Information Notice 1992-39, Unplanned Return to Criticality During Reactor Shutdown: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 12
| page count = 12
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555May 13, 1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-39: UNPLANNED RETURN TO CRITICALITY DURINGREACTOR SHUTDOWN
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 13, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 92-39: UNPLANNED
 
RETURN TO CRITICALITY
 
DURING REACTOR SHUTDOWN


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice to alert addressees to recent events involving unplanned returns tocriticality caused by the cooldown of the reactor coolant system during reactorshutdowns. It is expected that recipients will review the information forapplicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, toavoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this informationnotice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to recent events involving
 
unplanned
 
returns to criticality
 
caused by the cooldown of the reactor coolant system during reactor shutdowns.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
The licensees
 
for the following
 
plants recently experienced
 
unplanned criticalities
 
during reactor shutdowns:
the Monticello
 
===Nuclear Generating===
Plant, the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.Monticello
 
On June 6, 1991, an unplanned
 
criticality
 
occurred at the Monticello
 
Nuclear Generating
 
Plant during a reactor shutdown when an unanticipated
 
cooldown occurred in conjunction
 
with rod insertion.
 
The licensee initiated
 
this shutdown to repair a leaking safety-relief
 
valve shortly after the plant was returning
 
to power following
 
a refueling
 
outage.Since this shutdown occurred shortly after the cycle startup, the reactor did not generate sufficient
 
decay heat to produce the steam needed to supply the normal steam system loads and still maintain pressure in the reactor. As control rods were being inserted using notch insertion, the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature
 
began to decrease.
 
As long as the operator continued
 
to insert control rods, the reactor remained subcritical.
 
However, when the operator stopped inserting
 
control rods to review and evaluate plant conditions, the cooldown continued, adding sufficient
 
reactivity
 
to overcome the negative reactivity
 
from the insertion
 
of control rods and causing the reactor power to increase.
 
The reactor power continued
 
to 92050_*,, C j'A i / 1 ( / /CDQc
 
K)IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 increase until an intermediate-range
 
monitor (IRM) tripped on a high-high
 
flux setpoint, causing a reactor scram.Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report 50-263/91-15 or NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-263/91-13.
 
Big Rock Point On November 30, 1991, an unplanned
 
criticality
 
occurred at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred in conjunction
 
with a rod insertion.
 
The event occurred during a scheduled
 
shutdown for a refueling
 
outage.After taking the main turbine off line and bringing the reactor to a subcritical
 
condition, the licensee delayed actions to continue inserting control rods while changing shifts. However, the reactor coolant system continued
 
to cool down because the normal steam system loads were removing heat. The cooldown added sufficient
 
reactivity
 
to eventually
 
overcome the effects of the control rods, and the reactor returned critical.
 
The operators noticed the condition
 
in approximately
 
2 minutes and took the appropriate
 
actions to return the reactor subcritical.
 
Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report 50-155/91-OO9-orJNRC-Inspection-Report
 
50-155/91-25.
 
_ _ _Grand Gulf On December 30, 1991, an unplanned
 
criticality
 
occurred at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred in conjunction
 
with a rod insertion.
 
The event occurred during a scheduled shutdown for a maintenance
 
outage to replace a recirculation
 
pump shaft. To minimize the release of plated-out
 
radioactive
 
material from the fuel cladding and channels to the reactor coolant system, a slow power reduction
 
and a slow cooldown were prescribed
 
for this shutdown.The slow power reduction
 
and the effects of an earlier outage minimized
 
reactor decay heat and xenon peaking. The operators
 
were driving rods into the core individually
 
because gang drive for the control rods was unavailable.
 
This made the reactivity
 
insertion
 
slower than normal. The operators
 
inserted rods to reduce flux to range 3 on the IRMs and stopped rod insertion
 
in order to perform a source range monitor surveillance.
 
Indicated
 
power reached IRM range 1. However, the reactor coolant system continued
 
to cool down because the normal steam system loads were removing heat. In order not to affect the source range monitor surveillance, the shift supervisor
 
elected to not insert control rods and alerted the operators
 
to the possibility
 
of a return to criticality
 
as the cooldown continued.
 
The reactivity
 
added by the cooldown eventually
 
overcame the effects of the control rods. The reactor returned to a critical condition, and reactor power increased
 
on a reactor period between 300 to 800 seconds. The operators, having been trained on a similar event at another BWR, were monitoring
 
the condition
 
and expected the power to increase to the point of adding heat, where the fuel and moderator
 
temperature
 
coeffi-cients would halt the reactor power increase.
 
As the power increased, the
 
IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power level remained on scale. The power increase was terminated
 
with the IRMs reading on range 7 and 8. The operators
 
completed
 
the source range monitor surveillance, then resumed inserting
 
rods and successfully
 
completed
 
the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
The experience
 
at Monticello, Big Rock Point, and Grand Gulf indicates
 
that shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control if inadvertent
 
recritica- lity is to be prevented.
 
These events emphasize
 
the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.
 
Further, accepting
 
recriticality
 
without prior management
 
approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity
 
for contin-gency planning.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Va&res'E.Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
z I-0.<OD n; co> 0 m Z.4-m rn o 0 0 z Z G2-cn a En z* om o) Z en q-n M 0n a 0 n a -h <-Attachment
 
1 IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
===NOTICES Date of Information===
information
 
Notice No.92-38 1 92-37 92-16, Supp. 1 I 92-36' 92-35 Subject Implementation
 
Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective
 
Action Guides and Pro-tective Actions for Nuclear Incidents Implementation
 
of the Deliberate
 
Nisconduct
 
Rule Loss of Flow from the Re-sidual Heat Removal Pump during Refueling
 
Cavity Draindown Intersystem
 
===LOCA Outside Containment===
Higher Than Predicted
 
Ero-sion/Corrosion
 
in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping Inside Containment
 
at A Boiling Water Reactor New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased
 
Instrument
 
Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Issuance 05/12/92 05/08/92 05/07/92 05/07/92 05/06/92 Issued to All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors, non-power
 
reactors and materials
 
licensees
 
auth-orized to possess large quantities
 
of radioactive
 
material.All Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
Licensees.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.-u 0 rn>mD-C > 0 u) D-D2 zzz>0 92-34 92-33 I CP -'05/06/92 All licensees
 
whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations
 
of uranium and thorium.04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.(Operating
 
License Construction
 
Permit
 
IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power level remained on scale. The power increase was terminated
 
with the IRMs reading on range 7 and 8. The operators
 
completed
 
the source range monitor surveillance, then resumed inserting
 
rods and successfully
 
completed
 
the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
The experience
 
at Monticello, Big Rock Point, and Grand Gulf indicates
 
that shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control if inadvertent
 
recritica- lity is to be prevented.
 
These events emphasize
 
the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.
 
Further, accepting
 
recriticality
 
without prior management
 
approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity
 
for contin-gency planning.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original Signed by Nhedes E, Rossi Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB
 
ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB
 
C:DOEA:OEAB
 
NAME GWright* PO'Connor*
RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB
 
D X, NAME CBerlinger*
DATE 04/21/92 05/ 7/92 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-39 IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
The experience
 
at Big Rock Point, Grand Gulf, and Monticello
 
indicates
 
that shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control if inadvertent
 
recriticality
 
is to be prevented.
 
These events emphasize
 
the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.
 
Further, accepting
 
recriticality
 
without prior management
 
approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity
 
for contin-gency planning.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB
 
ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB
 
C:DOEA:OEAB
 
NAME GWright* PO'Connor*
RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB
 
D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger*
CRoss tD DATE 04/21/92 /9 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENKIG
 
IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition
 
during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality
 
can be inappropriate
 
if the licensed operators
 
do not have management's
 
oversight, training, and specific procedures
 
for this.The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control and require the operator and management
 
to give careful attention
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
The events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB
 
ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB
 
C:DOEA:OEAB
 
NAME GWright* PO'Connor*
RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DO J f D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger
 
CRosswa'y DATE f/;11/9 2/ 92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG
 
IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition
 
during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
In the event of recriticality, promptly inserting
 
control rods and terminating
 
the cooldown are more conservative
 
actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature
 
to reverse the direction
 
of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality
 
can be inappropriate
 
if the licensed operators
 
do not have management's
 
oversight, training, and specific procedures.
 
The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control and require the operator and management
 
to give careful attention
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
The events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR IV t'/ ' f'(301) 504-1307 4.f, Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEC
 
OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB
 
ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB
 
C:D0EA:OEAB
 
NAME GWright* PO'Connor*
RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 q1/t3/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB
 
D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger
 
CRossi DATE / /92 / /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG
 
IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition
 
during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
In the event of recriticality, promptly inserting
 
control rods and terminating
 
the cooldown are more conservative
 
actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature
 
to reverse the direction
 
of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality
 
can be inappropriate
 
if the licensed operators
 
do not have management's
 
oversight, training, and specific procedures.
 
The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control and require the operator and management
 
to give careful attention
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
The events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, 'RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB
 
ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB
 
C:DOEA:OEAB
 
NAME GWright* PO'Connor (OK RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee DATE 03/11/92 3 /17/92 Xis 192 03/11/92 03/13/92 / /92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB
 
D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger
 
CRossi DATE / /92 / /92 IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition
 
during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
Since recriti-cality has not been avoided, promptly inserting
 
control rods and terminating
 
the cooldown are more conservative
 
actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature
 
to reverse the direction
 
of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriti-cality can be inappropriate
 
if the licensed operators
 
do not have management's
 
oversight, training, and specific procedures.
 
The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a unique challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control and require the operator and management
 
to give careful attention
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
The events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance
 
of the operator giving continuous
 
attention
 
to plant parameters
 
during a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFC :RIII :S Oq;:EfAB:ADM:RPB
 
:C:D B :C:DOEA:OEAB
 
:C:DOEA:OGCB
 
:D:DOEA-____ _ _________----
_ --____________
----_ -:---------------
NAME :GWright*
:Rbennig :JMain* j Jones :AChaffee
 
:CBerlinger
 
:CRossi DATE :03/11/92
:3 /11/92 :03/11/92
: /13/92 : / /92 : / /92 : / /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG
 
Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
Given that recriticality
 
has not been avoided, prompt insertion
 
of control rods and termination
 
of the cooldown are more conservative
 
actions than upranging
 
IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on temperature
 
coefficients
 
to turn power.Upranging
 
IRMs in the event of recriticality
 
can be inappropriate
 
if management
 
oversight, prior training, and specific procedures
 
are absent.The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a particular
 
challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control, and require heightened
 
operator and management
 
awareness
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
In addition, the events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point highlight
 
the importance
 
of continuous
 
operator attention
 
to plant parameters
 
in the course of a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices OFC :RIII :SC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB
 
:C:DST:SRXB
 
:C:DOEA:OEAB
 
:C:DOEA:OGCB
 
:D:DOEA NAME :GWright :RDennig :JMain_ w :RJones :AChaffee
 
:CBerlinger
 
:CRossi DATE ://92 :1/92 :3/11 /92 :1/92 ://92 :1 /92 :/ /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG/DUP
 
IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection
 
Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.
 
Discussion
 
The underlying
 
principle
 
of reactivity
 
management
 
is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition
 
by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding
 
to the plant's changing parameters.
 
Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical
 
condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance
 
that the reactor be maintained
 
in that subcritical
 
condition.
 
Given that recriticality
 
has not been avoided, prompt insertion
 
of control rods and termination
 
of the cooldown are more conservative
 
actions than upranging IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on temperature
 
coefficients
 
to turn power.Upranging
 
IRMs in the event of recriticality
 
can be inappropriate
 
if management
 
oversight, prior training, and specific procedures
 
are absent.The experience
 
at Grand Gulf and Monticello
 
indicate that slow shutdowns
 
in situations
 
with low decay heat present a particular
 
challenge
 
to reactivity
 
control, and require heightened
 
operator and management
 
awareness
 
to avoid recriticality.
 
In addition, the events at Monticello
 
and Big Rock Point highlight
 
the importance
 
of continuous
 
operator attention
 
to plant parameters
 
in the course of a shutdown.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate


==Description of Circumstances==
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
The licensees for the following plants recently experienced unplannedcriticalities during reactor shutdowns: the Monticello Nuclear GeneratingPlant, the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.MonticelloOn June 6, 1991, an unplanned criticality occurred at the Monticello NuclearGenerating Plant during a reactor shutdown when an unanticipated cooldownoccurred in conjunction with rod insertion. The licensee initiated thisshutdown to repair a leaking safety-relief valve shortly after the plant wasreturning to power following a refueling outage.Since this shutdown occurred shortly after the cycle startup, the reactor didnot generate sufficient decay heat to produce the steam needed to supply thenormal steam system loads and still maintain pressure in the reactor. Ascontrol rods were being inserted using notch insertion, the reactor coolantsystem pressure and temperature began to decrease. As long as the operatorcontinued to insert control rods, the reactor remained subcritical.However, when the operator stopped inserting control rods to review andevaluate plant conditions, the cooldown continued, adding sufficientreactivity to overcome the negative reactivity from the insertion of controlrods and causing the reactor power to increase. The reactor power continued to92050_*,, C j'Ai / 1 ( / /CDQc


K)IN 92-39May 13, 1992 increase until an intermediate-range monitor (IRM) tripped on a high-high fluxsetpoint, causing a reactor scram.Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report50-263/91-15 or NRC Inspection Report 50-263/91-13.Big Rock PointOn November 30, 1991, an unplanned criticality occurred at the Big Rock PointNuclear Plant during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred in conjunctionwith a rod insertion. The event occurred during a scheduled shutdown for arefueling outage.After taking the main turbine off line and bringing the reactor to asubcritical condition, the licensee delayed actions to continue insertingcontrol rods while changing shifts. However, the reactor coolant systemcontinued to cool down because the normal steam system loads were removingheat. The cooldown added sufficient reactivity to eventually overcome theeffects of the control rods, and the reactor returned critical. The operatorsnoticed the condition in approximately 2 minutes and took the appropriateactions to return the reactor subcritical.Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report50-155/91-OO9-orJNRC-Inspection-Report 50-155/91-25. _ _ _Grand GulfOn December 30, 1991, an unplanned criticality occurred at the Grand GulfNuclear Station during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred inconjunction with a rod insertion. The event occurred during a scheduledshutdown for a maintenance outage to replace a recirculation pump shaft. Tominimize the release of plated-out radioactive material from the fuel claddingand channels to the reactor coolant system, a slow power reduction and a slowcooldown were prescribed for this shutdown.The slow power reduction and the effects of an earlier outage minimized reactordecay heat and xenon peaking. The operators were driving rods into the coreindividually because gang drive for the control rods was unavailable. Thismade the reactivity insertion slower than normal. The operators insertedrods to reduce flux to range 3 on the IRMs and stopped rod insertion in orderto perform a source range monitor surveillance. Indicated power reached IRMrange 1. However, the reactor coolant system continued to cool down becausethe normal steam system loads were removing heat. In order not to affect thesource range monitor surveillance, the shift supervisor elected to not insertcontrol rods and alerted the operators to the possibility of a return tocriticality as the cooldown continued. The reactivity added by the cooldowneventually overcame the effects of the control rods. The reactor returned to acritical condition, and reactor power increased on a reactor period between 300to 800 seconds. The operators, having been trained on a similar event atanother BWR, were monitoring the condition and expected the power to increaseto the point of adding heat, where the fuel and moderator temperature coeffi-cients would halt the reactor power increase. As the power increased, the
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


IN 92-39May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power levelremained on scale. The power increase was terminated with the IRMs reading onrange 7 and 8. The operators completed the source range monitor surveillance,then resumed inserting rods and successfully completed the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. The experience at Monticello, Big RockPoint, and Grand Gulf indicates that shutdowns in situations with low decayheat present a unique challenge to reactivity control if inadvertent recritica-lity is to be prevented. These events emphasize the importance of the operatorgiving continuous attention to plant parameters during a shutdown. Further,accepting recriticality without prior management approval and procedures, i.e.,an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity for contin-gency planning.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Va&res'E.Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Technical


zI-0.<OD n; co> 0m Z.4-mrno00zZ G2-cnaEn z* omo) Zen q-n M0n a0 na -h <-Attachment 1IN 92-39May 13, 1992Page I of 1LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESDate ofInformationinformationNotice No.92-381 92-3792-16,Supp. 1I 92-36' 92-35SubjectImplementation Date forthe Revision to the EPAManual of ProtectiveAction Guides and Pro-tective Actions forNuclear IncidentsImplementation of theDeliberate Nisconduct RuleLoss of Flow from the Re-sidual Heat Removal Pumpduring Refueling CavityDraindownIntersystem LOCA OutsideContainmentHigher Than Predicted Ero-sion/Corrosion in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping InsideContainment at A BoilingWater ReactorNew Exposure Limits forAirborne Uranium andThoriumIncreased InstrumentResponse Time WhenPressure DampeningDevices are InstalledIssuance05/12/9205/08/9205/07/9205/07/9205/06/92Issued toAll holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors,non-power reactors andmaterials licensees auth-orized to possess largequantities of radioactivematerial.All Nuclear RegulatoryCommission Licensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.-u0rn>mD-C > 0u) D-D2zzz>092-3492-33I CP -'05/06/92 All licensees whose opera-tions can cause airborneconcentrations of uraniumand thorium.04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.(Operating LicenseConstruction Permit
contacts:
Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


IN 92-39May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power levelremained on scale. The power increase was terminated with the IRMs reading onrange 7 and 8. The operators completed the source range monitor surveillance,then resumed inserting rods and successfully completed the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. The experience at Monticello, Big RockPoint, and Grand Gulf indicates that shutdowns in situations with low decayheat present a unique challenge to reactivity control if inadvertent recritica-lity is to be prevented. These events emphasize the importance of the operatorgiving continuous attention to plant parameters during a shutdown. Further,accepting recriticality without prior management approval and procedures, i.e.,an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity for contin-gency planning.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original Signed byNhedes E, RossiCharles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB C:DOEA:OEABNAME GWright* PO'Connor* RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92OFC C:DOEA:OGCB D X,NAME CBerlinger*DATE 04/21/92 05/ 7/92DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-39 IN 92-XXApril xx, 1992 DOCUMENT NAME:IN DENKIG
Notices OFC :R111 bC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB


IN 92-XXApril xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. Raising therange of the IRMs in the event of recriticality can be inappropriate if thelicensed operators do not have management's oversight, training, and specificprocedures for this.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a unique challenge to reactivitycontrol and require the operator and management to give careful attention toavoid recriticality. The events at Monticello and Big Rock Point also highlightthe importance of the operator giving continuous attention to plant parametersduring a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB C:DOEA:OEABNAME GWright* PO'Connor* RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92OFC C:DO J f D:DOEANAME CBerlinger CRosswa'yDATE f/;11/92/ 92OFFICIAL RECORD COPYDOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG
:C:DST:SRXB


IN 92-XXMarch xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. In the event ofrecriticality, promptly inserting control rods and terminating the cooldown aremore conservative actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scramwhile waiting on the changing temperature to reverse the direction of thepower. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality can beinappropriate if the licensed operators do not have management's oversight,training, and specific procedures.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a unique challenge to reactivitycontrol and require the operator and management to give careful attention toavoid recriticality. The events at Monticello and Big Rock Point also highlightthe importance of the operator giving continuous attention to plant parametersduring a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR IV t'/ ' f'(301) 504-1307 4.f,Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCECOFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB C:D0EA:OEABNAME GWright* PO'Connor* RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffeeDATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 q1/t3/92OFC C:DOEA:OGCB D:DOEANAME CBerlinger CRossiDATE / /92 / /92OFFICIAL RECORD COPYDOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG
:C:DOEA:OEAB


IN 92-XXMarch xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. In the event ofrecriticality, promptly inserting control rods and terminating the cooldown aremore conservative actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scramwhile waiting on the changing temperature to reverse the direction of thepower. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality can beinappropriate if the licensed operators do not have management's oversight,training, and specific procedures.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a unique challenge to reactivitycontrol and require the operator and management to give careful attention toavoid recriticality. The events at Monticello and Big Rock Point also highlightthe importance of the operator giving continuous attention to plant parametersduring a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, 'RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB C:DOEA:OEABNAME GWright* PO'Connor (OK RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffeeDATE 03/11/92 3 /17/92 Xis 192 03/11/92 03/13/92 / /92OFC C:DOEA:OGCB D:DOEANAME CBerlinger CRossiDATE / /92 / /92 IN 92-XXMarch xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. Since recriti-cality has not been avoided, promptly inserting control rods and terminatingthe cooldown are more conservative actions than raising the range of the IRMsto prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature to reverse thedirection of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriti-cality can be inappropriate if the licensed operators do not have management'soversight, training, and specific procedures.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a unique challenge to reactivitycontrol and require the operator and management to give careful attention toavoid recriticality. The events at Monticello and Big Rock Point also highlightthe importance of the operator giving continuous attention to plant parametersduring a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEOFC :RIII :S Oq;:EfAB:ADM:RPB :C:D B :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA-____ _ _________---- _ --____________ ----_ -:---------------NAME :GWright* :Rbennig :JMain* j Jones :AChaffee :CBerlinger :CRossiDATE :03/11/92 :3 /11/92 :03/11/92 : /13/92 : / /92 : / /92 : / /92OFFICIAL RECORD COPYDocument Name: IN DENNIG
:C:DOEA:OGCB


Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/92-04and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactor inthe desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding tothe plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. Given thatrecriticality has not been avoided, prompt insertion of control rods andtermination of the cooldown are more conservative actions than upranging IRMsto prevent scram while waiting on temperature coefficients to turn power.Upranging IRMs in the event of recriticality can be inappropriate if managementoversight, prior training, and specific procedures are absent.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a particular challenge to reactivitycontrol, and require heightened operator and management awareness to avoidrecriticality. In addition, the events at Monticello and Big Rock Pointhighlight the importance of continuous operator attention to plant parametersin the course of a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact oneof the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesOFC :RIII :SC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB :C:DST:SRXB :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEANAME :GWright :RDennig :JMain_ w :RJones :AChaffee :CBerlinger :CRossiDATE ://92 :1/92 :3/11 /92 :1/92 ://92 :1 /92 :/ /92OFFICIAL RECORD COPYDocument Name: IN DENNIG/DUP
:D:DOEA NAME :GWrightV'
:RDennig :JMain :RJones :AChaffee


IN 92-XXMarch xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection Report50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.DiscussionThe underlying principle of reactivity management is to maintain the reactorin the desired condition by properly anticipating, controlling, and respondingto the plant's changing parameters. Once a reactor has been placed in asubcritical condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importancethat the reactor be maintained in that subcritical condition. Given thatrecriticality has not been avoided, prompt insertion of control rods andtermination of the cooldown are more conservative actions than uprangingIRMs to prevent scram while waiting on temperature coefficients to turn power.Upranging IRMs in the event of recriticality can be inappropriate if managementoversight, prior training, and specific procedures are absent.The experience at Grand Gulf and Monticello indicate that slow shutdowns insituations with low decay heat present a particular challenge to reactivitycontrol, and require heightened operator and management awareness to avoidrecriticality. In addition, the events at Monticello and Big Rock Pointhighlight the importance of continuous operator attention to plant parametersin the course of a shutdown.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactone of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Melvyn Leach, RIII(708) 790-5559Geoffrey Wright, RIII(708) 790-5695Paul O'Connor, NRR(301) 504-1307Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesOFC :R111 bC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB :C:DST:SRXB :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEANAME :GWrightV' :RDennig :JMain :RJones :AChaffee :CBerlinger :CRossiDATE :3 /II/92 ://92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92OFFICIAL RECORD COPYDocument Name: IN DENNIG
:CBerlinger


}}
:CRossi DATE :3 /II/92 ://92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:09, 31 August 2018

Unplanned Return to Criticality During Reactor Shutdown
ML031200314
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/13/1992
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-039, NUDOCS 9205060036
Download: ML031200314 (12)


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 13, 1992 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 92-39: UNPLANNED

RETURN TO CRITICALITY

DURING REACTOR SHUTDOWN

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to recent events involving

unplanned

returns to criticality

caused by the cooldown of the reactor coolant system during reactor shutdowns.

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

The licensees

for the following

plants recently experienced

unplanned criticalities

during reactor shutdowns:

the Monticello

Nuclear Generating

Plant, the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant, and the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.Monticello

On June 6, 1991, an unplanned

criticality

occurred at the Monticello

Nuclear Generating

Plant during a reactor shutdown when an unanticipated

cooldown occurred in conjunction

with rod insertion.

The licensee initiated

this shutdown to repair a leaking safety-relief

valve shortly after the plant was returning

to power following

a refueling

outage.Since this shutdown occurred shortly after the cycle startup, the reactor did not generate sufficient

decay heat to produce the steam needed to supply the normal steam system loads and still maintain pressure in the reactor. As control rods were being inserted using notch insertion, the reactor coolant system pressure and temperature

began to decrease.

As long as the operator continued

to insert control rods, the reactor remained subcritical.

However, when the operator stopped inserting

control rods to review and evaluate plant conditions, the cooldown continued, adding sufficient

reactivity

to overcome the negative reactivity

from the insertion

of control rods and causing the reactor power to increase.

The reactor power continued

to 92050_*,, C j'A i / 1 ( / /CDQc

K)IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 increase until an intermediate-range

monitor (IRM) tripped on a high-high

flux setpoint, causing a reactor scram.Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report 50-263/91-15 or NRC Inspection

Report 50-263/91-13.

Big Rock Point On November 30, 1991, an unplanned

criticality

occurred at the Big Rock Point Nuclear Plant during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred in conjunction

with a rod insertion.

The event occurred during a scheduled

shutdown for a refueling

outage.After taking the main turbine off line and bringing the reactor to a subcritical

condition, the licensee delayed actions to continue inserting control rods while changing shifts. However, the reactor coolant system continued

to cool down because the normal steam system loads were removing heat. The cooldown added sufficient

reactivity

to eventually

overcome the effects of the control rods, and the reactor returned critical.

The operators noticed the condition

in approximately

2 minutes and took the appropriate

actions to return the reactor subcritical.

Further details of the event may be found in Licensee Event Report 50-155/91-OO9-orJNRC-Inspection-Report

50-155/91-25.

_ _ _Grand Gulf On December 30, 1991, an unplanned

criticality

occurred at the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station during a reactor shutdown when a cooldown occurred in conjunction

with a rod insertion.

The event occurred during a scheduled shutdown for a maintenance

outage to replace a recirculation

pump shaft. To minimize the release of plated-out

radioactive

material from the fuel cladding and channels to the reactor coolant system, a slow power reduction

and a slow cooldown were prescribed

for this shutdown.The slow power reduction

and the effects of an earlier outage minimized

reactor decay heat and xenon peaking. The operators

were driving rods into the core individually

because gang drive for the control rods was unavailable.

This made the reactivity

insertion

slower than normal. The operators

inserted rods to reduce flux to range 3 on the IRMs and stopped rod insertion

in order to perform a source range monitor surveillance.

Indicated

power reached IRM range 1. However, the reactor coolant system continued

to cool down because the normal steam system loads were removing heat. In order not to affect the source range monitor surveillance, the shift supervisor

elected to not insert control rods and alerted the operators

to the possibility

of a return to criticality

as the cooldown continued.

The reactivity

added by the cooldown eventually

overcame the effects of the control rods. The reactor returned to a critical condition, and reactor power increased

on a reactor period between 300 to 800 seconds. The operators, having been trained on a similar event at another BWR, were monitoring

the condition

and expected the power to increase to the point of adding heat, where the fuel and moderator

temperature

coeffi-cients would halt the reactor power increase.

As the power increased, the

IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power level remained on scale. The power increase was terminated

with the IRMs reading on range 7 and 8. The operators

completed

the source range monitor surveillance, then resumed inserting

rods and successfully

completed

the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

The experience

at Monticello, Big Rock Point, and Grand Gulf indicates

that shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control if inadvertent

recritica- lity is to be prevented.

These events emphasize

the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.

Further, accepting

recriticality

without prior management

approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity

for contin-gency planning.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Va&res'E.Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

z I-0.<OD n; co> 0 m Z.4-m rn o 0 0 z Z G2-cn a En z* om o) Z en q-n M 0n a 0 n a -h <-Attachment

1 IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 Page I of 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Date of Information

information

Notice No.92-38 1 92-37 92-16, Supp. 1 I 92-36' 92-35 Subject Implementation

Date for the Revision to the EPA Manual of Protective

Action Guides and Pro-tective Actions for Nuclear Incidents Implementation

of the Deliberate

Nisconduct

Rule Loss of Flow from the Re-sidual Heat Removal Pump during Refueling

Cavity Draindown Intersystem

LOCA Outside Containment

Higher Than Predicted

Ero-sion/Corrosion

in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping Inside Containment

at A Boiling Water Reactor New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased

Instrument

Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Issuance 05/12/92 05/08/92 05/07/92 05/07/92 05/06/92 Issued to All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors, non-power

reactors and materials

licensees

auth-orized to possess large quantities

of radioactive

material.All Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.-u 0 rn>mD-C > 0 u) D-D2 zzz>0 92-34 92-33 I CP -'05/06/92 All licensees

whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations

of uranium and thorium.04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.(Operating

License Construction

Permit

IN 92-39 May 13, 1992 reactor operator ranged the IRMs to prevent a reactor scram. Power level remained on scale. The power increase was terminated

with the IRMs reading on range 7 and 8. The operators

completed

the source range monitor surveillance, then resumed inserting

rods and successfully

completed

the shutdown.Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

The experience

at Monticello, Big Rock Point, and Grand Gulf indicates

that shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control if inadvertent

recritica- lity is to be prevented.

These events emphasize

the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.

Further, accepting

recriticality

without prior management

approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity

for contin-gency planning.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Original Signed by Nhedes E, Rossi Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB

C:DOEA:OEAB

NAME GWright* PO'Connor*

RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB

D X, NAME CBerlinger*

DATE 04/21/92 05/ 7/92 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-39 IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

The experience

at Big Rock Point, Grand Gulf, and Monticello

indicates

that shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control if inadvertent

recriticality

is to be prevented.

These events emphasize

the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.

Further, accepting

recriticality

without prior management

approval and procedures, i.e., an ad-hoc approach, raises concerns due to the lack of opportunity

for contin-gency planning.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB

C:DOEA:OEAB

NAME GWright* PO'Connor*

RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger*

CRoss tD DATE 04/21/92 /9 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENKIG

IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition

during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality

can be inappropriate

if the licensed operators

do not have management's

oversight, training, and specific procedures

for this.The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control and require the operator and management

to give careful attention

to avoid recriticality.

The events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB

C:DOEA:OEAB

NAME GWright* PO'Connor*

RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee*DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 04/13/92 OFC C:DO J f D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger

CRosswa'y DATE f/;11/9 2/ 92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG

IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition

during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

In the event of recriticality, promptly inserting

control rods and terminating

the cooldown are more conservative

actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature

to reverse the direction

of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality

can be inappropriate

if the licensed operators

do not have management's

oversight, training, and specific procedures.

The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control and require the operator and management

to give careful attention

to avoid recriticality.

The events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR IV t'/ ' f'(301) 504-1307 4.f, Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCEC

OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB

C:D0EA:OEAB

NAME GWright* PO'Connor*

RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee DATE 03/11/92 03/17/92 03/11/92 03/11/92 03/13/92 q1/t3/92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger

CRossi DATE / /92 / /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: IN DENNIG

IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition

during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

In the event of recriticality, promptly inserting

control rods and terminating

the cooldown are more conservative

actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature

to reverse the direction

of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriticality

can be inappropriate

if the licensed operators

do not have management's

oversight, training, and specific procedures.

The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control and require the operator and management

to give careful attention

to avoid recriticality.

The events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, 'RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC RIII ADR4-5:PD4-1 SC:DOEA:OEAB

ADM:RPB C:DST:SRXB

C:DOEA:OEAB

NAME GWright* PO'Connor (OK RDennig* JMain* RJones* AChaffee DATE 03/11/92 3 /17/92 Xis 192 03/11/92 03/13/92 / /92 OFC C:DOEA:OGCB

D:DOEA NAME CBerlinger

CRossi DATE / /92 / /92 IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition

during a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

Since recriti-cality has not been avoided, promptly inserting

control rods and terminating

the cooldown are more conservative

actions than raising the range of the IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on the changing temperature

to reverse the direction

of the power. Raising the range of the IRMs in the event of recriti-cality can be inappropriate

if the licensed operators

do not have management's

oversight, training, and specific procedures.

The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a unique challenge

to reactivity

control and require the operator and management

to give careful attention

to avoid recriticality.

The events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point also highlight the importance

of the operator giving continuous

attention

to plant parameters

during a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFC :RIII :S Oq;:EfAB:ADM:RPB

C:D B :C:DOEA:OEAB
C:DOEA:OGCB
D:DOEA-____ _ _________----

_ --____________


_ -:---------------

NAME :GWright*

Rbennig :JMain* j Jones :AChaffee
CBerlinger
CRossi DATE :03/11/92
3 /11/92 :03/11/92
/13/92 : / /92 : / /92 : / /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG

Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

Given that recriticality

has not been avoided, prompt insertion

of control rods and termination

of the cooldown are more conservative

actions than upranging

IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on temperature

coefficients

to turn power.Upranging

IRMs in the event of recriticality

can be inappropriate

if management

oversight, prior training, and specific procedures

are absent.The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a particular

challenge

to reactivity

control, and require heightened

operator and management

awareness

to avoid recriticality.

In addition, the events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point highlight

the importance

of continuous

operator attention

to plant parameters

in the course of a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices OFC :RIII :SC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB

C:DST:SRXB
C:DOEA:OEAB
C:DOEA:OGCB
D:DOEA NAME :GWright :RDennig :JMain_ w :RJones :AChaffee
CBerlinger
CRossi DATE ://92 :1/92 :3/11 /92 :1/92 ://92 :1 /92 :/ /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG/DUP

IN 92-XX March xx, 1992 Further details of the event may be found in NRC Inspection

Report 50-416/92-04 and Licensee Event Report 50-416/91-16.

Discussion

The underlying

principle

of reactivity

management

is to maintain the reactor in the desired condition

by properly anticipating, controlling, and responding

to the plant's changing parameters.

Once a reactor has been placed in a subcritical

condition, as part of a plant shutdown, it is of primary importance

that the reactor be maintained

in that subcritical

condition.

Given that recriticality

has not been avoided, prompt insertion

of control rods and termination

of the cooldown are more conservative

actions than upranging IRMs to prevent scram while waiting on temperature

coefficients

to turn power.Upranging

IRMs in the event of recriticality

can be inappropriate

if management

oversight, prior training, and specific procedures

are absent.The experience

at Grand Gulf and Monticello

indicate that slow shutdowns

in situations

with low decay heat present a particular

challenge

to reactivity

control, and require heightened

operator and management

awareness

to avoid recriticality.

In addition, the events at Monticello

and Big Rock Point highlight

the importance

of continuous

operator attention

to plant parameters

in the course of a shutdown.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Melvyn Leach, RIII (708) 790-5559 Geoffrey Wright, RIII (708) 790-5695 Paul O'Connor, NRR (301) 504-1307 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices OFC :R111 bC:DOEA:OEAB:ADM:RPB

C:DST:SRXB
C:DOEA:OEAB
C:DOEA:OGCB
D:DOEA NAME :GWrightV'
RDennig :JMain :RJones :AChaffee
CBerlinger
CRossi DATE :3 /II/92 ://92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Document Name: IN DENNIG