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| The design basis of leak-tightness for the seismic gap seal between the Electrical Penetration Area and the Mechanical Penetration Area is to ensure that the Electrical Penetration Area (temperature | | The design basis of leak-tightness for the seismic gap seal between the Electrical Penetration Area and the Mechanical Penetration Area is to ensure that the Electrical Penetration Area (temperature |
| < 120°F) is not subject to the harsh environment of a MSLB 375°F). The effects of a postulated double-ended guillotine MSLB in the LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 4 of 7 Unit 1 ANALYSIS-OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area (causing steam to enter through the deficient seal) may potentially cause the three Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs) in the Electrical Penetration Areas to become inoperable. | | < 120°F) is not subject to the harsh environment of a MSLB 375°F). The effects of a postulated double-ended guillotine MSLB in the LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 4 of 7 Unit 1 ANALYSIS-OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area (causing steam to enter through the deficient seal) may potentially cause the three Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs) in the Electrical Penetration Areas to become inoperable. |
| The MCCs control various ventilation and cooling equipment including: | | The MCCs control various ventilation and cooling equipment including: |
| : 1) Room Coolers for the: a) No. 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room; b) No. 1 Safety Injection Pump Room; c) Nos. 11 and 12 Component Cooling Pump Room; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms; e) Nos. 11 and 12 Containment Spray Pump Room and Nos. 11, 12 and 13 Charging Pump Rooms 2) Fans for the: a) Filters 11 and 12 Switchgear Area Supply; b) Nos. 11, 12, and 13 SWGR Room Exhaust (64' and 84' elevations); | | : 1) Room Coolers for the: a) No. 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room; b) No. 1 Safety Injection Pump Room; c) Nos. 11 and 12 Component Cooling Pump Room; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms; e) Nos. 11 and 12 Containment Spray Pump Room and Nos. 11, 12 and 13 Charging Pump Rooms 2) Fans for the: a) Filters 11 and 12 Switchgear Area Supply; b) Nos. 11, 12, and 13 SWGR Room Exhaust (64' and 84' elevations); |
| c) Nos. 11 and 12 Electrical Penetration Exhaust; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Circulation Fans for the 84' El. Piping Corridor; e) No. 11 Control Area A/C System Emergency Supply; f) No. 12 Emergency A/C Supply; g) No. 13 Air Conditioning; h) No. 1 Battery Room Exhaust; i) Nos. 11 and 12 Reactor Shield Ventilation; and j) Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Support Ventilation | | c) Nos. 11 and 12 Electrical Penetration Exhaust; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Circulation Fans for the 84' El. Piping Corridor; e) No. 11 Control Area A/C System Emergency Supply; f) No. 12 Emergency A/C Supply; g) No. 13 Air Conditioning; h) No. 1 Battery Room Exhaust; i) Nos. 11 and 12 Reactor Shield Ventilation; and j) Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Support Ventilation |
| : 3) Chiller Condenser Water Recirculation Pump 4) Heat Tracing for lB and lC 230 Volt 1-phase An engineering review of the "loss" of the above equipment shows that the most critical equipment are the room coolers for the: Charging Pump -Two of the three affected charging pumps would be used for high head safety injection in the mitigation of a design base accident; they are 100% redundant of each other Safety Injection Pump -both pumps (100% redundant to each other) would be affected; they would be used to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing intermediate head safety injection RHR Pump -there are 2 pumps (100% redundant to each other) which are used to remove residual core heat during shutdown conditions and to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing low head safety injection The room coolers, in conjunction with the once through ventilation system, are designed to limit the ambient temperature at vital pumping equipment. | | : 3) Chiller Condenser Water Recirculation Pump 4) Heat Tracing for lB and lC 230 Volt 1-phase An engineering review of the "loss" of the above equipment shows that the most critical equipment are the room coolers for the: Charging Pump -Two of the three affected charging pumps would be used for high head safety injection in the mitigation of a design base accident; they are 100% redundant of each other Safety Injection Pump -both pumps (100% redundant to each other) would be affected; they would be used to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing intermediate head safety injection RHR Pump -there are 2 pumps (100% redundant to each other) which are used to remove residual core heat during shutdown conditions and to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing low head safety injection The room coolers, in conjunction with the once through ventilation system, are designed to limit the ambient temperature at vital pumping equipment. |
| This helps assure long-term and reliable operation of the vital equipment. | | This helps assure long-term and reliable operation of the vital equipment. |
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| The MCCs are qualified for 96 hours at 131°F and 90% relative humidity. | | The MCCs are qualified for 96 hours at 131°F and 90% relative humidity. |
| Detailed analysis of the effects of a MSLB on the MCC's is continuing. | | Detailed analysis of the effects of a MSLB on the MCC's is continuing. |
| Preliminary modeling for this analysis includes: | | Preliminary modeling for this analysis includes: |
| : 1) A pressurized Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area with steam temperature reaching 375°F when blowdown ends at 10 minutes; 2) Inlet ventilation flow to the Electrical Penetration Area as permitted by the pressure therein; and 3) modeling of the MCC units with venting and natural circulation, as applicable. | | : 1) A pressurized Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area with steam temperature reaching 375°F when blowdown ends at 10 minutes; 2) Inlet ventilation flow to the Electrical Penetration Area as permitted by the pressure therein; and 3) modeling of the MCC units with venting and natural circulation, as applicable. |
| The Salem Unit 2 seismic gap was inspected on February 19, 1991. A portion of the horizontal run was found not properly sealed (per design); however, anchored flashing was in place. This flashing would have acted as a steam flow barrier even though it would deform under a pressure of 5.8 psig. Engineering is evaluating if the flashing would have provided sufficient protection to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in the Mechanical Penetration Area. Seals common to both Appendix R and High Energy Line Break Accident (HEBA) barriers (734 seals) have been inspected as part of the PSRG program. Approximately 11% (74) of the inspected seals were discovered to have openings requiring repair. Out of this 74 seals, 24 have been determined to have no safety significance and an additional 14 have been determined to have negligible affect on the environmental parameters of the targeted areas. Analysis to assess the safety impact of the remaining 36 impaired seals in on going. All but three (3) Unit 2 penetration seals have been repaired. | | The Salem Unit 2 seismic gap was inspected on February 19, 1991. A portion of the horizontal run was found not properly sealed (per design); however, anchored flashing was in place. This flashing would have acted as a steam flow barrier even though it would deform under a pressure of 5.8 psig. Engineering is evaluating if the flashing would have provided sufficient protection to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in the Mechanical Penetration Area. Seals common to both Appendix R and High Energy Line Break Accident (HEBA) barriers (734 seals) have been inspected as part of the PSRG program. Approximately 11% (74) of the inspected seals were discovered to have openings requiring repair. Out of this 74 seals, 24 have been determined to have no safety significance and an additional 14 have been determined to have negligible affect on the environmental parameters of the targeted areas. Analysis to assess the safety impact of the remaining 36 impaired seals in on going. All but three (3) Unit 2 penetration seals have been repaired. |
Similar Documents at Salem |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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Text
- Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 **DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 91-009-00 March 15, 1991 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (A), (B), and (D). This report is required to be issued within thirty (30) days of event discovery.
MJP:pc Distribution The Energy People 9103210245 910315 PDR ADOCK 05000272 :;:=; PDF<:
yours, S.
- LaBruna General Manager -Salem Operations 1Jr1\ 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 NRC Form 388 19-83) *
- U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMll NO. Jl!i0-4104 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) EXPIRES: 8/31185 FACILITY NAME 111 Salem Generating Station -Unit l 'DOCKET NUMBER 12) I PAOE (:I) o 15 Io Io Io I 2 f 7 I 2j 1 loF 01 7 TITLE 14) High Energy Line Break Barrier Not Installed Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE IB) LER NUMBER IBI REPORT DATE (71 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED Ill) MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR tt tt MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISl Salem Unit 2 o t s I o I o I o 13 I 11 l o I 2 l I s 9 l 911 -o j 9 -ol o q 3 l Is 9 I 1 OPERATING MOOE Ill THll REPORT 11 IUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Ch<<:lr on* or moro of th* fo//owin11/
1111 ] 20.402(bl l'OWER I 20.40lll1111 l(I) LEVEL -1101 11 0 I 0 20.40lll1ll1HUI NAME M. J. Pollack -LER Coordinator 20.40ll(cl
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....__ ll0.73(1112111111 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) ll0.7311)(2)11*1 ll0.73(.ll:ilM ll0.73111121(¥11) ll0.7311l12llv111llAI ll0.7311H21Mlllllll ll0.7311l12llxl AREA CODE 73.71lbl 73.71(c) OTHER (Sp<<:lfy in Ab1tnct bolow *nd In T**t. NRC Form 366A} TELEPHONE NUMBER 6i O 1 9 3 1 3 1 9 1-I 2 1 O I 2t 2 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT I I I I I I I I TURER I I I I I I IUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) 11 YES (If yn, compl*to EXPECTED SVIJMISSION DA TEI r-xi NO ABSTRACT (l.lmlt IO 14()() ipacn, I.* .* opproxlmotoly fihHn lin11l**IPICO ty1>>wrltten
/inn/ 11111 SYSTEM COMPONENT I I I I I I I I MANUFAC* TUR ER I I I I I I EXPECTED MONTH DAY SUBMl$SION DATE.1151 I I I On 2/15/91, a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of an unsealed portion of the seismic gap between the Inboard Mechanical Area and the Electrical Penetration Are.a was completed.
Results show change in the core damage frequency to be significantly increased (i.e., due to concern for a Main Steamline break in the Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area). The vertical run of the seismic gap for the Unit 2 areas was found not sealed prior to discovery of the Unit 1 seal concern. The Unit 2 PRA was incorrect due to a personnel error. The root cause of the seals not being in place is personnel error. Apparently, the required seal was not installed during original plant construction (per structural design prints). The U-2 horizontal seismic gap was inspected on 2/19/91. It too was not properly sealed; however, anchored flashing was in place which would act as a steam flow barrier. The U-2 seismic gap was sealed on 2/22/91. The missing portion of the U-1 seismic gap seal will be installed prior to startup of U-1. An analysis is being completed which assesses the operability of the Electrical Penetration Area MCCs with the seismic gap not sealed. The remaining seismic gap area (both Units) has been inspected by the PSRG. To date, the safety significant penetrations with inadequate seals have been repaired with the exception of the Unit 1 seismic gap seal (which will be sealed during the current outage). The PRA assessment engineer was counseled on the need to maintain attention to detail. A random sampling of DEFs will be reviewed.
Administrative controls, to control Appendix R penetrations, will be extended to include HEBA penetration impairments.
NRC Fotm 3118 19-831 I ' LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:
Westinghouse
-Pressurized Water Reactor LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 2 of 7 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as (xx) IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Concern for effects of a High Energy Line Break due to a breached barrier between mechanical and electrical penetration areas Event Date: 12/20/90 Discovery Date: 2/15/91 Report Date: 3/15/91 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.91-101. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
December 20, 1990: Mode 1 Reactor Power 100% February 8, 1990: Mode 1 -Unit shutdown in progress in support of ninth refueling outage preparation DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
On December 20, 1990, during normal power operation, a Penetration Seal Review Group (PSRG) walkdown identified an unsealed portion of the seismic gap between the Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area and the Electrical Penetration Area. This gap is an annular sector 6" wide by 5.5' high around the outside of the Containment at 120' elevation.
The seismic gap seal would prevent the steam environment of a Main Steamline Break (MSLB) in the Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area from entering the mild environment of the Electrical Penetration Area. The PSRG program is tasked to only review areas associated with lOCFRSO Appendix R concerns (i.e., fire barrier integrity).
Even though this finding was outside the scope of the project, they pursued a resolution.
A work order was initiated to seal the subject area in accordance with the work control process procedure (NC.NA-AP.ZZ-0009(Q)).
Previous to this specific finding, a similar condition was identified in May 1990 for Unit 2. The same areas were affected.
A vertical run along the seismic gap was not sealed per design. An analysis completed in November 1990 indicated that there was no equipment in the "Air Handling Area" (another name for the Electrical Penetration Area) whose failure would result in increased core damage risk (reference Discrepancy Evaluation Form DES-90-01573).
This analysis proved to be incorrect because it was not recognized (by the engineer performing the assessment) that the "Air Handling Area" was another name for the "Electrical Penetration Area" (100' Elevation).
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 3 of 7 Although there was minimal safety significance identified, the Unit 2 seismic gap section was sealed in November 1990. On February 8, 1991, recognizing that a portion of the Unit,l seismic gap had not been sealed, a request to evaluate the safety significance, including a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) analysis, was initiated (reference Deficiency Evaluation Form, DES-91-00066).
On February 15, 1991, the PRA assessment was completed.
Results of the PRA show that change in the core damage frequency is calculated to be 2.76E-5/Yr.
The core damage frequency normally attributed to Salem Unit 1 is 5.8E-5/Yr.
Due to the potential for the identified condition to challenge the operability of safety related equipment, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was notified on February 15, 1991 at 1743 hours0.0202 days <br />0.484 hours <br />0.00288 weeks <br />6.632115e-4 months <br /> as required by Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.72(b) (2) (iii). APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:
The root cause of not having the seismic gap seal(s) (both Units) installed is attributed to personnel error. Apparently, the required seal(s) were not installed, during original plant construction (per structural design prints). This could not be conclusively determined whether the subject section of the seismic gap seal was removed or was never installed; however, it is considered unlikely that the missing portion of the seal would have been removed. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
The Updated Final Safety Evaluation Report (UFSAR) Section 3.6.5.10 discusses leak tight areas of the contiguous zone; however, it does not detail specific requirements for the Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area. Engineering Field Directive No. S-C-VAR-MFD-0508-1 (issued in 1988) addresses this area and other areas of similar concern. The Field Directive was originally issued in response to LER 272/87-017-02 which identified a concern pertaining to leakage paths in the Steam Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump enclosures (for both Unit 1 and Unit 2). Another LER 272/87-017-02 corrective action required a walkdown of other protective pipe rupture enclosures.
This was completed; however, the seismic gap penetration areas were not clearly identified as part of the scope of this inspection.
Subsequently, they were not visually inspected as were the other penetrations.
The design basis of leak-tightness for the seismic gap seal between the Electrical Penetration Area and the Mechanical Penetration Area is to ensure that the Electrical Penetration Area (temperature
< 120°F) is not subject to the harsh environment of a MSLB 375°F). The effects of a postulated double-ended guillotine MSLB in the LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 4 of 7 Unit 1 ANALYSIS-OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area (causing steam to enter through the deficient seal) may potentially cause the three Vital Motor Control Centers (MCCs) in the Electrical Penetration Areas to become inoperable.
The MCCs control various ventilation and cooling equipment including:
- 1) Room Coolers for the: a) No. 1 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room; b) No. 1 Safety Injection Pump Room; c) Nos. 11 and 12 Component Cooling Pump Room; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump Rooms; e) Nos. 11 and 12 Containment Spray Pump Room and Nos. 11, 12 and 13 Charging Pump Rooms 2) Fans for the: a) Filters 11 and 12 Switchgear Area Supply; b) Nos. 11, 12, and 13 SWGR Room Exhaust (64' and 84' elevations);
c) Nos. 11 and 12 Electrical Penetration Exhaust; d) Nos. 11 and 12 Circulation Fans for the 84' El. Piping Corridor; e) No. 11 Control Area A/C System Emergency Supply; f) No. 12 Emergency A/C Supply; g) No. 13 Air Conditioning; h) No. 1 Battery Room Exhaust; i) Nos. 11 and 12 Reactor Shield Ventilation; and j) Nos. 11, 12, 13 and 14 Reactor Vessel Nozzle Support Ventilation
- 3) Chiller Condenser Water Recirculation Pump 4) Heat Tracing for lB and lC 230 Volt 1-phase An engineering review of the "loss" of the above equipment shows that the most critical equipment are the room coolers for the: Charging Pump -Two of the three affected charging pumps would be used for high head safety injection in the mitigation of a design base accident; they are 100% redundant of each other Safety Injection Pump -both pumps (100% redundant to each other) would be affected; they would be used to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing intermediate head safety injection RHR Pump -there are 2 pumps (100% redundant to each other) which are used to remove residual core heat during shutdown conditions and to mitigate the consequences of a design base accident by providing low head safety injection The room coolers, in conjunction with the once through ventilation system, are designed to limit the ambient temperature at vital pumping equipment.
This helps assure long-term and reliable operation of the vital equipment.
Based upon PSE&G Engineering Evaluation S-C-ABV-NEE-0504E, "Engineering Evaluation on the Effect An Inoperable Room Cooler Has on the Operability of Vital Pumps", operability of the vital pumps is affected by the availability of
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 5 of 7 associated Room Coolers. Therefore, with a Room Cooler inoperable the vital pumps in that room are considered inoperable.
The MCCs are qualified for 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> at 131°F and 90% relative humidity.
Detailed analysis of the effects of a MSLB on the MCC's is continuing.
Preliminary modeling for this analysis includes:
- 1) A pressurized Inboard Mechanical Penetration Area with steam temperature reaching 375°F when blowdown ends at 10 minutes; 2) Inlet ventilation flow to the Electrical Penetration Area as permitted by the pressure therein; and 3) modeling of the MCC units with venting and natural circulation, as applicable.
The Salem Unit 2 seismic gap was inspected on February 19, 1991. A portion of the horizontal run was found not properly sealed (per design); however, anchored flashing was in place. This flashing would have acted as a steam flow barrier even though it would deform under a pressure of 5.8 psig. Engineering is evaluating if the flashing would have provided sufficient protection to mitigate the consequences of a MSLB in the Mechanical Penetration Area. Seals common to both Appendix R and High Energy Line Break Accident (HEBA) barriers (734 seals) have been inspected as part of the PSRG program. Approximately 11% (74) of the inspected seals were discovered to have openings requiring repair. Out of this 74 seals, 24 have been determined to have no safety significance and an additional 14 have been determined to have negligible affect on the environmental parameters of the targeted areas. Analysis to assess the safety impact of the remaining 36 impaired seals in on going. All but three (3) Unit 2 penetration seals have been repaired.
These three (3) seals have been analysed as having no significant safety impact. Approximately 700 seals are part of barriers considered in pipe break analysis events which are not considered to be 10CFR50 Appendix R fire barriers.
These seals have not been as part of the PSRG program. As identified previously, LER 272/87-017-02 required completion of a visual inspection of HEBA areas required to be maintained airtight.
This inspection did not include review of the seismic gap locations (both Units) due to an Engineering oversight.
However, as addressed by the inspection, the design basis break in the Mechanical Penetration Areas, at 78' and 100' elevations and the Pipe Alley, is in a 6" main steam line to the Auxiliary Feedwater Turbine Pump. PRA analysis indicates no near term safety significance associated with this postulated break. The visual walkdown found no Unit 1 unsealed penetrations.
Two (2) unsealed areas in the Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room were identified (i.e., no others were identified).
The design break is in a 2" eves line and the break locations are sleeved and restrained.
PRA analysis indicates this postulated break
.. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 91-009-00 is not of near term safety significance based on as found PAGE 6 of 7 conditions.
Section 3.6.5.10 of the UFSAR indicates that all steam generated by this break can be carried away by the normal ventilation exhaust system. Based on the above discussion,.
it is judged that a postulated HELB will have no significant affect on equipment operability in the target areas. Due to the lack of a seismic gap seal, between the Mechanical Penetration Area and the Electrical Penetration Area, this event is reportable to the NRC in accordance with Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50. 73 (a) (2) (v) (A), (B) and (D). CORRECTIVE ACTION: The Unit 2 seismic gap (with flashing) was sealed (in accordance with the field directive and design prints) on February 22, 1991. The missing portion of the Unit 1 seismic gap seal will be installed upon completion of the current refueling outage, prior to startup of Salem Unit 1. An engineering analysis is being completed which assesses the operability of the Electrical Penetration Area MCCs with the seismic gap not sealed. Of the 74 seals, identified as deficient during the PSRG inspections, 59 seals have been repaired as of November 1990. An additional 12 non safety significant seals (associated with Unit 1) have been repaired during the current Unit 1 refueling outage. The remaining 3 non safety significant Unit 2 seals will be repaired during the next Unit 2 outage of sufficient duration (i.e., due to ALARA concerns).
The unsealed portion of the Unit 1 seismic gap will be repaired during the current refueling outage (prior to restart).
Analysis of the impact on equipment operability of the 36 penetration impaired seals (of the original 74 identified) is on going. The scope of the PSRG project has been increased to now include inspection and analysis of HEBA barrier penetrations not associated with Appendix R. Visual inspections for Unit 1 penetrations will be completed during the current outage. The accessible Unit 2 penetration inspections will be initiated upon completion of Unit 1 inspections.
Those penetrations, not accessible during operation, will be inspected during the next Unit 2 outage of sufficient duration.
This event has been reviewed by Engineering management.
The PRA assessment engineer was counseled.
The need to maintain attention to detail and to challenge assumptions used in performing calculations was stressed.
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station Unit 1 CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd) DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 LER NUMBER 91-009-00 PAGE 7 of 7 A 10% random sampling of DEFs will be reviewed to ensure analysis results were assessed correctly.
Included in this sampling will be the DEFs associated with the HEBA barrier concerns first identified in May 1990. Results of the random sampling assessment will be used to determine additional corrective actions as appropriate.
Administrative controls, to control Appendix R penetrations, will be extended to include HEBA penetration impairments.
MJP:pc SORC Mtg.91-027 General Manager -Salem Operations