ML17209A294: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 17: Line 17:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:3/4-4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTLOOPSLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.1Fourreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation-APPLICABILITY:Modes1and2.ACTION:Withlessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.4.1TheFlowDependentSelectorSwitchshallbedeterminedtobeinthe4pumppositionwithin15minutespriortomakingthereactorcriticalandatleastonceper12hoursthereafter.ST.LUCIE-UNITI'">>0S0$4)3/44-110;30'=80 I4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMHOTSTANDBYLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.2a.AtleasttwoofthereactorcoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE.b.c~1~ReactorCoolantLoop(A)andatleastoneassociatedreactorcoolantpump.2.ReactorCoolantLoop(B)andatleastoneassociatedreactorcoolantpump.3.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)(Mode4only).4-ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)(Mode4only).AtleastoneoftheaboveReactorCoolantLoopsshallbeinoperation*.Whenoperatingwithlessthan4reactorcoolingpumpsinMode3,theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementofSpecification3.1.1.1.shallbeincreasedtoandmaintainedat>4.1$.wk/K.TheprovisionsofSpecifications3.0.3and3.0.4arenotapplicable.APPLICABILITY:MODES3and4ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantloopsoperable,restoretherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatuswith72hoursorbeinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext30hours.b.Withnoreactorcoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredlooptooperation.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.4.1.2.1Atleasttheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumps,ifnotinoperation,shallbedeterminedtobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.4.4.1.2.2Atleastonecoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.~eA1reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided(1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/44-la10-30-80 IItt REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.3a.ThetwoShutdownCoolingloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:l.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)¹2.ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)¹b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation*.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withoutRCSintegrityACTION:a.With1essthantheaboverequiredcoolant1oopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequriedcoolantloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.IfrequiredloopsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEwithin8hours,immediatelyinitiateactiontorestoreRCSintegrity.b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSintegrityACTION:Withnocoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.SURVEILLANCEREURIEMENTS4.4.1.3.1Therequiredshutdowncoolingloop(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnitInserviceInspectionProgram,Pump,TestProgram,andValveTestProgram.KllreactorcooTantpumpsanddecayheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided(1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.¹ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableinMODE5-ST.LUCIE-UNIT13.44-lb10,:30,-;80 II'5IIIIIaiI'llIIII'',b REFUELINGOPERATIONS3/49.8SHUTDOWNCOOLINGANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONALLWATERLEVELSLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.98.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6ACTION:a~Withlessthanoneshutdowncoolingloopinoperation,exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperationsinvolvinganincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospherewithin4hours.b.Theshutdowncoolingloopmayberemovedfromoperationforupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformanceofCOREALTERATIONSinthevicinityofreactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.9.8.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantataflowrateofgreaterthanorequalto3000gpmatleastonceper4hours.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/49-8,10-30-80;=
{{#Wiki_filter:3/4-4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTLOOPSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.1Fourreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation-APPLICABILITY:
REFUELINGOPERATIONLOWMATERLEVELLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION'3.9.8.2TwoindependentshutdowncoolingloopsshallbeOPERABLE.*APPLICABILITY:MODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedwithinthereactorpressurevesselislessthan23feet.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturnloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.b.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIRENENTS4.9.8.2TherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsshallbedeterminedOPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnit1InserviceInspectionProgram,PumpTestProgram,andValveTestProgram.*Thenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachshutdowncoolingloop.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/49.8a10'-3040 4I'h4Ii'j 3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothreactorcoolantloopsandassociatedreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation,andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.ByoriginaldesignSTARTUPandPOWEROPERATIONmaybeinitiatedandmayproceedwithoneortworeactorcoolantpumpsnotinoperationafterthesetpointsforthePowerLevel-High,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low,andThermalMargin/LowPressuretripshavebeenreducedtotheirspecifiedvalues.ReducingthesetripsetpointsensuresthattheDNBRwillbemaintainedabove1.30duringthreepumpoperationsandthatduringtwopumpoperationthecorevoidfractionwillbelimitedtoensureparallelchannelflowstabilitywithinthecoreandthereby,preventprematureDNB.However,lessthan4pumpoperationinModes1and2iscurrentlynotauthorizedfortheunit.Asingleshutdowncoolinglooporasinglereactorcoolantloopwith.itssteamgeneratorfilledabovethelowleveltripsetpointprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforcorecoolingwhileinMODES3and4,however,,singlefailureconsiderationsrequireplantcooldownifcomponentrepairsand/orcorrectiveactioncannotbemadewithintheallowableout-of-servicetimeifatleast2redundentloopsarenotOPERABLE.TheadditionalSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforMode3providesassuranceofacceptableresultsshouldtherebeaMSLBwithlessthan4RCPsoperating.ForMode5withoutRCSintegrity(i.e.SGmanwaysopen)andMode6whenthewaterlevelabovefuelassembliesseatedinthevesselislessthan23'eet,asingleshutdowncoolingloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforcorecooling;however,singlefailureconsiderationsrequirethat2loopsbeOPERABLE.ForMode5withRCSintegrity,intheeventofafailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,othermethodsofheatremova)areviableandavailable,(i.e.injectionviatherequiredOPERABLEchargingorHPSIpump).Theseprovide,as'-aminimum,adequate,timetoinitiateemergencymeasurestocoolthecore.ST.LUCIE-UNITIB3/4.4-1f~.n,10-,,30-80 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizercodesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitsSafet~Limitof2750psia.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve2X10~lbsperhourofsaturatedsteamatthevalvesetpoint.Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressureconditionwhichcouldoccurduringshutdown.IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE,anoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,connectedtotheRCS,providesoverpressurereliefcapabilityandwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.Duringoperation,allpressurizercodesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitssafetylimitof2750psia.ThecombinedreliefcapacityofthesevalvesissufficienttolimittheReactorCoolantSystempressuretowithinitsSafetyLimitof2750psiafollowingacompletelossofturbinegeneratorloadwhileoperatingatRATEDTHERMALPOWERandassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtectiveSystemtripsetpoint(PressurizerPressure-High)isreached(i.e..nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofturbine)andalsoassumingnooperationofthepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalveorsteamdumpvalves.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/4.4-1a10'-,30.-80 i'1II'II REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATORCRANEOPERABILITYTheOPERABILITYrequirementsofthecranesusedformovementoffuelassembliesensurethat:1)eachcranehassufficientloadcapacitytoliftafuelelement,and2)thecoreinternalsandpressurevesselareprotectedfromexcessiveliftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertentlyengagedduringliftingoperations.3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestrictiononmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelasemblyandCEAoverirradiatedfuelassembliesensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisassumptionisconsistentwiththeactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.8COOLANTCIRCULATIONTherequirementthatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperationensuresthat(1)sufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE,and(2)sufficientcoolantcirculationismaintainedthroughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectsofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.TherequirementtohavetwoshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethecore,ensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofdecayheatremovalcapability.Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethecore,alargeheatsinkisavailableforcorecooling,thusintheeventofafailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtorinitiate'mergency,'proceduresto=cool~thecore~Therequirementthatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperationisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisoftheborondilutionaccidentandpreventslocalvariationsinboronconcentrations,thusminimizingtheeffectsofinadvertentborondilution.Italsoassuresthatsufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthissystemensuresthatthecontainmentisolationvalveswillbeautomaticallyisolatedupondetectionofhighradiationlevelswithinthecontainment.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactivematerialfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheenvironment.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/49-2<10-30~80) c>C REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11WATERLEVEL-REACTORVESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLWATERLEVELTherestrictionsonminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficientwaterdepthisavailabletoremove99Koftheassumed10$iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiatedfuelassembly.Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.3/4.9.12FUELPOOLVENTILATIONSYSTEM-FUELSTORAGEThelimitationsonthefuelhandlingbuildingventilationsystemensuresthatallradioactivematerialreleasedfromanirradiatedfuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischargetotheatmosphere.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemandtheresultingiodineremovalcapacityareconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKCRANEThemaximumloadwhichmaybehandledbythespentfuelcaskcraneislimitedtoaloadedsingleelementcaskwhichisequivalenttoapproximately25tons.Thisrestrictionisprovidedtoensurethestructuralintegrityofthespentfuelpoolintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.Structuraldamagecausedbydroppingaloadinexcessofaloadedsingleelementcaskcouldcauseleakagefromthespentfuelpoolinexcessofthemaximummakeupcapability.3/4.9.14DECAYTIME-STORAGEPOOLTheminimumrequirementfordecayoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesinthethree7X7modulesandtheone7X10modulenearestthefuelcaskcompartmentpriortomovementofthespentfuelcaskintothefuelcaskcompartmentensuresthatsufficienttimehasclaspedtoallowradioactivedecayofthefissionproducts.Thisdecaytimeisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthecaskdropaccidentanalysis.ST.LUGIE-UNITIB3/49-31D.30-,:80 NCWf~PQ SAFETYEVALUATIONRE:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Proposed;TechSecAmendmentI.IntroductionThisevaluationsupportsaproposal-torevisespecifications3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3'andtoaddspecifications3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2toensurethattheLimitingConditionsforOperationprovideforredundancyinavailabledecayheatremovalsystems.II.DiscussionTheproposedrevisionstoTechnicalSpecifications3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3andtheadditionofTechnicalSpecification3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2arenecessarytocomplywithaNRCletterdatedJunell,1980.ThepurposeofthesechangesistoprovideforredundancyintheShutdownCoolingandReactorCoolantSystemstoensureadequatedecayheatremovalcapabilityinallmodesofreactoroperation.III.ConclusionWehaveconcluded,basedontheconsiderationsdiscussedabove,that:(1)theamendmentdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofaccidentspreviouslyconsideredanddoesnotreducethemarginofsafety,(2)thereisreasonableassurancethatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbeendangeredbyoperationintheproposedmanner,and(3)suchactivitieswillbeconductedincompliancewiththeCommission'sregulationsandtheissuanceofthisamendmentwillnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.10;;30.:80 tY'()IIIb}}
Modes1and2.ACTION:Withlessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1TheFlowDependent SelectorSwitchshallbedetermined tobeinthe4pumppositionwithin15minutespriortomakingthereactorcriticalandatleastonceper12hoursthereafter.
ST.LUCIE-UNITI'">>0S0$4)3/44-110;30'=80 I4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMHOTSTANDBYLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.2a.AtleasttwoofthereactorcoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE.
b.c~1~ReactorCoolantLoop(A)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.2.ReactorCoolantLoop(B)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.3.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)(Mode4only).4-ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)(Mode4only).AtleastoneoftheaboveReactorCoolantLoopsshallbeinoperation*.
Whenoperating withlessthan4reactorcoolingpumpsinMode3,theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirement ofSpecification 3.1.1.1.shallbeincreased toandmaintained at>4.1$.wk/K.Theprovisions ofSpecifications 3.0.3and3.0.4arenotapplicable.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES3and4ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantloopsoperable, restoretherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatuswith72hoursorbeinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext30hours.b.Withnoreactorcoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredlooptooperation.
SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1.2.1 Atleasttheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumps,ifnotinoperation, shallbedetermined tobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifying correctbreakeralignments andindicated poweravailability.
4.4.1.2.2 Atleastonecoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.~eA1reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.
ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/44-la10-30-80 IItt REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.3a.ThetwoShutdownCoolingloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:
l.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)&#xb9;2.ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)&#xb9;b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation*.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE5withoutRCSintegrity ACTION:a.With1essthantheaboverequiredcoolant1oopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequriedcoolantloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.
IfrequiredloopsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEwithin8hours,immediately initiateactiontorestoreRCSintegrity.
b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE5withRCSintegrity ACTION:Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.
SURVEILLANCE REURIEMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 Therequiredshutdowncoolingloop(s)shallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnitInservice Inspection Program,Pump,TestProgram,andValveTestProgram.KllreactorcooTantpumpsanddecayheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.
&#xb9;Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable inMODE5-ST.LUCIE-UNIT13.44-lb10,:30,-;80 II'5IIIIIaiI'llIIII'',b REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/49.8SHUTDOWNCOOLINGANDCOOLANTCIRCULATION ALLWATERLEVELSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.98.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeinoperation.
APPLICABILITY:
MODE6ACTION:a~Withlessthanoneshutdowncoolingloopinoperation, exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperations involving anincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainment penetrations providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere within4hours.b.Theshutdowncoolingloopmayberemovedfromoperation forupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformance ofCOREALTERATIONS inthevicinityofreactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.
SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.9.8.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantataflowrateofgreaterthanorequalto3000gpmatleastonceper4hours.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/49-8,10-30-80;=
REFUELING OPERATION LOWMATERLEVELLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION
'3.9.8.2Twoindependent shutdowncoolingloopsshallbeOPERABLE.*
APPLICABILITY:
MODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopoftheirradiated fuelassemblies seatedwithinthereactorpressurevesselislessthan23feet.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturnloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.
b.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.
SURVEILLANCE REUIRENENTS 4.9.8.2Therequiredshutdowncoolingloopsshallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnit1Inservice Inspection Program,PumpTestProgram,andValveTestProgram.*Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable foreachshutdowncoolingloop.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/49.8a10'-3040 4I'h4Ii'j 3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothreactorcoolantloopsandassociated reactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperations andanticipated transients.
ByoriginaldesignSTARTUPandPOWEROPERATION maybeinitiated andmayproceedwithoneortworeactorcoolantpumpsnotinoperation afterthesetpoints forthePowerLevel-High, ReactorCoolantFlow-Low, andThermalMargin/LowPressuretripshavebeenreducedtotheirspecified values.Reducingthesetripsetpoints ensuresthattheDNBRwillbemaintained above1.30duringthreepumpoperations andthatduringtwopumpoperation thecorevoidfractionwillbelimitedtoensureparallelchannelflowstability withinthecoreandthereby,preventpremature DNB.However,lessthan4pumpoperation inModes1and2iscurrently notauthorized fortheunit.Asingleshutdowncoolinglooporasinglereactorcoolantloopwith.itssteamgenerator filledabovethelowleveltripsetpointprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecoolingwhileinMODES3and4,however,,singlefailureconsiderations requireplantcooldownifcomponent repairsand/orcorrective actioncannotbemadewithintheallowable out-of-service timeifatleast2redundent loopsarenotOPERABLE.
Theadditional SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforMode3providesassurance ofacceptable resultsshouldtherebeaMSLBwithlessthan4RCPsoperating.
ForMode5withoutRCSintegrity (i.e.SGmanwaysopen)andMode6whenthewaterlevelabovefuelassemblies seatedinthevesselislessthan23'eet,asingleshutdowncoolingloopprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecooling;however,singlefailureconsiderations requirethat2loopsbeOPERABLE.
ForMode5withRCSintegrity, intheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,othermethodsofheatremova)areviableandavailable, (i.e.injection viatherequiredOPERABLEchargingorHPSIpump).Theseprovide,as'-aminimum,adequate, timetoinitiateemergency measurestocoolthecore.ST.LUCIE-UNITIB3/4.4-1f~.n,10-,,30-80 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizer codesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitsSafet~Limitof2750psia.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve2X10~lbsperhourofsaturated steamatthevalvesetpoint.
Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressure condition whichcouldoccurduringshutdown.
IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE, anoperating shutdowncoolingloop,connected totheRCS,providesoverpressure reliefcapability andwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.
Duringoperation, allpressurizer codesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitssafetylimitof2750psia.Thecombinedreliefcapacityofthesevalvesissufficient tolimittheReactorCoolantSystempressuretowithinitsSafetyLimitof2750psiafollowing acompletelossofturbinegenerator loadwhileoperating atRATEDTHERMALPOWERandassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtective Systemtripsetpoint(Pressurizer Pressure-High) isreached(i.e..nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofturbine)andalsoassumingnooperation ofthepressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalveorsteamdumpvalves.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/4.4-1a10'-,30.-80 i'1II'II REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATOR CRANEOPERABILITY TheOPERABILITY requirements ofthecranesusedformovementoffuelassemblies ensurethat:1)eachcranehassufficient loadcapacitytoliftafuelelement,and2)thecoreinternals andpressurevesselareprotected fromexcessive liftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertently engagedduringliftingoperations.
3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestriction onmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelasemblyandCEAoverirradiated fuelassemblies ensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.
Thisassumption isconsistent withtheactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.
3/4.9.8COOLANTCIRCULATION Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation ensuresthat(1)sufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE,and(2)sufficient coolantcirculation ismaintained throughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectsofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.
Therequirement tohavetwoshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethecore,ensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofdecayheatremovalcapability.
Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethecore,alargeheatsinkisavailable forcorecooling,thusintheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtorinitiate'mergency,'procedures to=cool~thecore~Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation isconsistent withtheassumptions inthesafetyanalysisoftheborondilutionaccidentandpreventslocalvariations inboronconcentrations, thusminimizing theeffectsofinadvertent borondilution.
Italsoassuresthatsufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthissystemensuresthatthecontainment isolation valveswillbeautomatically isolatedupondetection ofhighradiation levelswithinthecontainment.
TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactive materialfromthecontainment atmosphere totheenvironment.
ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/49-2<10-30~80) c>C REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11WATERLEVEL-REACTOR VESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLWATERLEVELTherestrictions onminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficient waterdepthisavailable toremove99Koftheassumed10$iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiated fuelassembly.
Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalysis.
3/4.9.12FUELPOOLVENTILATION SYSTEM-FUEL STORAGEThelimitations onthefuelhandlingbuildingventilation systemensuresthatallradioactive materialreleasedfromanirradiated fuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischarge totheatmosphere.
TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemandtheresulting iodineremovalcapacityareconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalyses.
3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKCRANEThemaximumloadwhichmaybehandledbythespentfuelcaskcraneislimitedtoaloadedsingleelementcaskwhichisequivalent toapproximately 25tons.Thisrestriction isprovidedtoensurethestructural integrity ofthespentfuelpoolintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.
Structural damagecausedbydroppingaloadinexcessofaloadedsingleelementcaskcouldcauseleakagefromthespentfuelpoolinexcessofthemaximummakeupcapability.
3/4.9.14DECAYTIME-STORAGEPOOLTheminimumrequirement fordecayoftheirradiated fuelassemblies inthethree7X7modulesandtheone7X10modulenearestthefuelcaskcompartment priortomovementofthespentfuelcaskintothefuelcaskcompartment ensuresthatsufficient timehasclaspedtoallowradioactive decayofthefissionproducts.
Thisdecaytimeisconsistent withtheassumptions usedinthecaskdropaccidentanalysis.
ST.LUGIE-UNITIB3/49-31D.30-,:80 NCWf~PQ SAFETYEVALUATION RE:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Proposed;Tech SecAmendment I.Introduction Thisevaluation supportsaproposal-to revisespecifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3'and toaddspecifications 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2toensurethattheLimitingConditions forOperation provideforredundancy inavailable decayheatremovalsystems.II.Discussion Theproposedrevisions toTechnical Specifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3andtheadditionofTechnical Specification 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2arenecessary tocomplywithaNRCletterdatedJunell,1980.Thepurposeofthesechangesistoprovideforredundancy intheShutdownCoolingandReactorCoolantSystemstoensureadequatedecayheatremovalcapability inallmodesofreactoroperation.
III.Conclusion Wehaveconcluded, basedontheconsiderations discussedabove,that:(1)theamendment doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofaccidents previously considered anddoesnotreducethemarginofsafety,(2)thereisreasonable assurance thatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbeendangered byoperation intheproposedmanner,and(3)suchactivities willbeconducted incompliance withtheCommission's regulations andtheissuanceofthisamendment willnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.10;;30.:80 tY'()IIIb}}

Revision as of 18:07, 29 June 2018

Tech Spec 3/4.4 for Reactor Coolant Sys
ML17209A294
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/30/1980
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17209A293 List:
References
NUDOCS 8011030561
Download: ML17209A294 (18)
v • d • e


Text

3/4-4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTLOOPSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.1Fourreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation-APPLICABILITY:

Modes1and2.ACTION:Withlessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1TheFlowDependent SelectorSwitchshallbedetermined tobeinthe4pumppositionwithin15minutespriortomakingthereactorcriticalandatleastonceper12hoursthereafter.

ST.LUCIE-UNITI'">>0S0$4)3/44-110;30'=80 I4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMHOTSTANDBYLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.2a.AtleasttwoofthereactorcoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE.

b.c~1~ReactorCoolantLoop(A)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.2.ReactorCoolantLoop(B)andatleastoneassociated reactorcoolantpump.3.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)(Mode4only).4-ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)(Mode4only).AtleastoneoftheaboveReactorCoolantLoopsshallbeinoperation*.

Whenoperating withlessthan4reactorcoolingpumpsinMode3,theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirement ofSpecification 3.1.1.1.shallbeincreased toandmaintained at>4.1$.wk/K.Theprovisions ofSpecifications 3.0.3and3.0.4arenotapplicable.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES3and4ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantloopsoperable, restoretherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatuswith72hoursorbeinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext30hours.b.Withnoreactorcoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredlooptooperation.

SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.4.1.2.1 Atleasttheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumps,ifnotinoperation, shallbedetermined tobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifying correctbreakeralignments andindicated poweravailability.

4.4.1.2.2 Atleastonecoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.~eA1reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.

ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/44-la10-30-80 IItt REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.4.1.3a.ThetwoShutdownCoolingloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:

l.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)¹2.ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)¹b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation*.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE5withoutRCSintegrity ACTION:a.With1essthantheaboverequiredcoolant1oopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequriedcoolantloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.

IfrequiredloopsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEwithin8hours,immediately initiateactiontorestoreRCSintegrity.

b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE5withRCSintegrity ACTION:Withnocoolantloopinoperation, suspendalloperations involving areduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.

SURVEILLANCE REURIEMENTS 4.4.1.3.1 Therequiredshutdowncoolingloop(s)shallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnitInservice Inspection Program,Pump,TestProgram,andValveTestProgram.KllreactorcooTantpumpsanddecayheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energized forupto1hourprovided(1)nooperations arepermitted thatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration, and(2)coreoutlettemperature ismaintained atleast10'Fbelowsaturation temperature.

¹Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable inMODE5-ST.LUCIE-UNIT13.44-lb10,:30,-;80 II'5IIIIIaiI'llIIII,b REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/49.8SHUTDOWNCOOLINGANDCOOLANTCIRCULATION ALLWATERLEVELSLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION 3.98.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeinoperation.

APPLICABILITY:

MODE6ACTION:a~Withlessthanoneshutdowncoolingloopinoperation, exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperations involving anincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareduction inboronconcentration oftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainment penetrations providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere within4hours.b.Theshutdowncoolingloopmayberemovedfromoperation forupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformance ofCOREALTERATIONS inthevicinityofreactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.

SURVEILLANCE REUIREMENTS 4.9.8.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperation andcirculating reactorcoolantataflowrateofgreaterthanorequalto3000gpmatleastonceper4hours.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/49-8,10-30-80;=

REFUELING OPERATION LOWMATERLEVELLIMITINGCONDITION FOROPERATION

'3.9.8.2Twoindependent shutdowncoolingloopsshallbeOPERABLE.*

APPLICABILITY:

MODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopoftheirradiated fuelassemblies seatedwithinthereactorpressurevesselislessthan23feet.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLE, immediately initiatecorrective actiontoreturnloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.

b.Theprovisions ofSpecification 3.0.3arenotapplicable.

SURVEILLANCE REUIRENENTS 4.9.8.2Therequiredshutdowncoolingloopsshallbedetermined OPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnit1Inservice Inspection Program,PumpTestProgram,andValveTestProgram.*Thenormaloremergency powersourcemaybeinoperable foreachshutdowncoolingloop.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/49.8a10'-3040 4I'h4Ii'j 3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothreactorcoolantloopsandassociated reactorcoolantpumpsinoperation, andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperations andanticipated transients.

ByoriginaldesignSTARTUPandPOWEROPERATION maybeinitiated andmayproceedwithoneortworeactorcoolantpumpsnotinoperation afterthesetpoints forthePowerLevel-High, ReactorCoolantFlow-Low, andThermalMargin/LowPressuretripshavebeenreducedtotheirspecified values.Reducingthesetripsetpoints ensuresthattheDNBRwillbemaintained above1.30duringthreepumpoperations andthatduringtwopumpoperation thecorevoidfractionwillbelimitedtoensureparallelchannelflowstability withinthecoreandthereby,preventpremature DNB.However,lessthan4pumpoperation inModes1and2iscurrently notauthorized fortheunit.Asingleshutdowncoolinglooporasinglereactorcoolantloopwith.itssteamgenerator filledabovethelowleveltripsetpointprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecoolingwhileinMODES3and4,however,,singlefailureconsiderations requireplantcooldownifcomponent repairsand/orcorrective actioncannotbemadewithintheallowable out-of-service timeifatleast2redundent loopsarenotOPERABLE.

Theadditional SHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforMode3providesassurance ofacceptable resultsshouldtherebeaMSLBwithlessthan4RCPsoperating.

ForMode5withoutRCSintegrity (i.e.SGmanwaysopen)andMode6whenthewaterlevelabovefuelassemblies seatedinthevesselislessthan23'eet,asingleshutdowncoolingloopprovidessufficient heatremovalcapability forcorecooling;however,singlefailureconsiderations requirethat2loopsbeOPERABLE.

ForMode5withRCSintegrity, intheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,othermethodsofheatremova)areviableandavailable, (i.e.injection viatherequiredOPERABLEchargingorHPSIpump).Theseprovide,as'-aminimum,adequate, timetoinitiateemergency measurestocoolthecore.ST.LUCIE-UNITIB3/4.4-1f~.n,10-,,30-80 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizer codesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitsSafet~Limitof2750psia.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve2X10~lbsperhourofsaturated steamatthevalvesetpoint.

Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressure condition whichcouldoccurduringshutdown.

IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE, anoperating shutdowncoolingloop,connected totheRCS,providesoverpressure reliefcapability andwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.

Duringoperation, allpressurizer codesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurized aboveitssafetylimitof2750psia.Thecombinedreliefcapacityofthesevalvesissufficient tolimittheReactorCoolantSystempressuretowithinitsSafetyLimitof2750psiafollowing acompletelossofturbinegenerator loadwhileoperating atRATEDTHERMALPOWERandassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtective Systemtripsetpoint(Pressurizer Pressure-High) isreached(i.e..nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofturbine)andalsoassumingnooperation ofthepressurizer poweroperatedreliefvalveorsteamdumpvalves.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/4.4-1a10'-,30.-80 i'1II'II REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATOR CRANEOPERABILITY TheOPERABILITY requirements ofthecranesusedformovementoffuelassemblies ensurethat:1)eachcranehassufficient loadcapacitytoliftafuelelement,and2)thecoreinternals andpressurevesselareprotected fromexcessive liftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertently engagedduringliftingoperations.

3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestriction onmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelasemblyandCEAoverirradiated fuelassemblies ensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.

Thisassumption isconsistent withtheactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.9.8COOLANTCIRCULATION Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation ensuresthat(1)sufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE,and(2)sufficient coolantcirculation ismaintained throughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectsofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.

Therequirement tohavetwoshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethecore,ensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofdecayheatremovalcapability.

Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethecore,alargeheatsinkisavailable forcorecooling,thusintheeventofafailureoftheoperating shutdowncoolingloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtorinitiate'mergency,'procedures to=cool~thecore~Therequirement thatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperation isconsistent withtheassumptions inthesafetyanalysisoftheborondilutionaccidentandpreventslocalvariations inboronconcentrations, thusminimizing theeffectsofinadvertent borondilution.

Italsoassuresthatsufficient coolingcapacityisavailable toremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELING MODE.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEMTheOPERABILITY ofthissystemensuresthatthecontainment isolation valveswillbeautomatically isolatedupondetection ofhighradiation levelswithinthecontainment.

TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactive materialfromthecontainment atmosphere totheenvironment.

ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/49-2<10-30~80) c>C REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11WATERLEVEL-REACTOR VESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLWATERLEVELTherestrictions onminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficient waterdepthisavailable toremove99Koftheassumed10$iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiated fuelassembly.

Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalysis.

3/4.9.12FUELPOOLVENTILATION SYSTEM-FUEL STORAGEThelimitations onthefuelhandlingbuildingventilation systemensuresthatallradioactive materialreleasedfromanirradiated fuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischarge totheatmosphere.

TheOPERABILITY ofthissystemandtheresulting iodineremovalcapacityareconsistent withtheassumptions oftheaccidentanalyses.

3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKCRANEThemaximumloadwhichmaybehandledbythespentfuelcaskcraneislimitedtoaloadedsingleelementcaskwhichisequivalent toapproximately 25tons.Thisrestriction isprovidedtoensurethestructural integrity ofthespentfuelpoolintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.

Structural damagecausedbydroppingaloadinexcessofaloadedsingleelementcaskcouldcauseleakagefromthespentfuelpoolinexcessofthemaximummakeupcapability.

3/4.9.14DECAYTIME-STORAGEPOOLTheminimumrequirement fordecayoftheirradiated fuelassemblies inthethree7X7modulesandtheone7X10modulenearestthefuelcaskcompartment priortomovementofthespentfuelcaskintothefuelcaskcompartment ensuresthatsufficient timehasclaspedtoallowradioactive decayofthefissionproducts.

Thisdecaytimeisconsistent withtheassumptions usedinthecaskdropaccidentanalysis.

ST.LUGIE-UNITIB3/49-31D.30-,:80 NCWf~PQ SAFETYEVALUATION RE:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Proposed;Tech SecAmendment I.Introduction Thisevaluation supportsaproposal-to revisespecifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3'and toaddspecifications 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2toensurethattheLimitingConditions forOperation provideforredundancy inavailable decayheatremovalsystems.II.Discussion Theproposedrevisions toTechnical Specifications 3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3andtheadditionofTechnical Specification 3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2arenecessary tocomplywithaNRCletterdatedJunell,1980.Thepurposeofthesechangesistoprovideforredundancy intheShutdownCoolingandReactorCoolantSystemstoensureadequatedecayheatremovalcapability inallmodesofreactoroperation.

III.Conclusion Wehaveconcluded, basedontheconsiderations discussedabove,that:(1)theamendment doesnotincreasetheprobability orconsequences ofaccidents previously considered anddoesnotreducethemarginofsafety,(2)thereisreasonable assurance thatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbeendangered byoperation intheproposedmanner,and(3)suchactivities willbeconducted incompliance withtheCommission's regulations andtheissuanceofthisamendment willnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.10;;30.:80 tY'()IIIb

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML17209A294&oldid=750292"