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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555May 7, 1992NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-36: INTERSYSTEM LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 7, 1992 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 92-36: INTERSYSTEM
 
===LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information noticeto alert addressees of potential plant vulnerabilities to intersystem loss-of-coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). It is expected that recipients will reviewthe information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, asappropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are notNRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.This information notice provides information gathered during a concerted NRCstaff effort to study plant vulnerabilities to ISLOCAs. The staff gatheredthis information by performing (a) detailed evaluations of operating events,(b) inspections of a limited sample of pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and(c) extensive analyses of the sample PWRs. The information may be of use inrecipients' individual plant examination (IPE) programs.BackgroundThe ISLOCA is a class of accidents in which a break occurs in a system con-nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primarysystem inventory. This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system,such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently exposed tohigh RCS pressures beyond its capacity. ISLOCAs of most concern are thosethat can discharge the break flow outside the reactor containment building,primarily because they can result in high offsite radiological consequences butalso because the RCS inventory lost cannot be retrieved for long-term corecooling during the recirculation phase.In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published in 1975, and inNUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear PowerPlants," the NRC described the ISLOCA outside containment as an event of lowcore damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors to plant risk. Inthose studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilisticrisk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.However, these PRAs typically have modelled only those Event-V sequences thatinclude only the catastrophic failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from92050_ 45AMA
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
of potential
 
plant vulnerabilities
 
to intersystem
 
loss-of-coolant accidents (ISLOCAs).
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.This information
 
notice provides information
 
gathered during a concerted
 
NRC staff effort to study plant vulnerabilities
 
to ISLOCAs. The staff gathered this information
 
by performing (a) detailed evaluations
 
of operating
 
events, (b) inspections
 
of a limited sample of pressurized
 
water reactors (PWRs), and (c) extensive
 
analyses of the sample PWRs. The information
 
may be of use in recipients'  
individual
 
plant examination (IPE) programs.Background
 
The ISLOCA is a class of accidents
 
in which a break occurs in a system con-nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primary system inventory.
 
This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently
 
exposed to high RCS pressures
 
beyond its capacity.
 
ISLOCAs of most concern are those that can discharge
 
the break flow outside the reactor containment
 
building, primarily
 
because they can result in high offsite radiological
 
consequences
 
but also because the RCS inventory
 
lost cannot be retrieved
 
for long-term
 
core cooling during the recirculation
 
phase.In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published
 
in 1975, and in NUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment
 
for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," the NRC described
 
the ISLOCA outside containment
 
as an event of low core damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors
 
to plant risk. In those studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilistic
 
risk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.However, these PRAs typically
 
have modelled only those Event-V sequences
 
that include only the catastrophic
 
failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from 92050_ 45 AMA
 
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs included little consideration
 
of human errors leading to an ISLOCA. Also, most existing PRAs have given little or no credit for operator actions to terminate
 
an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiological
 
consequences
 
if core melt were to occur.On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power Company, licensee for the North Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR relief valves would not pass the design-basis
 
flow to relieve an overpressurization
 
of the RHR system when the latter is aligned to the RCS. The function of these relief valves is important
 
when the RCS is water solid and therefore
 
susceptible
 
to overpressur- ization events, such as from a charging-letdown
 
flow mismatch or a temperature
 
change.The licensee made this report after conducting
 
an engineering
 
evaluation
 
to respond to a notification
 
by the nuclear steam supply vendor, the Westinghouse
 
Electric Corporation.
 
In February 1990, Westinghouse
 
reviewed the RHR relief valve design basis for the Westinghouse
 
Owners Group and recommended
 
that its customers
 
review the following
 
three items: The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting
 
against cold overpressure
 
events Discharge
 
capability
 
of relief valves for probable back pressures Design basis commitments
 
for valve specifications, commitments
 
in the final safety analysis report, and technical
 
specifications
 
The NRC has issued several information
 
notices to discuss certain operational
 
events regarding
 
ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coolant," the staff. discussed
 
an event during which about 68,000 gallons of reactor water was discharged
 
outside the containment.
 
The staff has also analyzed operational
 
experience
 
and documented
 
its findings in augmented inspection
 
team (AIT) reports. On October 23, 1990, the staff issued AIT Report 50-456/90-020
on an event at Braidwood
 
that resulted in primary water leakage outside the containment
 
and in the contamination
 
of three personnel, one of whom received a second degree burn. Table 3 is a selected list of information
 
notices and AIT reports that the staff has issued on ISLOCAs and related events.Discussion
 
Although no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated
 
operational
 
experience, both in the United States and abroad, indicates
 
that ISLOCA-like
 
events have occurred at a rate higher than expected.
 
In conducting
 
this study, the staff defined an ISLOCA-like
 
event, or an ISLOCA precursor, as an event that results from the failure, degradation, or inadvertent
 
opening of the pressure isolation valves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure systems. An ISLOCA precursor may become an ISLOCA if it occurs during different
 
plant conditions, or if some of the failures occur together.The NRC staff conducted
 
root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors, extensive plant inspections, and detailed analyses of a sample of PWRs. These analyses
 
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 included thermal-hydraulic
 
analyses, fragility
 
analyses to determine
 
the likely sizes and locations
 
of a break, and human reliability
 
analyses.
 
The staff used the results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights about the significant
 
contributors
 
to ISLOCA risk.The staff directed the studies described
 
in this information
 
notice towards finding vulnerabilities
 
of PWR plants to ISLOCAs, since the primary pressures present in PWRs are greater than those found in boiling water reactors (BWRs), while the design pressures
 
of low pressure systems are about the same in both PWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees
 
also may find this information
 
to be relevant to their plants.Upon conducting
 
these studies, the staff made the following
 
observations
 
on the ISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants: 1. The estimated
 
core damage frequency
 
caused by ISLOCAs could be greater than was estimated
 
in PRAs for some plants.The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiators
 
and the capabili-ties for recovery.
 
These factors vary from plant to plant. The main contributors
 
to ISLOCA initiation
 
and/or recovery include (a) human errors and (b) the effects of the accident-caused
 
harsh environment
 
on plant equipment
 
and recovery activities.
 
Both factors have significant
 
uncer-tainties.
 
Existing PRAs have provided little or no treatment
 
of these factors. Plants that are particularly
 
vulnerable
 
to either of these two factors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated
 
by existing PRAs.2. Most plants lack contingency
 
plans to provide backup water supplies that can be transferred
 
readily to provide long-term
 
core cooling after an ISLOCA.By examining
 
a plant's emergency
 
procedures, a licensee can find insights for improving
 
the plant's features to address the concerns for both ISLOCAs and other accidents.
 
3. The root cause analyses of operational
 
events indicate that ISLOCA precur-sors most likely would be initiated
 
by human errors, notably during testing and maintenance
 
or because of procedural
 
deficiencies.
 
This may be attributed
 
to the general lack of awareness
 
of the possibility
 
or consequences
 
of an ISLOCA.Licensees
 
may significantly
 
reduce the probability
 
of ISLOCA precursors
 
by improving
 
the ability of operators
 
and maintenance
 
personnel
 
to recog-nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms
 
that can cause them, actions to prevent them, and methods to manage them if they occur.4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors
 
have low public risk consequences.
 
However, an ISLOCA precursor
 
can require a shutdown or extension
 
of a shutdown, require radioactivity
 
cleanup operations, and cause personnel
 
injury.
 
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
 
from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
 
Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing
 
its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
 
Loss of Coolant Accidents
 
in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
 
to licensees.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.es ERossi, Drectr Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts:
Kazimieras
 
Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed
 
Plant Vulnerabilities
 
to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
Attachment
 
1 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities
 
to ISLOCA Precursors (Obtained
 
from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors
 
and plant inspections)
1. Lack of awareness
 
of the nature or consequences
 
of ISLOCAs 2. Inadequate
 
emergency
 
procedures
 
for ISLOCA outside containment, especially
 
for non-power
 
operational
 
modes 3. Poor or incorrect
 
valve labels 4. Different
 
nomenclature
 
used for the same equipment
 
in the same plant 5. Poor coordination
 
between concurrently
 
run tests 6. Miscommunications
 
between the control room operators
 
and auxiliary
 
opera-tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open then close," but understood
 
to mean "open")7. Poor shift turn-over
 
communications
 
8. Poor post-maintenance
 
testing or operability
 
checks 9. Inadequate
 
application
 
of independent
 
verification
 
10. Tendency not to check diverse instrument
 
indications
 
11. Tendency to commit personnel
 
to extensive
 
overtime work, especially
 
during shutdown and startup operations, thus increasing
 
the fatigue level and the likelihood
 
of errors
 
Attachment
 
2 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights (Obtained
 
from ISLOCA PRAs)1. The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency
 
caused by an ISLOCA could be substantially
 
greater than previous PRA estimates
 
for some plants. This is primarily
 
caused by the effects of operator errors and harsh environments
 
caused by the accident.
 
Valve alignment
 
errors during transition
 
between operating
 
modes can be particularly
 
important.
 
2. Equipment
 
qualified
 
for a harsh environment
 
is likely to survive the adverse ISLOCA temperature
 
and humidity, but not the possible submersion
 
caused by flooding.3. Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment
 
or flooding, depending
 
on the size and location of the break in relation to affected equipment, the separation
 
of redundant
 
trains, and the effect of fire sprays on flooding.4. ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damage essen-tial equipment
 
thus complicating
 
long-term
 
cooling, and the rate of loss of reactor water outside the containment.
 
If the water is not quickly replenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak has been isolated.5. Symptom-based
 
procedures
 
may lead the operator to realize that an ISLOCA has occurred.
 
However, unless the emergency
 
procedures
 
refer to plant provisions
 
for conserving
 
and replenishing
 
water, the operator may have difficulty
 
managing the accident.6. Most observed ISLOCA precursors
 
have low risk consequences, primarily because of the presence of one or more of the following
 
conditions:
small leak size, redundant
 
means of detecting
 
and isolating
 
a leak, and low power or shutdown conditions.
 
Attachment
 
3 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References
 
===Identification===
IN 90-64 IN 90-05 IN 89-73 Title or Subject Potential
 
for Common-Mode
 
Failure of HPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment
 
During a LOCA Inter-system
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coolant Potential
 
Overpressurization
 
of Low Pressure Systems Date 10/04/90 01/29/90 11/01/89 10/23/90 05/08/89 AIT Report 50-456/90-20
AIT Report 50-293/89-80
An assessment
 
of the 10/4/90 Braidwood loss of reactor coolant inventory
 
and personnel
 
contamination
 
and injury An assessment
 
of the 4/12/89 Pilgrim overpressurization
 
event, which occurred during the conduct of the RCIC logic test Inspection
 
Report 50-382/90-200
Inspection
 
Report 50-413,414/90-200
Inspection
 
Report 50-346/89-201
 
===ISLOCA Program Inspection===
plant ISLOCA Program Inspection
 
plants ISLOCA Program Inspection
 
Besse plant of the Waterford of the Catawba of the Davis 09/14/90 06/11/90 12/21/89 Audit Report Docket No. 50-213 NUREG/CR-5745 NUREG/CR-5744 NUREG/CR-5604 NUREG/CR-5124 NUREG/CR-5102 Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24 -August 4, 1989, Enclosure
 
to Memorandum
 
from Frank J. Congel, NRC, to Steven A. Varga, NRC*Assessment
 
for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
 
and Application:
Combustion
 
Engineering
 
Plant Assessment
 
for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
 
and Application:
Westinghouse
 
Four-Loop
 
Ice Condenser
 
Plant Assessment
 
for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
 
and Application:
Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Power Station Interfacing
 
Systems LOCA, Boiling Water Reactors Interfacing
 
===Systems LOCA, Pressurized===
Water Reactors 09/20/89 June 91 Feb 91 Feb 91 Feb 89 Feb 89-A COpy OT this report is available
 
in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
 
Attachment
 
4 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-35 92-34 92-33 92-32 92-31 92-30 Higher Than Predicted
 
Ero-sion/Corrosion
 
in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping Inside Containment
 
at A Boiling Water Reactor New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased
 
Instrument
 
Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Problems Identified
 
with Emergency
 
Ventilation
 
Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emer-gency Operations
 
Facili-ties and Technical
 
Support Centers Electrical
 
Connection
 
===Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation===
YS-80 Programmable
 
Indi-cating Controllers
 
Falsification
 
of Plant Records Spent Fuel Pool Re-activity Calculations
 
05/06/92 05/06/92 04/30/92 04/29/92 04/27/92 04/23/92 04/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All licensees
 
whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations
 
of uranium and thorium.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all licensed operators and senior operators.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-21, Supp. 1 OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
 
from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
 
Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing
 
its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
 
Loss of Coolant Accidents
 
in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
 
to licensees.
 
This information
 
notice requires you have any questions
 
about the of the technical
 
contacts listed Reactor Regulation (NRR) project no specific action or written response.
 
If information
 
in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear manager.Original Signed by Charles E Rei Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical
 
contacts: Kazimieras
 
Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed
 
Plant Vulnerabilities
 
to ISLOCA Precursors'
2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices Document Name: IN 92-36*See previous concurrence.
 
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
 
D/DOEA:NRR
 
*CHBerlinger
 
04/24/92 RPB:ADM*TechEd 04/09/92 D/DSIR:RES
 
*WMinners 04/15/92 C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES
 
*KKniel 04/14/92 RPSIB:DSIR:RES
 
*GBurdick 04/13/92 C/EIB:DSIR:RES
 
*RLBaer 04/13/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
 
*CVHodge 04/08/92 SC/RAB:DREP:NRR
 
*KCampe 04/09/92 C/RAB:DREP:NRR
 
*WBeckner 04/09/92 D/DREP:NRR
 
*FCongel 04/09/92 EIB:DSIR:RES
 
*SDiab 04/13/92 IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
 
from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
 
Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing
 
its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
 
Loss of Coolant Accidents
 
in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
 
to licensees.
 
This information
 
notice requires no speci you have any questions
 
about the informat of the technical
 
contacts listed below or Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.fic action or written response.
 
If ion in this notice, please contact one the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


IN 92-36May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs included little consideration of human errorsleading to an ISLOCA. Also, most existing PRAs have given little or no creditfor operator actions to terminate an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiologicalconsequences if core melt were to occur.On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power Company, licensee for theNorth Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR relief valves would not passthe design-basis flow to relieve an overpressurization of the RHR system whenthe latter is aligned to the RCS. The function of these relief valves isimportant when the RCS is water solid and therefore susceptible to overpressur-ization events, such as from a charging-letdown flow mismatch or a temperaturechange.The licensee made this report after conducting an engineering evaluation torespond to a notification by the nuclear steam supply vendor, the WestinghouseElectric Corporation. In February 1990, Westinghouse reviewed the RHR reliefvalve design basis for the Westinghouse Owners Group and recommended that itscustomers review the following three items:The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting against coldoverpressure eventsDischarge capability of relief valves for probable back pressuresDesign basis commitments for valve specifications, commitments in thefinal safety analysis report, and technical specificationsThe NRC has issued several information notices to discuss certain operationalevents regarding ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system Discharge of ReactorCoolant," the staff. discussed an event during which about 68,000 gallons ofreactor water was discharged outside the containment. The staff has alsoanalyzed operational experience and documented its findings in augmentedinspection team (AIT) reports. On October 23, 1990, the staff issued AITReport 50-456/90-020 on an event at Braidwood that resulted in primary waterleakage outside the containment and in the contamination of three personnel,one of whom received a second degree burn. Table 3 is a selected list ofinformation notices and AIT reports that the staff has issued on ISLOCAs andrelated events.DiscussionAlthough no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated operational experience,both in the United States and abroad, indicates that ISLOCA-like events haveoccurred at a rate higher than expected. In conducting this study, the staffdefined an ISLOCA-like event, or an ISLOCA precursor, as an event that resultsfrom the failure, degradation, or inadvertent opening of the pressure isolationvalves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure systems. An ISLOCA precursormay become an ISLOCA if it occurs during different plant conditions, or if someof the failures occur together.The NRC staff conducted root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors, extensiveplant inspections, and detailed analyses of a sample of PWRs. These analyses
Technical


IN 92-36May 7, 1992 included thermal-hydraulic analyses, fragility analyses to determine the likelysizes and locations of a break, and human reliability analyses. The staff usedthe results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights about the significantcontributors to ISLOCA risk.The staff directed the studies described in this information notice towardsfinding vulnerabilities of PWR plants to ISLOCAs, since the primary pressurespresent in PWRs are greater than those found in boiling water reactors (BWRs),while the design pressures of low pressure systems are about the same in bothPWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees also may find this information to berelevant to their plants.Upon conducting these studies, the staff made the following observations on theISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants:1. The estimated core damage frequency caused by ISLOCAs could be greaterthan was estimated in PRAs for some plants.The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiators and the capabili-ties for recovery. These factors vary from plant to plant. The maincontributors to ISLOCA initiation and/or recovery include (a) human errorsand (b) the effects of the accident-caused harsh environment on plantequipment and recovery activities. Both factors have significant uncer-tainties. Existing PRAs have provided little or no treatment of thesefactors. Plants that are particularly vulnerable to either of these twofactors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated by existing PRAs.2. Most plants lack contingency plans to provide backup water supplies thatcan be transferred readily to provide long-term core cooling after anISLOCA.By examining a plant's emergency procedures, a licensee can findinsights for improving the plant's features to address the concerns forboth ISLOCAs and other accidents.3. The root cause analyses of operational events indicate that ISLOCA precur-sors most likely would be initiated by human errors, notably duringtesting and maintenance or because of procedural deficiencies. This maybe attributed to the general lack of awareness of the possibility orconsequences of an ISLOCA.Licensees may significantly reduce the probability of ISLOCA precursorsby improving the ability of operators and maintenance personnel to recog-nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms that can cause them, actions to prevent them, andmethods to manage them if they occur.4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low public risk consequences. However,an ISLOCA precursor can require a shutdown or extension of a shutdown,require radioactivity cleanup operations, and cause personnel injury.
contacts: Kazimieras


IN 92-36May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plantinspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence tolicensees.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact oneof the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.es ERossi, DrectrDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts: Kazimieras Campe, NRR(301) 504-1092Sammy Diab, RES(301) 492-3914Gary Burdick, RES(301) 492-3812Attachments:1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors"2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References"4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed


Attachment 1IN 92-36May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors(Obtained from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors and plant inspections)1. Lack of awareness of the nature or consequences of ISLOCAs2. Inadequate emergency procedures for ISLOCA outside containment, especiallyfor non-power operational modes3. Poor or incorrect valve labels4. Different nomenclature used for the same equipment in the same plant5. Poor coordination between concurrently run tests6. Miscommunications between the control room operators and auxiliary opera-tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open then close," but understoodto mean "open")7. Poor shift turn-over communications8. Poor post-maintenance testing or operability checks9. Inadequate application of independent verification10. Tendency not to check diverse instrument indications11. Tendency to commit personnel to extensive overtime work, especially duringshutdown and startup operations, thus increasing the fatigue level and thelikelihood of errors
Plant Vulnerabilities


Attachment 2IN 92-36May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights(Obtained from ISLOCA PRAs)1. The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency caused by anISLOCA could be substantially greater than previous PRA estimates for someplants. This is primarily caused by the effects of operator errors andharsh environments caused by the accident. Valve alignment errors duringtransition between operating modes can be particularly important.2. Equipment qualified for a harsh environment is likely to survive theadverse ISLOCA temperature and humidity, but not the possible submersioncaused by flooding.3. Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment orflooding, depending on the size and location of the break in relation toaffected equipment, the separation of redundant trains, and the effect offire sprays on flooding.4. ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damage essen-tial equipment thus complicating long-term cooling, and the rate of lossof reactor water outside the containment. If the water is not quicklyreplenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak hasbeen isolated.5. Symptom-based procedures may lead the operator to realize that an ISLOCAhas occurred. However, unless the emergency procedures refer to plantprovisions for conserving and replenishing water, the operator may havedifficulty managing the accident.6. Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low risk consequences, primarilybecause of the presence of one or more of the following conditions: smallleak size, redundant means of detecting and isolating a leak, and lowpower or shutdown conditions.
to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Attachment 3IN 92-36May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and ReferencesIdentificationIN 90-64IN 90-05IN 89-73Title or SubjectPotential for Common-Mode Failure ofHPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor CoolantOutside Containment During a LOCAInter-system Discharge of Reactor CoolantPotential Overpressurization of LowPressure SystemsDate10/04/9001/29/9011/01/8910/23/9005/08/89AIT Report50-456/90-20AIT Report50-293/89-80An assessment of the 10/4/90 Braidwoodloss of reactor coolant inventory andpersonnel contamination and injuryAn assessment of the 4/12/89 Pilgrimoverpressurization event, which occurredduring the conduct of the RCIC logic testInspectionReport50-382/90-200InspectionReport50-413,414/90-200InspectionReport50-346/89-201ISLOCA Program InspectionplantISLOCA Program InspectionplantsISLOCA Program InspectionBesse plantof the Waterfordof the Catawbaof the Davis09/14/9006/11/9012/21/89AuditReportDocket No. 50-213NUREG/CR-5745NUREG/CR-5744NUREG/CR-5604NUREG/CR-5124NUREG/CR-5102Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24 -August 4, 1989, Enclosure to Memorandumfrom Frank J. Congel, NRC, toSteven A. Varga, NRC*Assessment for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology and Application:Combustion Engineering PlantAssessment for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology and Application:Westinghouse Four-Loop Ice Condenser PlantAssessment for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology and Application: Babcockand Wilcox Nuclear Power StationInterfacing Systems LOCA, BoilingWater ReactorsInterfacing Systems LOCA, PressurizedWater Reactors09/20/89June 91Feb 91Feb 91Feb 89Feb 89-A COpy OT this report is available in the NRC Public Document Room,2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
Notices Document Name: C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR


Attachment 4IN 92-36May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to92-3592-3492-3392-3292-3192-30Higher Than Predicted Ero-sion/Corrosion in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping InsideContainment at A BoilingWater ReactorNew Exposure Limits forAirborne Uranium andThoriumIncreased InstrumentResponse Time WhenPressure DampeningDevices are InstalledProblems Identified withEmergency VentilationSystems for Near-Site(Within 10 Miles) Emer-gency Operations Facili-ties and Technical SupportCentersElectrical ConnectionProblem in JohnsonYokogawa CorporationYS-80 Programmable Indi-cating ControllersFalsification of PlantRecordsSpent Fuel Pool Re-activity Calculations05/06/9205/06/9204/30/9204/29/9204/27/9204/23/9204/22/92All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All licensees whose opera-tions can cause airborneconcentrations of uraniumand thorium.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactorsand all licensed operatorsand senior operators.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.92-21,Supp. 1OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
D/D1 CHBerling~*
fj, CER 04/21/92gq"'
04/RPB:ADM D/D TechEd J7Hh9q W" 04/ q/92 04/OGCB:DOEA:
RR SC/I CVHodge US9 KCai 04/od/92 04/ISLOCA REV 2 DOEA: NRR tossi l g kS 15~/ 92 RAB: REP:NRR imp I9/9 C L SI R:RES 04/A//92 C/RAB:DREP:IER


IN 92-36May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plantinspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence tolicensees.This information notice requiresyou have any questions about theof the technical contacts listedReactor Regulation (NRR) projectno specific action or written response. Ifinformation in this notice, please contact onebelow or the appropriate Office of Nuclearmanager.Original Signed byCharles E ReiCharles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Kazimieras Campe, NRR(301) 504-1092Sammy Diab, RES(301) 492-3914Gary Burdick, RES(301) 492-3812Attachments:1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors'2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References"4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDocument Name: IN 92-36*See previous concurrence.C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR*CHBerlinger04/24/92RPB:ADM*TechEd04/09/92D/DSIR:RES*WMinners04/15/92C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES*KKniel04/14/92RPSIB:DSIR:RES*GBurdick04/13/92C/EIB:DSIR:RES*RLBaer04/13/92OGCB:DOEA:NRR*CVHodge04/08/92SC/RAB:DREP:NRR*KCampe04/09/92C/RAB:DREP:NRR*WBeckner04/09/92D/DREP:NRR*FCongel04/09/92EIB:DSIR:RES*SDiab04/13/92 IN 92-XXApril xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plantinspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence tolicensees.This information notice requires no speciyou have any questions about the informatof the technical contacts listed below orReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.fic action or written response. Ifion in this notice, please contact onethe appropriate Office of NuclearCharles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contacts:Kazimieras Campe, NRR(301) 504-1092Sammy Diab, RES(301) 492-3914Gary Burdick, RES(301) 492-3812Attachments:1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors"2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References"4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information NoticesDocument Name:C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/D1CHBerling~* fj, CER04/21/92gq"' 04/RPB:ADM D/DTechEd J7Hh9q W"04/ q/92 04/OGCB:DOEA: RR SC/ICVHodge US9 KCai04/od/92 04/ISLOCA REV 2DOEA: NRRtossi lg kS15~/ 92RAB: REP:NRRimpI9/9C L SI R:RES04/A//92C/RAB:DREP:IERWBeckner Xyt04/A /92R Q DSIR:RESGB k04//3/92D/DREP:NFCongel04/9 /92C/EIB:D IRRESRLBaerXiF'04//3/92EIB:DSIR L>SDiab04/,3/92/  
WBeckner Xyt 04/A /92 R Q DSIR:RES GB k 04//3/92 D/DREP:N FCongel 04/9 /92 C/EIB:D IRRES RLBaerXiF'
}}
04//3/92 EIB:DSIR L>SDiab 04/,3/92/}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:08, 31 August 2018

Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment
ML031200356
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1992
From: Rossi C E
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-036, NUDOCS 9205010045
Download: ML031200356 (10)


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 7, 1992 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 92-36: INTERSYSTEM

LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

of potential

plant vulnerabilities

to intersystem

loss-of-coolant accidents (ISLOCAs).

It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.This information

notice provides information

gathered during a concerted

NRC staff effort to study plant vulnerabilities

to ISLOCAs. The staff gathered this information

by performing (a) detailed evaluations

of operating

events, (b) inspections

of a limited sample of pressurized

water reactors (PWRs), and (c) extensive

analyses of the sample PWRs. The information

may be of use in recipients'

individual

plant examination (IPE) programs.Background

The ISLOCA is a class of accidents

in which a break occurs in a system con-nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primary system inventory.

This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently

exposed to high RCS pressures

beyond its capacity.

ISLOCAs of most concern are those that can discharge

the break flow outside the reactor containment

building, primarily

because they can result in high offsite radiological

consequences

but also because the RCS inventory

lost cannot be retrieved

for long-term

core cooling during the recirculation

phase.In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published

in 1975, and in NUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment

for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," the NRC described

the ISLOCA outside containment

as an event of low core damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors

to plant risk. In those studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilistic

risk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.However, these PRAs typically

have modelled only those Event-V sequences

that include only the catastrophic

failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from 92050_ 45 AMA

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs included little consideration

of human errors leading to an ISLOCA. Also, most existing PRAs have given little or no credit for operator actions to terminate

an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiological

consequences

if core melt were to occur.On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power Company, licensee for the North Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR relief valves would not pass the design-basis

flow to relieve an overpressurization

of the RHR system when the latter is aligned to the RCS. The function of these relief valves is important

when the RCS is water solid and therefore

susceptible

to overpressur- ization events, such as from a charging-letdown

flow mismatch or a temperature

change.The licensee made this report after conducting

an engineering

evaluation

to respond to a notification

by the nuclear steam supply vendor, the Westinghouse

Electric Corporation.

In February 1990, Westinghouse

reviewed the RHR relief valve design basis for the Westinghouse

Owners Group and recommended

that its customers

review the following

three items: The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting

against cold overpressure

events Discharge

capability

of relief valves for probable back pressures Design basis commitments

for valve specifications, commitments

in the final safety analysis report, and technical

specifications

The NRC has issued several information

notices to discuss certain operational

events regarding

ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system

Discharge

of Reactor Coolant," the staff. discussed

an event during which about 68,000 gallons of reactor water was discharged

outside the containment.

The staff has also analyzed operational

experience

and documented

its findings in augmented inspection

team (AIT) reports. On October 23, 1990, the staff issued AIT Report 50-456/90-020

on an event at Braidwood

that resulted in primary water leakage outside the containment

and in the contamination

of three personnel, one of whom received a second degree burn. Table 3 is a selected list of information

notices and AIT reports that the staff has issued on ISLOCAs and related events.Discussion

Although no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated

operational

experience, both in the United States and abroad, indicates

that ISLOCA-like

events have occurred at a rate higher than expected.

In conducting

this study, the staff defined an ISLOCA-like

event, or an ISLOCA precursor, as an event that results from the failure, degradation, or inadvertent

opening of the pressure isolation valves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure systems. An ISLOCA precursor may become an ISLOCA if it occurs during different

plant conditions, or if some of the failures occur together.The NRC staff conducted

root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors, extensive plant inspections, and detailed analyses of a sample of PWRs. These analyses

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 included thermal-hydraulic

analyses, fragility

analyses to determine

the likely sizes and locations

of a break, and human reliability

analyses.

The staff used the results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights about the significant

contributors

to ISLOCA risk.The staff directed the studies described

in this information

notice towards finding vulnerabilities

of PWR plants to ISLOCAs, since the primary pressures present in PWRs are greater than those found in boiling water reactors (BWRs), while the design pressures

of low pressure systems are about the same in both PWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees

also may find this information

to be relevant to their plants.Upon conducting

these studies, the staff made the following

observations

on the ISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants: 1. The estimated

core damage frequency

caused by ISLOCAs could be greater than was estimated

in PRAs for some plants.The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiators

and the capabili-ties for recovery.

These factors vary from plant to plant. The main contributors

to ISLOCA initiation

and/or recovery include (a) human errors and (b) the effects of the accident-caused

harsh environment

on plant equipment

and recovery activities.

Both factors have significant

uncer-tainties.

Existing PRAs have provided little or no treatment

of these factors. Plants that are particularly

vulnerable

to either of these two factors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated

by existing PRAs.2. Most plants lack contingency

plans to provide backup water supplies that can be transferred

readily to provide long-term

core cooling after an ISLOCA.By examining

a plant's emergency

procedures, a licensee can find insights for improving

the plant's features to address the concerns for both ISLOCAs and other accidents.

3. The root cause analyses of operational

events indicate that ISLOCA precur-sors most likely would be initiated

by human errors, notably during testing and maintenance

or because of procedural

deficiencies.

This may be attributed

to the general lack of awareness

of the possibility

or consequences

of an ISLOCA.Licensees

may significantly

reduce the probability

of ISLOCA precursors

by improving

the ability of operators

and maintenance

personnel

to recog-nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms

that can cause them, actions to prevent them, and methods to manage them if they occur.4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors

have low public risk consequences.

However, an ISLOCA precursor

can require a shutdown or extension

of a shutdown, require radioactivity

cleanup operations, and cause personnel

injury.

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations

from root cause analyses and plant inspections.

Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing

its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem

Loss of Coolant Accidents

in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence

to licensees.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact one of the technical

contacts listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.es ERossi, Drectr Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts:

Kazimieras

Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed

Plant Vulnerabilities

to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities

to ISLOCA Precursors (Obtained

from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors

and plant inspections)

1. Lack of awareness

of the nature or consequences

of ISLOCAs 2. Inadequate

emergency

procedures

for ISLOCA outside containment, especially

for non-power

operational

modes 3. Poor or incorrect

valve labels 4. Different

nomenclature

used for the same equipment

in the same plant 5. Poor coordination

between concurrently

run tests 6. Miscommunications

between the control room operators

and auxiliary

opera-tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open then close," but understood

to mean "open")7. Poor shift turn-over

communications

8. Poor post-maintenance

testing or operability

checks 9. Inadequate

application

of independent

verification

10. Tendency not to check diverse instrument

indications

11. Tendency to commit personnel

to extensive

overtime work, especially

during shutdown and startup operations, thus increasing

the fatigue level and the likelihood

of errors

Attachment

2 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights (Obtained

from ISLOCA PRAs)1. The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency

caused by an ISLOCA could be substantially

greater than previous PRA estimates

for some plants. This is primarily

caused by the effects of operator errors and harsh environments

caused by the accident.

Valve alignment

errors during transition

between operating

modes can be particularly

important.

2. Equipment

qualified

for a harsh environment

is likely to survive the adverse ISLOCA temperature

and humidity, but not the possible submersion

caused by flooding.3. Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment

or flooding, depending

on the size and location of the break in relation to affected equipment, the separation

of redundant

trains, and the effect of fire sprays on flooding.4. ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damage essen-tial equipment

thus complicating

long-term

cooling, and the rate of loss of reactor water outside the containment.

If the water is not quickly replenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak has been isolated.5. Symptom-based

procedures

may lead the operator to realize that an ISLOCA has occurred.

However, unless the emergency

procedures

refer to plant provisions

for conserving

and replenishing

water, the operator may have difficulty

managing the accident.6. Most observed ISLOCA precursors

have low risk consequences, primarily because of the presence of one or more of the following

conditions:

small leak size, redundant

means of detecting

and isolating

a leak, and low power or shutdown conditions.

Attachment

3 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References

Identification

IN 90-64 IN 90-05 IN 89-73 Title or Subject Potential

for Common-Mode

Failure of HPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment

During a LOCA Inter-system

Discharge

of Reactor Coolant Potential

Overpressurization

of Low Pressure Systems Date 10/04/90 01/29/90 11/01/89 10/23/90 05/08/89 AIT Report 50-456/90-20

AIT Report 50-293/89-80

An assessment

of the 10/4/90 Braidwood loss of reactor coolant inventory

and personnel

contamination

and injury An assessment

of the 4/12/89 Pilgrim overpressurization

event, which occurred during the conduct of the RCIC logic test Inspection

Report 50-382/90-200

Inspection

Report 50-413,414/90-200

Inspection

Report 50-346/89-201

ISLOCA Program Inspection

plant ISLOCA Program Inspection

plants ISLOCA Program Inspection

Besse plant of the Waterford of the Catawba of the Davis 09/14/90 06/11/90 12/21/89 Audit Report Docket No. 50-213 NUREG/CR-5745 NUREG/CR-5744 NUREG/CR-5604 NUREG/CR-5124 NUREG/CR-5102 Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24 -August 4, 1989, Enclosure

to Memorandum

from Frank J. Congel, NRC, to Steven A. Varga, NRC*Assessment

for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology

and Application:

Combustion

Engineering

Plant Assessment

for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology

and Application:

Westinghouse

Four-Loop

Ice Condenser

Plant Assessment

for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology

and Application:

Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Power Station Interfacing

Systems LOCA, Boiling Water Reactors Interfacing

Systems LOCA, Pressurized

Water Reactors 09/20/89 June 91 Feb 91 Feb 91 Feb 89 Feb 89-A COpy OT this report is available

in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.

Attachment

4 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-35 92-34 92-33 92-32 92-31 92-30 Higher Than Predicted

Ero-sion/Corrosion

in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping Inside Containment

at A Boiling Water Reactor New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased

Instrument

Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Problems Identified

with Emergency

Ventilation

Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emer-gency Operations

Facili-ties and Technical

Support Centers Electrical

Connection

Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation

YS-80 Programmable

Indi-cating Controllers

Falsification

of Plant Records Spent Fuel Pool Re-activity Calculations

05/06/92 05/06/92 04/30/92 04/29/92 04/27/92 04/23/92 04/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All licensees

whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations

of uranium and thorium.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all licensed operators and senior operators.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-21, Supp. 1 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations

from root cause analyses and plant inspections.

Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing

its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem

Loss of Coolant Accidents

in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence

to licensees.

This information

notice requires you have any questions

about the of the technical

contacts listed Reactor Regulation (NRR) project no specific action or written response.

If information

in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear manager.Original Signed by Charles E Rei Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Kazimieras

Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed

Plant Vulnerabilities

to ISLOCA Precursors'

2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: IN 92-36*See previous concurrence.

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

D/DOEA:NRR

  • CHBerlinger

04/24/92 RPB:ADM*TechEd 04/09/92 D/DSIR:RES

  • WMinners 04/15/92 C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES
  • KKniel 04/14/92 RPSIB:DSIR:RES
  • GBurdick 04/13/92 C/EIB:DSIR:RES
  • RLBaer 04/13/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
  • CVHodge 04/08/92 SC/RAB:DREP:NRR
  • KCampe 04/09/92 C/RAB:DREP:NRR
  • WBeckner 04/09/92 D/DREP:NRR
  • FCongel 04/09/92 EIB:DSIR:RES
  • SDiab 04/13/92 IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations

from root cause analyses and plant inspections.

Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing

its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem

Loss of Coolant Accidents

in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence

to licensees.

This information

notice requires no speci you have any questions

about the informat of the technical

contacts listed below or Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.fic action or written response.

If ion in this notice, please contact one the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational

Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contacts: Kazimieras

Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed

Plant Vulnerabilities

to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices Document Name: C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR

D/D1 CHBerling~*

fj, CER 04/21/92gq"'

04/RPB:ADM D/D TechEd J7Hh9q W" 04/ q/92 04/OGCB:DOEA:

RR SC/I CVHodge US9 KCai 04/od/92 04/ISLOCA REV 2 DOEA: NRR tossi l g kS 15~/ 92 RAB: REP:NRR imp I9/9 C L SI R:RES 04/A//92 C/RAB:DREP:IER

WBeckner Xyt 04/A /92 R Q DSIR:RES GB k 04//3/92 D/DREP:N FCongel 04/9 /92 C/EIB:D IRRES RLBaerXiF'

04//3/92 EIB:DSIR L>SDiab 04/,3/92/