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{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D                                    Scenario Outline                        Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                    Scenario No.:      I    Op Test No.:      ILC-13 Examiners:                                                Operators:  CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 100% MDL, 9000 MWD/MTU, 848 PPM Boron.
                      . CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out
* HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
* Maintain power at current level.
Critical Task:
* Secure All RCPs due to EOP-E-0 Foldout Criteria.
* Start A Safety Injection Pump to provide adequate core cooling.
* Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode due to LB LOCA.
* Start A CV Spray Pump due to abnormal CV Conditions with reduced CV Spray and Cooling capability.
Event      Maif. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                              Description 1                  (C) BOP            A Circulating Water Pump Trips and Discharge Valve (V6-50A) fails to Auto-Close.
2                    (C) RO, CRS        PCV-455B fails OPEN while in AUTO (TS) CRS 3                  (C) BOP, CRS      A SWBP Trips (TS) CRS 4                  (R) RO            Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS (TS) CRS 5                  (I) RO, CRS        LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure (TS) CRS 6                  (C) RO, CRS        Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes) 7                    (M) ALL            Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip 8                    BOP                CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI 9                    RD                A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI 10                    RD                A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips 11                    RO                B RHR Pump Trips 10 sec. after starting A RHR Pump 12                    RD                A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
I Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1  I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts. The crew has been directed to maintain current plant conditions.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, A CW pump will trip on overcurrent and discharge valve V6-50A will fail to close automatically. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-01 2, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating Water Pump Trip. The operator will take manual action to close V6-50A from the RTGB. Condenser Vacuum will be minimally affected by the loss of A CW Pump. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PZR Spray valve PCV-455B will fail open due to a failure of the controller AUTO function and result in an entry into AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. Immediate actions will be taken to stabilize RCS pressure. Actions in AOP-019 will direct the crew to take manual control of the PZR Spray Valve and close the valve. The Operator will be able to close the valve; however, PC-455B will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Depending on the timeliness of operator actions, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB
 
parameters to within limit within 2 hours, will be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Service Water Booster Pump A will trip on overcurrent. APP 002-A8, B8, C8 and D8 will be received when the pump trips and will direct the crew to start the standby SWBP from the RTGB and restore normal flow to the CV HVH units. ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to
 
operable status within 72 hours, will be entered for the SWBP failure and ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to
 
operable status within 72 hours, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is > 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Tech Spec compliance, he can cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Control Rod H-10 will drop into the core. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Additionally AOP 001 will have the crew verify that only one control rod dropped and transition to Section A of AOP-001. The crew will then take action to reduce reactor and turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours using rods and boration to maintain Tavg with +/-1.5°F of Tref. SRO will determine that ITS 3.1.4 Condition B must be entered. ITS 3.1.4 Condition B requires that the rod be restored to within alignment limits within 1 hour OR verify SDM is within limits provided in the COLR within 1 hour AND reduce thermal power to less than 70% RTP AND verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR once per 12 hours AND perform SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours AND re-evaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions within 5 days. If above requirements cannot be achieved then ITS 3.1.4 Condition C will require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours. Due to the rapid reduction of Tave, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours, will
 
be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a leak will develop on PZR instrument tubing inside containment that will result in LT-460 Reference Leg Failure. PT-456 will also be impacted and will actuate OTz\T Bistables and alarms due to a reduction in pressure to approximately 2080 psig as sensed by PT-456. The crew may take actions lAW AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, to address LT-460 failed high; however, this is not necessary since LT-460 is not the controlling channel. OWP-030, PLT-2 and/or AOP-025 will direct the crew to replace LT-460 with LT-461 as a controlling channel and remove LT-460 from service. The crew should determine that the failures are related to a common sensing line on the Pressurizer and determine that a leak has developed. Due to the failure of LT-460, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-I Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be operable will not be
 
met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours. Due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Condition M requires that the channel be placed in trip in 6 hours or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours. Also due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection Channels and 3
 
Pressurizer Pressure Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours. Condition H requires that the interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours and Mode 4 in 13 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a seismic event will occur. APP-036-15, Seismic Monitor, alarm will be received along with a call from the Load Dispatcher reporting seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department. The crew will take actions lAW AOP-021, Seismic Disturbances. If dispatched, operator(s) will report that the DBE/SSE ALARM on Seismic Monitor A and the OBE ALARM on Seismic Monitor B are both EXTINGUISHED.
TRM 3.17, Seismic Shutdown, requirements are not met and thus entry in TRM 3.17 is not required. The seismic event will cause a RCS leak to develop and degrade to approximately 250 gpm over a 51/2 minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, and take prescribed actions to mitigate the RCS leakage. ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, will be entered due to having pressure boundary leakage and require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. The crew will ultimately determine that the leak rate is greater than the available charging pump capacity and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Immediately upon the initiation of the reactor trip the RCS leak will degrade to a Large Break LOCA. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew will determine that both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump failed to auto-start. The crew will manually start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump. Ten seconds after starting A RHR Pump the B RHR Pump will trip. Additionally, the crew will identify that CR HVAC failed to properly align to Emergency Pressurization Mode and must be manually realigned from the RTGB. When Containment Pressure exceeds 10 psig the A CV Spray Pump will fail to Auto-start and the B CV Spray Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting. This will ultimately be identified and A CV Spray Pump will be manually started from the RTGB.
After completing the required actions of EOP-E-0 the crew will transition to FRP-P. 1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, due to the rapid RCS depressurization and cooldown but exited due to the presence of a Large Break LOCA. The crew will then transition to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and performs required actions. While performing steps in EOP-E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip on over-current. This will cause the crew to ultimately transition to EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to not having at least one train of cold leg recirculation capability. EPP-1 5 will have the crew minimize CV Spray and ECCS flow. After verifying required CV Spray pump operating the crew will be notified that the problem with B RHR Pump has been corrected and can be started as needed.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after B RHR Pump has been started and crew transitions back to EOP-E-1 from EPP-1 5.
Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:    2    Op Test No.:        ILC-13 Examiners:                                              Operators: CRS    -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:  e    68% EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 139 PPM Boron.
e    CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out e    HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
* Maintain power at current level while RES is monitoring A MFP.
Critical Task:        e    Manually start HVH-9B to preclude shutdown within 1.5 hours.
* Open either SI-870A or SI-870B.
* Isolate feed to C SIG and Manually close A and B MSIV.
* Stop one Safety Injection Pump to minimize SI flow.
Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                          Description I                  (C) BOP          HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start 2                  (R) RO            A MFP Trips I Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS 3                  (C) RO, CRS      Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer (TS) CRS 4                  (I) RO, CRS      PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service (N) BOP 5                  (I) BOP, CRS      PT-495 fails Low (TS) CRS 6                  (M) ALL          72 inch Main Steam Header Fault 7                  ALL              C S/G Tube Rupture once SIG has dried out 8                  BOP              Main Turbine fails to Auto-Trip on Reactor Trip 9                  RO                Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open 10                  BOP              A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open 11                  BOP              Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close 12                  BOP              A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,  (l)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
I Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 68% RTP. Engineering has requested that power be held at 68% while monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP. Additionally, Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations.
Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, HVH-9A, CV Concrete Shield Cooling Fan, trips and HVH-9B fails to Auto-Start. The operator will verify the standby fan starts by manually starting HVH-9B from the RTGB in accordance with APP-010-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, A Main Feed Pump will trip. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-01 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be lowered to less than 60% Reactor Power. The crew will perform the load reduction in accordance with AOP-01 0 and OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and stabilize the plant, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the RCP Seal Injection Strainer will become clogged. The crew will determine the strainer is clogged by observing a reduction in RCP seal injection flow to zero flow along with receiving APP-001-A2, Seal Water Injection Filter High AP, APP-001-B4, RCP Seal Injection HI/LO Flow, and APP-001-B3, RCP A Bearing HI Temperature. APP-001-A2 will direct the crew to dispatch an auxiliary operator to check Seal Water Injection Filter AP and will ultimately direct the crew to have the auxiliary operator shift seal injection filters using OP-301. The CRS will enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and enter Section C, Loss of Seal Injection. AOP-018 will also diagnose the event as a clogged strainer and direct the crew to shift seal injection filters. Once the seal injection filters are shifted the RCP seal injection flows will return to normal. While seal injection flow is less than 6 gpm to any RCP the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, is applicable since seal injection to any RCP is not within limit with at least one charging pump operable. The required action is to initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to restore seal injection flow and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Pressure Transmitter PT-145 for Letdown Line Pressure will fail LOW, causing PCV-145 to close and isolate letdown flow. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section A will be implemented to isolate the letdown line, reduce charging flow and place Excess Letdown in service. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-495, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, will fail low. The BOP will perform immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section G, and take manual control of FCV-498, C SIG Feed Regulating Valve, and restore C SIG level to the normal band. The crew will then take action to swap to the alternate channel, place the C FRV back in Automatic and remove PT-495 from service in accordance with OWP-025, SGP-1 1. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1  I Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Condition D. Also due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the plant will experience a fault on the 72 inch Main Steam Header. The crew will determine that a reactor trip is required and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. An automatic safety injection signal will be initiated due to high steam line flow with low Tavg. During the immediate actions of EOP-E-0 it will be determined that the Turbine failed to automatically trip and manual actions will be taken to trip the turbine from the RTGB. During further actions of EOP-E-0 it will be discovered that SI-870A and B, BIT Outlets, fail to automatically open and have to be manually opened from the RTGB in order to provide safety injection flow. All Main Steam Isolation Valves will fail to automatically close and manually actions will be taken to close them from the RTGB. C MSIV will remain failed in the open position. V2-6A, B, and C, Feedwater Header Section Valves, will fail to automatically close and will have to be manually closed from the RTGB. A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will fail to automatically start and will be manually started from the RTGB.
Once C SIG has dried out a 400 gpm tube rupture will ramp in over 60 seconds on C SIG.
The crew will complete EOP-E-0 and transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and perform the actions to isolate C SIG. Once C SIG is isolated the crew will then transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, due to elevated readings on R-31 C, Main Steam Line Channel, and continued steam flow from C SIG. Since C MSIV cannot be closed the crew will direct local isolation of C SIG. Ultimately the crew will transition to EPP-1 7, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, and secure all but one RCP and one Safety Injection pump.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.
Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
I Appendix D                                    Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:          HB ROBINSON                    Scenario No.:      3    Op Test No.:      ILC-13 Examiners:                                                Operators:    CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 100% EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 96 PPM Boron.
                        . CCW Pump C is OCS and breaker is racked out
* HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
* Maintain power at current level.
Critical Task:
* Establish Containment Isolation.
                        . Manually start A MDAFW pump.
                        . Secure all RCPs due to a loss of subcooling with SI flow.
                        . Manually Start A SI Pump
                        . Direct local actions to Swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST to prevent Gas Binding of the Charging Pumps. (Contingency)
Event      Ma If. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                              Description 1                    (I) BOP, CRS        PT-447 fails Low (TS) CRS 2                    (C) RO, CRS        TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure 3                    (I) RD              Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High (TS) CRS 4                    (R) RO              HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load (N) BOP, CRS        Reduction 5                    (I) BOP, CRS        SIG Level Median Selector Module failure (TS) CRS 6                    (M) ALL            Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close 7                    (M) ALL            Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2) 8                    (M) ALL            Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
9                    BOP                SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start.
10                    RD                  CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A 11                    RO                  A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (l)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.
The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section H, and verify S/Gs trending to 39% and place Rod Control in Manual. SIG levels will be restored to normal, alternate channel selected and feedwater regulating valves returned to automatic. Rod control will be returned to automatic once Tavg verified in the required band. PT-447 will then be removed from service in accordance with OWP-033, FSP-2. Failure of PT-447 will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Item 17e, requirement to have 2 Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 inputs available for Reactor Protection System Interlocks to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition T, will be entered which requires that the P-7 interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e, requirement to have 2 High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation will not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.2, Condition D, will be entered which requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 18 hours. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, TCV-i44, Letdown Temperature Controller, will fail close causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. TCV-123, VCT/DEMIN Dlv, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT and manual action will be taken to divert letdown flow from the RTGB in accordance with APP-001 -A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD. The operator will then determine that TCV-144 has failed closed and take manual actions at the RTGB to open TCV 144 to re-establish cooling flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger in accordance with APP-00i-A6. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, NI-44, Power Range, Upper Detector will fail high. The channel will be removed from service in accordance with OWP-0i 1, N 1-4. N 1-44 failure will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-i, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.
Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours. Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours (Condition S)
OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours (Condition T). Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, HCV-1459 will fail open. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-Oi 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be controlled less than 100% and take action to lower turbine load. Once Reactor Power is stabilized below 100%, the crew will receive a report from Operations Management that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP and recommends that Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Reactor Power be reduced to 70% power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.
Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the A S/G level median selector module will fail resulting in a loss of SIG level input to the A Feedwater Regulating Valve. The crew will take immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction, with the BOP taking manual control of A FRy. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control and stabilize A SIG level, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, three main turbine governor valves will begin to randomly oscillate and ultimately fail closed resulting in a Secondary Load Rejection. The crew may decide to take a conservative action and initiate a reactor trip and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, the crew may enter AOP-015, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to diagnose the problem. Once in AOP-015 the crew will eventually reach a continuous action step that requires the crew to trip the reactor if greater than two governor valves indicate closed. During the fast-bus transfer following the Reactor Trip, 4KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Start-up Transformer due to breaker 52/17 tripping open. On the loss of 4KV Bus 3 the B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of power to 480V Bus E-2.
Due to the seal failure and suction line leak on B RCP a safety injection will be required. Only A train ECCS components will be available due to the loss of Bus E-2. However, A SI Pump does not auto-start and must be manually started from the RTGB. Also during the reactor trip the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will trip and neither A or B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start. CVC-200A, Letdown Orifice Isolation, and
( CVC-204A and CVC-240B, Letdown Line Isolation Valves, fail to close as required on the Phase A signal. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew should dispatch personnel to investigate and troubleshoot the failure of B EDG. If dispatched, maintenance personnel will determine and correct the cause (fuel racks found tripped and reset) and recommend that the B EDG be started locally. If personnel are not dispatched then 480V Bus E-2 will remain deenergized. With 480V Bus E-2 denergized MCC-6 will not have power and thus LCV-1 I SC, VCT Isolation, will remain in the open position preventing Charging Pump suction swapover to the RWST. If not identified this will eventually result in a loss of suction to the Charging Pumps and lead to gas binding if LCV-1 1 5C is not closed locally. If gas binding of the Charging Pumps occurs then all Charging Pumps will be secured, LCV-1 1 5C will have to be locally closed and Charging Pumps vented prior to restoring charging pump flow.
The crew will progress through EOP-E-0 and address the malfunctions discussed above.
Additionally, subcooling will lower to the point at which RCP Trip Criteria is met and all RCPs will be secured. EOP-E-0 will eventually direct the crew to transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. At some point during the performance of EOP-E-0 or EOP-E-1 the crew is expected to realize that B RCP experienced a seal failure and that AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, is required to be implemented since it is a Concurrent AOP. The crew will perform EOP-E-1 and eventually transition to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, and initiate RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown and Depressurization of the RCS to refill the PZR.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.
Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:      4    Op Test No.:        ILC-13 Examiners:                                              Operators:  CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:  e    1OE-8 amps, EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 513 PPM Boron.
                      . No equipment out of service.
Turnover:            e    Startup in progress in accordance with GP-003, Step 8.4.
Critical Task:        e    Manually Trip the reactor.
                      . Establish Containment Isolation.
                      . Isolate A Steam Generator in accordance with EOP-E-3.
                      . Restart ECCS equipment after loss of off-site power.
                      . Establish Auxiliary Feedwater Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                            Description I                  (R) RO,            Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat (N) CRS 2                  (I) RO, CRS        PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close (TS) CRS 3                  (C) BOP, CRS        SW Break at Suction of A SWBP (TS) CRS 4                  (C) RO, CRS        B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure 5                  (C) RO, CRS        A SIG Tube Leak 6                  (M) ALL            A SIG Tube Rupture 7                  RO                  Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button 8                  (M) ALL            Loss of Startup Transformer 9                  BOP                MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-1 6s) 10                  BOP                Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
11                  BOP                SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (V1-8s) fail to Auto Open on Loss of Startup Transformer (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,    (l)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
I Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 1OE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003, Normal Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Critical. The crew will continue with GP-003 at Step 8.4, Post Critical Operations, and withdraw control rods to the Point of Adding Heat and then stabilize Reactor Power between 3% and 5%. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to stabilize reactor power, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-445, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, fails High. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, and attempt to close PCV-456, PZR PORV. PCV-456 will fail to fully close and the operator will take manual action to close the PORV Block Valve. Once the PORV Block Valve is close PZR Pressure will automatically recover to normal band. Due to the failure of PCV-456 to fully close the SRO will determine that ITS LCO Condition B, is applicable due to one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. This LCO requires that the block valve be closed within 1 hour and power removed from the associated block valve within 1 hour and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control PZR Pressure and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a Service Water Break will occur at the Suction of A SWBP.
The crew will implement AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Section D, for Leak on South Service Water Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545. The crew will perform required valve and Service Water Booster Pump manipulations from the RTGB and direct field actions in accordance with AOP-022 attachments to isolate the ruptured section of Service Water piping and restore various components to operable status. The Service Water Break will result in entry into ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours without reliance on steam generator for heat removal. ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, is also applicable due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, B RCP will experience a 40 gpm thermal barrier leak. This will be identified by a rising trend and alarm on R-17, rising CCW surge tank level, and RCP thermal barrier cooling water high flow alarm. FCV-626, Thermal Barrier Flow Control, will receive the signal to auto-close, however the breaker to the MOV will trip leaving the valve in mid-position. The crew will take action to close CC-735, Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation, from the RTGB due to the FCV-626 failure. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a 300 gpm tube leak on A S!G will be ramped over a six minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-035, SIG Tube Leak, and attempt to control pressurizer level. Ultimately the crew will determine that the leak is greater than the capacity of available charging pumps and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection. The reactor will not trip on an automatic signal or by depressing the right hand reactor trip pushbutton. The RO will identify this failure and trip the reactor by depressing the left hand reactor trip pushbutton. On the initiation of the Reactor Trip the SIG tube leak will degrade to 1000 gpm. On initiation of the Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1  I Safety Injection the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves will fail to close on the Phase A signal. The BOP will take manual action to adjust the individual valves potentiometer on the RTGB to close the valves. Additionally, the Motor Driven Feedwater Pumps Discharge Valves will fail to Auto-Open. This failure will be identified, but the crew may determine it not necessary to open the valves until needed due to adequate SIG levels present at the onset of the major event. The crew will carry out the actions of EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, identifying the conditions noted above and stabilizing the plant. The crew will transition from EOP-E-0 to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Once A S/G has been isolated and an operator dispatched to deenergize the associated AFW valves the plant will experience a loss of off-site power. On the loss of off-site power, the Main Steam Supply valves to the Steam Driven AFW Pump will fail to open. The crew will take required actions to restart safeguards equipment since SI would have been reset at this point in the EOP Network. After safeguards equipment has been restarted the crew will perform an RCS cooldown and depressurization to stop the primary to secondary leakage. The crew will be required to either open the MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves (V2-16s) or manually start the SDAFW pump to provide AFW flow during the RCS cooldown. Once the primary to secondary leakage is stopped, both safety injection pumps will be secured.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after the safety injection pumps have been secured in accordance with EOP-E-3, or at his discretion.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
I H .B. Robinson ILC-13 NRC Licensing Exam Simulator Scenarios Final Submittal
 
Appendix D                                    Scenario Outline                        Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:    1    Op Test No.:      ILC-13 Examiners:                                              Operators:  CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 100% MOL, 9000 MWD/MTU, 848 PPM Boron.
* CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out o    HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
* Maintain power at current level.
Critical Task:
* Secure All RCPs due to EOP-E-0 Foldout Criteria.
                      . Start A Safety Injection Pump to provide adequate core cooling.
* Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode due to LB LOCA.
* Start A CV Spray Pump due to abnormal CV Conditions with reduced CV Spray and Cooling capability.
Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                            Description 1                  (C) BOP            A Circulating Water Pump Trips and Discharge Valve
                                  $?/      (V6-50A) fails to Auto-Close.
2                  (C) RO, CRS        PCV-455B fails OPEN while in AUTO (TS) CRS 3                  (C) BOP, CRS      A SWBP Trips (TS) CRS 4                  (R) RO            Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction (N)BOP,CRS (TS) CRS 5                  (I) RO, CRS        LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure (TS) CRS 6                  (C) RO, CRS        Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes) 7                  (M) ALL            Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip 8                  BOP                CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI 9                  RO                A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI 10                  RO                A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips 11                  RO                B RHR Pump Trips 10 sec. after starting A RHR Pump 12                  RO                A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,  (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,  (M)ajor Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-i ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts. The crew has been directed to maintain current plant conditions.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, A CW pump will trip on overcurrent and discharge valve V6-50A will fail to close automatically. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating Water Pump Trip. The operator will take manual action to close V6-50A from the RTGB. Condenser Vacuum will be minimally affected by the loss of A CW Pump. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PZR Spray valve PCV-455B will fail open due to a failure of the controller AUTO function and result in an entry into AOP-01 9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. Immediate actions will be taken to stabilize RCS pressure. Actions in AOP-019 will direct the crew to take manual control of the PZR Spray Valve and close the valve. The Operator will be able to close the valve; however, PC-455B will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Depending on the timeliness of operator actions, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB
 
parameters to within limit within 2 hours, will be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Service Water Booster Pump A will trip on overcurrent. APP 002-A8, B8, C8 and D8 will be received when the pump trips and will direct the crew to start the standby SWBP from the RTGB and restore normal flow to the CV HVH units. ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to
 
operable status within 72 hours, will be entered for the SWBP failure and ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to
 
operable status within 72 hours, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is> 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Tech Spec compliance, he can cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Control Rod H-i 0 will drop into the core. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Additionally AOP 001 will have the crew verify that only one control rod dropped and transition to Section A of AOP-001. The crew will then take action to reduce reactor and turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours using rods and boration to maintain Tavg with +/-1.5°F of Tref. SRO will determine that ITS 3.1.4 Condition B must be entered. ITS 3.1.4 Condition B requires that the rod be restored to within alignment limits within 1 hour OR verify SDM is within limits provided in the COLR within 1 hour AND reduce thermal power to less than 70% RTP AND verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR once per 12 hours AND perform SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours AND re-evaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions within 5 days. If above requirements cannot be achieved then ITS 3.1.4 Condition C will require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours. Due to the rapid reduction of Tave, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours, will
 
be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1  I Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a leak will develop on PZR instrument tubing inside containment that will result in LT-460 Reference Leg Failure. PT-456 will also be impacted and will actuate OTAT Bistables and alarms due to a reduction in pressure to approximately 2080 psig as sensed by PT-456. The crew may take actions lAW AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, to address LT-460 failed high; however, this is not necessary since LT-460 is not the controlling channel. OWP-030, PLT-2 and/or AOP-025 will direct the crew to replace LT-460 with LT-461 as a controlling channel and remove LT-460 from service. The crew should determine that the failures are related to a common sensing line on the Pressurizer and determine that a leak has developed and perform the actions of AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage and AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System. Due to the failure of LT-460, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be
 
operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours.
Due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Condition M requires that the channel be placed in trip in 6 hours or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours. Also due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection
 
Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours. Condition H requires that the interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours and Mode 4 in 13 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a seismic event will occur. APP-036-15, Seismic Monitor, alarm will be received along with a call from the Load Dispatcher reporting seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department. The crew will take actions lAW AOP-021, Seismic Disturbances. If dispatched, operator(s) will report that the DBE/SSE ALARM on Seismic Monitor A and the OBE ALARM on Seismic Monitor B are both EXTINGUISHED.
TRM 3.17, Seismic Shutdown, requirements are not met and thus entry in TRM 3.17 is not required. The seismic event will cause a RCS leak to develop and degrade to approximately 250 gpm over a 5 % minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, and take prescribed actions to mitigate the RCS leakage. ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, will be entered due to having pressure boundary leakage and require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. The crew will ultimately determine that the leak rate is greater than the available charging pump capacity and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1  I Immediately upon the initiation of the reactor trip the RCS leak will degrade to a Large Break LOCA. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew will determine that both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump failed to auto-start. The crew will manually start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump. Ten seconds after starting A RHR Pump the B RHR Pump will trip. Additionally, the crew will identify that CR HVAC failed to properly align to Emergency Pressurization Mode and must be manually realigned from the RTGB. When Containment Pressure exceeds 10 psig the A CV Spray Pump will fail to Auto-start and the B CV Spray Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting. This will ultimately be identified and A CV Spray Pump will be manually started from the RTGB.
After completing the required actions of EOP-E-0 the crew will transition to FRP-P. 1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, due to the rapid RCS depressurization and cooldown but exited due to the presence of a Large Break LOCA. The crew will then transition to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and performs required actions. While performing steps in EOP-E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip on over-current. This will cause the crew to ultimately transition to EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to not having at least one train of cold leg recirculation capability. EPP-1 5 will have the crew minimize CV Spray and ECCS flow. After verifying required CV Spray pump operating the crew will be notified that the problem with B RHR Pump has been corrected and can be started as needed.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after B RHR Pump has been started and crew transitions back to EOP-E-1 from EPP-1 5.
Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-i ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I SIMULATOR SETUP ICIS ETU P:
* lC-901, SCN 006_ILC_i 3_NRC_i.
* Status board is provided to crew is IC-13.
PRE-LOADED EVENTS:
The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:
o Event 7: Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip
* Event 8: CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI
* Event 9: A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI
* Event 10: A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips
* Event Ii: B RHR Pump Trips 10 seconds after manually starting A RHR Pump
* Event 12: A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
* Event 1: A CWP Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close
* Event 2: PCV-455B fails open while in AUTO
* Event 3: A SWBP trips
* Event 4: Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction
* Event 5:  LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing line Failure
* Event 6: Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)
EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
* AOP-012
* AOP-019
* APP-002
* AOP-001
* AOP-025, Section B
* OWP-030, PLT-2
* OWP-029, PLT-2
* AOP-021
* AOP-016
* EOP-E-0
* FRP-P.1
* EOP-E-i
* EPP-15 Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #      I      Event #          1        Page    6  of    6 Event
 
== Description:==
A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-008D4, CW PMP A MOTORIDISCH VLV TRIP!OLVD, is illuminated A CWP RTGB GREEN OFF light illuminated V6-50A RTGB RED OPEN IF                illuminated Enters AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating SRO Water Pump Trip SRO        Verifies immediate actions complete.
Start any available CWP with its Associated CW PMP SEAL WTR BOP LOST Alarm Extinguished. (All available are running.)
RO        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.
BOP        Check Liquid Waste Batch Release              In Progress (NO)
Check Condenser Status          VACUUM PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BOP (YES)
Check Status of the tripped CWP Discharge Valves Completed BOP Closing (YES, V6-50A manually closed from RTGB.)
BOP        Check Plant Conditions        In Modes I OR 2 (YES)
Continuous Action Step:
Check Condenser Back Pressure On P1-1312 AND P1-I 313 IJF APPROACHES RESTRICTED REGION OF ATTACHMENT 3, CONDENSER BACKPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE (NO, Go to Step 13)
Continuous Action Step:
BOP Check Condenser Vacuum Degrading (NO, Go to Step 15)
SRO        Implement the EALs Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      1      Event#          1        Page    7  of    7 Event
 
== Description:==
A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE:                      Crew should notify WCC SRO andlor l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, vent the water boxes and notify the Operations Manager.
bUU I H UFKA I        uic cnowieage any direction associated witn water box venting, inspections, etc. If requested, report that the CWP breaker trippeo and the cause is unknown. Traveling Screens appear to be free of debris. 15 minutes after the request to vent the water boxes reporl that venting has been completed.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (PCV-455B fails open in AUTO) on cue from the
                          *Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      1LC-1 3 NRC  Scenario #    1      Event #        2        Page  8  of      8 Event
 
== Description:==
PCV-455B fails open in Auto Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, PCV-455B fails open in AUTO EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS PC-455B output failing high.
PCV-455B RTGB indication RED open light illuminates.
Pressurizer Pressure lowering.
Pressurizer Control Bank Heaters energize.
Immediate Action Step Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:
RO
* Check PZR pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)
                                                              -
* Verify Both PZR PORVs CLOSED (YES)
                                                                  -
Immediate Action Step Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RO RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band
* Place PCV-455B in Manual and Close SRO        Enters AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control SRO        Verifies immediate actions complete.
CREW          Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445            FAILED RO (NO, Go to Step 7)
Check PC-444J, PZR PRESS OPERATING PROPERLY IN AUTO RO
                                                                -
(YES)
RO        Observe the NOTE prior to Step I I and Go to Step 11 Check RCS Pressure LESS THAN REQUIRED FOR CURRENT RO
                                                      -
PLANT CONDITIONS (YES)
I              I Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    1      Event #        2        Page  9  of        9 Event
 
== Description:==
PCV-455B fails open in Auto Time      I  Position  1                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Restore Pressure Within 2 HOURS OR Be In Mode 2 Within 6 RO HOURS Check Both PZR SPRAY VALVES CLOSED (NO, based on initial
 
event conditions. May answer as YES based on current conditions.)
Perform the following:
: a. Place the affected PZR SPRAY VALVE Controller in MAN AND RO adjust the output to zero.
: b. IF the affected valve will NOT close, THEN Go To Step 16. (NO)
: c. IF the affected valve has closed, THEN observe the CAUTION prior to Step 20 and Go to Step 20. (YES)
RO          Check CVC-31 1, Aux Pzr SDrav Valve            Closed (YES)
Continuous Action Step RO          Check APP-003-F8, PZR LO LVL HTR OFF & LTDN SECURE EXTINGUISHED (YES)
SRO/BOP        Contact Maintenance and Enqineerinq to check PZR Heater capacity PnnTI4npPPATOR*              If! Whn
                              ..
W(( SRfl Minfcnnsc nrIfrir nc1InArincL wIt minutAs nrI then mnnrt that thr is no
                              ---..---------,,-------      ----------
reduced PZR heater caoacitv.
RO        Check PZR Heater capacity        REDUCED (NO, Go to Step 23)
Check PZR Pressure STABLE OR TRENDING TO REQUIRED
                                                        -
RO VALUE (YES. Go to Steo 29)
SRO        Implement the EAL5 SRO        Contact I&C to Make Repair to the PZR Pressure Control System Refer to ITS for Applicable LCOs ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within SRO limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours,
 
will be entered if PZR Pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig.
SRO        Return to Procedure and Step in Effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (A SWBP Trips) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #      I    Event #      3      Page    10 of      10 Event
 
== Description:==
A SWBP Trips Time          Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, A SWBP Trips EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-002-A8, B8, C8, D8, HVH-1 (-2, -3, -4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW A SWBP RTGB Indication RED and GREEN lights illuminated.
B SWBP RTGB Indication GREE light illuminated.
BOP      Recognizes A SWBP trioDed and B SWBP secured.
Reviews APP-002-A8, B8, C8, D8 Step I IF the operating SWBP has RO tripped, THEN START Standby SWBP.
BOP      Manually starts the B SWBP Dispatches AO to observe SWBP operation and verify proper flow to C REW the CV HVH units.
BOOTH OPERATOR: IF dispatched, report that A SWBP breaker indicates tripped on over-current and HVH flows are all within the normal band.
Reviews ITS for applicability.
ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to operable status within 72 hours, will
 
be entered for the SWBP failure.
CRS ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to operable status within 72 hours, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is > 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units.
Notify WCC SRO to initiate Work Request, contact Maintenance and CRS Work Management and notify Operations I Plant Management.
BOOTH OPERATOR: insert Event #4 (Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    I      Event#          4        Page II  of    11 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-005-A3, PR DROP ROD APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV APP-005-F2, ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP APP-005-F3, PR UPPER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT APP-005-F4, PR LOWER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT Rod H-1O Rod Bottom Light Illuminated and IRPI lowers to zero APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS APP-O 04, TAVGITREF DEV Determine If Multiple Rods Have Dropped As Follows:
: a. Analyze Indications For Multiple Rod Drop
* Prompt Drop PRESENT (YES)
 
RO
* More than I Rod Bottom Light ILLUMINATED (NO)
* More Than I IRPI INDICATES ON BOTTOM (NO)
                                                          -
: b. Check Multiple Dropped Rods PRESENT (NO, Go To Step 10.)
 
BOP      Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Check Tavg TRENDING TO Tref (NO)
                                          -
RO      RNO: Perform Attachment 1, Turbine Load Adjustment, to restore Tavg within +1- 1.5°F Determine The Status Of Rods As Follows:
: a. Analyze the below indications for a dropped rod:
* APP-005-A3, PR DROP ROD ILLUMINATED (YES)
* APP-005-F2, ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP ILLUMINATED RO              (YES)
* Rod Bottom Light for affected rod ILLUMINATED (YES)
* Indication of Prompt Drop PRESENT (YES)
* Quadrant Power Tilt indications PRESENT (YES)
: b. Check Dropped Rod PRESENT (YES)
 
SRO      Go To Section A, Dropped Rod RO      Check Plant Status    Mode I (YES)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    1      Event#          4        Page  12  of      12 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time      I  Position                              Ar:rnlicants Actions or Behavior RO        Check Droied Rod Location              In Controllinci Bank (NO. Go to Steo 4)
Notify Reactor Engineering AND I&C Personnel to Perform the following:
: a. Verify the status of the dropped rod RO              b. Investigate the cause of the dropped rod.
: c. Avoid ANY action that could cause inadvertent withdrawal of the affected rod.
: d. Determine appropriate recovery actions.
BOOTH OPERATOR            Acknowledqe the request for Reactor Enqineerinq andlor I&C to investiaate. aetermine cause ana aerermine aororiate recovery i ifi nn q
                          ---.-.
Check APP-005-B5, ROD BANKS AIB/C/D LO LIMIT RO EXTINGUISHED (NO)
Establish Stable Conditions At OR Below 70% Reactor Power As follows:
: a. Check Reactor power Greater Than 70% (YES)
: b. Check APP-005-E2, ROD CONT SYSTEM URGENT FAILURE EXTINGUISHED (YES)
RO              c. Reduce Reactor AND Turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours using rods and boration to maintain Tavg within +1- 1.5°F of Tref using OP-301, CVCS, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, AND Attachment 1, Turbine Load Adjustment (OP-3d, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist, is included at the end of Event #4)
Attachment I Turbine Load Adjustment
                                                -
: 1. Check Turbine Control Mode Automatic (YES)
: 2. Check Turbine Load Adjustment In IMP IN Desired (YES)
: 3. Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton (IMP IN depressed)
: 4. Set the Desired Load in the SETTER (REF V to adjust setter)
: 5. Set the Desired Load Rate (Thumbwheel to set load rate)
BOP
: 6. Depress the GO and HOLD Pushbuttons as necessary (Pushbuttons)
(BOP and RO will coordinate the power reduction with boron additions and rods.)
(OP-301, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist, is included at the end of Event #4 (shaded area))
Appendix D                                                              NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1      Event #        4        Page 13  of    13 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time          Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS        Notify Load Dispatcher of the Units Load Capability Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1      Event#        4        Page 14  of    14 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time    j Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step RO      Check Total Reactor Power Change Greater than 15% in any one
 
hour period. (This will eventually be true.)
Monitor Quadrant Power Tilt AND Axial Flux Difference to Ensure RO Compliance with ITS LCO 3.2.3 and ITS LCO 3.2.4 Determine if Axial Flux Difference (AFD) should be Adjusted As Follows:
: a. Check APP-005-E2, Rod Cont System Urgent Failure RO              Extinguished (YES)
: b. Check AFD Within Target Band (YES)
: c. Check AFD Within Operating Band (YES)
: d. GotoStepl3 Confirm Dropped Rod as Follows:
: a. Determine if a dropped rod exists by at least ONE of the following:
* Quadrant Power Tilt indications Present o APP-005-F3 ILLUMINATED (YES)
 
o APP-005-F4 ILLUMINATED (YES)
 
RO                        o APP-005-C3 ILLUMINATED (YES)
 
o Power Range Drawer Indications (YES) o Axial Flux Difference indications (YES)
                                    . Incore flux map
                                    . Reactor Engineering or l&C determination
                                    . APP-005-A3 ILLUMINATED (YES)
: b. Check dropped rod determination Complete (YES)
 
RO      Check Dropped Rod        Confirmed (YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1      Event #        4        Page  15  of      15 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check Rod Recovery Status Complete (NO)
 
RNO:
IF the rod will NOT be restored to within the alignment limits within 1 hour of discovery, THEN perform the following:
: a. Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR within I hour in accordance with FMP-012, Manual Determination of Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.
: b. Reduce Thermal Power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours RO
: c. Verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR every 12 hours in accordance with FMP-012, Manual Determination of Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.
: d. Notify Reactor Engineering to perform ITS SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours
: e. IF the rod can NOT be realigned, THEN within 5 days, complete a Safety Analysis for continued operation with the misaligned rod.
: f. IF the requirements of items a through e can NOT be achieved.
THEN be in Mode 3 within 6 hours.
Notify I&C To Make Repairs As Necessary To Restore Proper CRS Operation Of The Rod Control System RO        Check IRPI for the drooed rod          Indicates Rod Fully Inserted (YES)
Contact Reactor Engineering to Obtain the Following:
RO            a. Power level at which recovery is to be performed.
: b. Rate at which rod should be withdrawn BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, state power level of 70%
RTP and rate of withdrawal should be no greater than 10 steps per minute. When contacted as Manager Operations acknowledge
 
the report and provide approval for rod recovery.
Notify  Manager Operations OR His Designee Of The Following:
                                              -
: a. Current plant conditions CRS            b. Power level required for rod alignment
: c. Approval for rod alignment is required prior to continuing
: d. Check rod recovery APPROVED
                                                            -
RO      Check Cause of Dropped Rod            FOUND AND CORRECTED Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
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-                                                                  0) 0)0.                                              m CD                                                          CO CD      00 0.0      0                  30.                cI,
                                                                            .-.
s3 13 I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                                            Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #              I          Event #      4        Page        17      of      17 Event
 
== Description:==
Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time      fi  Position  I                                        Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added, THEN verify the following:
FCV-1 13A, BORIC ACID FLOW, closes.
RD            *
* FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
* IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.
* The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.
IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow path as follows:
* PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.
* SET YIC-1 14, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.
* PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to CLOSE.
* Momentarily PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START.
* IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RD                  the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP nnsitinn
                                                                    ...,.d                n
(,      I-rimrv Wtr dditinn rr.h th 1ird iIii
* WHIN thA sirM mriint ot I-nmrv VVtAr ha heen du1d
                                            - .-  . ..-  .
E*        -
C)      r/          i I  3B R.ei icieci iviU  u  .rii,  .L IC 1  :I( )StS
                                          ,    II Ifl MI      itO  I      me operrinn        IrIm2rv            i mn P
RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:
* VERIFY FCV-1 14A Primary WTR Flow Dilute Mode is in AUTO.
PLACE FCV-1 14B Blended MU to VCT to the AUTO position.
RD            *
* PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
* VERIFY FCV-1 I 3A Boric Acid Flow is in AUTO.
* Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.
RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RD        TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.
MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RD inform the CRS OR the SM of the results of the boration.
End of OP-301 , Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist Appendix D                                                                        NUREG1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      1      Event#        5      Page    18 of      18 Event
 
== Description:==
LT-460 Reference Leg / PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time      1  Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (LT-460 Reference Leg!
PT-456 Sensing Line Failure).
EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-003-C8, PZR PROT HI LEVEL Bistable LC46OAI illuminated APP-002-E2, HVH CONDENSATE COLL AOP-025 may be entered for guidance due to LT-460 failure lAW APP-003-C8, however, not required since LT-460 is not the controlling CRS channel. Determines OWP-029 will be utilized for removal of PT-456 from service.
NOTE: Crew will enter AOP-016 once the determination has been made that the failures d.i tn    ninn Iin Ik            AflP.IIIR
                                                ...
tirnq
                                                      -.-----.-..
IitAri fnhIrwinn th AflP-fl7 tIons A(JF-U(Jfi. Ra1atIOn Monatorino system. will e entered once N-Il
                              ,
                                                          .-
andlor R-12 are in alarm. AOP-005 follows AOP-016 in this Guide.
RO        Check LCV-460A&B, LTDN LINE STOP                Closed (NO, go to step 4)
BOP        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Restore PZR Level to between 22% and 53% by Performing One of the Following:
                                  . Adjust operating Charging Pump speed in Manual RO                                    OR
                                  . Level Controller LC-459G in Manual (Neither action is required since PZR level is being controlled by LT 459.)
Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM (YES, RO not impacted by failures.)
Check Number of Operable PZR Level Channels              Greater than one RO
 
(YES)
Place LM-459, PZR LEVEL, In the Switch Position for the Alternate
                    ,,
Channel Below:
I Failed Channel          I Switch Position I LT-460                  I 461 REPL 460 Verify Selector Switch LR-459      Selected to the Controlling Channel RO
                                  . REC459 Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #      1    Event#          5      Page      19 of        19 Event
 
== Description:==
LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Restore PZR Level Control To Automatic As Follows:
* Check Normal Letdown Isolated (NO)
 
RD
* Start additional Charging Pump as desired. (N/A)
* Check PZR level Within +/- 1% of Programmed Reference
 
Level (YES)
* Restore PZR Level control to Automatic (No action required.)
RD        Check affected PZR Level            FAILED LOW (NO)
Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM (YES, RD not impacted by failures.)
BOP        Remove the affected Transmitter from Service lAW OWP-030, PLT-2.
Contact WCC SRO for assistance with OWPs for LT-460 and PT-456.
CRS Also, requests W/R initiation and Maintenance contacted.
Briefs the crew on removal of LT-460 from service lAW OWP-030 and CRS PT-456 from service lAW OWP-029.
Dr-I-LI ftDAFfD            iII.......                            1WRI fl)fl      rlAIrJ Afl IAAI fM &#xa3; I.
    *        ,                *
* P  I    W I
* fl. WW II F                                                  II I%1 Determines the following ITS implications for failure:
LT-460: ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be operable will not be met
 
and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours.
PT-456: ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E: Channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 CRS hours. Condition M: Channel be placed in trip in 6 hours or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours.
ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items 1 .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure
 
Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D: Channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours. Condition H: Interlock verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours and Mode 4 in 13 hours.
Appendix D                                                              NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      1      Event#        5      Page    20 of      20 Event
 
== Description:==
LT-460 Reference Leg / PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time      fi  Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior AOP-016    Excessive Primary Plant Leakage Continuous Action Step Check RCS Pressure Greater than 1000 psig. (YES)
 
Check the following:
PZR Level Less than 14% AND lowering in an uncontrolled manner
 
(NO)
RO OR RCS Subcooling Less than 35&deg;F (NO)
 
IF PZR Level can NOT be maintained greater than 14%
Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 35&deg; F, THEN trip the Reactor and Go to EOP-E-0.
Crew      Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Continuous Action Step Check VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (NO)
                                                  -
RO
* IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches, THEN perform Step 5.
Go To Step 6 Check Charging Pump Status LESS THAN TWO RUNNING (NO)
RO
                                      *__GoToStepli.
Place running Charging Pump Speed Controllers in MAN AND adjust RO output to maximum Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER
                                                  -
RO        (NO)
                                      *__GotoStep2o RO        Control Charging Flow To Maintain Desired RCS Level Continuous Action Step RO        Monitor RCS Level Lowering In An Uncontrolled Manner (NO)
* GotoStep22 SRO        Implement ITS LCO 3.4.13 Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    1      Event#          5      Page      21 of      21 Event
 
== Description:==
LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time      I  Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Check for Primary-to-Secondary Leakage as Indicated by One or More of the Following: (NO, go to step 25)
RO
                                      . R-15, R-I9AIBIC, R-3IAIBIC, Secondary Chemistry Sample Results.
Initiate Leak Rate Determination Using One or More of the following RO        Methods:
                                      . OST-051, OST-901, Charqinq vs Letdown Flow Balance SRO        Implement EALs AOP-005      Radiation Monitoring System BOP        Check R-1 IIR-12 Selector Switch        Selected to CV (YES)
BOP        Check RCS Temperature        Greater than 200&deg;F (YES)
Check Channel R-1 1IR-12 Low Flow Alarm              Illuminated (NO, Go to BOP StelD 5.)
BOP        Check EOP Network Procedures            Implemented (NO, Go to Step 7)
BOP        Check Personnel      IN CV (NO, Go to Step 13)
BOP        Check Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves            Closed (YES)
Place the Following CV Iodine Removal Fan Control Switches to BOP        Prepurge Position:
                                      . HVE-3/4 Request RC to perform a background radiation check at Radiation BOP Monitors R-11 and R-12.
BOP        Determine if Primary System Leakage is Occurring (YES)
Go to AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, while continuing BOP with this procedure.
BOP        Refer to ITS 3.3.6 and ODCM Table 3.10-1.
bOO I H OPERA I OK. On cue from tIie chief Examiner Insert EVflt b Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes)).
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:        ILC-13NRC      Scenario#    1    Event#          6        Page 22 of    22 Event
 
== Description:==
Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)
Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6 (Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 / minutes)).
EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-036-15, SEISMIC ALARM APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED CV SUMP LEVEL RISE BOOTH OPERATOR: After 1 minute contact the control room as the Load Dispatcher and report that seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department.
CRS      Enters AOP-021 for Seismic Disturbances.
BOP      Dispatch an Operator to the Seismic Monitors to check local alarms.
BOP      Make PA Announcement Compare Current RTGB Indications with the Operating Logs to Detect RO/BOP any abnormal trends.
Check Either Event Below  Has Occurred
                                . Noticeable Tremors or Vibrations (NO)
CRS OR
                                . Report by Outside Aciencv (YES)
Check For Changes From Pre-earthquake Conditions That May Impair Safety-related Function
                                . CRDM operation
                                . Nuclear Instrumentation
                                . RCS radiation levels
                                . Process Radiation Monitors
                                . Area Radiation Monitors C REW
                                . RCS flow, temperature and pressure
                                . Loose Parts Monitor System
                                . RCS Chemistry sample and results
                                . Secondary System Chemistry sample and results
                                . Electrical power sources
                                . Fire Protection System leaks
                                . Spurious relay actuations CRS      Notify the Manager    Operations of the following:
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-1 3 NRC    Scenario #    1    Event #      6        Page 23  of    23 Event
 
== Description:==
Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)
Time          Position                            ADNcants Actions or Behavior
                                    . A Seismic event has occurred.
                                    . Any abnormal plant conditions that have been identified.
CRS        Implement the EALs Implement Applicable Technical Specification LCOs.
CRS TRM 3.17 Seismic Shutdown Limits, should be referenced Check Local Monitors    Observed (YES, once report is received for CRS both monitors)
EXAMINERS NOTE:                By this time the crew will identify the RCS leak and either enter AOP-016 or conservatively decide to trip the reactor based on the number of failures that have occurred.
CRS        Enters AOP-016 for RCS Leakacie Continuous Action Step Check RCS Pressure Greater than 1000 psig. (YES)
 
Check the following:
PZR Level Less than 14%
lowering in an uncontrolled manner (NO)
RO OR RCS Subcooling Less than 35&deg;F (NO)
 
                                ]f PZR Level can        be maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 35&deg;F, THEN trip the Reactor and Go to EOP-E-0.
BOP        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry RO        Control Charging Flow to Maintain Desired RCS Level Check Charging Pump Status LESS THAN TWO RUNNING (NO, go RO to Step 11)
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #    1      Event#          6        Page    24 of    24 Event
 
== Description:==
Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)
Time          Position  1                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Place running Charging Pump Speed Controllers in MAN AND adjust RO outiut to maximum Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER
                                                  -
(YES)
(If answered as NO, depending on scenario timeline, the crew will RO control charging flow and ultimately determine that RCS level is lowering in an uncontrolled manner and return to step I of AOP-016.
This question will eventually be answered as YES.)
RO          Check Any Letdown      - IN SERVICE (YES)
Verify All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:
                                    . LCV-460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves CLOSED      -
                                    . HIC-142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO  -
RO                  0%
                                    . HIC-137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO  -
0%
                                    . CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP CLOSED        -
Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO
                                                  -
(YES)
RO          Check RCS Pressure        GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG (YES)
Directs the RO to the Trip the reactor, initiate safety injection and go to CRS EOP-E-O.
EXAMINERS NOTE:              A Large Break LOCA will be inserted when the Reactor Trip pushbutton is depressed.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario#    1      Event#        7-12      Page 25 of    25 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position  1                            Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:              A Large Break LOCA will be inserted when the Reactor Trip pushbutton is depressed.
RO          Check Reactor tripped (YES)
Check Turbine Trip:
: a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)
BOP
                                                                            -
: b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action required by BOP)
Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:
BOP                  a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)
: b. El and E2 Both eneraized (YES)
 
Check SI Status:
a) Check if SI is actuated:
                                              . SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)
 
                                              . SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)
 
RO                  b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED
                                              . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)
 
                                              . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)
 
RNO: Manually actuate BOTH trains of SI (Candidate may start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump at this time or wait until Att. 1.)
Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0. Announce Adverse CRS numbers are in effect due to CV Pressure Greater than 4 psig.
FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect RCP Trip Criteria IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN trip all RCPs: (YES)
                                          . Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED (YES)
 
OR Critical
* BOTH of the following satisfied:
CRS Task                                          o SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND
                                                                  -
CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW (YES, B SI Pump is running)
AND o RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS  -
THAN_30&deg;F_[50&deg;F]_(YES)
I              I                I Appendix D                                                            NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ESD-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      I      Event#        7-12      Page  26 of    26 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:            Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.
                            . Manually start A SI Pump and A RHR Pump
                            . Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode
* Manually start A CV Spray Pump Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS            with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. I steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)
Beciinnina of EOP-E-0 Attachment I (RAmInrir nt I-OF-I--() I-nllrwc this Sctinn1
                              .    ........
Att. 1                      Check ECCS Pumps Running:
Critical          BOP        . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts A SI Pump)
                                              -
Task                        . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts B RHR Pump)
                                                  -
EXAMINEF S NOTE:          B RHR Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting A RHR Pump.
Att. 1          BOP        Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)
                                                        -
Att. 1          BOP        Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
                                                      -
Check Containment Isolation Phase A
: a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
: b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP
: c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)
 
                                                . CVC-387 Closed (YES)
 
                                                . HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)
 
Check Feedwater Isolation:
a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)
 
b) Main feedwater ISOLATED
 
Alt. I          BOP
* FRVs Closed (YES)
* Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (YES)
* Feedwater header section valves Closed (YES)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1      Event #      7 - 12    Page 27  of      27 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:
a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (YES)
 
e  Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (YES)
 
OR Att. I          BOP                e  High steam flow with: (NO) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig
 
OR o Tavg less than 543&deg;F
 
b) Check MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED (YES)
Check  Proper Service Water System Operation:
: a. SW pumps All running (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP          b. SW booster pumps Both running (YES)
: c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)
Extinguished (YES)
Att. 1          BOP      Check Both EDGs      Runninci (YES)
Check ECCS Flow:
: a. RCS pressure less than 1700 psig (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP          b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES)
: c. RCS pressure less than 350 psig. (YES)
 
d.__RHR _Flow_Indicated_(YES)
Att. 1          BOP      Check CV Recirculation Fans        All Runnnq (YES. all available)
Check IVSW Actuated (YES)
                                          -
Att. I          BOP
* PCV-1 922A Open (YES)
 
                                *__PCV-1922B        Open_(YES)
Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)
Att 1            BOP
: a. CV ventilation isolation valves        CLOSED (YES)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1    Event #        7- 12      Page 28 of    28 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time      I  Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)
                                                              -
                                . HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)
 
                                . HVE-16 Stopped (YES)
 
Att. 1
                                . HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (NO, starts HVE-19A or HVE Critical          BOP
 
1 9B)
Task
                                . Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)
 
                                . CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)
 
                                . CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Check DS Bus    Enerqized (YES)
Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
 
APP-036-D2 Extinquished (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Stop R-11112 Sample Pump Att. I          BOP      Locally Reset and Load IACs as necessary (N/A)
Perform Crew Update to include the following:
                                . Attachment Completion
* Manual Actions Taken (Started A SI and RHR Pumps, Placed Att 1            BOP
      .                            CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode)
* Failed Equipment status (B RHR Pump has tripped.)
* SW_status_(All_operating)
Erni nt EOP-E-C) Attwhmnt1 Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1    Event #        7- 12      Page  29 of    29 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuation of EOP-E-O RO      Check AFW Pumps          Running (ALL running)
Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)
 
                                . AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)
 
RO
* AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)
* Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump
 
is running. (YES)
Check Total AFW Flow:
* Reset SI RO
* Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 18% and 50%.
* Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 arm (YES)
Check  CV Spray NOT Required:
: a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (NO)
 
RNO:  Perform the following
: 1)  Check CV spray actuated. (YES, all actuated except A CV Spray Pump)
IF CV spray is NOT actuated, THEN manually actuate BOTH trains of CV spray.
: 2)  Verify the following:
a) Both CV spray pumps are running. (NO, manually starts A CV Spray Pump, B CV Spray Pump Tripped)
    .                                b) CV spray pump discharge valves are open: (YES)
Critical                                    Sl-880A RO
* Tasks
* SI-880B
* Sl-880C
* SI-880D c) CV spray additive tank discharge valves are open: (YES)
* SI-845A
* Sl-845B d) Spray additive tank flow is approximately 12 gpm:
* Adjust Sl-845C, SAT throttling valve, as necessary.
: 3)  Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valves are closed. (YES)
: 4)  Stop all RCPs.
: 5)  Observe CAUTION prior to Step 10 and Go To Step 10.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    I    Event #        7- 12      Page  30  of    30 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCP Seal Cooling:
                                      . CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (NO)
 
o APP-001-C1 I DI Extinguished (NO)
 
OR RO
                                      . Seal injection flow Normal (YES)
 
o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP
 
OR o Thermal barrier APs Greater than 5 inches water.
 
                                              .i1.4fIf flA
* I                              I S            I            wI I.
J eaI injection flow using the P&ID function.
Check RCS Temperature With NO RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or trending to 547&deg;F (NO)
RNO: IF temperature is less then 547&deg;F AND lowering then perform the following: (YES)
: a. Stop dumping steam RO                  b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to minimum for decay heat removal:
o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 18% in at least one SIG.
: c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bvoass_valves.
Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:
: a. PORVs Closed (YES)
 
RO
: b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
 
c.__Aux_spray_valve__Closed_(YES)
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
RO                  a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per FOLDOUT)
 
RNO:_Go_to_Step_14 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all SIGs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o__None_Completely_depressurized_(YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #  1    Event #        7- 12      Page 31 of    31 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time      I  Position    1                        Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Tubes are Intact:
                                  . Secondary radiation monitors Have Remained Normal (YES)
* R-15 BOP
* R-19s
* R-31s
                                  . SIG levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)
 
Check if RCS is Intact: (NO)
                                  . CV radiation Normal (NO)
 
o R-2 o R-32A1B
* CV pressure Normal (NO)
RO
* CV sump level Normal (NO)
 
RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs. Go to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1. (Crew will identify that a RED Terminus exists for RCS Integrity and transition to FRP P.1)
CRS        Determines that FRP-P1 must be entered.
FRP-P.1 BOP Check CST Level      Less than 10%
FRP-P.1 Determine if RCS cooldown is due to a Large Break LOCA as follows:
: a. Check both of the following conditions exist:
RO
* RCS pressure LESS THAN 350 PSIG (YES)
 
AND
* RHR flow on Fl-605 GREATER THAN 1200 GPM (YES)
 
b.__Reset_SPDS_and_return_to_procedure_and_step_in_effect.
CRS        Determines that entry into EOP-E-1 is now warranted.
: r.                                                  ofEOPE1E NOTE CRS FOLDOUT for EOP-E-1 is in effect. (None applicable.)
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
RO            a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per EOP-E-0 FOLDOUT)
 
RNO:_Go_to_Steo_2 Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    1    Event#      7- 12      Page    32  of      32 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position                              AIicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o None Completely depressurized (YES)
Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels:
SOP            a. Narrow range levels Greater than 18% (YES)
: b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels      between 18% AND 50%
RO        Reset SI RO        Reset Containment Isolation Phase A EXAMINERS NOTE:            A RHR Pump will trip ten seconds after resetting Containment Isolation Phase A BOOTH 01 ERATOR: I f dispatched to investigate cause of RHR Pump trips, wait 5 minutes and rack out the B RHR Pump Breaker lAW SCN File.
Check Secondary Radiation:
: a. Secondary radiation monitors Have remained normal (YES)
 
o R-15, R-19s, R-31s BOP            b. Perform the following:
: 1) Request periodic activity samples of all S/Gs
: 2) Secondary sample results Normal (When results
 
available)
Check  PZR PORVs and Block Valves:
: a. Power to block valves Available (YES)
 
RO
: b. PORVs Closed (YES)
: c. Block valves At least one open. (YES)
 
Establish Instrument Air to CV:
: a. Check APP-002-F7 Extinguished (YES)
RO
: b. Reset IA PCV-1716 c.__Check_IA_PCV-1716 OPEN_(YES)
 
Check Power Supply to Charging Pumps            Offsite power available RO
 
(YES)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #    I    Event #        7 - 12    Page    33  of    33 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if Charging Flow has been established:
: a. Charging pumps At least one running. (YES)
: b. Establish desired charging flow:
o Start additional pump(s) as necessary o Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to RO establish desired charging flow.
o Adjust HIC-121 as necessary to establish desired charging flow:
o Maintain seal injection flow Between 6 gpm and
 
20 qpm per RCP unless seal injection isolated.
Check if SI flow should be terminated:
RO            a. RCS subcooling base on core exit TCs              Greater than 55&deg;F (NO, Go to Step 12.)
Continuous Action Step Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:
a Spray pump Any running (YES)
: b. Containment pressure Less than 4 psig (NO)
 
RO RNO: Perform the following:
: 1) When containment pressure is less than 4 psig, then do steps 21.c through 12.g. (Will remain above 4 psig.)
: 2) Observe Caution prior to Step 13 and Continue with Step 13.
Check if RHR Pumps Should be Stopped:
RO            a. Check RCS pressure:
o__Pressure Greater than_350_psig_(NO,_go to_step_15)
 
Check if Diesel Generators should be Stopped:
: a. AC emergency busses Energized by Offsite Power (YES)
 
o E-1 BOP                  o E-2
: b. EDG starting air annunciators Extinguished (YES)
 
o APP-010-B2 I B3
: c. Stop unloaded EDGs Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status:
: a. Check Cold leg recirculation capability:
RO
                                      . Train A and Train B:
Crew determines that neither A or B RHR Pumps are AVAILABLE Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    1    Event #      7- 12      Page  34  of    34 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew determines that at least ONE train of cold leg recirculation Critical CRS        capability can NOT be verified, and resets SPDS and transitions to Task EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 1.
1 Continuous Action Step Check Emergency Coolant Recirculation Capability Restored (NO)
RO
 
RNO: If Emergency Coolant Recirculation is restored, THEN perform Step 2. Goto Step 3.
RO        Reset SPDS and Initiate Monitoring of CSFSTs.
Foldout Pages are not applicable during performance of this CREW procedure.
Continuous Action Step Check Suction Source to Any of The following Pumps          Lost (NO, go RO
 
to step 7)
SI Pumps, RHR Pumps, CV Spray Pumps Check Emergency Recirculation Equipment Available Using
 
Supplement D (NO)
RO RNO: Try to restore at least one train while continuing with this procedure.
Verify the following CV Recirc Fans        Running (NO, HVH-4 is OOS)
RO
 
HVH-1, 2,3,4 RO        Place the Containment Spray Key Switch to the OVRD/REST Position Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #  I      Event #      7 - 12      Page 35  of    35 Event
 
== Description:==
Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine CV Spray Pump Requirements Determine Number of CV Spray Pumps Required using the following Table:
Containment            Fan Coolers    Spray Pumps RWST Pressure                Running        Required Greater than 42 2
RO                                psig Greater                                    0 or I          2 Between 4 psig than 27%                                    2 or 3            I and 42 psig 4              0 Less than 4 rsic                              0 Determines that I CV Spray Pump is required.
ROOTH 0 F ERAT0R            pmnv th MIfiintinn fnr R RHR nhimn nrI Rack In B RHR
                              ----------------------------
ump breaker lAW SCN file and notify the Control Room that Electrical Maintenance personnel have corrected the problem with t he B RHR Pump breaker (poor breaker alignment) and can be
                            ;tarted as needed.
RO        Starts B RHR PumD.
CRS        Determines that transition to EOP-E-1 Step 16 is warranted.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once it has been identified that transition out of EPP-15 is allowed.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I TURNOVER SHEET
: 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:            MOL b) Reactor Power:                100%
c) Turbine Load:                  778.5 MWe d) Boron Concentration:          848 ppm e) Rod Height:                    218 CBD f) RCS Pressure:                  2235 psig g) RCS Level:                    53.2%
h) Xenon:                        Equilibrium
: 2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. #              Description 3.7.6 Cond. A        Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours.
3.6.6 Cond. C        Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.
: 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW 005 for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours with estimated RTS in 24 hours.
b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours. Available for emergency use only.
: 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a)  None
: 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a)  A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-E1 52/22C.
: 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a)  None
: 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a)  Unrestricted
: 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a)  Maintain current power level
: 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a)  No additional information.
: 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)    Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
: 11. RISK a)  GREEN Appendix D                                                NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:    2    Op Test No.:        ILC-13 Examiners:                                              Operators:  CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 68% EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 139 PPM Boron.
* CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out
* HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
* Maintain power at current level while RES is monitoring A MFP.
Critical Task:
* Manually start HVH-9B to preclude shutdown within 1.5 hours.
* Open either SI-870A or SI-870B.
* Isolate feed to C SIG and Manually close A and B MS IV.
* Stop one Safety Injection Pump to minimize SI flow.
Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                          Description 1                  (C) BOP          HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start 2                  (R) RO            A MFP Trips I Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS 3                  (C) RO, CRS      Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer (TS) CRS 4                  (I) RO, CRS      PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service (N) BOP 5                  (I) BOP, CRS      PT-495 fails Low (TS) CRS 6                  (M) ALL          72 inch Main Steam Header Fault 7                  ALL              C S/G Tube Rupture once S/G has dried out 8                  BOP              Main Turbine fails to Auto-Trip on Reactor Trip 9                  RO                Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open 10                  BOP              A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open II                  BOP              Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close 12                  BOP              A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,  (l)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 68% RTP. Engineering has requested that power be held at 68% while monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP. Additionally, Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations.
Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, HVH-9A, CV Concrete Shield Cooling Fan, trips and HVH-9B fails to Auto-Start. The operator will verify the standby fan starts by manually starting HVH-9B from the RTGB in accordance with APP-010-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, A Main Feed Pump will trip. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-010 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be lowered to less than 60% Reactor Power. The crew will perform the load reduction in accordance with AOP-010 and OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and stabilize the plant, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the RCP Seal Injection Strainer will become clogged. The crew will determine the strainer is clogged by observing a reduction in RCP seal injection flow to zero flow along with receiving APP-001-A2, Seal Water Injection Filter High zP, APP-001-B4, RCP Seal Injection HI/LO Flow, and APP-001-B3, RCP A Bearing HI Temperature. APP-001-A2 will direct the crew to dispatch an auxiliary operator to check Seal Water Injection Filter AP and will ultimately direct the crew to have the auxiliary operator shift seal injection filters using OP-301. The CRS will enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and enter Section C, Loss of Seal Injection. AOP-018 will also diagnose the event as a clogged strainer and direct the crew to shift seal injection filters. Once the seal injection filters are shifted the RCP seal injection flows will return to normal. While seal injection flow is less than 6 gpm to any RCP the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, is applicable since seal injection to any RCP is not within limit with at least one charging pump operable. The required action is to initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to restore seal injection flow and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Pressure Transmitter PT-145 for Letdown Line Pressure will fail LOW, causing PCV-145 to close and isolate letdown flow. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section A will be implemented to isolate the letdown line, reduce charging flow and place Excess Letdown in service. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-495, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, will fail low. The BOP will perform immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section G, and take manual control of FCV-498, C S/G Feed Regulating Valve, and restore C SIG level to the normal band. The crew will then take action to swap to the alternate channel, place the C FRV back in Automatic and remove PT-495 from service in accordance with OWP-025, SGP-11. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Condition D. Also due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the plant will experience a fault on the 72 inch Main Steam Header. The crew will determine that a reactor trip is required and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. An automatic safety injection signal will be initiated due to high steam line flow with low Tavg. During the immediate actions of EOP-E-0 it will be determined that the Turbine failed to automatically trip and manual actions will be taken to trip the turbine from the RTGB. During further actions of EOP-E-0 it will be discovered that SI-870A and B, BIT Outlets, fail to automatically open and have to be manually opened from the RTGB in order to provide safety injection flow. All Main Steam Isolation Valves will fail to automatically close and manually actions will be taken to close them from the RTGB. C MSIV will remain failed in the open position. V2-6A, B, and C, Feedwater Header Section Valves, will fail to automatically close and will have to be manually closed from the RTGB. A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will fail to automatically start and will be manually started from the RTGB.
Once C SIG has dried out a 400 gpm tube rupture will ramp in over 60 seconds on C SIG.
The crew will complete EOP-E-0 and transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and perform the actions to isolate C SIG. The crew may chose to perform Supplement G to isolate C SIG prior to transitioning to EOP-E-2. Supplement G will direct performance of Supplement N. Once C SIG is isolated the crew will then transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, due to elevated readings on R-31 C, Main Steam Line Channel, and continued steam flow from C SIG. Since C MSIV cannot be closed the crew will direct local isolation of C S/G. Ultimately the crew will transition to EPP-17, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, and secure all but one RCP and one Safety Injection pump.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.
Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:
* IC-902, SCN 006_ILQj3_NRC_2.
* Status board is provided to crew is IC-17.
PRE-LOADED EVENTS:
The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:
* Event 7: C S/G Tube Rupture once SIG has dried out
* Event 8: Main Turbine fails to Auto-Trip on Reactor Trip
* Event 9: Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open
* Event 10: A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open
* Event 11: Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close
* Event 12: A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start EVENTS!TRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
* Event 1: HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start
* Event 2: A MFP Trips I Load Reduction
* Event 3: Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer
* Event 4: PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service
* Event 5: PT-495 fails low
* Event 6: 72 inch Main Steam Header Fault EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
* APP-010
* AOP-010
* APP-001
* AOP-018
* AOP-025, Section A
* AOP-025, Section G
* OWP-025, SGP-1 1
* EOP-E-0
* Supplement G (Optional)
* Supplement N (Optional)
* EOP-E-2
* EOP-E-3
* EPP-17 Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      2    Event#          1        Page 5 of    5 Event
 
== Description:==
HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto Start Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto Start EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-O1O-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST!OVLD, is illuminated HVH-9A RTGB GREEN OFF light illuminated BOP      Acknowledges alarm and references APP-010-A7.
APP-010-A7 IF the operating fan has tripped, THEN VERIFY the BOP
 
standby fan starts. (Starts HVH-9B)
NOTE:                      Crew should notify WCC SRO andlor l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, and notify the Operations Manager.
Buu I I-i UFKA I      UK: insert Ivent #.  (MI-Is A I rips) on cue trom the Uhiet hxaminer.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC  Scenario#    2    Event#          2        Page  6 of      6 Event
 
== Description:==
MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time          Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, MFP A Trips.
EVENT INDICATIONS:
Feed Flow and SIG Level Transients on all S!Gs.
APP-7-A3, FW PMP A MOTOR OVLDITRIP, illuminated MFP A indicates OFF Multiple APP-006, S!G Systems, ----S AOP-O1O MAIN FEEDWATERICONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Immediate Action Step Check Feedwater Regulating Valves OPERATING PROPERLY
                                                                      -
B        (MANUAL OR AUTO): (YES)
* FCV-478
* FCV-488
                                *___FCV-498 Continuous Action Step Check Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED (NO)
                                                            -
RO
* IF a Reactor Trip Setpoint is approached, THEN trip the Reactor and Go to EOP-E-0.
* GotoStep4.
SRO        Enters AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction SRO      Verifies immediate actions complete.
CREW        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Go to the appropriate Step from the Table Below:
BOP
                                  *__Main_Feed_Pump_Trip_ Step_6 RO        Check Reactor Power    Less than 70% (YES)
RO        Check Reactor Power    Greater than 60% (YES)
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    2      Event #        2        Page  7  of      7 Event
 
== Description:==
MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time          Position                              Appicants Actions or Behavior Reduce Turbine Load At I %/MIN To 5%/MIN To Achieve Less Than 60% Reactor Power as follows:
: a. Verify Rods in AUTOMATIC. (YES)
: b. Check Turbine Control Mode AUTOMATIC
: 1) Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton
: 2) Set the Desired Load in the SETTER.
CREW
: 3) Set the Desired Load Rate.
: 4) Depress the GO Pushbutton or the HOLD Pushbutton as Necessary to Reduce Turbine Load
: c. Borate Per OP-301 RCS Quick Boration Checklist as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band. Boration steps listed at the end of this section.
SRO        Go To Step 13 BOP        Check Main Feed Pumps        At Least One Running (YES)
SRO        Observe the NOTE prior to Step 38 and go to Step 38.
BOP        Check S/G Level    At OR Trending to Program (YES)
BOP        Check Tavg    At or Trending to Tref (YES)
Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater CREW Problem.
SRO        Implement the EAL5.
Check current loading for the following pumps LESS THAN
                                                                                    -
MAXIMUM (YES)
BOP            . Main Feedwater Pump 0.715 KAMPS
                                                                  -
                                  . Condensate Pumps 370 AMPS
                                                            -
                                  . Heater Drain Pumps 90 AMPS
                                                              -
BOOTH OPERATOR: Report the following AMPS as the current readings:
Main Feedwater Pump 560 AMPS Condensate Pumps            310 AMPS Heater Drain Pumps          75 AMPS I              I Continuous Action Step Determine Iodine Sampling Requirements As Follows: (NO)
SRO
: a. Check Power Change GREATER THAN 15% IN ONE HOUR
                                                                -
                                  . GoToStep44 Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC  Scenario #    2    Event #        2        Page  8 of      8 Event
 
== Description:==
MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time          Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior
                                . IF YES, then implement SR 3.4.16.2 Monitor Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With ITS 3.2.3 RO (YES)
CREW        Notify Load Dispatcher Of The Units Load Capability SRO      Return To Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE:                      OP-301, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist (shaded area) is included in the following steps, but may be used following the commencement of the plant down power.
Expect about 35 -45 gallons of Boric Acid to be added.
DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS and RO OBTAIN an independent check of the volume required OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of RO boric acid previouslydetermined.
PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE RO position.
RO      SET YIC-1 13, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.
IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN RO      AND manually ADJUST controller FCV-1 13A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons.
Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the RO START position Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC  Scenario #    2    Event #        2        Page  9    of      9 Event
 
== Description:==
MFP A Trips / Load Reduction Time          Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior ci the oeiow conaitions occur, i t-IN            ity piace the F<US MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:
RC
* Rod Motion is blocked OR is in the wrong direction
* TAVG goes up
* Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:
* FCV-1 13A, BORIC ACID FLOW, closes.
RO
* FCV-1 I 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
* IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.
* The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.
IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow as follows:
* PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.
* SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.
* PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the CLOSE position.
* Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to ti START position.
* IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RO              the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:
o Unanticipated Rod Motion o Primary Water addition reaches the desired value
* WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:
o FCV-114A, PWTO BLENDER, closes.
o FCV-1 13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
o IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.
o The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.
RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:
* VERIFY FCV-1 14A, PW TO BLENDER, is in AUTO.
* PLACE FCV-1 14B,BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position.
RO
* PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
* VERIFY FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, is in AUTO
* Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    2    Event#          2        Page  lOof      10 Event
 
== Description:==
MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RO        TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.
MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RQ        inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the boration.
(END_OP-301_Section_8.2.8)
                  ..      I BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ESD-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-1 3 NRC    Scenario #        2    Event #        3      Page    ilof      11 Event
 
== Description:==
Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time      I : Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer EVENT INDICATIONS:
Reduction in RCP seal injection flows to zero.
APP-OO1-A2, SEAL WATER INJECTON FILTER HIGH AP APP-OO1-B4, RCP SEAL NJECTION HIILO FLOW APP-OO1-B3, RCP A BEARING HI TEMPERATURE APP-001-A2 IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN REFER TO
 
RO AOP-018 (Informs SRO of AOP-018 entry requirement.)
APP-001-A2 IF RCP Seal Injection flow can NOT be maintained
 
RO        greater than 6 gpm to each RCP, THEN REFER TO AOP-01 8 AND ITS SR 3.4.17.1. (Informs SRO of ITS SR 3.4.17.1 implication.)
APP-001-A2 DISPATCH an operator to check Seal Water Injection RO
 
Filter AP. (Dispatches lAO to CCP Room.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: *WHEN dispatched, wait 2 minutes and then report that A Seal Water Injection Filter indicates pegged high at> 25 psid.
IF RCP Seal Injection Filter AP is high AND is NOT caused by high RO        flow, THEN SHIFT filters using OP-301. (Requests permission from SRO and then directs the lAO to shift filers.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: WHEN dispatched, wait 7 minutes and then shift RCP Seal Injection Filters lAW SCN File.
SRO        Enters AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions CREW        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Determines that Section C, Loss of Seal Injection, is the appropriate SRO section.
Check APP-0O1-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm RO ILLUMINATED (NO, go to step 11)
Determine If a Charging Pump Can Be Started:
RO
: a. Check Charging System Piping Ruptured (NO, go to Step 12)
 
RO        Check SI      Initiated (NO, go to Step 14.)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #      2      Event #      3      Page    12 of      12 Event
 
== Description:==
Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time          Position  I                        Applicants Actions or Behavior RO        Verify at Least ONE Charqinci Pump RUNNING-Check Seal Injection to RCPs:
* ANY Seal Injection flow LESS THAN 6 GPM (YES)
RO AND
                                *__ANY Thermal_Barrier AP _LESS_THAN_5_inches_(YES)
Adjust any OR all of the following to restore seal injection flow.
* HIC-121
* CCP Speed RO
* CVC-297A1B/C (Depending on timeline, all OR none of these actions may be taken.
Crew may determine that clogged strainer is cause and wait to see impact of swapping seal injection strainers.)
Check Seal Injection to RCPs:
* ANY Seal Injection flow LESS THAN 6 GPM (YES)
 
AND RO
* ANY Thermal Barrier AP LESS THAN 5 inches (YES)
 
(May be answered as NO depending on status of swapping RCP seal iniection filters.)
Check P1-121, CHARGING PUMPS DISCH PRESS Indicator LESS RO THAN RCS PRESSURE (NO. ao to SteD 41.)
Check APP-OO1-A2, SEAL WTR INJ FILTER HI i\P Alarm RO ILLUMINATED (YES, if filters have not been swapped)
Shift Seal Injection Filters Using OP-301. (Dispatch lAO to perform if RO not already dispatched.)
Check Alternate Seal Injection Filter      IN SERVICE (When YES, then RO ao to Steo 47.)
Establish Charging Flow on Fl-I 22A, Charging Line Flow        Greater RO than 35 gpm (YES)
RO        Check Normal Letdown      In Service (YES)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      2    Event#        3      Page    13 of        13 Event
 
== Description:==
Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Control Charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:
RO
* Within +1- 5% of Reference Level OR
* PZR level between 30% and 40% with RCP C stopped.
Establish Normal Seal Injection
: a. Check RCP Seal Injection Aligned (YES)
RO
: b. Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 gpm and 13 gpm
 
(YES)
RO        Check Seal Injection Flow    Established To All RCPs SRO        Implement the EALs Refer to Technical Specifications for any applicable LCOs:
Determines that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, was applicable during the time that seal injection flow was less than 6 gpm to any RCP.
SRO Condition D requires that you initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs Immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours.
CRS        Notify WCC SRO to initiate Work Request to replace clo&#xe7;jqed filter.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (PT-145 fails low) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      2      Event#        4        Page    14 of    14 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-145 fails low! Place Excess Letdown in Service Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, PT-I 45 fails low resulting in placing excess letdown in service.
EVENT INDICATIONS:
AOP-OOI-B6 LP LTDN LN HI TEMP
 
AOP-OOI-D6 LP LTDN LN HI PRESS
                -
RO        References APP-00I and informs SRO of need to refer to AOP-025.
SRO        Enters AOP25, RTGB Instrument Failure RO        Place LCV-460A&B In The CLOSE Position RO        Place Excess Letdown in Service Usinq Attachment 2.
Verify Closed the following valves:
                                  . LCV-460A&B Att. 2          BOP
                                  . CVC-200AIBIC
                                  . CVC-204A/B Att. 2          BOP        Verify Open CC-739 Att. 2          BOP        Position CVC-389 to the RCDT Position Att. 2          BOP        Open CVC-387, Excess Ltdn Stop Slowly Open HCV-137, Excess Ltdn Flow, not to exceed 195&deg;F as Att. 2          BOP indicated on TI-I 39, Excess Ltdn HX Outlet TemiD.
Att. 2          BOP        Notify the CRS that Excess Letdown is in service.
Update the ERFS Calorimetric program to reflect Excess Letdown is in Att 2            BOP
      .                      service.
IF required to control Pzr Level, THEN contact Chemistry to perform Att. 2          BOP        the alignment for purging the PZR Liquid sample line with full flow to the VCT iaw CP-003.
BOOTH OPERATOR: IF requested to align sample line for purge, wait 5 minutes and
                            ;m.Imii+        IAUII C(kI .I,.
IIIIJI.IIIIIL IUW  IV    I II.                            -            -
IF PZR Liquid sample line is used to control PZR Level, TEN remove Att. 2      BOP/SRO the calorimetric calculation from service and enter TRM 3.25 Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#        2      Event#        4        Page  15 of    15 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-145 fails low / Place Excess Letdown in Service Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior IF desired to align Excess Letdown to the VCT, THEN perform the following:
Att. 2                          a. Position CVC-389 to the VCT.
BOP
: b. Notify Rad. Control that Excess Letdown is in service through the Seal Water Filters and Heat Exchanger, which will result in RAISED radiation levels in those areas.
RO      Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.
Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 and 13 gpm. (NO)
 
                                  . Locally throttle CVC-297A1B/C to obtain 8 to 13 gpm.
                                  . If required to maintain minimum flow, then throttle HIC-121 while maintaining Charging Pump Discharge pressure less RO than 2500 psig.
                                  . If the normal Seal Injection Range can NOT be maintained, then an expanded range of between 6 to 20 gpm may be used.
                                  . Check ITS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.
BOOTH 01 ERATOR: When requested, throttle CVC-297A1B1C as necessary using the P&ID function to obtain requested seal injection flows.
SRO      Contact Plant Operations Staff to Expedite Repair of PT-145.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #5 (PT-495 fails low) on cue fromthe Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    2    Event #        5      Page    16 of      16 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-495 fails low Time 1j      Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (PT-495 fails low).
EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-006-A4 STM LINE HI AP
 
APP-006-C2 SIG C STM> FW FLOW
 
Steam Flow I Feed Flow Transient on SIG C Immediate Action Step BOP      Verify the Affected FRV in MAN FCV-498 (FRV C)
Immediate Action Step BOP Restore Affected SIG Level to between 39% and 52%
Check Reactor Trip Setpoint Being Approached (NO, go to Step 5.
BOP
 
IF YES, trip the Reactor and go to EOP-E-0.)
BOP      Make PA Announcement For procedure entry.
Place the affected SIG Steam Flow Selector Switch to the alternate channel:
BOP Failed Channel        Affected Channel          Selected Position PT-495                  Fl-494                  CH 495 BOOTH OPERATOR: if requested to check for instrument steam leaks wait 5 minutes and report no indication of steam leaks.
Continuous Action Step Restore Affected Controller to Automatic as Follows:
BOP          a. Check SIG Level Within +1- 1% of Programmed Level
: b. Place the affected Controller in AUTO (when within +1-1% of programmed_level)
Remove the Affected Transmitter from Service using OWP-025, SGP BOP 11.
Contact WCC SRO for assistance with OWP and W/R initiation.
SRO Contact Maintenance.
BOOTH OPERATOR: implement OWP-025, SGP-11, as requested, lAW SCN File.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC  Scenario#      2    Event#          5      Page    17 of      17 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-495 fails low Time      1  Position  1                        Applicants Actions or Behavior
                              . ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours.
e  ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS SRO 3.3.2 Condition D.
                              . ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met.
                              . ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #        6- 12      Page 18  of    18 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6 (72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C S!G Tube Rupture)
EVENT INDICATIONS:
Audible Steam Noise Steam Flow Rising on all Channels Reactor Power Rising on FWUFM and Nis Multiple alarms on APP-004 and APP-006 CREW        Determines that a Reactor Trip is prudent.
RO        Check Reactor tripped (YES)
Check Turbine Trip:
: a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)
BOP
                                                                        -
: b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action reciuired by BOP)
Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:
BOP                a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)
 
b.__El_and_E2__Both_enerqized_(YES)
Check SI Status:
a) Check if SI is actuated:
                                          . SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)
* SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)
 
RO b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED
* SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
* RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
 
(Automatic SI from High Steam Line Flow with Low Tavg)
CRS      Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0.
FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect (IF crew takes an early action to close the MSIVs then C S/G will be identified as Faulted.)
Faulted SIG AFW Isolation Criteria Critical          CRS          a. Reset SI Task                          b. Close V2-14C, SDAFW Pump Discharge Valve to C S/G
: c. Close V2-16C, AFW Header Discharge Valve to C S/G
: d. Perform Att. 2, Deenergizing AFW Valves for Faulted S/Gs
: e. Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow rancie_level_is_cireater than_8%_in_at_least_one_S/G.
RITICAL TASK          ISOLATE FEED TO C SIG Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                          Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #      2      Event #        6 12
                                                                                -            Page 19 of    19 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      I  Position  I                                Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:            Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.
                            . Manually open SI-870A andlor Sl-870B e    Manually close all MSIVs (C MSIV fails remains failed open)
                            . Manually start A MDAFW Pump e    Manually close Feedwater Section Isolation Valves Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS            with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOPE-0.)
Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-O Follows this Stinn
                              -----    - - --                    -----.--- --F Check ECCS Pumps Running:
Att. 1          BOP        . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
                                                -
                              . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
                                                  -
Att. I Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (NO)
Critical          BOP
                                                          -
Task                              . Manually Opens SI-870A and/or SI-870B RITICAL TASK          OPEN SI-870A OR SI-870B Att. 1          BOP        Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
                                                        -
Check Containment Isolation Phase A
: a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
: b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)
: c. Excess letdown Isolated (NO)
 
Att. 1          BOP
* CVC-387 Closed (NO, Manually close CVC-387
 
from RTGB)
* HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (NO, Manually adjust
 
HIC-I37 controller to 0%)
Check Feedwater Isolation:
a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)
 
b) Main feedwater ISOLATED
 
Att. 1          BOP
* FRVs Closed (YES)
* Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (YES)
* Feedwater header section valves Closed (NO, Appendix D                                                                NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-1 3 NRC    Scenario #    2      Event #        6 - 12    Page  20  of      20 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG    Tube Rupture Time          Position                            ADplicants Actions or Behavior Manually closes all Feedwater Header Section_Valves.)
Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:
a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (YES)
 
                                      . Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (NO)
 
Att. 1 Critical          BOP
* High steam flow with: (YES) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig Task OR o Tavg less than 543&deg;F
 
b) Check MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED (NO, Manually closes A and B MSIVs. C MSIV is failed open.)
C ITICAL TASK CLOSES A AND B MSIVs Check  Proper Service Water System Operation:
: a. SW pumps All running (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP          b. SW booster p.umps Both running (YES)
: c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)
Extinguished (YES)
Att. 1          BOP      Check Both EDGs      Running (YES)
Check ECCS Flow:
: a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (YES)
Att              BOP
 
      .                        b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES) c.__RCS_pressure__less_than_275_psiq._(NO,_Go_to_Step_10)
Att. I          BOP      Check CV Recirculation Fans        All Running (YES, all available)
Check IVSW Actuated (YES)
                                          -
Att. 1          BOP
* PCV-1 922A Open (YES)
 
                                *__PCV-1922B        Open_(YES)
Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)
Att              BOP
      .                        a. CV ventilation isolation valves        CLOSED (YES)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    2    Event#        6-12      Page 21  of    21 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time          Position                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)
                                                              -
                                . HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)
 
                                . HVE-16 Stopped (YES)
Att. 1          BOP
* HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (YES)
 
                                . Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)
 
                                . CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)
 
                                . CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Check DS Bus    Energized (YES)
Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)
 
Att. I          BOP      APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
 
APP-036-D2 Extinguished (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Stoi R-1I/12 Sample Pump Att. I          BOP      Locally Reset and Load lACs as necessary (N/A)
Perform Crew Update to include the following:
* Attachment Completion
* Manual Actions Taken (Opened Sl-870A/B, Closed FW Header Att 1            BOP
      .                            Section Valves, Closed A and B MSIVs)
* Failed Equipment status
* SW_status_(All_ojeratinq)
End of EOP-E-O Attachment I Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #        6- 12      Page  22  of  22 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      I  Position                            Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Continuation of EOP-E-O EXAMINER NOTE:              SRO MAY DECIDE TO TAKE A PROMPT AND PRUDENT ACTION AND DIRECT THE BOP TO BEGIN ISOLATING C SIG lAW SUPPLEMENT G and N. CREW MAY HAVE DETERMINED THAT C SIG HAS A TUBE RUPTURE BY THIS POINT IN THE SCENARIO.
Check AFW Pumps        Running (NO, A MDAFW Pump must be RO
 
manually started.)
Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)
 
                                . AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)
 
RO
* AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)
 
                                . Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump
 
is_running._(YES)
Check Total AFW Flow:
                                . Reset SI RO
* Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 8% and 50%.
                                *__Check_total_AFW flow-_Greater than_300_gpm_(YES)
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
                                      . CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (YES)
 
o APP-001-C1 I Dl          Extinguished (YES)
OR RO
* Seal injection flow Normal (YES)
 
o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP
 
OR o__Thermal_barrier zIPs Greater_than_5_inches_water.
 
BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&ID function I
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2      Event #        6- 12      Page  23  of    23 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Temperature With any RCPs running, RCS average temperature Stable at or trending to 547&deg;F (NO)
RNO: IF temperature is less then 547&deg; F AND lowering then perform the following: (YES)
: a. Stop dumping steam RO                b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to minimum for decay heat removal:
o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 8% in at least one SIG.
: c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.
Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:
: a. PORVs Closed (YES)
RO
: b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
: c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)
 
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
: a. RCPs Any Running (YES)
: b. SI pumps At least one running and capable of delivering RO flow.
: c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs            Less than 30&deg;F (NO, go to step 14)
Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all S/Gs o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (NO)
BOP o None Completely depressurized (NO)
RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs.
Go to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.
Beqinning of EOP-E-2 Check MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves for faulted S/G CLOSED BOP (A and B MSIVs manually closed. C MSIV failed open)
Check IF ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary is Intact:
BOP a.__Check_pressure_in_all_S/G_ ANY_STABLE_OR_RISING_(YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #        6 12
                                                                          -        Page  24 of      24 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      I  Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Identify Faulted SIGs: (C SIG is faulted)
: a. Check pressures in all SIGs:
* Any SIG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner BOP (YES)
OR
* Any S/G Completely depressurized. (YES)
Isolate Faulted S/G:
: a. Check main feedwater to faulted SIB Isolated (FCV-498,
 
FCV-499, V2-6C) (YES)
: b. Reset SI
: c. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G
* Close V2-14C and V2-16C BOP
: d. Check faulted SIG steam line PORV Closed (RV-3) (YES)
: e. Close V1-8C
: f. Perform Att. 1 to De-energize AFW Valves for Faulted S/G
: g. Locally close MS-38
: h. Check SIG Blowdown and Blowdown sample valves from faulted S/G Closed (YES)
 
BOOTH OPERATOR: As directed de-energize AFW valves and close MS-38 lAW SCN File.
BOP        Check CST level >10% (YES)
Check Secondary Radiation:
: a. Request periodic activity samples of all SIGs
: b. Unisolated secondary radiation monitors have remained BOP
 
normal (NO, R-31C is elevated)
RNO: Reset SPDS and Go to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.
NOTE
* FOLDOUT for EOP-E-3 is in effect.
* Chemistry should be available for sampling during this SRO procedure.
* Step I RCP trip criteria applies until an operator controlled RCS_cooldown_is_initiated.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-1 3 NRC      Scenario #        2  Event #        6 12
                                                                            -        Page 25 of    25 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time          Position  i                            Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTINUOUS ACTION STEP Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
: a. RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES)
                                                -
: b. SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF RO
                                                    -
nFl I/PPlN( FLOW (YES)
: c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN 30&deg;F
                                                                                        -
rn&deg;i      (NIfl\
                                          * .1 \*
* l-<NU: (o to ter 2 Identify Ruptured S/G(s): (C S/G is ruptured)
                                  . Unexpected rise in any S/G narrow range level OR
                                  . High radiation from any SG steamlne (R-31s)
OR BOP
                                  . High radiation from any SG blowdown line (R-19s)
OR
                                  . High radiation from any S/G sample:
o Contact Chemistry to sample all S/Gs for activity as necessary CAUTION
                                  . If the steam driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the steam driven AFW pump should CRS be maintained from at least one S/G.
                                  . At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    2      Event#        6-12      Page 26  of    26 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      1  Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Flow From Ruptured SIG(s):
: a. Adjust ruptured SIG(s) steam line PORV controller setpoint to 1060 psig
: b. Check ruptured S/G steam line PORV (RV1-3) CLOSED (YES)
: c. Close steam driven AFW pump steam shutoff valve for ruptured SIC: (Vi-8C)
: d. Locally close the following valve for ruptured SIG(s) while continuing with this procedure:
                                      . MS-38, SG C BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP (pipe jungle above/right of Vi -8C)
: e. Check S/C blow down and blow down sample valves from ruptured S/G(s) Closed
 
                                      . SG3 Blowdown Critical BOP                . FCV-1932A&B Task
                                      . FCV-1935A&BSHUT
: f. Check MSIV above and below seat drain valves for ruptured S/C CLOSED (YES)
: g. Close ruptured SIG MSIV and MSIV bypass valve Vi-3C and MS-353C. (NO, V1-3C is failed open.)
RNO:
: 1) Close all remaining MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves. (YES)
: 2) Verify the following valves are closed
                                          . Turbine stop and governor valves
                                          . MSR purge and shutoff valves
                                          . Condenser steam dump valves
: 3) Perform Att. 5, Local Isolation of Ruptured S/G with Failed MSIV or Bypass Valve, while continuing with this procedure.
: 4) Use_intact_S/Cs_steam_line_PORVs_for_steam_dump.
BOOTH O ERATOR: Acknowledge direction to perform Att. 5. Wait 5 minutes and close GS-3 lAW SCN File and then report Aft. 5 complete. All other valves are not modeled.
            ]              ]
                                                  .J CAUTION
                                  . If any ruptured S/G is faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless SRO needed for RCS cooldown.
                                  . If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required_to_restart_safeguards_equipment.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #      6 12
                                                                          -        Page  27 of      27 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIC Tube Rupture
[    Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check Ruptured S/G Level:
BOP
: a. Narrow range level Greater than 8%. (NO, per caution feed
 
flow will remain isolated. Go to Step 5.)
CAUTION Major steam flow paths from the ruptured SIG(s) should be isolated SRO before initiating RCS cooldown. This includes MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves, steam line PORV, and AFW pump steam shutoff valve.
Check Ruptured SIG Pressure Greater than 370 psig. (NO)
BOP ,
RNO: Reset SPDS and Go to EPP-17, SGTR with Loss of Reactor SRO Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, Step 1.
B.&#xe9;jflijof SRO      Open Foldout E (None applicable)
RO        Reset SAFETY INJECTION RO        Reset CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A AND PHASE B Continuous Action Step BOP Check Loss Of Offsite Power      IN PROGRESS (NO, go to step 8)
Continuous Action Step Establish Instrument Aw To CV As Follows:
* Check APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS RO                    EXTINGUISHED (YES)
* Momentarily place IA PCV-1 716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV Switch, to RESET
* Check INST AIR VALVE TO CV PCV-1716 OPEN (YES)
 
Continuous Action Step RO        Determine If CV Spray Should Be Stopped As Follows:
                                    .__Check_CV_Spray_Pumps__RUNNING_(NO,_go_to_step_11)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #        6- 12      Page 28 of    28 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C S/G Tube Rupture Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior nunuous cuon Step Control Ruptured S/G Level As Follows:
: a. Check ruptured S/G level LESS THAN 8% [18%] (YES)
                                                                    -
BOP            b. Check ruptured S/G(s) Aso Faulted (YES)
: c. Check ruptured-faulted SIG(s) needed for RCS Cooldown RNO: Stop feed flow to ruptured-faulted S/G(s) and go to Step 12.
Continuous Action Step Determine If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped
: a. Check RCS pressure:
* GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [400 PSIG] (YES)
RO
* STABLE OR INCREASING
: b. Verify RHR Pumps Stopped
: c. Check RCS pressure Less than 275 psig [400 PSIG] (NO, go
 
to Step 13)
Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:
: a. Check Auxiliary Building radiation monitors NORMAL (YES)
: b. Contact Chemistry to obtain the following periodic samples:
* RCS for boron and activity RO
* Ruptured S/G(s) for boron
* Pressurizer for boron
: c. Contact Plant Operations Staff to determine additional actions to evaluate plant status, while continuing with this procedure Establish Charging Flow As Follows
* Check Charging Pumps ALL STOPPED (NO, go to step RO
 
14.h.)
* Verify charging flow on Fl-122A Greater than 35 GPM (YES)
 
Align Charging Pump Suction To RWST as follows:
: a. From the RTGB, verify LCV-1 I 5B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT            -
OPEN RO        b. Verify LCV-1 1 5C, VCT OUTLET CLOSED  -
: c. Start all available Charging Pumps
: d. Increase running Charging Pumps speed to maximum
: e. Verify maximum charging flow on Fl-I 22A (YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    2    Event #        6- 12      Page  29 of    29 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time          Position                              ADrlicants Actions or Behavior Identify Faulted SIGs As Follows:
: a. Check pressure in all SIGs:
                                  . ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN BOP UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)
OR
                                  . ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)
BOP      Check Faulted S/Gs        PREVIOUSLY ISOLATED (YES)
Control Intact S/G Levels As Follows:
: a. Check intact S/G levels ANY GREATER THAN 8% (YES)
: b. Control feed flow to maintain intact S/G levels between 8% and BOP 50%
: c. Check intact S/G levels ANY INCREASING IN AN
 
UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO. ao to step 19)
Continuous Action Step RO        Ensure Adequate Shutdown Margin Exists As Follows:
: a. Check boron samile results AVAILABLE (NO. cio to step 20)
 
Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown As Follows:
: a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than 100&deg;F in the last 60 minute
: b. Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within limits of Curve 3.4, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature
 
BOP                Limitations For Cooldown
: c. Check intact S/Gs AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE FOR RCS
                                                            -
COOLDOWN (YES)
: d. Check steam dump to Condenser Available (NO)
 
RNO: Dump steam using Steam Line PORVs and go to step 21.
RO        Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures              Less than 543&deg;F (YES)
Restore Steam Dumps as follows:
BOP        Check steam dump to condenser Available (NO, continue RCS
 
cooldown using Steam Line PORVs and go to step 23.)
Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:
: a. Momentarily place Safety Injection Tavg Selector Switch to RO                BLOCK position.
: b. Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light Illuminated. (YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    2      Event#        6-12      Page 30 of    30 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      1  Position  fi                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Determine if subcooled recovery is appropriate as follows RO Check RWST level Greater than 56% (YES)
 
Check ruptured S/G Level Less than 84% (YES)
 
RO        Check RCS Subcooling        Greater than 35&deg;F (YES)
Check SI and RHR Pump Status:
* SI Pumps Any running (YES)
RO
 
OR
* RHR Pumps Any running in LO Head Injection Mode (YES)
 
RO        Energize PZR Heaters to Maintain Steam Bubble Continuous Action Step RO        Depressurize RCS to Refill PZR as follows.
Check PZR Level Less than 27%. (NO, go to step 32)
 
RO        Check RCP Status      All Stoed (NO. cio to steD 37 Establish Normal PZR Spray as Follows:
: a. Check RCP Status Only One Running (NO, Stop all but one
 
RCP)
RO            b. Check RCP C Running (YES, unless stopped in step above)
: c. Check RCP B Running (NO)
 
RNO: Place PCV-455A, PZR Spray Valve Controller, in MAN and adjust output to ZERO. Go to Step 38.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    2      Event #        6- 12      Page    31 of    31 Event
 
== Description:==
72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine if one SI Pump should be stopped:
: a. Check SI Pumps Any running (YES)
: b. Determine required RCS subcoolinq from table:
Charging Pump                    Any RCP Running Status            One SI Pump              Two SI Pumps Running                    Running D0NOTst0pSI None Running
                                          .
Pump                        72 F One Running                197&deg;F                      68&deg;F Two Running                176&deg;F                      65&deg;F Three Running              158&deg;F                      62&deg;F C. Check RCS subcooling Less tnan required subcooling (NO,
 
go to step 38.f.)
: f. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (YES)
: g. Stop on SI Pump
: h. Check RCS Pressure Stable or increasing (YES)
 
Go to Step 38.a.
RO
: a. Check SI Pumps Any running (YES)
: b. Determine required RCS subcoolinq from table:
Charging Pump                    Any RCP Running Status            One SI Pump              Two SI Pumps Running                    Running Do NOT stop SI None Running                                          72&deg;F Pump One Running                197&deg;F                      68&deg;F Two Running                176&deg;F                      65&deg;F Three Running              158&deg;F                      62&deg;F
: d. Check RCS subcooling Less tnan required subcooling (NO,
 
go to step 38.f.)
: f. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (YES)
: g. Stop on SI Pump
: h. Check RCS Pressure Stable or increasing (YES)
 
Go to Step 38.a.
: a. Check SI Pumis      Any runninq (NO, cio to stei 39)
Check RCS subcooling        Less than required subcooling (NO, go to RO step 38.f.)
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2 TURNOVER SHEET
: 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:            EOL b) Reactor Power:                68%
c) Turbine Load:                  485 MWe d) Boron Concentration:          139 ppm e) Rod Height:                    165 CBD f) RCS Pressure:                  2235 psig g) RCS Level:                    41.9%
h) Xenon:                        Equilibrium
: 2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. #              Description 3.7.6 Cond. A      Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours.
3.6.6 Cond. C      Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.
: 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW OOS for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours with estimated RTS in 24 hours.
b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours. Available for emergency use only.
: 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a)  None
: 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a)  A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-.E1 52/22C.
: 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a)  None
: 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a)  Unrestricted
: 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a)  Maintain current power level
: 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a)  Maintain current power level while RES is monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP.
: 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)    Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
: 11. RISK a)    GREEN Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:      3    Op Test No.:      ILC-13 Examiners:                                              Operators:    CRS  -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 100% EOL, 15,697 MWD/M1
                    . CCW Pump C is QOS and
                      . HVH-4isOOSandbreakeri            iW 1
                                                            ,
2            (f.L.,  -
Turnover:
* Maintain power at current Ie
                                                            , 021 4    Jr Critical Task:
* Establish Containment Isolal
                      . Manually start A MDAFW F        7 J_k      -
* Secure all RCPs due to a lo                  L LiU  -
* Manually Start A SI Pump                  I
* Direct local actions to Swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST to prevent Gas Binding of the Charging Pumps. (Contingency)
Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                            Description 1                  (I) BOP, CRS      PT-447 fails Low (TS) CRS 2                  (C) RO, CRS      TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure 3                  (I) RO            Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High (TS) CRS 4                  (R) RO            HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load (N) BOP, CRS      Reduction 5                  (I) BOP, CRS      SIG Level Median Selector Module failure (TS) CRS 6                  (M) ALL          Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close 7                  (M) ALL          Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2) 8                  (M) ALL          Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
9                  BOP              SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start.
10                  RO                CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A 11                  RO                A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,    (1)nstrument,  (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.
The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section H, and verify S/Gs trending to 39% and place Rod Control in Manual. S/G levels will be restored to normal, alternate channel selected and feedwater regulating valves returned to automatic. Rod control will be returned to automatic once Tavg verified in the required band. PT-447 will then be removed from service in accordance with OWP-033, FSP-2. Failure of PT-447 will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Item 17e, requirement to have 2 Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 inputs available for Reactor Protection System Interlocks to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition T, will be entered which requires that the P-7 interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours. ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e, requirement to have 2 High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation will not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.2, Condition D, will be entered which requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours AND be in Mode 4 in 18 hours. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, TCV-144, Letdown Temperature Controller, will fail close causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. TCV-123, VCT/DEMIN DIV, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT and manual action will be taken to divert letdown flow from the RTGB in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD. The operator will then determine that TCV-144 has failed closed and take manual actions at the RTGB to open TCV 144 to re-establish cooling flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger in accordance with APP-001-A6. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, Nl-44, Power Range, Upper Detector will fail high. The channel will be removed from service in accordance with OWP-0i 1, N 1-4. N 1-44 failure will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.
Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours. Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours (Condition 5)
OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours (Condition T). Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, HCV-1 459 will fail open. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-0i 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-01 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be controlled less than 100% and take action to lower turbine load. Once Reactor Power is stabilized below 100%, the crew will receive a report from Operations Management that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP and recommends that Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Reactor Power be reduced in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, and secure A MFP. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, the A SIG level median selector module will fail resulting in a loss of S/G level input to the A Feedwater Regulating Valve. The crew will take immediate actions of AOP-O1 0, Main Feedwater / Condensate Malfunction, with the BOP taking manual control of A FRy. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control and stabilize A S/G level, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, three main turbine governor valves will begin to randomly oscillate and ultimately fail closed resulting in a Secondary Load Rejection. The crew may decide to take a conservative action and initiate a reactor trip and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, the crew may enter AOP-01 5, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to diagnose the problem. Once in AOP-015 the crew will eventually reach a continuous action step that requires the crew to trip the reactor if greater than two governor valves indicate closed. During the fast-bus transfer following the Reactor Trip, 4KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Start-up Transformer due to breaker 52/17 tripping open. On the loss of 4KV Bus 3 the B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of power to 480V Bus E-2.
Due to the seal failure and suction line leak on B RCP a safety injection will be required. Only A train ECCS components will be available due to the loss of Bus E-2. However, A SI Pump does not auto-start and must be manually started from the RTGB. Also during the reactor trip the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will trip and neither A or B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start. CVC-200A, Letdown Orifice Isolation, and CVC-204A and CVC-240B, Letdown Line Isolation Valves, fail to close as required on the Phase A signal. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew should dispatch personnel to investigate and troubleshoot the failure of B EDG. If dispatched, maintenance personnel will determine and correct the cause (fuel racks found tripped and reset) and recommend that the B EDG be started locally. If personnel are not dispatched then 480V Bus E-2 will remain deenergized. With 480V Bus E-2 denergized MCC-6 will not have power and thus LCV-1 1 5C, VCT Isolation, will remain in the open position preventing Charging Pump suction swapover to the RWST. If not identified this will eventually result in a loss of suction to the Charging Pumps and lead to gas binding if LCV-1 1 SC is not closed locally. If gas binding of the Charging Pumps occurs then all Charging Pumps will be secured, LCV-1 I 5C will have to be locally closed and Charging Pumps vented prior to restoring charging pump flow.
The crew will progress through EOP-E-0 and address the malfunctions discussed above.
Additionally, subcooling will lower to the point at which RCP Trip Criteria is met and all RCPs will be secured. EOP-E-0 will eventually direct the crew to transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. At some point during the performance of EOP-E-0 or EOP-E-1 the crew is expected to realize that B RCP experienced a seal failure and that AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, is required to be implemented since it is a Concurrent AOP. The crew will perform EOP-E-1 and eventually transition to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, and initiate RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown and Depressurization of the RCS to refill the PZR.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.
Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
I Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:
* IC-902, SCN 006_ILC_13_NRC_3.
* Status board is provided to crew is 10-21.
PRE-LOADED EVENTS:
The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:
* Event 7: Loss of 4 KV bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2)
* Event 8: Locked Rotor on B results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak
* Event 9: SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start
* Event 10: CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A
* Event 11: A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
* Event 1:  PT-447 fails Low
* Event 2:  TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure
* Event 3: Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High
* Event 4: HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP vibrations I Load Reduction
* Event 5: SIG Level Median Selector Module failure
* Event 6: Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
* AOP-025, Section H
* OWP-033, FSP-2
* APP-001
* APP-005
* OWP-011,Nl-4
* AOP-01 0 (Twice)
* AOP-038
* EOP-E-0
* AOP-018
* EOP-E-1
* EPP-8 Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
__________
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13NRC      Scenario#      3      Event#          I        Page        5 of      5 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.
Time      :
I  Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, PT-447 fails low EVENT INDICATIONS:
PT-447 pressure indication fail to 0 PSIG APP-003-D4, TAVGITREF DEV APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUBIBYPD APP-006-D4, E4, F4, SIG A, B, C STM LINE HI FLOW APP-006-A3, B3, C3, SIG A, B, C LVL DEV TR-408 Pen #2 defaults to 547&deg;F Immediate Action Step:
BOP      Check Turbine Load Reduction in progress or has occurred.
(NO, Go TO Step 3)
Immediate Action Step:
BOP
  ..                        [Check S/G Level trend controlling in AUTO to 39%. (YES)
Immediate Action Step:
Manually control Reactor power and TAVG:
RO
: a. Place the Rod Control Selector Switch in Manual.
b.__Operate_rods_to_maintain_reactor_power_less_than_100%.
SRO      Enters AOP-025 and Verifies immediate actions complete.
CREW        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.
Check S/G levels stabilized at between 39% and 52%. (In progress)
BOP      RNO: When S/G level is stabilized at between 39% to 52%, then go to step 6.b.
Verify ALL FRV Controllers in MAN BOP
                                . FCV-478, FCV-488, and FCV-498.
Place the First Stage Pressure Selector Switch to the alternate BOP channel (PT-446).
BOP      Restore each S/G level to program level using FRVs or Bypass Valves Continuous Action Step:
Restore each FRV to AUTOMATIC as follows:
BOP
: a. Check S/G level within +1- 1% of program level.
:                                h Place th ected rnr+ roller              Al ITfl i.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-1 3 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #        I        Page        6 of    6 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.
Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step:
Restore Rod Control to AUTOMATIC as follows:
* Check TAVG within 0.5 to +0.5&deg;F of TREE AND Axial Offset BOP                within the target band. (NO) o Restore TAVG using manual rod control prior to placing rods in auto.
* Place the Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO.
SRO        Remove PT-447 from service using OWP-033, FSP-2.
BOOTH 01 ERATOR:            When reciuested. Derform ste&#xf8;s of OWP-033 to remove PT-447 rrom service. ixctions snouici inciucie AiVIU nortion ot UWI-033 IT requestea 10 cnec I- I -ii, report mat mere is no visinie Jamage or leakage noted.
Check ITS LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for applicability
* ITS Table 3.3.1-1 Item 17e, Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 input Condition T requires to verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour or be in Mode 2 within 7 hours (Current plant conditions requires that the REACTOR TRIP BLOCK P-7 status light be extinguished).
SRO
* ITS Table 3.3.2-1 Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation High Steam Line Flow with Low Tave or Low Steam Line Pressure Condition D: Place channel in
 
trip within 6 hours OR Be in Mode 3 in 12 hours AND Be in Mode 4 within 18 hours.
* ITS Table 3.3.6-1 Item 4 Safety Injection for Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation refers to LCO 3.3.2 Functions 1 .a-f (which have already been addressed).
SRO        Go to Procedure Main Body, Step 2 SRO        Implement the EALs NOTE:                        Crew should notify WCC SRO and!or l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, and notify the Operations Manager.
SOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (TC V-I 44 Controller fails closed with TC V-I 43 auto-swap failure) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    3      Event#          2        Page  7  of      7 Event
 
== Description:==
TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure.
Time          Position  1                        Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, TCV-I 44 Controller fails closed with TCV-I 43 auto-swap failure EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-OOI-A6 LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD
 
Refers to APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, and RO monitors letdown parameters.
IF letdown temperature is greater than 135&deg;F, THEN VERIFY APP-aol -A6        RO        controller TC-143 is diverted to the VCT. (RO must take manual action to divert TCV-143 to the VCT.)
IF CCW flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchange is low, THEN INCREASE Component Cooling Water flow using TC-144. (RO must APP-OOl -A6        RO take manual control of TC-144 and adjust as necessary to raise CCW flow to the NRHX.)
Contact the WCC SRO to initiate a W/R and contact Maintenance to SRO prepare for troubleshooting and repair.
BOOTH OPERATOR: If! When contacted as WCC SRO or Maintenance, acknowledge the report and state that a WIR will be initiated and Work Week Coordinator will be contacted.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (NI-44 Upper Detector fails High) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-1 3 NRC    Scenario #      3      Event #        3    Page      8 of        8 Event
 
== Description:==
N 1-44 Upper Detector fails High Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, NI-44 Upper Detector fails Hiqh EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-005-A4 PR SINGLE CH HI RANGE ALERT
                -
APP-005-B4 PR OVERPOWER ROD STOP
                -
APP-005-C3 PR DET LOSS OF VOLT
 
APP-005-D6 A FLUX WARNING I STATUS
                -
APP-005-F3 PR UPPER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT
 
Nl-44 Upper detector output pegged HIGH Identifies that NI-44 Upper Detector has failed. Refers the various RO APP-005 alarms annunciator procedures.
Informs SRO of APP direction to remove failed Power Range Detector RO from service lAW OWP-01 I SRO        Briefs OWP-01 1, N 1-4, for removal of N 1-44 from service.
Contacts the WCC SRO and directs the initiation of W/R and contact SRO        of Maintenance. Also, requests WCC SRO assist with implementation of OWP-0l 1.
Implement OWP-011, NI-4
                                  . Remove Nl-44 from ERFIS SCN: NINOO44A
                                  . Dropped Rod Mode Switch Bypass 
                                  . NIS Rod Drop Bypass NI-44 Status Light ILLUM   
                                  . N 1-44 Out of Service Trip Switch Tripped (Behind NI Panel)
 
                                  . Bistable Light HI POW RANGE HI FLUX NC44R ILLUM RO/BOP
* Rod Stop Bypass Switch Bypass PR 44
* Comparator Channel Defeat Switch Select PR 44
* Detector Current Comparator Drawer:
o Upper Section Switch Select PR 44
 
o Lower Section Switch Select PR 44
 
(N 1-44 Instrument Power Fuses are not to be removed per ** note since power is greater than P-b.)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #      3      Event#        3      Page    9 of      9 Event
 
== Description:==
Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High Time      I  Position  I                          Anolicants Actions or Behavior Implements applicable ITS LCOs:
ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels is not met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.
SRO        Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours.
Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours (Condition S) OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours (Condition T).
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (HGV-I 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#    3      Event#        4        Page    10  of    10 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-007-B6 HDT HIILO LVL
 
HCV-1459 Open light illuminated Calorimetric Power rising AOP-O1O, Main FeedwaterlCondensate Malfunction Immediate Action BOP      Check Feedwater Regulating Valves Operating Properly (YES)
 
                                . FCV-478 I 488 I 498 Continuous Action Step RO Check Reactor Trip Setpoint      Being Approached (NO, go to step 4)
BOP      Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Go to the appropriate step from the Table below:
BOP HCV-1459 Failed Open Step 35
 
NOTE:                      Crew may take action lAW OMM-OO1-2 to reduce Reactor Power to less than 2339 MWth by use of the Valve Position Limiter.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      3      Event#        4        Page    11    of    11 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time          Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine if HCV-1459 has failed as follows:
: a. Check HCV-1459 Open (YES)
: b. Maintain Reactor Power less than 100% by reducing Turbine Load at 1 %/min to 5%/mm as follows:
: 1) Verify rods in Automatic a) Check Turbine Control Mode Automatic (YES)
 
b) Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton a) Set the Desired Load in the SETTER d) Set the DesiredLoad Rate e) Depress the GO Pushbutton or the HOLD Pushbutton BOP as Necessary to Reduce Turbine Load.
: 2) Borate per OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band.
(Boration steps are listed below and are shadedj
: 3) Continue power reduction until Feed Water Pump suction pressures are greater than 400 psig
: 4) Check Feed Water Pump suction pressures Greater than 400 psig (YES)
: c. Verify HCV-1459 Closed (NO)
 
RNO: Locally isolate HCV-1 459 by closing C-52A, HCV-1459 Inlet.
BOOTH 01 ERATOR: Vhen requested, wait 2 minutes and report the Feed Water Pump suction oressures as indicated on the P&ID function. When lIrpctprL wmt 3 minLItPs nrI isnIt HGV-145 lAW CN file.
Beginning of OP-301, Quick Boration Checklist RD        DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS RO        OBTAIN an independent check of the volume required.
RD        OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to borate.
RD        PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch to BORATE.
RD        SET YIC-l 13, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to desired quantity.
IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN RD AND manually ADJUST using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #          3      Event #        4          Page      12        of          12 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time          Position  I                                  Applicants Actions or Behavior RO        Momentrilv          PLACE thA RS MAKIRJP SYSTPM witr.h tn START                                    I IF any of the below conditions occur. THEN momentarily olace the
 
RO
* RtId M(tItw1
 
hIi.kcinr inth wrnnri tlir--tinn I              IAVfl.1UUP                                                                            I I                        . .  .                                                                      I I      .      Korir. Acid dditinn      eY.ccic th dirri wIii                                        I AILII.I 4k.. -J                    ,.- ...  . A ..J L-..-....      ....J..J.....J  r1 IFhI .
VVI IL..I4 LI I L1IIL1 dIIIUUI IL UI LJUI I !L..IU I Id L)I I dUUU,                I riai VIii)l the following:
* FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, closes.
RO
                                  .      FCV.-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
                                  .      IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.
* The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.
IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow path as follows:
                                  .      PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.
                                  .      SET YIC-1 14, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.
                                  .      PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to CLOSE.
                                  .      Momentarily PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START.
                                  .      IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RCR MAkI ID VSTIM              QMif.h hi fhQ CTflI)          rrw+irr RO
* a** -dd        rea        he
* vvMEN tne aesirea amount ot l-nmary VVater nas been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:
o FCV-1 14A PW to Blender closes.
o FCV-113B Blended MU to CHG Suct. closes.
o    IF in Aiim    THFN the nperatinci PrimrvNter Piimn RE I URN me                  iviaeup System to automatic as tollows:
* VERIFY FCV-1 14A Primary WTR Flow Dilute Mode is in AUTO.
* PLACE FCV-1 14B Blended MU to VCT to the AUTO position.
RO
* PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
* VERIFY FCV-1 I 3A Boric Acid Flow is in AUTO.
* Mnmnfrii, P1 A(F the Rnc MA1<PI IP VTIM AIifIh in fh p
Appendix D                                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      3      Event#        4        Page    13  of    13 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time      1  Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RD        TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.
MONITOR Darameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RD        intnrm th (RS N        the SM of th rnlt of th boration.
lflC1 ot UI-3(J1    (iiihk  Eortinn      (hckIit SRO        Contact l&C to Troubleshoot AND Correct the HCV-1459 Problem CREW        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Unless Previously Made.
BOP        Check S/G Level        At OR Trending to Program (YES)
RD        Check Tavg      At OR Trending to Tref (YES)
BOOTH OPERATOR: Contact the SRO as Operations Manager and report that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP. Recommend that Reactor Power be reduced in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, and secure A MFP as soon as plant conditions support.
Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater SRO Problem SRO        Implement the EALs NOTE:                      The SRO may continue in AOP-O1O once the downpower has commenced in accordance with AOP-038. The remaining steps in AOP-O1O are notifications and parameter verifications and are not listed in this scenario guide.
Determines the need to transition to ADP-038 and commence Rapid SRO Downpower.
Notify Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using the Plant Page CREW System.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I!
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      4        Page    14  of    14 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations! Load Reduction Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine Corrected Boration and Target Rod Height for Target Power Level using Most Recently Performed OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan.
RD
* Target Load Reduction Rate            %/min
* Target Power Level
* Target Rod Height
                                  . Corrected Boration            Gallons Perform Brief of Control Room Personnel to include the following
                                  . Reason for downpower
* Target Power Level SRO
                                  . Target Rod Height
                                  . Rate of load reduction
* Amount of boric acid addition Continuous Action Step RD      Check Required Power Reduction Rate              Less than or equal to 5%/mm. (YES)
RO      Enerqize All available PZR Heaters RD      Check Rod Control      IN AUTO (YES)
Initiate Boration Using Att. 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing with this RD procedure.
Att. 1            RD      Place the RCS Makeup Mode Selector Switch to BORATE IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts are anticipated, THEN Att              RO place Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch AliQned to BLEND to ON.
Att. 1            RD      Set YIC-1 13 to amount determined in Main Body Step 2.
Att. I            RD      Momentarily place the RCS Makeup System Switch to START.
IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN place Att. 1            RD      FCV-1 1 3A in MAN and manually adjust controller FCV-1 1 3A using UP and DOWN pushbuttons.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:        ILC-I3NRC      Scenario#      3      Event#        4        Page    15  of    15 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time          Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior When the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS Makeup System Switch is placed in STOP, THEN verify the following:
Att. 1            RO            a. FCV-1 1 3A closes
: b. FCV-1 1 3B closes
: c. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops
: d. RCS Makeuo System is OFF Initiate Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing with this procedure:
: a. Check EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO
: b. Prepare for Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:
BOP                    1) Check IMP IN ILLUMINATED
: 2) SET desired load in the SETTER
: 3) Select the desired Load Rate
: c. Depress the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction.
Adjust Turbine Load to Control Tavg within 5&deg;F of Tref using one of the following:
BOP            . Adjust Load Rate OR
                                  . Depress GO and HOLD pushbuttons Initiate Notification of the following:
                                  . Load Dispatcher of Load Reduction
                                  . E&C to control secondary chemistry
                                  . RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe SRO Alley
                                  . On-call Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team
                                  . E&C for impending 15% power change for 1-131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours Check Auxiliary Boilers        At Least One Operating (NO, not needed BOP
 
since staying on-line.)
Continuous Action Step RO      Check Tavg Within 5&deg;F of Tref (IF NO, then take necessary action
 
with Turbine Load reduction or boration rate)
Continuous Action Step RO      Check Axial Flux Distribution Within Target Band (IF NO, then refer
 
to ITS 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, for required actions.)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                      Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #      3    Event#        4        Page  16  of    16 Event
 
== Description:==
HCV-1 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time      I  Position  N                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Check APP-006-F5, Steam Dump Armed Extinguished (NO, no BOP
 
actions recuired since> 15%. Illuminated due to PT-447 failure.)
Check any of the following conditions MET:     
                                    .      Target load/power has been reached (NO)
SRO
* Load reduction is no longer required (NO)
                                    .        CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction (NO)
Go to Step 16 Check Reactor Power Less than 85% (NO)
 
RO        (In hold until at 85% Power. Once at 85% power one Heater Drain Pump will be secured.
bUU III UF(M I UK:          unce me L..nIeT examiner is sausTiea witn tne crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, Insert Event #5 (A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure) on cue from the Chief
                                  ...,  fr. F. r Appendix D                                                              NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #      3    Event#          5      Page    17 of      17 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure Time          Position  8                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure).
EVENT INDICATIONS:
Feed flow transient on A SIG APP-006-A3 SIG A LVL DEV
 
Determines entry into AOP-010 is warranted due to Feedwater Flow CREW Transient Immeaiate ,.ction Step Check Feedwater Regulating Valves          Operating Properly (Manual OR Auto):
* FCV-478, FRV A (NO)
* FCV-488, FRV B (YES)
* FCV-498, FRV C (YES)
RNO: Perform the following:
BOP            a. Verify FRV for affected S/G in manual control. (Places FCV 478 in Manual)
: b. Attempt to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.
: c. Stop any load change in progress. (Place turbine controls to HOLD.)
: d. Restore affected S/G level to between 39% and 52%.
: e. IF unable to control S/G level, THEN trip the Reactor and go to EOP-E-0.
: f. Go to Step 37.
BOP        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry BOP        Check SIG Level    At OR Trending to Program (YES)
RO        Check Tavc      At OR Trendinci to Tref (YES)
Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater SRO Problem SRO        Implement the EALs Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6 12
                                                                          -        Page    18  of    18 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on 8 RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      I  Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6, Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close EVENT INDICATIONS:
Governor valve indications and lights oscillate Steam Flow and SIG Level Transients Lowering Main Generator Output May enter AOP-01 5, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to SRO        diagnose the problem. The crew will most likely trip once the governor valves fail closed. AOP-015 steps listed for contingency.
BOP        Check SIG Levels      Trendinq to Program Level (YES)
RO        Check Tavg      Trending to Tref (YES)
CREW          Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Load Reduction Greater than 100 MWe. (YES, Once BOP
 
Governor valves fail close)
SRO        Trip the Reactor AND go to EOP-E-O.
Beginning of EOP-E-O RO        Check Reactor tripped (YES)
Check Turbine Trip:
: a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)
BOP
                                                                        -
: b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action required by BOP)
Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:
BOP                a. El or E2  At least one energized (YES) b.__El_and_E2__Both_energized_(YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #        6 12
                                                                            -        Page    19  of    19 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position  1                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Status:
a) Check if SI is actuated:
* SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)
* SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)
RO b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED
* SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)
* RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
 
RNO: Manually actuate BOTH trains of SI CRS      Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0.
EXAMINERS NOTE:            During the fast-bus transfer, 4 KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Startup Transformer due to breaker 52117 tripping open. B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of 480V Bus E-2.
EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.
                          .      Manually start A SI Pump
                          .      Manually start A MDAFW Pump
                          .      Manually close CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect RCP TriD Criteria IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN trip all RCPs: (YES)
                                      . Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED (NO)
 
OR Critical
* BOTH of the following satisfied:
Task            CRS o SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND
                                                                -
CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW (YES, A SI Pump is running)
AND o RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS        -
THAN_30&deg;F_(YES,_depending_on_scenario_timeline)
CRITICAL TASK        -  STOP ALL RCPs Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3        Event #        6 12
                                                                              -        Page  20  of    20 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      N  Position                                  Apolicants Actions or Behavior Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS          with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)
Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-0 Follows this Section)
Check ECCS Pumps Running:
Att. I Critical                    . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts A SI Pump)
BOP
                                              -
Task                        . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, only A RHR pump has
                                                  -
power.)
CRITICAL TASK            START A SI PUMP Att. I          BOP        Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)
                                                        -
Att. I          BOP        Check CCW PumDs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
                                                      -
Check Containment Isolation Phase A
: a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
 
Att. I                              b. Phase A valves Closed (NO, Manually closes CVC-200A
 
Critical          BOP                    and CVC-204A and CVC-204B)
Task                              c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)
 
                                                . CVC-387 Closed (YES)
 
                                                . HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)
 
CRITICAL TASK .        Es ablish Containment Isolation (Close CVC-200A and CVC-204A and CVC-204B)
Check Feedwater Isolation:
a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)
 
b) Main feedwater ISOLATED Att. I          BOP
* FRVs Closed (YES)
 
                                          . Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (YES)
* Feedwater header section valves Closed (YES)
Appendix D                                                              NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6- 12    Page      21  of    21 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position  I                          Atlicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steam lines Should Be Isolated:
a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (NO)
 
                                      . Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (NO)
 
OR Att. 1          BOP                . High steam flow with: (NO) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig
 
OR o Tavg less than 543&deg; F
 
RNO: Go to Step 7 Check Proper Service Water System Operation:
: a. SW pumps All running (NO, verifies all available running.)
: b. SW booster pumps          Both running (NO, verifies A SWBP Att. 1          BOP
 
running.)
: c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)
Extinguished (YES)
Check Both EDGs Running (NO, B EDG has failed to start.
Att. 1          BOP
 
Attempt to start from the RTGB. Will not be successful.)
Check  ECCS Flow:
: a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP
: b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES)
: c. RCS pressure less than 275 psig. (NO, go to step 10)
 
Check CV Recirculation Fans          All Running (NO, verifies all available BOP
 
Att. 1 running.)
Check IVSW Actuated (YES)
                                            -
Att. 1          BOP          . PCV-1 922A Open (YES)
 
                                . PCV-1922B Open (YES)
 
Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)
Att. 1          BOP a.__CV_ventilation_isolation_valves__CLOSED_(YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #        6- 12      Page    22  of    22 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)
                                                                  -
                                  . HVA-1A or HVA-1 B Running (YES)
 
                                  . HVE-16 Stopped (YES)
 
Att. I          BOP            . HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (YES)
 
                                  . Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)
                                  . CR-DIA-SA Closed (YES)
 
                                  . CR.-DI B-SB Closed (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Check DS Bus        Energized (YES)
Check Battery Chargers Energized
 
APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      APP-036-D2 Extinguished (NO, Acknowledge restart of battery
 
chargers within 30 minutes of power loss using OP-601, DC Supply System.)
AtL1            BOP      StoD R-11112 Sample Pump Att. 1          BOP      Locally Reset and Load IACs as necessary (N/A)
Perform Crew Update to include the following:
                                  . Attachment Completion
                                  . Manual Actions Taken (Started A SI pump and closed CVC Att. I          BOP                  200A and CVC-204A1B)
                                  . Failed Equipment status (B EDG has not started. Battery Charger BIB-I Trouble Alarm.)
                                  . SW status (All available operatinq)
Contacts WCC SRO or directs BOP to contact WCC SRO to have SRO        Maintenance assist with troubleshooting and repair to B EDG as top priority.
BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched to B EDG, wait 10 minutes, and report that the fuel racks were found tripped. Inform control room that the fuel racks have been reset and request to locally start B EDG. Once permission granted, execute commands to start B EDG lAW SCN file.
If dispatched to close LCV-115C, wait 3 minutes and execute command to close LCV-115C lAW SCN file.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-I 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6 12
                                                                          -        Page    23  of    23 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      I  Position    1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior 1fl0  01 10F-t-U    Attacflment 1 I            I
              .                          Continuation of EOP-E-O Check AFW Pumps        Running
: a. Motor driven AFW pumps          Both Running (NO, manually starts A MDAFW Pump)
: b. SIG levels Two SIGs less than 16% (YES)
 
RO
: c. Steam Driven AFW pump steam shutoff valves ALL OPEN (NO, opens V1-8AIB/C.)
NOTE: SDAFW pump has tripped and will not start. V1-Bs will open and eventually re-close.
Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)
 
                                  . AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)
 
                                  . AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)
RO
                                  . Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump
 
is running. (YES, but should be closed once it is determined that the SDAFW pump has tripped.)
Check Total AFW Flow:
                                  . Reset SI RO            . Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted SIGs narrow range level Between 8% and 50%.
 
                                  . Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 am (YES)
Check CV Spray NOT Required:
RO            a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (YES)
 
b.__CV_spray__NOT_Actuated_(YES)
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
                                      . CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (YES)
 
o APP-001-C1 I Dl Extinguished (YES)
 
RO                                          OR
                                      . Seal injection flow Normal (YES)
 
o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP
 
OR o__Thermal_barrier APs Greater than_5_inches_water.
 
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                          Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    3      Event#        6-12      Page    24  of    24 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP qp  inicrtinn
                                ---J---
flow  iiqinn  th P&lfl fiinrtinn
                                                            -- -
EXAMINERS NOTE:            During the check RCP parameters the crew should realize that seal injection flow is extremely high on B RCP and nearly zero on A and C RCP. Further review of RCP parameters should lead the crew to determine that B RCP has experience a seal failure. The SRO should direct performance of AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, as manpower permits. AOP 018 Actions are listed at the end of the simulator guide.
When I IF B EDG is restored, the crew will have to take manual actions to start B Train ECCS components.
Check RCS Temperature With NO RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or trending to 547&deg;F (NO, Depending on scenario timeline the RCPs could still be running.)
RNO: IF temperature is greater then 547&deg;F AND rising then perform the following: (YES)
RD                . IF condenser is available, THEN dump steam to condenser:
: a. Place steam dump mode switch in Steam Pressure mode.
: b. Adjust steam pressure controller as necessary OR
                                      . Dump steam using SIG steam line PORVs.
Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:
: a. PORVs Closed (YES)
RO
: b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
: c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)
 
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
RD                a. RCPs    Any Running (NO, stopped per FOLDOUT)
RNO: Go to Step 14 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o__None_Completely_depressurized_(YES)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6 - 12    Page    25  of    25 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position                              Aoilicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Tubes are Intact:
* Secondary radiation monitors Have Remained Normal (YES)
* R-15 BOP
                                      . R-19s
                                      . R-31s
                                  . S/G levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)
 
Check if RCS is Intact: (NO)
* CV radiation Normal (NO)
 
o R-2 o R-32A1B RO
                                  . CV pressure Normal (NO)
* CV sump level Normal (NO)
 
RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs. Go to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step I BgjngofEOP-E_
NOTE CRS FOLDOUT for EOP-E-1 is in effect. (None applicable.)
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
RO            a. RCPs    Any Running (NO, stopped per EOP-E-0 FOLDOUT)
RNO: Go to Step 2 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o    None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o    None Completely depressurized (YES)
Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels:
: a. Narrow range levels Greater than 8% (NO)
 
BOP                RNO: Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 8% in at least one S/G.
: b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels          between 8% AND 50%
RO        Reset SI Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6 12
                                                                          -        Page    26  of    26 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position  I                          App!icants Actions or Behavior RO        Reset Containment Isolation Phase A Check Secondary Radiation:
: a. Secondary radiation monitors            Have remained normal (YES) o R-15, R-19s, R-31s BOP          b. Perform the following:
: 1) Request periodic activity samples of all S/Gs
: 2) Secondary sample results Normal (When results
 
available)
Continuous Action Step Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves.
RO          a. Power to block valves Available (YES)
 
b PORVs Closed (YES)
: c. Block valves At least one open. (YES)
 
Establish Instrument Air to CV:
: a. Check APP-002-F7 Extinguished (YES)
RD
: b. Reset IA PCV-1716
: c. Check IA PCV-1716 OPEN (YES)
 
Check Power Supply to Charging Pumps                Offsite power available RD (YES)
Check if Charging Flow has been established:
: a. Charging pumps        At least one running. (YES)
: b. Establish desired charging flow:
o Start additional pump(s) as necessary o Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to RD establish desired charging flow.
o Adjust HIC-121 as necessary to establish desired charging flow:
o  Maintain seal injection flow Between 6 gpm and
 
20 gpm_per_RCP_unless_seal_injection_isolated.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6- 12      Page    27  of    27 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      1  Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&ID function.
If B EDG has not been started AND LCV-115C remains OPEN, check the Charging Pump status under the malfunction screen to see if the Charging Pumps have become gas bound. If gas binding is occurring report to the Control Room that extremely loud metallic noise is emanating from the running Charging Pumps.
EXAMINERS NOTE: During the check RCP parameters the crew should realize that seal injection flow is extremely high on B RCP and nearly zero on A and C RCP. Further review of RCP parameters should lead the crew to determine that B RCP has experience a seal failure. The SRO should direct performance of AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, as manpower permits. AOP 018 Actions are listed at the end of the simulator guide.
If gas binding occurs on the Charging Pumps the Crew should secure all running charging pumps and develop a recovery plan.
BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested to close LCV-115C and vent the charging pumps, wait 10 minutes and then execute the restoration of charging pump suction command lAW SCN file.
I            I Continuous Action Step Check if SI flow should be terminated:
RO
: a. RCS subcooling base on core exit TCs              Greater than 35&deg;F (NO, Goto Step 12.)
Continuous Action Step Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:
RO
: a. Spray pump Any running (YES)
 
RNO:ObserveC aution prior to Step 13 and Go to Stp 13.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    3      Event#        6-12      Page    28  of    28 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if RHR Pumps Should be Stopped:
: a. Check RCS pressure:
: 1) Pressure Greater than 275 psig (YES)
: 2) Pressure Stable or Rising (YES)
 
RO
: b. RHR pumps Any running with suction aligned to RWST (YES,
 
A RHR Pump)
: c. Stop RHR pumps (Stops A RHR pump)
: d. Monitor RCS pressure.
Check RCS and S/G Pressure:
RO/BOP
* Check pressure in all S/Gs Stable OR Rising (YES)
 
                                *__Check_RCS_pressure__Stable_OR_Lowering Check if Diesel Generators should be Stopped:
: a. AC emergency busses Energized by Offsite Power
 
o E-1 (YES)
: b. EDG starting air annunciator Extinguished (APP-01 0-B2)
 
(YES)
: c. Stop unloaded EDG. (Stops A EDG) o E-2 (NO)
RNO (for E-2 being deenergized):
Perform the following: (For B EDG)
: 1) Try to restore offsite power to AC emergency busses.
: 2) IF any AC emergency bus is NOT energized, THEN try to BOP                restore power to affected bus from the EDG. (Crew should dispatch personnel to attempt to repair and/or start B EDG, if not already performed.
: 3) Locally load the following on AC emergency buss(es) as necessary:
                                          . Instrument Air compressor after reset.
                                          . Battery chargers.
: 4) IF DS bus in NOT energized, THEN place DSDG in service (DS bus is energized.)
: 5)    Implement Supplement 5, EDG Monitoring, while continuing with this procedure. (Not applicable until B EDG is started.)
: 6) Verify emergency oil pump is running (YES)
: 7) Locally_verify_air_side_seal_oil_backup_pump_is_runninq._(YES)
BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested to verify air side seal oil backup pump running, wait 3 minutes and report to control room that it is running Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #      3      Event #      6 12
                                                                            -        Page    29  of    29 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status:
: a. Check Cold leg recirculation capability:
e    Train A and Train B:
e    IF B EDG still QOS Crew determines on Train A is
 
available.
                                        . IF B EDG has been restored Crew determine that both
 
Train A and Train B is available.
: b. Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL (YES)
: c. Contact Chemistry to obtain samples for RCS boron and activity and CV atmosphere.
: d. Evaluate plant equipment to support long term recover y as necessary:
                                                  . RHR pumps (both available)
RO
* SI pumps (both running)
* CV spray pumps (both available)
                                                  . CV fans (three running)
                                                  . AFW pumps (both MDAFW pumps available)
                                                  . SW system (all SWPs and SWBPs available)
                                                  . CCW system (two available)
* IVSW system (system in service)
* EDG fuel and auxiliaries. (A EDG available and B EDG running)
: e. Start I align plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:
* Aux. Boiler
* Other plant equipment needed during cooldown to cold shutdown.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Acknowledge direction to start Auxiliary Boilers. Take no actions.
Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization if required:
: a. RCS pressure Greater than 275 psig. (YES)
RO
: b. Reset SPDS and Go to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Step 1.
SRO        Open Foldout B (None applicable.)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    3      Event #      6- 12      Page    30  of    30 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Determine if RHR Pumps should be stopped:
: a. Check RCS pressure greater than 275 psig and stable or increasing (YES)
RO
: b. Verify RHR Pumps Stopped (YES)
: c. Check RCS pressure less than 275 psig (NO)
 
RNO: IF RCS pressure decreases below 275 psig during this procedure, THEN restart RHR pumps. Go to Step 3.
Check Emergency Busses Any Energized by Emergency Diesel BOP
 
(YES, E-2 powered from B EDG if personnel dispatched to start.)
Perform the following:
: a. Verify each running EDG has loaded required equipment:
* MDAFW Pump (Verifies B MDAFW pump available or running.)
* CCW pump (C CCW pump is OOS)
* SW pump (Verifies C and D SWPs are running.)
* SW Booster Pump (Verifies B SWBP is running.)
: b. Verify EDG capacity using Supplement F and load the following equipment on the EDG:
RO/BOP
* Charging Pumps (Verifies C Charging Pump running.)
* Instrument Air Compressor (If not already accomplished, dispatches an operator to reset and start B IAC)
: c. Check Battery Chargers In Service:
* APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
* APP-036-D2 Extinguished (YES, if E-2 powered from
 
B EDG)
: d. Check PZR Heaters        Power Available (YES)
I            I Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #      3    Event #        6- 12      Page    31  of    31 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      I  Position  I                            Arplicants Actions or Behavior Check all Non-emergency AC Busses Energized by Offsite Power.
 
(NO, E-2 energized by B EDG)
RNO:
: a. Verify one of the following pumps are running:
                                          . Turning gear oil pump OR Emerg Oil Pump (YES)
BOP            b. Verify one of the following pumps are running: Seal Oil Backup Pump or Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump (YES)
: c. Determine the cause of the loss of offsite power.
IF due to a failure within the plant, THEN restore power using OP-603, Electrical Distribution, after repairs are completed.
(YES, breaker 52/17 tripped on over-current.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested, state that Electrical technicians are working with the Planner and Engineering to determine the appropriate course of action to restore breaker 52117.
Establish Charging flow as follows:
RO            a. Check Charging Pumps All Stopped (NO, go to step 6.h.)
: h. Verify charciinq flow on Fl-i 22A Greater than 35 cpm. (YES)
 
Align Charging Pump Suction to RWST as follows:
: a. From the RTGB, verify LCV-1 i SB OPEN (YES)
: b. Verify LCV-1 1 SC CLOSED (If B EDG still OOS, then an
 
operator will have to be dispatched to locally close LCV-IISC.
If this is the case then most likely the Charging Pumps will be RO gas bound.)
: c. Start all available charging pumps. (Verifies all available charging pumps are running.)
: d. Increase running Charging Pumps speed to maximum.
: e. Verify maximum charciinci flow on Fl-i 22A. (YES)
Control Intact S/G Levels As follows:
: a. Check intact SIG levels Greater than 8%. (YES)
: b. Control feed flow to maintain intact S/G levels between 8% and BOP                50%.
: c. Check intact SIG levels Any increasing in an uncontrolled
 
manner. (NO)
RNO:_Go_to_step_9.
Contact Chemistry to Obtain periodic Boron Samples of the RCS and RO/BOP Pressurizer.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                      Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #    3      Event #        6 12
                                                                            -        Page    32  of    32 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      1  Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior RO          Check boron sample results          Available (NO, go to step 1 1.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: Whn cnnftrI                            (hmifn, fnr hnrnn mpIe results, report that the technician is in route to obtain the sample. Expect results AIifhinfhhcI.r Initiate RCS Cooldown to cold shutdown as follows:
: a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than 1 00&deg;F/hr in the last 60 minutes.
: b. Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within limits of curve BOP                  3.4, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature
 
limitation for cooldown.
: c. Check steam dump to condenser Available (NO)
 
RNO: Dump steam from intact S/Gs using Steam Line PORVs.
Go to step 12.
RO          Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures              Less than 543&deg;F (YES)
Check Steam Dump to Condenser Available (NO)
 
BOP        RNO: Continue RCS cooldown using Steam Line PORVs. Go to Step 14.
Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:
: a. Momentarily place Safety Injection T-avg Selector Switch to RO                  BLOCK position.
: b. Verify Lo Temp Safety Injection Blocked status light Illuminated._(YES)
RO          Check RCS Pressure          Less than 1950 rsici. (YES)
Defeat Low Pressure Safety Injection Signal as follows:
: a. Momentarily place Pzr Press/HI Stm Line DP Switch to BLOCK RO                  position.
: b. Verify Lo Press Safety Injection Blocked status light Illuminated._(YES)
RO        Check RCS Subcooling          Greater than 35&deg;F (YES)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                        Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    3      Event#        6-12      Page    33  of    33 Event
 
== Description:==
Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.
Time      I  Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI and RHR Pump status:
                                  . SI Pumps Any running (YES)
 
RO OR
                                  . RHR Pumps Any running in Lo Head Injection Mode. (NO)
Determine PZR Heater Status:
RO              a. Check RCS Leak Location            Known to be PZR (NO, go to step 20)
Continuous Action Step I Check PZR Level Greater than 73% (NO)
 
RNO: Place all PZR Heaters in OFF RO IF PZR level increases above 73%, THEN energize PZR heaters to maintain steam bubble.
Go to steR Continuous Action Step Depressurize RCS to Refill PZR as Follows:
: a. Check PZR level Less than 27% (YES)
: b. Use normal PZR spray to depressurize the RCS (NO, RCPs RO                  secured.)
RNO: Use one PZR PORV
: c. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (NO)
 
RNO: WHEN PZR level greater than 27%, THEN stop RCS depressurization._Go_to_steo_23.
RO          Check RCP Status      ALL STOPPED (YES)
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#    3      Event#          8        Page  34  of    34 Event
 
== Description:==
AOP-O1 8 Steps to Address Total Seal Stack Failure of B RCP Time      I  Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior AOP-018 RCP Abnormal Conditions
 
EXAMINERS NOTE:            AOP-018 will be entered once it is determined by the crew that a seal failure has occurred on B RCP. AOP-018 is a concurrent AOP and should be performed while in the EOP Network.
RO I BOP      Determines that Section A, RCP Seal Failure is aDDlicable.
Check Either of the following conditions exist:
                                  . RCP#1 Seal Leakoff flow on Unaffected RCP Reduced RO/BOP                (YES)
OR
                                  . RCP Thermal Barrier AP on affected RCP Reduced (YES)
 
Check Plant Status Mode I OR Mode 2 (NO)
RO, BOP
 
RNO: Stop the affected RCP (Verified stopped. Go to step 5)
Check Time Elapsed Since Stopping the Affected RCPs            Greater RO BOP than 3 minutes (YES)
RO I BOP      Close CVC-303B, Seal Leakoff Valve RO I BOP      Check SI  Actuated (YES)
Continuous Action Step Establish Instrument Air to CV as follows:
: a. Check APP-002-F2 Extinguished (YES)
 
RO / BOP          b. Reset Safety Injection
: c. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A
: d. Momentarily place IA PCV-1716, to RESET position.
: e. Check PCV-1716-OPEN RO/BOP        GotoStep3o RO I BOP      Check RCP(s) B        C  Running (NO, Go to Step 33)
Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 gpm and 13 gpm (NO)
RNO: Locally throttle CVC-297A1B/C to obtain flow to each RCP RO / BOP      between 6 gpm to 20 gpm. IF required to maintain minimum flow, THEN throttle HIC-121, Charging Flow Valve, while maintaining Charging Pump Discharge pressure less than 2500 psig.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #  3      Event #        8        Page 35  of  35 Event
 
== Description:==
AOP-018 Steps to Address Total Seal Stack Failure of B RCP Time      I  Position  1                        Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&lD function.
RO I BOP      Check FCV-626    Closed (NO, go to step 40)
Review OP-i 01, RCS and RCP Startup and Operation, Precautions RO I BOP      and Limitations Relating to RCP Number 1 Seal Leakoff Flow and Take Appropriate Actions. (No actions required.)
RO I BOP      Implement the EALs (Informs SRO of EAL5)
RO I BOP      Refer to ITS RO I BOP      Go to Main Body, Step 2.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-i 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3 TURNOVER SHEET
: 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:            EOL b) Reactor Power:                100%
c) Turbine Load:                  751.7 MWe d) Boron Concentration:          96 ppm e) Rod Height:                    218 CBD f) RCS Pressure:                  2235 psig g) RCS Level:                    53.2 %
h) Xenon:                        Equilibrium
: 2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. #              Description 3.7.6 Cond. A        Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours.
3.6.6 Cond. C        Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.
: 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW OOS for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours with estimated RTS in 24 hours.
b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours. Available for emergency use only.
: 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a)  None
: 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a)  A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-E1 52/22C.
: 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a)  None
: 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a)  Unrestricted
: 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a)  Maintain current power level
: 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a)  No additional information.
: 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)    Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
: 11. RISK a)  GREEN Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 Facility:        HB ROBINSON                  Scenario No.:      4    Op Test No.:        ILC-13 Examiners:                                                Operators:  CRS -
RO BOP Initial Conditions:
* 1OE-8 amps, EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 513 PPM Boron.
                      . No equipment out of service.
Turnover:
* Startup in progress in accordance with GP-003, Step 8.4. Raise Power to the POAH and stabilize power until relieved by on-coming crew.
Critical Task:
* Manually Trip the reactor.
* Establish Containment Isolation.
* Isolate A Steam Generator in accordance with EOP-E-3.
* Restart ECCS equipment after loss of off-site power.
* Establish Auxiliary Feedwater Event      MaIf. No. Event Type*                                  Event No.                                                            Description 1                  (R) RO,            Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat (N) CRS 2                  (I) RO, CRS        PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close (TS) CRS 3                  (C) BOP, CRS        SW Break at Suction of A SWBP (TS) CRS 4                  (C) RO, CRS        B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure 5                  (C) RO, CRS        A SIG Tube Leak 6                  (M) ALL            A SIG Tube Rupture 7                  RO                  Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button 8                  (M) ALL            Loss of Startup Transformer 9                  BOP                MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-1 6s) 10                  BOP                Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
11                  BOP                SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (VI -8s) fail to Auto Open on Loss of Startup Transformer (N)ormal,  (R)eactivity,    (l)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
I Appendix D                                  Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1  I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4
 
==SUMMARY==
DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at I OE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003, Normal Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Critical. The crew will continue with GP-003 at Step 8.4, Post Critical Operations, and withdraw control rods to the Point of Adding Heat and then stabilize Reactor Power between 3% and 5%. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to stabilize reactor power, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-445, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, fails High. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, and attempt to close PCV-456, PZR PORV. PCV-456 will fail to fully close and the operator will take manual action to close the PORV Block Valve. Once the PORV Block Valve is close PZR Pressure will automatically recover to normal band. Due to the failure of PCV-456 to fully close the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.11, Condition B, is applicable due to one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. This LCO requires that the block valve be closed within 1 hour and power removed from the associated block valve within 1 hour and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control PZR Pressure and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a Service Water Break will occur at the Suction of A SWBP.
The crew will implement AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Section D, for Leak on South Service Water Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545. The crew will perform required valve and Service Water Booster Pump manipulations from the RTGB and direct field actions in
(  accordance with AOP-022 attachments to isolate the ruptured section of Service Water piping and restore various components to operable status. The Service Water Break will result in entry into ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours without reliance on steam generator for heat removal. ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, is also applicable due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, B RCP will experience a 40 gpm thermal barrier leak. This will be identified by a rising trend and alarm on R-17, rising CCW surge tank level, and RCP thermal barrier cooling water high flow alarm. FCV-626, Thermal Barrier Flow Control, will receive the signal to auto-close, however the breaker to the MOV will trip leaving the valve in mid-position. The crew will take action to close CC-735, Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation, from the RTGB due to the FCV-626 failure. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.
On cue from the Chief Examiner, a 300 gpm tube leak on A SIG will be ramped over a six minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-035, SIG Tube Leak, and attempt to control pressurizer level. Ultimately the crew will determine that the leak is greater than the capacity of available charging pumps and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection. The reactor will not trip on an automatic signal or by depressing the right hand reactor trip pushbutton. The RO will identify this failure and trip the reactor by depressing the left hand reactor trip pushbutton. On the initiation of the Reactor Trip the SIG tube leak will degrade to 1000 gpm. On initiation of the Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Scenario Outline                            Form ES-D-1  I Safety Injection the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves will fail to close on the Phase A signal. The BOP will take manual action to adjust the individual valves potentiometer on the RTGB to close the valves. Additionally, the Motor Driven Feedwater Pumps Discharge Valves will fail to Auto-Open. This failure will be identified, but the crew may determine it not necessary to open the valves until needed due to adequate SIG levels present at the onset of the major event. The crew will carry out the actions of EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, identifying the conditions noted above and stabilizing the plant. The crew will transition from EOP-E-O to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Once A S/G has been isolated and an operator dispatched to de-energize the associated AFW valves the plant will experience a loss of off-site power. On the loss of off-site power, the Main Steam Supply valves to the Steam Driven AFW Pump will fail to open. The crew will take required actions to restart safeguards equipment since SI would have been reset at this point in the EOP Network. After safeguards equipment has been restarted the crew will perform an RCS cooldown and depressurization to stop the primary to secondary leakage. The crew will be required to either open the MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves (V2-16s) or manually start the SDAFW pump to provide AFW flow during the RCS cooldown. Once the primary to secondary leakage is stopped, both safety injection pumps will be secured.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after the safety injection pumps have been secured in accordance with EOP-E-3, or at his discretion.
Appendix D                                                      NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
I Appendix D                              Scenario Outline                          Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:
* IC-19, SCN 006_ILC_I3NRC_4.
* Status board is provided to crew is IC-19.
PRE-LOADED EVENTS:
The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:
* Event 7: Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button
* Event 8: Loss of Startup Transformer
* Event 9: MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-16s)
* Event 10: Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
* Event 11: SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (V1-8s) fail to Auto-Open on Loss of Startup Transformer EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
* Event  1: Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat
* Event  2: PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close
* Event  3: SW Break at Suction of A SWBP
* Event  4: B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure
* Event  5: A SIG Tube Leak
* Event  6: A SIG Tube Rupture EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
* GP-003
* AOP-025, Section C
* AOP-022
* AOP-014
* AOP-035
* EOP-E-0
* Supplement M
* EOP-E-3 Appendix D                                                  NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                              Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC        Scenario #    4      Event#          1        Page 5 of    5 Event
 
== Description:==
Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat Time          Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: No actions required.
EVENT INDICATIONS:
Not applicable.
EXAMINERS NOTE: The crew will assume the watch with the Reactor at IOE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003. The crew should be given adequate time to brief the evolution prior to entering the simulator. The crew will start at Section 8.4, Step 8.4.7 Performs brief on Identification of reaching the POAH, startup rate SRO limitations_and_maximum_power_limit_of_5%.
Adjust Control Rod position as necessary to establish a positive SUR RO and_raise_reactor_power_to_the_POAH.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
The crew will monitor for indications of the Point of Adding Heat (POAH) which are as follows:
* The POAH is that power level identified b NO control rod motion and:
* IF MTC is negative, then SUR with be lowering
* Onset of RCS temperature rise, Onset of PZR pressure rise, Onset PZR level rise.
* Reduction in AUTO Charging Pump speed demand.
* Rising indication of AUTO Steam Dump demand on PC-464B, Steam Header Pressure, when Steam Dumps are being used for RCS Temperature Control.
* Small rise in Steam Generator Steam Flow.
Adjust control rods as necessary to achieve the following while continuing with this procedure:
RO
* RCS Tavg between 547&deg;F and 551&deg;F
* Reactor Power 3% to less than or equal to 5%.
When Reactor power is greater than 1%, then notify Reactor SRO Engineering to commence logging date required by EST-067.
Controlling SIG levels by adjusting the Feed Regulating Valve Bypass BOP Valves.
EXAMINERS NOTE: If Reactor Power rises above 5% the Crew should declare the plant in Mode I and update ERFIS.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                              Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC  Scenario#      4    Event#          2        Page    6 of      6 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-003-C3, PRT HI PRESS APP-003-D6, PZR PORV I SAFETY VLV OPEN APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS PT-445 indication rising to high limit of gauge.
PCV-456 RTGB indication RED open light illuminates.
Pressurizer Pressure lowering.
Pressurizer Control Bank Heaters energize.
Immediate Action Step Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:
                                . Check PZR pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)
                                                            -
RO
* Verify Both PZR PORVs CLOSED (NO, PCP-456 has failed
                                                                -
at mid-position)
RNO: IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve (Closes RC-535, PORV BLOCK)
Immediate Action Step Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band RO (RO should allow PC-444J to control pressure in AUTO, unless controller needs to be unsaturated due to possible overshoot while restoring pressure.)
Enters AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, Pressurizer SRO Pressure Transmitter Failure, and verifies immediate actions.
CREW        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check PT-444 Failed Transmitter (NO)
RO
 
RNO: IF PT-445 has failed, then qo to step 7. (YES)
Verify Selector Switch PM-444 Selected to the Operable Channel RO
 
REC 444 (YES, no action reauired.)
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4      Event #        2        Page    7 of      7 Event
 
== Description:==
PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close Time      I  Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Check the following ITS LCOs for applicability:
ITS 3.3.4 Not applicable since the required number of channels (I)
 
remain operable.
ITS 3.4.1 Not applicable since the plant is in Mode 2. However, if
 
reactor power has increased above 5% then ITS 3.4.1 will be applicable and Condition A entered if PZR Pressure is lowered below 2205 psig. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits SRO Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours, will be entered if PZR Pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig.
ITS 3.4.1 1 ITS LCO 3.4.1 1, Condition B will be entered due to one
 
PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. The LCO requires that the block valve be closed with 1 hour and remove power from associated block valve in 1 hour and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours.
Informs WCC SRO of the Inoperable PZR PORV and requests a W/R be initiated and Maintenance contacted to being planning for SRO        troubleshooting and repair. Directs WCC SRO to dispatch an AO to open the breaker for RC-535 and prepare and install a clearance to maintain power removed.
BOOTH OPERATOR: If! When contacted as WCC SRO, acknowledge the request to initiate a WIR for RC-535 , contacting Maintenance and dispatching an AO to open the breaker for RC-535. Wait 5 minutes and the open the breaker for RC-535 lAW SCN file.
SRO        Go to Procedure Main Body, Step 2.
CRS        Implement the EALs CRS        Return to Procedure and Step in Effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      4      Event#        3      Page    8    of      8 Event
 
== Description:==
Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time          Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-035-H1 WDBRP Trouble
 
APP-008-F7 SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS
 
APP-008-F8 NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS
 
Recognizes no SW Pump has tripped and determines that a rupture in APP..008..F7      BOP a SW Header has occurred and informs the SRO to refer to AOP-022.
Immediate Action Step Check the following Alarms Extinguished BOP
* APP-008-E7, S SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL (YES)
* APP-008-E8, N SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL (YES)
Continuous Action Step BOP Check SW Any Available (YES)
 
CREW          Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Leak Location Identified (NO, unless determine in Auxiliary
 
Building based on WDBRP Trouble alarm.)
BOP        RNO: Perform local inspections as necessary to determine leak location. (Dispatches Inside AC to inspect the Auxiliary Building to determine leak location.)
tUU I H UIKA I UK          UflC
                              - 1 ciIsfltCfld to insnct AuxIIIrv        KI1IIc1ncL wait I minhit nrI J,.
fhn rnnf      ffh infrnI rnrm ni1 infrwm fhm fhf Wtr Krk            nrtriirrrI t thSiirtinn of A SWRP              Wtr ievei in uxiiiarv t3uIIclIna 0 Hallway is annroximateiv nn incn.
                                                                                          ---
Perform appropriate section for leak location: South Service Water SRO Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545 Section D BOP        Close V6-12A to isolate the Service Water Header Close V6-16B to isolate the Turbine Building from the affected Service BOP Water Header Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      4      Event#        3      Page    9 of      9 Event
 
== Description:==
Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the following valves OPEN: (YES)
                                    . V6-12D
* V6-12B BOP
* V6-12C
* V6-16A
* V6-16C Continuous Action Step Verify the following SW Booster Pump alignment:
BOP SW Booster Pump B Running (YES)
 
SW Booster PumD A Stopped (YES)
 
Perform Attachment 7 while continuing with this procedure. (Crew SRO dispatches an AO to perform Attachment 7.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested Attachment 7 in accordance with the following timeline in minutes from the time contacted:
* T+3 Perform steps 1 and 2 lAW SCN file and contact Control Room lAW Step 3.
* T+4 Perform step 4 lAW SCN file
* T+6 Perform RNO for step 9 lAW SCN file and contact Control Room lAW RNO step 9.
* T+1O Perform Step 12 lAW SCN file.
* T+1 1 Contact the Control Room and inform them that Att. 7 is complete and that SW has
 
been Cross-Connected to supply the following equipment: EDG A, IAC A, SAC, HVH-6A, HVH-8A Determine if actions for Auxiliary Building Flooding are necessary as follows:
Check for any of the following indications of flooding:
* Water level on Auxiliary Building first floor Greater than 6
 
inches by local indication (NO)
RO OR
* APP-OO1-E4 Illuminated (NO)
OR
* APP-OO1-E5 Illuminated (NO)
 
RNO: Go to Step 7 BOOTH OPERATOR: If contacted with regard to water level on Auxiliary Building first floor, report that level is still at approximately one inch.
Verify the following equipment      Stopped: (YES)
BOP
* EDGA
                                    *__MDAFWPumpA Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-1 3 NRC    Scenario #      4      Event #      3      Page    lOof        10 Event
 
== Description:==
Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time          Position                              Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the following Valves at the Intake Structure      Closed
* SW-187 BP
* SW-851
                                  *__SW-857 BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed to close the above valves, wait 10 minutes and close valves lAW SCN file and report status to control room.
BOP        Check Circulating Water Pump Status          Any running (YES)
Check SW-I 87 Closed (NO, not until 10 minutes after being BOP        dispatched as noted above in BOOTH OPERATOR notes.)
RNO: When SW-i 87 is closed, then perform step I I. Go to step 12.
Step 1 1 (To be completed once SW-i 87 reported as closed.)
Determine if adequate seal water is available to circulating water pumps as follows:
BOP APP-008-E4 Extinguished (YES)
 
APP-008-E5 Extinguished (YES)
 
APP-008-E6 Extinguished (YES)
 
SRO        Check Steps I and 2 Complete (YES, depending on timeline.)
BOP        Check N. SW Header Press. on P1-1616            Greater than 40 psig (YES)
Determine Maximum allowable CCW temperature as follows:
Check RCS temperature Less than or equal to 350&deg;F (NO)
 
RO RNO: Maintain CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature indicated on Tl-607 less than or equal to 1 05&deg; F. Go to step 15.
SRO          Check Step I I of Att. 7  Complete (YES, depending on timeline.)
Determine if a SW Booster Pump should be started:
BOP          Check SWBPs All stopped (NO)
 
RNO: Verify one SWBP is running (YES, go to step 17.)
Check Service Water Cooling from SI pumps to drain header          Flow BOP Observed. (YES, once report received from AO.)
BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed to determine if adequate flow is observed from SI pumps to drain header, wait 2 minutes and report that adequate flow was observed.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      4      Event#        3      Page    11 of      11 Event
 
== Description:==
Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time      I  Position  I                          Arrnlicants Actions or Behavior Align Emergency Cooling Water to MDAFW Pump A using Att. 2 while BOP continuing with this procedure.
BOOTH 0 ERATOR: When directed align emergency cooling water to MDAFW Pump A, wait 15 minutes and contact the control room and request that they start the Motor Driven Fire Pump. Once Fire Pump is started, wait 5 minutes and inform the control room that emergency cooling water has been aligned to the MDAFW Pump A.
Perform the following:
                                  . Inspect the area of the leak.
SRO
                                  . Report findings to the Control Room
* Identify and Isolate the source of the SW leak.
BOOTH 0 rERATOR: Nhenllf dispatched to isolate the leak and remove power from A SWBP, wait 5 minutes and isolate the leak and remove power from A SWBP, as directed, lAW SCN file.
Continuous Action Step SRO Check Attachment 7 Completed (YES, depending on timeline.)
 
Check SW to Instrument Air Compressor A and Station Air BOP Compressor Isolated (NO, go to step 22)
 
Refer to ITS LCOs for Applicability ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 4 in 18 hours without reliance on steam generator for SRO        heat removal.
ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours.
SRO          Implement the EALs SRO        Return to procedure and step in effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure) on cue from the Chief Examiner Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4      Event #      4        Page    12 of      12 Event
 
== Description:==
B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure Time      N  Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure EVENT INDICATIONS:
APP-OO1-B2, RCP LABYRTH SEAL LO AP APP-OO1-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HIILO FLOW APP-OO1-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW APP-OO1-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW APP-OO1-E1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI TEMP RR-1 for R-17 APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD (R-17 in alarm)
FCV-626 indicates both RED and GREEN lights illuminated CCW Surge Tank slowly rising.
SRO        Implement the EALs BOP        Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Go to Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction: Rising CCW RO Inventory OR R-17 Alarmina, Section B.
Check FCV-626 AUTO CLOSED (NO, indicates stuck mid-position)
 
RNO: IF APP-001-C1 is illuminated the perform one of the following:
                                  . At the RTGB, verify FCV-626 is closed (FCV-626 will not close)
RO OR
                                  . IF FCV-626 will NOT close, the close CC-735 and go to step 2.
(RO will close CC-735)
RO        Check RCP Seal Leakoff        Any greater than 5 gpm (NO, go to step 4)
Continuous Action Step Check the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure Both Exist RO            . RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Isolated due to High Flow
 
(YES)
AND
                                  . R-17 Risina trend or Alarm. (YES)
 
Check Seal Injection flow to the Affected RCP(s)          LOST (NO, go to RO step 7.)
Dispatch Operator to Containment to Perform Att. 6, RCP Thermal RO Barrier Isolation.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario #    4      Event #      4        Page  13 of    13 Event
 
== Description:==
B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure Time      1  Position                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched to the Containment to perform Aft. 6, acknowledge the report and take no additional action, If contacted on status later, state that you are waiting on the HP to perform CV entry brief.
Check  RCP status as follows:
: a. Check RCP B OR C Running (YES)
RO
                                                            -
: b. Check RCP B Running (YES)
: c. Check RCP C Running (YES)
 
SRO      When Att. 6 is completed, then go to step 23.
BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #5 (A SIG Tube Leak) on cue from the Chief Examiner.
Appendix D                                                        NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.:          ILC-I3NRC        Scenario#      4      Event#        5-11      Page 14  of      14 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position  ft                          Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (A SIG Tube Leak)
EVENT INDICATIONS:
Rising Speed on AUTO Charging Pump PZR Level lowering APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED RR-1 on R-15 APP-036-C7, R-24 MONITOR HI (R-24A HIGH)
APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD (R-15 in Alarm)
SRO        Determines entry into AOP-035 is warranted based plant indications.
EXAM I N El S NOTE: 1 he tube leak is rampinq in over 6 minutes to 300 gpm.
Continuous Action Step Determine if Reactor Trip needed as follows:
: a. Check the following
                                            . PZR Level Less than 7% (NO)
 
RO OR
* RCS Subcooling Less than 35&deg;F (NO)
 
RNO: IF the conditions above are met then trip the reactor and go to EOP-E-0. Go to Step 2.
BOP        Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Continuous Action Step RO Check VCT Level Less than 12.5 inches (NO, go to step 5)
 
RO        Check RCS Level        Lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES)
Adjust Charging Flow as follows:
: a. Check Charging Pump Status At least two running (YES)
RO
: b. Place running Charging Pumps Speed Controllers in MAN AND adiust output to maximum RO        Check RCS Level        Lowering in an Uncontrolled Manner (YES)
RO        Check Letdown        In Service (YES)
Verify All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated as follows:
RO
* LCV-460A &B        CLOSED
                                    .__HIC-137_Adjusted_to_0%
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      4    Event#          5-11      Page 15 of      15 Event
 
== Description:==
A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior
                                  . CVC-387 CLOSED
                                                    -
Check RCS Level Lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES, if leak
 
RO has been inserted for more than 3 minutes.)
Directs the RO to Trip the Reactor and Initiate Safety Injection and go SRO to EOP-E-O Depresses the Right Hand Reactor Trip Pushbutton
                                  . Check Reactor Trip (NO)
Critical RO                  RNO: Manually trip the reactor. (RO depresses the Left Hand Task Reactor Trip Pushbutton.
                                  . Check Reactor Trip (YES)
CRITICAL TASK          - MANUALLY TRIPS THE REACTOR EXAMINERS NOTE: Upon tripping the reactor the S!G tube leak will degrade to a 1000 gpm tube rupture.
Check Turbine Trip:
: a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)
                                                                          -
BOP
: b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Verifies valves closed)
Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:
BOP                  a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)
 
b.__El_and_E2__Both_energized_(YES)
Check SI Status:
a) Check if SI is actuated:
                                            . SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)
 
RO
* SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)
 
b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED
* SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
 
                                            *__RHR_pumps        BOTH_RUNNING_(YES)
SRO        Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-O.
SRO        Places FOLDOUT for EOP-E-O in effect (NONE apply)
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #      4      Event #        5-11      Page  16 of    16 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      I  Position                                Aoolicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:            Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.
                            . Manually open MDAFW Pump Discharge Valves (V2-16s)
                            . Manually close the FRV Bypass Valves Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS          with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)
Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-0 Follows this Section)
Check ECCS Pumps Running:
Att. 1          BOP        . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
                                              -
                              . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
                                                  -
Att. I          BOP        Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)
                                                        -
Att. 1          BOP        Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
                                                      -
Check Containment Isolation Phase A
: a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
: b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP                c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)
 
                                                . CVC-387 Closed (YES)
 
                                                . HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)
 
Check Feedwater Isolation:
a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)
 
b) Main feedwater ISOLATED Att. I                                    . FRV5 Closed (YES)
 
Critical          BOP Task                                      . Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (NO)
 
                                            . Feedwater header section valves Closed (YES)
 
RNO: Manually close valves as necessary (Closes all three Feedwater reg bypass valves.)
CRITICAL TASK          ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BY CLOSING THE FEEDWATER REG BYPASS VALVES Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4      Event #      5-11      Page 17  of      17 Event
 
== Description:==
A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position                              Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:
Mt              BOP
      .                        a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (NO, Go to Step 7)
 
Check Proper Service Water System Operation:
: a. SW pumps      All running (YES)
: b. SW booster pumps Both running (NO due to previous leak)
: c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)
Extinguished (NO)
RNO: Perform the following:
Att. I          BOP          1) Isolate SW to the Turbine Building:
                                          . Close V6-1 6C, SW turbine building isolation OR
                                          . Close V6-16A and V6-16B, SW turbine building supply
: 2) WHEN this Attachment is complete, THEN perform Supplement M, Component Alignment for Loss of SW to Turbine Buildinci, as time iermits.
Att. I          BOP      Check Both EDGs        Runnin&#xe7;j (YES)
Check ECCS Flow:
: a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (NO, depending on
 
scenario timeline, go to step 10)
Att              BOP
: b. SI pumps Flow Indicated (YES, if RCS pressure below shutoff head of SI pumps) c.__RCS_pressure__less_than_350_psig._(NO,_go_to_step_10)
Att. I          BOP      Check CV Recirculation Fans          All Run nina (YES)
Check IVSW Actuated (YES)
                                            -
Att. I          BOP
* PCV-I 922A Open (YES)
 
                                *__PCV-1922B        Open_(YES)
Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)
Att              BOP
        .                      a. CV ventilation isolation valves          CLOSED (YES)
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4    Event#        5-11      Page 18  of      18 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)
                                                                -
                                . HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)
 
e    HVE-16 Stopped (YES)
 
Att. I          BOP
* HVE-1 9A or HVE-1 9B Running (YES)
 
                                . Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)
* CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)
* CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)
 
Att. I          BOP      Check DS Bus        Enerqized (YES)
Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
 
APP-036-D2 Extinquished (YES)
 
Att. 1          BOP      Stop R-11/12 Sample Pump Att. I          BOP      Locally Reset and Load lACs as necessary (N/A)
Perform Crew Update to include the following:
* Attachment Completion
* Manual Actions Taken (Closed FRV bypass valves)
Att 1            BOP
* Failed Equipment status (None)
* SW status (Isolated SW to the Turbine Building and will be performing Supplement M)
PnrI nf IOP-I-fl Attr.hmcnt I Beginning of Supplement NI Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4      Event #        5-11      Page  19 of    19 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior
: 1. Shutdown secondary as follows:
: a. Check SIGs Any ruptured (YES)
: b. Adjust ruptured Steam Line PORV setpoint to 1060 psig using Status Board
: c. Close all MSIVS and MSIV Bypass Valves
: d. Break vacuum to the Condenser as follows:
: 1)    Depress and hold the THINK Pushbutton
: 2)    Open Vacuum Breaker Valves: MS-70A I B Supp. M          BOP                        3)    WHEN the valves are open, THEN release the THINK pushbutton.
: e. Verify the following equipment stopped:
                                              .      FWPMPA/B
                                              .      CONDPUMPA/B
                                              .      Heater Drain Pump A I B
                                              .      GOV Fluid Pump A I B (Pull to Lock)
                                                . Vacuum Pump Al B
: 2. Return to procedure and steD in effect.
End of Supplement M Continuation of EOP-E-O Check AFW Pumps Running RO            a. MDAFW Pumps Both running (YES)
: b. SIG Levels Two S/Gs less than 16% (NO continue w/ step 7)
 
Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)
 
                                  . AFW header discharge valves Full Open (NO, verifies valves
 
Critical                              will manually open)
RO Task                          . AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)
 
                                  . Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump
 
is running. (YES)
CRITICAL TASK        - ESTABLISH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER EXAMINERS NOTE: Depending on SIG Levels, then candidate decide not to open the AFW Header Discharge Valves until needed during the RCS cooldown in EOP-E-3.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-1 3 NRC        Scenario #    4      Event #        5-11      Page  20  of    20 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position    1                            Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Total AFW Flow:
                                  . Reset SI RO              . Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 18% and 50%.
 
                                  . Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 gpm (YES)
Continuous Action Step Check CV Spray NOT Required:
RO
: a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (YES)
: b. CV Spray NOT ACTUATED (YES)
 
Check RCP Seal Cooling:
                                        . CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (NO)
 
o APP-001-C1 I Dl          Extinguished (NO)
OR RO
                                        . Seal injection flow Normal (YES)
 
o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP
 
OR o Thermal barrier ziPs Greater than 5 inches water.
 
BOOTH 01 ERATOR: s requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&lD function.
Continuous Action Step Check RCS Temperature With any RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or
 
trending to 547&deg;F (YES)
RNO: IF temperature is less then 547&deg;F AND lowering then perform the following:
* a. Stop dumping steam
: b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to RO                        minimum for decay heat removal:
o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 18% in at least one SIG.
: c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.
RNO: IF temperature is greater than 547&deg;F and rising, THEN perform thefollowing:
                                          .__Dump_steam_using_SIG_steam_line_PORVs Appendix D                                                            NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC    Scenario#      4      Event#        5-11      Page  21 of    21 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      I  Position  I                          A&#xf8;plicants Actions or Behavior Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:
: a. PORVs Closed (YES)
RO
: b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
: c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)
 
Check If RCPs should be stopped:
: a. RCPs Any Running (YES)
: b. SI pumps At least one running and capable of delivering
 
RO flow (YES)
: c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs Less than 30&deg;F
 
(NO, go to step 14.)
Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:
: a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o None Completely depressurized (YES)
Check if S/G Tubes are Intact:
                                . Secondary radiation monitors          Have Remained Normal (NO)
                                    . R-15
                                    . R-19s BOP
                                    . R-31s
                                . SIG levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)
RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. Go to EOP-E-3, S/G Tube Rupture, Step 1.
Beginning of EOP-E-3 NOTE
                                    . FOLDOUT for EOP-E-3 is in effect.
* Chemistry should be available for sampling during this SRO procedure.
* Step 1 RCP trip criteria applies until an operator controlled RCS_cooldown_is_initiated.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4    Event #      5-11      Page  22  of      22 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      fi  Position  1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:
: a. RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES)
                                              -
: b. SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF
                                                  -
RO DELIVERING FLOW (YES)
: c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN 30&deg;F
                                                                                      -
[50&deg;F] (NO)
RNO: Go to Step 2 Identify Ruptured SIG(s): (A S/G is ruptured)
                                  . Unexpected rise in any S/G narrow range level OR
                                  . High radiation from any SG steamline (R-31s)
OR BOP
                                  . High radiation from any SG blowdown line (R-19s)
OR
                                  . High radiation from any S/G sample:
o Contact Chemistry to sample all S/Gs for activity as necessary CAUTION
                                  . If the steam driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the steam driven AFW pump should SRO be maintained from at least one S/G.
                                  . At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-13 NRC        Scenario#    4      Event#        5-11      Page 23 of      23 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position  I                              Arrnlicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):
: a. Adjust ruptured S/G(s) steam line PORV controller setpoint to 1060 psig
: b. Check ruptured S/G PORV (RV1-1) CLOSED (YES)
: c. Close steam driven AFW pump steam shutoff valve for ruptured S/G: (V1-8A)
: d. Locally close the following valve for ruptured S/G(s) while continuing with this procedure:
                                          . MS-20, SG A BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO BOP                        AFW PUMP (pipe jungle above/right of V1-8B)
: e. Check S/G blow down and blow down sample valves from ruptured S/G(s) Closed (YES)
 
                                          . SG1 Blowdown
                                          . FCV-1930A&B
                                          . FCV-1933A&BSHUT
: f. Check MSIV above and below seat drain valves for ruptured SIG CLOSED (YES)
: g. Close ruptured S/G MSIV and MSIV bypass valve V1-3A and MS-353A.
BOOTH 01 ERATOR: Vhen requested, wait 3 minutes and then close MS-20 lAW SCN file.
CAUTION
                                  . If any ruptured S/G is faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless SRO needed for RCS cooldown.
                                  . If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.
Continuous Action Step Check Ruptured S/G Level:
: a. Narrow range level          Greater than 8%. (YES)
Critical                          b.      Reset SI BOP Task                            c.      Stop feed flow to ruptured S/G:
                                          . Close steam driven AFW pump discharge valve: V2-14A
                                          . Close AFW header discharge valve: V2-16A
: d.      Perform Att. 4, Deenergizing AFW Valves For Ruptured S/Gs CRITICAL TASK          - ISOLATE A STEAM GENERATOR Appendix D                                                              NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC        Scenario#    4      Event#        5-11      Page 24  of      24 Event
 
== Description:==
A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      fi  Position  I                            Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When dispatched to perform Att. 4, wait 3 minutes and then open the breakers for AFW valves as specified in Att. 4 lAW the SCN file.
NOTE: A command to cause a loss of the Startup Transformer is built into the steDs to onen the AFW Valve breakers.
EXAMINERS NOTE:              A loss of Startup Transformer will occur while the breakers are being opened for the AFW valves.
CAUTION Major steam flow paths from the ruptured SIG(s) should be isolated SRO before initiating RCS cooldown. This includes MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves, steam line PORV, and AFW pump steam shutoff valve.
BOP        Check Ruptured SIG Pressure          Greater than 370 psig. (YES)
CAUTION IF RCPs are not running, the following steps may cause a false CSF SRO 4, Integrity Status Tree, indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard the ruptured loop T-cold indication until after performina Step 28.
NOTE Main steamline isolation may occur if the high steam flow setpoint is SRO exceeded. The cooldown should be continued using the steam line PORV(s) if MSIV closure occurs.
Identifies the loss of Start-up Transformer. Takes actions per previous CREW notes to restart safequards equipment after a loss of off-site power.
Critical                      Verifies that the SI and RHR pumps are running. (Starting of RHR RO Task                        Pumps is not a Critical Task.)
Verifies that the MDAFW Pumps and SDAFW Pump are running.
Verifies all available SW Pumps and SWBP are running.
Critical BOP        Verifies that both EDGs are running with appropriate voltage.
Task (Critical Task is to verify that at least 300 gpm AFW flow is available to support subseciuent cooldown.)
CRITICAL TASK          RESTART ECCS EQUIPMENT AFTER LOSS OF OFF-SITER POWER Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
Appendix D                                    Operator Action                                    Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:      ILC-1 3 NRC        Scenario #    4      Event #        5-11      Page    25 of    25 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time          Position                                Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate RCS Cooldown:
: a. Determine required core exit temperature:
Required Core Exit Ruptured SG Pressure (P810)                    Temperature ( F) 0 1150 and above                                  508  [488]
1100 to 1149                                    503  [483) 1050 to 1099                                    497  [477]
1000 to 1049                                    491  [471]
950 to 999                                      485  [465]
900 to 949                                      478  [458]
850 to 899                                      472  [452]
800 to 849                                      465  [445]
750 to 799                                      458  [438]
700 to 749                                      450  [430]
650 to 699                                      442  [422]
600 to 649                                      433  [413]
RO              550 to 599                                      424  [404]
500 to 549                                      415  [395]
450 to 499                                      404  [384]
400 to 449                                      393  [373]
370 to 399                                      385  [365]
: b. Dump steam to condenser from intact SIG(s) at maximum rate:
maximum rate from intact
: 1) Check condenser AVAILABLE FROM INTACT SIG(s)
                                                                  -
(NO)
RNO: Manually dump steam at maximum rate from intact SIG using steam line PORVs.
: c. Core exit TCs Less Than Required Temperature (NO,
 
continue cooldown until less that required temperature.
Continue with step 7.)
: d. Stop RCS cooldown
: e. Maintain core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED
 
TEMPERATURE Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels RO              a. Narrow range levels Greater than 8% (YES)
: b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels            BETWEEN 21% and 50%.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario #    4      Event #        5-11      Page 26  of      26 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      I  Position                                Aoolicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION SRO        If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 8.b should be repeated after pressure lowers to less than 2335 psig.
Continuous Action Step Check PZR PORVs And Block Valves:
RO            a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE (YES)
: b. PORVs CLOSED (YES)
: c. Block valves AT LEAST ON OPEN (YES)
 
CAUTION SRO        If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.
RO        Reset SI RO        Reset Containment Isolation Phase A EstabUsh Instrument Air To CV:
: a. Check APP-002-F7 EXTINGUISHED (YES)
RO
: b. Reset IA PCV-1716, instrument air isolation to CV c.__Check_IA_PCV-1716 OPEN_(YES)
 
CAUTION If RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 275 SRO psig [350 psig], the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.
Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:
: a. RCS pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)
RO
                                                        -
: b. Stop RHR pumps c.__Monitor_RCS_pressure Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      4    Event#        5-11      Page  27  of    27 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      I  Position  I                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Establish Charging Flow:
: a. Charging pumps- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
: b. Align charging pump suction to RWST
: 1) Open LCV-115B
: 2) Close LCV-1 1 5C
: 3) Place RCS makeup system switch to STOP
: c. Establish charging flow:
                                      . Start charging pump(s) as necessary to establish at least RO                      one running
                                      . Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to establish maximum charging flow for running pump(s)
                                      . Adjust HIC-121, charging flow control valve, as necessary to establish desired charging flow:
o Maintain seal injection flow BETWEEN 6 GPM
                                                                                    -
AND 20 GPM PER RCP UNLESS SEAL INJECTION ISOLATED Check If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:
: a. Check core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED
                                                              -
TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 6 (YES, if NO then hold at this RO/BOP                step until YES)
: b. Stop RCS cooldown
: c. Maintain core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATU RE BOP        Check Ruptured S/G Pressure          Stable or Rising (YES)
Check RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exit TCs                Greater than 55&deg;F RO (YES)
Depressurize RCS to Minimize Break Flow and Refill the PZR:
RO
: a. Normal PZR spray AVAILABLE (NO. ao to SteD 18)
 
CAUTION
                                  . The PRT may rupture if a PZR PORV is used to depressurize SRO the RCS. This may result in abnormal containment conditions.
                                  . Cycling of the PZR PORV should be minimized.
NOTE SRO        The upper head region may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are NOT running. This will result in a rapidly rising PZR level.
Appendix D                                                          NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I
 
Appendix D                                  Operator Action                                  Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:        ILC-13 NRC      Scenario#      4      Event#        5-11      Page  28  of    28 Event
 
== Description:==
A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
Time      I  Position    1                          Applicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize RCS using PZR PORV to minimize break flow and refill the PZR:
: a. At least one PZR PORV Available (YES)
: b. Open one PZR PORV until any of the following conditions are satisfied:
                                        . Both of the following:
: 1) RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G
 
PRESSURE RO
: 2) PZR level GREATER THAN 14%
 
OR
                                        . PZR level GREATER THAN 73%
 
OR
                                        . RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN
 
35&deg;F
: c. Close PZR PORV when any condition in Step I 8.b satisfied (conditions listed above)
RO        Check RCS Pressure        Rising (YES)
CAUTION SRO        SI must be terminated when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfillinq the ruptured SIG(s).
Check if SI Flow Should be Terminated:
: a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs GREATER THAN 35&deg;F (YES)
: b. Secondary heat sink:
                                          . Total feed flow to S/Gs AT LEAST 300 GPM
 
RO                        AVAILABLE (YES)
OR
                                          . Narrow range level in at least one intact S/G GREATER
 
THAN 8% (YES)
: c. RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES)
: d. PZR level GREATER THAN 14% (YES)
 
RO          Stop Both SI Pumps.
The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or anytime after the SI pumps have been secured lAW EOP-E-3.
Appendix D                                                            NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
 
ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4 TURNOVER SHEET
: 1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:              EOL b) Reactor Power:                  1OE-8 amps c) Turbine Load:                  0 MWe d) Boron Concentration:            513 ppm e) Rod Height:                    95 CBD f) RCS Pressure:                  2235 psig g) RCS Level:                      53.2%
h) Xenon:                          Equilibrium
: 2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. #                Description
: 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) None
: 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a)  None
: 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a)  None
: 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a)  None
: 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a)  Unrestricted
: 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a)    Continue with plant startup in accordance with GP-003 and raise reactor power to the POAH. Once at the POAH, stabilize power and hold until the on-coming crew that is performing Just-Tn-Time training for the Turbine startup relieves the shift.
: 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a)  No additional information.
: 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)    Power Trax Tnformation.
: 11. RISK a)  GREEN Appendix D                                                    NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1}}

Revision as of 10:40, 4 November 2019

Initial Exam 2013-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios
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Issue date: 11/30/2013
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To:
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Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: I Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

. CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out

  • HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
  • Maintain power at current level.

Critical Task:

  • Start A Safety Injection Pump to provide adequate core cooling.
  • Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode due to LB LOCA.
  • Start A CV Spray Pump due to abnormal CV Conditions with reduced CV Spray and Cooling capability.

Event Maif. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (C) BOP A Circulating Water Pump Trips and Discharge Valve (V6-50A) fails to Auto-Close.

2 (C) RO, CRS PCV-455B fails OPEN while in AUTO (TS) CRS 3 (C) BOP, CRS A SWBP Trips (TS) CRS 4 (R) RO Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS (TS) CRS 5 (I) RO, CRS LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure (TS) CRS 6 (C) RO, CRS Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes) 7 (M) ALL Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip 8 BOP CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI 9 RD A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI 10 RD A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips 11 RO B RHR Pump Trips 10 sec. after starting A RHR Pump 12 RD A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts. The crew has been directed to maintain current plant conditions.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, A CW pump will trip on overcurrent and discharge valve V6-50A will fail to close automatically. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-01 2, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating Water Pump Trip. The operator will take manual action to close V6-50A from the RTGB. Condenser Vacuum will be minimally affected by the loss of A CW Pump. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PZR Spray valve PCV-455B will fail open due to a failure of the controller AUTO function and result in an entry into AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. Immediate actions will be taken to stabilize RCS pressure. Actions in AOP-019 will direct the crew to take manual control of the PZR Spray Valve and close the valve. The Operator will be able to close the valve; however, PC-455B will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Depending on the timeliness of operator actions, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB

parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, will be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Service Water Booster Pump A will trip on overcurrent. APP 002-A8, B8, C8 and D8 will be received when the pump trips and will direct the crew to start the standby SWBP from the RTGB and restore normal flow to the CV HVH units. ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to

operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will be entered for the SWBP failure and ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to

operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is > 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Tech Spec compliance, he can cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Control Rod H-10 will drop into the core. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Additionally AOP 001 will have the crew verify that only one control rod dropped and transition to Section A of AOP-001. The crew will then take action to reduce reactor and turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> using rods and boration to maintain Tavg with +/-1.5°F of Tref. SRO will determine that ITS 3.1.4 Condition B must be entered. ITS 3.1.4 Condition B requires that the rod be restored to within alignment limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR verify SDM is within limits provided in the COLR within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND reduce thermal power to less than 70% RTP AND verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND perform SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND re-evaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions within 5 days. If above requirements cannot be achieved then ITS 3.1.4 Condition C will require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Due to the rapid reduction of Tave, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, will

be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a leak will develop on PZR instrument tubing inside containment that will result in LT-460 Reference Leg Failure. PT-456 will also be impacted and will actuate OTz\T Bistables and alarms due to a reduction in pressure to approximately 2080 psig as sensed by PT-456. The crew may take actions lAW AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, to address LT-460 failed high; however, this is not necessary since LT-460 is not the controlling channel. OWP-030, PLT-2 and/or AOP-025 will direct the crew to replace LT-460 with LT-461 as a controlling channel and remove LT-460 from service. The crew should determine that the failures are related to a common sensing line on the Pressurizer and determine that a leak has developed. Due to the failure of LT-460, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-I Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be operable will not be

met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Condition M requires that the channel be placed in trip in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Also due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection Channels and 3

Pressurizer Pressure Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. Condition H requires that the interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a seismic event will occur. APP-036-15, Seismic Monitor, alarm will be received along with a call from the Load Dispatcher reporting seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department. The crew will take actions lAW AOP-021, Seismic Disturbances. If dispatched, operator(s) will report that the DBE/SSE ALARM on Seismic Monitor A and the OBE ALARM on Seismic Monitor B are both EXTINGUISHED.

TRM 3.17, Seismic Shutdown, requirements are not met and thus entry in TRM 3.17 is not required. The seismic event will cause a RCS leak to develop and degrade to approximately 250 gpm over a 51/2 minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, and take prescribed actions to mitigate the RCS leakage. ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, will be entered due to having pressure boundary leakage and require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The crew will ultimately determine that the leak rate is greater than the available charging pump capacity and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Immediately upon the initiation of the reactor trip the RCS leak will degrade to a Large Break LOCA. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew will determine that both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump failed to auto-start. The crew will manually start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump. Ten seconds after starting A RHR Pump the B RHR Pump will trip. Additionally, the crew will identify that CR HVAC failed to properly align to Emergency Pressurization Mode and must be manually realigned from the RTGB. When Containment Pressure exceeds 10 psig the A CV Spray Pump will fail to Auto-start and the B CV Spray Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting. This will ultimately be identified and A CV Spray Pump will be manually started from the RTGB.

After completing the required actions of EOP-E-0 the crew will transition to FRP-P. 1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, due to the rapid RCS depressurization and cooldown but exited due to the presence of a Large Break LOCA. The crew will then transition to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and performs required actions. While performing steps in EOP-E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip on over-current. This will cause the crew to ultimately transition to EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to not having at least one train of cold leg recirculation capability. EPP-1 5 will have the crew minimize CV Spray and ECCS flow. After verifying required CV Spray pump operating the crew will be notified that the problem with B RHR Pump has been corrected and can be started as needed.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after B RHR Pump has been started and crew transitions back to EOP-E-1 from EPP-1 5.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions: e 68% EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 139 PPM Boron.

e CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out e HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:

  • Maintain power at current level while RES is monitoring A MFP.

Critical Task: e Manually start HVH-9B to preclude shutdown within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.

  • Open either SI-870A or SI-870B.
  • Isolate feed to C SIG and Manually close A and B MSIV.
  • Stop one Safety Injection Pump to minimize SI flow.

Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description I (C) BOP HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start 2 (R) RO A MFP Trips I Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS 3 (C) RO, CRS Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer (TS) CRS 4 (I) RO, CRS PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service (N) BOP 5 (I) BOP, CRS PT-495 fails Low (TS) CRS 6 (M) ALL 72 inch Main Steam Header Fault 7 ALL C S/G Tube Rupture once SIG has dried out 8 BOP Main Turbine fails to Auto-Trip on Reactor Trip 9 RO Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open 10 BOP A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open 11 BOP Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close 12 BOP A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 68% RTP. Engineering has requested that power be held at 68% while monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP. Additionally, Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations.

Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, HVH-9A, CV Concrete Shield Cooling Fan, trips and HVH-9B fails to Auto-Start. The operator will verify the standby fan starts by manually starting HVH-9B from the RTGB in accordance with APP-010-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, A Main Feed Pump will trip. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-01 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be lowered to less than 60% Reactor Power. The crew will perform the load reduction in accordance with AOP-01 0 and OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and stabilize the plant, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the RCP Seal Injection Strainer will become clogged. The crew will determine the strainer is clogged by observing a reduction in RCP seal injection flow to zero flow along with receiving APP-001-A2, Seal Water Injection Filter High AP, APP-001-B4, RCP Seal Injection HI/LO Flow, and APP-001-B3, RCP A Bearing HI Temperature. APP-001-A2 will direct the crew to dispatch an auxiliary operator to check Seal Water Injection Filter AP and will ultimately direct the crew to have the auxiliary operator shift seal injection filters using OP-301. The CRS will enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and enter Section C, Loss of Seal Injection. AOP-018 will also diagnose the event as a clogged strainer and direct the crew to shift seal injection filters. Once the seal injection filters are shifted the RCP seal injection flows will return to normal. While seal injection flow is less than 6 gpm to any RCP the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, is applicable since seal injection to any RCP is not within limit with at least one charging pump operable. The required action is to initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to restore seal injection flow and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Pressure Transmitter PT-145 for Letdown Line Pressure will fail LOW, causing PCV-145 to close and isolate letdown flow. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section A will be implemented to isolate the letdown line, reduce charging flow and place Excess Letdown in service. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-495, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, will fail low. The BOP will perform immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section G, and take manual control of FCV-498, C SIG Feed Regulating Valve, and restore C SIG level to the normal band. The crew will then take action to swap to the alternate channel, place the C FRV back in Automatic and remove PT-495 from service in accordance with OWP-025, SGP-1 1. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Condition D. Also due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the plant will experience a fault on the 72 inch Main Steam Header. The crew will determine that a reactor trip is required and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. An automatic safety injection signal will be initiated due to high steam line flow with low Tavg. During the immediate actions of EOP-E-0 it will be determined that the Turbine failed to automatically trip and manual actions will be taken to trip the turbine from the RTGB. During further actions of EOP-E-0 it will be discovered that SI-870A and B, BIT Outlets, fail to automatically open and have to be manually opened from the RTGB in order to provide safety injection flow. All Main Steam Isolation Valves will fail to automatically close and manually actions will be taken to close them from the RTGB. C MSIV will remain failed in the open position. V2-6A, B, and C, Feedwater Header Section Valves, will fail to automatically close and will have to be manually closed from the RTGB. A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will fail to automatically start and will be manually started from the RTGB.

Once C SIG has dried out a 400 gpm tube rupture will ramp in over 60 seconds on C SIG.

The crew will complete EOP-E-0 and transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and perform the actions to isolate C SIG. Once C SIG is isolated the crew will then transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, due to elevated readings on R-31 C, Main Steam Line Channel, and continued steam flow from C SIG. Since C MSIV cannot be closed the crew will direct local isolation of C SIG. Ultimately the crew will transition to EPP-1 7, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, and secure all but one RCP and one Safety Injection pump.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

. CCW Pump C is OCS and breaker is racked out

  • HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
  • Maintain power at current level.

Critical Task:

  • Establish Containment Isolation.

. Manually start A MDAFW pump.

. Secure all RCPs due to a loss of subcooling with SI flow.

. Manually Start A SI Pump

. Direct local actions to Swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST to prevent Gas Binding of the Charging Pumps. (Contingency)

Event Ma If. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (I) BOP, CRS PT-447 fails Low (TS) CRS 2 (C) RO, CRS TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure 3 (I) RD Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High (TS) CRS 4 (R) RO HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load (N) BOP, CRS Reduction 5 (I) BOP, CRS SIG Level Median Selector Module failure (TS) CRS 6 (M) ALL Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close 7 (M) ALL Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2) 8 (M) ALL Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

9 BOP SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start.

10 RD CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A 11 RO A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.

The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section H, and verify S/Gs trending to 39% and place Rod Control in Manual. SIG levels will be restored to normal, alternate channel selected and feedwater regulating valves returned to automatic. Rod control will be returned to automatic once Tavg verified in the required band. PT-447 will then be removed from service in accordance with OWP-033, FSP-2. Failure of PT-447 will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Item 17e, requirement to have 2 Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 inputs available for Reactor Protection System Interlocks to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition T, will be entered which requires that the P-7 interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e, requirement to have 2 High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation will not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.2, Condition D, will be entered which requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, TCV-i44, Letdown Temperature Controller, will fail close causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. TCV-123, VCT/DEMIN Dlv, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT and manual action will be taken to divert letdown flow from the RTGB in accordance with APP-001 -A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD. The operator will then determine that TCV-144 has failed closed and take manual actions at the RTGB to open TCV 144 to re-establish cooling flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger in accordance with APP-00i-A6. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, NI-44, Power Range, Upper Detector will fail high. The channel will be removed from service in accordance with OWP-0i 1, N 1-4. N 1-44 failure will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-i, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.

Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition S)

OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition T). Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, HCV-1459 will fail open. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-Oi 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be controlled less than 100% and take action to lower turbine load. Once Reactor Power is stabilized below 100%, the crew will receive a report from Operations Management that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP and recommends that Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Reactor Power be reduced to 70% power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the A S/G level median selector module will fail resulting in a loss of SIG level input to the A Feedwater Regulating Valve. The crew will take immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction, with the BOP taking manual control of A FRy. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control and stabilize A SIG level, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, three main turbine governor valves will begin to randomly oscillate and ultimately fail closed resulting in a Secondary Load Rejection. The crew may decide to take a conservative action and initiate a reactor trip and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, the crew may enter AOP-015, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to diagnose the problem. Once in AOP-015 the crew will eventually reach a continuous action step that requires the crew to trip the reactor if greater than two governor valves indicate closed. During the fast-bus transfer following the Reactor Trip, 4KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Start-up Transformer due to breaker 52/17 tripping open. On the loss of 4KV Bus 3 the B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of power to 480V Bus E-2.

Due to the seal failure and suction line leak on B RCP a safety injection will be required. Only A train ECCS components will be available due to the loss of Bus E-2. However, A SI Pump does not auto-start and must be manually started from the RTGB. Also during the reactor trip the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will trip and neither A or B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start. CVC-200A, Letdown Orifice Isolation, and

( CVC-204A and CVC-240B, Letdown Line Isolation Valves, fail to close as required on the Phase A signal. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew should dispatch personnel to investigate and troubleshoot the failure of B EDG. If dispatched, maintenance personnel will determine and correct the cause (fuel racks found tripped and reset) and recommend that the B EDG be started locally. If personnel are not dispatched then 480V Bus E-2 will remain deenergized. With 480V Bus E-2 denergized MCC-6 will not have power and thus LCV-1 I SC, VCT Isolation, will remain in the open position preventing Charging Pump suction swapover to the RWST. If not identified this will eventually result in a loss of suction to the Charging Pumps and lead to gas binding if LCV-1 1 5C is not closed locally. If gas binding of the Charging Pumps occurs then all Charging Pumps will be secured, LCV-1 1 5C will have to be locally closed and Charging Pumps vented prior to restoring charging pump flow.

The crew will progress through EOP-E-0 and address the malfunctions discussed above.

Additionally, subcooling will lower to the point at which RCP Trip Criteria is met and all RCPs will be secured. EOP-E-0 will eventually direct the crew to transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. At some point during the performance of EOP-E-0 or EOP-E-1 the crew is expected to realize that B RCP experienced a seal failure and that AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, is required to be implemented since it is a Concurrent AOP. The crew will perform EOP-E-1 and eventually transition to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, and initiate RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown and Depressurization of the RCS to refill the PZR.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions: e 1OE-8 amps, EOL, 15,697 MWD/MTU, 513 PPM Boron.

. No equipment out of service.

Turnover: e Startup in progress in accordance with GP-003, Step 8.4.

Critical Task: e Manually Trip the reactor.

. Establish Containment Isolation.

. Isolate A Steam Generator in accordance with EOP-E-3.

. Restart ECCS equipment after loss of off-site power.

. Establish Auxiliary Feedwater Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description I (R) RO, Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat (N) CRS 2 (I) RO, CRS PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close (TS) CRS 3 (C) BOP, CRS SW Break at Suction of A SWBP (TS) CRS 4 (C) RO, CRS B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure 5 (C) RO, CRS A SIG Tube Leak 6 (M) ALL A SIG Tube Rupture 7 RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button 8 (M) ALL Loss of Startup Transformer 9 BOP MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-1 6s) 10 BOP Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

11 BOP SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (V1-8s) fail to Auto Open on Loss of Startup Transformer (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 1OE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003, Normal Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Critical. The crew will continue with GP-003 at Step 8.4, Post Critical Operations, and withdraw control rods to the Point of Adding Heat and then stabilize Reactor Power between 3% and 5%. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to stabilize reactor power, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-445, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, fails High. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, and attempt to close PCV-456, PZR PORV. PCV-456 will fail to fully close and the operator will take manual action to close the PORV Block Valve. Once the PORV Block Valve is close PZR Pressure will automatically recover to normal band. Due to the failure of PCV-456 to fully close the SRO will determine that ITS LCO Condition B, is applicable due to one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. This LCO requires that the block valve be closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and power removed from the associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control PZR Pressure and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a Service Water Break will occur at the Suction of A SWBP.

The crew will implement AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Section D, for Leak on South Service Water Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545. The crew will perform required valve and Service Water Booster Pump manipulations from the RTGB and direct field actions in accordance with AOP-022 attachments to isolate the ruptured section of Service Water piping and restore various components to operable status. The Service Water Break will result in entry into ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> without reliance on steam generator for heat removal. ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, is also applicable due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, B RCP will experience a 40 gpm thermal barrier leak. This will be identified by a rising trend and alarm on R-17, rising CCW surge tank level, and RCP thermal barrier cooling water high flow alarm. FCV-626, Thermal Barrier Flow Control, will receive the signal to auto-close, however the breaker to the MOV will trip leaving the valve in mid-position. The crew will take action to close CC-735, Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation, from the RTGB due to the FCV-626 failure. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a 300 gpm tube leak on A S!G will be ramped over a six minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-035, SIG Tube Leak, and attempt to control pressurizer level. Ultimately the crew will determine that the leak is greater than the capacity of available charging pumps and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection. The reactor will not trip on an automatic signal or by depressing the right hand reactor trip pushbutton. The RO will identify this failure and trip the reactor by depressing the left hand reactor trip pushbutton. On the initiation of the Reactor Trip the SIG tube leak will degrade to 1000 gpm. On initiation of the Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Safety Injection the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves will fail to close on the Phase A signal. The BOP will take manual action to adjust the individual valves potentiometer on the RTGB to close the valves. Additionally, the Motor Driven Feedwater Pumps Discharge Valves will fail to Auto-Open. This failure will be identified, but the crew may determine it not necessary to open the valves until needed due to adequate SIG levels present at the onset of the major event. The crew will carry out the actions of EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, identifying the conditions noted above and stabilizing the plant. The crew will transition from EOP-E-0 to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Once A S/G has been isolated and an operator dispatched to deenergize the associated AFW valves the plant will experience a loss of off-site power. On the loss of off-site power, the Main Steam Supply valves to the Steam Driven AFW Pump will fail to open. The crew will take required actions to restart safeguards equipment since SI would have been reset at this point in the EOP Network. After safeguards equipment has been restarted the crew will perform an RCS cooldown and depressurization to stop the primary to secondary leakage. The crew will be required to either open the MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves (V2-16s) or manually start the SDAFW pump to provide AFW flow during the RCS cooldown. Once the primary to secondary leakage is stopped, both safety injection pumps will be secured.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after the safety injection pumps have been secured in accordance with EOP-E-3, or at his discretion.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

I H .B. Robinson ILC-13 NRC Licensing Exam Simulator Scenarios Final Submittal

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

  • CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out o HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
  • Maintain power at current level.

Critical Task:

. Start A Safety Injection Pump to provide adequate core cooling.

  • Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode due to LB LOCA.
  • Start A CV Spray Pump due to abnormal CV Conditions with reduced CV Spray and Cooling capability.

Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (C) BOP A Circulating Water Pump Trips and Discharge Valve

$?/ (V6-50A) fails to Auto-Close.

2 (C) RO, CRS PCV-455B fails OPEN while in AUTO (TS) CRS 3 (C) BOP, CRS A SWBP Trips (TS) CRS 4 (R) RO Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction (N)BOP,CRS (TS) CRS 5 (I) RO, CRS LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure (TS) CRS 6 (C) RO, CRS Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes) 7 (M) ALL Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip 8 BOP CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI 9 RO A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI 10 RO A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips 11 RO B RHR Pump Trips 10 sec. after starting A RHR Pump 12 RO A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts. The crew has been directed to maintain current plant conditions.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, A CW pump will trip on overcurrent and discharge valve V6-50A will fail to close automatically. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating Water Pump Trip. The operator will take manual action to close V6-50A from the RTGB. Condenser Vacuum will be minimally affected by the loss of A CW Pump. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PZR Spray valve PCV-455B will fail open due to a failure of the controller AUTO function and result in an entry into AOP-01 9, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control. Immediate actions will be taken to stabilize RCS pressure. Actions in AOP-019 will direct the crew to take manual control of the PZR Spray Valve and close the valve. The Operator will be able to close the valve; however, PC-455B will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. Depending on the timeliness of operator actions, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB

parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, will be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Service Water Booster Pump A will trip on overcurrent. APP 002-A8, B8, C8 and D8 will be received when the pump trips and will direct the crew to start the standby SWBP from the RTGB and restore normal flow to the CV HVH units. ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to

operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will be entered for the SWBP failure and ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to

operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is> 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the Tech Spec compliance, he can cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Control Rod H-i 0 will drop into the core. The crew will take immediate actions lAW AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. Additionally AOP 001 will have the crew verify that only one control rod dropped and transition to Section A of AOP-001. The crew will then take action to reduce reactor and turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> using rods and boration to maintain Tavg with +/-1.5°F of Tref. SRO will determine that ITS 3.1.4 Condition B must be entered. ITS 3.1.4 Condition B requires that the rod be restored to within alignment limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR verify SDM is within limits provided in the COLR within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND reduce thermal power to less than 70% RTP AND verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND perform SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> AND re-evaluate safety analyses and confirm results remain valid for duration of operation under these conditions within 5 days. If above requirements cannot be achieved then ITS 3.1.4 Condition C will require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Due to the rapid reduction of Tave, ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, will

be entered due to PZR Pressure being reduced to less than 2205 psig. Once the Chief Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a leak will develop on PZR instrument tubing inside containment that will result in LT-460 Reference Leg Failure. PT-456 will also be impacted and will actuate OTAT Bistables and alarms due to a reduction in pressure to approximately 2080 psig as sensed by PT-456. The crew may take actions lAW AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, to address LT-460 failed high; however, this is not necessary since LT-460 is not the controlling channel. OWP-030, PLT-2 and/or AOP-025 will direct the crew to replace LT-460 with LT-461 as a controlling channel and remove LT-460 from service. The crew should determine that the failures are related to a common sensing line on the Pressurizer and determine that a leak has developed and perform the actions of AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage and AOP-005, Radiation Monitoring System. Due to the failure of LT-460, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be

operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Condition M requires that the channel be placed in trip in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Also due to the failure of PT-456, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection

Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. Condition H requires that the interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a seismic event will occur. APP-036-15, Seismic Monitor, alarm will be received along with a call from the Load Dispatcher reporting seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department. The crew will take actions lAW AOP-021, Seismic Disturbances. If dispatched, operator(s) will report that the DBE/SSE ALARM on Seismic Monitor A and the OBE ALARM on Seismic Monitor B are both EXTINGUISHED.

TRM 3.17, Seismic Shutdown, requirements are not met and thus entry in TRM 3.17 is not required. The seismic event will cause a RCS leak to develop and degrade to approximately 250 gpm over a 5 % minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-01 6, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, and take prescribed actions to mitigate the RCS leakage. ITS 3.4.13 RCS Operational Leakage, Condition B, will be entered due to having pressure boundary leakage and require that the plant be placed in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The crew will ultimately determine that the leak rate is greater than the available charging pump capacity and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Immediately upon the initiation of the reactor trip the RCS leak will degrade to a Large Break LOCA. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew will determine that both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump failed to auto-start. The crew will manually start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump. Ten seconds after starting A RHR Pump the B RHR Pump will trip. Additionally, the crew will identify that CR HVAC failed to properly align to Emergency Pressurization Mode and must be manually realigned from the RTGB. When Containment Pressure exceeds 10 psig the A CV Spray Pump will fail to Auto-start and the B CV Spray Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting. This will ultimately be identified and A CV Spray Pump will be manually started from the RTGB.

After completing the required actions of EOP-E-0 the crew will transition to FRP-P. 1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock, due to the rapid RCS depressurization and cooldown but exited due to the presence of a Large Break LOCA. The crew will then transition to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and performs required actions. While performing steps in EOP-E-1 the A RHR Pump will trip on over-current. This will cause the crew to ultimately transition to EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, due to not having at least one train of cold leg recirculation capability. EPP-1 5 will have the crew minimize CV Spray and ECCS flow. After verifying required CV Spray pump operating the crew will be notified that the problem with B RHR Pump has been corrected and can be started as needed.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after B RHR Pump has been started and crew transitions back to EOP-E-1 from EPP-1 5.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-i ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I SIMULATOR SETUP ICIS ETU P:

  • lC-901, SCN 006_ILC_i 3_NRC_i.
  • Status board is provided to crew is IC-13.

PRE-LOADED EVENTS:

The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:

o Event 7: Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip

  • Event 8: CR HVAC fails to Auto Actuate on SI
  • Event 9: A SI Pump and A RHR Pump fail to Auto-Start on SI
  • Event 10: A CV Spray Pump fails to Auto-Start and B CV Spray Pump Trips
  • Event Ii: B RHR Pump Trips 10 seconds after manually starting A RHR Pump
  • Event 12: A RHR Pump Trips after entering EOP-E-1 EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
  • Event 1: A CWP Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close
  • Event 2: PCV-455B fails open while in AUTO
  • Event 3: A SWBP trips
  • Event 4: Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction
  • Event 5: LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing line Failure
  • Event 6: Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)

EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:

  • APP-002
  • OWP-030, PLT-2
  • OWP-029, PLT-2
  • FRP-P.1
  • EOP-E-i
  • EPP-15 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 1 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-008D4, CW PMP A MOTORIDISCH VLV TRIP!OLVD, is illuminated A CWP RTGB GREEN OFF light illuminated V6-50A RTGB RED OPEN IF illuminated Enters AOP-012, Partial Loss of Condenser Vacuum or Circulating SRO Water Pump Trip SRO Verifies immediate actions complete.

Start any available CWP with its Associated CW PMP SEAL WTR BOP LOST Alarm Extinguished. (All available are running.)

RO Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.

BOP Check Liquid Waste Batch Release In Progress (NO)

Check Condenser Status VACUUM PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED BOP (YES)

Check Status of the tripped CWP Discharge Valves Completed BOP Closing (YES, V6-50A manually closed from RTGB.)

BOP Check Plant Conditions In Modes I OR 2 (YES)

Continuous Action Step:

Check Condenser Back Pressure On P1-1312 AND P1-I 313 IJF APPROACHES RESTRICTED REGION OF ATTACHMENT 3, CONDENSER BACKPRESSURE LIMIT CURVE (NO, Go to Step 13)

Continuous Action Step:

BOP Check Condenser Vacuum Degrading (NO, Go to Step 15)

SRO Implement the EALs Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 1 Page 7 of 7 Event

Description:

A Circulating Water Pump Trips and V6-50A fails to Auto-Close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE: Crew should notify WCC SRO andlor l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, vent the water boxes and notify the Operations Manager.

bUU I H UFKA I uic cnowieage any direction associated witn water box venting, inspections, etc. If requested, report that the CWP breaker trippeo and the cause is unknown. Traveling Screens appear to be free of debris. 15 minutes after the request to vent the water boxes reporl that venting has been completed.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (PCV-455B fails open in AUTO) on cue from the

  • Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1LC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

PCV-455B fails open in Auto Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, PCV-455B fails open in AUTO EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS PC-455B output failing high.

PCV-455B RTGB indication RED open light illuminates.

Pressurizer Pressure lowering.

Pressurizer Control Bank Heaters energize.

Immediate Action Step Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:

RO

  • Check PZR pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)

-

  • Verify Both PZR PORVs CLOSED (YES)

-

Immediate Action Step Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RO RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band

  • Place PCV-455B in Manual and Close SRO Enters AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control SRO Verifies immediate actions complete.

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445 FAILED RO (NO, Go to Step 7)

Check PC-444J, PZR PRESS OPERATING PROPERLY IN AUTO RO

-

(YES)

RO Observe the NOTE prior to Step I I and Go to Step 11 Check RCS Pressure LESS THAN REQUIRED FOR CURRENT RO

-

PLANT CONDITIONS (YES)

I I Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

PCV-455B fails open in Auto Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Restore Pressure Within 2 HOURS OR Be In Mode 2 Within 6 RO HOURS Check Both PZR SPRAY VALVES CLOSED (NO, based on initial

event conditions. May answer as YES based on current conditions.)

Perform the following:

a. Place the affected PZR SPRAY VALVE Controller in MAN AND RO adjust the output to zero.
b. IF the affected valve will NOT close, THEN Go To Step 16. (NO)
c. IF the affected valve has closed, THEN observe the CAUTION prior to Step 20 and Go to Step 20. (YES)

RO Check CVC-31 1, Aux Pzr SDrav Valve Closed (YES)

Continuous Action Step RO Check APP-003-F8, PZR LO LVL HTR OFF & LTDN SECURE EXTINGUISHED (YES)

SRO/BOP Contact Maintenance and Enqineerinq to check PZR Heater capacity PnnTI4npPPATOR* If! Whn

..

W(( SRfl Minfcnnsc nrIfrir nc1InArincL wIt minutAs nrI then mnnrt that thr is no

---..---------,,------- ----------

reduced PZR heater caoacitv.

RO Check PZR Heater capacity REDUCED (NO, Go to Step 23)

Check PZR Pressure STABLE OR TRENDING TO REQUIRED

-

RO VALUE (YES. Go to Steo 29)

SRO Implement the EAL5 SRO Contact I&C to Make Repair to the PZR Pressure Control System Refer to ITS for Applicable LCOs ITS 3.4.1, Condition A, One or more RCS DNB parameters not within SRO limits Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />,

will be entered if PZR Pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig.

SRO Return to Procedure and Step in Effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (A SWBP Trips) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 3 Page 10 of 10 Event

Description:

A SWBP Trips Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, A SWBP Trips EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-002-A8, B8, C8, D8, HVH-1 (-2, -3, -4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW A SWBP RTGB Indication RED and GREEN lights illuminated.

B SWBP RTGB Indication GREE light illuminated.

BOP Recognizes A SWBP trioDed and B SWBP secured.

Reviews APP-002-A8, B8, C8, D8 Step I IF the operating SWBP has RO tripped, THEN START Standby SWBP.

BOP Manually starts the B SWBP Dispatches AO to observe SWBP operation and verify proper flow to C REW the CV HVH units.

BOOTH OPERATOR: IF dispatched, report that A SWBP breaker indicates tripped on over-current and HVH flows are all within the normal band.

Reviews ITS for applicability.

ITS 3.7.7, Condition A, one Service Water System (SWS) train inoperable Restore SWS train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will

be entered for the SWBP failure.

CRS ITS 3.6.6, Condition D, Two Containment Cooling Trains inoperable Restore one containment cooling train to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, will be entered due to the failure to meet SR 3.6.6.3 (Verify cooling water flow rate to each cooling unit is > 750 gpm) for the CV HVH units.

Notify WCC SRO to initiate Work Request, contact Maintenance and CRS Work Management and notify Operations I Plant Management.

BOOTH OPERATOR: insert Event #4 (Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# I Event# 4 Page II of 11 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-005-A3, PR DROP ROD APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV APP-005-F2, ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP APP-005-F3, PR UPPER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT APP-005-F4, PR LOWER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT Rod H-1O Rod Bottom Light Illuminated and IRPI lowers to zero APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS APP-O 04, TAVGITREF DEV Determine If Multiple Rods Have Dropped As Follows:

a. Analyze Indications For Multiple Rod Drop
  • Prompt Drop PRESENT (YES)

RO

  • More than I Rod Bottom Light ILLUMINATED (NO)
  • More Than I IRPI INDICATES ON BOTTOM (NO)

-

b. Check Multiple Dropped Rods PRESENT (NO, Go To Step 10.)

BOP Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Check Tavg TRENDING TO Tref (NO)

-

RO RNO: Perform Attachment 1, Turbine Load Adjustment, to restore Tavg within +1- 1.5°F Determine The Status Of Rods As Follows:

a. Analyze the below indications for a dropped rod:
  • APP-005-A3, PR DROP ROD ILLUMINATED (YES)
  • APP-005-F2, ROD BOTTOM ROD DROP ILLUMINATED RO (YES)
  • Rod Bottom Light for affected rod ILLUMINATED (YES)
  • Indication of Prompt Drop PRESENT (YES)
  • Quadrant Power Tilt indications PRESENT (YES)
b. Check Dropped Rod PRESENT (YES)

SRO Go To Section A, Dropped Rod RO Check Plant Status Mode I (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Page 12 of 12 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time I Position Ar:rnlicants Actions or Behavior RO Check Droied Rod Location In Controllinci Bank (NO. Go to Steo 4)

Notify Reactor Engineering AND I&C Personnel to Perform the following:

a. Verify the status of the dropped rod RO b. Investigate the cause of the dropped rod.
c. Avoid ANY action that could cause inadvertent withdrawal of the affected rod.
d. Determine appropriate recovery actions.

BOOTH OPERATOR Acknowledqe the request for Reactor Enqineerinq andlor I&C to investiaate. aetermine cause ana aerermine aororiate recovery i ifi nn q

---.-.

Check APP-005-B5, ROD BANKS AIB/C/D LO LIMIT RO EXTINGUISHED (NO)

Establish Stable Conditions At OR Below 70% Reactor Power As follows:

a. Check Reactor power Greater Than 70% (YES)
b. Check APP-005-E2, ROD CONT SYSTEM URGENT FAILURE EXTINGUISHED (YES)

RO c. Reduce Reactor AND Turbine power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> using rods and boration to maintain Tavg within +1- 1.5°F of Tref using OP-301, CVCS, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, AND Attachment 1, Turbine Load Adjustment (OP-3d, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist, is included at the end of Event #4)

Attachment I Turbine Load Adjustment

-

1. Check Turbine Control Mode Automatic (YES)
2. Check Turbine Load Adjustment In IMP IN Desired (YES)
3. Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton (IMP IN depressed)
4. Set the Desired Load in the SETTER (REF V to adjust setter)
5. Set the Desired Load Rate (Thumbwheel to set load rate)

BOP

6. Depress the GO and HOLD Pushbuttons as necessary (Pushbuttons)

(BOP and RO will coordinate the power reduction with boron additions and rods.)

(OP-301, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist, is included at the end of Event #4 (shaded area))

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Notify Load Dispatcher of the Units Load Capability Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Page 14 of 14 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step RO Check Total Reactor Power Change Greater than 15% in any one

hour period. (This will eventually be true.)

Monitor Quadrant Power Tilt AND Axial Flux Difference to Ensure RO Compliance with ITS LCO 3.2.3 and ITS LCO 3.2.4 Determine if Axial Flux Difference (AFD) should be Adjusted As Follows:

a. Check APP-005-E2, Rod Cont System Urgent Failure RO Extinguished (YES)
b. Check AFD Within Target Band (YES)
c. Check AFD Within Operating Band (YES)
d. GotoStepl3 Confirm Dropped Rod as Follows:
a. Determine if a dropped rod exists by at least ONE of the following:
  • Quadrant Power Tilt indications Present o APP-005-F3 ILLUMINATED (YES)

o APP-005-F4 ILLUMINATED (YES)

RO o APP-005-C3 ILLUMINATED (YES)

o Power Range Drawer Indications (YES) o Axial Flux Difference indications (YES)

. Incore flux map

. Reactor Engineering or l&C determination

. APP-005-A3 ILLUMINATED (YES)

b. Check dropped rod determination Complete (YES)

RO Check Dropped Rod Confirmed (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check Rod Recovery Status Complete (NO)

RNO:

IF the rod will NOT be restored to within the alignment limits within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> of discovery, THEN perform the following:

a. Verify SDM is within the limits specified in the COLR within I hour in accordance with FMP-012, Manual Determination of Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.
b. Reduce Thermal Power to less than or equal to 70% within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> RO
c. Verify SDM is within the limits provided in the COLR every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in accordance with FMP-012, Manual Determination of Shutdown Margin Boron Concentration.
d. Notify Reactor Engineering to perform ITS SR 3.2.1.1 AND SR 3.2.2.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />
e. IF the rod can NOT be realigned, THEN within 5 days, complete a Safety Analysis for continued operation with the misaligned rod.
f. IF the requirements of items a through e can NOT be achieved.

THEN be in Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Notify I&C To Make Repairs As Necessary To Restore Proper CRS Operation Of The Rod Control System RO Check IRPI for the drooed rod Indicates Rod Fully Inserted (YES)

Contact Reactor Engineering to Obtain the Following:

RO a. Power level at which recovery is to be performed.

b. Rate at which rod should be withdrawn BOOTH OPERATOR: When contacted as Reactor Engineering, state power level of 70%

RTP and rate of withdrawal should be no greater than 10 steps per minute. When contacted as Manager Operations acknowledge

the report and provide approval for rod recovery.

Notify Manager Operations OR His Designee Of The Following:

-

a. Current plant conditions CRS b. Power level required for rod alignment
c. Approval for rod alignment is required prior to continuing
d. Check rod recovery APPROVED

-

RO Check Cause of Dropped Rod FOUND AND CORRECTED Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

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Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 4 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

Dropped Control Rod resulting in Load Reduction Time fi Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added, THEN verify the following:

FCV-1 13A, BORIC ACID FLOW, closes.

RD *

  • FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
  • IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.
  • The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow path as follows:

  • PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.
  • SET YIC-1 14, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.
  • PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to CLOSE.
  • Momentarily PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START.
  • IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RD the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP nnsitinn

...,.d n

(, I-rimrv Wtr dditinn rr.h th 1ird iIii

  • WHIN thA sirM mriint ot I-nmrv VVtAr ha heen du1d

- .- . ..- .

E* -

C) r/ i I 3B R.ei icieci iviU u .rii, .L IC 1 :I( )StS

, II Ifl MI itO I me operrinn IrIm2rv i mn P

RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

  • VERIFY FCV-1 14A Primary WTR Flow Dilute Mode is in AUTO.

PLACE FCV-1 14B Blended MU to VCT to the AUTO position.

RD *

  • PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
  • Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RD TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.

MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RD inform the CRS OR the SM of the results of the boration.

End of OP-301 , Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist Appendix D NUREG1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

LT-460 Reference Leg / PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (LT-460 Reference Leg!

PT-456 Sensing Line Failure).

EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-003-C8, PZR PROT HI LEVEL Bistable LC46OAI illuminated APP-002-E2, HVH CONDENSATE COLL AOP-025 may be entered for guidance due to LT-460 failure lAW APP-003-C8, however, not required since LT-460 is not the controlling CRS channel. Determines OWP-029 will be utilized for removal of PT-456 from service.

NOTE: Crew will enter AOP-016 once the determination has been made that the failures d.i tn ninn Iin Ik AflP.IIIR

...

tirnq

-.-----.-..

IitAri fnhIrwinn th AflP-fl7 tIons A(JF-U(Jfi. Ra1atIOn Monatorino system. will e entered once N-Il

,

.-

andlor R-12 are in alarm. AOP-005 follows AOP-016 in this Guide.

RO Check LCV-460A&B, LTDN LINE STOP Closed (NO, go to step 4)

BOP Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Restore PZR Level to between 22% and 53% by Performing One of the Following:

. Adjust operating Charging Pump speed in Manual RO OR

. Level Controller LC-459G in Manual (Neither action is required since PZR level is being controlled by LT 459.)

Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM (YES, RO not impacted by failures.)

Check Number of Operable PZR Level Channels Greater than one RO

(YES)

Place LM-459, PZR LEVEL, In the Switch Position for the Alternate

,,

Channel Below:

I Failed Channel I Switch Position I LT-460 I 461 REPL 460 Verify Selector Switch LR-459 Selected to the Controlling Channel RO

. REC459 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Restore PZR Level Control To Automatic As Follows:

  • Check Normal Letdown Isolated (NO)

RD

  • Start additional Charging Pump as desired. (N/A)
  • Check PZR level Within +/- 1% of Programmed Reference

Level (YES)

  • Restore PZR Level control to Automatic (No action required.)

RD Check affected PZR Level FAILED LOW (NO)

Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM (YES, RD not impacted by failures.)

BOP Remove the affected Transmitter from Service lAW OWP-030, PLT-2.

Contact WCC SRO for assistance with OWPs for LT-460 and PT-456.

CRS Also, requests W/R initiation and Maintenance contacted.

Briefs the crew on removal of LT-460 from service lAW OWP-030 and CRS PT-456 from service lAW OWP-029.

Dr-I-LI ftDAFfD iII....... 1WRI fl)fl rlAIrJ Afl IAAI fM £ I.

  • , *
  • P I W I
  • fl. WW II F II I%1 Determines the following ITS implications for failure:

LT-460: ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 8 which requires 3 Pressurizer Water Level High Channel to be operable will not be met

and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition M, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

PT-456: ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 5 and 7 which requires 3 OTAT Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Conditions E and M. Condition E: Channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 CRS hours. Condition M: Channel be placed in trip in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> or reduce thermal power to less than P-7 within 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items 1 .d and 6.a which requires 3 Pressurizer Pressure Low Safety Injection Channels and 3 Pressurizer Pressure

Low ESFAS Interlock Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Conditions D and H. Condition D: Channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. Condition H: Interlock verified in the required state for existing unit condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br />.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

LT-460 Reference Leg / PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time fi Position Applicants Actions or Behavior AOP-016 Excessive Primary Plant Leakage Continuous Action Step Check RCS Pressure Greater than 1000 psig. (YES)

Check the following:

PZR Level Less than 14% AND lowering in an uncontrolled manner

(NO)

RO OR RCS Subcooling Less than 35°F (NO)

IF PZR Level can NOT be maintained greater than 14%

Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 35° F, THEN trip the Reactor and Go to EOP-E-0.

Crew Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Continuous Action Step Check VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (NO)

-

RO

  • IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches, THEN perform Step 5.

Go To Step 6 Check Charging Pump Status LESS THAN TWO RUNNING (NO)

RO

  • __GoToStepli.

Place running Charging Pump Speed Controllers in MAN AND adjust RO output to maximum Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

-

RO (NO)

  • __GotoStep2o RO Control Charging Flow To Maintain Desired RCS Level Continuous Action Step RO Monitor RCS Level Lowering In An Uncontrolled Manner (NO)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 5 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

LT-460 Reference Leg I PT-456 Sensing Line Failure Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check for Primary-to-Secondary Leakage as Indicated by One or More of the Following: (NO, go to step 25)

RO

. R-15, R-I9AIBIC, R-3IAIBIC, Secondary Chemistry Sample Results.

Initiate Leak Rate Determination Using One or More of the following RO Methods:

. OST-051, OST-901, Charqinq vs Letdown Flow Balance SRO Implement EALs AOP-005 Radiation Monitoring System BOP Check R-1 IIR-12 Selector Switch Selected to CV (YES)

BOP Check RCS Temperature Greater than 200°F (YES)

Check Channel R-1 1IR-12 Low Flow Alarm Illuminated (NO, Go to BOP StelD 5.)

BOP Check EOP Network Procedures Implemented (NO, Go to Step 7)

BOP Check Personnel IN CV (NO, Go to Step 13)

BOP Check Containment Ventilation Isolation Valves Closed (YES)

Place the Following CV Iodine Removal Fan Control Switches to BOP Prepurge Position:

. HVE-3/4 Request RC to perform a background radiation check at Radiation BOP Monitors R-11 and R-12.

BOP Determine if Primary System Leakage is Occurring (YES)

Go to AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage, while continuing BOP with this procedure.

BOP Refer to ITS 3.3.6 and ODCM Table 3.10-1.

bOO I H OPERA I OK. On cue from tIie chief Examiner Insert EVflt b Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 1/2 minutes)).

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: ILC-13NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 6 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6 (Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 / minutes)).

EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-036-15, SEISMIC ALARM APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED CV SUMP LEVEL RISE BOOTH OPERATOR: After 1 minute contact the control room as the Load Dispatcher and report that seismic events have been noted in the area from the US Geological Department.

CRS Enters AOP-021 for Seismic Disturbances.

BOP Dispatch an Operator to the Seismic Monitors to check local alarms.

BOP Make PA Announcement Compare Current RTGB Indications with the Operating Logs to Detect RO/BOP any abnormal trends.

Check Either Event Below Has Occurred

. Noticeable Tremors or Vibrations (NO)

CRS OR

. Report by Outside Aciencv (YES)

Check For Changes From Pre-earthquake Conditions That May Impair Safety-related Function

. CRDM operation

. Nuclear Instrumentation

. RCS radiation levels

. Process Radiation Monitors

. Area Radiation Monitors C REW

. RCS flow, temperature and pressure

. Loose Parts Monitor System

. RCS Chemistry sample and results

. Secondary System Chemistry sample and results

. Electrical power sources

. Fire Protection System leaks

. Spurious relay actuations CRS Notify the Manager Operations of the following:

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 6 Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)

Time Position ADNcants Actions or Behavior

. A Seismic event has occurred.

. Any abnormal plant conditions that have been identified.

CRS Implement the EALs Implement Applicable Technical Specification LCOs.

CRS TRM 3.17 Seismic Shutdown Limits, should be referenced Check Local Monitors Observed (YES, once report is received for CRS both monitors)

EXAMINERS NOTE: By this time the crew will identify the RCS leak and either enter AOP-016 or conservatively decide to trip the reactor based on the number of failures that have occurred.

CRS Enters AOP-016 for RCS Leakacie Continuous Action Step Check RCS Pressure Greater than 1000 psig. (YES)

Check the following:

PZR Level Less than 14%

lowering in an uncontrolled manner (NO)

RO OR RCS Subcooling Less than 35°F (NO)

]f PZR Level can be maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 35°F, THEN trip the Reactor and Go to EOP-E-0.

BOP Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry RO Control Charging Flow to Maintain Desired RCS Level Check Charging Pump Status LESS THAN TWO RUNNING (NO, go RO to Step 11)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 6 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

Seismic Event and RCS Leak (250 gpm ramped in over 5 % minutes)

Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Place running Charging Pump Speed Controllers in MAN AND adjust RO outiut to maximum Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

-

(YES)

(If answered as NO, depending on scenario timeline, the crew will RO control charging flow and ultimately determine that RCS level is lowering in an uncontrolled manner and return to step I of AOP-016.

This question will eventually be answered as YES.)

RO Check Any Letdown - IN SERVICE (YES)

Verify All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:

. LCV-460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves CLOSED -

. HIC-142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO -

RO 0%

. HIC-137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO -

0%

. CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP CLOSED -

Check RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO

-

(YES)

RO Check RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG (YES)

Directs the RO to the Trip the reactor, initiate safety injection and go to CRS EOP-E-O.

EXAMINERS NOTE: A Large Break LOCA will be inserted when the Reactor Trip pushbutton is depressed.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 1 Event# 7-12 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: A Large Break LOCA will be inserted when the Reactor Trip pushbutton is depressed.

RO Check Reactor tripped (YES)

Check Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)

BOP

-

b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action required by BOP)

Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:

BOP a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)

b. El and E2 Both eneraized (YES)

Check SI Status:

a) Check if SI is actuated:

. SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)

. SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)

RO b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED

. SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)

. RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)

RNO: Manually actuate BOTH trains of SI (Candidate may start both A SI Pump and A RHR Pump at this time or wait until Att. 1.)

Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0. Announce Adverse CRS numbers are in effect due to CV Pressure Greater than 4 psig.

FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect RCP Trip Criteria IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN trip all RCPs: (YES)

. Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED (YES)

OR Critical

  • BOTH of the following satisfied:

CRS Task o SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND

-

CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW (YES, B SI Pump is running)

AND o RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS -

THAN_30°F_[50°F]_(YES)

I I I Appendix D NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# I Event# 7-12 Page 26 of 26 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.

. Manually start A SI Pump and A RHR Pump

. Place CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode

  • Manually start A CV Spray Pump Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. I steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)

Beciinnina of EOP-E-0 Attachment I (RAmInrir nt I-OF-I--() I-nllrwc this Sctinn1

. ........

Att. 1 Check ECCS Pumps Running:

Critical BOP . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts A SI Pump)

-

Task . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts B RHR Pump)

-

EXAMINEF S NOTE: B RHR Pump will trip 10 seconds after starting A RHR Pump.

Att. 1 BOP Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)

-

Att. 1 BOP Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

-

Check Containment Isolation Phase A

a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)

Att. 1 BOP

c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)

. CVC-387 Closed (YES)

. HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)

Check Feedwater Isolation:

a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)

b) Main feedwater ISOLATED

Alt. I BOP

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7 - 12 Page 27 of 27 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:

a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (YES)

e Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (YES)

OR Att. I BOP e High steam flow with: (NO) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig

OR o Tavg less than 543°F

b) Check MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED (YES)

Check Proper Service Water System Operation:

a. SW pumps All running (YES)

Att. 1 BOP b. SW booster pumps Both running (YES)

c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)

Extinguished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check Both EDGs Runninci (YES)

Check ECCS Flow:

a. RCS pressure less than 1700 psig (YES)

Att. 1 BOP b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES)

c. RCS pressure less than 350 psig. (YES)

d.__RHR _Flow_Indicated_(YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check CV Recirculation Fans All Runnnq (YES. all available)

Check IVSW Actuated (YES)

-

Att. I BOP

  • PCV-1 922A Open (YES)
  • __PCV-1922B Open_(YES)

Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)

Att 1 BOP

a. CV ventilation isolation valves CLOSED (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7- 12 Page 28 of 28 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)

-

. HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)

. HVE-16 Stopped (YES)

Att. 1

. HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (NO, starts HVE-19A or HVE Critical BOP

1 9B)

Task

. Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)

. CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)

. CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check DS Bus Enerqized (YES)

Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)

Att. 1 BOP APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)

APP-036-D2 Extinquished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Stop R-11112 Sample Pump Att. I BOP Locally Reset and Load IACs as necessary (N/A)

Perform Crew Update to include the following:

. Attachment Completion

  • Manual Actions Taken (Started A SI and RHR Pumps, Placed Att 1 BOP

. CR HVAC in Emergency Pressurization Mode)

  • Failed Equipment status (B RHR Pump has tripped.)
  • SW_status_(All_operating)

Erni nt EOP-E-C) Attwhmnt1 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7- 12 Page 29 of 29 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuation of EOP-E-O RO Check AFW Pumps Running (ALL running)

Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)

. AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)

RO

  • Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump

is running. (YES)

Check Total AFW Flow:

  • Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 18% and 50%.
  • Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 arm (YES)

Check CV Spray NOT Required:

a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (NO)

RNO: Perform the following

1) Check CV spray actuated. (YES, all actuated except A CV Spray Pump)

IF CV spray is NOT actuated, THEN manually actuate BOTH trains of CV spray.

2) Verify the following:

a) Both CV spray pumps are running. (NO, manually starts A CV Spray Pump, B CV Spray Pump Tripped)

. b) CV spray pump discharge valves are open: (YES)

Critical Sl-880A RO

  • Tasks
  • SI-880B
  • Sl-880C
  • SI-880D c) CV spray additive tank discharge valves are open: (YES)
  • SI-845A
  • Sl-845B d) Spray additive tank flow is approximately 12 gpm:
  • Adjust Sl-845C, SAT throttling valve, as necessary.
3) Verify Containment Isolation Phase B valves are closed. (YES)
4) Stop all RCPs.
5) Observe CAUTION prior to Step 10 and Go To Step 10.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 7- 12 Page 30 of 30 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCP Seal Cooling:

. CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (NO)

o APP-001-C1 I DI Extinguished (NO)

OR RO

. Seal injection flow Normal (YES)

o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP

OR o Thermal barrier APs Greater than 5 inches water.

.i1.4fIf flA

  • I I S I wI I.

J eaI injection flow using the P&ID function.

Check RCS Temperature With NO RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or trending to 547°F (NO)

RNO: IF temperature is less then 547°F AND lowering then perform the following: (YES)

a. Stop dumping steam RO b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to minimum for decay heat removal:

o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 18% in at least one SIG.

c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bvoass_valves.

Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

a. PORVs Closed (YES)

RO

b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)

c.__Aux_spray_valve__Closed_(YES)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

RO a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per FOLDOUT)

RNO:_Go_to_Step_14 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all SIGs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o__None_Completely_depressurized_(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7- 12 Page 31 of 31 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Tubes are Intact:

. Secondary radiation monitors Have Remained Normal (YES)

  • R-19s
  • R-31s

. SIG levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)

Check if RCS is Intact: (NO)

. CV radiation Normal (NO)

o R-2 o R-32A1B

  • CV pressure Normal (NO)

RO

  • CV sump level Normal (NO)

RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs. Go to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1. (Crew will identify that a RED Terminus exists for RCS Integrity and transition to FRP P.1)

CRS Determines that FRP-P1 must be entered.

FRP-P.1 BOP Check CST Level Less than 10%

FRP-P.1 Determine if RCS cooldown is due to a Large Break LOCA as follows:

a. Check both of the following conditions exist:

RO

  • RCS pressure LESS THAN 350 PSIG (YES)

AND

  • RHR flow on Fl-605 GREATER THAN 1200 GPM (YES)

b.__Reset_SPDS_and_return_to_procedure_and_step_in_effect.

CRS Determines that entry into EOP-E-1 is now warranted.

r. ofEOPE1E NOTE CRS FOLDOUT for EOP-E-1 is in effect. (None applicable.)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

RO a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per EOP-E-0 FOLDOUT)

RNO:_Go_to_Steo_2 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event# 7- 12 Page 32 of 32 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position AIicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o None Completely depressurized (YES)

Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels:

SOP a. Narrow range levels Greater than 18% (YES)

b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels between 18% AND 50%

RO Reset SI RO Reset Containment Isolation Phase A EXAMINERS NOTE: A RHR Pump will trip ten seconds after resetting Containment Isolation Phase A BOOTH 01 ERATOR: I f dispatched to investigate cause of RHR Pump trips, wait 5 minutes and rack out the B RHR Pump Breaker lAW SCN File.

Check Secondary Radiation:

a. Secondary radiation monitors Have remained normal (YES)

o R-15, R-19s, R-31s BOP b. Perform the following:

1) Request periodic activity samples of all S/Gs
2) Secondary sample results Normal (When results

available)

Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves:

a. Power to block valves Available (YES)

RO

b. PORVs Closed (YES)
c. Block valves At least one open. (YES)

Establish Instrument Air to CV:

a. Check APP-002-F7 Extinguished (YES)

RO

b. Reset IA PCV-1716 c.__Check_IA_PCV-1716 OPEN_(YES)

Check Power Supply to Charging Pumps Offsite power available RO

(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 7 - 12 Page 33 of 33 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if Charging Flow has been established:

a. Charging pumps At least one running. (YES)
b. Establish desired charging flow:

o Start additional pump(s) as necessary o Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to RO establish desired charging flow.

o Adjust HIC-121 as necessary to establish desired charging flow:

o Maintain seal injection flow Between 6 gpm and

20 qpm per RCP unless seal injection isolated.

Check if SI flow should be terminated:

RO a. RCS subcooling base on core exit TCs Greater than 55°F (NO, Go to Step 12.)

Continuous Action Step Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

a Spray pump Any running (YES)

b. Containment pressure Less than 4 psig (NO)

RO RNO: Perform the following:

1) When containment pressure is less than 4 psig, then do steps 21.c through 12.g. (Will remain above 4 psig.)
2) Observe Caution prior to Step 13 and Continue with Step 13.

Check if RHR Pumps Should be Stopped:

RO a. Check RCS pressure:

o__Pressure Greater than_350_psig_(NO,_go to_step_15)

Check if Diesel Generators should be Stopped:

a. AC emergency busses Energized by Offsite Power (YES)

o E-1 BOP o E-2

b. EDG starting air annunciators Extinguished (YES)

o APP-010-B2 I B3

c. Stop unloaded EDGs Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status:
a. Check Cold leg recirculation capability:

RO

. Train A and Train B:

Crew determines that neither A or B RHR Pumps are AVAILABLE Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 1 Event # 7- 12 Page 34 of 34 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Crew determines that at least ONE train of cold leg recirculation Critical CRS capability can NOT be verified, and resets SPDS and transitions to Task EPP-15, Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirculation, Step 1.

1 Continuous Action Step Check Emergency Coolant Recirculation Capability Restored (NO)

RO

RNO: If Emergency Coolant Recirculation is restored, THEN perform Step 2. Goto Step 3.

RO Reset SPDS and Initiate Monitoring of CSFSTs.

Foldout Pages are not applicable during performance of this CREW procedure.

Continuous Action Step Check Suction Source to Any of The following Pumps Lost (NO, go RO

to step 7)

SI Pumps, RHR Pumps, CV Spray Pumps Check Emergency Recirculation Equipment Available Using

Supplement D (NO)

RO RNO: Try to restore at least one train while continuing with this procedure.

Verify the following CV Recirc Fans Running (NO, HVH-4 is OOS)

RO

HVH-1, 2,3,4 RO Place the Containment Spray Key Switch to the OVRD/REST Position Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # I Event # 7 - 12 Page 35 of 35 Event

Description:

Large Break LOCA on Reactor Trip Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine CV Spray Pump Requirements Determine Number of CV Spray Pumps Required using the following Table:

Containment Fan Coolers Spray Pumps RWST Pressure Running Required Greater than 42 2

RO psig Greater 0 or I 2 Between 4 psig than 27% 2 or 3 I and 42 psig 4 0 Less than 4 rsic 0 Determines that I CV Spray Pump is required.

ROOTH 0 F ERAT0R pmnv th MIfiintinn fnr R RHR nhimn nrI Rack In B RHR

ump breaker lAW SCN file and notify the Control Room that Electrical Maintenance personnel have corrected the problem with t he B RHR Pump breaker (poor breaker alignment) and can be

tarted as needed.

RO Starts B RHR PumD.

CRS Determines that transition to EOP-E-1 Step 16 is warranted.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once it has been identified that transition out of EPP-15 is allowed.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO I TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100%

c) Turbine Load: 778.5 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 848 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CBD f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) RCS Level: 53.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description 3.7.6 Cond. A Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3.6.6 Cond. C Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW 005 for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> with estimated RTS in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Available for emergency use only.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None
5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-E1 52/22C.
6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) None
7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted
8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain current power level
9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) No additional information.
10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
11. RISK a) GREEN Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

  • CCW Pump C is OOS and breaker is racked out
  • HVH-4 is OOS and breaker is racked out Turnover:
  • Maintain power at current level while RES is monitoring A MFP.

Critical Task:

  • Manually start HVH-9B to preclude shutdown within 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />.
  • Open either SI-870A or SI-870B.
  • Isolate feed to C SIG and Manually close A and B MS IV.
  • Stop one Safety Injection Pump to minimize SI flow.

Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (C) BOP HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start 2 (R) RO A MFP Trips I Load Reduction (N) BOP, CRS 3 (C) RO, CRS Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer (TS) CRS 4 (I) RO, CRS PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service (N) BOP 5 (I) BOP, CRS PT-495 fails Low (TS) CRS 6 (M) ALL 72 inch Main Steam Header Fault 7 ALL C S/G Tube Rupture once S/G has dried out 8 BOP Main Turbine fails to Auto-Trip on Reactor Trip 9 RO Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open 10 BOP A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open II BOP Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close 12 BOP A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 68% RTP. Engineering has requested that power be held at 68% while monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP. Additionally, Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations.

Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, HVH-9A, CV Concrete Shield Cooling Fan, trips and HVH-9B fails to Auto-Start. The operator will verify the standby fan starts by manually starting HVH-9B from the RTGB in accordance with APP-010-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, A Main Feed Pump will trip. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-010 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be lowered to less than 60% Reactor Power. The crew will perform the load reduction in accordance with AOP-010 and OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to perform a controlled reduction in power and stabilize the plant, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the RCP Seal Injection Strainer will become clogged. The crew will determine the strainer is clogged by observing a reduction in RCP seal injection flow to zero flow along with receiving APP-001-A2, Seal Water Injection Filter High zP, APP-001-B4, RCP Seal Injection HI/LO Flow, and APP-001-B3, RCP A Bearing HI Temperature. APP-001-A2 will direct the crew to dispatch an auxiliary operator to check Seal Water Injection Filter AP and will ultimately direct the crew to have the auxiliary operator shift seal injection filters using OP-301. The CRS will enter AOP-01 8, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, and enter Section C, Loss of Seal Injection. AOP-018 will also diagnose the event as a clogged strainer and direct the crew to shift seal injection filters. Once the seal injection filters are shifted the RCP seal injection flows will return to normal. While seal injection flow is less than 6 gpm to any RCP the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, is applicable since seal injection to any RCP is not within limit with at least one charging pump operable. The required action is to initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to restore seal injection flow and demonstrate Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Pressure Transmitter PT-145 for Letdown Line Pressure will fail LOW, causing PCV-145 to close and isolate letdown flow. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section A will be implemented to isolate the letdown line, reduce charging flow and place Excess Letdown in service. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-495, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, will fail low. The BOP will perform immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section G, and take manual control of FCV-498, C S/G Feed Regulating Valve, and restore C SIG level to the normal band. The crew will then take action to swap to the alternate channel, place the C FRV back in Automatic and remove PT-495 from service in accordance with OWP-025, SGP-11. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.2 Condition D. Also due to the failure of PT-495, ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the plant will experience a fault on the 72 inch Main Steam Header. The crew will determine that a reactor trip is required and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. An automatic safety injection signal will be initiated due to high steam line flow with low Tavg. During the immediate actions of EOP-E-0 it will be determined that the Turbine failed to automatically trip and manual actions will be taken to trip the turbine from the RTGB. During further actions of EOP-E-0 it will be discovered that SI-870A and B, BIT Outlets, fail to automatically open and have to be manually opened from the RTGB in order to provide safety injection flow. All Main Steam Isolation Valves will fail to automatically close and manually actions will be taken to close them from the RTGB. C MSIV will remain failed in the open position. V2-6A, B, and C, Feedwater Header Section Valves, will fail to automatically close and will have to be manually closed from the RTGB. A Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will fail to automatically start and will be manually started from the RTGB.

Once C SIG has dried out a 400 gpm tube rupture will ramp in over 60 seconds on C SIG.

The crew will complete EOP-E-0 and transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and perform the actions to isolate C SIG. The crew may chose to perform Supplement G to isolate C SIG prior to transitioning to EOP-E-2. Supplement G will direct performance of Supplement N. Once C SIG is isolated the crew will then transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, due to elevated readings on R-31 C, Main Steam Line Channel, and continued steam flow from C SIG. Since C MSIV cannot be closed the crew will direct local isolation of C S/G. Ultimately the crew will transition to EPP-17, SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, and secure all but one RCP and one Safety Injection pump.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:

  • IC-902, SCN 006_ILQj3_NRC_2.
  • Status board is provided to crew is IC-17.

PRE-LOADED EVENTS:

The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:

  • Event 7: C S/G Tube Rupture once SIG has dried out
  • Event 9: Sl-870A1B fail to Auto-Open
  • Event 10: A and B MSIV fail to Auto-Close and C MSIV has failed open
  • Event 11: Feed Header Section Isolation Valves fail to Auto-Close
  • Event 12: A MDAFW Pump fails to Auto-Start EVENTS!TRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
  • Event 1: HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto-Start
  • Event 2: A MFP Trips I Load Reduction
  • Event 3: Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer
  • Event 4: PT-145 fails Low I Place Excess Letdown in Service
  • Event 5: PT-495 fails low
  • APP-010
  • APP-001
  • OWP-025, SGP-1 1
  • Supplement G (Optional)
  • Supplement N (Optional)
  • EPP-17 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 1 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto Start Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, HVH-9A Trips with HVH-9B failure to Auto Start EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-O1O-A7, HVH-9AIB AIR FLOW LOST!OVLD, is illuminated HVH-9A RTGB GREEN OFF light illuminated BOP Acknowledges alarm and references APP-010-A7.

APP-010-A7 IF the operating fan has tripped, THEN VERIFY the BOP

standby fan starts. (Starts HVH-9B)

NOTE: Crew should notify WCC SRO andlor l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, and notify the Operations Manager.

Buu I I-i UFKA I UK: insert Ivent #. (MI-Is A I rips) on cue trom the Uhiet hxaminer.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, MFP A Trips.

EVENT INDICATIONS:

Feed Flow and SIG Level Transients on all S!Gs.

APP-7-A3, FW PMP A MOTOR OVLDITRIP, illuminated MFP A indicates OFF Multiple APP-006, S!G Systems, ----S AOP-O1O MAIN FEEDWATERICONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Immediate Action Step Check Feedwater Regulating Valves OPERATING PROPERLY

-

B (MANUAL OR AUTO): (YES)

  • FCV-478
  • FCV-488
  • ___FCV-498 Continuous Action Step Check Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED (NO)

-

RO

  • GotoStep4.

SRO Enters AOP-01 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction SRO Verifies immediate actions complete.

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Go to the appropriate Step from the Table Below:

BOP

  • __Main_Feed_Pump_Trip_ Step_6 RO Check Reactor Power Less than 70% (YES)

RO Check Reactor Power Greater than 60% (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 7 of 7 Event

Description:

MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time Position Appicants Actions or Behavior Reduce Turbine Load At I %/MIN To 5%/MIN To Achieve Less Than 60% Reactor Power as follows:

a. Verify Rods in AUTOMATIC. (YES)
b. Check Turbine Control Mode AUTOMATIC
1) Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton
2) Set the Desired Load in the SETTER.

CREW

3) Set the Desired Load Rate.
4) Depress the GO Pushbutton or the HOLD Pushbutton as Necessary to Reduce Turbine Load
c. Borate Per OP-301 RCS Quick Boration Checklist as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band. Boration steps listed at the end of this section.

SRO Go To Step 13 BOP Check Main Feed Pumps At Least One Running (YES)

SRO Observe the NOTE prior to Step 38 and go to Step 38.

BOP Check S/G Level At OR Trending to Program (YES)

BOP Check Tavg At or Trending to Tref (YES)

Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater CREW Problem.

SRO Implement the EAL5.

Check current loading for the following pumps LESS THAN

-

MAXIMUM (YES)

BOP . Main Feedwater Pump 0.715 KAMPS

-

. Condensate Pumps 370 AMPS

-

. Heater Drain Pumps 90 AMPS

-

BOOTH OPERATOR: Report the following AMPS as the current readings:

Main Feedwater Pump 560 AMPS Condensate Pumps 310 AMPS Heater Drain Pumps 75 AMPS I I Continuous Action Step Determine Iodine Sampling Requirements As Follows: (NO)

SRO

a. Check Power Change GREATER THAN 15% IN ONE HOUR

-

. GoToStep44 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. IF YES, then implement SR 3.4.16.2 Monitor Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With ITS 3.2.3 RO (YES)

CREW Notify Load Dispatcher Of The Units Load Capability SRO Return To Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: OP-301, Section 8.2.8 Quick Boration Checklist (shaded area) is included in the following steps, but may be used following the commencement of the plant down power.

Expect about 35 -45 gallons of Boric Acid to be added.

DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS and RO OBTAIN an independent check of the volume required OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of RO boric acid previouslydetermined.

PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE RO position.

RO SET YIC-1 13, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN RO AND manually ADJUST controller FCV-1 13A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons.

Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the RO START position Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

MFP A Trips / Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ci the oeiow conaitions occur, i t-IN ity piace the F<US MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

RC

  • Rod Motion is blocked OR is in the wrong direction
  • TAVG goes up
  • Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:

RO

  • FCV-1 I 3B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.
  • IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.
  • The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow as follows:

  • PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.
  • SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.
  • PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the CLOSE position.
  • Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to ti START position.
  • IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RO the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

o Unanticipated Rod Motion o Primary Water addition reaches the desired value

  • WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:

o FCV-114A, PWTO BLENDER, closes.

o FCV-1 13B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

o IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

o The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

  • VERIFY FCV-1 14A, PW TO BLENDER, is in AUTO.
  • PLACE FCV-1 14B,BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position.

RO

  • PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
  • Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 2 Page lOof 10 Event

Description:

MFP A Trips I Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RO TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.

MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RQ inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the boration.

(END_OP-301_Section_8.2.8)

.. I BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ESD-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page ilof 11 Event

Description:

Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time I : Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer EVENT INDICATIONS:

Reduction in RCP seal injection flows to zero.

APP-OO1-A2, SEAL WATER INJECTON FILTER HIGH AP APP-OO1-B4, RCP SEAL NJECTION HIILO FLOW APP-OO1-B3, RCP A BEARING HI TEMPERATURE APP-001-A2 IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN REFER TO

RO AOP-018 (Informs SRO of AOP-018 entry requirement.)

APP-001-A2 IF RCP Seal Injection flow can NOT be maintained

RO greater than 6 gpm to each RCP, THEN REFER TO AOP-01 8 AND ITS SR 3.4.17.1. (Informs SRO of ITS SR 3.4.17.1 implication.)

APP-001-A2 DISPATCH an operator to check Seal Water Injection RO

Filter AP. (Dispatches lAO to CCP Room.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: *WHEN dispatched, wait 2 minutes and then report that A Seal Water Injection Filter indicates pegged high at> 25 psid.

IF RCP Seal Injection Filter AP is high AND is NOT caused by high RO flow, THEN SHIFT filters using OP-301. (Requests permission from SRO and then directs the lAO to shift filers.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: WHEN dispatched, wait 7 minutes and then shift RCP Seal Injection Filters lAW SCN File.

SRO Enters AOP-018, RCP Abnormal Conditions CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Determines that Section C, Loss of Seal Injection, is the appropriate SRO section.

Check APP-0O1-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm RO ILLUMINATED (NO, go to step 11)

Determine If a Charging Pump Can Be Started:

RO

a. Check Charging System Piping Ruptured (NO, go to Step 12)

RO Check SI Initiated (NO, go to Step 14.)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 12 of 12 Event

Description:

Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Verify at Least ONE Charqinci Pump RUNNING-Check Seal Injection to RCPs:

  • ANY Seal Injection flow LESS THAN 6 GPM (YES)

RO AND

  • __ANY Thermal_Barrier AP _LESS_THAN_5_inches_(YES)

Adjust any OR all of the following to restore seal injection flow.

  • HIC-121
  • CVC-297A1B/C (Depending on timeline, all OR none of these actions may be taken.

Crew may determine that clogged strainer is cause and wait to see impact of swapping seal injection strainers.)

Check Seal Injection to RCPs:

  • ANY Seal Injection flow LESS THAN 6 GPM (YES)

AND RO

  • ANY Thermal Barrier AP LESS THAN 5 inches (YES)

(May be answered as NO depending on status of swapping RCP seal iniection filters.)

Check P1-121, CHARGING PUMPS DISCH PRESS Indicator LESS RO THAN RCS PRESSURE (NO. ao to SteD 41.)

Check APP-OO1-A2, SEAL WTR INJ FILTER HI i\P Alarm RO ILLUMINATED (YES, if filters have not been swapped)

Shift Seal Injection Filters Using OP-301. (Dispatch lAO to perform if RO not already dispatched.)

Check Alternate Seal Injection Filter IN SERVICE (When YES, then RO ao to Steo 47.)

Establish Charging Flow on Fl-I 22A, Charging Line Flow Greater RO than 35 gpm (YES)

RO Check Normal Letdown In Service (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 3 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

Clogged RCP Seal Injection Strainer Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Control Charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:

RO

  • Within +1- 5% of Reference Level OR
  • PZR level between 30% and 40% with RCP C stopped.

Establish Normal Seal Injection

a. Check RCP Seal Injection Aligned (YES)

RO

b. Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 gpm and 13 gpm

(YES)

RO Check Seal Injection Flow Established To All RCPs SRO Implement the EALs Refer to Technical Specifications for any applicable LCOs:

Determines that ITS LCO 3.4.17, Condition E, was applicable during the time that seal injection flow was less than 6 gpm to any RCP.

SRO Condition D requires that you initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCPs Immediately and be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

CRS Notify WCC SRO to initiate Work Request to replace cloçjqed filter.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (PT-145 fails low) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 14 of 14 Event

Description:

PT-145 fails low! Place Excess Letdown in Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, PT-I 45 fails low resulting in placing excess letdown in service.

EVENT INDICATIONS:

AOP-OOI-B6 LP LTDN LN HI TEMP

AOP-OOI-D6 LP LTDN LN HI PRESS

-

RO References APP-00I and informs SRO of need to refer to AOP-025.

SRO Enters AOP25, RTGB Instrument Failure RO Place LCV-460A&B In The CLOSE Position RO Place Excess Letdown in Service Usinq Attachment 2.

Verify Closed the following valves:

. LCV-460A&B Att. 2 BOP

. CVC-200AIBIC

. CVC-204A/B Att. 2 BOP Verify Open CC-739 Att. 2 BOP Position CVC-389 to the RCDT Position Att. 2 BOP Open CVC-387, Excess Ltdn Stop Slowly Open HCV-137, Excess Ltdn Flow, not to exceed 195°F as Att. 2 BOP indicated on TI-I 39, Excess Ltdn HX Outlet TemiD.

Att. 2 BOP Notify the CRS that Excess Letdown is in service.

Update the ERFS Calorimetric program to reflect Excess Letdown is in Att 2 BOP

. service.

IF required to control Pzr Level, THEN contact Chemistry to perform Att. 2 BOP the alignment for purging the PZR Liquid sample line with full flow to the VCT iaw CP-003.

BOOTH OPERATOR: IF requested to align sample line for purge, wait 5 minutes and

m.Imii+ IAUII C(kI .I,.

IIIIJI.IIIIIL IUW IV I II. - -

IF PZR Liquid sample line is used to control PZR Level, TEN remove Att. 2 BOP/SRO the calorimetric calculation from service and enter TRM 3.25 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

PT-145 fails low / Place Excess Letdown in Service Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF desired to align Excess Letdown to the VCT, THEN perform the following:

Att. 2 a. Position CVC-389 to the VCT.

BOP

b. Notify Rad. Control that Excess Letdown is in service through the Seal Water Filters and Heat Exchanger, which will result in RAISED radiation levels in those areas.

RO Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.

Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 and 13 gpm. (NO)

. Locally throttle CVC-297A1B/C to obtain 8 to 13 gpm.

. If required to maintain minimum flow, then throttle HIC-121 while maintaining Charging Pump Discharge pressure less RO than 2500 psig.

. If the normal Seal Injection Range can NOT be maintained, then an expanded range of between 6 to 20 gpm may be used.

. Check ITS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.

BOOTH 01 ERATOR: When requested, throttle CVC-297A1B1C as necessary using the P&ID function to obtain requested seal injection flows.

SRO Contact Plant Operations Staff to Expedite Repair of PT-145.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #5 (PT-495 fails low) on cue fromthe Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

PT-495 fails low Time 1j Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (PT-495 fails low).

EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-006-A4 STM LINE HI AP

APP-006-C2 SIG C STM> FW FLOW

Steam Flow I Feed Flow Transient on SIG C Immediate Action Step BOP Verify the Affected FRV in MAN FCV-498 (FRV C)

Immediate Action Step BOP Restore Affected SIG Level to between 39% and 52%

Check Reactor Trip Setpoint Being Approached (NO, go to Step 5.

BOP

IF YES, trip the Reactor and go to EOP-E-0.)

BOP Make PA Announcement For procedure entry.

Place the affected SIG Steam Flow Selector Switch to the alternate channel:

BOP Failed Channel Affected Channel Selected Position PT-495 Fl-494 CH 495 BOOTH OPERATOR: if requested to check for instrument steam leaks wait 5 minutes and report no indication of steam leaks.

Continuous Action Step Restore Affected Controller to Automatic as Follows:

BOP a. Check SIG Level Within +1- 1% of Programmed Level

b. Place the affected Controller in AUTO (when within +1-1% of programmed_level)

Remove the Affected Transmitter from Service using OWP-025, SGP BOP 11.

Contact WCC SRO for assistance with OWP and W/R initiation.

SRO Contact Maintenance.

BOOTH OPERATOR: implement OWP-025, SGP-11, as requested, lAW SCN File.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

PT-495 fails low Time 1 Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior

. ITS Table 3.3.1 Table 3.3.1-1 Item 14 which requires 2 Steam Flow I Feedwater Flow Mismatch Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS 3.3.1 Condition E, which requires the channel to placed in trip with 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

e ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items I.e which requires 3 Steam Line High Differential Pressure between Steam header and Steam Lines Channels to be operable will not be met and require entry into ITS SRO 3.3.2 Condition D.

. ITS Table 3.3.3-1, Item 20 which requires 2 Steam Generator Pressure Channels per SIG to be operable will be reviewed and determined to be met.

. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6 (72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C S!G Tube Rupture)

EVENT INDICATIONS:

Audible Steam Noise Steam Flow Rising on all Channels Reactor Power Rising on FWUFM and Nis Multiple alarms on APP-004 and APP-006 CREW Determines that a Reactor Trip is prudent.

RO Check Reactor tripped (YES)

Check Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)

BOP

-

b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action reciuired by BOP)

Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:

BOP a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)

b.__El_and_E2__Both_enerqized_(YES)

Check SI Status:

a) Check if SI is actuated:

. SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)

  • SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)

RO b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED

  • SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
  • RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

(Automatic SI from High Steam Line Flow with Low Tavg)

CRS Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0.

FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect (IF crew takes an early action to close the MSIVs then C S/G will be identified as Faulted.)

Faulted SIG AFW Isolation Criteria Critical CRS a. Reset SI Task b. Close V2-14C, SDAFW Pump Discharge Valve to C S/G

c. Close V2-16C, AFW Header Discharge Valve to C S/G
d. Perform Att. 2, Deenergizing AFW Valves for Faulted S/Gs
e. Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow rancie_level_is_cireater than_8%_in_at_least_one_S/G.

RITICAL TASK ISOLATE FEED TO C SIG Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 12

- Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.

. Manually open SI-870A andlor Sl-870B e Manually close all MSIVs (C MSIV fails remains failed open)

. Manually start A MDAFW Pump e Manually close Feedwater Section Isolation Valves Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOPE-0.)

Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-O Follows this Stinn

- - -- -----.--- --F Check ECCS Pumps Running:

Att. 1 BOP . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

-

. RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

-

Att. I Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (NO)

Critical BOP

-

Task . Manually Opens SI-870A and/or SI-870B RITICAL TASK OPEN SI-870A OR SI-870B Att. 1 BOP Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

-

Check Containment Isolation Phase A

a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)
c. Excess letdown Isolated (NO)

Att. 1 BOP

  • CVC-387 Closed (NO, Manually close CVC-387

from RTGB)

  • HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (NO, Manually adjust

HIC-I37 controller to 0%)

Check Feedwater Isolation:

a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)

b) Main feedwater ISOLATED

Att. 1 BOP

  • Feedwater header section valves Closed (NO, Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 - 12 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position ADplicants Actions or Behavior Manually closes all Feedwater Header Section_Valves.)

Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:

a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (YES)

. Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (NO)

Att. 1 Critical BOP

  • High steam flow with: (YES) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig Task OR o Tavg less than 543°F

b) Check MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves CLOSED (NO, Manually closes A and B MSIVs. C MSIV is failed open.)

C ITICAL TASK CLOSES A AND B MSIVs Check Proper Service Water System Operation:

a. SW pumps All running (YES)

Att. 1 BOP b. SW booster p.umps Both running (YES)

c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)

Extinguished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check Both EDGs Running (YES)

Check ECCS Flow:

a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (YES)

Att BOP

. b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES) c.__RCS_pressure__less_than_275_psiq._(NO,_Go_to_Step_10)

Att. I BOP Check CV Recirculation Fans All Running (YES, all available)

Check IVSW Actuated (YES)

-

Att. 1 BOP

  • PCV-1 922A Open (YES)
  • __PCV-1922B Open_(YES)

Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)

Att BOP

. a. CV ventilation isolation valves CLOSED (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6-12 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)

-

. HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)

. HVE-16 Stopped (YES)

Att. 1 BOP

  • HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (YES)

. Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)

. CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)

. CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check DS Bus Energized (YES)

Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)

Att. I BOP APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)

APP-036-D2 Extinguished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Stoi R-1I/12 Sample Pump Att. I BOP Locally Reset and Load lACs as necessary (N/A)

Perform Crew Update to include the following:

  • Attachment Completion
  • Manual Actions Taken (Opened Sl-870A/B, Closed FW Header Att 1 BOP

. Section Valves, Closed A and B MSIVs)

  • Failed Equipment status
  • SW_status_(All_ojeratinq)

End of EOP-E-O Attachment I Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Continuation of EOP-E-O EXAMINER NOTE: SRO MAY DECIDE TO TAKE A PROMPT AND PRUDENT ACTION AND DIRECT THE BOP TO BEGIN ISOLATING C SIG lAW SUPPLEMENT G and N. CREW MAY HAVE DETERMINED THAT C SIG HAS A TUBE RUPTURE BY THIS POINT IN THE SCENARIO.

Check AFW Pumps Running (NO, A MDAFW Pump must be RO

manually started.)

Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)

. AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)

RO

. Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump

is_running._(YES)

Check Total AFW Flow:

. Reset SI RO

  • Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 8% and 50%.
  • __Check_total_AFW flow-_Greater than_300_gpm_(YES)

Check RCP Seal Cooling:

. CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (YES)

o APP-001-C1 I Dl Extinguished (YES)

OR RO

  • Seal injection flow Normal (YES)

o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP

OR o__Thermal_barrier zIPs Greater_than_5_inches_water.

BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&ID function I

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check RCS Temperature With any RCPs running, RCS average temperature Stable at or trending to 547°F (NO)

RNO: IF temperature is less then 547° F AND lowering then perform the following: (YES)

a. Stop dumping steam RO b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to minimum for decay heat removal:

o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 8% in at least one SIG.

c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

a. PORVs Closed (YES)

RO

b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

a. RCPs Any Running (YES)
b. SI pumps At least one running and capable of delivering RO flow.
c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs Less than 30°F (NO, go to step 14)

Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all S/Gs o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (NO)

BOP o None Completely depressurized (NO)

RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs.

Go to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.

Beqinning of EOP-E-2 Check MSIVs and MSIV Bypass Valves for faulted S/G CLOSED BOP (A and B MSIVs manually closed. C MSIV failed open)

Check IF ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary is Intact:

BOP a.__Check_pressure_in_all_S/G_ ANY_STABLE_OR_RISING_(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 12

- Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Identify Faulted SIGs: (C SIG is faulted)

a. Check pressures in all SIGs:
  • Any SIG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner BOP (YES)

OR

  • Any S/G Completely depressurized. (YES)

Isolate Faulted S/G:

a. Check main feedwater to faulted SIB Isolated (FCV-498,

FCV-499, V2-6C) (YES)

b. Reset SI
c. Isolate AFW flow to faulted S/G
  • Close V2-14C and V2-16C BOP
d. Check faulted SIG steam line PORV Closed (RV-3) (YES)
e. Close V1-8C
f. Perform Att. 1 to De-energize AFW Valves for Faulted S/G
g. Locally close MS-38
h. Check SIG Blowdown and Blowdown sample valves from faulted S/G Closed (YES)

BOOTH OPERATOR: As directed de-energize AFW valves and close MS-38 lAW SCN File.

BOP Check CST level >10% (YES)

Check Secondary Radiation:

a. Request periodic activity samples of all SIGs
b. Unisolated secondary radiation monitors have remained BOP

normal (NO, R-31C is elevated)

RNO: Reset SPDS and Go to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.

NOTE

  • Chemistry should be available for sampling during this SRO procedure.
  • Step I RCP trip criteria applies until an operator controlled RCS_cooldown_is_initiated.

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 12

- Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position i Applicants Actions or Behavior CONTINUOUS ACTION STEP Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

a. RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES)

-

b. SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF RO

-

nFl I/PPlN( FLOW (YES)

c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN 30°F

-

rn°i (NIfl\

  • .1 \*
  • l-<NU: (o to ter 2 Identify Ruptured S/G(s): (C S/G is ruptured)

. Unexpected rise in any S/G narrow range level OR

. High radiation from any SG steamlne (R-31s)

OR BOP

. High radiation from any SG blowdown line (R-19s)

OR

. High radiation from any S/G sample:

o Contact Chemistry to sample all S/Gs for activity as necessary CAUTION

. If the steam driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the steam driven AFW pump should CRS be maintained from at least one S/G.

. At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6-12 Page 26 of 26 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time 1 Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Flow From Ruptured SIG(s):

a. Adjust ruptured SIG(s) steam line PORV controller setpoint to 1060 psig
b. Check ruptured S/G steam line PORV (RV1-3) CLOSED (YES)
c. Close steam driven AFW pump steam shutoff valve for ruptured SIC: (Vi-8C)
d. Locally close the following valve for ruptured SIG(s) while continuing with this procedure:

. MS-38, SG C BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP (pipe jungle above/right of Vi -8C)

e. Check S/C blow down and blow down sample valves from ruptured S/G(s) Closed

. SG3 Blowdown Critical BOP . FCV-1932A&B Task

. FCV-1935A&BSHUT

f. Check MSIV above and below seat drain valves for ruptured S/C CLOSED (YES)
g. Close ruptured SIG MSIV and MSIV bypass valve Vi-3C and MS-353C. (NO, V1-3C is failed open.)

RNO:

1) Close all remaining MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves. (YES)
2) Verify the following valves are closed

. Turbine stop and governor valves

. MSR purge and shutoff valves

. Condenser steam dump valves

3) Perform Att. 5, Local Isolation of Ruptured S/G with Failed MSIV or Bypass Valve, while continuing with this procedure.
4) Use_intact_S/Cs_steam_line_PORVs_for_steam_dump.

BOOTH O ERATOR: Acknowledge direction to perform Att. 5. Wait 5 minutes and close GS-3 lAW SCN File and then report Aft. 5 complete. All other valves are not modeled.

] ]

.J CAUTION

. If any ruptured S/G is faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless SRO needed for RCS cooldown.

. If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required_to_restart_safeguards_equipment.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6 12

- Page 27 of 27 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIC Tube Rupture

[ Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check Ruptured S/G Level:

BOP

a. Narrow range level Greater than 8%. (NO, per caution feed

flow will remain isolated. Go to Step 5.)

CAUTION Major steam flow paths from the ruptured SIG(s) should be isolated SRO before initiating RCS cooldown. This includes MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves, steam line PORV, and AFW pump steam shutoff valve.

Check Ruptured SIG Pressure Greater than 370 psig. (NO)

BOP ,

RNO: Reset SPDS and Go to EPP-17, SGTR with Loss of Reactor SRO Coolant: Subcooled Recovery, Step 1.

B.éjflijof SRO Open Foldout E (None applicable)

RO Reset SAFETY INJECTION RO Reset CONTAINMENT ISOLATION PHASE A AND PHASE B Continuous Action Step BOP Check Loss Of Offsite Power IN PROGRESS (NO, go to step 8)

Continuous Action Step Establish Instrument Aw To CV As Follows:

  • Check APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS RO EXTINGUISHED (YES)
  • Momentarily place IA PCV-1 716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV Switch, to RESET
  • Check INST AIR VALVE TO CV PCV-1716 OPEN (YES)

Continuous Action Step RO Determine If CV Spray Should Be Stopped As Follows:

.__Check_CV_Spray_Pumps__RUNNING_(NO,_go_to_step_11)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 28 of 28 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C S/G Tube Rupture Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior nunuous cuon Step Control Ruptured S/G Level As Follows:

a. Check ruptured S/G level LESS THAN 8% [18%] (YES)

-

BOP b. Check ruptured S/G(s) Aso Faulted (YES)

c. Check ruptured-faulted SIG(s) needed for RCS Cooldown RNO: Stop feed flow to ruptured-faulted S/G(s) and go to Step 12.

Continuous Action Step Determine If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped

a. Check RCS pressure:
  • GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [400 PSIG] (YES)

RO

  • STABLE OR INCREASING
b. Verify RHR Pumps Stopped
c. Check RCS pressure Less than 275 psig [400 PSIG] (NO, go

to Step 13)

Initiate Evaluation Of Plant Status:

a. Check Auxiliary Building radiation monitors NORMAL (YES)
b. Contact Chemistry to obtain the following periodic samples:
  • Ruptured S/G(s) for boron
c. Contact Plant Operations Staff to determine additional actions to evaluate plant status, while continuing with this procedure Establish Charging Flow As Follows
  • Check Charging Pumps ALL STOPPED (NO, go to step RO

14.h.)

  • Verify charging flow on Fl-122A Greater than 35 GPM (YES)

Align Charging Pump Suction To RWST as follows:

a. From the RTGB, verify LCV-1 I 5B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT -

OPEN RO b. Verify LCV-1 1 5C, VCT OUTLET CLOSED -

c. Start all available Charging Pumps
d. Increase running Charging Pumps speed to maximum
e. Verify maximum charging flow on Fl-I 22A (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 29 of 29 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time Position ADrlicants Actions or Behavior Identify Faulted SIGs As Follows:

a. Check pressure in all SIGs:

. ANY S/G PRESSURE DECREASING IN AN BOP UNCONTROLLED MANNER (YES)

OR

. ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (NO)

BOP Check Faulted S/Gs PREVIOUSLY ISOLATED (YES)

Control Intact S/G Levels As Follows:

a. Check intact S/G levels ANY GREATER THAN 8% (YES)
b. Control feed flow to maintain intact S/G levels between 8% and BOP 50%
c. Check intact S/G levels ANY INCREASING IN AN

UNCONTROLLED MANNER (NO. ao to step 19)

Continuous Action Step RO Ensure Adequate Shutdown Margin Exists As Follows:

a. Check boron samile results AVAILABLE (NO. cio to step 20)

Initiate RCS Cooldown To Cold Shutdown As Follows:

a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than 100°F in the last 60 minute
b. Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within limits of Curve 3.4, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature

BOP Limitations For Cooldown

c. Check intact S/Gs AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE FOR RCS

-

COOLDOWN (YES)

d. Check steam dump to Condenser Available (NO)

RNO: Dump steam using Steam Line PORVs and go to step 21.

RO Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures Less than 543°F (YES)

Restore Steam Dumps as follows:

BOP Check steam dump to condenser Available (NO, continue RCS

cooldown using Steam Line PORVs and go to step 23.)

Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:

a. Momentarily place Safety Injection Tavg Selector Switch to RO BLOCK position.
b. Verify LO TEMP SAFETY INJECTION BLOCKED status light Illuminated. (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 2 Event# 6-12 Page 30 of 30 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time 1 Position fi Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Determine if subcooled recovery is appropriate as follows RO Check RWST level Greater than 56% (YES)

Check ruptured S/G Level Less than 84% (YES)

RO Check RCS Subcooling Greater than 35°F (YES)

Check SI and RHR Pump Status:

  • SI Pumps Any running (YES)

RO

OR

  • RHR Pumps Any running in LO Head Injection Mode (YES)

RO Energize PZR Heaters to Maintain Steam Bubble Continuous Action Step RO Depressurize RCS to Refill PZR as follows.

Check PZR Level Less than 27%. (NO, go to step 32)

RO Check RCP Status All Stoed (NO. cio to steD 37 Establish Normal PZR Spray as Follows:

a. Check RCP Status Only One Running (NO, Stop all but one

RCP)

RO b. Check RCP C Running (YES, unless stopped in step above)

c. Check RCP B Running (NO)

RNO: Place PCV-455A, PZR Spray Valve Controller, in MAN and adjust output to ZERO. Go to Step 38.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 2 Event # 6- 12 Page 31 of 31 Event

Description:

72 inch Main Steam Header Fault followed by C SIG Tube Rupture Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine if one SI Pump should be stopped:

a. Check SI Pumps Any running (YES)
b. Determine required RCS subcoolinq from table:

Charging Pump Any RCP Running Status One SI Pump Two SI Pumps Running Running D0NOTst0pSI None Running

.

Pump 72 F One Running 197°F 68°F Two Running 176°F 65°F Three Running 158°F 62°F C. Check RCS subcooling Less tnan required subcooling (NO,

go to step 38.f.)

f. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (YES)
g. Stop on SI Pump
h. Check RCS Pressure Stable or increasing (YES)

Go to Step 38.a.

RO

a. Check SI Pumps Any running (YES)
b. Determine required RCS subcoolinq from table:

Charging Pump Any RCP Running Status One SI Pump Two SI Pumps Running Running Do NOT stop SI None Running 72°F Pump One Running 197°F 68°F Two Running 176°F 65°F Three Running 158°F 62°F

d. Check RCS subcooling Less tnan required subcooling (NO,

go to step 38.f.)

f. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (YES)
g. Stop on SI Pump
h. Check RCS Pressure Stable or increasing (YES)

Go to Step 38.a.

a. Check SI Pumis Any runninq (NO, cio to stei 39)

Check RCS subcooling Less than required subcooling (NO, go to RO step 38.f.)

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once one safety injection pump has been secured in accordance with EPP-17.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 2 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 68%

c) Turbine Load: 485 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 139 ppm e) Rod Height: 165 CBD f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) RCS Level: 41.9%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description 3.7.6 Cond. A Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3.6.6 Cond. C Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW OOS for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> with estimated RTS in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Available for emergency use only.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None
5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-.E1 52/22C.
6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) None
7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted
8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain current power level
9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) Maintain current power level while RES is monitoring the recently replaced motor on A MFP.
10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
11. RISK a) GREEN Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

  • 100% EOL, 15,697 MWD/M1

. CCW Pump C is QOS and

. HVH-4isOOSandbreakeri iW 1

,

2 (f.L., -

Turnover:

  • Maintain power at current Ie

, 021 4 Jr Critical Task:

  • Establish Containment Isolal

. Manually start A MDAFW F 7 J_k -

  • Secure all RCPs due to a lo L LiU -
  • Manually Start A SI Pump I
  • Direct local actions to Swap Charging Pump suction to the RWST to prevent Gas Binding of the Charging Pumps. (Contingency)

Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (I) BOP, CRS PT-447 fails Low (TS) CRS 2 (C) RO, CRS TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure 3 (I) RO Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High (TS) CRS 4 (R) RO HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load (N) BOP, CRS Reduction 5 (I) BOP, CRS SIG Level Median Selector Module failure (TS) CRS 6 (M) ALL Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close 7 (M) ALL Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2) 8 (M) ALL Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

9 BOP SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start.

10 RO CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A 11 RO A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (1)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at 100% RTP. Maintenance is currently in progress on Component Cooling Water Pump C for pump mechanical seal replacement. HVH-4 is Out of Service due to Excessive Motor Vibrations. Repairs on HVH-4 are on hold awaiting parts.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.

The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section H, and verify S/Gs trending to 39% and place Rod Control in Manual. S/G levels will be restored to normal, alternate channel selected and feedwater regulating valves returned to automatic. Rod control will be returned to automatic once Tavg verified in the required band. PT-447 will then be removed from service in accordance with OWP-033, FSP-2. Failure of PT-447 will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Item 17e, requirement to have 2 Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 inputs available for Reactor Protection System Interlocks to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Condition T, will be entered which requires that the P-7 interlock be verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />. ITS Table 3.3.2-1, Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e, requirement to have 2 High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation will not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.2, Condition D, will be entered which requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND be in Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />. ITS Table 3.3.6.1 Item 4 will also be reviewed and determined to be applicable due to affecting Safety Injection ESFAS Instrumentation associated with Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, TCV-144, Letdown Temperature Controller, will fail close causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. TCV-123, VCT/DEMIN DIV, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT and manual action will be taken to divert letdown flow from the RTGB in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD. The operator will then determine that TCV-144 has failed closed and take manual actions at the RTGB to open TCV 144 to re-establish cooling flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger in accordance with APP-001-A6. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, Nl-44, Power Range, Upper Detector will fail high. The channel will be removed from service in accordance with OWP-0i 1, N 1-4. N 1-44 failure will result in ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels to not be met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.

Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition 5)

OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition T). Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, HCV-1 459 will fail open. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-0i 0, Main Feedwater I Condensate Malfunction. While performing the remaining actions of AOP-01 0 the crew will determine that Reactor Power is required to be controlled less than 100% and take action to lower turbine load. Once Reactor Power is stabilized below 100%, the crew will receive a report from Operations Management that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP and recommends that Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Reactor Power be reduced in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, and secure A MFP. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, the A SIG level median selector module will fail resulting in a loss of S/G level input to the A Feedwater Regulating Valve. The crew will take immediate actions of AOP-O1 0, Main Feedwater / Condensate Malfunction, with the BOP taking manual control of A FRy. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control and stabilize A S/G level, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, three main turbine governor valves will begin to randomly oscillate and ultimately fail closed resulting in a Secondary Load Rejection. The crew may decide to take a conservative action and initiate a reactor trip and transition to EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. However, the crew may enter AOP-01 5, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to diagnose the problem. Once in AOP-015 the crew will eventually reach a continuous action step that requires the crew to trip the reactor if greater than two governor valves indicate closed. During the fast-bus transfer following the Reactor Trip, 4KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Start-up Transformer due to breaker 52/17 tripping open. On the loss of 4KV Bus 3 the B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of power to 480V Bus E-2.

Due to the seal failure and suction line leak on B RCP a safety injection will be required. Only A train ECCS components will be available due to the loss of Bus E-2. However, A SI Pump does not auto-start and must be manually started from the RTGB. Also during the reactor trip the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will trip and neither A or B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump will automatically start. CVC-200A, Letdown Orifice Isolation, and CVC-204A and CVC-240B, Letdown Line Isolation Valves, fail to close as required on the Phase A signal. During the performance of EOP-E-0 the crew should dispatch personnel to investigate and troubleshoot the failure of B EDG. If dispatched, maintenance personnel will determine and correct the cause (fuel racks found tripped and reset) and recommend that the B EDG be started locally. If personnel are not dispatched then 480V Bus E-2 will remain deenergized. With 480V Bus E-2 denergized MCC-6 will not have power and thus LCV-1 1 5C, VCT Isolation, will remain in the open position preventing Charging Pump suction swapover to the RWST. If not identified this will eventually result in a loss of suction to the Charging Pumps and lead to gas binding if LCV-1 1 SC is not closed locally. If gas binding of the Charging Pumps occurs then all Charging Pumps will be secured, LCV-1 I 5C will have to be locally closed and Charging Pumps vented prior to restoring charging pump flow.

The crew will progress through EOP-E-0 and address the malfunctions discussed above.

Additionally, subcooling will lower to the point at which RCP Trip Criteria is met and all RCPs will be secured. EOP-E-0 will eventually direct the crew to transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. At some point during the performance of EOP-E-0 or EOP-E-1 the crew is expected to realize that B RCP experienced a seal failure and that AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, is required to be implemented since it is a Concurrent AOP. The crew will perform EOP-E-1 and eventually transition to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, and initiate RCS Cooldown to Cold Shutdown and Depressurization of the RCS to refill the PZR.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:

  • IC-902, SCN 006_ILC_13_NRC_3.
  • Status board is provided to crew is 10-21.

PRE-LOADED EVENTS:

The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:

  • Event 7: Loss of 4 KV bus 3 with B EDG failure (Loss of E-2)
  • Event 8: Locked Rotor on B results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak
  • Event 9: SDAFW Pump Trips and A and B MDAFW pumps fail to Auto-Start
  • Event 10: CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B fail to close on Phase A
  • Event 11: A SI Pump fails to Auto-Start on SI EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
  • Event 1: PT-447 fails Low
  • Event 2: TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure
  • Event 3: Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High
  • Event 4: HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP vibrations I Load Reduction
  • Event 5: SIG Level Median Selector Module failure
  • Event 6: Three Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
  • OWP-033, FSP-2
  • APP-001
  • APP-005
  • OWP-011,Nl-4
  • EPP-8 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

__________

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13NRC Scenario# 3 Event# I Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.

Time  :

I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed, insert Event 1, PT-447 fails low EVENT INDICATIONS:

PT-447 pressure indication fail to 0 PSIG APP-003-D4, TAVGITREF DEV APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUBIBYPD APP-006-D4, E4, F4, SIG A, B, C STM LINE HI FLOW APP-006-A3, B3, C3, SIG A, B, C LVL DEV TR-408 Pen #2 defaults to 547°F Immediate Action Step:

BOP Check Turbine Load Reduction in progress or has occurred.

(NO, Go TO Step 3)

Immediate Action Step:

BOP

.. [Check S/G Level trend controlling in AUTO to 39%. (YES)

Immediate Action Step:

Manually control Reactor power and TAVG:

RO

a. Place the Rod Control Selector Switch in Manual.

b.__Operate_rods_to_maintain_reactor_power_less_than_100%.

SRO Enters AOP-025 and Verifies immediate actions complete.

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry.

Check S/G levels stabilized at between 39% and 52%. (In progress)

BOP RNO: When S/G level is stabilized at between 39% to 52%, then go to step 6.b.

Verify ALL FRV Controllers in MAN BOP

. FCV-478, FCV-488, and FCV-498.

Place the First Stage Pressure Selector Switch to the alternate BOP channel (PT-446).

BOP Restore each S/G level to program level using FRVs or Bypass Valves Continuous Action Step:

Restore each FRV to AUTOMATIC as follows:

BOP

a. Check S/G level within +1- 1% of program level.
h Place th ected rnr+ roller Al ITfl i.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # I Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

PT-447, Turbine First Stage Pressure Transmitter, fails low.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step:

Restore Rod Control to AUTOMATIC as follows:

  • Check TAVG within 0.5 to +0.5°F of TREE AND Axial Offset BOP within the target band. (NO) o Restore TAVG using manual rod control prior to placing rods in auto.
  • Place the Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO.

SRO Remove PT-447 from service using OWP-033, FSP-2.

BOOTH 01 ERATOR: When reciuested. Derform steøs of OWP-033 to remove PT-447 rrom service. ixctions snouici inciucie AiVIU nortion ot UWI-033 IT requestea 10 cnec I- I -ii, report mat mere is no visinie Jamage or leakage noted.

Check ITS LCO 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 for applicability

  • ITS Table 3.3.1-1 Item 17e, Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 input Condition T requires to verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or be in Mode 2 within 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Current plant conditions requires that the REACTOR TRIP BLOCK P-7 status light be extinguished).

SRO

  • ITS Table 3.3.2-1 Items if, ig, 4d, and 4e for Safety Injection and Steam Line Isolation High Steam Line Flow with Low Tave or Low Steam Line Pressure Condition D: Place channel in

trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OR Be in Mode 3 in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> AND Be in Mode 4 within 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />.

  • ITS Table 3.3.6-1 Item 4 Safety Injection for Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation refers to LCO 3.3.2 Functions 1 .a-f (which have already been addressed).

SRO Go to Procedure Main Body, Step 2 SRO Implement the EALs NOTE: Crew should notify WCC SRO and!or l&C to write a work request, investigate and initiate repairs, and notify the Operations Manager.

SOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (TC V-I 44 Controller fails closed with TC V-I 43 auto-swap failure) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Page 7 of 7 Event

Description:

TCV-144 Controller fails closed with TCV-143 auto-swap failure.

Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, TCV-I 44 Controller fails closed with TCV-I 43 auto-swap failure EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-OOI-A6 LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD

Refers to APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, and RO monitors letdown parameters.

IF letdown temperature is greater than 135°F, THEN VERIFY APP-aol -A6 RO controller TC-143 is diverted to the VCT. (RO must take manual action to divert TCV-143 to the VCT.)

IF CCW flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchange is low, THEN INCREASE Component Cooling Water flow using TC-144. (RO must APP-OOl -A6 RO take manual control of TC-144 and adjust as necessary to raise CCW flow to the NRHX.)

Contact the WCC SRO to initiate a W/R and contact Maintenance to SRO prepare for troubleshooting and repair.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If! When contacted as WCC SRO or Maintenance, acknowledge the report and state that a WIR will be initiated and Work Week Coordinator will be contacted.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (NI-44 Upper Detector fails High) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

N 1-44 Upper Detector fails High Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, NI-44 Upper Detector fails Hiqh EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-005-A4 PR SINGLE CH HI RANGE ALERT

-

APP-005-B4 PR OVERPOWER ROD STOP

-

APP-005-C3 PR DET LOSS OF VOLT

APP-005-D6 A FLUX WARNING I STATUS

-

APP-005-F3 PR UPPER CH HI FLUX DEV I AUTO DEFEAT

Nl-44 Upper detector output pegged HIGH Identifies that NI-44 Upper Detector has failed. Refers the various RO APP-005 alarms annunciator procedures.

Informs SRO of APP direction to remove failed Power Range Detector RO from service lAW OWP-01 I SRO Briefs OWP-01 1, N 1-4, for removal of N 1-44 from service.

Contacts the WCC SRO and directs the initiation of W/R and contact SRO of Maintenance. Also, requests WCC SRO assist with implementation of OWP-0l 1.

Implement OWP-011, NI-4

. Remove Nl-44 from ERFIS SCN: NINOO44A

. Dropped Rod Mode Switch Bypass

. NIS Rod Drop Bypass NI-44 Status Light ILLUM

. N 1-44 Out of Service Trip Switch Tripped (Behind NI Panel)

. Bistable Light HI POW RANGE HI FLUX NC44R ILLUM RO/BOP

  • Rod Stop Bypass Switch Bypass PR 44
  • Comparator Channel Defeat Switch Select PR 44
  • Detector Current Comparator Drawer:

o Upper Section Switch Select PR 44

o Lower Section Switch Select PR 44

(N 1-44 Instrument Power Fuses are not to be removed per ** note since power is greater than P-b.)

Appendix D NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 3 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

Nl-44 Upper Detector fails High Time I Position I Anolicants Actions or Behavior Implements applicable ITS LCOs:

ITS Table 3.3.1-1, Items 2, 17.c and 17.d, requirements to have 4 Power Range Neutron Flux Channels is not met. ITS LCO 3.3.1, Conditions D, S and T will be entered.

SRO Condition D requires that the channel be placed in trip within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and SR 3.2.4.2 be performed once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Conditions S and T requires that the interlock is verified in the required state for existing unit conditions within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> OR be in Mode 3 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition S) OR be in Mode 2 in 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> (Condition T).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (HGV-I 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 10 of 10 Event

Description:

HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-007-B6 HDT HIILO LVL

HCV-1459 Open light illuminated Calorimetric Power rising AOP-O1O, Main FeedwaterlCondensate Malfunction Immediate Action BOP Check Feedwater Regulating Valves Operating Properly (YES)

. FCV-478 I 488 I 498 Continuous Action Step RO Check Reactor Trip Setpoint Being Approached (NO, go to step 4)

BOP Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Go to the appropriate step from the Table below:

BOP HCV-1459 Failed Open Step 35

NOTE: Crew may take action lAW OMM-OO1-2 to reduce Reactor Power to less than 2339 MWth by use of the Valve Position Limiter.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 11 of 11 Event

Description:

HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine if HCV-1459 has failed as follows:

a. Check HCV-1459 Open (YES)
b. Maintain Reactor Power less than 100% by reducing Turbine Load at 1 %/min to 5%/mm as follows:
1) Verify rods in Automatic a) Check Turbine Control Mode Automatic (YES)

b) Depress the IMP IN Pushbutton a) Set the Desired Load in the SETTER d) Set the DesiredLoad Rate e) Depress the GO Pushbutton or the HOLD Pushbutton BOP as Necessary to Reduce Turbine Load.

2) Borate per OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band.

(Boration steps are listed below and are shadedj

3) Continue power reduction until Feed Water Pump suction pressures are greater than 400 psig
4) Check Feed Water Pump suction pressures Greater than 400 psig (YES)
c. Verify HCV-1459 Closed (NO)

RNO: Locally isolate HCV-1 459 by closing C-52A, HCV-1459 Inlet.

BOOTH 01 ERATOR: Vhen requested, wait 2 minutes and report the Feed Water Pump suction oressures as indicated on the P&ID function. When lIrpctprL wmt 3 minLItPs nrI isnIt HGV-145 lAW CN file.

Beginning of OP-301, Quick Boration Checklist RD DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS RO OBTAIN an independent check of the volume required.

RD OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to borate.

RD PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch to BORATE.

RD SET YIC-l 13, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to desired quantity.

IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN RD AND manually ADJUST using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 12 of 12 Event

Description:

HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Momentrilv PLACE thA RS MAKIRJP SYSTPM witr.h tn START I IF any of the below conditions occur. THEN momentarily olace the

RO

  • RtId M(tItw1

hIi.kcinr inth wrnnri tlir--tinn I IAVfl.1UUP I I . . . I I . Korir. Acid dditinn eY.ccic th dirri wIii I AILII.I 4k.. -J ,.- ... . A ..J L-..-.... ....J..J.....J r1 IFhI .

VVI IL..I4 LI I L1IIL1 dIIIUUI IL UI LJUI I !L..IU I Id L)I I dUUU, I riai VIii)l the following:

RO

. FCV.-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

. IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

  • The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow path as follows:

. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the ALT DILUTE position.

. SET YIC-1 14, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to 15-20 gallons.

. PLACE FCV-1 14B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to CLOSE.

. Momentarily PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START.

. IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place RCR MAkI ID VSTIM QMif.h hi fhQ CTflI) rrw+irr RO

  • a** -dd rea he
  • vvMEN tne aesirea amount ot l-nmary VVater nas been added to the RCS, THEN verify the following:

o FCV-1 14A PW to Blender closes.

o FCV-113B Blended MU to CHG Suct. closes.

o IF in Aiim THFN the nperatinci PrimrvNter Piimn RE I URN me iviaeup System to automatic as tollows:

  • VERIFY FCV-1 14A Primary WTR Flow Dilute Mode is in AUTO.
  • PLACE FCV-1 14B Blended MU to VCT to the AUTO position.

RO

  • PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in AUTO.
  • Mnmnfrii, P1 A(F the Rnc MA1<PI IP VTIM AIifIh in fh p

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations I Load Reduction Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER RD TOTALIZER, YIC-1 14 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC-1 13 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.

MONITOR Darameters for the expected change in reactivity AND RD intnrm th (RS N the SM of th rnlt of th boration.

lflC1 ot UI-3(J1 (iiihk Eortinn (hckIit SRO Contact l&C to Troubleshoot AND Correct the HCV-1459 Problem CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Unless Previously Made.

BOP Check S/G Level At OR Trending to Program (YES)

RD Check Tavg At OR Trending to Tref (YES)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Contact the SRO as Operations Manager and report that Engineering has noted an unusual noise and vibration on A MFP. Recommend that Reactor Power be reduced in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, and secure A MFP as soon as plant conditions support.

Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater SRO Problem SRO Implement the EALs NOTE: The SRO may continue in AOP-O1O once the downpower has commenced in accordance with AOP-038. The remaining steps in AOP-O1O are notifications and parameter verifications and are not listed in this scenario guide.

Determines the need to transition to ADP-038 and commence Rapid SRO Downpower.

Notify Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using the Plant Page CREW System.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I!

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 14 of 14 Event

Description:

HCV-1459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations! Load Reduction Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Determine Corrected Boration and Target Rod Height for Target Power Level using Most Recently Performed OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan.

RD

  • Target Load Reduction Rate  %/min
  • Target Power Level
  • Target Rod Height

. Corrected Boration Gallons Perform Brief of Control Room Personnel to include the following

. Reason for downpower

  • Target Power Level SRO

. Target Rod Height

. Rate of load reduction

  • Amount of boric acid addition Continuous Action Step RD Check Required Power Reduction Rate Less than or equal to 5%/mm. (YES)

RO Enerqize All available PZR Heaters RD Check Rod Control IN AUTO (YES)

Initiate Boration Using Att. 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing with this RD procedure.

Att. 1 RD Place the RCS Makeup Mode Selector Switch to BORATE IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts are anticipated, THEN Att RO place Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch AliQned to BLEND to ON.

Att. 1 RD Set YIC-1 13 to amount determined in Main Body Step 2.

Att. I RD Momentarily place the RCS Makeup System Switch to START.

IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN place Att. 1 RD FCV-1 1 3A in MAN and manually adjust controller FCV-1 1 3A using UP and DOWN pushbuttons.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: ILC-I3NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 4 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

HCV-1 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior When the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS Makeup System Switch is placed in STOP, THEN verify the following:

Att. 1 RO a. FCV-1 1 3A closes

b. FCV-1 1 3B closes
c. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops
d. RCS Makeuo System is OFF Initiate Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing with this procedure:
a. Check EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO
b. Prepare for Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

BOP 1) Check IMP IN ILLUMINATED

2) SET desired load in the SETTER
3) Select the desired Load Rate
c. Depress the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction.

Adjust Turbine Load to Control Tavg within 5°F of Tref using one of the following:

BOP . Adjust Load Rate OR

. Depress GO and HOLD pushbuttons Initiate Notification of the following:

. Load Dispatcher of Load Reduction

. E&C to control secondary chemistry

. RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe SRO Alley

. On-call Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

. E&C for impending 15% power change for 1-131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Check Auxiliary Boilers At Least One Operating (NO, not needed BOP

since staying on-line.)

Continuous Action Step RO Check Tavg Within 5°F of Tref (IF NO, then take necessary action

with Turbine Load reduction or boration rate)

Continuous Action Step RO Check Axial Flux Distribution Within Target Band (IF NO, then refer

to ITS 3.2.3, Axial Flux Difference, for required actions.)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 4 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

HCV-1 459 fails Open with A MFP Vibrations / Load Reduction Time I Position N Applicants Actions or Behavior Check APP-006-F5, Steam Dump Armed Extinguished (NO, no BOP

actions recuired since> 15%. Illuminated due to PT-447 failure.)

Check any of the following conditions MET:

. Target load/power has been reached (NO)

SRO

  • Load reduction is no longer required (NO)

. CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction (NO)

Go to Step 16 Check Reactor Power Less than 85% (NO)

RO (In hold until at 85% Power. Once at 85% power one Heater Drain Pump will be secured.

bUU III UF(M I UK: unce me L..nIeT examiner is sausTiea witn tne crews actions to lower reactor power in a controlled manner, Insert Event #5 (A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure) on cue from the Chief

..., fr. F. r Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event# 5 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure Time Position 8 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (A SIG Level Median Selector Module Failure).

EVENT INDICATIONS:

Feed flow transient on A SIG APP-006-A3 SIG A LVL DEV

Determines entry into AOP-010 is warranted due to Feedwater Flow CREW Transient Immeaiate ,.ction Step Check Feedwater Regulating Valves Operating Properly (Manual OR Auto):

  • FCV-478, FRV A (NO)
  • FCV-488, FRV B (YES)
  • FCV-498, FRV C (YES)

RNO: Perform the following:

BOP a. Verify FRV for affected S/G in manual control. (Places FCV 478 in Manual)

b. Attempt to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.
c. Stop any load change in progress. (Place turbine controls to HOLD.)
d. Restore affected S/G level to between 39% and 52%.
e. IF unable to control S/G level, THEN trip the Reactor and go to EOP-E-0.
f. Go to Step 37.

BOP Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry BOP Check SIG Level At OR Trending to Program (YES)

RO Check Tavc At OR Trendinci to Tref (YES)

Contact Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater SRO Problem SRO Implement the EALs Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on 8 RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: On cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #6, Main Turbine Governor Valves randomly oscillate and ultimately fail close EVENT INDICATIONS:

Governor valve indications and lights oscillate Steam Flow and SIG Level Transients Lowering Main Generator Output May enter AOP-01 5, Secondary Load Rejection, and attempt to SRO diagnose the problem. The crew will most likely trip once the governor valves fail closed. AOP-015 steps listed for contingency.

BOP Check SIG Levels Trendinq to Program Level (YES)

RO Check Tavg Trending to Tref (YES)

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Load Reduction Greater than 100 MWe. (YES, Once BOP

Governor valves fail close)

SRO Trip the Reactor AND go to EOP-E-O.

Beginning of EOP-E-O RO Check Reactor tripped (YES)

Check Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)

BOP

-

b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Manual action required by BOP)

Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:

BOP a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES) b.__El_and_E2__Both_energized_(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI Status:

a) Check if SI is actuated:

  • SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)

RO b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED

  • SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO)
  • RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

RNO: Manually actuate BOTH trains of SI CRS Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-0.

EXAMINERS NOTE: During the fast-bus transfer, 4 KV Bus 3 will lose power from the Startup Transformer due to breaker 52117 tripping open. B RCP will experience a locked rotor along with a total seal stack failure and suction line leak. Additionally, B EDG will fail resulting in a loss of 480V Bus E-2.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.

. Manually start A SI Pump

. Manually start A MDAFW Pump

. Manually close CVC-200A and CVC-204A1B FOLDOUT for EOP-E-0 is in effect RCP TriD Criteria IF either condition listed below occurs, THEN trip all RCPs: (YES)

. Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED (NO)

OR Critical

  • BOTH of the following satisfied:

Task CRS o SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND

-

CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW (YES, A SI Pump is running)

AND o RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS -

THAN_30°F_(YES,_depending_on_scenario_timeline)

CRITICAL TASK - STOP ALL RCPs Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time N Position Apolicants Actions or Behavior Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)

Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-0 Follows this Section)

Check ECCS Pumps Running:

Att. I Critical . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, Starts A SI Pump)

BOP

-

Task . RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (NO, only A RHR pump has

-

power.)

CRITICAL TASK START A SI PUMP Att. I BOP Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)

-

Att. I BOP Check CCW PumDs AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

-

Check Containment Isolation Phase A

a. Phase A Actuated (YES)

Att. I b. Phase A valves Closed (NO, Manually closes CVC-200A

Critical BOP and CVC-204A and CVC-204B)

Task c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)

. CVC-387 Closed (YES)

. HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)

CRITICAL TASK . Es ablish Containment Isolation (Close CVC-200A and CVC-204A and CVC-204B)

Check Feedwater Isolation:

a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)

b) Main feedwater ISOLATED Att. I BOP

. Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6- 12 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position I Atlicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steam lines Should Be Isolated:

a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (NO)

. Containment pressure Greater than 10 psig (NO)

OR Att. 1 BOP . High steam flow with: (NO) o S/G pressure less than 614 psig

OR o Tavg less than 543° F

RNO: Go to Step 7 Check Proper Service Water System Operation:

a. SW pumps All running (NO, verifies all available running.)
b. SW booster pumps Both running (NO, verifies A SWBP Att. 1 BOP

running.)

c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)

Extinguished (YES)

Check Both EDGs Running (NO, B EDG has failed to start.

Att. 1 BOP

Attempt to start from the RTGB. Will not be successful.)

Check ECCS Flow:

a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (YES)

Att. 1 BOP

b. SI pumps- Flow Indicated (YES)
c. RCS pressure less than 275 psig. (NO, go to step 10)

Check CV Recirculation Fans All Running (NO, verifies all available BOP

Att. 1 running.)

Check IVSW Actuated (YES)

-

Att. 1 BOP . PCV-1 922A Open (YES)

. PCV-1922B Open (YES)

Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)

Att. 1 BOP a.__CV_ventilation_isolation_valves__CLOSED_(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6- 12 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)

-

. HVA-1A or HVA-1 B Running (YES)

. HVE-16 Stopped (YES)

Att. I BOP . HVE-19A or HVE-19B Running (YES)

. Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)

. CR-DIA-SA Closed (YES)

. CR.-DI B-SB Closed (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Check DS Bus Energized (YES)

Check Battery Chargers Energized

APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP APP-036-D2 Extinguished (NO, Acknowledge restart of battery

chargers within 30 minutes of power loss using OP-601, DC Supply System.)

AtL1 BOP StoD R-11112 Sample Pump Att. 1 BOP Locally Reset and Load IACs as necessary (N/A)

Perform Crew Update to include the following:

. Attachment Completion

. Manual Actions Taken (Started A SI pump and closed CVC Att. I BOP 200A and CVC-204A1B)

. Failed Equipment status (B EDG has not started. Battery Charger BIB-I Trouble Alarm.)

. SW status (All available operatinq)

Contacts WCC SRO or directs BOP to contact WCC SRO to have SRO Maintenance assist with troubleshooting and repair to B EDG as top priority.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched to B EDG, wait 10 minutes, and report that the fuel racks were found tripped. Inform control room that the fuel racks have been reset and request to locally start B EDG. Once permission granted, execute commands to start B EDG lAW SCN file.

If dispatched to close LCV-115C, wait 3 minutes and execute command to close LCV-115C lAW SCN file.

Appendix D NUREG-I 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior 1fl0 01 10F-t-U Attacflment 1 I I

. Continuation of EOP-E-O Check AFW Pumps Running

a. Motor driven AFW pumps Both Running (NO, manually starts A MDAFW Pump)
b. SIG levels Two SIGs less than 16% (YES)

RO

c. Steam Driven AFW pump steam shutoff valves ALL OPEN (NO, opens V1-8AIB/C.)

NOTE: SDAFW pump has tripped and will not start. V1-Bs will open and eventually re-close.

Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)

. AFW header discharge valves Full Open (YES)

. AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)

RO

. Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump

is running. (YES, but should be closed once it is determined that the SDAFW pump has tripped.)

Check Total AFW Flow:

. Reset SI RO . Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted SIGs narrow range level Between 8% and 50%.

. Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 am (YES)

Check CV Spray NOT Required:

RO a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (YES)

b.__CV_spray__NOT_Actuated_(YES)

Check RCP Seal Cooling:

. CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (YES)

o APP-001-C1 I Dl Extinguished (YES)

RO OR

. Seal injection flow Normal (YES)

o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP

OR o__Thermal_barrier APs Greater than_5_inches_water.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 6-12 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP qp inicrtinn

---J---

flow iiqinn th P&lfl fiinrtinn

-- -

EXAMINERS NOTE: During the check RCP parameters the crew should realize that seal injection flow is extremely high on B RCP and nearly zero on A and C RCP. Further review of RCP parameters should lead the crew to determine that B RCP has experience a seal failure. The SRO should direct performance of AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, as manpower permits. AOP 018 Actions are listed at the end of the simulator guide.

When I IF B EDG is restored, the crew will have to take manual actions to start B Train ECCS components.

Check RCS Temperature With NO RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or trending to 547°F (NO, Depending on scenario timeline the RCPs could still be running.)

RNO: IF temperature is greater then 547°F AND rising then perform the following: (YES)

RD . IF condenser is available, THEN dump steam to condenser:

a. Place steam dump mode switch in Steam Pressure mode.
b. Adjust steam pressure controller as necessary OR

. Dump steam using SIG steam line PORVs.

Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

a. PORVs Closed (YES)

RO

b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

RD a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per FOLDOUT)

RNO: Go to Step 14 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o__None_Completely_depressurized_(YES)

Appendix D NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 - 12 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position Aoilicants Actions or Behavior Check if SIG Tubes are Intact:

  • Secondary radiation monitors Have Remained Normal (YES)

. R-19s

. R-31s

. S/G levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)

Check if RCS is Intact: (NO)

  • CV radiation Normal (NO)

o R-2 o R-32A1B RO

. CV pressure Normal (NO)

  • CV sump level Normal (NO)

RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of CSFSTs. Go to EOP-E 1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step I BgjngofEOP-E_

NOTE CRS FOLDOUT for EOP-E-1 is in effect. (None applicable.)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

RO a. RCPs Any Running (NO, stopped per EOP-E-0 FOLDOUT)

RNO: Go to Step 2 Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o None Completely depressurized (YES)

Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels:

a. Narrow range levels Greater than 8% (NO)

BOP RNO: Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 8% in at least one S/G.

b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels between 8% AND 50%

RO Reset SI Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 26 of 26 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position I App!icants Actions or Behavior RO Reset Containment Isolation Phase A Check Secondary Radiation:

a. Secondary radiation monitors Have remained normal (YES) o R-15, R-19s, R-31s BOP b. Perform the following:
1) Request periodic activity samples of all S/Gs
2) Secondary sample results Normal (When results

available)

Continuous Action Step Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves.

RO a. Power to block valves Available (YES)

b PORVs Closed (YES)

c. Block valves At least one open. (YES)

Establish Instrument Air to CV:

a. Check APP-002-F7 Extinguished (YES)

RD

b. Reset IA PCV-1716
c. Check IA PCV-1716 OPEN (YES)

Check Power Supply to Charging Pumps Offsite power available RD (YES)

Check if Charging Flow has been established:

a. Charging pumps At least one running. (YES)
b. Establish desired charging flow:

o Start additional pump(s) as necessary o Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to RD establish desired charging flow.

o Adjust HIC-121 as necessary to establish desired charging flow:

o Maintain seal injection flow Between 6 gpm and

20 gpm_per_RCP_unless_seal_injection_isolated.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6- 12 Page 27 of 27 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&ID function.

If B EDG has not been started AND LCV-115C remains OPEN, check the Charging Pump status under the malfunction screen to see if the Charging Pumps have become gas bound. If gas binding is occurring report to the Control Room that extremely loud metallic noise is emanating from the running Charging Pumps.

EXAMINERS NOTE: During the check RCP parameters the crew should realize that seal injection flow is extremely high on B RCP and nearly zero on A and C RCP. Further review of RCP parameters should lead the crew to determine that B RCP has experience a seal failure. The SRO should direct performance of AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, as manpower permits. AOP 018 Actions are listed at the end of the simulator guide.

If gas binding occurs on the Charging Pumps the Crew should secure all running charging pumps and develop a recovery plan.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested to close LCV-115C and vent the charging pumps, wait 10 minutes and then execute the restoration of charging pump suction command lAW SCN file.

I I Continuous Action Step Check if SI flow should be terminated:

RO

a. RCS subcooling base on core exit TCs Greater than 35°F (NO, Goto Step 12.)

Continuous Action Step Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

RO

a. Spray pump Any running (YES)

RNO:ObserveC aution prior to Step 13 and Go to Stp 13.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 6-12 Page 28 of 28 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Check if RHR Pumps Should be Stopped:

a. Check RCS pressure:
1) Pressure Greater than 275 psig (YES)
2) Pressure Stable or Rising (YES)

RO

b. RHR pumps Any running with suction aligned to RWST (YES,

A RHR Pump)

c. Stop RHR pumps (Stops A RHR pump)
d. Monitor RCS pressure.

Check RCS and S/G Pressure:

RO/BOP

  • Check pressure in all S/Gs Stable OR Rising (YES)
  • __Check_RCS_pressure__Stable_OR_Lowering Check if Diesel Generators should be Stopped:
a. AC emergency busses Energized by Offsite Power

o E-1 (YES)

b. EDG starting air annunciator Extinguished (APP-01 0-B2)

(YES)

c. Stop unloaded EDG. (Stops A EDG) o E-2 (NO)

RNO (for E-2 being deenergized):

Perform the following: (For B EDG)

1) Try to restore offsite power to AC emergency busses.
2) IF any AC emergency bus is NOT energized, THEN try to BOP restore power to affected bus from the EDG. (Crew should dispatch personnel to attempt to repair and/or start B EDG, if not already performed.
3) Locally load the following on AC emergency buss(es) as necessary:

. Instrument Air compressor after reset.

. Battery chargers.

4) IF DS bus in NOT energized, THEN place DSDG in service (DS bus is energized.)
5) Implement Supplement 5, EDG Monitoring, while continuing with this procedure. (Not applicable until B EDG is started.)
6) Verify emergency oil pump is running (YES)
7) Locally_verify_air_side_seal_oil_backup_pump_is_runninq._(YES)

BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested to verify air side seal oil backup pump running, wait 3 minutes and report to control room that it is running Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 29 of 29 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate Evaluation of Plant Status:

a. Check Cold leg recirculation capability:

e Train A and Train B:

e IF B EDG still QOS Crew determines on Train A is

available.

. IF B EDG has been restored Crew determine that both

Train A and Train B is available.

b. Check auxiliary building radiation NORMAL (YES)
c. Contact Chemistry to obtain samples for RCS boron and activity and CV atmosphere.
d. Evaluate plant equipment to support long term recover y as necessary:

. RHR pumps (both available)

RO

  • SI pumps (both running)
  • CV spray pumps (both available)

. CV fans (three running)

. AFW pumps (both MDAFW pumps available)

. SW system (all SWPs and SWBPs available)

. CCW system (two available)

  • IVSW system (system in service)
  • EDG fuel and auxiliaries. (A EDG available and B EDG running)
e. Start I align plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:
  • Aux. Boiler
  • Other plant equipment needed during cooldown to cold shutdown.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Acknowledge direction to start Auxiliary Boilers. Take no actions.

Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization if required:

a. RCS pressure Greater than 275 psig. (YES)

RO

b. Reset SPDS and Go to EPP-8, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization, Step 1.

SRO Open Foldout B (None applicable.)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6- 12 Page 30 of 30 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Determine if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

a. Check RCS pressure greater than 275 psig and stable or increasing (YES)

RO

b. Verify RHR Pumps Stopped (YES)
c. Check RCS pressure less than 275 psig (NO)

RNO: IF RCS pressure decreases below 275 psig during this procedure, THEN restart RHR pumps. Go to Step 3.

Check Emergency Busses Any Energized by Emergency Diesel BOP

(YES, E-2 powered from B EDG if personnel dispatched to start.)

Perform the following:

a. Verify each running EDG has loaded required equipment:
  • MDAFW Pump (Verifies B MDAFW pump available or running.)
  • SW pump (Verifies C and D SWPs are running.)
  • SW Booster Pump (Verifies B SWBP is running.)
b. Verify EDG capacity using Supplement F and load the following equipment on the EDG:

RO/BOP

  • Charging Pumps (Verifies C Charging Pump running.)
  • Instrument Air Compressor (If not already accomplished, dispatches an operator to reset and start B IAC)
c. Check Battery Chargers In Service:
  • APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)
  • APP-036-D2 Extinguished (YES, if E-2 powered from

B EDG)

d. Check PZR Heaters Power Available (YES)

I I Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6- 12 Page 31 of 31 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time I Position I Arplicants Actions or Behavior Check all Non-emergency AC Busses Energized by Offsite Power.

(NO, E-2 energized by B EDG)

RNO:

a. Verify one of the following pumps are running:

. Turning gear oil pump OR Emerg Oil Pump (YES)

BOP b. Verify one of the following pumps are running: Seal Oil Backup Pump or Air Side Seal Oil Backup Pump (YES)

c. Determine the cause of the loss of offsite power.

IF due to a failure within the plant, THEN restore power using OP-603, Electrical Distribution, after repairs are completed.

(YES, breaker 52/17 tripped on over-current.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested, state that Electrical technicians are working with the Planner and Engineering to determine the appropriate course of action to restore breaker 52117.

Establish Charging flow as follows:

RO a. Check Charging Pumps All Stopped (NO, go to step 6.h.)

h. Verify charciinq flow on Fl-i 22A Greater than 35 cpm. (YES)

Align Charging Pump Suction to RWST as follows:

a. From the RTGB, verify LCV-1 i SB OPEN (YES)
b. Verify LCV-1 1 SC CLOSED (If B EDG still OOS, then an

operator will have to be dispatched to locally close LCV-IISC.

If this is the case then most likely the Charging Pumps will be RO gas bound.)

c. Start all available charging pumps. (Verifies all available charging pumps are running.)
d. Increase running Charging Pumps speed to maximum.
e. Verify maximum charciinci flow on Fl-i 22A. (YES)

Control Intact S/G Levels As follows:

a. Check intact SIG levels Greater than 8%. (YES)
b. Control feed flow to maintain intact S/G levels between 8% and BOP 50%.
c. Check intact SIG levels Any increasing in an uncontrolled

manner. (NO)

RNO:_Go_to_step_9.

Contact Chemistry to Obtain periodic Boron Samples of the RCS and RO/BOP Pressurizer.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 6 12

- Page 32 of 32 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time 1 Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior RO Check boron sample results Available (NO, go to step 1 1.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: Whn cnnftrI (hmifn, fnr hnrnn mpIe results, report that the technician is in route to obtain the sample. Expect results AIifhinfhhcI.r Initiate RCS Cooldown to cold shutdown as follows:

a. Maintain cooldown rate in RCS cold legs less than 1 00°F/hr in the last 60 minutes.
b. Maintain RCS temperature and pressure within limits of curve BOP 3.4, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature

limitation for cooldown.

c. Check steam dump to condenser Available (NO)

RNO: Dump steam from intact S/Gs using Steam Line PORVs.

Go to step 12.

RO Check RCS Hot Leg Temperatures Less than 543°F (YES)

Check Steam Dump to Condenser Available (NO)

BOP RNO: Continue RCS cooldown using Steam Line PORVs. Go to Step 14.

Defeat Low Tavg Safety Injection Signal as follows:

a. Momentarily place Safety Injection T-avg Selector Switch to RO BLOCK position.
b. Verify Lo Temp Safety Injection Blocked status light Illuminated._(YES)

RO Check RCS Pressure Less than 1950 rsici. (YES)

Defeat Low Pressure Safety Injection Signal as follows:

a. Momentarily place Pzr Press/HI Stm Line DP Switch to BLOCK RO position.
b. Verify Lo Press Safety Injection Blocked status light Illuminated._(YES)

RO Check RCS Subcooling Greater than 35°F (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 6-12 Page 33 of 33 Event

Description:

Main Turbine Governor Valves Randomly Oscillate and Ultimately Fail Close, Loss of 4KV Bus 3 with B EDG Failure, Locked Rotor on B RCP results in total seal stack failure and suction line leak.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Check SI and RHR Pump status:

. SI Pumps Any running (YES)

RO OR

. RHR Pumps Any running in Lo Head Injection Mode. (NO)

Determine PZR Heater Status:

RO a. Check RCS Leak Location Known to be PZR (NO, go to step 20)

Continuous Action Step I Check PZR Level Greater than 73% (NO)

RNO: Place all PZR Heaters in OFF RO IF PZR level increases above 73%, THEN energize PZR heaters to maintain steam bubble.

Go to steR Continuous Action Step Depressurize RCS to Refill PZR as Follows:

a. Check PZR level Less than 27% (YES)
b. Use normal PZR spray to depressurize the RCS (NO, RCPs RO secured.)

RNO: Use one PZR PORV

c. Check PZR level Greater than 27% (NO)

RNO: WHEN PZR level greater than 27%, THEN stop RCS depressurization._Go_to_steo_23.

RO Check RCP Status ALL STOPPED (YES)

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or once RCS Cooldown and/or RCS Depressurization has commenced in accordance with EPP-8.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 3 Event# 8 Page 34 of 34 Event

Description:

AOP-O1 8 Steps to Address Total Seal Stack Failure of B RCP Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior AOP-018 RCP Abnormal Conditions

EXAMINERS NOTE: AOP-018 will be entered once it is determined by the crew that a seal failure has occurred on B RCP. AOP-018 is a concurrent AOP and should be performed while in the EOP Network.

RO I BOP Determines that Section A, RCP Seal Failure is aDDlicable.

Check Either of the following conditions exist:

. RCP#1 Seal Leakoff flow on Unaffected RCP Reduced RO/BOP (YES)

OR

. RCP Thermal Barrier AP on affected RCP Reduced (YES)

Check Plant Status Mode I OR Mode 2 (NO)

RO, BOP

RNO: Stop the affected RCP (Verified stopped. Go to step 5)

Check Time Elapsed Since Stopping the Affected RCPs Greater RO BOP than 3 minutes (YES)

RO I BOP Close CVC-303B, Seal Leakoff Valve RO I BOP Check SI Actuated (YES)

Continuous Action Step Establish Instrument Air to CV as follows:

a. Check APP-002-F2 Extinguished (YES)

RO / BOP b. Reset Safety Injection

c. Reset Containment Isolation Phase A
d. Momentarily place IA PCV-1716, to RESET position.
e. Check PCV-1716-OPEN RO/BOP GotoStep3o RO I BOP Check RCP(s) B C Running (NO, Go to Step 33)

Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 gpm and 13 gpm (NO)

RNO: Locally throttle CVC-297A1B/C to obtain flow to each RCP RO / BOP between 6 gpm to 20 gpm. IF required to maintain minimum flow, THEN throttle HIC-121, Charging Flow Valve, while maintaining Charging Pump Discharge pressure less than 2500 psig.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 3 Event # 8 Page 35 of 35 Event

Description:

AOP-018 Steps to Address Total Seal Stack Failure of B RCP Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: As requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&lD function.

RO I BOP Check FCV-626 Closed (NO, go to step 40)

Review OP-i 01, RCS and RCP Startup and Operation, Precautions RO I BOP and Limitations Relating to RCP Number 1 Seal Leakoff Flow and Take Appropriate Actions. (No actions required.)

RO I BOP Implement the EALs (Informs SRO of EAL5)

RO I BOP Refer to ITS RO I BOP Go to Main Body, Step 2.

Appendix D NUREG-i 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 3 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 100%

c) Turbine Load: 751.7 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 96 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CBD f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) RCS Level: 53.2 %

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description 3.7.6 Cond. A Restore required CCW train to Operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3.6.6 Cond. C Restore containment cooling train to Operable status within 7 days AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) C CCW OOS for mechanical seal repair. OOS for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> with estimated RTS in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

b) HVH-4 OOS for abnormal motor vibrations. OOS for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Available for emergency use only.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None
5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A and B CCW Pumps, A and B CCW Pump RTGB Control Switches, A CCW Pump Breaker 480V-DS 52/34B and B CCW Pump Breaker 480V-E1 52/22C.
6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) None
7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted
8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain current power level
9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) No additional information.
10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions
11. RISK a) GREEN Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: HB ROBINSON Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: ILC-13 Examiners: Operators: CRS -

RO BOP Initial Conditions:

. No equipment out of service.

Turnover:

  • Startup in progress in accordance with GP-003, Step 8.4. Raise Power to the POAH and stabilize power until relieved by on-coming crew.

Critical Task:

  • Manually Trip the reactor.
  • Establish Containment Isolation.
  • Restart ECCS equipment after loss of off-site power.
  • Establish Auxiliary Feedwater Event MaIf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 (R) RO, Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat (N) CRS 2 (I) RO, CRS PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close (TS) CRS 3 (C) BOP, CRS SW Break at Suction of A SWBP (TS) CRS 4 (C) RO, CRS B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure 5 (C) RO, CRS A SIG Tube Leak 6 (M) ALL A SIG Tube Rupture 7 RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button 8 (M) ALL Loss of Startup Transformer 9 BOP MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-1 6s) 10 BOP Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

11 BOP SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (VI -8s) fail to Auto Open on Loss of Startup Transformer (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4

SUMMARY

DESCRIPTION The crew will assume the watch with the plant at I OE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003, Normal Plant Startup from Hot Shutdown to Critical. The crew will continue with GP-003 at Step 8.4, Post Critical Operations, and withdraw control rods to the Point of Adding Heat and then stabilize Reactor Power between 3% and 5%. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to stabilize reactor power, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, PT-445, Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter, fails High. The crew will perform the immediate actions of AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, and attempt to close PCV-456, PZR PORV. PCV-456 will fail to fully close and the operator will take manual action to close the PORV Block Valve. Once the PORV Block Valve is close PZR Pressure will automatically recover to normal band. Due to the failure of PCV-456 to fully close the CRS will determine that ITS LCO 3.4.11, Condition B, is applicable due to one PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. This LCO requires that the block valve be closed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and power removed from the associated block valve within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions to control PZR Pressure and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a Service Water Break will occur at the Suction of A SWBP.

The crew will implement AOP-022, Loss of Service Water, Section D, for Leak on South Service Water Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545. The crew will perform required valve and Service Water Booster Pump manipulations from the RTGB and direct field actions in

( accordance with AOP-022 attachments to isolate the ruptured section of Service Water piping and restore various components to operable status. The Service Water Break will result in entry into ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> without reliance on steam generator for heat removal. ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, is also applicable due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions and Tech Spec compliance, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, B RCP will experience a 40 gpm thermal barrier leak. This will be identified by a rising trend and alarm on R-17, rising CCW surge tank level, and RCP thermal barrier cooling water high flow alarm. FCV-626, Thermal Barrier Flow Control, will receive the signal to auto-close, however the breaker to the MOV will trip leaving the valve in mid-position. The crew will take action to close CC-735, Thermal Barrier Outlet Isolation, from the RTGB due to the FCV-626 failure. Once the Chief Examiner is satisfied with the crews actions, the Chief Examiner will cue the next event.

On cue from the Chief Examiner, a 300 gpm tube leak on A SIG will be ramped over a six minute time period. The crew will enter AOP-035, SIG Tube Leak, and attempt to control pressurizer level. Ultimately the crew will determine that the leak is greater than the capacity of available charging pumps and initiate a reactor trip and safety injection. The reactor will not trip on an automatic signal or by depressing the right hand reactor trip pushbutton. The RO will identify this failure and trip the reactor by depressing the left hand reactor trip pushbutton. On the initiation of the Reactor Trip the SIG tube leak will degrade to 1000 gpm. On initiation of the Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 I Safety Injection the Feedwater Regulating Bypass Valves will fail to close on the Phase A signal. The BOP will take manual action to adjust the individual valves potentiometer on the RTGB to close the valves. Additionally, the Motor Driven Feedwater Pumps Discharge Valves will fail to Auto-Open. This failure will be identified, but the crew may determine it not necessary to open the valves until needed due to adequate SIG levels present at the onset of the major event. The crew will carry out the actions of EOP-E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, identifying the conditions noted above and stabilizing the plant. The crew will transition from EOP-E-O to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture. Once A S/G has been isolated and an operator dispatched to de-energize the associated AFW valves the plant will experience a loss of off-site power. On the loss of off-site power, the Main Steam Supply valves to the Steam Driven AFW Pump will fail to open. The crew will take required actions to restart safeguards equipment since SI would have been reset at this point in the EOP Network. After safeguards equipment has been restarted the crew will perform an RCS cooldown and depressurization to stop the primary to secondary leakage. The crew will be required to either open the MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves (V2-16s) or manually start the SDAFW pump to provide AFW flow during the RCS cooldown. Once the primary to secondary leakage is stopped, both safety injection pumps will be secured.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at any time after the safety injection pumps have been secured in accordance with EOP-E-3, or at his discretion.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

I Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4 SIMULATOR SETUP ICISETUP:

  • IC-19, SCN 006_ILC_I3NRC_4.
  • Status board is provided to crew is IC-19.

PRE-LOADED EVENTS:

The following events should occur on the reactor trip or triggered events following the reactor trip:

  • Event 7: Failure of Automatic Rx Trip and Right Hand Rx Trip Button
  • Event 8: Loss of Startup Transformer
  • Event 9: MDAFW Pump Motor Operated Discharge Valves fail to Auto-Open (V2-16s)
  • Event 10: Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.
  • Event 11: SDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves (V1-8s) fail to Auto-Open on Loss of Startup Transformer EVENTSITRIGGERS INITIATED DURING THE SCENARIO:
  • Event 1: Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat
  • Event 2: PT-445 fails High with PCV-456 failing to fully close
  • Event 3: SW Break at Suction of A SWBP
  • Event 4: B RCP Thermal Barrier leak I FCV-626 failure
  • Event 5: A SIG Tube Leak
  • Event 6: A SIG Tube Rupture EXPECTED PROCEDURE FLOWPATH OR COPIES NEEDED:
  • GP-003
  • Supplement M
  • EOP-E-3 Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Page 5 of 5 Event

Description:

Withdraw Rods to the Point of Adding Heat Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: No actions required.

EVENT INDICATIONS:

Not applicable.

EXAMINERS NOTE: The crew will assume the watch with the Reactor at IOE-8 amps performing a plant startup in accordance with GP-003. The crew should be given adequate time to brief the evolution prior to entering the simulator. The crew will start at Section 8.4, Step 8.4.7 Performs brief on Identification of reaching the POAH, startup rate SRO limitations_and_maximum_power_limit_of_5%.

Adjust Control Rod position as necessary to establish a positive SUR RO and_raise_reactor_power_to_the_POAH.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

The crew will monitor for indications of the Point of Adding Heat (POAH) which are as follows:

  • IF MTC is negative, then SUR with be lowering
  • Onset of RCS temperature rise, Onset of PZR pressure rise, Onset PZR level rise.
  • Reduction in AUTO Charging Pump speed demand.
  • Rising indication of AUTO Steam Dump demand on PC-464B, Steam Header Pressure, when Steam Dumps are being used for RCS Temperature Control.

Adjust control rods as necessary to achieve the following while continuing with this procedure:

RO

  • RCS Tavg between 547°F and 551°F
  • Reactor Power 3% to less than or equal to 5%.

When Reactor power is greater than 1%, then notify Reactor SRO Engineering to commence logging date required by EST-067.

Controlling SIG levels by adjusting the Feed Regulating Valve Bypass BOP Valves.

EXAMINERS NOTE: If Reactor Power rises above 5% the Crew should declare the plant in Mode I and update ERFIS.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #2 (PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 2 Page 6 of 6 Event

Description:

PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 2, PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-003-C3, PRT HI PRESS APP-003-D6, PZR PORV I SAFETY VLV OPEN APP-003-D8, PZR CONTROL HIILO PRESS PT-445 indication rising to high limit of gauge.

PCV-456 RTGB indication RED open light illuminates.

Pressurizer Pressure lowering.

Pressurizer Control Bank Heaters energize.

Immediate Action Step Determine If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:

. Check PZR pressure LESS THAN 2335 PSIG (YES)

-

RO

  • Verify Both PZR PORVs CLOSED (NO, PCP-456 has failed

-

at mid-position)

RNO: IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve (Closes RC-535, PORV BLOCK)

Immediate Action Step Control The PZR SPRAY VALVES AND PZR Heaters To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band RO (RO should allow PC-444J to control pressure in AUTO, unless controller needs to be unsaturated due to possible overshoot while restoring pressure.)

Enters AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, Section C, Pressurizer SRO Pressure Transmitter Failure, and verifies immediate actions.

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check PT-444 Failed Transmitter (NO)

RO

RNO: IF PT-445 has failed, then qo to step 7. (YES)

Verify Selector Switch PM-444 Selected to the Operable Channel RO

REC 444 (YES, no action reauired.)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 7 of 7 Event

Description:

PT-445 fails HIGH with PCV-456 failing to fully close Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Check the following ITS LCOs for applicability:

ITS 3.3.4 Not applicable since the required number of channels (I)

remain operable.

ITS 3.4.1 Not applicable since the plant is in Mode 2. However, if

reactor power has increased above 5% then ITS 3.4.1 will be applicable and Condition A entered if PZR Pressure is lowered below 2205 psig. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits SRO Restore RCS DNB parameters to within limit within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, will be entered if PZR Pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig.

ITS 3.4.1 1 ITS LCO 3.4.1 1, Condition B will be entered due to one

PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. The LCO requires that the block valve be closed with 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and remove power from associated block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and restore PORV to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Informs WCC SRO of the Inoperable PZR PORV and requests a W/R be initiated and Maintenance contacted to being planning for SRO troubleshooting and repair. Directs WCC SRO to dispatch an AO to open the breaker for RC-535 and prepare and install a clearance to maintain power removed.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If! When contacted as WCC SRO, acknowledge the request to initiate a WIR for RC-535 , contacting Maintenance and dispatching an AO to open the breaker for RC-535. Wait 5 minutes and the open the breaker for RC-535 lAW SCN file.

SRO Go to Procedure Main Body, Step 2.

CRS Implement the EALs CRS Return to Procedure and Step in Effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #3 (Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 8 of 8 Event

Description:

Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 3, Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-035-H1 WDBRP Trouble

APP-008-F7 SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

APP-008-F8 NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS

Recognizes no SW Pump has tripped and determines that a rupture in APP..008..F7 BOP a SW Header has occurred and informs the SRO to refer to AOP-022.

Immediate Action Step Check the following Alarms Extinguished BOP

  • APP-008-E7, S SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL (YES)
  • APP-008-E8, N SW HDR STRAINER PIT HI LEVEL (YES)

Continuous Action Step BOP Check SW Any Available (YES)

CREW Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Check Leak Location Identified (NO, unless determine in Auxiliary

Building based on WDBRP Trouble alarm.)

BOP RNO: Perform local inspections as necessary to determine leak location. (Dispatches Inside AC to inspect the Auxiliary Building to determine leak location.)

tUU I H UIKA I UK UflC

- 1 ciIsfltCfld to insnct AuxIIIrv KI1IIc1ncL wait I minhit nrI J,.

fhn rnnf ffh infrnI rnrm ni1 infrwm fhm fhf Wtr Krk nrtriirrrI t thSiirtinn of A SWRP Wtr ievei in uxiiiarv t3uIIclIna 0 Hallway is annroximateiv nn incn.

---

Perform appropriate section for leak location: South Service Water SRO Header Downstream of Check Valve SW-545 Section D BOP Close V6-12A to isolate the Service Water Header Close V6-16B to isolate the Turbine Building from the affected Service BOP Water Header Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 9 of 9 Event

Description:

Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the following valves OPEN: (YES)

. V6-12D

  • V6-12C
  • V6-16A
  • V6-16C Continuous Action Step Verify the following SW Booster Pump alignment:

BOP SW Booster Pump B Running (YES)

SW Booster PumD A Stopped (YES)

Perform Attachment 7 while continuing with this procedure. (Crew SRO dispatches an AO to perform Attachment 7.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested Attachment 7 in accordance with the following timeline in minutes from the time contacted:

  • T+3 Perform steps 1 and 2 lAW SCN file and contact Control Room lAW Step 3.
  • T+4 Perform step 4 lAW SCN file
  • T+6 Perform RNO for step 9 lAW SCN file and contact Control Room lAW RNO step 9.
  • T+1O Perform Step 12 lAW SCN file.
  • T+1 1 Contact the Control Room and inform them that Att. 7 is complete and that SW has

been Cross-Connected to supply the following equipment: EDG A, IAC A, SAC, HVH-6A, HVH-8A Determine if actions for Auxiliary Building Flooding are necessary as follows:

Check for any of the following indications of flooding:

  • Water level on Auxiliary Building first floor Greater than 6

inches by local indication (NO)

RO OR

  • APP-OO1-E4 Illuminated (NO)

OR

  • APP-OO1-E5 Illuminated (NO)

RNO: Go to Step 7 BOOTH OPERATOR: If contacted with regard to water level on Auxiliary Building first floor, report that level is still at approximately one inch.

Verify the following equipment Stopped: (YES)

BOP

  • EDGA
  • __MDAFWPumpA Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page lOof 10 Event

Description:

Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Verify the following Valves at the Intake Structure Closed

  • SW-187 BP
  • SW-851
  • __SW-857 BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed to close the above valves, wait 10 minutes and close valves lAW SCN file and report status to control room.

BOP Check Circulating Water Pump Status Any running (YES)

Check SW-I 87 Closed (NO, not until 10 minutes after being BOP dispatched as noted above in BOOTH OPERATOR notes.)

RNO: When SW-i 87 is closed, then perform step I I. Go to step 12.

Step 1 1 (To be completed once SW-i 87 reported as closed.)

Determine if adequate seal water is available to circulating water pumps as follows:

BOP APP-008-E4 Extinguished (YES)

APP-008-E5 Extinguished (YES)

APP-008-E6 Extinguished (YES)

SRO Check Steps I and 2 Complete (YES, depending on timeline.)

BOP Check N. SW Header Press. on P1-1616 Greater than 40 psig (YES)

Determine Maximum allowable CCW temperature as follows:

Check RCS temperature Less than or equal to 350°F (NO)

RO RNO: Maintain CCW Heat Exchanger outlet temperature indicated on Tl-607 less than or equal to 1 05° F. Go to step 15.

SRO Check Step I I of Att. 7 Complete (YES, depending on timeline.)

Determine if a SW Booster Pump should be started:

BOP Check SWBPs All stopped (NO)

RNO: Verify one SWBP is running (YES, go to step 17.)

Check Service Water Cooling from SI pumps to drain header Flow BOP Observed. (YES, once report received from AO.)

BOOTH OPERATOR: When directed to determine if adequate flow is observed from SI pumps to drain header, wait 2 minutes and report that adequate flow was observed.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 3 Page 11 of 11 Event

Description:

Service Water Break at Suction of A SWBP Time I Position I Arrnlicants Actions or Behavior Align Emergency Cooling Water to MDAFW Pump A using Att. 2 while BOP continuing with this procedure.

BOOTH 0 ERATOR: When directed align emergency cooling water to MDAFW Pump A, wait 15 minutes and contact the control room and request that they start the Motor Driven Fire Pump. Once Fire Pump is started, wait 5 minutes and inform the control room that emergency cooling water has been aligned to the MDAFW Pump A.

Perform the following:

. Inspect the area of the leak.

SRO

. Report findings to the Control Room

  • Identify and Isolate the source of the SW leak.

BOOTH 0 rERATOR: Nhenllf dispatched to isolate the leak and remove power from A SWBP, wait 5 minutes and isolate the leak and remove power from A SWBP, as directed, lAW SCN file.

Continuous Action Step SRO Check Attachment 7 Completed (YES, depending on timeline.)

Check SW to Instrument Air Compressor A and Station Air BOP Compressor Isolated (NO, go to step 22)

Refer to ITS LCOs for Applicability ITS LCO 3.7.5, Condition C, due to Service Water supply to AFW system being inoperable and requires that the plant be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 4 in 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> without reliance on steam generator for SRO heat removal.

ITS LCO 3.7.7, Condition A, due to one Service Water train inoperable and requires that the train be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in Mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Mode 5 in 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.

SRO Implement the EALs SRO Return to procedure and step in effect BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #4 (B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure) on cue from the Chief Examiner Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 12 of 12 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure Time N Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: At the discretion of the Examiner, insert Event 4, B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure EVENT INDICATIONS:

APP-OO1-B2, RCP LABYRTH SEAL LO AP APP-OO1-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HIILO FLOW APP-OO1-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW APP-OO1-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW APP-OO1-E1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI TEMP RR-1 for R-17 APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD (R-17 in alarm)

FCV-626 indicates both RED and GREEN lights illuminated CCW Surge Tank slowly rising.

SRO Implement the EALs BOP Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry Go to Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction: Rising CCW RO Inventory OR R-17 Alarmina, Section B.

Check FCV-626 AUTO CLOSED (NO, indicates stuck mid-position)

RNO: IF APP-001-C1 is illuminated the perform one of the following:

. At the RTGB, verify FCV-626 is closed (FCV-626 will not close)

RO OR

. IF FCV-626 will NOT close, the close CC-735 and go to step 2.

(RO will close CC-735)

RO Check RCP Seal Leakoff Any greater than 5 gpm (NO, go to step 4)

Continuous Action Step Check the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure Both Exist RO . RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling Isolated due to High Flow

(YES)

AND

. R-17 Risina trend or Alarm. (YES)

Check Seal Injection flow to the Affected RCP(s) LOST (NO, go to RO step 7.)

Dispatch Operator to Containment to Perform Att. 6, RCP Thermal RO Barrier Isolation.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 13 of 13 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak I FCV-626 Failure Time 1 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: If dispatched to the Containment to perform Aft. 6, acknowledge the report and take no additional action, If contacted on status later, state that you are waiting on the HP to perform CV entry brief.

Check RCP status as follows:

a. Check RCP B OR C Running (YES)

RO

-

b. Check RCP B Running (YES)
c. Check RCP C Running (YES)

SRO When Att. 6 is completed, then go to step 23.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Insert Event #5 (A SIG Tube Leak) on cue from the Chief Examiner.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 OpTestNo.: ILC-I3NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 14 of 14 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position ft Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: After adequate power reduction has been observed and on cue from the Chief Examiner Insert Event #5 (A SIG Tube Leak)

EVENT INDICATIONS:

Rising Speed on AUTO Charging Pump PZR Level lowering APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED RR-1 on R-15 APP-036-C7, R-24 MONITOR HI (R-24A HIGH)

APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD (R-15 in Alarm)

SRO Determines entry into AOP-035 is warranted based plant indications.

EXAM I N El S NOTE: 1 he tube leak is rampinq in over 6 minutes to 300 gpm.

Continuous Action Step Determine if Reactor Trip needed as follows:

a. Check the following

. PZR Level Less than 7% (NO)

RO OR

  • RCS Subcooling Less than 35°F (NO)

RNO: IF the conditions above are met then trip the reactor and go to EOP-E-0. Go to Step 2.

BOP Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry Continuous Action Step RO Check VCT Level Less than 12.5 inches (NO, go to step 5)

RO Check RCS Level Lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES)

Adjust Charging Flow as follows:

a. Check Charging Pump Status At least two running (YES)

RO

b. Place running Charging Pumps Speed Controllers in MAN AND adiust output to maximum RO Check RCS Level Lowering in an Uncontrolled Manner (YES)

RO Check Letdown In Service (YES)

Verify All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated as follows:

RO

  • LCV-460A &B CLOSED

.__HIC-137_Adjusted_to_0%

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 15 of 15 Event

Description:

A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

. CVC-387 CLOSED

-

Check RCS Level Lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES, if leak

RO has been inserted for more than 3 minutes.)

Directs the RO to Trip the Reactor and Initiate Safety Injection and go SRO to EOP-E-O Depresses the Right Hand Reactor Trip Pushbutton

. Check Reactor Trip (NO)

Critical RO RNO: Manually trip the reactor. (RO depresses the Left Hand Task Reactor Trip Pushbutton.

. Check Reactor Trip (YES)

CRITICAL TASK - MANUALLY TRIPS THE REACTOR EXAMINERS NOTE: Upon tripping the reactor the S!G tube leak will degrade to a 1000 gpm tube rupture.

Check Turbine Trip:

a. Both turbine stop valves Closed (YES)

-

BOP

b. Close MSR purge and shutoff valves (Verifies valves closed)

Check Power to AC Emergency Busses:

BOP a. El or E2 At least one energized (YES)

b.__El_and_E2__Both_energized_(YES)

Check SI Status:

a) Check if SI is actuated:

. SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED (YES)

RO

  • SI equipment AUTO STARTED (YES)

b) Check BOTH trains of SI ACTUATED

  • SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)
  • __RHR_pumps BOTH_RUNNING_(YES)

SRO Verifies all immediate actions for EOP-E-O.

SRO Places FOLDOUT for EOP-E-O in effect (NONE apply)

Appendix D NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 16 of 16 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew may take early actions at this time to address items that did not function or operate as designed.

. Manually open MDAFW Pump Discharge Valves (V2-16s)

. Manually close the FRV Bypass Valves Perform Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While continuing CRS with this procedure. (Should be assigned to BOP.) (Att. 1 steps are presented next followed by the remainder of EOP-E-0.)

Beginning of EOP-E-O Attachment I (Remainder of EOP-E-0 Follows this Section)

Check ECCS Pumps Running:

Att. 1 BOP . SI pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

-

. RHR pumps BOTH RUNNING (YES)

-

Att. I BOP Check ECCS Valves PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT (YES)

-

Att. 1 BOP Check CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)

-

Check Containment Isolation Phase A

a. Phase A Actuated (YES)
b. Phase A valves Closed (YES)

Att. 1 BOP c. Excess letdown Isolated (YES)

. CVC-387 Closed (YES)

. HIC-137 at 0% DEMAND (YES)

Check Feedwater Isolation:

a) Main feed pumps BOTH TRIPPED (YES)

b) Main feedwater ISOLATED Att. I . FRV5 Closed (YES)

Critical BOP Task . Feedwater reg bypass valves Closed (NO)

. Feedwater header section valves Closed (YES)

RNO: Manually close valves as necessary (Closes all three Feedwater reg bypass valves.)

CRITICAL TASK ESTABLISH CONTAINMENT ISOLATION BY CLOSING THE FEEDWATER REG BYPASS VALVES Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 17 of 17 Event

Description:

A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior Check if Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:

Mt BOP

. a) Main steamline isolation REQUIRED (NO, Go to Step 7)

Check Proper Service Water System Operation:

a. SW pumps All running (YES)
b. SW booster pumps Both running (NO due to previous leak)
c. Both SW header low pressure alarms (APP-008-F7/F8)

Extinguished (NO)

RNO: Perform the following:

Att. I BOP 1) Isolate SW to the Turbine Building:

. Close V6-1 6C, SW turbine building isolation OR

. Close V6-16A and V6-16B, SW turbine building supply

2) WHEN this Attachment is complete, THEN perform Supplement M, Component Alignment for Loss of SW to Turbine Buildinci, as time iermits.

Att. I BOP Check Both EDGs Runninçj (YES)

Check ECCS Flow:

a. RCS pressure less than 1650 psig (NO, depending on

scenario timeline, go to step 10)

Att BOP

b. SI pumps Flow Indicated (YES, if RCS pressure below shutoff head of SI pumps) c.__RCS_pressure__less_than_350_psig._(NO,_go_to_step_10)

Att. I BOP Check CV Recirculation Fans All Run nina (YES)

Check IVSW Actuated (YES)

-

Att. I BOP

  • PCV-I 922A Open (YES)
  • __PCV-1922B Open_(YES)

Check CV ventilation isolation (YES)

Att BOP

. a. CV ventilation isolation valves CLOSED (YES)

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event# 5-11 Page 18 of 18 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Check control room ventilation aligned for pressurization mode (YES)

-

. HVA-IA or HVA-1 B Running (YES)

e HVE-16 Stopped (YES)

Att. I BOP

  • HVE-1 9A or HVE-1 9B Running (YES)

. Control Room HVAC outside air damper A or B Open (YES)

  • CR-D1A-SA Closed (YES)
  • CR-D1 B-SB Closed (YES)

Att. I BOP Check DS Bus Enerqized (YES)

Check Battery Chargers Energized (YES)

Att. 1 BOP APP-036-D1 Extinguished (YES)

APP-036-D2 Extinquished (YES)

Att. 1 BOP Stop R-11/12 Sample Pump Att. I BOP Locally Reset and Load lACs as necessary (N/A)

Perform Crew Update to include the following:

  • Attachment Completion
  • Manual Actions Taken (Closed FRV bypass valves)

Att 1 BOP

  • Failed Equipment status (None)
  • SW status (Isolated SW to the Turbine Building and will be performing Supplement M)

PnrI nf IOP-I-fl Attr.hmcnt I Beginning of Supplement NI Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 19 of 19 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior

1. Shutdown secondary as follows:
a. Check SIGs Any ruptured (YES)
b. Adjust ruptured Steam Line PORV setpoint to 1060 psig using Status Board
c. Close all MSIVS and MSIV Bypass Valves
d. Break vacuum to the Condenser as follows:
1) Depress and hold the THINK Pushbutton
2) Open Vacuum Breaker Valves: MS-70A I B Supp. M BOP 3) WHEN the valves are open, THEN release the THINK pushbutton.
e. Verify the following equipment stopped:

. FWPMPA/B

. CONDPUMPA/B

. Heater Drain Pump A I B

. GOV Fluid Pump A I B (Pull to Lock)

. Vacuum Pump Al B

2. Return to procedure and steD in effect.

End of Supplement M Continuation of EOP-E-O Check AFW Pumps Running RO a. MDAFW Pumps Both running (YES)

b. SIG Levels Two S/Gs less than 16% (NO continue w/ step 7)

Check AFW Valves Proper Emergency Alignment (YES)

. AFW header discharge valves Full Open (NO, verifies valves

Critical will manually open)

RO Task . AFW header section valves Full Open (YES)

. Steam driven AFW pump discharge valves Full open if pump

is running. (YES)

CRITICAL TASK - ESTABLISH AUXILIARY FEEDWATER EXAMINERS NOTE: Depending on SIG Levels, then candidate decide not to open the AFW Header Discharge Valves until needed during the RCS cooldown in EOP-E-3.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 20 of 20 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Check Total AFW Flow:

. Reset SI RO . Control feed flow to maintain NON-faulted S/Gs narrow range level Between 18% and 50%.

. Check total AFW flow- Greater than 300 gpm (YES)

Continuous Action Step Check CV Spray NOT Required:

RO

a. CV pressure Has remained less than 10 psig. (YES)
b. CV Spray NOT ACTUATED (YES)

Check RCP Seal Cooling:

. CCW flow to RCP thermal barriers Normal (NO)

o APP-001-C1 I Dl Extinguished (NO)

OR RO

. Seal injection flow Normal (YES)

o Seal injection flow Greater than 6 gpm per RCP

OR o Thermal barrier ziPs Greater than 5 inches water.

BOOTH 01 ERATOR: s requested, adjust CVC-297A,B,C as necessary to control RCP seal injection flow using the P&lD function.

Continuous Action Step Check RCS Temperature With any RCPs running, RCS cold leg temperatures Stable at or

trending to 547°F (YES)

RNO: IF temperature is less then 547°F AND lowering then perform the following:

  • a. Stop dumping steam
b. IF cooldown continues, THEN reduce total feed flow to RO minimum for decay heat removal:

o Maintain total feed flow greater than 300 gpm until narrow range level is greater than 18% in at least one SIG.

c. IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves.

RNO: IF temperature is greater than 547°F and rising, THEN perform thefollowing:

.__Dump_steam_using_SIG_steam_line_PORVs Appendix D NUREG-l 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 21 of 21 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time I Position I Aøplicants Actions or Behavior Check PZR PORVs and Spray Valves:

a. PORVs Closed (YES)

RO

b. Normal PZR spray valves Closed (YES)
c. Aux spray valve Closed (YES)

Check If RCPs should be stopped:

a. RCPs Any Running (YES)
b. SI pumps At least one running and capable of delivering

RO flow (YES)

c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs Less than 30°F

(NO, go to step 14.)

Check if SIG Secondary Pressure Boundaries are Intact:

a. Check pressures in all S/Gs BOP o None lowering in an uncontrolled manner (YES) o None Completely depressurized (YES)

Check if S/G Tubes are Intact:

. Secondary radiation monitors Have Remained Normal (NO)

. R-15

. R-19s BOP

. R-31s

. SIG levels None Rising in an Uncontrolled Manner. (YES)

RNO: Reset SPDS and initiate monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. Go to EOP-E-3, S/G Tube Rupture, Step 1.

Beginning of EOP-E-3 NOTE

. FOLDOUT for EOP-E-3 is in effect.

  • Chemistry should be available for sampling during this SRO procedure.
  • Step 1 RCP trip criteria applies until an operator controlled RCS_cooldown_is_initiated.

Appendix D NUREG-1021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 22 of 22 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time fi Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Continuous Action Step Check If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

a. RCPs ANY RUNNING (YES)

-

b. SI pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF

-

RO DELIVERING FLOW (YES)

c. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN 30°F

-

[50°F] (NO)

RNO: Go to Step 2 Identify Ruptured SIG(s): (A S/G is ruptured)

. Unexpected rise in any S/G narrow range level OR

. High radiation from any SG steamline (R-31s)

OR BOP

. High radiation from any SG blowdown line (R-19s)

OR

. High radiation from any S/G sample:

o Contact Chemistry to sample all S/Gs for activity as necessary CAUTION

. If the steam driven AFW pump is the only available source of feed flow, steam supply to the steam driven AFW pump should SRO be maintained from at least one S/G.

. At least one S/G must be maintained available for RCS cooldown.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 23 of 23 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position I Arrnlicants Actions or Behavior Isolate Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):

a. Adjust ruptured S/G(s) steam line PORV controller setpoint to 1060 psig
b. Check ruptured S/G PORV (RV1-1) CLOSED (YES)
c. Close steam driven AFW pump steam shutoff valve for ruptured S/G: (V1-8A)
d. Locally close the following valve for ruptured S/G(s) while continuing with this procedure:

. MS-20, SG A BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO BOP AFW PUMP (pipe jungle above/right of V1-8B)

e. Check S/G blow down and blow down sample valves from ruptured S/G(s) Closed (YES)

. SG1 Blowdown

. FCV-1930A&B

. FCV-1933A&BSHUT

f. Check MSIV above and below seat drain valves for ruptured SIG CLOSED (YES)
g. Close ruptured S/G MSIV and MSIV bypass valve V1-3A and MS-353A.

BOOTH 01 ERATOR: Vhen requested, wait 3 minutes and then close MS-20 lAW SCN file.

CAUTION

. If any ruptured S/G is faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions unless SRO needed for RCS cooldown.

. If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

Continuous Action Step Check Ruptured S/G Level:

a. Narrow range level Greater than 8%. (YES)

Critical b. Reset SI BOP Task c. Stop feed flow to ruptured S/G:

. Close steam driven AFW pump discharge valve: V2-14A

. Close AFW header discharge valve: V2-16A

d. Perform Att. 4, Deenergizing AFW Valves For Ruptured S/Gs CRITICAL TASK - ISOLATE A STEAM GENERATOR Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 24 of 24 Event

Description:

A S/G Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time fi Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: When dispatched to perform Att. 4, wait 3 minutes and then open the breakers for AFW valves as specified in Att. 4 lAW the SCN file.

NOTE: A command to cause a loss of the Startup Transformer is built into the steDs to onen the AFW Valve breakers.

EXAMINERS NOTE: A loss of Startup Transformer will occur while the breakers are being opened for the AFW valves.

CAUTION Major steam flow paths from the ruptured SIG(s) should be isolated SRO before initiating RCS cooldown. This includes MSIVs and MSIV bypass valves, steam line PORV, and AFW pump steam shutoff valve.

BOP Check Ruptured SIG Pressure Greater than 370 psig. (YES)

CAUTION IF RCPs are not running, the following steps may cause a false CSF SRO 4, Integrity Status Tree, indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard the ruptured loop T-cold indication until after performina Step 28.

NOTE Main steamline isolation may occur if the high steam flow setpoint is SRO exceeded. The cooldown should be continued using the steam line PORV(s) if MSIV closure occurs.

Identifies the loss of Start-up Transformer. Takes actions per previous CREW notes to restart safequards equipment after a loss of off-site power.

Critical Verifies that the SI and RHR pumps are running. (Starting of RHR RO Task Pumps is not a Critical Task.)

Verifies that the MDAFW Pumps and SDAFW Pump are running.

Verifies all available SW Pumps and SWBP are running.

Critical BOP Verifies that both EDGs are running with appropriate voltage.

Task (Critical Task is to verify that at least 300 gpm AFW flow is available to support subseciuent cooldown.)

CRITICAL TASK RESTART ECCS EQUIPMENT AFTER LOSS OF OFF-SITER POWER Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-1 3 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Initiate RCS Cooldown:

a. Determine required core exit temperature:

Required Core Exit Ruptured SG Pressure (P810) Temperature ( F) 0 1150 and above 508 [488]

1100 to 1149 503 [483) 1050 to 1099 497 [477]

1000 to 1049 491 [471]

950 to 999 485 [465]

900 to 949 478 [458]

850 to 899 472 [452]

800 to 849 465 [445]

750 to 799 458 [438]

700 to 749 450 [430]

650 to 699 442 [422]

600 to 649 433 [413]

RO 550 to 599 424 [404]

500 to 549 415 [395]

450 to 499 404 [384]

400 to 449 393 [373]

370 to 399 385 [365]

b. Dump steam to condenser from intact SIG(s) at maximum rate:

maximum rate from intact

1) Check condenser AVAILABLE FROM INTACT SIG(s)

-

(NO)

RNO: Manually dump steam at maximum rate from intact SIG using steam line PORVs.

c. Core exit TCs Less Than Required Temperature (NO,

continue cooldown until less that required temperature.

Continue with step 7.)

d. Stop RCS cooldown
e. Maintain core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED

TEMPERATURE Continuous Action Step Check Intact SIG Levels RO a. Narrow range levels Greater than 8% (YES)

b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels BETWEEN 21% and 50%.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario # 4 Event # 5-11 Page 26 of 26 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time I Position Aoolicants Actions or Behavior CAUTION SRO If any PZR PORV opens because of high PZR pressure, Step 8.b should be repeated after pressure lowers to less than 2335 psig.

Continuous Action Step Check PZR PORVs And Block Valves:

RO a. Power to block valves AVAILABLE (YES)

b. PORVs CLOSED (YES)
c. Block valves AT LEAST ON OPEN (YES)

CAUTION SRO If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.

RO Reset SI RO Reset Containment Isolation Phase A EstabUsh Instrument Air To CV:

a. Check APP-002-F7 EXTINGUISHED (YES)

RO

b. Reset IA PCV-1716, instrument air isolation to CV c.__Check_IA_PCV-1716 OPEN_(YES)

CAUTION If RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 275 SRO psig [350 psig], the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.

Check If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

a. RCS pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [350 PSIG] (YES)

RO

-

b. Stop RHR pumps c.__Monitor_RCS_pressure Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 27 of 27 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior Establish Charging Flow:

a. Charging pumps- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING (YES)
b. Align charging pump suction to RWST
1) Open LCV-115B
2) Close LCV-1 1 5C
3) Place RCS makeup system switch to STOP
c. Establish charging flow:

. Start charging pump(s) as necessary to establish at least RO one running

. Adjust charging pump speed controllers as necessary to establish maximum charging flow for running pump(s)

. Adjust HIC-121, charging flow control valve, as necessary to establish desired charging flow:

o Maintain seal injection flow BETWEEN 6 GPM

-

AND 20 GPM PER RCP UNLESS SEAL INJECTION ISOLATED Check If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

a. Check core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED

-

TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 6 (YES, if NO then hold at this RO/BOP step until YES)

b. Stop RCS cooldown
c. Maintain core exit TCs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATU RE BOP Check Ruptured S/G Pressure Stable or Rising (YES)

Check RCS Subcooling Based on Core Exit TCs Greater than 55°F RO (YES)

Depressurize RCS to Minimize Break Flow and Refill the PZR:

RO

a. Normal PZR spray AVAILABLE (NO. ao to SteD 18)

CAUTION

. The PRT may rupture if a PZR PORV is used to depressurize SRO the RCS. This may result in abnormal containment conditions.

. Cycling of the PZR PORV should be minimized.

NOTE SRO The upper head region may void during RCS depressurization if RCPs are NOT running. This will result in a rapidly rising PZR level.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: ILC-13 NRC Scenario# 4 Event# 5-11 Page 28 of 28 Event

Description:

A SIG Tube Leak to Tube Rupture, Loss of SUT, V2-16s and V1-8s fail to Auto-Open, Feed Regulating Bypass Valves fail to close on Phase A.

Time I Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior Depressurize RCS using PZR PORV to minimize break flow and refill the PZR:

a. At least one PZR PORV Available (YES)
b. Open one PZR PORV until any of the following conditions are satisfied:

. Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G

PRESSURE RO

2) PZR level GREATER THAN 14%

OR

. PZR level GREATER THAN 73%

OR

. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs LESS THAN

35°F

c. Close PZR PORV when any condition in Step I 8.b satisfied (conditions listed above)

RO Check RCS Pressure Rising (YES)

CAUTION SRO SI must be terminated when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfillinq the ruptured SIG(s).

Check if SI Flow Should be Terminated:

a. RCS subcooling based on core exit TCs GREATER THAN 35°F (YES)
b. Secondary heat sink:

. Total feed flow to S/Gs AT LEAST 300 GPM

RO AVAILABLE (YES)

OR

. Narrow range level in at least one intact S/G GREATER

THAN 8% (YES)

c. RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING (YES)
d. PZR level GREATER THAN 14% (YES)

RO Stop Both SI Pumps.

The Chief Examiner may terminate the scenario at his discretion or anytime after the SI pumps have been secured lAW EOP-E-3.

Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1

ILC-13 NRC SCENARIO 4 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 1OE-8 amps c) Turbine Load: 0 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 513 ppm e) Rod Height: 95 CBD f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) RCS Level: 53.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description
3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) None
4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None
5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) None
6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) None
7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted
8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Continue with plant startup in accordance with GP-003 and raise reactor power to the POAH. Once at the POAH, stabilize power and hold until the on-coming crew that is performing Just-Tn-Time training for the Turbine startup relieves the shift.
9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) No additional information.
10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Power Trax Tnformation.
11. RISK a) GREEN Appendix D NUREG-1 021, Rev. 9, Supp. 1
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