ML18096A884

Special Rept 92-4-1:on 920430,fire Pump 1 Started Knocking 10 Minutes Into half-hour Run.Caused by sheared-off Follower Guide Pin.On 920514,fire Pump Developed Severe Oil Leak.Caused by Piston Failing to Contact Cylinder Head

ML18096A884
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	08/07/1992
From:	Vondra C Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
92-4-1, NUDOCS 9208170042
Download: ML18096A884 (5)

Text

. e . . Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station u. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk DC 20555

Dear sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 SPECIAL REPORT SUPPLEME.NT 92-4-1

• August 7, 1992

• This Special Report Supplement addresses a change in the reasons for the inoperability of both Salem Fire Pumps. This report is submitted for informational

• purposes

• in *accordance with Technical

• Specification 3.1.10.1 Action b.2.c pursuant to Specification 6.9.2. MJP:pc Distribution

• L '., ***-: 700 4" 920807 92081 05000272 PDR ADOCK PDR s Sincerely yours, c. A. Vondra General. Manager -Salem Operations

')/ . , /.1),() J /' 0 /{,,J ;{/ . . ( ?5*2189 12-89 UNif' 1. SPECIAL REPORT '-4-1 '\ PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station -Units 1 & 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Nos. 1 and _2 Fire Pumps Inoperable Event Date{s): Report Date: 4/30/92 and 5/14/92 8/7/92 The original events are documented in Incident Nos.92-269, 92-282,92-320, 92-398,92-415 and 92-423. The original Special Report addressed inoperability of the two {2) Salem Station Fire Pumps for greater than seven (7) days. It was submitted for. informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Action "a" and "b.2.c". Since the issuance of that report, the reason for the No. 2 Fire Pump inoperability has changed. The No. 2 Fire Pump was originally inoperable due to equipment friilure.

However, from-June 11, 1992 to July 17, 1992 it was inoperable due to personnel error.

• CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

5/14/92: Unit 1 -Reactor defueled -*10th Refueling Outage in progress Unit 2 -Mode 3; Re£ctor Startup in progress following completion of the 6 h Refueling outage . DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 23, 1992, at 0400 hours0.00463 days <br />0.111 hours <br />6.613757e-4 weeks <br />1.522e-4 months <br />, the No. 1 Fire Pump became inoperable during the biweekly surveillance.

Its diesel engine started knocking approximately ten minutes into the half hour run. Investigation revealed the cam follower.guide pin had sheared causing the valve lifter to rotate and score the camshaft.

On May 14, 1992, at 2250 hours0.026 days <br />0.625 hours <br />0.00372 weeks <br />8.56125e-4 months <br />, No. 2 Fire Pump was declared inoperable due to an observed severe oil leak during a surveillance test run. No. 1 Fire Pump had not been returned to service at this time; therefore, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of the inoperability of both Fire Pumps in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Actions "b.2.a" and "b.2.b".*

The written notification (dated May 15, 1992) required by Action b.2.b incorrectly identified No. 1 Fire Pump as having a failed crankshaft (instead of a failed camshaft) . Investigation of th_e oil leak revealed that the No. 2 Fire Pump diesel engine No. 3 right piston failed contacting the cylinder head. Fuel oil contamination of the lubricating oil was also found. Technical Specification 3.7.10.1 Action "a" states:

1---e UNIT-1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4-1 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) "With one pump and/or one water supply inoperable, restore the inoperable equipment to OPERABLE status within 7 days or, in lieu of any other report required by Specification 6.9.1, prepare and submit a Special Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within the next 30 days outlining the plans and procedures to be used to provide for the loss of redundancy in this system. The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable." Technical 3.7.10.1 Action "b" states: "With both fire suppression water systems i?operable:

1. Establish a backup fire suppression water system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, and 2. Submit a Special Report in accordance with Specification 6.9.2; a) By telephone within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, b) Confirmed by telegraph,-mailgram or facsimile transmission no later than the first working day following the event, _and c) In writing within 14 days following the event, out-lining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for * -restoring the_ system to O;E>ERABLE status." The above Technical Specifications and Action Statements are identical for both Salem Units. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause-of the respective April 23, 1992 and May 14,-1992_ No. 1 and No. 2 Fire Pumps' diesel engine.failures is equipment failure. Neither pump was returned to service within seven days due to the extent of engine damage. Both pump engines were sent offsite to factory authorized facilities for repair. The No. 1 Fire Pump engine failure resulted from random failure of the valve lifter guide pin. This pin had sheared causing the valve lifter to rotate and score the camshaft.

The lifter then split apart and damaged the balancing

shaft, and cylinder liner when pieces 6f the split lifter fell through the crankcase and into the oil pan. Investigation of the No. 2 Fire Pump engine failure revealed that lube oil was contaminated with diesel fuel, the No. 3 piston had seized, and the bearings had been scored. The fuel injection supply and return tubes on a cylinder had failed due to fatigue.

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e 1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4-1 .e '\ ANALYSIS' OF OCCURRENCE:

Operability of the.Fire suppression systems ensures adequate fire suppression capability to confine and extinguish fires occurring in

• any portion of the facility where safety related equipment is located in either Unit 1 or Uriit 2. The Fire Suppression system consists of a water distribution system, spray and/or sprinklers, co 2 , Halon, and fire hose stations.

The collective capability of the Fire Suppression Systems minimizes potential damage to safety related equipment and is a major element in the facility fire protection program. With both fire pumps inoperable, the station fire protection system was degraded.

On April 30, 1992, the Hope Creek fire protection system cross-tie valve was opened. It was still open when the No. 2 Fire Pump engine failed thereby meeting the requirements of Technical ication 3.7.10.1 Action b.1. The cross-tie is a backup fire water system for Salem station. Additionally, temporary diesel *driven pumping capacity was made available onsite. Therefore, this *occurrence involved no undue risk to the health and safety of the general public. This report satisfies Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.10.1.b Section 2.c requirements and 3.7.10.1.a Report requirements for both fire* pumps. ANALYSIS-OF EVENTS FOLLOWING THE FIRST FIRE PUMP ENGINE'S RETURN No .. 1 Fire Pump e.ngine was returned to the Salem site (following completion of repairs) on May 29, 1992. It was placed in the No. 2 Fire Pump position the temporary diesel fire pump piping had been connected to the No_. .1 Fire Pump piping (where it remains).

No. 2 Fire Pump was returned to service on June 11, 1992, based on completion of a successful half hour test run. No detailed post maintenance testing was specified.

Consequently, a wiring connection error of the battery charging circuit went unobserved.

The wire from the battery charger was incorrectly connected to the low side of --the . engine motor coil instead of the high side. Since the battery was now wired in series with the relay coil, a voltage drop across the coil limited the battery-charging current.and degraded battery capacity.

The wiring connection error had occurred during installation of the No. 1 Fire Pump engine into the No. 2 Fire Pump position.

The subject wiring had previously been disconnected to support Fire Pump engine removal after the May 14, 1992 The wiring 6onnection error was due to personnel error. Since post installatiori wiring checks were not specified, the wiring connection error went undiscovered.

The No. 2 Fire Pump was returned to service on July 17, 1992 with the wiring connection error corrected and the batteries fully charged. Between June 11, 1992 and July 8, 1992 the Fire Pump was removed from service three (3) times. Only after the third event was the wiring connection error discovered.

Several identified concerns occurred during this They involved:

1) not reporting failed Technica1*specification Fire Pump battery surveillances to the, 1-e*

1 SPECIAL REPORT 92-4-1 i.. ANALYSIS' OF OCCURRENCE: . {cont'd) operating shift; 2) inadequate investigation of these failed. surveillances; and 3) subsequent restoration of No. 2 Fire Pump to service even though the root cause of a failed battery had not been resolved.

These concerns were discussed at a meeting with NRC Region I on. Ju*1y 9, 1992. During the periods when the No. 2 Fire Pump was thought to be "operable", the Rope Creek cross-tie backup fire suppression capability and the temporary fire pump (in the No. 1 Fire Pump slot) was available.

Therefore, these subsequent events did not affect the health or safety of tpe public. CORRECTIVE ACTION: Both fire pump diesel engines were sent*out for repairs. The No. 1 engine was returned to PSE&G on May 27, 1992 and has been returned to service in the No. 2 Fire Pump position.

The No. 2 engine will be installed in the No. 1 Fire Pump position upon completion of its repair. The Hope Creek fire protection system cross-tie valve was opened and remains open to provide backup fire protection suppression water capacity.

The No. 2 Fire Pump engine's associated battery charger was replaced, "2A" Battery Bank was repiaced and the incorrect wiring connections were corrected.

Procedure MllL, "Fire Pump Diesel Inspection" and the fire pump diesel maintenance requirements will be reviewed to ensure equipment concerns are identified.

The diesel fire pump battery surveillan6e procedure wiil be enhanced to improve data collection and reporting requirements.

Positive discipline has been with those individuals involved in not reporting battery surveillance failures as identified in the Analysis of Occurrence section. The circumstances surrounding this event is being reviewed, by Site Services with applicable department personnel.

In addition, a detailed assessment of this event for further programmatic enhancements has been completed.

Actions will be taken upon completion of management review. MJP:pc SORC Mtg.92-089 General Manager -Salem Operations