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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 August 31, 2011 Mr. Thomas Saporito Senior Consulting Associate Saprodani Associates Post Office Box 8413 Jupiter, Florida 33468  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 August 31, 2011 Mr. Thomas Saporito Senior Consulting Associate Saprodani Associates Post Office Box 8413 Jupiter, Florida 33468


==Dear Mr. Saporito:==
==Dear Mr. Saporito:==


Your petition dated April 17, 2011, received by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on May 12, 2011, and addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) of the NRC's regulations.
Your petition dated April 17, 2011, received by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on May 12, 2011, and addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) of the NRC's regulations. You request that the NRC:
You request that the NRC: suspend or revoke the NRC license granted to the licensee for operation of the H.B. Robinson Plant, issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against the licensee, and issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against William Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Progress Energy, As the basis for your request, you state the sequence of events related to a March 28, 2010, electrical fire at the H. B. Robinson Plant. On May 25,2011, the petition manager contacted you to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer you an opportunity to address the NRC's petition review board (PRB), prior to making its initial recommendation.
: 1. suspend or revoke the NRC license granted to the licensee for operation of the H.B.
On May 25, 2011, you accepted the opportunity to address the PRB via a teleconference.
Robinson Plant,
On June 14, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to provide additional information in support of your petition request. On June 27,2011, the PRB met internally to discuss the initial recommendation.
: 2. issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against the licensee, and
In accordance with NRC's Management Directive (MD) 8.11, which describes the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the PRB made an initial recommendation that your petition met the criteria for rejection on the basis that the issue raised has already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
: 3. issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against William Johnson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Progress Energy, Inc.
On July 8, 2011, the petition manager informed you of the PRB's initial recommendation and you requested a second opportunity to address the PRB Via a teleconference.
As the basis for your request, you state the sequence of events related to a March 28, 2010, electrical fire at the H. B. Robinson Plant. On May 25,2011, the petition manager contacted you to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer you an opportunity to address the NRC's petition review board (PRB), prior to making its initial recommendation. On May 25, 2011, you accepted the opportunity to address the PRB via a teleconference.
On July 28, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to discuss the PRB's initial recommendation.
On June 14, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to provide additional information in support of your petition request. On June 27,2011, the PRB met internally to discuss the initial recommendation. In accordance with NRC's Management Directive (MD) 8.11, which describes the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the PRB made an initial recommendation that your petition met the criteria for rejection on the basis that the issue raised has already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
The results of that discussion have been considered in the PRB's determination regarding whether or not the petition meets the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. No new information was provided during the call that was not already previously considered by the NRC staff. Therefore, the PRB's final recommendation is that your petition meets the criteria for rejection because, per MD 8.11, the issue raised has already been the T. subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
On July 8, 2011, the petition manager informed you of the PRB's initial recommendation and you requested a second opportunity to address the PRB Via a teleconference. On July 28, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to discuss the PRB's initial recommendation. The results of that discussion have been considered in the PRB's determination regarding whether or not the petition meets the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. No new information was provided during the call that was not already previously considered by the NRC staff. Therefore, the PRB's final recommendation is that your petition meets the criteria for rejection because, per MD 8.11, the issue raised has already been the
A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28,2010, event on March 30,2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2,2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions: White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PATH-1 operating Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52/24 Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance instructions for the volume control tank comparator There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy. Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC Jo n W. Lu inski, Deputy Director Ivision of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request) Distribution via Listserv T. -2 subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
 
A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28, 2010, event on March 30, 2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2, 2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions: White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PA TH-1 operating Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52124 Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance instructions for the volume control tank comparator There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy. Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC. Sincerely, IRA! John W. Lubinski, Deputy Director Division of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request) Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
T. Saporito                                      -2 subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
G20110367/EDATS:
A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28,2010, event on March 30,2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2,2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions:
OEDO-2011-0359 PUBLIC RidsNrrDorllpl2-2 RidsOgcRp RMusser, RII lPl2-2 rlf RidsNrrLABClayton RidsNrrMailCenter SCurrle, NRR RidsEdoMailCenter RidsNrrPMRobinson RldsRgn2MailCenter TMensah, NRR RidsNrrOd RidsOpaMail JDodson. RII TOrt. NRR RidsNrrDorl RidsOcaMailCenter Jlubinski, NRR ADAMS Accession Nos. Pkg ML11243A026 Incoming ML11140A016 Ltr ML11237A081 Transcripts ML11243A024  
* White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control
& ML11243A025 OFFICE NAME DATE lPl2-2/PM TOrt 08/31/11 lPl2-21LA BClayton (RSola for) 08/31/11 lPL2-21BC DBroaddus 08/31/11 DCI/DD Jlublnski 08/31/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy}}
* Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response
* White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training
* Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PATH-1 emergency operating procedure
* Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip
* Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52/24
* Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance testing instructions for the volume control tank comparator module There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy.
Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC Jo n W. Lu inski, Deputy Director Ivision of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 cc: Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request)
Distribution via Listserv
 
T. Saporito                                                    -2 subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.
A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28, 2010, event on March 30, 2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2, 2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions:
* White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control
* Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response
* White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training
* Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PATH-1 emergency operating procedure
* Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip
* Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52124
* Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance testing instructions for the volume control tank comparator module There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy.
Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC.
Sincerely, IRA!
John W. Lubinski, Deputy Director Division of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 cc: Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request)
Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:       G20110367/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0359 PUBLIC                           RidsNrrDorllpl2-2                 RidsOgcRp                           RMusser, RII lPl2-2 rlf                       RidsNrrLABClayton                 RidsNrrMailCenter                   SCurrle, NRR RidsEdoMailCenter                 RidsNrrPMRobinson                 RldsRgn2MailCenter                 TMensah, NRR RidsNrrOd                         RidsOpaMail                       JDodson. RII                       TOrt. NRR RidsNrrDorl                       RidsOcaMailCenter                 Jlubinski, NRR ADAMS Accession Nos. Pkg ML11243A026 Incoming ML11140A016 Ltr ML11237A081       Transcripts ML11243A024 & ML11243A025 OFFICE           lPl2-2/PM                 lPl2-21LA                   lPL2-21BC                  DCI/DD NAME            TOrt                      BClayton (RSola for)       DBroaddus                  Jlublnski DATE            08/31/11                   08/31/11                   08/31/11                    08/31/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy}}

Latest revision as of 16:34, 12 November 2019

G20110367/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0359 - Acknowledgement Letter - Thomas Saporito Ltr Re H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit 2
ML11237A081
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/2011
From: John Lubinski
NRC/NRR/DCI
To: Saporito T
Saprodani Associates
Orf T
Shared Package
ML11243A026 List:
References
2.206, G20110367, OEDO-2011-0359
Download: ML11237A081 (3)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555*0001 August 31, 2011 Mr. Thomas Saporito Senior Consulting Associate Saprodani Associates Post Office Box 8413 Jupiter, Florida 33468

Dear Mr. Saporito:

Your petition dated April 17, 2011, received by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on May 12, 2011, and addressed to the Executive Director for Operations, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, has been referred to the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation pursuant to Section 2.206 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 2.206) of the NRC's regulations. You request that the NRC:

1. suspend or revoke the NRC license granted to the licensee for operation of the H.B.

Robinson Plant,

2. issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against the licensee, and
3. issue a notice of violation with a proposed civil penalty against William Johnson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Progress Energy, Inc.

As the basis for your request, you state the sequence of events related to a March 28, 2010, electrical fire at the H. B. Robinson Plant. On May 25,2011, the petition manager contacted you to discuss the 10 CFR 2.206 process and to offer you an opportunity to address the NRC's petition review board (PRB), prior to making its initial recommendation. On May 25, 2011, you accepted the opportunity to address the PRB via a teleconference.

On June 14, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to provide additional information in support of your petition request. On June 27,2011, the PRB met internally to discuss the initial recommendation. In accordance with NRC's Management Directive (MD) 8.11, which describes the 10 CFR 2.206 process, the PRB made an initial recommendation that your petition met the criteria for rejection on the basis that the issue raised has already been the subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

On July 8, 2011, the petition manager informed you of the PRB's initial recommendation and you requested a second opportunity to address the PRB Via a teleconference. On July 28, 2011, you addressed the PRB by teleconference to discuss the PRB's initial recommendation. The results of that discussion have been considered in the PRB's determination regarding whether or not the petition meets the criteria for consideration under 10 CFR 2.206. No new information was provided during the call that was not already previously considered by the NRC staff. Therefore, the PRB's final recommendation is that your petition meets the criteria for rejection because, per MD 8.11, the issue raised has already been the

T. Saporito -2 subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28,2010, event on March 30,2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2,2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions:

  • White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control
  • Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response
  • White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training
  • Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PATH-1 emergency operating procedure
  • Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip
  • Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52/24
  • Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance testing instructions for the volume control tank comparator module There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy.

Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC Jo n W. Lu inski, Deputy Director Ivision of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 cc: Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request)

Distribution via Listserv

T. Saporito -2 subject of NRC staff review and evaluation for which a resolution has been achieved, the issues have been resolved, and the resolution is applicable to the facility in question.

A Special Inspection Team began their inspection of the March 28, 2010, event on March 30, 2010, and the inspection was upgraded to an Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) on April 19, 2010. The team developed a sequence of events, reviewed related records, interviewed operators and individuals involved with the fire and plant response, and conducted walkdowns of affected areas. On July 2, 2010, the AIT issued their inspection report with a total of 14 open items. Those open items were later closed after subsequent inspections including the following enforcement actions:

  • White finding for failure to follow operating procedure and inadequate command and control
  • Green finding for failure to design and Implement a simulator model that demonstrated reference plant response
  • White finding for failure to implement element 3 of the systems approach to training
  • Green noncited-violation for failure to establish an adequate PATH-1 emergency operating procedure
  • Green finding for deficiencies in nonsafety-related cable installation result in fire and reactor trip
  • Green finding for failure to correct a control power fuse defect in 4kV breaker 52124
  • Green finding for failure to have adequate work and post maintenance testing instructions for the volume control tank comparator module There are no remaining open items from the AIT inspection, and in accordance with MD 8.11, you have not provided any significant new information to justify the NRC varying from its enforcement policy.

Thank you for bringing these issues to the attention of the NRC.

Sincerely, IRA!

John W. Lubinski, Deputy Director Division of Component Integrity Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-261 cc: Licensee (w/copy of incoming 2.206 request)

Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION: G20110367/EDATS: OEDO-2011-0359 PUBLIC RidsNrrDorllpl2-2 RidsOgcRp RMusser, RII lPl2-2 rlf RidsNrrLABClayton RidsNrrMailCenter SCurrle, NRR RidsEdoMailCenter RidsNrrPMRobinson RldsRgn2MailCenter TMensah, NRR RidsNrrOd RidsOpaMail JDodson. RII TOrt. NRR RidsNrrDorl RidsOcaMailCenter Jlubinski, NRR ADAMS Accession Nos. Pkg ML11243A026 Incoming ML11140A016 Ltr ML11237A081 Transcripts ML11243A024 & ML11243A025 OFFICE lPl2-2/PM lPl2-21LA lPL2-21BC DCI/DD NAME TOrt BClayton (RSola for) DBroaddus Jlublnski DATE 08/31/11 08/31/11 08/31/11 08/31/11 OFFICIAL RECORD COpy

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