Information Notice 1992-36, Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 7, 1992 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 92-36: INTERSYSTEM
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 7, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-36:   INTERSYSTEM LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT
 
===LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT===


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
 
licenses or construction


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
of potential
 
plant vulnerabilities
 
to intersystem
 
loss-of-coolant accidents (ISLOCAs).
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information


for applicability
to alert addressees of potential plant vulnerabilities to intersystem loss-of- coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). It is expected that recipients will review


to their facilities
the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as


and consider actions, as appropriate.
appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not


However, suggestions
NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


contained
This information notice provides information gathered during a concerted NRC


in this information
staff effort to study plant vulnerabilities to ISLOCAs. The staff gathered


notice are not NRC requirements;
this information by performing (a) detailed evaluations of operating events, (b) inspections of a limited sample of pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.This information


notice provides information
(c) extensive analyses of the sample PWRs. The information may be of use in


gathered during a concerted
recipients' individual plant examination (IPE) programs.


NRC staff effort to study plant vulnerabilities
Background


to ISLOCAs. The staff gathered this information
The ISLOCA is a class of accidents in which a break occurs in a system con- nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primary


by performing (a) detailed evaluations
system inventory. This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently exposed to


of operating
high RCS pressures beyond its capacity. ISLOCAs of most concern are those


events, (b) inspections
that can discharge the break flow outside the reactor containment building, primarily because they can result in high offsite radiological consequences but


of a limited sample of pressurized
also because the RCS inventory lost cannot be retrieved for long-term core


water reactors (PWRs), and (c) extensive
cooling during the recirculation phase.


analyses of the sample PWRs. The information
In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published in 1975, and in


may be of use in recipients'
NUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power
individual


plant examination (IPE) programs.Background
Plants," the NRC described the ISLOCA outside containment as an event of low


The ISLOCA is a class of accidents
core damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors to plant risk. In


in which a break occurs in a system con-nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primary system inventory.
those studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilistic


This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently
risk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.


exposed to high RCS pressures
However, these PRAs typically have modelled only those Event-V sequences that


beyond its capacity.
include only the catastrophic failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from


ISLOCAs of most concern are those that can discharge
AMA


the break flow outside the reactor containment
92050_  45


building, primarily
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs  included little consideration of human errors


because they can result in high offsite radiological
leading to an ISLOCA. Also, most  existing PRAs have given little or no credit


consequences
for operator actions to terminate  an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiological


but also because the RCS inventory
consequences if core melt were to  occur.


lost cannot be retrieved
On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power


for long-term
North Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR Company, licensee for the


core cooling during the recirculation
relief valves would not pass


phase.In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published
the design-basis flow to relieve an overpressurization


in 1975, and in NUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment
the latter is aligned to the RCS. The function                of the RHR system when


for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants," the NRC described
important when the RCS is water solid and thereforeof these    relief valves is


the ISLOCA outside containment
ization events, such as from a charging-letdown        susceptible      to overpressur- flow  mismatch      or  a temperature


as an event of low core damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors
change.


to plant risk. In those studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilistic
The licensee made this report after conducting


risk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.However, these PRAs typically
respond to a notification by the nuclear steam an engineering evaluation to


have modelled only those Event-V sequences
supply vendor, the Westinghouse


that include only the catastrophic
Electric Corporation. In February 1990, Westinghouse


failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from 92050_ 45 AMA
valve design basis for the Westinghouse Owners              reviewed the RHR relief


IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs included little consideration
customers review the following three items:      Group  and    recommended that its


of human errors leading to an ISLOCA. Also, most existing PRAs have given little or no credit for operator actions to terminate
The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting


an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiological
overpressure events                                        against cold


consequences
Discharge capability of relief valves for probable


if core melt were to occur.On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power Company, licensee for the North Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR relief valves would not pass the design-basis
back pressures


flow to relieve an overpressurization
Design basis commitments for valve specifications, final safety analysis report, and technical specificationscommitments in the


of the RHR system when the latter is aligned to the RCS. The function of these relief valves is important
The NRC has issued several information notices


when the RCS is water solid and therefore
to discuss certain operational


susceptible
events regarding ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system


to overpressur- ization events, such as from a charging-letdown
Coolant," the staff. discussed an event during              Discharge of Reactor


flow mismatch or a temperature
which


change.The licensee made this report after conducting
reactor water was discharged outside the containment.     about    68,000 gallons of


an engineering
analyzed operational experience and documented                The    staff has also


evaluation
inspection team (AIT) reports. On October 23,    its  findings      in augmented


to respond to a notification
Report 50-456/90-020 on an event at Braidwood      1990,  the    staff  issued AIT


by the nuclear steam supply vendor, the Westinghouse
that resulted in primary water


Electric Corporation.
leakage outside the containment and in the contamination


In February 1990, Westinghouse
one of whom received a second degree burn. Table                of three personnel, information notices and AIT reports that the          3 is  a  selected list of


reviewed the RHR relief valve design basis for the Westinghouse
related events.                                staff  has  issued    on ISLOCAs and


Owners Group and recommended
Discussion
 
that its customers
 
review the following
 
three items: The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting
 
against cold overpressure
 
events Discharge
 
capability
 
of relief valves for probable back pressures Design basis commitments
 
for valve specifications, commitments
 
in the final safety analysis report, and technical
 
specifications
 
The NRC has issued several information
 
notices to discuss certain operational
 
events regarding
 
ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coolant," the staff. discussed
 
an event during which about 68,000 gallons of reactor water was discharged
 
outside the containment.
 
The staff has also analyzed operational
 
experience
 
and documented
 
its findings in augmented inspection
 
team (AIT) reports. On October 23, 1990, the staff issued AIT Report 50-456/90-020
on an event at Braidwood
 
that resulted in primary water leakage outside the containment
 
and in the contamination
 
of three personnel, one of whom received a second degree burn. Table 3 is a selected list of information
 
notices and AIT reports that the staff has issued on ISLOCAs and related events.Discussion


Although no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated
Although no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated


operational
both in the United States and abroad, indicates               operational experience, occurred at a rate higher than expected. In         that  ISLOCA-like       events have
 
experience, both in the United States and abroad, indicates
 
that ISLOCA-like
 
events have occurred at a rate higher than expected.
 
In conducting
 
this study, the staff defined an ISLOCA-like
 
event, or an ISLOCA precursor, as an event that results from the failure, degradation, or inadvertent
 
opening of the pressure isolation valves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure systems. An ISLOCA precursor may become an ISLOCA if it occurs during different
 
plant conditions, or if some of the failures occur together.The NRC staff conducted
 
root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors, extensive plant inspections, and detailed analyses of a sample of PWRs. These analyses
 
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 included thermal-hydraulic
 
analyses, fragility
 
analyses to determine
 
the likely sizes and locations
 
of a break, and human reliability
 
analyses.
 
The staff used the results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights about the significant
 
contributors
 
to ISLOCA risk.The staff directed the studies described
 
in this information


notice towards finding vulnerabilities
conducting


of PWR plants to ISLOCAs, since the primary pressures present in PWRs are greater than those found in boiling water reactors (BWRs), while the design pressures
defined an ISLOCA-like event, or an ISLOCA precursor,          this    study, the staff


of low pressure systems are about the same in both PWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees
from the failure, degradation, or inadvertent              as    an  event  that results


also may find this information
valves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure  opening of the pressure isolation


to be relevant to their plants.Upon conducting
may become an ISLOCA if it occurs during differentsystems. An ISLOCA precursor


these studies, the staff made the following
of the failures occur together.                        plant conditions, or if some


observations
===The NRC staff conducted root cause analyses of===
plant inspections, and detailed analyses of a ISLOCA precursors, extensive


on the ISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants: 1. The estimated
sample of PWRs. These analyses


core damage frequency
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 to determine the likely


caused by ISLOCAs could be greater than was estimated
included thermal-hydraulic analyses, fragility analysesanalyses. The staff used


in PRAs for some plants.The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiators
sizes and locations of a break, and human reliability about the significant


and the capabili-ties for recovery.
the results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights


These factors vary from plant to plant. The main contributors
contributors to ISLOCA risk.


to ISLOCA initiation
notice towards


and/or recovery include (a) human errors and (b) the effects of the accident-caused
The staff directed the studies described in this information


harsh environment
since    the  primary    pressures


on plant equipment
finding vulnerabilities of PWR plants to ISLOCAs,            water    reactors  (BWRs),
present in PWRs are greater than those found    in boiling


and recovery activities.
systems  are  about    the same  in  both


Both factors have significant
while the design pressures of low pressure                this    information    to  be


uncer-tainties.
PWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees also    may  find


Existing PRAs have provided little or no treatment
relevant to their plants.


of these factors. Plants that are particularly
following observations on the


vulnerable
===Upon conducting these studies, the staff made the===
ISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants:
                                                                  could be greater


to either of these two factors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated
1.    The estimated core damage frequency caused by ISLOCAs


by existing PRAs.2. Most plants lack contingency
than was estimated in PRAs for some  plants.


plans to provide backup water supplies that can be transferred
and the capabili- The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiatorsto  plant.    The main


readily to provide long-term
ties for recovery. These factors  vary  from plant


core cooling after an ISLOCA.By examining
and/or  recovery    include    (a) human errors


a plant's emergency
contributors to ISLOCA initiation                                      on plant


procedures, a licensee can find insights for improving
and (b) the effects of the accident-caused harsh environment  significant uncer- equipment and recovery activities. Both factors have      treatment of these


the plant's features to address the concerns for both ISLOCAs and other accidents.
tainties. Existing PRAs have provided little or noto either of these two


3. The root cause analyses of operational
factors. Plants that are particularly vulnerable                by existing PRAs.


events indicate that ISLOCA precur-sors most likely would be initiated
factors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated


by human errors, notably during testing and maintenance
water supplies that


or because of procedural
2.  Most plants lack contingency plans to provide backup cooling after an


deficiencies.
can be transferred readily to provide long-term core


This may be attributed
ISLOCA.


to the general lack of awareness
can find


of the possibility
By examining a plant's emergency procedures, a licensee the concerns for


or consequences
insights for improving the plant's features to address


of an ISLOCA.Licensees
both ISLOCAs and other accidents.


may significantly
indicate that ISLOCA precur-
  3. The root cause analyses of operational events errors,        notably during


reduce the probability
sors most likely would be initiated by human                              This may


of ISLOCA precursors
testing and maintenance or because of procedural      deficiencies.


by improving
of  the  possibility    or


the ability of operators
be attributed to the general lack of awareness


and maintenance
consequences of an ISLOCA.


personnel
ISLOCA precursors


to recog-nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms
Licensees may significantly reduce the probability of personnel to recog- by improving the ability of operators and  maintenance


that can cause them, actions to prevent them, and methods to manage them if they occur.4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors
to prevent them, and


have low public risk consequences.
nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms that can cause them, actions


However, an ISLOCA precursor
methods to manage them if they occur.


can require a shutdown or extension
risk consequences. However,
 
  4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low publicextension of a shutdown, an ISLOCA precursor can require a shutdown  or
of a shutdown, require radioactivity
 
cleanup operations, and cause personnel


injury.
injury.


IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
require radioactivity cleanup operations, and cause personnel
 
from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
 
Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing


its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root


Loss of Coolant Accidents
inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from cause analyses and plant


in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
the ISLOCA PRAs.


to licensees.
The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program


This information
"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Waterunder Generic Issue 105, ing this research, the staff may issue further generic Reactors." Upon complet- licensees.                                              correspondence to


notice requires no specific action or written response.
This information notice requires   no specific action or written response. If


If you have any questions
you have any questions about the  information in this notice, please contact one


about the information
of the technical contacts listed  below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project  manager.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
es ERossi, Drectr


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.es ERossi, Drectr Division of Operational
Division of Operational Events Assessment


===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical contacts:  Kazimieras Campe, NRR


contacts:
(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES
Kazimieras


Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES
1. Table 1. "Observed


Plant Vulnerabilities
(301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to


to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"                 ISLOCA Precursors"
3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports


Notices
and References"
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Attachment
Attachment 1 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors


1 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities
plant inspections)
(Obtained from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors and


to ISLOCA Precursors (Obtained
1. Lack of awareness of the nature or consequences of ISLOCAs


from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors
especially


and plant inspections)
2.   Inadequate emergency procedures for ISLOCA outside containment, for non-power operational modes
1. Lack of awareness


of the nature or consequences
3.  Poor or incorrect valve labels


of ISLOCAs 2. Inadequate
plant


emergency
4.  Different nomenclature used for the same equipment in the same


procedures
5.  Poor coordination between concurrently run tests


for ISLOCA outside containment, especially
opera-
6.  Miscommunications between the control room operators and auxiliary


for non-power
but  understood


operational
tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open  then  close,"
    to mean "open")
7.  Poor shift turn-over communications


modes 3. Poor or incorrect
8.   Poor post-maintenance testing or operability checks


valve labels 4. Different
9.   Inadequate application of independent verification


nomenclature
10.  Tendency not to check diverse instrument indications


used for the same equipment
during


in the same plant 5. Poor coordination
11. Tendency to commit personnel to extensive overtime work, especially


between concurrently
level  and the


run tests 6. Miscommunications
shutdown and startup operations, thus increasing  the fatigue


between the control room operators
likelihood of errors


and auxiliary
Attachment 2 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights


opera-tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open then close," but understood
(Obtained from ISLOCA PRAs)
                                                                          by an


to mean "open")7. Poor shift turn-over
1.   The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency caused for some


communications
ISLOCA could be substantially greater than previous PRA  estimates


8. Poor post-maintenance
and


testing or operability
plants. This is primarily caused by the effects of operator errors during


checks 9. Inadequate
harsh environments caused by the accident. Valve alignment    errors


application
transition between operating modes can be particularly important.


of independent
the


verification
2.  Equipment qualified for a harsh environment is likely to survive  submersion


10. Tendency not to check diverse instrument
adverse ISLOCA temperature and humidity, but not the  possible


indications
caused by flooding.


11. Tendency to commit personnel
or


to extensive
3.  Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment to


overtime work, especially
flooding, depending on the size and location of the  break  in  relation


during shutdown and startup operations, thus increasing
of


the fatigue level and the likelihood
affected equipment, the separation of redundant trains, and the effect


of errors
fire sprays on flooding.


Attachment
essen-
4.    ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damageof loss


2 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights (Obtained
tial equipment thus complicating long-term cooling, and  the  rate


from ISLOCA PRAs)1. The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency
of reactor water outside the containment. If the water is not quickly    has


caused by an ISLOCA could be substantially
replenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak


greater than previous PRA estimates
been isolated.


for some plants. This is primarily
an ISLOCA


caused by the effects of operator errors and harsh environments
5.  Symptom-based procedures may lead the operator to realize that to  plant


caused by the accident.
has occurred. However, unless the emergency  procedures  refer


Valve alignment
water, the  operator  may  have


errors during transition
provisions for conserving and replenishing


between operating
difficulty managing the accident.


modes can be particularly
6.  Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low risk consequences, primarily small


important.
because of the presence of one or more of the following conditions:low


2. Equipment
leak size, redundant means of detecting and isolating a leak, and


qualified
power or shutdown conditions.


for a harsh environment
Attachment 3 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References


is likely to survive the adverse ISLOCA temperature
Identification            Title or Subject                            Date


and humidity, but not the possible submersion
Potential for Common-Mode Failure of              10/04/90
IN 90-64 HPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant


caused by flooding.3. Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment
Outside Containment During a LOCA


or flooding, depending
Inter-system Discharge of Reactor Coolant          01/29/90
IN 90-05 IN 89-73            Potential Overpressurization of Low                11/01/89 Pressure Systems


on the size and location of the break in relation to affected equipment, the separation
AIT Report          An assessment of the 10/4/90 Braidwood            10/23/90
50-456/90-20        loss of reactor coolant inventory and


of redundant
personnel contamination and injury


trains, and the effect of fire sprays on flooding.4. ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damage essen-tial equipment
AIT Report          An assessment of the 4/12/89 Pilgrim                05/08/89
50-293/89-80        overpressurization event, which occurred


thus complicating
during the conduct of the RCIC logic test


long-term
ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Waterford        09/14/90
 
Inspection
cooling, and the rate of loss of reactor water outside the containment.
 
If the water is not quickly replenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak has been isolated.5. Symptom-based


procedures
Report              plant


may lead the operator to realize that an ISLOCA has occurred.
50-382/90-200
 
                      ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Catawba          06/11/90
However, unless the emergency
 
procedures
 
refer to plant provisions
 
for conserving
 
and replenishing
 
water, the operator may have difficulty
 
managing the accident.6. Most observed ISLOCA precursors
 
have low risk consequences, primarily because of the presence of one or more of the following
 
conditions:
small leak size, redundant
 
means of detecting
 
and isolating
 
a leak, and low power or shutdown conditions.
 
Attachment
 
3 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References
 
===Identification===
IN 90-64 IN 90-05 IN 89-73 Title or Subject Potential
 
for Common-Mode
 
Failure of HPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant Outside Containment
 
During a LOCA Inter-system
 
Discharge
 
of Reactor Coolant Potential
 
Overpressurization
 
of Low Pressure Systems Date 10/04/90 01/29/90 11/01/89 10/23/90 05/08/89 AIT Report 50-456/90-20
AIT Report 50-293/89-80
An assessment
 
of the 10/4/90 Braidwood loss of reactor coolant inventory
 
and personnel
 
contamination
 
and injury An assessment
 
of the 4/12/89 Pilgrim overpressurization
 
event, which occurred during the conduct of the RCIC logic test Inspection
 
Report 50-382/90-200
Inspection
 
Report 50-413,414/90-200
Inspection
Inspection


Report 50-346/89-201
Report               plants
 
===ISLOCA Program Inspection===
plant ISLOCA Program Inspection
 
plants ISLOCA Program Inspection


Besse plant of the Waterford of the Catawba of the Davis 09/14/90 06/11/90 12/21/89 Audit Report Docket No. 50-213 NUREG/CR-5745 NUREG/CR-5744 NUREG/CR-5604 NUREG/CR-5124 NUREG/CR-5102 Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24 -August 4, 1989, Enclosure
50-413,414/90-200
Inspection          ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Davis             12/21/89 Report               Besse plant


to Memorandum
50-346/89-201 Audit                Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24  -        09/20/89 Report              August 4, 1989, Enclosure to Memorandum


from Frank J. Congel, NRC, to Steven A. Varga, NRC*Assessment
Docket No. 50-213    from Frank J. Congel, NRC, to


for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
Steven A. Varga, NRC*
NUREG/CR-5745        Assessment for ISLOCA Risks -                       June 91 Draft Methodology and Application:
                      Combustion Engineering Plant


and Application:
NUREG/CR-5744      Assessment for ISLOCA Risks -                      Feb 91 Draft Methodology and Application:
Combustion
                      Westinghouse Four-Loop Ice Condenser Plant


Engineering
NUREG/CR-5604        Assessment for ISLOCA Risks -                      Feb 91 Draft Methodology and Application: Babcock


Plant Assessment
and Wilcox Nuclear Power Station


for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
NUREG/CR-5124        Interfacing Systems LOCA, Boiling                  Feb 89 Water Reactors


and Application:
NUREG/CR-5102        Interfacing Systems LOCA, Pressurized              Feb 89 Water Reactors
Westinghouse


Four-Loop
-A COpy OT this report is available in the NRC Public Document Room,
  2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.


Ice Condenser
Attachment 4 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


Plant Assessment
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


for ISLOCA Risks -Draft Methodology
Information                                      Date of


and Application:
Notice No.            Subject                    Issuance  Issued to
Babcock and Wilcox Nuclear Power Station Interfacing


Systems LOCA, Boiling Water Reactors Interfacing
92-35          Higher Than Predicted Ero-      05/06/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


===Systems LOCA, Pressurized===
sion/Corrosion in Unisol-                 for nuclear power reactors.
Water Reactors 09/20/89 June 91 Feb 91 Feb 91 Feb 89 Feb 89-A COpy OT this report is available


in the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.
able Reactor Coolant Pres- sure Boundary Piping Inside


Attachment
Containment at A Boiling


4 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
Water Reactor


NOTICES Information
92-34          New Exposure Limits for          05/06/92  All licensees whose opera- Airborne Uranium and                      tions can cause airborne


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 92-35 92-34 92-33 92-32 92-31 92-30 Higher Than Predicted
Thorium                                    concentrations of uranium


Ero-sion/Corrosion
and thorium.


in Unisol-able Reactor Coolant Pres-sure Boundary Piping Inside Containment
92-33          Increased Instrument            04/30/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


at A Boiling Water Reactor New Exposure Limits for Airborne Uranium and Thorium Increased
Response Time When                        for nuclear power reactors.


Instrument
Pressure Dampening


Response Time When Pressure Dampening Devices are Installed Problems Identified
Devices are Installed


with Emergency
92-32          Problems Identified with         04/29/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


Ventilation
Emergency Ventilation                       for nuclear power reactors.


Systems for Near-Site (Within 10 Miles) Emer-gency Operations
Systems for Near-Site


Facili-ties and Technical
(Within 10 Miles) Emer- gency Operations Facili- ties and Technical Support


Support Centers Electrical
Centers


Connection
92-31          Electrical Connection             04/27/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


===Problem in Johnson Yokogawa Corporation===
Problem in Johnson                         for nuclear power reactors.
YS-80 Programmable


Indi-cating Controllers
Yokogawa Corporation


Falsification
YS-80 Programmable Indi- cating Controllers


of Plant Records Spent Fuel Pool Re-activity Calculations
92-30          Falsification of Plant           04/23/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


05/06/92 05/06/92 04/30/92 04/29/92 04/27/92 04/23/92 04/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All licensees
Records                                    for nuclear power reactors


whose opera-tions can cause airborne concentrations
and all licensed operators


of uranium and thorium.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors and all licensed operators and senior operators.
and senior operators.


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.92-21, Supp. 1 OL = Operating
92-21,          Spent Fuel Pool Re-              04/22/92  All holders of OLs or CPs


License CP = Construction
Supp. 1        activity Calculations                      for nuclear power reactors.


Permit
OL = Operating License


IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
CP = Construction Permit


from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plant


Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing
inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.


its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,
"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet- ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence to


Loss of Coolant Accidents
licensees.


in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
This information notice requires  no specific action or written response. If


to licensees.
you have any questions about the  information in this notice, please contact one


This information
of the technical contacts listed  below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


notice requires you have any questions
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project  manager.


about the of the technical
Original Signed by


contacts listed Reactor Regulation (NRR) project no specific action or written response.
Charles E Rei


If information
Charles E. Rossi, Director


in this notice, please contact one below or the appropriate
Division of Operational Events Assessment


Office of Nuclear manager.Original Signed by Charles E Rei Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
Technical contacts:  Kazimieras Campe, NRR


contacts: Kazimieras
(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES


Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES
1. Table 1. "Observed


Plant Vulnerabilities
(301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors'
2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"
3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References"
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


to ISLOCA Precursors'
Document Name: IN 92-36
2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
*See previous concurrence.


Notices Document Name: IN 92-36*See previous concurrence.
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR
 
C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
 
D/DOEA:NRR


*CHBerlinger
*CHBerlinger


04/24/92 RPB:ADM*TechEd 04/09/92 D/DSIR:RES
04/24/92 RPB:ADM         D/DSIR:RES      C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES  RPSIB:DSIR:RES C/EIB:DSIR:RES


*WMinners 04/15/92 C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES
*TechEd          *WMinners       *KKniel            *GBurdick          *RLBaer


*KKniel 04/14/92 RPSIB:DSIR:RES
04/09/92        04/15/92        04/14/92           04/13/92            04/13/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR    SC/RAB:DREP:NRR C/RAB:DREP:NRR      D/DREP:NRR          EIB:DSIR:RES


*GBurdick 04/13/92 C/EIB:DSIR:RES
*CVHodge        *KCampe          *WBeckner          *FCongel            *SDiab


*RLBaer 04/13/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR
04/08/92        04/09/92        04/09/92          04/09/92            04/13/92


*CVHodge 04/08/92 SC/RAB:DREP:NRR
IN 92-XX


*KCampe 04/09/92 C/RAB:DREP:NRR
April xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plant


*WBeckner 04/09/92 D/DREP:NRR
inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.


*FCongel 04/09/92 EIB:DSIR:RES
The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,
"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet- ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence to


*SDiab 04/13/92 IN 92-XX April xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations
licensees.


from root cause analyses and plant inspections.
This information notice requires    no speci fic action or written response. If


Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.The staff is completing
you have any questions about the   informat ion in this notice, please contact one


its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,"Intersystem
of the technical contacts listed    below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


Loss of Coolant Accidents
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project    manager.


in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet-ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence
Charles E. Rossi, Director


to licensees.
Division of Operational Events Assessment


This information
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


notice requires no speci you have any questions
Technical contacts:    Kazimieras Campe, NRR
 
about the informat of the technical
 
contacts listed below or Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.fic action or written response.
 
If ion in this notice, please contact one the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Charles E. Rossi, Director Division of Operational
 
===Events Assessment===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


Technical
(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES


contacts: Kazimieras
(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES


Campe, NRR (301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES (301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES (301) 492-3812 Attachments:
(301) 492-3812 Attachments:
1. Table 1. "Observed
1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors"
2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"
3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References"
4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Plant Vulnerabilities
Document Name: ISLOCA REV    2 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/D1DOEA: NRR


to ISLOCA Precursors" 2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" 3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References" 4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
CHBerling~* fj, CER tossi l


Notices Document Name: C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR
04/21/92gq"'    04/
RPB:ADM          D/D g kS          CL        SI R:RES RQ    DSIR:RES C/EIB:D IRRES


D/D1 CHBerling~*
TechEd J7Hh9q    W"                                   GB      k      RLBaerXiF'
fj, CER 04/21/92gq"'  
04/ q/92        04/ 15~/ 92       04/A//92          04//3/92       04//3/92 OGCB:DOEA: RR    SC/IRAB: REP:NRR C/RAB:DREP:IER     D/DREP:N      EIB:DSIR L>
04/RPB:ADM D/D TechEd J7Hh9q W" 04/ q/92 04/OGCB:DOEA:
CVHodge US9      KCaiimp          WBeckner    Xyt    FCongel        SDiab
RR SC/I CVHodge US9 KCai 04/od/92 04/ISLOCA REV 2 DOEA: NRR tossi l g kS 15~/ 92 RAB: REP:NRR imp I9/9 C L SI R:RES 04/A//92 C/RAB:DREP:IER


WBeckner Xyt 04/A /92 R Q DSIR:RES GB k 04//3/92 D/DREP:N FCongel 04/9 /92 C/EIB:D IRRES RLBaerXiF'
04/od/92         04/ I9/9          04/A /92           04/9 /92       04/,3/92/}}
04//3/92 EIB:DSIR L>SDiab 04/,3/92/}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:22, 24 November 2019

Intersystem LOCA Outside Containment
ML031200356
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/07/1992
From: Rossi C
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-92-036, NUDOCS 9205010045
Download: ML031200356 (10)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 7, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-36: INTERSYSTEM LOCA OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power

reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice

to alert addressees of potential plant vulnerabilities to intersystem loss-of- coolant accidents (ISLOCAs). It is expected that recipients will review

the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as

appropriate. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not

NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

This information notice provides information gathered during a concerted NRC

staff effort to study plant vulnerabilities to ISLOCAs. The staff gathered

this information by performing (a) detailed evaluations of operating events, (b) inspections of a limited sample of pressurized water reactors (PWRs), and

(c) extensive analyses of the sample PWRs. The information may be of use in

recipients' individual plant examination (IPE) programs.

Background

The ISLOCA is a class of accidents in which a break occurs in a system con- nected to the reactor coolant system (RCS), causing a loss of the primary

system inventory. This type of accident can occur when a low pressure system, such as the residual heat removal (RHR) system, is inadvertently exposed to

high RCS pressures beyond its capacity. ISLOCAs of most concern are those

that can discharge the break flow outside the reactor containment building, primarily because they can result in high offsite radiological consequences but

also because the RCS inventory lost cannot be retrieved for long-term core

cooling during the recirculation phase.

In the "Reactor Safety Study," (WASH-1400), published in 1975, and in

NUREG-1150, "Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power

Plants," the NRC described the ISLOCA outside containment as an event of low

core damage frequency, but as one of the main contributors to plant risk. In

those studies the NRC referred to the ISLOCA as "Event-V." Most probabilistic

risk assessments (PRAs) have also shown that the ISLOCA is very unlikely.

However, these PRAs typically have modelled only those Event-V sequences that

include only the catastrophic failure of check valves that isolate the RCS from

AMA

92050_ 45

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 low pressure systems. These PRAs included little consideration of human errors

leading to an ISLOCA. Also, most existing PRAs have given little or no credit

for operator actions to terminate an ISLOCA or to mitigate its radiological

consequences if core melt were to occur.

On January 22, 1992, the Virginia Electric Power

North Anna Power Station, reported that the RHR Company, licensee for the

relief valves would not pass

the design-basis flow to relieve an overpressurization

the latter is aligned to the RCS. The function of the RHR system when

important when the RCS is water solid and thereforeof these relief valves is

ization events, such as from a charging-letdown susceptible to overpressur- flow mismatch or a temperature

change.

The licensee made this report after conducting

respond to a notification by the nuclear steam an engineering evaluation to

supply vendor, the Westinghouse

Electric Corporation. In February 1990, Westinghouse

valve design basis for the Westinghouse Owners reviewed the RHR relief

customers review the following three items: Group and recommended that its

The adequacy of the RHR relief valves for protecting

overpressure events against cold

Discharge capability of relief valves for probable

back pressures

Design basis commitments for valve specifications, final safety analysis report, and technical specificationscommitments in the

The NRC has issued several information notices

to discuss certain operational

events regarding ISLOCAs. In IN 90-05, "Inter-system

Coolant," the staff. discussed an event during Discharge of Reactor

which

reactor water was discharged outside the containment. about 68,000 gallons of

analyzed operational experience and documented The staff has also

inspection team (AIT) reports. On October 23, its findings in augmented

Report 50-456/90-020 on an event at Braidwood 1990, the staff issued AIT

that resulted in primary water

leakage outside the containment and in the contamination

one of whom received a second degree burn. Table of three personnel, information notices and AIT reports that the 3 is a selected list of

related events. staff has issued on ISLOCAs and

Discussion

Although no ISLOCA has caused core damage, accumulated

both in the United States and abroad, indicates operational experience, occurred at a rate higher than expected. In that ISLOCA-like events have

conducting

defined an ISLOCA-like event, or an ISLOCA precursor, this study, the staff

from the failure, degradation, or inadvertent as an event that results

valves (PIYs) between the RCS and lower pressure opening of the pressure isolation

may become an ISLOCA if it occurs during differentsystems. An ISLOCA precursor

of the failures occur together. plant conditions, or if some

The NRC staff conducted root cause analyses of

plant inspections, and detailed analyses of a ISLOCA precursors, extensive

sample of PWRs. These analyses

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 to determine the likely

included thermal-hydraulic analyses, fragility analysesanalyses. The staff used

sizes and locations of a break, and human reliability about the significant

the results of these analyses in PRAs to gain insights

contributors to ISLOCA risk.

notice towards

The staff directed the studies described in this information

since the primary pressures

finding vulnerabilities of PWR plants to ISLOCAs, water reactors (BWRs),

present in PWRs are greater than those found in boiling

systems are about the same in both

while the design pressures of low pressure this information to be

PWRs and BWRs. However, BWR licensees also may find

relevant to their plants.

following observations on the

Upon conducting these studies, the staff made the

ISLOCA risk at nuclear power plants:

could be greater

1. The estimated core damage frequency caused by ISLOCAs

than was estimated in PRAs for some plants.

and the capabili- The ISLOCA risk depends on both the accident initiatorsto plant. The main

ties for recovery. These factors vary from plant

and/or recovery include (a) human errors

contributors to ISLOCA initiation on plant

and (b) the effects of the accident-caused harsh environment significant uncer- equipment and recovery activities. Both factors have treatment of these

tainties. Existing PRAs have provided little or noto either of these two

factors. Plants that are particularly vulnerable by existing PRAs.

factors could have a higher ISLOCA risk than indicated

water supplies that

2. Most plants lack contingency plans to provide backup cooling after an

can be transferred readily to provide long-term core

ISLOCA.

can find

By examining a plant's emergency procedures, a licensee the concerns for

insights for improving the plant's features to address

both ISLOCAs and other accidents.

indicate that ISLOCA precur-

3. The root cause analyses of operational events errors, notably during

sors most likely would be initiated by human This may

testing and maintenance or because of procedural deficiencies.

of the possibility or

be attributed to the general lack of awareness

consequences of an ISLOCA.

ISLOCA precursors

Licensees may significantly reduce the probability of personnel to recog- by improving the ability of operators and maintenance

to prevent them, and

nize ISLOCAs, mechanisms that can cause them, actions

methods to manage them if they occur.

risk consequences. However,

4. Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low publicextension of a shutdown, an ISLOCA precursor can require a shutdown or

injury.

require radioactivity cleanup operations, and cause personnel

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root

inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from cause analyses and plant

the ISLOCA PRAs.

The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program

"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Waterunder Generic Issue 105, ing this research, the staff may issue further generic Reactors." Upon complet- licensees. correspondence to

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

es ERossi, Drectr

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kazimieras Campe, NRR

(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES

(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES

(301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to

2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights" ISLOCA Precursors"

3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports

and References"

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1. Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors

plant inspections)

(Obtained from root cause analyses of ISLOCA precursors and

1. Lack of awareness of the nature or consequences of ISLOCAs

especially

2. Inadequate emergency procedures for ISLOCA outside containment, for non-power operational modes

3. Poor or incorrect valve labels

plant

4. Different nomenclature used for the same equipment in the same

5. Poor coordination between concurrently run tests

opera-

6. Miscommunications between the control room operators and auxiliary

but understood

tors ("get the valve" is meant as "crack open then close,"

to mean "open")

7. Poor shift turn-over communications

8. Poor post-maintenance testing or operability checks

9. Inadequate application of independent verification

10. Tendency not to check diverse instrument indications

during

11. Tendency to commit personnel to extensive overtime work, especially

level and the

shutdown and startup operations, thus increasing the fatigue

likelihood of errors

Attachment 2 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 2. ISLOCA Risk Insights

(Obtained from ISLOCA PRAs)

by an

1. The staff's studies suggest that the core damage frequency caused for some

ISLOCA could be substantially greater than previous PRA estimates

and

plants. This is primarily caused by the effects of operator errors during

harsh environments caused by the accident. Valve alignment errors

transition between operating modes can be particularly important.

the

2. Equipment qualified for a harsh environment is likely to survive submersion

adverse ISLOCA temperature and humidity, but not the possible

caused by flooding.

or

3. Multiple system failures may result from the ISLOCA harsh environment to

flooding, depending on the size and location of the break in relation

of

affected equipment, the separation of redundant trains, and the effect

fire sprays on flooding.

essen-

4. ISLOCA recovery is limited by harsh environments, which may damageof loss

tial equipment thus complicating long-term cooling, and the rate

of reactor water outside the containment. If the water is not quickly has

replenished, an ISLOCA may lead to core damage, even after the leak

been isolated.

an ISLOCA

5. Symptom-based procedures may lead the operator to realize that to plant

has occurred. However, unless the emergency procedures refer

water, the operator may have

provisions for conserving and replenishing

difficulty managing the accident.

6. Most observed ISLOCA precursors have low risk consequences, primarily small

because of the presence of one or more of the following conditions:low

leak size, redundant means of detecting and isolating a leak, and

power or shutdown conditions.

Attachment 3 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 3. A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References

Identification Title or Subject Date

Potential for Common-Mode Failure of 10/04/90

IN 90-64 HPSI Pumps or Release of Reactor Coolant

Outside Containment During a LOCA

Inter-system Discharge of Reactor Coolant 01/29/90

IN 90-05 IN 89-73 Potential Overpressurization of Low 11/01/89 Pressure Systems

AIT Report An assessment of the 10/4/90 Braidwood 10/23/90

50-456/90-20 loss of reactor coolant inventory and

personnel contamination and injury

AIT Report An assessment of the 4/12/89 Pilgrim 05/08/89

50-293/89-80 overpressurization event, which occurred

during the conduct of the RCIC logic test

ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Waterford 09/14/90

Inspection

Report plant

50-382/90-200

ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Catawba 06/11/90

Inspection

Report plants

50-413,414/90-200

Inspection ISLOCA Program Inspection of the Davis 12/21/89 Report Besse plant

50-346/89-201 Audit Haddam Neck ISLOCA Audit Report: July 24 - 09/20/89 Report August 4, 1989, Enclosure to Memorandum

Docket No. 50-213 from Frank J. Congel, NRC, to

Steven A. Varga, NRC*

NUREG/CR-5745 Assessment for ISLOCA Risks - June 91 Draft Methodology and Application:

Combustion Engineering Plant

NUREG/CR-5744 Assessment for ISLOCA Risks - Feb 91 Draft Methodology and Application:

Westinghouse Four-Loop Ice Condenser Plant

NUREG/CR-5604 Assessment for ISLOCA Risks - Feb 91 Draft Methodology and Application: Babcock

and Wilcox Nuclear Power Station

NUREG/CR-5124 Interfacing Systems LOCA, Boiling Feb 89 Water Reactors

NUREG/CR-5102 Interfacing Systems LOCA, Pressurized Feb 89 Water Reactors

-A COpy OT this report is available in the NRC Public Document Room,

2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, DC.

Attachment 4 IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

92-35 Higher Than Predicted Ero- 05/06/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

sion/Corrosion in Unisol- for nuclear power reactors.

able Reactor Coolant Pres- sure Boundary Piping Inside

Containment at A Boiling

Water Reactor

92-34 New Exposure Limits for 05/06/92 All licensees whose opera- Airborne Uranium and tions can cause airborne

Thorium concentrations of uranium

and thorium.

92-33 Increased Instrument 04/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Response Time When for nuclear power reactors.

Pressure Dampening

Devices are Installed

92-32 Problems Identified with 04/29/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Emergency Ventilation for nuclear power reactors.

Systems for Near-Site

(Within 10 Miles) Emer- gency Operations Facili- ties and Technical Support

Centers

92-31 Electrical Connection 04/27/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Problem in Johnson for nuclear power reactors.

Yokogawa Corporation

YS-80 Programmable Indi- cating Controllers

92-30 Falsification of Plant 04/23/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Records for nuclear power reactors

and all licensed operators

and senior operators.

92-21, Spent Fuel Pool Re- 04/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs

Supp. 1 activity Calculations for nuclear power reactors.

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 92-36 May 7, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plant

inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.

The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,

"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet- ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence to

licensees.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Original Signed by

Charles E Rei

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kazimieras Campe, NRR

(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES

(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES

(301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors'

2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"

3. Table 3. "A Selected List of ISLOCA Reports and References"

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: IN 92-36

  • See previous concurrence.

C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/DOEA:NRR

  • CHBerlinger

04/24/92 RPB:ADM D/DSIR:RES C/RPSIB:DSIR:RES RPSIB:DSIR:RES C/EIB:DSIR:RES

  • TechEd *WMinners *KKniel *GBurdick *RLBaer

04/09/92 04/15/92 04/14/92 04/13/92 04/13/92 OGCB:DOEA:NRR SC/RAB:DREP:NRR C/RAB:DREP:NRR D/DREP:NRR EIB:DSIR:RES

  • CVHodge *KCampe *WBeckner *FCongel *SDiab

04/08/92 04/09/92 04/09/92 04/09/92 04/13/92

IN 92-XX

April xx, 1992 Table 1 presents the staff's observations from root cause analyses and plant

inspections. Table 2 presents insights gained from the ISLOCA PRAs.

The staff is completing its ISLOCA research program under Generic Issue 105,

"Intersystem Loss of Coolant Accidents in Light Water Reactors." Upon complet- ing this research, the staff may issue further generic correspondence to

licensees.

This information notice requires no speci fic action or written response. If

you have any questions about the informat ion in this notice, please contact one

of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Charles E. Rossi, Director

Division of Operational Events Assessment

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Kazimieras Campe, NRR

(301) 504-1092 Sammy Diab, RES

(301) 492-3914 Gary Burdick, RES

(301) 492-3812 Attachments:

1. Table 1. "Observed Plant Vulnerabilities to ISLOCA Precursors"

2. Table 2. "ISLOCA Risk Insights"

3. Table 3. "A Partial List of ISLOCA Reports and References"

4. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Document Name: ISLOCA REV 2 C/OGCB:DOEA:NRR D/D1DOEA: NRR

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