ML20195D632: Difference between revisions

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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TYPE C LEAK TESTING PROGRAM MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET N0. 50-309 INTRODUCTION As a result of a staff's safety evaluation (SE) sent to Maine Yankee, the licensee, by letter dated August 24, 1984, the licensee performed a reevaluation of the Containment Isolation Valve Type C Leak Rate Testing Program for various penetrations in question. The results of their reevaluation were submitted by letters dated January 8, 1985 and November 14, 1985.
SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TYPE C LEAK TESTING PROGRAM MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET N0. 50-309 INTRODUCTION As a result of a staff's safety evaluation (SE) sent to Maine Yankee, the licensee, by {{letter dated|date=August 24, 1984|text=letter dated August 24, 1984}}, the licensee performed a reevaluation of the Containment Isolation Valve Type C Leak Rate Testing Program for various penetrations in question. The results of their reevaluation were submitted by letters dated January 8, 1985 and November 14, 1985.
4 The staff's position on these items and conclusions with regard to the Maine Yankee submittal are presented in this Safety Evaluation.
4 The staff's position on these items and conclusions with regard to the Maine Yankee submittal are presented in this Safety Evaluation.
EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION On January 11, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of an analysis to show that, for various penetrations, Type C testing was not required. This proposal was reviewed by the staff and based on that review the staff did not agree with MYAPCo's conclusions for 24 penetrations. The denial was based on either nonconformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, or lack of enough information to decide if relief could be granted. The licensee upon reviewing the staff's Safety Evaluation, agreed with the evaluation on eleven (11) penetrations and will perform Type C testing as required. For the other thirteen (13) penetrations plus six (6) added penetrations, the licensee has submitted a reevaluation containing more information as required by the staff.
EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION On January 11, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of an analysis to show that, for various penetrations, Type C testing was not required. This proposal was reviewed by the staff and based on that review the staff did not agree with MYAPCo's conclusions for 24 penetrations. The denial was based on either nonconformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, or lack of enough information to decide if relief could be granted. The licensee upon reviewing the staff's Safety Evaluation, agreed with the evaluation on eleven (11) penetrations and will perform Type C testing as required. For the other thirteen (13) penetrations plus six (6) added penetrations, the licensee has submitted a reevaluation containing more information as required by the staff.

Latest revision as of 13:59, 9 December 2021

Safety Evaluation Supporting Containment Isolation Valve Type C Leak Rate Testing Programs for Various Penetrations, Per Util 840928,850108,0305 & 1114 Ltrs
ML20195D632
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 05/23/1986
From:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20195D617 List:
References
NUDOCS 8606040349
Download: ML20195D632 (2)
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO THE CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE TYPE C LEAK TESTING PROGRAM MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER STATION DOCKET N0. 50-309 INTRODUCTION As a result of a staff's safety evaluation (SE) sent to Maine Yankee, the licensee, by letter dated August 24, 1984, the licensee performed a reevaluation of the Containment Isolation Valve Type C Leak Rate Testing Program for various penetrations in question. The results of their reevaluation were submitted by letters dated January 8, 1985 and November 14, 1985.

4 The staff's position on these items and conclusions with regard to the Maine Yankee submittal are presented in this Safety Evaluation.

EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION On January 11, 1984, the licensee submitted the results of an analysis to show that, for various penetrations, Type C testing was not required. This proposal was reviewed by the staff and based on that review the staff did not agree with MYAPCo's conclusions for 24 penetrations. The denial was based on either nonconformance to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, or lack of enough information to decide if relief could be granted. The licensee upon reviewing the staff's Safety Evaluation, agreed with the evaluation on eleven (11) penetrations and will perform Type C testing as required. For the other thirteen (13) penetrations plus six (6) added penetrations, the licensee has submitted a reevaluation containing more information as required by the staff.

For penetrations 33 and 34, the containment safeguard sump, the licensee has demonstrated that following a design base accident (DBA), the water inventory from a Loss of Coolant Accident (L.0.C.A.) will accumulate on the containment floor thus flooding the containment safeguard sump and would prevent the leak-age of the containment atmosphere. Based on the above information the staff

agrees that Type C testing is not required for penetrations 33 and 34.

The licensee, through reviewing penetrations 22, 26, 27, 28 and 36 which involve the charging line, Reactor Coolant Loop Fill, and the Seal Water Injection Lines, states that even if one of the inner containment isolation valves were to fail open, small drain lines common to the charging loop fill and seal water injection lines may be exposed to peak accident pressure.

These drain lines are designed to withstand 2500 psig operating pressures,

! therefore, are adequate to withstand the 50 psig accident pressure.

Additionally, the licensee verifies the integrity of the system by performing hydrostatic and inservice leak testing during the inservice inspection j intervals. Based on this the staff agrees Type C testing for penetrations 22, 26, 27, 28 and 36 is not required.

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. l For penetrations 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21, the containment air recirculation cooling water for the containment air coolers, the licensee has demonstrated that they are a closed system and are separated from the reactor coolant system by an inner annulus wall for missile protection.

This closed system is also designed as a safety Class 2 which means it will remain intact during a L.O.C. A. Therefore, based on this information the staff agrees Type C testing for penetrations: 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21 is not required.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with tne Commission's regulations and the issuance of this relief request will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: May 23, 1986 Principal Contributor:

S. D. Kucharski Division of Reactor Projects Region I

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