Information Notice 1985-23, Inadequate Surveillance and Postmaintenance and Postmodification System Testing: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23:  INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 85-23: INADEQUATE
AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING
 
SURVEILLANCE
 
===AND POSTMAINTENANCE===
AND POSTMODIFICATION
 
SYSTEM TESTING


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
 
holding an operating
 
license (OL) or a construction


permit (CP).
construction permit (CP).


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This information
:
This information notice is to alert addressees of several instances pertaining


notice is to alert addressees
to improper system modifications, inadequate postmodification system testing, and inadequate surveillance testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear


of several instances
power facility.


pertaining
It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this


to improper system modifications, inadequate
notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.


postmodification
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
system testing, and inadequate
On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four
 
surveillance
 
testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear power facility.It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
contained
 
in this notice for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, if appropri-ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring
 
at their facilities.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;
there-fore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances:
On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four Rosemont differential
 
pressure transmitters
 
that control the closing of four isolation
 
valves of the upper-head
 
injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly
 
installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the original Barton reverse-acting
 
differential
 
pressure switches were replaced with Rosemont direct-acting
 
differential
 
pressure transmitters
 
during April of 1984). As a result, the UHI isolation
 
valves failed to close during draining of the accumulator
 
when the water level in the UHI accumulator
 
reached the-set point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification
 
testing was limited to a dry calibration
 
method that does not use the actual reference leg of the accumulator;
therefore, the installation
 
error was not detected by the postmodification
 
test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi-mately five months with the UHI isolation
 
valves inoperable.
 
The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator
 
that supplies pressurized
 
nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator
 
into the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis
 
loss-of-coolant
 
accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis
 
LOCA had occurred while the UHI isolation


valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;however, the UHI isolation
Rosemont differential pressure transmitters that control the closing of four


valves would not have closed when the water in the 8503210461 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator
isolation valves of the upper-head injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the


had been depleted.
original Barton reverse-acting differential pressure switches were replaced


As a result, nitrogen gas could have been injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis
with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of


LOCA.Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi-cated that the peak cladding temperature
1984). As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining


of 2200'F most likely would have been exceeded and that the worst-case
of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set


increase in containment
point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing


pressure could have resulted in exceeding
was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference


the design pressure by 2 psi.A related but separate event involved the establishing
leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by


of the set points for closing the UHI isolation
the postmodification test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.


valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the use of a dry calibration
The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that


method, which would establish
supplies pressurized nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator into


the trip set point for closing the UHI isolation
the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant


valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu-lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative
accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI


error in the trip set point occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible
isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;
however, the UHI isolation valves would not have closed when the water in the


instrument
8503210461


engineer misinterpreted
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted. As a result, nitrogen gas could have been


the tank measurements
injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.


made by instrument
Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi- cated that the peak cladding temperature of 2200'F most likely would have been


technicians.
exceeded and that the worst-case increase in containment pressure could have


Because the dry calibration
resulted in exceeding the design pressure by 2 psi.


method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu-mulator, this error was left undetected
A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for


at both units for several months. The calibration
closing the UHI isolation valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the


error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving
use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for


the incorrect
closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point


installation
occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer


of the differential
misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians. Because


pressure transmitters.
the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The


The conse-quences of this event would be the early isolation
calibration error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel


of the UHI water accumulator
were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving the


during a design-basis
incorrect installation of the differential pressure transmitters. The conse- quences of this event would be the early isolation of the UHI water accumulator


LOCA, resulting
during a design-basis LOCA, resulting in less water being delivered to the


in less water being delivered
vessel than assumed in the analysis.


to the vessel than assumed in the analysis.A completely
A completely unrelated event involved the inoperability of two of the four


unrelated
overpower delta temperature reactor protection channels at McGuire Unit 2.


event involved the inoperability
This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two


of two of the four overpower
affected channels responded contrary to that expected. This event was caused


delta temperature
because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower


reactor protection
delta temperature input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure


channels at McGuire Unit 2.This defect was discovered
that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing
 
on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per-forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two affected channels responded
 
contrary to that expected.
 
This event was caused because an electrical
 
jumper was not installed
 
on two of the four overpower delta temperature
 
input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure that the overpower
 
delta temperature
 
system provides protection
 
for decreasing


temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance
temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance


tests only verified that protection
tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for
 
would be provided for increasing
 
tempera-ture, but not for decreasing
 
temperature.
 
This defect was left undetected
 
for an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant startup. Subsequent
 
investigations
 
revealed that in addition to inadequate


testing, there was an absence of instructions
an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant


and descriptions
startup. Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate


of the required jumpers.The above examples illustrate
testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required


the need for thorough reviews and detailed attention
jumpers.


to plant surveillance
The above examples illustrate the need for thorough reviews and detailed


and postmaintenance
attention to plant surveillance and postmaintenance and postmodification tests, to ensure that they accomplish the required verification of system function.


and postmodification
IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice;
however, if you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the


tests, to ensure that they accomplish
Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical


the required verification
contact listed below.


of system function.
Dieor


IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information
Divis    of Emergency Preparedness


notice;however, if you have any questions
and 'ngineering Response


regarding
Office of Inspection and Enforcement


this notice, please contact the Regional Administrator
Technical Contacts:  I. Villalva, IE


of the appropriate
(301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII


NRC regional office or the technical contact listed below.Dieor Divis of Emergency
(404) 221-5533 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


===Preparedness===
Attachment 1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
and 'ngineering


Response Office of Inspection
IE INFORMATION NOTICES


and Enforcement
Information                                    Date of


Technical
Notice No.      Subject                        Issue  Issued to


Contacts:
85-22          Failure Of Limitorque Motor-   3/21/85 All power reactor
I. Villalva, IE (301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII (404) 221-5533 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information


Notices
Operated Valves Resulting              facilities holding


Attachment
From Incorrect Installation            an OL or CP


1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
Of Pinon Gear


NOTICES Information
85-21          Main Steam Isolation Valve    3/18/85 All PWR facilities


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 85-22 85-21 Failure Of Limitorque
Closure Logic                          holding an OL or CP


Motor-Operated Valves Resulting From Incorrect
85-20          Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85  All power reactor


===Installation===
Due To Hammering Effect                facilities holding
Of Pinon Gear Main Steam Isolation


Valve Closure Logic 3/21/85 3/18/85 85-20 Motor-Operated
an OL or CP


Valve Failures 3/12/85 Due To Hammering
85-19          Alleged Falsification Of      3/11/85 All power reactor


Effect 85-19 85-10 Sup. 1 84-18 83-70 Sup. 1 85-17 85-16 85-15 Alleged Falsification
Certifications And Alteration          facilities holding


Of Certifications
Of Markings On Piping, Valves          an OL or CP


===And Alteration===
And Fittings
Of Markings On Piping, Valves And Fittings Posstensioned


Containment
85-10          Posstensioned Containment     3/8/85  All power reactor


===Tendon Anchor Head Failure Failures Of Undervoltage===
Sup. 1          Tendon Anchor Head Failure             facilities holding
Output Circuit Boards In The Westinghouse-Designed


Solid State Protection
an OL or CP


System Vibration-Induced
84-18          Failures Of Undervoltage      3/7/85  All Westinghouse


Valve Failures Possible Sticking Of ASCO Solenoid Valves Time/Current
Output Circuit Boards In The          PWR facilities


Trip Curve Discrepancy
Westinghouse-Designed Solid            holding an OL or CP


Of ITE/Siemens- Allis Molded Case Circuit Breaker Nonconforming
State Protection System


Structural
83-70          Vibration-Induced Valve        3/4/85  All power reactor


Steel For Safety-Related
Sup. 1          Failures                              facilities holding


Use 3/11/85 3/8/85 3/7/85 3/4/85 3/1/85 2/27/85 2/22/85 All power reactor facilities
an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All PWR facilities
85-17            Possible Sticking Of ASCO    3/1/85  All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Solenoid Valves                      facilities holding


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
an OL or CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
85-16            Time/Current Trip Curve      2/27/85 All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All Westinghouse
Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens-          facilities holding


===PWR facilities===
Allis Molded Case Circuit            an OL or CP
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Breaker


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
85-15            Nonconforming Structural      2/22/85 All power reactor


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
Steel For Safety-Related              facilities holding


holding an OL or CP OL = Operating
Use                                  an OL or CP


License CP = Construction
OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 02:37, 24 November 2019

Inadequate Surveillance and Postmaintenance and Postmodification System Testing
ML031180395
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill, Crane
Issue date: 03/22/1985
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-85-023, NUDOCS 8503210461
Download: ML031180395 (4)


SSINS No: 6835 IN 85-23 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 85-23: INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE AND POSTMAINTENANCE

AND POSTMODIFICATION SYSTEM TESTING

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This information notice is to alert addressees of several instances pertaining

to improper system modifications, inadequate postmodification system testing, and inadequate surveillance testing recently detected at the McGuire nuclear

power facility.

It is expected that recipients will review the information contained in this

notice for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropri- ate, to preclude similar problems from occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances

On November 1, 1984, Duke Power Company (DPC) informed the NRC that the four

Rosemont differential pressure transmitters that control the closing of four

isolation valves of the upper-head injection (UHI) system at McGuire Unit 1 were improperly installed (i.e., the impulse lines were reversed when the

original Barton reverse-acting differential pressure switches were replaced

with Rosemont direct-acting differential pressure transmitters during April of

1984). As a result, the UHI isolation valves failed to close during draining

of the accumulator when the water level in the UHI accumulator reached the-set

point. In addition to the improper installation, the postmodification testing

was limited to a dry calibration method that does not use the actual reference

leg of the accumulator; therefore, the installation error was not detected by

the postmodification test. Consequently, the plant was operated for approxi- mately five months with the UHI isolation valves inoperable.

The McGuire UHI system design includes a separate nitrogen accumulator that

supplies pressurized nitrogen to force the water from the UHI accumulator into

the reactor vessel during the initial phase of a design-basis loss-of-coolant

accident (LOCA). Thus, if a design-basis LOCA had occurred while the UHI

isolation valves were inoperable, the UHI system would have been actuated;

however, the UHI isolation valves would not have closed when the water in the

8503210461

IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 UHI accumulator had been depleted. As a result, nitrogen gas could have been

injected into the reactor vessel during the course of a design-basis LOCA.

Under such conditions, and using Appendix K assumptions, DPC's analysis indi- cated that the peak cladding temperature of 2200'F most likely would have been

exceeded and that the worst-case increase in containment pressure could have

resulted in exceeding the design pressure by 2 psi.

A related but separate event involved the establishing of the set points for

closing the UHI isolation valves. On February 14, 1984, DPC approved the

use of a dry calibration method, which would establish the trip set point for

closing the UHI isolation valves relative to the bottom of the UHI water accumu- lator tank. However, a 24-inch nonconservative error in the trip set point

occurred at McGuire Units 1 and 2 when the responsible instrument engineer

misinterpreted the tank measurements made by instrument technicians. Because

the dry calibration method does not use the actual process leg of the UHI accu- mulator, this error was left undetected at both units for several months. The

calibration error was finally detected on November 2, 1984, while DPC personnel

were taking "as-found" data in response to the previous error involving the

incorrect installation of the differential pressure transmitters. The conse- quences of this event would be the early isolation of the UHI water accumulator

during a design-basis LOCA, resulting in less water being delivered to the

vessel than assumed in the analysis.

A completely unrelated event involved the inoperability of two of the four

overpower delta temperature reactor protection channels at McGuire Unit 2.

This defect was discovered on November 26, 1984, by a DPC engineer while per- forming a posttrip review of a reactor scram in which signals of the two

affected channels responded contrary to that expected. This event was caused

because an electrical jumper was not installed on two of the four overpower

delta temperature input logic cards. The purpose of the jumper is to ensure

that the overpower delta temperature system provides protection for decreasing

temperature, as might be expected on a steam line break. DPC's surveillance

tests only verified that protection would be provided for increasing tempera- ture, but not for decreasing temperature. This defect was left undetected for

an unknown period of time, but most likely it had existed since initial plant

startup. Subsequent investigations revealed that in addition to inadequate

testing, there was an absence of instructions and descriptions of the required

jumpers.

The above examples illustrate the need for thorough reviews and detailed

attention to plant surveillance and postmaintenance and postmodification tests, to ensure that they accomplish the required verification of system function.

IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice;

however, if you have any questions regarding this notice, please contact the

Regional Administrator of the appropriate NRC regional office or the technical

contact listed below.

Dieor

Divis of Emergency Preparedness

and 'ngineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contacts: I. Villalva, IE

(301) 492-9007 H. Dance, RII

(404) 221-5533 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 85-23 March 22, 1985 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

85-22 Failure Of Limitorque Motor- 3/21/85 All power reactor

Operated Valves Resulting facilities holding

From Incorrect Installation an OL or CP

Of Pinon Gear

85-21 Main Steam Isolation Valve 3/18/85 All PWR facilities

Closure Logic holding an OL or CP

85-20 Motor-Operated Valve Failures 3/12/85 All power reactor

Due To Hammering Effect facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-19 Alleged Falsification Of 3/11/85 All power reactor

Certifications And Alteration facilities holding

Of Markings On Piping, Valves an OL or CP

And Fittings

85-10 Posstensioned Containment 3/8/85 All power reactor

Sup. 1 Tendon Anchor Head Failure facilities holding

an OL or CP

84-18 Failures Of Undervoltage 3/7/85 All Westinghouse

Output Circuit Boards In The PWR facilities

Westinghouse-Designed Solid holding an OL or CP

State Protection System

83-70 Vibration-Induced Valve 3/4/85 All power reactor

Sup. 1 Failures facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-17 Possible Sticking Of ASCO 3/1/85 All power reactor

Solenoid Valves facilities holding

an OL or CP

85-16 Time/Current Trip Curve 2/27/85 All power reactor

Discrepancy Of ITE/Siemens- facilities holding

Allis Molded Case Circuit an OL or CP

Breaker

85-15 Nonconforming Structural 2/22/85 All power reactor

Steel For Safety-Related facilities holding

Use an OL or CP

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit