Information Notice 1995-33, Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:K>UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:K>
                                  UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 23, 1995 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 95-33: SWITCHGEAR
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 23, 1995 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-33:   SWITCHGEAR FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE


FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AT WATERFORD
POWER AT WATERFORD GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3
 
GENERATING
 
STATION, UNIT 3  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.PurDose The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice (IN) to alert addressees
 
to a switchgear
 
fire and subsequent
 
partial loss of offsite power at Waterford
 
Generating


Station, Unit 3. It is expected that recipients
reactors.


will review the information
PurDose


for applicability
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information


to their facilities
notice (IN)to alert addressees to a switchgear fire and subsequent partial


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.However, suggestions
loss of offsite power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3. It is expected


contained
that recipients will review the information for applicability to their


in this information
facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.


notice are not NRC requirements;
However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Description


of Circumstances
requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


On June 10, 1995, Waterford
==Description of Circumstances==
On June 10, 1995, Waterford 3 was operating at 100 percent power with an


3 was operating
operations staff consisting of a shift supervisor (SS), a control room


at 100 percent power with an operations
supervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators. At 8:58 a.m. a generator trip


staff consisting
occurred in response to failure of a lightning arrester on a remote offsite


of a shift supervisor (SS), a control room supervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators.
substation transformer. The generator trip resulted in a fast transfer


At 8:58 a.m. a generator
activation. All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred as designed except the


trip occurred in response to failure of a lightning
4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normal6.9 kV


arrester on a remote offsite substation
power supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency perturbation on the


transformer.
Al bus, which caused an underspeed condition on rector coolant pumps IA and


The generator
2A. This circumstance resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power


trip resulted in a fast transfer activation.
to the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related A2 bus and the associated 4.16 kV safety- the


All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred
related A3 bus. Emergency Diesel Generator A started and loaded to power


as designed except the 4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical
A3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary operator informed the control room of


fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normal power supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency
heavy smoke within the turbine generator building. At that time, the SS did


perturbation
not activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directed


on the 6.9 kV Al bus, which caused an underspeed
two auxiliary operators to don protective gear and investigate whether a fire


condition
existed. At 9:35 a.m., the operators reported seeing flames above the A2 switchgear and the SS activated the fire brigade. Operators requested


on rector coolant pumps IA and 2A. This circumstance
assistance from the local offsite fire department and declared an Unusual


resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power to the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related
Event in accordance with emergency response procedures. The fire brigade was


A2 bus and the associated
unable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers. The offsite


4.16 kV safety-related A3 bus. Emergency
fire department arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished the fire


Diesel Generator
with water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized. During the


A started and loaded to power the A3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary
cooldown transition from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators discovered that the


operator informed the control room of heavy smoke within the turbine generator
isolation valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.


building.
9508180092 PDR It                          9S-.o33          9,s5T3


At that time, the SS did not activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directed two auxiliary
tJ                                    <J    IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 38 hours while these


operators
The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately


to don protective
valves were repaired.


gear and investigate
Discussion


whether a fire existed. At 9:35 a.m., the operators
an augmented
 
reported seeing flames above the A2 switchgear
 
and the SS activated
 
the fire brigade. Operators
 
requested assistance
 
from the local offsite fire department
 
and declared an Unusual Event in accordance
 
with emergency
 
response procedures.
 
The fire brigade was unable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers.
 
The offsite fire department
 
arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished
 
the fire with water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized.
 
During the cooldown transition
 
from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators
 
discovered
 
that the isolation
 
valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.9508180092 PDR It 9S-.o33 9,s5T3 tJ <J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately
 
38 hours while these valves were repaired.Discussion


During the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted
During the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted


an augmented inspection
causes,     conditions, and
 
team (AIT) inspection
 
to determine
 
the causes, conditions, and circumstances
 
relevant to this event. The results of this AIT inspection
 
are documented
 
in NRC Inspection


Report 50-382/92-15, dated July 7, 1995. The AIT identified
inspection team (AIT) inspection to determine the of this AIT inspection are


three primary issues: fire protection, fast bus transfer design, and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit).
circumstances relevant to this event. The resultsdated July 7, 1995. The AIT


These three issues are discussed
documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/92-15, fast bus transfer design, identified three primary issues: fire protection,            issues are discussed in


in greater detail in the following
and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit). These three


sections.Fire Protection
greater detail in the following sections.


Several recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants have included a fire concurrent
===Fire Protection===
                                                        have included a fire


with a plant transient.
Several recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants  Waterford    3 highlights the


The fire at Waterford
concurrent with a plant transient. The fire     at


3 highlights
response    to initial


the importance
importance of (1) training for timely and effective are not assigned


of (1) training for timely and effective
indications of a plant fire, (2) ensuring  personnel


response to initial indications
potentially conflicting duties, and (3) plant staffing.


of a plant fire, (2) ensuring personnel
noticed heavy smoke in


are not assigned potentially
An auxiliary operator (a trained fire brigade member)          room. The auxiliary


conflicting
the turbine generator building and notified the control and  responded    that he did


duties, and (3) plant staffing.An auxiliary
operator was asked if there was a fire  in the  room


operator (a trained fire brigade member) noticed heavy smoke in the turbine generator
The CRS did not


building and notified the control room. The auxiliary operator was asked if there was a fire in the room and responded
not see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke.  report    of heavy smoke.


that he did not see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke. The CRS did not declare a fire until 29 minutes after receiving
declare a fire until 29 minutes after   receiving   the


the report of heavy smoke.Activating
SS to  assume    the responsibilities  of


the fire brigade required the SS to assume the responsibilities
Activating the fire brigade required the             was directing plant


of the CRS (the designated
the CRS (the designated fire brigade leader), who event, operators stated that


fire brigade leader), who was directing
personnel responding to the event.  Following  the


plant personnel
adversely affect their


responding
the loss of the CRS from the control room did not fire scenario, which


to the event. Following
ability to respond to this event and noted that a                  used during


the event, operators
requires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely


stated that the loss of the CRS from the control room did not adversely
requalification training.


affect their ability to respond to this event and noted that a fire scenario, which requires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely
to extinguish the fire


used during requalification
Before the local offsite fire department was allowed the fire using portable


training.Before the local offsite fire department
with water, the fire brigade attempted to extinguish  extinguishers. The use of


was allowed to extinguish
carbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire                the fire. When the


the fire with water, the fire brigade attempted
portable extinguishers was not effective in extinguishing


to extinguish
water to extinguish the


the fire using portable carbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire extinguishers.
fire department arrived, it recommended the use of        of water until about


The use of portable extinguishers
fire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use by the offsite fire


was not effective
20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished        of water is consistent


in extinguishing
department within 4 minutes of using water. The use              that the operators


the fire. When the fire department
with documented NRC staff positions. The AIT determined  based on previous training


arrived, it recommended
were reluctant to apply water to an electrical fire        on electrical fires.


the use of water to extinguish
that had emphasized the use of water as a last resort


the fire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use of water until about 20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished
in the control room, the


by the offsite fire department
Although the appropriate fire alarms had activated          of (1) other auditory


within 4 minutes of using water. The use of water is consistent
control room crew was not aware of the alarms because          fire alarm signal on a


with documented
alarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual did not refer to the


NRC staff positions.
front panel of the control room. Control room operators      seeing heavy smoke. In


The AIT determined
fire alarm panel when the auxiliary operator reported did not directly affect


that the operators were reluctant
this instance, the ineffectiveness of the fire alarms


to apply water to an electrical
KJ-J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 the control


fire based on previous training that had emphasized
the response to the fire because an auxiliary operator alerted    fire  alarms that


the use of water as a last resort on electrical
room to heavy smoke in the turbine building. Nevertheless, redundant visual


fires.Although the appropriate
are inaudible under actual operational conditions and lack to, plant fires.


fire alarms had activated
signals can inhibit prompt identification of, and responsealarm panel upon any


in the control room, the control room crew was not aware of the alarms because of (1) other auditory alarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual fire alarm signal on a front panel of the control room. Control room operators
Also, it is important for operators to refer to the fire        the fire is not


did not refer to the fire alarm panel when the auxiliary
verbal report of a potential fire, in order to ensure that requirements and


operator reported seeing heavy smoke. In this instance, the ineffectiveness
wider spread than visually reported. NRC fire protection of fire alarm


of the fire alarms did not directly affect
guidelines specify that fire drills include an assessment


KJ-J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 the response to the fire because an auxiliary
effectiveness.


operator alerted the control room to heavy smoke in the turbine building.
licensees that


Nevertheless, fire alarms that are inaudible
IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded


under actual operational
Section 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations


conditions
licensed personnel.


and lack redundant
(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses minimum staffing levels for          all actions


visual signals can inhibit prompt identification
It does not address availability of personnel for performing


of, and response to, plant fires.Also, it is important
required    during an


for operators
specified in the licensee's administrative procedures        provide  flexibility in


to refer to the fire alarm panel upon any verbal report of a potential
event. NRC fire protection requirements and guidelines leader may possess


fire, in order to ensure that the fire is not wider spread than visually reported.
assigning personnel to a fire brigade (e.g.,   the brigade


NRC fire protection
plant safety- either an operator's license or an equivalent knowledge ofbe assigned duties


requirements
related systems). The potential exists for    personnel  to


and guidelines
demands.


specify that fire drills include an assessment
that, during certain events, may present concurrent and conflictingof those


of fire alarm effectiveness.
the  response


IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded licensees
===Such conditions could significantly delay or degrade===
individuals.


that Section 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
===Fast Bus Transfer Design===
                                                                          transfer of


(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses
The Waterford 3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic


minimum staffing levels for licensed personnel.
the  normal  power


It does not address availability
safety and nonsafety-related station auxiliary  loads  from


of personnel
unit  auxiliary    transformer)    to the


for performing
supply (from the main generator through the                          through  the


all actions specified
alternate power supply (from the offsite  transmission    network


in the licensee's
Magne-Blast


administrative
startup transformer). All supply breakers are General Electric,      are  designed to


procedures
type. During a fast bus transfer, the  normal  supply  breakers


required during an event. NRC fire protection
breakers    are  designed  to close in


requirements
open in five cycles and the alternate supply                              buses.  To


and guidelines
seven cycles, resulting in a two-cycle deadband  on  the  respective


provide flexibility
supply  breakers,    some  other  fast bus


in assigning
prevent simultaneous closing of both the                            The  Waterford  3 transfer designs include mechanical or electrical    interlocks.


personnel
design does not include interlocks.


to a fire brigade (e.g., the brigade leader may possess either an operator's
the A2 bus normal


license or an equivalent
During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, supply breaker


knowledge
supply breaker did not open in five cycles  but  the  alternate


of plant safety-related systems).
was connected to both


The potential
closed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus (2) both supply


exists for personnel
the offsite transmission network and the main generator, (3) while the A2 bus


to be assigned duties that, during certain events, may present concurrent
breakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent trip signals, transmission network, alternate supply breaker adequately isolated the offsite generator, (4) the


and conflicting
the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main fire, and (5) the


demands.Such conditions
A2 switchgear cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught


could significantly
cable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.


delay or degrade the response of those individuals.
Shutdown Cooling Valves


Fast Bus Transfer Design The Waterford
isolation valves


3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic
During the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling          low-temperature


transfer of safety and nonsafety-related
failed to operate properly when operators  attempted  to  align


station auxiliary
for  placing  shutdown


loads from the normal power supply (from the main generator
overpressure protection relief valves in preparation


through the unit auxiliary
IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 suction header isolation


transformer)
cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling          closed after
to the alternate


power supply (from the offsite transmission
valve (SI-405B) failed to fully open and automatically    suction header


network through the startup transformer).
approximately 15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling


All supply breakers are General Electric, Magne-Blast
several hours later, the


type. During a fast bus transfer, the normal supply breakers are designed to open in five cycles and the alternate
isolation valve (SI-405A) fully opened; however, continuously      instead of


supply breakers are designed to close in seven cycles, resulting
valve hydraulic pump was observed to be running                  portions  of the


in a two-cycle
cycling as designed. These two valves isolate low-pressure  and  must  be opened  in


deadband on the respective
shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system5). Troubleshooting


buses. To prevent simultaneous
order to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode          oil levels in the


closing of both the supply breakers, some other fast bus transfer designs include mechanical
revealed that both valves  contained inadequate  hydraulic


or electrical
was inadequate


interlocks.
valve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels  valves.


The Waterford
instructions for a periodic maintenance task for the


3 design does not include interlocks.
===Related Generic Communications===
                                                        Station," dated March 24, BUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power


During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not open in five cycles but the alternate
1975.


supply breaker closed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus was connected
Station," dated April 3, BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power


to both the offsite transmission
1975 Station," dated


network and the main generator, (2) both supply breakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent
BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power


trip signals, (3) while the A2 bus alternate
November 3, 1975.


supply breaker adequately
of an


isolated the offsite transmission
IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation


network, the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main generator, (4) the A2 switchgear
15, 1985.


cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught fire, and (5) the cable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.Shutdown Cooling Valves During the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling isolation
October


valves failed to operate properly when operators
Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated


attempted
dated September 19, 1991.


to align low-temperature
IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers,"
                                                      dated November 26, 1991.


overpressure
IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants,"
                                                        Transient," dated


protection
IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit


relief valves in preparation
June 15, 1993.


for placing shutdown
Shift," dated


IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling suction header isolation valve (SI-405B)
IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on
failed to fully open and automatically


closed after approximately
October 12, 1993.


15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling suction header isolation
response. If you have


valve (SI-405A)
This information notice requires no specific or writtenplease  contact the
fully opened; however, several hours later, the valve hydraulic


pump was observed to be running continuously
any questions about the information in this  notice, Office  of  Nuclear Reactor


instead of cycling as designed.
technical contact listed below or the appropriate


These two valves isolate low-pressure
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


portions of the shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system and must be opened in order to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode 5). Troubleshooting
DennvsWM. CrutchfieldP Director


revealed that both valves contained
Division of Reactor Program Management


inadequate
hydraulic
oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.
===The cause of the low levels was inadequate===
instructions
for a periodic maintenance
task for the valves.Related Generic Communications
BUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
of an Emergency
Class, Implementation
of an Emergency
Plan, and Emergency
Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational
Experience
on Bus Transfers," dated September
19, 1991.IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational
Challenges
During a Dual-Unit
Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation
of Engineering
Expertise
on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information
notice requires no specific or written response.
If you have any questions
about the information
in this notice, please contact the technical
contact listed below or the appropriate
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.DennvsWM.
CrutchfieldP
===Director Division of Reactor Program Management===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical contact:  Eric J. Benner, NRR


contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachment:
(301) 415-1171 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Notices@-gL~5~ 44yAGgQ
@-gL~5~                                   44yAGgQ


K>Kreachment
K>                           Kreachment


IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


NOTICES Information
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 95-10, Supp. 2 95-32 95-31 95-30 94-66, Supp. 1 95-29 95-28 95-27 Potential
Information                                      Date of


for Loss of Automatic
Notice No.              Subject                Issuance  Issued to


Engineered
Potential for Loss of            08/11/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


Safety Features Actuation Thermo-Lag
95-10,                                                      for nuclear power reactors.


330-1 Flame Spread Test Results Motor-Operated
===Supp. 2        Automatic Engineered===
                Safety Features Actuation


Valve Failure Caused by Stem Protector
Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame          08/10/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


Pipe Inter-ference Susceptibility
95-32 Spread Test Results                        for nuclear power reactors.


of Low-Pressure Coolant Injection and Core Spray Injection Valves to Pressure Locking Overspeed
Motor-Operated Valve            08/09/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


of Turbine-Driven Pumps Caused by Binding in Stems of Governor Valves Oversight
95-31                                                      for nuclear power reactors.


of Design and Fabrication
Failure Caused by Stem


Activities
Protector Pipe Inter- ference


for Metal Components
Susceptibility of Low-          08/03/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


Used in Spent Fuel Dry Storage Systems Emplacement
95-30                                                      for nuclear power reactors.


of Support Pads for Spent Fuel Dry Storage Installations
Pressure Coolant Injection


at Reactor Sites NRC Review of Nuclear Energy Institute,"Thermo-Lag
and Core Spray Injection


330-1 Combustibility
Valves to Pressure Locking


Evaluation
Overspeed of Turbine-            06/16/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


Methodology
94-66,                                                      for nuclear power reactors.


Plant Screening Guide" 08/11/95 08/10/95 08/09/95 08/03/95 06/16/95 06/07/95 06/05/95 05/31/95 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power plants.OL -Operating
===Supp. 1        Driven Pumps Caused by===
                Binding in Stems of


License CP = Construction
Governor Valves


Permit
Oversight of Design and          06/07/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


-11 IN 95-XX August xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshooting
95-29                                                        for nuclear power reactors.


revealed that both valves contained
Fabrication Activities


inadequate
for Metal Components Used


hydraulic
in Spent Fuel Dry Storage


oil levels in the valve actuator reservoirs.
Systems


===The cause of the low levels was inadequate===
Emplacement of Support          06/05/95    All holders of OLs or CPs
instructions


for a periodic maintenance
95-28                                                      for nuclear power reactors.


task for the valves.Related Generic Communications
Pads for Spent Fuel Dry


BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1975.BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1975.IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
Storage Installations at


of an Emergency
Reactor Sites


Class, Implementation
NRC Review of Nuclear            05/31/95  All holders of OLs or CPs


of an Emergency
95-27                                                      for nuclear power plants.


Plan, and Emergency
Energy Institute,
                  "Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation


Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.IN 91-57, "Operational
Methodology Plant Screening


Experience
Guide"
OL - Operating License


on Bus Transfers," dated September
CP = Construction Permit


19, 1991.IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.IN 93-44, "Operational
- 11 IN 95-XX


Challenges
August xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshooting


During a Dual-Unit
revealed that both valves contained inadequate hydraulic oil levels in the


Transient," dated June 15, 1993.IN 93-81, "Implementation
valve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels was inadequate


of Engineering
instructions for a periodic maintenance task for the valves.


Expertise
Related Generic Communications


on Shift," dated October 12, 1993.This information
BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,
              1975.


notice requires no specific or written response.
BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,
              1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated


If you have any questions
November 3, 1975.


about the information
IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991.


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.


===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient," dated
Technical


contacts:
June 15, 1993.
Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR
IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," dated


*See Previous Concurrence
October 12, 1993.


To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure
This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you have


'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure
any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the


'N" = No copy---------I OFFICE PECB:DRPM
technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


ADM:PUB C/PECB:DRPM
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


C/SPLB:DSSA
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


C/EELB:DE
Division of Reactor Program Management


I NAME EBenner* Tech Editor* EGoodwin*
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
CMcCracken*
JCalvo*DATE 07/21/95 7/24/95 8/2/95 7/25/95 7/27/95 OFFICE C/HHFB:DRCH


RI D/DSSA I1> PECB:DRPM
Technical contacts:                   Eric J. Benner, NRR


J A C/0&.DRPM
(301) 415-1171 Attachments:
                1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


lNAME CThomas* RHuey* AGHolahan
DOCUMENT NAME:              G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR                      *See Previous Concurrence                                        'N" = No copy


Wb! Riiessel M1AC~affee
To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure 'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure


DATE 8/1/95 8/2/95 /95 /95 95 jOFFICE D/DRPM NAME DCrutchfield
---------  I


DATE / /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
OFFICE          PECB:DRPM                        ADM:PUB                      C/PECB:DRPM              C/SPLB:DSSA                C/EELB:DE              I


IN 95-XX'__ _ July xx, 1995 Related Generic Communications
NAME            EBenner*                          Tech Editor*                EGoodwin*                CMcCracken*                JCalvo*
  DATE            07/21/95                         7/24/95                    8/2/95                    7/25/95                    7/27/95 OFFICE          C/HHFB:DRCH                      RI                          D/DSSA        I1>        PECB:DRPM J            A C/0&.DRPM l


BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24, 1995 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated November 3, 1995 BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3, 1995 IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration
NAME            CThomas*                          RHuey*                                    Wb!        Riiessel M1AC~affee        AGHolahan


of an Emergency
DATE            8/1/95                            8/2/95                                /95                        /95                      95 jOFFICE          D/DRPM


Class, Implementation
NAME            DCrutchfield


of an Emergency
DATE                /      /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


Plan, and Emergency
IN 95-XX


Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985 IN 91-57, "Operational
_
                                                                                                      '__        July xx, 1995 Related Generic Communications


Experience
BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,
              1995 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated


on Bus Transfers," dated September
November 3, 1995 BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,
              1995 IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an


19, 1991 IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991 IN 93-44, "Operational
Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985 IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991 IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991 IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual Unit Transient," dated


Challenges
June 15, 1993 IN 93-81, Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," dated


During a Dual Unit Transient," dated June 15, 1993 IN 93-81, Implementation
October 12, 1993 This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you have


of Engineering
any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the


Expertise
technical contacts below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


on Shift," dated October 12, 1993 This information
Regulation (NRR) project manager.


notice requires no specific or written response.
Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director


If you have any questions
Division of Reactor Program Management


about the information
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
in this notice, please contact one of the technical
 
contacts below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director Division of Reactor Program Management
 
===Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contacts: Forrest R. Huey, RIV (510) 975-0342 Eric J. Benner, NRR (301) 415-1171 Amarjit Singh, NRR (301) 415-1237 David (301)R. Desaulniers, NRR 415-1043 Sikhindra


K. Mitra, NRR (301) 415-2783 Thomas A. Bergman, NRR (301) 415-1021 Attachments:
Technical contacts:            Forrest R. Huey, RIV                              Eric J. Benner, NRR
A.1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices If- M DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.IN
(510) 975-0342                                    (301) 415-1171 Amarjit Singh, NRR                                David R. Desaulniers, NRR


To rocalva a ca at ofis docunm Indicatae
(301) 415-1237                                    (301) 415-1043 Sikhindra K. Mitra, NRR                          Thomas A. Bergman, NRR


I Oem box: ' -COY wilthout atachment/enrcbsum
(301) 415-2783                                    (301) 415-1021 Attachments:                                                                                                   A.      *. 4tD


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1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices                                                              If-MSW07teV1 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.IN


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I C/SWA C/EELB:DE NAME EBenner _ Tech Editors EGoodwin I McC__;_____  
NAME           EBenner             _       Tech Editors EGoodwin                                 IMcC__;_____               JCavo             /_T-
JCavo /_T-DATE 07/21/95 '/-r//95 /I&2J95 'I / 3795 "A 12/27 /95 l"a'OFFICE /"ff:DRCgL
DATE           07/21/95                         '/-r//95                   /I&2J95           'I       / 3795           "A 12/27 /95 l"a'
OFFICE           /"ff:DRCgL                 D/DRCH                      C/TQMB:DOTS                RIV                      PECB:DRPM


D/DRCH C/TQMB:DOTS
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RIV PECB:DRPM NAME h [BBoger SBlack RHueyQ! A k~ RKiessel DATE I /95 / 95 /95 J 1/-> /95 I / /95 OFFICE PECB:DRPM
DATE               I     /95                       /   95                           /95           J 1/->       /95       I/             /95 OFFICE         PECB:DRPM                    D/DRPM


D/DRPM NAME AChaffee DCrutchfield
NAME           AChaffee                     DCrutchfield                 _
  DATE              /      /95                                              R        D/95 O


_DATE / /95 R D/95 O OFF ICIA L RECORD COPY}}
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{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 04:32, 24 November 2019

Switchgear Fire and Partial Loss of Offsite Power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3
ML031060305
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/23/1995
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-95-033, NUDOCS 9508180092
Download: ML031060305 (7)
v • d • e


K>

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 23, 1995 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 95-33: SWITCHGEAR FIRE AND PARTIAL LOSS OF OFFSITE

POWER AT WATERFORD GENERATING STATION, UNIT 3

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

PurDose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice (IN)to alert addressees to a switchgear fire and subsequent partial

loss of offsite power at Waterford Generating Station, Unit 3. It is expected

that recipients will review the information for applicability to their

facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC

requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On June 10, 1995, Waterford 3 was operating at 100 percent power with an

operations staff consisting of a shift supervisor (SS), a control room

supervisor (CRS), and two reactor operators. At 8:58 a.m. a generator trip

occurred in response to failure of a lightning arrester on a remote offsite

substation transformer. The generator trip resulted in a fast transfer

activation. All 6.9 kV and 4.16 kV buses transferred as designed except the

4.16 kV A2 bus. A fire and electrical fault on the 4.16 kV A2 bus normal6.9 kV

power supply breaker caused a voltage and frequency perturbation on the

Al bus, which caused an underspeed condition on rector coolant pumps IA and

2A. This circumstance resulted in a reactor trip and a loss of offsite power

to the 4.16 kV nonsafety-related A2 bus and the associated 4.16 kV safety- the

related A3 bus. Emergency Diesel Generator A started and loaded to power

A3 bus. At 9:06 a.m., an auxiliary operator informed the control room of

heavy smoke within the turbine generator building. At that time, the SS did

not activate the plant fire alarm or dispatch the fire brigade, but directed

two auxiliary operators to don protective gear and investigate whether a fire

existed. At 9:35 a.m., the operators reported seeing flames above the A2 switchgear and the SS activated the fire brigade. Operators requested

assistance from the local offsite fire department and declared an Unusual

Event in accordance with emergency response procedures. The fire brigade was

unable to suppress the fire using portable fire extinguishers. The offsite

fire department arrived on the scene at 9:58 a.m. and extinguished the fire

with water at 10:22 a.m., after the A2 bus was deenergized. During the

cooldown transition from Mode 4 to Mode 5, operators discovered that the

isolation valves for both trains of shutdown cooling did not operate properly.

9508180092 PDR It 9S-.o33 9,s5T3

tJ <J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 38 hours4.398148e-4 days <br />0.0106 hours <br />6.283069e-5 weeks <br />1.4459e-5 months <br /> while these

The plant cooldown to Mode 5 was delayed approximately

valves were repaired.

Discussion

an augmented

During the period of June 13-16, 1995, the NRC conducted

causes, conditions, and

inspection team (AIT) inspection to determine the of this AIT inspection are

circumstances relevant to this event. The resultsdated July 7, 1995. The AIT

documented in NRC Inspection Report 50-382/92-15, fast bus transfer design, identified three primary issues: fire protection, issues are discussed in

and shutdown cooling valve inoperabilit). These three

greater detail in the following sections.

Fire Protection

have included a fire

Several recent events at U.S. nuclear power plants Waterford 3 highlights the

concurrent with a plant transient. The fire at

response to initial

importance of (1) training for timely and effective are not assigned

indications of a plant fire, (2) ensuring personnel

potentially conflicting duties, and (3) plant staffing.

noticed heavy smoke in

An auxiliary operator (a trained fire brigade member) room. The auxiliary

the turbine generator building and notified the control and responded that he did

operator was asked if there was a fire in the room

The CRS did not

not see flames because of the presence of heavy smoke. report of heavy smoke.

declare a fire until 29 minutes after receiving the

SS to assume the responsibilities of

Activating the fire brigade required the was directing plant

the CRS (the designated fire brigade leader), who event, operators stated that

personnel responding to the event. Following the

adversely affect their

the loss of the CRS from the control room did not fire scenario, which

ability to respond to this event and noted that a used during

requires that the CRS leave the control room, is routinely

requalification training.

to extinguish the fire

Before the local offsite fire department was allowed the fire using portable

with water, the fire brigade attempted to extinguish extinguishers. The use of

carbon dioxide (CO ), halon, and dry chemical fire the fire. When the

portable extinguishers was not effective in extinguishing

water to extinguish the

fire department arrived, it recommended the use of of water until about

fire. The fire brigade leader did not allow the use by the offsite fire

20 minutes later. The fire was finally extinguished of water is consistent

department within 4 minutes of using water. The use that the operators

with documented NRC staff positions. The AIT determined based on previous training

were reluctant to apply water to an electrical fire on electrical fires.

that had emphasized the use of water as a last resort

in the control room, the

Although the appropriate fire alarms had activated of (1) other auditory

control room crew was not aware of the alarms because fire alarm signal on a

alarms caused by the event and (2) the lack of a visual did not refer to the

front panel of the control room. Control room operators seeing heavy smoke. In

fire alarm panel when the auxiliary operator reported did not directly affect

this instance, the ineffectiveness of the fire alarms

KJ-J IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 the control

the response to the fire because an auxiliary operator alerted fire alarms that

room to heavy smoke in the turbine building. Nevertheless, redundant visual

are inaudible under actual operational conditions and lack to, plant fires.

signals can inhibit prompt identification of, and responsealarm panel upon any

Also, it is important for operators to refer to the fire the fire is not

verbal report of a potential fire, in order to ensure that requirements and

wider spread than visually reported. NRC fire protection of fire alarm

guidelines specify that fire drills include an assessment

effectiveness.

licensees that

IN 91-77 'shift staffing at Nuclear Power Plants', reminded

Section 50.54(m) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

licensed personnel.

(10 CFR 50.54 (m)) addresses minimum staffing levels for all actions

It does not address availability of personnel for performing

required during an

specified in the licensee's administrative procedures provide flexibility in

event. NRC fire protection requirements and guidelines leader may possess

assigning personnel to a fire brigade (e.g., the brigade

plant safety- either an operator's license or an equivalent knowledge ofbe assigned duties

related systems). The potential exists for personnel to

demands.

that, during certain events, may present concurrent and conflictingof those

the response

Such conditions could significantly delay or degrade

individuals.

Fast Bus Transfer Design

transfer of

The Waterford 3 fast bus transfer design consists of an automatic

the normal power

safety and nonsafety-related station auxiliary loads from

unit auxiliary transformer) to the

supply (from the main generator through the through the

alternate power supply (from the offsite transmission network

Magne-Blast

startup transformer). All supply breakers are General Electric, are designed to

type. During a fast bus transfer, the normal supply breakers

breakers are designed to close in

open in five cycles and the alternate supply buses. To

seven cycles, resulting in a two-cycle deadband on the respective

supply breakers, some other fast bus

prevent simultaneous closing of both the The Waterford 3 transfer designs include mechanical or electrical interlocks.

design does not include interlocks.

the A2 bus normal

During this event, when the fast bus transfer was initiated, supply breaker

supply breaker did not open in five cycles but the alternate

was connected to both

closed within seven cycles. As a result, (1) the A2 bus (2) both supply

the offsite transmission network and the main generator, (3) while the A2 bus

breakers to the A2 bus received overcurrent trip signals, transmission network, alternate supply breaker adequately isolated the offsite generator, (4) the

the A2 bus normal supply breaker did not isolate the main fire, and (5) the

A2 switchgear cubicle for the normal supply breaker caught

cable bus for the normal supply breaker also caught fire.

Shutdown Cooling Valves

isolation valves

During the plant cooldown to Mode 5, the shutdown cooling low-temperature

failed to operate properly when operators attempted to align

for placing shutdown

overpressure protection relief valves in preparation

IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 suction header isolation

cooling into service. The Loop 1 shutdown cooling closed after

valve (SI-405B) failed to fully open and automatically suction header

approximately 15 minutes. The Loop 2 shutdown cooling

several hours later, the

isolation valve (SI-405A) fully opened; however, continuously instead of

valve hydraulic pump was observed to be running portions of the

cycling as designed. These two valves isolate low-pressure and must be opened in

shutdown cooling system from the reactor coolant system5). Troubleshooting

order to complete plant cooldown below 200 OF (Mode oil levels in the

revealed that both valves contained inadequate hydraulic

was inadequate

valve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels valves.

instructions for a periodic maintenance task for the

Related Generic Communications

Station," dated March 24, BUL 75-04, wCable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power

1975.

Station," dated April 3, BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power

1975 Station," dated

BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power

November 3, 1975.

of an

IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation

15, 1985.

October

Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated

dated September 19, 1991.

IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers,"

dated November 26, 1991.

IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants,"

Transient," dated

IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit

June 15, 1993.

Shift," dated

IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on

October 12, 1993.

response. If you have

This information notice requires no specific or writtenplease contact the

any questions about the information in this notice, Office of Nuclear Reactor

technical contact listed below or the appropriate

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

DennvsWM. CrutchfieldP Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contact: Eric J. Benner, NRR

(301) 415-1171 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

@-gL~5~ 44yAGgQ

K> Kreachment

IN 95-33 August 23, 1995 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

Potential for Loss of 08/11/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-10, for nuclear power reactors.

Supp. 2 Automatic Engineered

Safety Features Actuation

Thermo-Lag 330-1 Flame 08/10/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-32 Spread Test Results for nuclear power reactors.

Motor-Operated Valve 08/09/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-31 for nuclear power reactors.

Failure Caused by Stem

Protector Pipe Inter- ference

Susceptibility of Low- 08/03/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-30 for nuclear power reactors.

Pressure Coolant Injection

and Core Spray Injection

Valves to Pressure Locking

Overspeed of Turbine- 06/16/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

94-66, for nuclear power reactors.

Supp. 1 Driven Pumps Caused by

Binding in Stems of

Governor Valves

Oversight of Design and 06/07/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-29 for nuclear power reactors.

Fabrication Activities

for Metal Components Used

in Spent Fuel Dry Storage

Systems

Emplacement of Support 06/05/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-28 for nuclear power reactors.

Pads for Spent Fuel Dry

Storage Installations at

Reactor Sites

NRC Review of Nuclear 05/31/95 All holders of OLs or CPs

95-27 for nuclear power plants.

Energy Institute,

"Thermo-Lag 330-1 Combustibility Evaluation

Methodology Plant Screening

Guide"

OL - Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

- 11 IN 95-XX

August xx, 1995 order to complete plant cooldown below 200 *F (Mode 5). Troubleshooting

revealed that both valves contained inadequate hydraulic oil levels in the

valve actuator reservoirs. The cause of the low levels was inadequate

instructions for a periodic maintenance task for the valves.

Related Generic Communications

BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,

1975.

BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,

1975 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated

November 3, 1975.

IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an

Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications," dated October 15, 1985.

IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991.

IN 91-77, -Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991.

IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual-Unit Transient," dated

June 15, 1993.

IN 93-81, "Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," dated

October 12, 1993.

This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you have

any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the

technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Eric J. Benner, NRR

(301) 415-1171 Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.INR *See Previous Concurrence 'N" = No copy

To receive a copy of this document, Indicate In the box: 'C' = Copy without attachment/enclosure 'E' = Copy with attachment/enclosure

I

OFFICE PECB:DRPM ADM:PUB C/PECB:DRPM C/SPLB:DSSA C/EELB:DE I

NAME EBenner* Tech Editor* EGoodwin* CMcCracken* JCalvo*

DATE 07/21/95 7/24/95 8/2/95 7/25/95 7/27/95 OFFICE C/HHFB:DRCH RI D/DSSA I1> PECB:DRPM J A C/0&.DRPM l

NAME CThomas* RHuey* Wb! Riiessel M1AC~affee AGHolahan

DATE 8/1/95 8/2/95 /95 /95 95 jOFFICE D/DRPM

NAME DCrutchfield

DATE / /95 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

IN 95-XX

_

'__ July xx, 1995 Related Generic Communications

BUL 75-04, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated March 24,

1995 BUL 75-04B, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated

November 3, 1995 BUL 75-04A, "Cable Fire at Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station," dated April 3,

1995 IN 85-80, "Timely Declaration of an Emergency Class, Implementation of an

Emergency Plan, and Emergency Notifications, " dated October 15, 1985 IN 91-57, "Operational Experience on Bus Transfers," dated September 19, 1991 IN 91-77, "Shift Staffing at Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 26, 1991 IN 93-44, "Operational Challenges During a Dual Unit Transient," dated

June 15, 1993 IN 93-81, Implementation of Engineering Expertise on Shift," dated

October 12, 1993 This information notice requires no specific or written response. If you have

any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one of the

technical contacts below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Director

Division of Reactor Program Management

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Forrest R. Huey, RIV Eric J. Benner, NRR

(510) 975-0342 (301) 415-1171 Amarjit Singh, NRR David R. Desaulniers, NRR

(301) 415-1237 (301) 415-1043 Sikhindra K. Mitra, NRR Thomas A. Bergman, NRR

(301) 415-2783 (301) 415-1021 Attachments: A. *. 4tD

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices If-MSW07teV1 DOCUMENT NAME: G:\IN\WATERFOR.IN

To rocalva a ca at

ofis docunm Indicatae I Oembox: ' - COY wilthout atachment/enrcbsum T a Cov with Irtthnt/encosure W - No copy _F

OFFICE PECB:DRPM ADM:PUB SC/PECB:DRPM I C/SWA C/EELB:DE

NAME EBenner _ Tech Editors EGoodwin IMcC__;_____ JCavo /_T-

DATE 07/21/95 '/-r//95 /I&2J95 'I / 3795 "A 12/27 /95 l"a'

OFFICE /"ff:DRCgL D/DRCH C/TQMB:DOTS RIV PECB:DRPM

NAME h [BBoger SBlack RHueyQ!A k~ RKiessel

DATE I /95 / 95 /95 J 1/-> /95 I/ /95 OFFICE PECB:DRPM D/DRPM

NAME AChaffee DCrutchfield _

DATE / /95 R D/95 O

OFF ICIA L RECORD COPY


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