMENT NAME:
IN 93-January , 1993 No written response is required by this information
notice. If you have any questions
about this matter, please contact the appropriate
NRC regional office or the personnel
listed below.Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial
and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical
Contacts: Gary Shear, 708-790-562C
Region III Charles Cain, Region IV 817-860-8186 Scott Moore, NMSS 301-504-2514 Attachments:
1. List of Recently 2. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
Notices Issued NRC Information
Notices* -caP nyVauiniiC
anlnlnrranra
-Fe F 9- y ... _OFC IMOB I E NMSS I Nj IMOB I E IMAB lNAME *SMoore/sm/l1
- EKraus *CJones *JGlenn nATr IllnQ/I2 1 1 12n iog 12/08/92 12/09/92 Unsu I II-IU ---v -S ~ ~ ~ ~ --r~OFC SCDB I E IMOB , IM0B I E IMNS _ NS NAME *CHaughney
KRamsey K 4 *FCombs y Aves ham DATE 12/10/92 I/ E 91q 3 ,f 12/8/92 I / ____ 3 I_ _ / __ __ a :_ I C: COVER E: COVER & LNCL.N: NU WLI OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: G:LOCKING.SWM
IN 92-December , 1992 No written response is required by this information
notice.questions
about this matter, please contact the appropriate
office or the personnel
listed below.If you have any NRC regional Richard E. Cunningham, Director Division Industrial
and Medical Nuclear Safety, NMSS Technical
Contacts:
Gary Shear, Region III 708-790-5620
\m Charles Cain, Region IV 817-860-8186 cott Moore, NMSS 01-504-2514 Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NHSS Information
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NR nformation
Notices OFC HQ IEI M A INI -AIEI AB IA NAME ro I _I ______I____/_
I_____DATE ii /o30/92 10/19/92/A/ I/92\6 I,9I1/92 OFC SCDB IM Io IIi I MNS IMNS NAME CH ge KRamsey = Uo X xJGreeves
RECunninghim
DATE It/la /92 j9/ /92 81I _2 /_/92 //92_C: COVER E: COVER & ENCL.N: NO COPY OFFICIAL RECORD COPY: G:LOCKING.SWM
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list | - Information Notice 1993-01, Accuracy of Motor-Operated Valve Diagnostic Equipment Manufactured by Liberty Technologies (4 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-02, Malfunction of a Pressurizer Code Safety Valve (4 January 1993, Topic: Loop seal)
- Information Notice 1993-04, Investigation and Reporting of Misadministrations by the Radiation Safety Officer (7 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-05, Locking of Radiography Exposure Devices (14 January 1993, Topic: Uranium Hexafluoride)
- Information Notice 1993-06, Potential Bypass Leakage Paths Around Filters Installed in Ventilation Systems (22 January 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-07, Classification of Transportation Emergencies (1 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-08, Failure of Residual Heat Removal Pump Bearings Due to High Thrust Loading (1 February 1993, Topic: Probabilistic Risk Assessment)
- Information Notice 1993-09, Failure of Undervoltage Trip Attachment on Westinghouse Model DB-50 Reactor Trip Breaker (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-10, Dose Calibrator Quality Control (2 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-11, Single Failure Vulnerability of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (4 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-12, Off-Gassing in Auxiliary Feedwater System Raw Water Sources (11 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-13, Undetected Modification of Flow Characteristics in High Pressure Safety Injection System (16 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-14, Clarification of 10 CFR 40.22, Small Quantities of Source Material (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-15, Failure to Verify the Continuity of Shunt Trip Attachment Contacts in Manual Safety Injection and Reactor Trip Switches (18 February 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-16, Failures of Not-Locking Devices in Check Valves (19 February 1993, Topic: Anchor Darling, Flow Induced Vibration)
- Information Notice 1993-17, Safety Systems Response to Loss of Coolant and Loss of Offsite Power (25 March 1994, Topic: Fire Barrier, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1993-18, Portable Moisture-Density Gauge User Responsibilities During Field Operations (10 March 1993, Topic: Moisture Density Gauge, Moisture-Density Gauge, Stolen)
- Information Notice 1993-19, Slab Hopper Bulging (17 March 1993, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1993-20, Thermal Fatigue Cracking of Feedwater Piping to Steam Generators (24 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-21, Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs (25 March 1993, Topic: Weld Overlay)
- Information Notice 1993-22, Tripping of Klockner-Moeller Molded-Case Circuit Breakers Due to Support Lever Failure (26 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-23, Weschler Instruments Model 252 Switchboard Meters (31 March 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-24, Distribution of Revision 7 of NUREG-1021, Operation Licensing Examiner Standards (31 March 1993, Topic: Job Performance Measure)
- Information Notice 1993-25, Electrical Penetration Assembly Degradation (1 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-26, Grease Soldification Causes Molded-Case Circuit Breaker Failure to Close (31 January 1994)
- Information Notice 1993-27, Level Instrumentation Inaccuracies Observed During Normal Plant Depressurization (8 April 1993, Topic: Reactor Vessel Water Level)
- Information Notice 1993-28, Failure to Consider Loss of DC Bus in the Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation May Lead to Nonconservative Analysis (9 April 1993, Topic: Fuel cladding)
- Information Notice 1993-29, Problems with the Use of Unshielded Test Leads in Reactor Protection System Circuitry (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-30, NRC Requirements for Evaluation of Wipe Test Results; Calibration of Count Rate Survey Instruments (12 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-31, Training of Nurses Responsible for the Care of Patients with Brachytherapy Implants (13 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-32, Nonconservative Inputs for Boron Dilution Events Analysis (21 April 1993, Topic: Shutdown Margin)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class Ie Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-33, Potential Deficiency of Certain Class IE Instrumental and Control Cables (28 April 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-34, Potential for Loss of Emergency Cooling Function Due to a Combination of Operational and Post-LOCA Debris in Containment (6 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-35, Insights from Common-Cause Failure Events (12 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-36, Notifications, Reports, and Records of Misadministrations (7 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-37, Eyebolts with Indeterminate Properties Installed in Limitorque Valve Operator Housing Covers (19 May 1993, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1993-38, Inadequate Testing of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (24 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams From Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-39, Radiation Beams from Power Reactor Biological Shields (25 May 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-40, Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Fire Barrier Material (26 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier, Fire Protection Program)
- Information Notice 1993-41, One Hour Fire Endurance Test Results for Thermal Ceramics Kaowool, 3M Company FS-195 and 3M Company Interam E-50 Fire Barrier Systems (28 May 1993, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1993-42, Failure of Anti-Rotation Keys in Motor-Operated Valves Manufactured by Yelan (9 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-43, Use of Inappropriate Lubrication Oils in Satety-Related Applications (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-44, Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient (15 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-45, Degradation of Shutdown Cooling System Performance (16 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-46, Potential Problem with Westinghouse Rod Control System and Inadvertent Withdrawal of Single Rod Control Cluster Assembly (10 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-47, Unrecognized Loss of Control Room Annunciators (18 June 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-48, Failure of Turbine-Driven Main Feedwater Pump to Trip Because of Contaminated Oil (6 July 1993)
- Information Notice 1993-49, Improper Integration of Software Into Operating Practices (8 July 1993)
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