IR 05000336/2019002

Integrated Inspection Report 05000336/2019002 and 05000423/2019002

ML19224B324
Person / Time
Site:	Millstone
Issue date:	08/12/2019
From:	Daniel Schroeder Reactor Projects Branch 2
To:	Stoddard D Dominion Energy
Schroeder D
References
IR 2019002
Download: ML19224B324 (30)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:ust 12, 2019

SUBJECT:

MILLSTONE POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000336/2019002 AND 05000423/2019002

Dear Mr. Stoddard:

On June 30, 2019, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3. On July 10, 2019, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with John Daugherty, Site Vice President and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

Two findings of very low safety significance (Green) are documented in this report. Both of these findings involved violations of NRC requirements. The inspectors documented a licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance in this report. The NRC is treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance or severity of the violations documented in this inspection report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Millstone. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely, /RA/ Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 05000336 and 05000423 License Nos. DPR-65 and NPF-49

Enclosure:

As stated

Inspection Report

Docket Numbers: 05000336 and 05000423 License Numbers: DPR-65 and NPF-49 Report Numbers: 05000336/2019002 and 05000423/2019002 Enterprise Identifier: I-2019-002-0045 Licensee: Dominion Energy Nuclear Connecticut, Inc.

Facility: Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 Location: P. O. Box 128 Waterford, CT 06385 Inspection Dates: April 1, 2019 to June 30, 2019 Inspectors: J. Fuller, Senior Resident Inspector C. Highley, Resident Inspector L. McKown, Resident Inspector P. Boguszewski, Project Engineer J. Ambrosini, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist A. Turilin, Reactor Inspector S. Wilson, Health Physicist Approved By: Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Millstone Power Station, Units 2 and 3 in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Licensee-identified non-cited violations are documented in report sections: 71111.13.

List of Findings and Violations Inadequate post maintenance testing resulted in engineered safety features building emergency ventilation failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - Teamwork 71111.19 Systems NCV 05000423/2019002-01 Open A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was self-revealed on June 13, 2019, when 3HVQ*ACUS2B, the Unit 3 B train engineered safety features (ESF) building air conditioning unit (ACU), failed to start during routine surveillance testing of the ESF building emergency fan. Dominion failed to establish an adequate post maintenance test plan to ensure that the ACU would perform satisfactorily in service after two refrigerant pressure control valves were replaced on May 2, 2019. The ACU was not operable and unable to perform its safety function from May 11 to June 13, 2019.

Degraded jacket water piping for emergency diesel generator not promptly corrected Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71152 Systems NCV 05000423/2019002-02 Management Open A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was self-revealed when Dominion did not promptly correct deficient welds on the Unit 3 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water piping, which resulted in a weld crack and inoperability of the 'A' EDG on February 6, 2019.

Additional Tracking Items None.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 2 began the inspection period at rated thermal power. On April 22, 2019, Unit 2 reduced power to 53 percent due to a feedwater heater tube leak, and then further reduced power to 10 percent due to feedwater heater valve leakage on the other train. The unit returned to rated thermal power on May 5, 2019, and operated at or near full power for the remainder of the cycle.

Unit 3 began the inspection period coasting down to the scheduled refueling outage. On April 11, 2019, Unit 3 shutdown for a scheduled refueling outage. The unit returned to rated thermal power on May 18, 2019, and remained at or near rated thermal power for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

71111.01 - Adverse Weather Protection Summer Readiness Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors evaluated summer readiness of offsite and alternate alternating current power systems on June 10, 2019.

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following systems/trains:

(1) Unit 2 service water partial system alignment with a focus on the EDG cooling water flow following a leaking service water valve on April 8, 2019

(2) Unit 2 'C' high pressure safety injection pump aligned to the Facility 2 header on April 9, 2019

(3) Unit 2 motor driven auxiliary feedwater partial system alignment during surveillance testing of turbine driven auxiliary feedwater following secondary system waterhammer event on April 24, 2019

(4) Unit 2 containment tendon grease pressurization system on May 10, 2019

(5) Unit 3 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump partial system alignment after inservice testing on April 2, 2019

71111.04S - Equipment Alignment Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02)

(1) Unit 3 'A' residual heat removal (RHR) train outside containment on April 10 and inside containment on April 12-16, 2019

(2) Unit 3 'A' loop of the reactor coolant system (RCS) on April 15, 2019

71111.05A - Fire Protection (Annual) Annual Inspection (IP Section 03.02)

(1) The inspectors evaluated fire brigade performance on June 6, 2019

71111.05Q - Fire Protection Quarterly Inspection (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected areas:

(1) Unit 2 turbine building general area (Fire Area T-1C), upon discovery of main lube oil return pipe leak onto main steam headers (condition report (CR)1120217) on April 9, 2019

(2) Unit 2 auxiliary building east penetration rooms (Fire Areas A-10A, B, C) on April 18, 2019

(3) Unit 2 auxiliary building west penetration rooms (Fire Areas A-8C, D, E) on April 18, 2019

(4) Unit 3 south RHR heat exchanger cubicle (Fire Area ESF-6) on April 10, 2019

(5) Unit 3 west and east switchgear (Fire Areas CB1 and CB2) and battery rooms 1-5 (Fire Areas CB3-CB7) on April 15, 2019

(6) Unit 3 main control room (Fire Area CB-9) with a focus on additional fire protection measures implemented to support back panel modifications for normal station service transformer (NSST) relay replacement on April 18, 2019

(7) Unit 3 containment (Fire Area RC-1) on April 18, 2019

71111.06 - Flood Protection Measures Inspection Activities - Internal Flooding (IP Section 02.02a.)

The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the:

(1) Unit 2 emergency safeguards actuation system rooms internal flooding protection on May 1, 2019, and associated NRC operating experience smart sample 2007/02, analysis of flooding vulnerabilities, Revision 3

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance Annual Review (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1) Unit 3 'A' emergency diesel jacket water cooler (3EGS*E2A) and engine air cooler water heat exchangers (3EGS*E1A)

71111.08P - Inservice Inspection Activities (PWR) PWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) The inspectors verified that the RCS boundary, steam generator tubes, reactor vessel internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary are appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were appropriately fabricated, examined and accepted by reviewing the following activities from April 22 to May 3, 2019:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. Ultrasonic examination of low pressure safety injection pipe to elbow weld SIL-505-5-SW-5 2. Ultrasonic examination of low pressure safety injection elbow to pipe weld SIL-505-5-SW-6 3. Phased array ultrasonic examination of reactor vessel 'A' loop outlet nozzle to safe end dissimilar metal weld 302-121-C (W28)4. Ultrasonic examination of steam generator '1A' outlet nozzle to head weld 03-003-SW-U 5. Ultrasonic examination of RCS loop 'C' elbow to pipe weld RCS-LP3-FW-6 6. Containment coating and moisture barrier general visual inspections 7. Component accepted for continued service from previous outage a. Boric acid residue at reactor pressure vessel head control rod drive mechanism vent plug B10 (Design change MP3-16-01053, to replace carbon steel eyebolt with 316 stainless steel seal cap) CR1081798 8. Repair/Replacement Activity a. Mitigation via Water-jet cavitation peening of reactor vessel outlet nozzle to safe-end dissimilar metal weld 302-121-A, 302-121-B, 302-121-C, 302-121-D (WO 53203152549)03.01.b - Pressurized-Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Examination Activities.

1. Bare metal visual examination of Unit 3 reactor vessel head penetrations 40, 71 and 78 03.01.c - Pressurized-Water Reactor Boric Acid Corrosion Control Activities.

1. Evaluation for CR1099220, 'A' containment recirculation pump to 'A' RHR train bolted connection, M33RSS*MV8837A 2. Evaluation for CR1101854, 'B' RHR pump suction isolation from RCS bolted connection, M33RHS*MV8702A 3. Evaluation for CR1099250, 'A' RHR discharge to hot legs and refueling water storage tank bolted connection, 3RHS*MV8716 03.01.d - Pressurized-Water Reactor Steam Generator Tube Examination Activities.

1. 'B' and 'D' steam generator tube eddy current examinations 2. 'C' steam generator secondary side visual examinations

==71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated operator performance in the Unit 2 control room during an emergent downpower from 100 percent to 54 percent power to isolate an internal leak at the '3A' feedwater heater leak on April 22, 2019

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the Unit 3 control room during the following infrequently conducted or complex evolutions (ICCEs): turbine over speed testing on April 12, RCS solid plant conditions on April 13, loss of power testing on April 13, and decreased RCS inventory on April 15, 2019 Licensed Operator Requalification Training/Examinations (IP Section 03.02)==

(1) The inspectors observed and evaluated Unit 3 licensed operators perform just in time training for the scheduled refueling outage on April 7- 8, 2019

(2) The inspectors observed and evaluated the operators performance in the Unit 2 simulator during a LORT exam covering a loss of a condensate pump, reactor trip due to a loss of offsite power, excessive steam demand due to a steam line rupture in containment, failure of a pressurizer level control instrument, and an activation of the safety injection system on June 11, 2019.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness Routine Maintenance Effectiveness Inspection (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:

(1) Unit 3 EDGs (a)(1) evaluation as a result of the 'A' jacket water leak (February 6, 2019) and the 'B' jacket water leak (May 24, 2017) on April 4, 2019

(2) Unit 3 auxiliary shutdown panel preventive maintenance program following the reactor head vent to excess letdown isolation valve failure to stroke from the auxiliary shutdown panel on May 15, 2019

Quality Control (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated maintenance and quality control activities associated with the following equipment performance activities:

(1) Unit 3 quality control receipt inspection records for safety-related couplings, pipe, and valve for the replacement of pressurizer spray bypass valve 3RCS*V059 on April 19, 2019

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01)

The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent work activities:

(1) Unit 2 elevated risk during Facility 2 engineering safeguards actuation signal under voltage testing during Unit 3 NSST maintenance window on April 15, 2019

(2) Unit 2 emergent downpower to 54 percent to isolate '3A' feedwater heater internal leak and emergent power reduction from 54 percent to 10 percent to take the turbine offline due to steam leak at '2B' feedwater heater normal level control valve on April 22, 2019

(3) Unit 2 emergent risk associated with 'A' EDG DC air compressor troubleshooting on and about the protected 'A' EDG on May 14, 2019

(4) Unit 2 unplanned yellow risk entered for blocking of safety injection actuation signal switch which removed the 'A' service water header to swap from 'B' to 'A' service water pump on June 6, 2019

(5) Unit 2 elevated risk and associated high risk plan during installation of clamp on cracked vent line weld for valve 2-HD-262, '1B' to '2B' feedwater heater drain line vent valve isolation, on June 27, 2019

(6) Unit 3 elevated risk during decreased RCS inventory to three feet below the reactor vessel flange for reactor pressure vessel head removal on April 17, 2019

(7) Unit 3 main control room panel cutting for installation of new NSST relay installation on April 17, 2019

(8) Unit 3 elevated risk during decreased RCS inventory to three feet below the reactor vessel flange for reactor pressure vessel reassembly while the 'A' EDG was unavailable on May 4, 2019

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 02.02)

The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1) Unit 2 events coincident with the single phase loss of 23 kV Waterford line on April 11, 2019 (CR1120401, CR1120406, and CR1120411)

(2) Unit 2 'A' EDG silencer anchor bolt broken on June 6, 2019 (CR1124528)

(3) Unit 3 'B' RHR system suction header relief valve (3RHS*RV37B) failed as-found testing on April 21, 2019 (CR1121378)

(4) Unit 3 'B' RHR discharge to cold leg valve (3SIL*MV8809B) coasted into backseat with torque greater than the specified structural limit on April 24, 2019 (CR1121652)

(5) Unit 3 pressurizer pressure transmitter channel 1 and 2 found out of acceptance criteria on April 30, 2019 (CR1121366 & CR1121367)

(6) Unit 3 'B' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump failure to meet required flow rate on May 7, 2019 (CR1122705)

(7) Unit 3 loop 1 and 4 average coolant temperature not expected to scale with power ascension on May 17, 2019 (CR1123526)

(8) Unit 3 battery 1 ground identified and associated abnormal operating procedure entry on May 28, 2019 (CR1124010)

==71111.18 - Plant Modifications Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02) (4 Samples) The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1) Unit 2 temporary modification to install on the 'A' EDG silencer a hold down bracket for the missing anchor bolt on June 10, 2019

(2) Unit 3 permanent modification to replace pressurizer spray bypass valve number 3RCS*V059 associated with design change number MP3-18-00172 on April 29, 2019

(3) Unit 3 safety analysis report change to Updated Final Safety Analysis Table 6.2-65, Containment Penetrations; 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix J scope reduction for water-filled penetrations described in ETE-MP-2018-1066

(4) Unit 3 permanent modification to modify the gear ratio of motor operated valve 3SIH*MV8801A (charging pump safety injection header isolation) to increase the closing torque margin [design change MP3-18-01053]

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing Post Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01)

[[IP sample::=

=IP 71111.18|count=7}}

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:

(1) Unit 2 'A' hydrogen analyzer switch replacement on May 30, 2019 (WO53M20600546)

(2) Unit 3 'B' feedwater isolation valve troubleshooting, overhaul, and solenoid repair on April 17, 2019 (WO53203244517,WO53103147082, and WO532032477552)

(3) Unit 3 'B' charging pump post maintenance testing on May 2, 2019

(4) Unit 3 verification of flow through pressurizer spray valve (3RCS*V59) after replacement on May 12, 2019 (WO53103143979)

(5) Unit 3 corrective maintenance for reactor vessel head vent to excess letdown failure to stroke from auxiliary shutdown panel on May 13, 2019 (WO53203246998)

(6) Unit 3 stroke time testing of 3SIH*MV8801A (charging pump safety injection header isolation valve) after modification to its gear ratio on May 31, 2019 (WO53203224432)

(7) Unit 3 preventative maintenance for valve 3SWP*PV113B1, 3HVQ*ACU2B freon pressure control valve on June 13, 2019 (WO53M30312778)

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 3 scheduled refueling outage from April 11 to May 14, 2019

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01)

(1) Unit 3 local leak rate testing of penetration number 120(i) valve 3SSP*CTV8 (post accident sample return containment penetration inside isolation valve) on April 19, 2019

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) Unit 2, SP 2604AO-002, HPSI pump inservice testing >1750 psia, Facility 1, 'B' HPSI pump and check valve IST, Facility 1, performed on April 9, 2019 (WO 53203230131)

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (7 Samples)

(1) Unit 3 main steam code safety valve testing on April 9, 2019

(2) Unit 3 turbine over-speed trip testing - ICCE on April 12, 2019

(3) Unit 3 'B' train loss of power test (ICCE) on April 13, 2019

(4) Unit 3 vital batteries and battery chargers surveillance frequency change evaluation STI-M3-2017-002, approved April 2019 and battery 301B-2 service discharge test on April 15, 2019

(5) Unit 3 low pressure safety injection valve interlock testing on April 30, 2019

(6) Unit 3 SP 3612A.1, containment and containment sump inspection, on May 12, 2019

(7) Unit 3 train 'B' solid state protection system operational test on June 14, 2019

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1) Beyond design basis auxiliary feed water pump annual operating run on June 11, 2019

==71114.06 - Drill Evaluation Select Emergency Preparedness Drills and/or Training for Observation (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated the conduct of a routine emergency planning drill on May 21,

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 02.01)==

The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls.

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiological hazards assessments and controls. The inspectors reviewed the following:

Radiological surveys

• Unit 3 reactor cavity - removal of blank flange from transfer tube
• Unit 3 containment - dose verification after shutdown
• Unit 3 Spent fuel building 52 elevation Risk significant radiological work activities
• 3CHS*AV8147 Valve Actuator Overhaul and Repack
• Reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal rebuild
• Steam generator eddy current testing
• Reactor head inspection Air sample survey records
• Containment tritium sampling
• Removal of insulation from reactor head
• RCP seal removal
• Reactor head removal

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas.

(1) The inspectors evaluated instructions to workers including radiation work permits used to access high radiation areas:

Radiation work packages

• 3190402, 3CHS*AV8147 Valve Actuator Overhaul and Repack
• 3190401, Perform Reactor Vessel Hot Leg Nozzle Weld Inspections and Cavitation Peening
• 3190329, RCP Seal Replacement Electronic alarming dosimeter alarms One unanticipated EAD alarm occurred during the period of this inspection:

CR1107907; worker briefed on high radiation area conditions but signed in on wrong RWP task.

Labeling of containers All containers in the RAM storage area were inspected and were labeled in accordance with regulations and Dominion procedures.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material.

(1) The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination and radioactive material. The inspectors verified the following sealed sources are accounted for and are intact:

J.L. Shepherd and Associates Model No. 6810, SN 3132GY J.L. Shepherd and Associates Model No. 6810, SN 84CS-15 QSA Global, Inc., SN 2785GP Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

(1) The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and observation of radiological work activities.

Radiological work package for areas with airborne radioactivity in Unit 3: a. Reactor disassembly b. RCP seal replacement c. Steam generator eddy current testing d. 3CHS*AV8147 Valve Actuator Overhaul and Repack High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated risk-significant high radiation area and very high radiation area controls in Unit 3.

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP Section 02.06) (1 Sample)

(1) The inspectors evaluated radiation worker performance and radiation protection technician proficiency.

71124.08 - Radioactive Solid Waste Processing and Radioactive Material Handling, Storage, and Transportation Radioactive Material Storage (IP Section 02.01)

The inspectors evaluated radioactive material storage.

(1) The inspectors observed radioactive waste container storage areas and verified the postings and controls and that the licensee had established a process for monitoring the impact of long-term storage of the waste.

Radioactive Waste System Walkdown (IP Section 02.02) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated the following radioactive waste processing systems [and processes] during plant walkdowns:

(1) The inspectors walked down: accessible portions of liquid and solid radioactive waste processing systems; abandoned in place radioactive waste processing equipment; and, current methods and procedures for dewatering waste.

Waste Characterization and Classification (IP Section 02.03) (1 Sample) The inspectors evaluated the radioactive waste characterization and classification for the following waste streams:

(1) The inspectors identified radioactive waste streams and reviewed radiochemical sample analysis results to support radioactive waste characterization. The inspectors reviewed the use of scaling factors and calculations to account for difficult-to-measure radionuclides.

Shipment Preparation (IP Section 02.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated [and observed] the following radioactive material shipment preparation processes:

(1) The inspectors reviewed the records of shipment packaging, surveying, labeling, marking, placarding, vehicle checks, emergency instructions, disposal manifest, shipping papers provided to the driver, and licensee verification of shipment readiness.

Shipping Records (IP Section 02.05) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated the following non-excepted package shipment records:

(1) The inspectors reviewed five non-excepted package shipment records: 18-005, 18-006, 18-043, 18-102, and 19-014.

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

===71151 - Performance Indicator Verification The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) ===

(1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

IE03: Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.02) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

IE04: Unplanned Scrams with Complications (USwC) Sample (IP Section 02.03) (2 Samples)

(1) Unit 2 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

(2) Unit 3 (April 1, 2018 - March 31, 2019)

71152 - Problem Identification and Resolution Semiannual Trend Review (IP Section 02.02)

(1) The inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program for potential adverse trends in dose assessment during emergency preparedness drills and exercises that might be indicative of a more significant safety issue. To support this review, the inspectors observed the May 21, 2019, training drill, with a specific focus on the performance of the Radiological Dose Assessment Team and the Radiological Assessment Engineers in particular.

Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues (IP Section 02.03) (3 Samples) The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program related to the following issues:

(1) Unit 3 reactor plant component cooling water pump long standing reliability issues

(2) Unit 3 NRC Operating Experience Smart Sample 2007/03 (Revision 3), crane and heavy lift inspection, supplemental guidance to IP 71111.20 and IP 71111.13

(3) Unit 3 'A' EDG jacket water cooling leaks identified on January 18, 2017, and February 6, 2019

71153 - Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion Personnel Performance (IP Section 03.03)

Review personnel performance during planned nonroutine plant evolutions. Determine whether personnel performance contributed to unplanned events and transients.

(1) The inspectors evaluated an emergent power reduction at Unit 2 from 54 percent to 10 percent to take the turbine offline and main steam out of service to isolate a steam leak in the turbine building at the feedwater heater '2B' normal level control valve and licensees performance on April 22,

INSPECTION RESULTS

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation 71111.13 This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) requires that "before performing maintenance activities (including but not limited to surveillance, post-maintenance testing, and corrective and preventive maintenance), the licensee shall assess and manage the increase in risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities."

Contrary to the above, on June 5, 2019, Dominion failed to properly assess and manage the increase in risk when swapping from the 'A' service water pump to the 'B' service water pump on facility 1, when aligning the system to perform thermal back washing of the condensers.

Significance/Severity: Green. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor because, when the proper Functional Equipment Group (FEG) code was assigned to the pump swap, the risk state changed from green to yellow in accordance with Dominion procedure NF-AA-PRA-370, Revision 20. This issue was determined to be similar to example 7.f of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues.

Corrective Action Reference: CR 1124777 Inadequate post maintenance testing resulted in engineered safety features building emergency ventilation failure to start Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.4] - 71111.19 Systems NCV 05000423/2019002-01 Teamwork Open A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, was self-revealed on June 13, 2019, when 3HVQ*ACUS2B, the Unit 3 'B' train engineered safety features (ESF) building air conditioning unit (ACU), failed to start during routine surveillance testing of the ESF building emergency fan. Dominion failed to establish an adequate post maintenance test plan to ensure that the ACU would perform satisfactorily in service after two refrigerant pressure control valves were replaced on May 2, 2019. The ACU was not operable and unable to perform its safety function from May 11 to June 13, 2019.

Description:

As described in Section 9.4.5.2, System Design, of the Millstone Unit 3 updated final safety analysis report, 3HVQ*ACUS2B, ESF self-contained ACU, is part of the ESF building emergency ventilation system and provides cooling to the containment recirculation spray (RSS) pumps and heat exchangers during plant accident conditions.

3HVQ*ACUS2B is a required support system for the B train of RSS. The ACU is designed to limit the temperature of the RSS cubicle to a maximum of 104°F. The self-contained ACU is required to start automatically when the RSS pump starts and supply air throughout the equipment area and return the air to the units. When the ACU receives a start signal, one of the four interlocks that must be satisfied is the differential pressure between the compressor crankcase oil pressure and refrigerant pressure.

On June 13, 2019, 3HVQ*ACUS2B, ESF self-contained ACU, failed to start when the control switch was taken to start during surveillance testing. At 02:44 am on June 13, 2019, the licensee entered the 72-hour shutdown action statement of Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 for the 'B' train of RSS inoperable. The operating crew reset the unit per OP 3314D, ESF Building Ventilation and Air Conditioning, and the ACU was successfully started. The licensee exited Technical Specification 3.6.2.2 at 3:28 pm on June 13, 2019.

During the last refueling outage, in the Spring of 2019, 3HVQ*ACUS2B was tagged out of service to support service water valve maintenance per Work Orders 53M30312778 and 53M30312779. Dominion's investigation revealed that neither of the post maintenance test plans for these work orders included a functional test of the ACU. The licensee determined that the post maintenance test plan should have specified that the ACU be run in accordance with OP 3314D, which would have ensured the proper alignment of the system, including the reset of the oil pressure switches, and a functional run of the ACU. The required procedural actions to align the ACU for operation following clearance removal on May 2, 2019, were not performed prior to Mode 4 entry on May 11, 2019. As a result, the ACU compressor oil pressure switches were not reset. The licensee determined that the failure to reset the oil pressure switches is what caused the ACU to not start.

Dominion engineering staff performed an evaluation for the impacted RSS pump cubicle and determined that, with a complete loss of ventilation, the room temperature would not exceed 168.2°F. Moreover, the licensee determined that the RSS pumps and other equipment important to safety located in the RSS pump and heat exchanger cubicle would operate reliably up to 170°F. Therefore, the licensee determined that the supported equipment (RSS pump and heat exchanger) remained operable, despite the inoperability of the ACU.

The licensee's investigation determined that the post maintenance test plan for the service water valve maintenance was not adequate, in that it did not include a functional test of the ACU following the maintenance work. Moreover, the licensee determined that the two senior reactor operators responsible for coordinating the clearance of the ESF ACU during the refueling outage inappropriately assumed that the other group would restore the ACU per OP 3314D, but neither group performed the procedure to restore and run the ACU.

Dominion performed a reportability evaluation for this issue and determined that it was not reportable because the failure of the ACU to start did not result in a loss of safety function and did not result in a condition prohibited by the plant's technical specifications.

Corrective Actions: The licensee promptly generated CR1125027, completed a reportability evaluation, and performed a level of effort evaluation to determine the likely cause of the failure.

Corrective Action Reference: CR1125027

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: The inspectors determined that Dominion's failure to establish an adequate post maintenance test plan to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that the 'B' ESF building ACU, 3HVQ*ACUS2B, would perform satisfactorily in service, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, was a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Configuration Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The failure to properly restore the ESF building emergency ventilation system alignment adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because:

(1) the finding was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system,

(2) the finding did not represent a loss of system and/or function;

(3) the finding did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and

(4) the finding does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.4 - Teamwork: Individuals and work groups communicate and coordinate their activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. The licensee determined that the two senior reactor operators responsible for coordinating the clearance of the ESF ACU during the refueling outage failed to communicate and coordinate their activities, in that both groups assumed that the other group would restore the ACU per OP 3314D but neither group performed the procedure to restore and run the ACU.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, states, in part, that a test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents.

Contrary to the above, from May 11 to June 13, 2019, Dominion's test program failed to assure that testing required to demonstrate that the 'B' train of the engineered safety features building emergency ventilation system would perform satisfactorily in service was identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporated the requirements and acceptance limits contained in Section 9.4.5.2 of the updated final safety analysis report.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Degraded jacket water piping for emergency diesel generator not promptly corrected Cornerstone Significance Cross-Cutting Report Aspect Section Mitigating Green [H.5] - Work 71152 Systems NCV 05000423/2019002-02 Management Open A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was self-revealed when Dominion did not promptly correct deficient welds on the Unit 3 'A' emergency diesel generator (EDG) jacket water piping, which resulted in a weld crack and inoperability of the 'A' EDG on February 6, 2019.

Description:

Millstone Unit 3 has two EDGs that provide emergency AC power in the event that off-site power is lost. The jacket water cooling system is a safety-related, seismic category I system designed to transfer heat from the EDG to the service water system, and is a required support system for the EDG.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated with 'A' EDG jacket water leaks on January 18, 2017 (CR 1058105) and February 6, 2019 (CR 1115548). Both leaks were caused by fatigue-induced cracks in the partial-joint penetration welds supplied by the diesel manufacturer. The licensee determined that, in both instances, the leak rate did not exceed the capacity of the jacket cooling water system, but structural integrity of the piping was not maintained. Upon identification of the jacket water leaks on both January 18, 2017, and February 6, 2019, the licensee promptly entered the issues into their corrective action program and repair the cracked welds.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective actions associated with 'A' EDG jacket water leaks on January 18, 2017 (CR 1058105) and February 6, 2019 (CR 1115548). The two leaks were located in the jacket water discharge lines from the diesel left and right cylinder banks, and from the turbo charger cooling piping. A complete failure of this piping would have resulted in the jacket water being pumped out of the system and a loss of jacket water cooling after the jacket water expansion tank was drained. Both leaks were caused by fatigue-induced cracks in the partial-joint penetration welds supplied by the diesel manufacturer. The licensee determined that in both instances, the observed leak rate did not exceed the capacity of the jacket cooling water system, but structural integrity of the piping was not maintained.

In an effort to better understand the significance of the January 18, 2017, leak, the licensee performed a leakage and crack growth analysis, which determined that the cracked weld would not survive the 24 hour mission time. On February 6, 2019, after Dominion confirmed that the weld was cracked, they applied the evaluation from 2017 to the current leak and declared the 'A' EDG inoperable at 4:27 pm on February 6, 2019, and Action Statement b.5 of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 was entered. Dominion promptly repaired the cracked weld and returned the 'A' EDG to service at 1:04 pm on February 7, 2019, which was within the technical specification allowed outage time.

In response to the 2017 leak, Dominion created a corrective action to repair or replace the Unit 3 'A' diesel left and right bank jacket water discharge elbow and turbocharger cooling piping, using full penetration welds. Dominion scheduled this corrective action as a long-term corrective action based on the ability to monitor leakage during surveillance runs and the need to schedule with a major diesel inspection window.

The inspectors determined that Dominion's 2017 corrective actions to repair or replace the jacket water piping were appropriate; however, the scheduling of the corrective action was not adequate and the licensee was unable to effectively monitor leakage during routine surveillance runs. The failure to promptly correct this condition adverse to quality resulted in a second failed weld in a similar location and the inoperability of the 'A' EDG.

Corrective Actions: Dominion promptly entered the issue into its corrective action program, repaired the weld crack, and returned the 'A' EDG to service within the technical specification allowed outage time. Dominion performed a level of effort evaluation (LEE) and determined the cause was "the probability of a subsequent jacket water leak [after the January 18, 2017 leak], was underestimated and as a result a bridging strategy was not considered prior to scheduled repairs." Moreover, for both Unit 3 EDGs, Dominion created corrective actions and work orders to replace all partial joint penetration welds with full penetration welds "at the first available opportunity." Dominion also created a corrective action to review all work orders with a risk ranking of 4 or greater, for mitigating systems, to determine if risk was appropriately addressed with respect to the timing of corrective actions.

Corrective Action References: CR1115548, CA7510523 (LEE)

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: Dominion's failure to promptly correct the deficient jacket cooling water piping welds, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was determined to be a performance deficiency.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The failure to promptly correct the deficient piping affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system that did not maintain its operability, but,

(1) did not represent a loss of system and/or function,

(2) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and

(3) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensee's maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours.

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.5 - Work Management: The organization implements a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. The work process includes the identification and management of risk commensurate to the work and the need for coordination with different groups or job activities. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect of Human Performance - Work Management, because Dominion's work process did not appropriately prioritize the corrective actions to resolve the deficient partial-penetration welds commensurate with the safety significance, in that the plan to "repair or replace" the partial penetration welds with full penetration welds was not scheduled in a timely manner and the action to "monitor leakage during surveillance runs" was not an adequate corrective action to resolve the deficient welds.

Enforcement:

Violation: 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," states that "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected."

Contrary to the above, from January 18, 2017, to February 6, 2019, the licensee's corrective action program did not assure that a condition adverse to quality, deficient safety-related cooling water piping for the 'A' EDG, was promptly corrected.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Observation: Semi-Annual Trend Review - Dose Assessment 71152 The inspectors evaluated a sample of CRs generated by the emergency preparedness department, between December 2017 and May 2019, in response to recent challenges in performing dose assessments during drills and exercises. In 2017, Dominion did not meet the drill objective for dose assessment during their December training drill and conducted an apparent cause evaluation (ACE 3084027). This ACE determined that inadequate teamwork and communication were the cause of the dose assessment challenges and proposed corrective actions to address these gaps. Dominion identified a contributing cause that the dose assessment procedure contained insufficient guidance to support the decision making process. To correct this contributing cause, Dominion developed an enhanced position checklist and provided additional tools such as a key parameter status board and enhanced reviews of assessments that focused on enhancing the dose assessment team communications and teamwork.

During the March 2018 FEMA evaluated exercise at Millstone, Dominion again did not meet the drill objective for dose assessment and performed another ACE (ACE 3164372). This ACE focused on the lack of written guidance on the technical aspects of the MIDAS computer code that supports dose assessment at Millstone and how MIDAS impacts the assessments performed by the radiological assessment engineers. One action implemented to correct these issues was the development of broader changes of Millstone site procedures to incorporate additional operating experience from the rest of the Dominion fleet intended to strengthen the technical performance of the dose assessment team.

The inspectors compared the corrective actions from ACE 3084027 (2017) and ACE 3164372 (2018) to determine if it would have been reasonable for Dominion to foresee and correct the dose assessment issues following the December 2017 drill and prior to the March 2018 exercise. While the inspectors determined it was a missed opportunity for Dominion to begin the broader changes after the missed drill objective in December 2017, the comprehensive procedure upgrades would not have been ready in time for the March 2018 evaluated exercise and the corrective actions would be unlikely to prevent a repeat of the missed dose assessment objective. Additionally, during the May 21, 2019, training drill at Millstone, the inspectors observed that Dominion successfully met the dose assessment objective after full implementation of the corrective actions from ACE 3084027 (2017) and ACE 3164372 (2018)and that the dose assessment team performed with an appropriate level of communications and teamwork.

Observation: Unit 3 Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water Pump Long 71152 Standing Reliability Issues The inspectors performed a detailed review of Dominion Energys long standing reliability issues associated with the Unit 3 reactor plant component cooling water pumps including condition and performance monitoring, system health reporting, preventive maintenance, design changes, and industry operating experience. The inspectors noted that Dominion Energy had identified a number of degraded conditions from darkened bearing oil and axial motion to unexpected noises dating back to 2014 approximately two years after the last replacement of the mechanical seals in 2012. The inspectors also noted that Dominion Energy deferred corrective maintenance throughout this period until the 'C' pump seal failed in February 2019.

On February 8, 2019, at 0715, shortly after a reactor plant component cooling water system pump swap from C pump on A train to the A pump on A train for surveillance testing, the inboard mechanical seal on the C pump was leaking at steady stream (CR1115751). The C pump was secured but aligned to the A train. Dominion Energy determined that the leakage rate (159 GPD) exceeded the 69 GPD operability limit for the system and declared the A train inoperable. Dominion Energy promptly isolated the C pump to restore operability to the A train, performed pump seal and bearing overhaul, and an evaluation of the degraded condition. Dominion Energy's engineering evaluation could not definitively determine the cause of the leakage, but did identify that the station should implement recommendations from the pump supplier to install a larger diameter pump shaft, which should improve the long term reliability of the component cooling water pumps. Dominion stated in their engineering evaluation that "since these enhancements to the pumps are expected to resolve long standing reliability issues associated with these pumps, the implementation of the [vendor] recommendations was determined to be a corrective action."

The inspectors noted that the licensee's planned corrective actions to replace the pump shafts was reasonable given that the exact cause of the seal leakage could not be determined.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On July 10, 2019, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to John Daugherty, Site Vice President and other members of the licensee staff.

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 71111.04 Corrective Action CR 1090985 Documents Corrective Action CR1122997 Documents Resulting from Inspection Drawings 25203-26075 Miscellaneous Systems Containment Tendon Greasing Revision 84- System 024 212-26005 Condensate Storage & Auxiliary Feedwater, Sheet 3 Revision 60 212-26902, P&ID Reactor Coolant System Sheet 1 212-26904 High Pressure Safety Injection Pumps, Sheet 2 Revision 48 212-26912 P&ID Low Pressure Safety Injection Sheet 1 71111.05Q Miscellaneous Millstone Unit 2 Fire Hazard Analysis Revision 11 U2-24-FFS Millstone Unit 2 Fire Fighting Strategies Revision 0 71111.06 Corrective Action CR1101404 Documents CR1104389 Drawings 25203-20146 Air & Water Tight Walls Auxiliary Building (-)45-6, Sheet June 29, 27 1973 203-24101 Containment & Auxiliary Building Elevation (-)45-6 Barrier Revision 83- Boundaries 030 Work Orders 53203227123 71111.11Q Corrective Action CR1121431 Documents CR1121445 71111.12 Corrective Action CA 3058822 Documents CA 7510496 CR 1115548 CR1021585 CR1055102 CR1122866 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Corrective Action CR1123796 Documents Resulting from Inspection Miscellaneous Certified material test reports for safety-related couplings

                                              (42154771), pipe (M3582191), valve (42159195), and weld

filler metal (M3931571 and M3931581) associated with work order 53103143979 SO-19-004 Millstone Unit 3 Standing Order May 20, 2019 Procedures EOP 3503 Shutdown Outside Control Room Procedure Basis Revision Document 016-03 EOP 3504 Cooldown Outside Control Room Procedure Basis Revision Document 009-02 71111.13 Corrective Action CR1121431 Documents CR1121445 CR1121510 CR1124547 CR1124777 Miscellaneous Operator's risk report for actual conditions on June 5, 2019 June 6, 2019 that showed the correct estimated risk state High risk plan and risk mitigation actions for WO Revision 9 203148393, Unit 3 NSST replacement control room panel R and main board work outage EOOS Version May 14, 4.1 for Millstone 2019 Unit 2 EOOS Version April 15, 4.1 for Millstone 2019 Unit 2 EOOS Version April 22, 4.1 for Millstone 2019 Unit 2 EOOS Version For the Service Water pump swap June 3, 2019 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 4.1 for Unit 2 High risk plan Installation of clamp on 2-HD-262 under work order 06/26/2019 203250035 SO-19-013 2-HD-262 steam leak mitigation standing order and 06/23/2019 operational decision making checklist Procedures NF-AA-PRA-370 Probabilistic Risk Assessment and Methods: MRule (a)(4) Revision 20 Risk Monitor Guide NF-AA-PRA-370 Probable Risk Assessment Procedures and Methods: MRule Revision 16

                                           (a)(4) Risk Monitor Guidance

OP 3216 Reactor Coolant System Drain (ICCE) Revision 16 Work Orders WO 53102687355 WO 53203230768 71111.15 Corrective Action CR 1122705 Documents CR 1124010 CR1121378 CR1124528 CR1221652 Miscellaneous Calculation 89-094-1012ES Revision 8 212-29153 Cast Steel Pressure Seal Wedge Gate Valve with Weld Sheet 87 Ends and Limitorque SB-3 Motor Operator Assembly Operability SO-19-011 Operations Standing Order for Unit 2 A Emergency Diesel 06/05/2019 Evaluations Generator to be declared inoperable if a tornado warning is received or predicted for Millstone station. Procedures C MP 756 DC Bus Ground Fault Analysis Revision 1 ER-AA-IST-103 ASME IST Program - Inservice testing of pressure relief Revision 3 devices ER-AA-ISTZ- ASME IST Program - Inservice testing of pressure relief Revision 1 PRD-103 devices implementation ETE-MP-2019- 3FWA*P1B IST Comprehensive Pump Test Total Flow Revision 0 1053 Reference Value Evaluation 71111.18 Corrective Action CR 1083792 Documents Engineering MP2-19-01077 Temporary Restraint of the Unit 2 'A' Emergency Diesel Revision 0 Changes Generator Discharge Silencer Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Miscellaneous Standard Specification SP-ME-572, piping classes for Revision 3 Millstone nuclear power station Unit 3 Advanced work authorization number AWA-001 for MP3-18- 00172 Design equivalent change package number MP3-18-01053, Revision 0 MOV 3SIH*MV8801A needs to be re-geared to increase it's margin ETE-MP-2018-1066, 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Scope Revision 0 Reduction Water-Filled Penetrations SAR change request MP3-UCR-2018-017, 10 CFR 50 Appendix J Scope Reduction Water-Filled Penetrations, dated February 21, 2019 Design equivalent change package number MP3-18-00172, Revision 0 Replacement of 3RCS*V059 Pressurizer Spray Bypass Valve Procedures Advanced work authorization number AWA-001 for MP3-18- 00172 Work Orders WO 53203224432 DC MP3-18-01053: MOV Re-gearing to increase margin WO53103143979 Replace Obsolete Valve IAW AWA-001 and MP3-18-00172 71111.19 Calculations T-01566S3 Loss of Ventilation Analysis - RSS Pump and Cooler Area Revision 001-A Corrective Action CA7626110 07/23/19 Documents CR 1123141 CR1125027 Engineering ETE-MP-2019- Assessment of MP3 RSS Cubicle Peak Temperature With Revision 1 Evaluations 1077 Loss of 3HVQ*ACUS2A/B Functionality MP-EV-05-0009 Containment recirculating pump (RSS) motor bearing Revision 0 operation at elevated temperatures Miscellaneous 03-ESG3314D- Maintenance rule function basis document Revision 0 1.02 53M30312778 Post maintenance test plan for M33SWP*PV113B1 valve Revision 1 overhaul 53M30312779 Post maintenance test plan for M33SWP*PV113B2 valve Revision 1 overhaul Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Memo number MP3 - HVQ System, 3HVQ*ACUS2A Unavailability due to 09/28/2005 NUCENG-05-127 potential SW flow blockage and impact on equipment important to safety located in the A RSS cubicle Procedures OP 3314D ESF Building Ventilation and Air Conditioning Revision 16 SP 3608.6 Cold Shutdown Stroke Testing of 3SIH*MV8801A and Revision 1 3SIH*MV8801B SP 3608.6-008 Cold Shutdown Stroke Testing of 3SIH*MV8801A and Revision 1 3SIH*MV8801B SP3604A.4, 3CHS*P3B Biennial IST Comprehensive Pump Test Revision 1 Work Orders 53103129463 203224432 DC MP3-18-01053: MOV Re-gearing to increase margin Revision 0 71111.20 Miscellaneous Mode 3 and Mode 4 checklists from OP 3201, Plant Heatup Revision 33 Shutdown Safety Assessments - Daily updates throughout the outage Pre-3R19 Shutdown risk schedule review report Revision 1, dated April 11, 2019 Procedures OP 3201 Plant Heatup Revision 33 OP 3206 Plant Shutdown Revision 19 OP 3207 Reactor Shutdown Revision 17 OP 3208 Plant Cooldown Revision 31 OP 3209B Shutdown Margin Revision 11 OP 3211 Solid Plant Pressure Control (ICCE) Revision 1 OU-AA-200 Shutdown risk Management Revision 10 71111.22 Corrective Action CR 1121308 Documents CR 1122122 CR1124931 Miscellaneous ETE-MP-2019- STIE-M3-2017-002 Unit 3 Batteries Revision 1 24 MP-DWG-000- ELEM DIAG 480V MC RHR P1A TO CHARGING PMP VLV 212-32000 [3SIL*MV8804A] Procedures C SP 760 Battery Discharge Test Revision 10 CM-AA-STI-101 Risk Informed Technical Specification Surveillance Revision 3 Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date Frequency Control Program MA-MP-BDB-101 Semi-Annual or Annual Test of Flex Equipment Revision 6 SP 3446B12 Train B Solid State Protection System Operational Test Revision 17 SP 3612A.1-001 Containment Inspection Revision 15 SP 3612B.4 Containment Local Leak Rate Test Type C Penetration Revision 18 SP 3612B.4-102 Type C LLRT - Penetration No. 120(i) [3SSP*CTV8] Revision 5 SP 3619B.2 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve Operability Test - Train Revision 16 A SP 3619B.3 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve Operability Test - Train Revision 17 B SP 3620B.3 Low Pressure Safety Injection Valve Operability Test - Train Revision 16 B SP 3623.1 Turbine Generator Testing (ICCE) Revision 29 SP 3646A.16 Train B Loss of Power Test Revision 18 SP 3712G Main Steam Code Safety Valve Surveillance Testing Revision 13 Work Orders WO53103144457 71152 Corrective Action CA 3048581 MP3 'A' EDG Jacket Water Weld Leak Response 01/18/2017 Documents CA7510523 Level of Effort Evaluation 05/3/2019 CR 1092806 CR 1112524 CR 1115548 CR1080038 CR1095966 CR1096161 CR1115751 CR1121044* CR552986 Engineering 0282-0169-LTR- Unit 3 A Emergency Diesel Generator Leakage and Crack Revision 0 Evaluations 001 Growth Analysis ETE-MP-2018- Determination of Tolerable Leakage Rates for Unit 3 EDG Revision 0 1042 Lube Oil and Jacket Water Miscellaneous Electric Transmission Recommendations for Nuclear Power 04/17/2019 Stations: Millstone Inspection Type Designation Description or Title Revision or Procedure Date 212-336-001, Installation, Operation and Maintenance of Reactor Plant Revision 1 Component Cooling Pumps, MMAY19TD Millstone Unit 3 Training Drill Package 05/21/2019 Procedures EP-AA-MIDAS- PC-MIDAS Guideline Revision 0 1001 MP 3704B Control of Heavy Loads Revision 6 MP 3744KA Reactor Plant Cooling Pump Maintenance Revision 7 MP 3770BA Operating the Polar Crane Revision 6 MP-26-EPI- Dose Assessment Revision 15 FAP10 SP 3603A.1 Testing of the Spent Fuel Bridge Fuel Overload dated May 8, 2019 Work Orders WO53103124673 WO53103142631 71153 Corrective Action CR1121431 Documents CR1121445 CR1121510 27| ]]