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l Copy Copyright 01987, by PLG-0525 l | |||
, GPU Nuclear Corporation Volume 3 l l | |||
1 Three Mile Island Unit 1 ! | |||
Probabilistic Risk Assessment PLANT MODEL REPORT Project Director B. John Garrick Project Manager Douglas C. Iden Principal Investigator Frank R. Hubbard Task Leaders Mardyros Kazarians Ali Mosleh Harold F. Perla Martin B. Sattison Donald J. Wakefield Prepared for GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION Parsippany, New Jersey November 1987 8806210073 DR 880212 p AncCN 05000239 I O Pickarc.,Lowe anc Garrick,Inc. | |||
Engineers e Applied Scientists e Management Consultants Newport Beach, CA Washington, DC | |||
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l NOTICE l | |||
This is a report of work conducted by individual (s) and contractors for use by GPU Nuclear Corporetion. Neither GPU Nuclear Corporation nor the authors of the report warrant that the report is complete or accurate. Nothing contained in the report establishes company policy or constitutes a commitment by GPU : | |||
Nuclear Corporation. l 1 | |||
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==SUMMARY== | |||
OF CONTENTS ~ | |||
O EXECUTIVE | |||
==SUMMARY== | |||
REPORT Volume 1 Acknowledgment Foreword TECHNICAL | |||
==SUMMARY== | |||
REPORT Volume 2 PLANT MODEL REPORT Volume 3 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 4 OATA ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 5 HUMAN ACTIONS ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND EXTERNAL HAZARDS REPORT Volume 7 O | |||
, O 0540G123186 | |||
..y, + sa S a as i. | |||
~ | |||
CONTENTS | |||
.G ' | |||
Section Page LIST OF TABLES .i LIST OF FIGURES ix LIST OF ACRONYMS xi 1 PLANT MODEL OVERVIEW ' l-1 2 DEFINITION OF INITIATING EVENTS 2-1 2.1 Master Logic Diagram 2-1 2.2 Initiating Event List 2-2 2.3 Initiating Events Caused by Internal and _ | |||
External Hazards 2-4 2.3.1 Loss of Reactor Coolant System | |||
: Inventory . | |||
2-4 2.3.2 Loss of Electric Power- 2-5 2.4 Grouping of Initiators 2-5 2.5 Initiating Event Group Frequer!cies 2-6 3 SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL 3-1 3.1 Support System Dependency Diagram 3-1 3.2 Support System Event Tree 3-10 3.3 Support System States 3-12 3.4 References 3-15 4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM MODEL 4.1-1 1 4.1 The Event Sequence Analysis Process 4.1-1 I 4.1.1 General Transient Event Sequence Diagram 4.1-2 4.1.1.1 Nominal Actions 4.1-2 4.1.1.2 Actions to Cool Down to Cold Shutdown 4.1-4 4.1.1.3 Scenarios Involving HPI Cooling 4.1-5 4.1.1.4 Scenarios Involving Reactor i Trip Failure 4.1-6 ! | |||
4.1.2 The Event Tree Development Process 4.1-7 1 4.1.3 Development of Boundary Condition Tables 4.1-10 4.1.4 Frontline System Success Criteria 4.1-11 4.1.4.1 Scenarios with Reactor Trip Failure 4.1-12 4 | |||
4.1.4.2 Scenarios with Relief Valve Opening 4.1-12 | |||
] 4.1.4.3 Excessive Cooldown Scenarios 4.1-12 1 4.1.4.4 Loss of RCS Inventory Scenarios 4.1-13 4 | |||
4.1.4.5 HPI Cooling Scenarios 4.1-13 4.2 Early Response or Main Trees 4.2-1 4.2.1 Large LOCA Main Tree 4.2.1-1 ; | |||
4.2.2 Medium LOCA Main Tree 4.2.2-1 ' | |||
O 4.2.3 Small LOCA Main Tree 4.2.3-1 iii 0594G102787PMR | |||
CONTENTS (continued) | |||
{g Section > | |||
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4.2.4 Very Small LOCA Main Tree 4.2.4-1 4.2.5 Inadvertent Opening of DHR Valves 4.2.5-1 4.2.6 Main Steam Line Break in Intermediate Building Main Tree 4.2.6-1 4.2.7 Steam Line Break in Turbine Building Main Tree 4.2.7-1 4.2.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Main Tree 4.2.8-1 4.2.9 Excessive Main Feedwater Flow Main Tree 4.2.9-1 4.2.10 Total Loss of Main Feedwater Main Tree 4.2.10-1 4.2.11 Reactor Trip Main Tree 4.2.11-1 4.2.12 Turbine Trip Main Tree 4.2.12-1 4.2.13 Loss of Instrument Air Main Tree 4.2.13-1 4.2.14 Le of Control Building Ventilation Main Tree 4.2.14-1 4.2.15 Loss of ATA Main Tree 4.2.15-1 4.2.16 Loss of DC Power Train A Main Tree 4.2.16-1 4.2.17 Loss of Offsite oower Main Tree 4.2.17-1 4.2.18 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Main Tree 4.2.18-1 4.2.19 Loss of River Water Main Tree 4.2.19-1 4.2.20 0.159 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.20-1 4.2.21 0.259 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.21-1 4.2.22 0.49 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.22-1 4.2.23 0.69 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.23-1 4.3 Late Response or Subtrees 4.3.1-1 4.3.1 Subtree A 4.3.1-1 4.3.2 Subtree B 4.3.2-1 4.3.3 Subtree C 4.3.3-1 4.3.4 Subtree LLA 4.3.4-1 4.3.5 Subtree MLA 4.3.5-1 4.3.6 Subtree MLB 4.3.6-1 4.3.7 Subtree MLC 4.3.7-1 4.3.8 Subtree CD1 4.3.8-1 4.3.9 Subtree RT4 4.3.9-1 4.3.10 Subtree RY2 4.3.10-1 4.3.11 Subtree TC1 4.3.11-1 4.3.12 Subtree TC2 4.3.12-1 4.3.13 Subtree TC3 4.3.13-1 4.3.14 Subtree TR1 4.3.14-1 4.3.15 Subtree TR2 4.3.15-1 4.3.16 Subtree RC2 4.3.16-1 4.3.17 Subtree RWA 4.3.17-1 4.3.18 Subtree RWB 4.3.18-1 4.3.19 Subtree RWC 4.3.13-1 4.3.20 Subtree CB 4.3.20-1 4.3.21 Subtree ANS 4.3.21-1 5 PLANT DAMAGE STATES 5-1 l iv 0594G102787PMR | |||
c CONTENTS (continued) | |||
Section Page 6 PLANT MODEL ASSEMBLY AND QUANTIFICATION 6-1 6.1 Point Estimate Quantification and Assembly 6-1 6.1.1 Matrix Results 6-2 6.1.2 Dominant Scenarios 6-2 6.1.3 Dominant Systems 6-3 6.2 Propagation of Uncertainties through Dominant Scenarios 6-3 6.3 Caveats 6-4 APPENDIX A: MAXIMA RESULTS A-1 A.1 MAXIMA for Internal Events and F04 A-2 , | |||
A.2 MAXIMA for Earthquakes A-80 , | |||
APPENDIX B: DOMINANT SCENARIO EQUATIONS B-1 B.* Equations Used for Propagating Core Damage Frequency Uncertainties B-2 , | |||
B.2 Plant Damage State Equations Used for Propagating Uncertainties - | |||
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LIST OF TABLES Table Page O | |||
2-1 TMI-1 Initiating Event List 2-7 2-2 Event Grouping for Scenario Development 2-13 2-3 TMI-1 Initiating Event List 2-16 3-1 Support Model Intersystem Dependencies 3-16 3-2 Split Fractions Used in Quantification of the Support Model Event Tree for General Transients 3-19 3-3 Effects of Support System Top Event Failures on Frontline Systems 3-21 3-4 Frontline System Impacts Combined Due to Symmetry 3-34 3-5 Impact Vectors Assigned to Each Support System State 3-35 3-6 Support Sp tem State Impacts on Frontline Systems 3-47 3-7 Point Estimate Frequencies of Support System States Versus Initiating Events 3-49 4.1-1 Event Tr 3 Top Events and Split Fractions 4.1-15 4.1-2 General Transient Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.1-30 4.1-3 General Transient Boundary Conditions 4.1-31 4.1-4 Split Fraction Translation Table 4.1-32 4.1-5 Split Fraction Translation Rules Firle 4.1-37 4.1-6 Safety Function Success Criteria 4.1-45 4.2-1 Event Tree Layout 4.2-2 4.2.1 1 Large LOCA Top Event Definitions 4.2.1-2 4.2.1-2 Large LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.1-3 4.2.2-1 Medium LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.2-2 4.2.2-2 Medium LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.2-3 4.2.3-1 Small Break LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.3-2 4.2.3-2 Small LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.3-3 4.2.4-1 Very Small LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.4-2 4.2.4-2 Very Small LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.4-3 4.2.6-1 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.6-4 4.2.6-2 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Boundary l Conditions 4.2.6-5 4.2.8-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Top Event Definitions I and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.8-3 4.2.8-2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Boundary Conditions 4.2.8-4 i 4.2.9-1 Excessive Main Feedwater Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.9-2 4.2.9-2 Excessive Feedwater Boundary Conditions 4.2.9-3 4.2.10-1 Loss of Feedwater Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.10-2 4.2.10-2 Loss of Feedwater Boundary Conditions 4.2.10-3 4.2.11-1 Reactor Trip Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.11-2 O | |||
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i LIST OF TABLES (continued)- | |||
Table Page 4.2.11-2 Reactor Trip Boundary Conditions 4.2.11-3 4.2.12-1 Turbine Trip Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.12-2 4.2.12-2 Turbine Trip Boundary Conditions 4.2.12-3 ! | |||
4.2.14-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Top Event Definitions 4.2.14-2 4.2.14-2 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Boundary Conditions 4.2.14-3 4.2.15-1 Components / Systems States Resulting from Loss of ATA 4.2.15-4 4.2.15-2 Loss of ATA Power Top Event Definitions and Conditional-Split Fractions 4.2.15-5 : | |||
4.2.15-3 Loss of ATA Power Boundary Conditions 4.2.15-6 ! | |||
4.2.17-1 TMI-1 Loss of Offsite Power Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.17-3 ; | |||
4.2.17-2 Loss of Offsite Power Boundary Conditions 4.2.17-4 4.2.18-1 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.18-2 4.2.18-2 Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water Boundary Conditions 4.2.18-3 ; | |||
4.2.19-1 Loss of River Water Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions - | |||
4.2.19-3 4.2.19-2 Loss of River Water Boundary Conditions 4.2.19-4 r 4.2.20-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.159 Earthquake 4.2.20-2 ! | |||
4.2.21-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.25g Earthquake 4.2.21-2 ; | |||
O 4.2.22-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.4g Earthquake 4.2.23-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.69 Earthquake 4.2.22-2 4.2.23-2 l | |||
4.3.1-1 Subtree A Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split i Fractions 4.3.1-2 ! | |||
4.3.1-2 Subtree A Boundary Conditions 4.3.1-3 4.3.2-1 Subtree B Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.2-2 i 4.3.2-2 Subtree B Boundary Conditions 4.3.2-3 ! | |||
4.3.3-1 Subtree C Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions j 4.3.3-2 < | |||
4.3.3-2 Subtree C Boundary Conditions 4.3.3-3 i 4.3.5-1 Medium LOCA Subtree A Top Event Definitions and l Conditional Split Fractions- 4.3.5-2 ; | |||
4.3.5-2 Subtree MLA Boundary Conditions 4.3.5-3 ; | |||
4.3.6-1 Medium LOCA Subtree B Top Event Definitions and l Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.6-2 ; | |||
4.3.6-2 Subtree MLB Boundary Conditions 4.3.6-3 l 4.3.7-1 Medium LOCA Subtree C Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.7-2 4.3.7-2 Subtree MLC Boundary Conditionc 4.3.7-3 : | |||
4.2.8-1 Subtree CD1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split 1 Fractions 4.3.8-2 l 4.2.8-2 Subtree CD1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.8-3 l 4.3.10-1 Subtree RV2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split 1 Fractions 4.3.10-2 ' | |||
4.3.10-2 Subtree RV2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.10-3 vii i | |||
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LIST OF TABLES (continued) | |||
Table Page O | |||
4.3.11-1 Subtree TC1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.11-2 4.3.11-2 Subtree TC1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.11-3 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.12-2 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.12-3 4.3.13-1 Subtree TC3 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.13-2 4.3.13-2 Subtree TC3 Boundary Conditions 4.3.13-3 4.3.14-1 Subtree TR1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.14-2 4.3.14-2 Subtree TR1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.14-3 4.3.15-1 Subtree TR2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.15-2 4.3.15-2 Subtree TR2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.15-3 4.3.16-1 Subtree RC2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.16-2 4.3.16-2 Subtree RC2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.16-3 4.3.20-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilatic>n Subtree Top Event Definitions 4.3.20-2 4.3.20-2 Loss Control Building Ventilation Subtree Boundary Conditions 4.3.20-3 4.3.21-1 Subtree ANS Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.21-2 4.3.21-2 Subtree ANS Boundary Conditions 4.3.21-3 5-1 TMI-1 PRA Plant Damage State Matrix 5-4 6-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions 6-6 6-2 Plant Matrix 6-14 6-3 Plant Damage State Frequencies 6-21 6-4 Contributions to Core Damage Frequency from Those Initiating Events for Which Event Trees Were Used 6-22 6-5 Summary for Plant Damage 6-23 6-6 Support System Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-48 6-7 Frontline, Early Response Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-49 6-8 Frontline, Late Response Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-50 6-9 Distributions Propagated through Core Damage Frequency Equations 6-51 O | |||
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LIST OF FIGURES O -; | |||
t Figure Page 1-1 Structure of PRA Model 1-4 1-2 Three-Tree Structure 1-5 2-1 Master Logic Diagram 2-18 , | |||
3-1 TMI-1 Plant Mechanical Intersystem Dependencies 3-50 i 3-2 TMI-1 Electrical Intersystem Dependencies 3-51 e 3-3 TMI-l' Plant Mechanical Intersystem Dependencies Grouped into Top Events 3-52 j 3-4 Electrical Intersystem Dependencies Grouped into Top Events 3-53 3-5 TMI-1 PRA Support System Reduced Event Tree 3-54 i 4.1-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Generalized Transient 4.1-48 4.1-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Generalized Transient 4.1-49 : | |||
4.1-3 General Transient Event Tree 4 1-64 - | |||
4.2.1-1 Large LOCA Event Tree 4.2.1-4 4.2.2-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Medium LOCA 4.2.2-4 ( | |||
4.2.2-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Medium LOCA 4.2.2-5 ; | |||
4.2.2-3 Medium LOCA Event Tree 4.2.2-11 4.2.3-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Small LOCA , 4.2.3-4 l 4.2.3-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Small LOCA 4.2.3-5 L 4.2.3-3 Small Break LOCA Event Tree 4.2.3-14 ! | |||
4.2.4-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Very Small LOCA 4.2.4 4 . | |||
/ 4.2.4-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Very Small LOCA 4.2.4-5 l C 4.2.4-3 Very Small LOCA Event Tree 4.2.4-18 . | |||
4.2.6-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Main Steam Line Break in L Intermediate Building 4.2.6-6 [ | |||
4.2.6-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Line Break 4.2.6-7 , | |||
4.2.6-3 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Event Tree 4.2.6 4.2.7-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Steam Line Break in Turbine ! | |||
Building 4.2.7-2 - | |||
4.2.7-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Line Break in the Turbine Building 4.2.7-3 , | |||
4.2.8-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2.8-5 ! | |||
4.2.8-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2.8-6 > | |||
4.2.8-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Tree 4.2.8-20 : | |||
4.2.9-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Excessive Main Feedwater Flow 4.2.9-4 . | |||
4.2.9-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Excessive Feedwater Flow 4.2.9-5 l 4.2.9-3 Excessive Main Feedwater Event Tree 4.2.9-19 ! | |||
4.2;10-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Total Loss of Main Feedwater 4.2.10-4 ! | |||
4.2.10-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Total Loss of Main Feedwater 4.2.10-5 4.2.10-3 Loss of Main Feedwater Event Tree 4.2.10-18 l 4.2.11-1 Reactor Trip Event Tree 4.2.11-4 i 4.2.12-1 Turbine Trip Event Tree 4.2.12-4 , | |||
4.2.14-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Event Tree 4.2.14-4 ! | |||
4.2.15.1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of ATA 4.2.15-7 l 4.2.15-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Loss of ATA 4.2.15-8 ( | |||
4.2.15-3 Loss of ATA Power Event Tree 4.2.15-22 O 4.2.17-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water 4.2.17-5 ; | |||
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LIST OF FIGURES ll Figurc Page 4.2.17-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Loss of Offsite Power 4.2.17-6 4.2.17-3 Loss of Offsite Power Event Tree 4.2.17-21 4.2.18-1 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Event Tree 4.2.J8-4 4.2.19-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of River Water 4.2.19-5 4.2.19-2 Event Sequence Diagram for loss of River Water 4.2.19-6 4.2.19-3 Loss of River Water Event Tree 4.2.19-21 4.3.1-1 Subtree A Event Tree 4.3.1-4 4.3.2-1 Subtree B Event Tree 4.3.2-4 4.3.3-1 Subtree C Event Tree 4.3.3-4 4.3.5-1 Medium LOCA Subtree A Event Tree 4.3.5-4 4.3.6-1 Medium LOCA Subtree B Event Tree 4.3.6-4 4.3.7-1 Medium LOCA Subtree C Event Tree 4.3.7-4 4.3.8-1 Subtree CD1 Event Tree 4.3.8-4 4.3.10-1 Subtree RV2 Event Tree 4.3.10-4 4.3.11-1 Subtree TC1 Event Tree 4.3.11-4 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Event Tree 4.3.12-4 4.3.13-1 Subtree TC3 Event Tree 4.3.13-4 4.3.14-1 Subtree TR1 Event Tree 4.3.14-4 4.3.15-1 Subtree TR2 Event Tree 4.3.15-4 4.3.16-1 Subtree RC2 Event Tree 4.3.16-4 4.3.20-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Subtree Event Tree 4.3.20-4 4.3.21-1 Subtree ANS Event Tree 4.3.21-4 6-1 Probability of Plant Damage State Frequency 6-59 l | |||
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t g- LIST OF ACRONYMS | |||
.U | |||
] | |||
Abbreviation Definition l ADY atmospheric dump valve ! | |||
ATWS. anticipated transient without scram- : | |||
BWST borated water storage tank CFT core flood tank , | |||
CR0 control rod drive - ' | |||
CRDS control rod drive system l CSP containment spray pump , | |||
DHR decay heat removal ! | |||
ECCS emergency core cooling system : | |||
CFW emergency feedwater l EHC electrohydraulic control ; | |||
ESAS engineered safeguards actuation system ! | |||
i ESD event sequence diagram i j ESF engineered safety feature i j ESV engineered safety valve i 1 | |||
i FPR fission product removal FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GPUN GPU Nuclear Corporation f HPI high pressure injection | |||
! HPIP high pressure injection pump ' | |||
: HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning i | |||
\ | |||
ICCW intermediate closed cooling system t LPI low pressure injection i LPIP low pressure injection pump ! | |||
LORW loss of river water LOSP loss of offsite power l j MFLIV main feedwater line isolation valve j MCC motor control center 3 MFW main feedwater MFWP main feedwater pump MLD master logic diagram MSIV main steam isolation valve NSLB main steam line break MSSV main steam safety valve NSCC nuclear services closed cooling 0TSG once-through steam generator l xi : | |||
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LIST OF ACRONYMS (continued) | |||
Abbreviation Definition PDS plant damage state PLG Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. | |||
PORY power-operated relief valve PRA probabilistic risk assessment PSV pressurizer safety valve PTS pressurized thermal shock R8HVAC reactor building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning RCP reactor coolant pump RCS reactor coolant system RPS reactor protection system SLB steam line break SLRDS steam line rupture detection system SSCC secondary system containment cooling SSCCW secondary system containment cooling water SSS support system state TBY turbine bypass valve TCV turbine control valve TSV turbine safety valve O | |||
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: 1. Pl. ANT MODEL OVERVIEW This section develops the plant model described in Section 3 of the Technical Summary Report and presupposes that the reader is familiar with Section 4 of the Technical Summary. The plant model defines scenarios that translate initiating events into plant damage states. To develop scenarios from an initiating event, the expected plant response must be carefully delineated. Scenarios other than the expected ones can then be postulated as a result of the initiator and failure of one (or perhaps ! | |||
more) of the normally responding systems. Only after all the PRA team members have agreed to the expected plant performance can a realistic plant model be developed. Event sequence analysis and the support system dependency matrix were used to document this agreement. Detailed technical review of these results was vital in making the plant model realistic. | |||
In response to any of the scenario initiators considered, all the safety functions indicated in Table 3-1 of the Technical Sumary must be accomplished. TMI-1 is designed so that there are two or more ways to accomplish each safety function; that is, there is more than one possible success path per scenario initiator. | |||
The plant model, which was described in the PRA Methodology Overview section as being one of three parts of the PRA model, was itself subdivided into three parts as shown in Figure 1-1. Splitting the plant A model portion of each scenario was a calculational convenience. The V three-plant model parts were split to quantify the scenario frecuencies for the same reason a risk model would be split. | |||
The frontline systems were considered in a combination of one main tree and one or more subtrees. In addition, the support systems are treated in another, separate event tree described in Section 3. The main trees and subtrees for each initiator are discussed in Section 4 How the plant model end states, the plant damage states described in Section 3 of the Technical Summary, were chosen is described in Section 5. Section 6 assembles the three parts of the plant model and produces the frequency of the most important plant model scenarios. | |||
The process used for splitting the plant model is illustrated in Figure 1-2. Only 3 of the 16 support system Top Events OP, GB, and HB are shown in the first event tree. The outcome of each branch of the support system tree was designated as a support system state; e.g., SSS-1 and SSS-4 in the figure. | |||
The support system model is conditional on the initiating event. (Two initiating events are discussed in this illustration.) llhen evaluated for the first initiator shown, turbine trip, Top Event OP (offsite power) is possible, and its success leads to SSS-1 and SSS-4 as shown. For the second initiating event, loss of offsite power, Top Event OP is impossible because there is no offsite power. The dotted lines in the O | |||
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support tree IM* show that for the loss of offsite power initiating event, the first two branches cannot be reached. Failure of Top Event OP has changed the boundary conditions for decay heat closed / river water train B, Top Event HB, as indicated by the split fraction HB-2 instead of the HB-1 appearing in the scenarios above. GB-1, HB-2, etc. , indicate the split fractions; they denote values for each down branch (failure) likelihood used at each point in the tree to quantify the scenario frequency under different boundary conditions. This should be interpreted to mean that in the case of offsite power, the likelihood of failure of HB is HB-2, and not HB-1. Thus, the support system scenarios going to SSS-4 now have tha frequency. | |||
(freQtosp) - [1-(GB-li) - (HB-2) | |||
Next, the main (early response, frontline) tree for each initiating event is evaluated for each SSS. The turbine trip main tree in Figure 1-2 is shown evaluated for the supoort system states SSS-1 and SSS-4. For SSS-1, all support systems are available; therefore, all scenarios in the main tree are possible and tne Top Events MF , EF , and HP can be unavailable only due to failures within themselves. On the other hand, for 555-4 the decay heat river and closed cooling water system, train B HB is unavailable, making high pressure injection cooling ("bleed and feed") unavailable even without failures in HP itself since high pressure injection is unavailable as a result of being in SSS-4 The high pressure injection pumps need motor coolers; without them, the pumps will stop working after a few minutes and the system will become unavailable. | |||
The arrows indicate the fate of each main tree scenario. The first two scenarios for SSS-1 recuire no further analysis; i.e., they go to PDS S. | |||
The third scenario goes to subtree A and the fourth one to subtree B. In the third scenario, emergency feedwater has failed, but HPI cooling is working. Reactor coolant system heat removal is under control through the power-operated relief valve or pressurizer safety valves with RCS inventory control being maintained by the HPI purps. If "HPI cooling" is to be maintained for more than 12 to 13 hours, however, a recirculation water source will have to be provided for long-term RCS inventory control. The long-term inventory control and possible subsequent top events appear in subtree A. | |||
Subtree A first asks if "piggyback" recirculation alignment HL is successful. If it is (first scenario in subtree A), containment sprays are not necessary and only the sump valves SR need to operate for the scenario's outcome to be :uccessful (PDS S). If the sump valves do not open, core damage results and the scenario is sent to the centainment event tree for plant damage state 48 (high pressure >: ore melt with water in the surp and fan coolers operating, but sprays have failed). | |||
*IM, NN, etc., are in figure for clarity, but will not appear in the event trees in Section 4 0578G101337PMR | |||
-l O A complete plant model ' scenario as discussed above and.shown highlighted on Figure 1-2 consists of - | |||
One scenario to PDS 48 = | |||
TT Initiating Event OP HB From Support System Model TF- ET- HP From Main Tree-HL 3R From Subtree Note: Bars above top event names indicate failure; no bars indicate success. | |||
The frequency of this scenario can be calculated from (freqTT) . [1 (op.1)) . [1-(HB-1)] - (MF-1) | |||
- (EF-1) - [1-(HP-1)] - [1-(HL-1)] - (SR-1). | |||
where the (HL-1) terms are split fraction values. | |||
In general, subtrees must be evaluated conditional on the support system state, the initiating event, and the scenario that calls them. In , | |||
practice, all possible main tree scenarios did not require unique O | |||
subtrees. | |||
O 1-3 0578G1013S7PMR | |||
V COtJTAltJMEtJT | |||
^ HAD ACTIVE ItJITIATirJG PLAtJT E | |||
MATERIAL PierJT (ACTIVE _ , DAr. G RELEASE , DY EA EVEtJTS SYSTEMS) MODEL DAMAGE CATEGOnlES DISPERSIOtl AND PnOGRESSIOtJ ^ "' ^ EFFECT TYPE STAT ES t.tODEL MODEL (flot presently part of TPRA model) | |||
{ | |||
W FAQa tTLitJE FAOtJTLitJE SYST D.I - | |||
UP ORT YST EMS - | |||
fy5, St>PPORT g SUOTAFE , COf TA PJ (Erli SYS T E u nESPOtJSE TRLGUEtJCIES ' S AF ETY MODEL FEAmnES STAT ES MODEL RESPOtJSE | |||
,MODEL j FIGURE 1-1. STRUCTURE OF PRA MODEL e 9 9 | |||
f) f'~% f'% | |||
% b) | |||
INITB ATING FRONTt.lNE SYSTEMS: | |||
EVENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS: . SHORT TERM AND INKCTION LONG TEHM AND RECIRCULATION BE OP GB HB M F-- EF- HP HL CS SR PDS I,$P'"'"' ''3 j 118-1 3mSSS i MF-1 M 2 h E $$a"TR$"*"'" | |||
S | |||
; TT- uAiN TREE rOR SSS-1 EF- 8'"E g .- -w m -- | |||
,.,.....y g L .~ - | |||
: u. ,3g_t (EGENo: IIP-1 l 7, 4 OP = OFFSITE POWER G8 - | |||
01ESEL GENER ATOR THAfN 8 A -SU8 TREE FOR $$f_ } | |||
Hs - | |||
3 4A DECAY HE AT CLOSED /HIVEH WATER TRAIN 8 MF = | |||
TOO LITTL E MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW CS-1 SR-2 EF = | |||
TOO LITTLE EMEPGENCY FIEDWATER FLOW A HP = 48 HIGH PH E SSLI*1E f ri)ECT aON HL = | |||
HIGH Pf 4 ESSURE Rf C8HCULATION CS - | |||
CON T AINMENT SPRAY n g 4g SR = | |||
SUMP RECIHCUL AT80N | |||
~ PDS = | |||
PL ANT DAMAGE STAT E | |||
. -, 2 - | |||
1 3A Pm = | |||
NoT NECESSAHY u, ,u . ,MPOSS e p t E I SR-1 IN = | |||
INCONSE QUE N TI A L 2 38 SSS = SUPPOni Sv5TEu STATE B - SUBTHEE FOR suPoSSistE SCENARIO SSS-1 as | |||
-] 3 g SS4 - | |||
M 1h NO CORE DAMAGE rr- ualN TREE FOR SSS-4 | |||
; F,1 ]W NO CORE DAMAGE LOSS Or OF FSITE POWER @ -h - - ~~ l SSS-I ,g _ _ _y{- 22:D CAfrT GET TO A1 | |||
- -2 SSS-4 T10 C 3 SSS-6 r | |||
---1.0g1. 0 , | |||
-3 34 GB-1 ne2 - " | |||
4 SSS-4 B -SUITREETOR | |||
'bbb-4 3 5 SSS-7 8 3 as L 2 L 3 L 1 v 2 | |||
v SUPPORT SYSTEM TREE MAIN TREE SUBTREE FIGURE l-2. THREE-TREE STRUCTUtlE | |||
A p 2. 9EFINITION OF INITIATING EVENTS As discussed in Section 4 of the Technical Summary Report, a risk , | |||
analysis can be characterized as a listing of r.11 possibic core damage scenarios with an assessment of their frequency, uncertainty, and damage. The first' step in developing the set of scenarios was to define a set of scenario initiators or initiating events.* This was done using i a master logic diagram based on the hazards and safety functions described in Sect.cn 2.2 of the Technical Summary. The master logic , | |||
diagram allowed the choice of a set of initiating events that was as ' | |||
complete u possible. | |||
2.1 MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM A master logic diagram (similar to a fault tree) was constructed to guide the effort of searching for ways in which the hazard of radioactive material release may become an unacceptable risk by loss of control of the essential safety functions, The master logic diagram is shown in Figure 2-1. | |||
; The events in the master logic diagram are identified by the level at which they appear in the tree with the top event being Level 1. The tree ' | |||
has been classified into levels as an ordering technique to assist in-locating events by approach to an offsite release. In principle, the i strategy is to achieve completeness of events by level. The event. | |||
"Excessive Offsite Release," is the top undesired event. Excissive | |||
*O offsite release, Level 1, can result from either (OR gate) an "Excessive Direct Release" or an "Excessive Indirect Release." These and only these release paths exist from TMI-1, so they constitute a Level 2 of completeness. | |||
Excessive direct release wou;d come from such sources as the spent fuel pool and the waste tanks and has been generally agreed, based on previous PRAs, to be an insignificant contributor to risk and therefore will not be further developed here, , | |||
4 To occur, an excessive indirect releast would require "Extensive Core Damage," "Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Failure," and "Containment Failure" (AND gate). | |||
In other words, in order for radioactivity to escape to the environment, it must first escape the fuel cladding, pass out of the reactor coolant system, and finally penetrate the reactor containment building. Only if i | |||
i | |||
*The definition for initiating event used here is: Sone single occur- l rence, usually a system malfunction or misoperation or internal or ; | |||
external hazard, that starts a disturbance in the nuclear power plant and ! | |||
j eventually perturbs the reactor coolant system or in some other way can i y lead to a large release of radioactivity; i.e., it starts a scenario, i | |||
2-1 0579G101387PMR | |||
all three of these barriers to core fission product release are violated would there be an offsite release of the radioactivity contained in the fuel rods in the reactor core. Therefore, these three events form a Level 3 of completeness. | |||
As discussed in Section 3.2 of the Technical Summary Report, in order to have extensive core damage, one of five safety functions must not be adequately performed, as required by the conditions in the plant. That is, extensive core damage will result if any of the following occurs: | |||
: 1. The core reactivity is irsufficiently controlled so that more heat is generated than can be removed ("Insufficient Reactivity Control") | |||
: 2. The heat is coming from the reactor fuel faster than it can be transferred out to other systems ("Insufficient Core Heat Removal") | |||
: 3. The heat transfer medium (coolant) in the RCS is not sufficient to remove all the heat generated in the core ("Insufficient R; i Inventory Control") | |||
: 4. The coolant is not in the proper state [e.g. , the void fraction is too high] ("Insufficient RCS Pressure Control") | |||
: 5. The heat transferred from the RCS through the int rfaces with other heat removal systems is not sufficient ("Insufficient RCS Heat Remova l ") | |||
Reactor coolant system pressure bound:ry Toilure would only occur as a result of insufficient RCS pressure control; e.g., the pressure results in stresses in excess of the strain that the pressure boundary will endure or the relief valves open and remain open. | |||
Failure of the reactor containment can result from either failing to close penetrations through the containment ("Insufficient Isolation") or a break in the containment. A break or crack in the containment can result ' am failure to control the temperature and prasure of the air and steam in the containment ("Insufficient Pressure / Temperature Control") or from failure to keep hydrogen gas below the limit for its ignition ("Insufficient Ccabustible Gas Control"). Should hydrogen concentration exceed 15 to 17%, ignition of the hydrogen may releas: | |||
sufficient energy to break the containment. | |||
The events in Level 3 can only take place if one of eight safety functions it insufficiently accomplished; therefore, nonperformance of the safety functions constitutes a Level 4 of completeness. | |||
The events that have been describ'd constitute a complete set of events for Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. | |||
2.2 INITIATING EVENT LIST At Level 5 in the master logic diagram, the question is, "What equipment malfunction or misoperation could threaten the accomplishment of each 2-2 0579G101387PMR | |||
/^N safety function?" All such scenario initiators considered for TMI-1 are | |||
-() listed in Table 2-1 accordmg to the safety function they threaten. | |||
Under each safety function is the category "other," which is to be interpreted simply as "all initiating events not otherwise included in the list." | |||
The master logic diagram is complete at Levels 1 through 4; with the inclusion of "other" categories, it can logically he said that the search for initiating events is also complete at Level 5. That is, any initiator that can cause a level 4 event is included somewhere in the , | |||
list of scenario initiators, either specifically or in the "other" category. . | |||
By inclusion of the "other" categ /, the question of "completeness" has been changed. Instead of asking, "What about the things that have been forgotten?"--a question that has a lot of emotional content to it--the t question becomes, "What numerical value shall be assigned to the frequency of occurrence of the 'other' scenarios?" The frequency of the "other" category of initiators was not quantified, it was used to remind the TMI-1 PRA team to include a term in the final quantification process (Section 6 below) that would account for all scenarios that might be started by initiating events not appearing explicitly in the list in Table 2-1. In this form, the question of completeness is more amenable I for handling in a rational, quantitative fashion. In fact, the question becomes entirely the same as for any other scenario that was considered i explicitly; namely, "What is the frequency?" The answer is given in the form of a probability curve against frequency, with the probability curve V reflecting all evidence, knowledge, and experience. This argurrent is - | |||
valid because we have already been complete in specifying all possible threatening effects. | |||
The list of initiating events in Table 2-1 is the result of an exten- ; | |||
sive analysis by the TMI-1 probabilistic risk assessment team, backed up ; | |||
by many years of reactor safety research by the government and private industry. The list was produced by a detailed review of the plant design and industry operating experience. The plant design review included - | |||
material contained in the systems descriptions in the Systems Analysis Report. | |||
The initiators in Table 2-1 are grouped according to the way that they affect accomplishment of the particular safety function. These effect groupings serve the purpose of facilitating the scenario development process described in Section 4 as well as organizing the search for scenario initiators. I i | |||
The idea of grouping by effect can be better understood by considering at least two more levels of the master logic diagram between Levels 4 and 5, Levels 4' and 4". In der to threaten the control of a safety function, an initiator will result in either too much or too little RCS heat l removal for instance. Steam line breaks remove too much heat from the l RCS; a_ turbine trip causes too little to be removed. Thus, Level 4' is "too little" or "too much." Since only certain ways exist for threatening each safety function, a Level 4" suggests itself. For 1 | |||
2-3 l 0579G101387PMR H | |||
instance, only steam flow and feed flow can effect the removal of heat from the RCS. Thus, thinking of Levels 4' and 4" together, we can be sure to be complete if we consider all initiators that result in "too little" or "too much" steam flow or "too little" or "too much" feed flow. | |||
In terms of mitigating the effects of "too much" steam flow, for instance, it may matter whether secondary system inventory is lost as well or whether this loss of inventory takes place inside or outside containment. Table 2-1 categorizes all the things that can initiate scenarios into groups which have the same effect. These threatening affects groups were occasionally further collected to form those groups discussed as pinch point I in Section 3.2 of the Technical Sumary. This further grouping for the scenario definition and quantification process is described in Sectiori 2.4. | |||
2.3 INITIATING EVENTS CAUSED BY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HAZARDS At the cause level in Table 2-1, initiating events may occur because of mechanical component failures, human errors, or internal or external hazards. Internal hazards, such as fire, ficoding, steam leaks, pipe whip, or explosions, can initiate challenges of one or more of the safety functions included in Level 4 of the master logic diagram. External hazards such as earthquakes, high winds, river flooding, etc., can also initiate zcenarios that threaten the control of safety functions. For example, if one RCS dropline isolation valve opens due to a hot short in control ci.cuitry caused by a fire and the other due to disk failure, RCS Inventory Control will be threatened. Internal and external hazards are described in detail in tne Spatial Interactions ' ort. Of all these hazards, only fires and earthquakes were deterr to be sufficiently important risk contributers to be analyzed with i.. .nt trees and have their sce iarios compared in detail against 1 c;e from other causes. | |||
The following information sources were used, in conjunction with the master logic diagram approach, to characterize these initia~cing events: | |||
o Previously Experienced Plant Events e Comparison With Other PRAs e Feedback From Other Parts of the Risk Model As long as the most freauent intitiating events caused by internal and external hazards are identified, the significance of the "other" initiating events and associated causes can be minimized. | |||
2.3.1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY There are several potential leak paths connected to the RCS that, if exposed to an internal hazard 2nd opened during normal reactor operation, could lead to loss of RCS inventory. In the analysis, we have assumed that pipes that have a check valve are not susceptible to being opened by a failure of power or control system. | |||
In the TMI-1 plant, a loss of both reactor coolant pump seal injection from the makeup pumps and intermediate closed cooling water can cause substantial physical damage to the RCP seals. Such seal damage will 2-4 0579G101387PMR | |||
O eventually result in loss of RCS inventcry control because seal injection U | |||
is provided by the same pumps that maintain RCS inventory control the high pressure injection pumps. | |||
RCP seal injection can fail by failing power cables to all three makeup pumps, MU-P1A, MU-PIB, and MU P1C, or by f ailing power or control circuitry to air-operated valve MU-V20, a fail closed type isolation valve. The same hazard could fail intermediate cooling 'yu severing power ; | |||
cables to both intermediate cooling pumps or' by causing hot shorts in valve control circuitry, which close one of the following. valves: IC-V4, IC-V79A, IC-V798, IC-V79C, IC-V790, IC-V2, or IC-V3. Closure of IC-V2, IC-V3, or IC-V4 would stop all intermediate cooling flow to the RCP seal 1 coolers. Closure of IC-V79A, B, C, or 0 stops flow to its one respective - | |||
RCP bearing cooler. Any internal hazard affecting cables or panels i containing circuitry associated with the above-mentioned components can , | |||
potentially cause an RCP seal failure and potentially result in core damage if it has also caused the three makeup pumps to become unavailable. | |||
2.3.2 LOSS OF ELECTRIC POWER Internal hazards in several areas in the plant can cause the loss of AC l or DC power. Internal hazards affecting major cable chases have the potential of severing the connections of the unit auxiliary transformers with the vital switchgear. An internal hazard in the control room, cable i spreading room, or switchgear room can cause an inadvertent trip of the unit auxiliary transformer breakers. Si tilarly, internal hazards can p) | |||
'n. | |||
damage breaker control circuitry or power cables resulting in the loss of an AC or DC electric power train. | |||
2.4 GROUPING 0F Ird (IATORS ' | |||
In Section 2.2, initiators were defined and grouped in terms of their threat to safety functions. This preliminary grouping facilitated completeness; i.e., it helped find them all. However, during the definition of the scenarios that arose from each initiator, it was convenient in some cases to collect these threatening effect groups into what are called "Initiating Event Groups." That is, we formed groups of initiators, which we assumed initiated identical plant response sequences. This represents the process described as pinch point I in Figure 4-4 of the Technical Sumary Report. | |||
The formation of initiating event groups was done in various ways. : | |||
Sometimes distinctions between threatening effect groups were treated l explicitly by making each such group into a separate initiating event , | |||
group, and, in other cases, distinctions between such groups were tracked through insertion of questions in the event trees. These questions served, for instance, to split steam line breaks into those in the intermediate and turbine buildings. This was done for convenience in defining scenarios. | |||
All of the threatening effect groups are shown as they were collected into initiating event groups in Table 2-2. As can be seen, many threatening effect groups were collected in the reactor trip initiating l | |||
2-5 ! | |||
0576 ' J1387PMR I l | |||
event group. A short description of why this could be done will serve to illustrate this grouping process. | |||
The reactor trip group came about because a single common system, the reactor protection system, protects against a number of threatening effects. If it works, and this is highly iikely, then all of these threatening effects will be arrested in the same manner. For instance, although they threaten different safety functions, a rapid insertion of positive reactivity (even: 1) and a decrease in flow rt.te through the core (event 18) will both result in a reactor trip cnd otherwise will require no different alleviating actions. (The difference is in the parts of the RPS trip logic that are used. The differences in RCS flow rate and initial rod position are insignificant.) If the RPS does not work, the safety function threatening effects of the initiating event will become clearer. | |||
The colloquial initiating event group names in Table 2-2 were used to describe the plant model initiating event pinch point I groups from this point on. It should be kept continuously in mind, however, that each name refers to a group of initiators. All scenarios developed and frequencies calculated are assumed to be valid for all initiators in the group. Such a grouping was made as a modeling and calculational conven-ience only and introduces some approximations into the scenarios. Such errors are believed to be small. | |||
2.5 INITIATING EVENT GROUP FREQUENCIES Some initi: ting event group frequencies were calculated from data, from systems equations, and from the seismic analysis. Those calculated from data were derived using the two-stage Bayesian procedure, which combines TMI-1 site-specific information and generic industry experience fron other pressurized water reactors. Details of how the initiating event frequencies ware quantified using data are presented in the Data Report. | |||
Those calcult ad from system equations were analyzed in the same manner as the split fractions; i.e., w'th b,0ck diagrams and boolean equations. | |||
Details of how this was done appear in the Systems Analysis Report. The seismic initiating event frequencies are the frequency of earthquakes in a particular intensity range and their derivation is found in the Seisnic Analysis Report. The fire frquencies were all calculated based on historical data and their derivation is found in the Spatial Analysis Report. All of the initiating event frequencies are presented in Table 2-3. | |||
O 2-6 0579G101387PMR | |||
O U | |||
O G J | |||
) | |||
TABLE 2-1. Td!-l INITIATING EVENT LIST Sheet 1 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: ""E ** | |||
Source of Threat Threa tened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Reactivity Control 1 RT Rapid insertion of positive Uncontrolled Group Withdrawal CRDCS Failure reactivity. Internal Hazard 2 SL Rapid insertion of positive Control Rod Ejection CRD Weld Failure reactivity and small loss of RCS inventory. | |||
3 RT Rapid insertion of a little Control Rod Prop CRD Power Supply Failure negative reactivity. Internal Hazard 4 RT Slow insertion of negative Inadvertent Boration Makeup and Purification reactivity. System Malfunction Internal Hazard 5 RT Slow insertion of positive Inadvertent Deboration Makeup and Purification reactivity. System Malfunction Internal Hazard 6 [RT] Rapid insertion of a lot Inadvertent Reactor Trip Instrumentatio", Noise l | |||
7 u | |||
of negative reactivity. Inaavertent reanual Scram RPS Test Errors s | |||
Othe r. | |||
RCS Inventory Control 7 [VL] Very small loss of RCS Very Small Pipe Breaks Loss of Seal Cooling inventory. RCP Seal Failure Internal Hazard 7A [SL] Small loss of RCS inventory Small RCS Pipe Breaks Internal Hazard (nonisolable, inside Inadvertent PSV containment) . | |||
8 [ML] Intermediate loss of RCS Meditsa RCS Pipe Breaks inventory (nonisolable, inside containment). | |||
LEGEND: | |||
[ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. | |||
0580G101487PMR | |||
_ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . - ._ . _ . . ._ _ . . , . . _ . . ~ , _ . _ .. . . . . . . _ _ | |||
TABLE 2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of S MTW Threa tened Tree Threatening Ef fect Cause of Threat 9 RCS Inventory Control [LL] Large loss of RCS inventory Large RCS Pipe Breaks (continued) (nonkolable, inside con. Inment). | |||
10 SL Isolable loss of RCS Inadvertent PORV or High Internal Hazard inventory inside Point Vent Valve Opening containment. | |||
11 SL Isolable loss of RCS Letdown or Sample Lire inventory outside Break contain:nent. | |||
12 [LL] Loss of RCS inventory and Reactor Vessel Rupture ECCS flow to core. | |||
13 [TR] Loss of RCS inventory to Steam Generator Tube Rupture steam generator. | |||
14 1:T Decrease in RCS inventory Charging letdown Internal Hazard with no coolant spillage. | |||
to 15 [VS]* Medium icss of RCS inventory Break in DHR Drop 11ne Internal Hazard (outside containment). Dropline Valve Failure Other. LPI Line Valve Failure | |||
[Fl] Very smalllossofRC$ complete RCP Seal failure Various Fires | |||
[F2] inventory. and Failure of HPIPs Ottie r. | |||
RCS Pressure Control 16 RT Increase in RCS pressure Pressurizer Heater Control System Malfunction with no change in inventory. Failure Internal Hazard 17 RT Decrease in RCS pressure Pressurizer Spray Ce ntrol System Malfunction with no change in inventory. Failure Internal Hazard Othe r. | |||
* Treated without an event tree. | |||
LEGEND: | |||
[ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. | |||
101487PMR | |||
TABLE 2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of Source of Threat Threa tened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Core Heat Removal 18 RT Decrease in flow rate RCP Trip Inadvertent Breaker ; | |||
through core. Opening RCP Shaft Seizure / Break Loss of Lube Oil Cooling Internal Hazard 19 RT Decrease in flow rate Core Internals Vent Yalve through core - no RCP Fails Open speed change. | |||
20 RT Change in flow distribution, Core Flow Blockage Corrosion no RCP speed change. Crud Buildup Othe r. | |||
Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal m 21 SLI Increase in steam flow, Turbine Control Valve Turbine Pressure e | |||
* dcwnstream of MSIV, no Opening Regulator Failure loss of inventory. Inadvertent TBV Opening ICS Malfunction Increase in Electric Demand Internal Hazard 22 [TT] Decrease in steam flow, TSVs Close (equipment Turbine Generator 60wnstream of MSIV. protection turbine trip) Malfunction or TCVs Throttle EHC System Malfunction Internal Hazard 23 FW Decrease in steam flow, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of Cf rtulating Water downstream of MSIY and Vacuum pump Failure interruption of feedwater. Internal Hazard 24 [AT] Initial insufficient ICS Failure ICS Bus Pr Supply, and subsequent excessive [ATA] Faflure main feed flow. Internal Hazard LEGEND: | |||
{ [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. | |||
l . | |||
4 j 0580G101487FMR | |||
TABLE 2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 4 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of Number Source of Threat Threatened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat 25 Reactor Coolant SLI Small increase in steam Small SLB Intemal Hazarc System Heat Removal flow, upstream of MSIV, Inadvertent Opening of (continued) with loss of secondary ADV Or MSIV inventory outside containment. | |||
26 SLI Small increase in steam Sau11 SLB Jnside flow with loss of secondary Containment inventory into containment. | |||
27 SLI Small increase in steam Small SLB Outside flow downstream of MSIV Containment with loss of secondary Inadvertent N)V Opening system inventory. | |||
28 [SLI] Large cease in steam Large Steam Line Break flow ,. Jeam of MSIV Inside Containment with loss of secondary inventory. | |||
~ | |||
O 29 SLI Large increase in steam flow large Steam Line Break Outside with loss of secondary Containment Upstream of MSIVs inventory, unisolable, outside containment. | |||
30 [SLI] Large increase in steam flow large Steam Line Break Outside with loss of secondary Containment Downstream of system inventory, isolable. MSIVs outside containment. | |||
31 [EC] Excessive feedwater flow. MFM Pump Speed Increase Control System Malfunction NW Control Valve Opening Internal Hazard above Demand 32 [W] Inadequate feedwater flow. MFW or Booster Pump (s) Internal Hazard Trip MW Control Valve Closure MW Isolation valve Closure LEGEND: | |||
[ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from watch the ir4f tiating event group derives its title. | |||
101487FNR | |||
O O O TABLE 2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 5 of 6 ey n on hent InWadng hent %ups: | |||
* Number Source of Threat Theeatened Tree Threatening Eft ect Cause of Threat 33 Reactor Coolant TT Interruption of steam flow Inadvertent MSIV Closure Internal Hazard System Heat Removal upstream of turbine and Lcontinued) turbine bypass and atmos-pheric dump valves. | |||
34 SLI Interruption of feedwater Feedwater Line Break Upstream flow to one steam generator. of MFLIV 35 SLI Increase in steam flow, Feedwater Line Break Down-downstream of W LIV, inside stream of MFLIVs containment with inter-ruption of MFM. | |||
36 FW Interruption of feedwater loss of Control s.ie Air Header Failure flow. Internal Hazard 37 [LR] Loss of all essential Loss of River Water System Screen Blockage equipment cooling. Internal Hazard y 38 [AC] Loss of power to auxiliary Loss of Offsite Power Grid Collapse e transformers. | |||
39 [LD] Loss of essential equipment Loss of DC Power Internal Hazard control. Train A. | |||
40 [LNS] Loss of essential equipment loss of Nuclear Services Internal Hazard cooling. Closed Cycle Cooling Equipment Failure 41 [LC] Slow loss of essential loss of Control Building CV Power Failure equipment power. Ventilation Chiller Failure Other. | |||
Containment Isolation 42 | |||
* Direct release to the Failure of the Reactor environment. Building Isolation | |||
*These scenarios are modeled as top events in the event trees. | |||
LEGEND: | |||
[ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. | |||
0580G101487PMR | |||
TABLE 2-1 (continaed) | |||
Sheet 6 of 6 Safety function Event Initiating Event Groups- Examples of Number Source of Threat Threatened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Containment Pressure / | |||
Temperature Control 43 | |||
* Loss of containment Inadvartent Reactor Building pressure / tempera ture Spray control. | |||
44 | |||
* Loss of containment loss of Nonnal Containment RBHVAC Malfunction pressure / tempera ture Cooling control. | |||
Control of Excessive Direct Releases | |||
** Spent Fuel Element Cladding 45 Release of spent fuel Dropping of a Fuel fission products. Failure Element During Refueling Operation Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling N 46 ** Release of stored radio- Waste Gas / Liquid Tank Diversion Valve i | |||
N active wastes. Mal func tion | |||
*These scenarios are modeled as top events in the event trees. | |||
**The consequences resulting from the loss of these functions are not significant compared to the other safety functions and, therefore, are not modeled further. | |||
LEGEND: | |||
[ ]s indicate the threatening ef fect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. | |||
t 2101487PMR | |||
O ' | |||
fN b | |||
TABLE 2-2. EVENT GROUPING FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT Sheet 1 of 3 Group Initiating Event Table 2-1 ety nction 3 Tt.eatening Ef fect Number Group Name Number Threatened 1 Large Loss of LL 9 Large Loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, inside RCS Inventory Control RCS Inventory containment) 2 Medium ML 8 Intermediate loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, RCS Inventory Control Loss of RCS inside containment Inventory 3 Small Loss of SL 2 Rapid Insertion of Positive Reactivity and Small Reactivity Control RCS Inventory Loss of RCS Inventory 7A Small Loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, inside RCS Inventory Control containment) 10 Isolable Loss of RCS Inventory Inside Containment RCS In-entory Control 11 Isolable Loss of RCS Inventory Outside Containmant RCS Inventory Control 10 Loss of Main FW 23 Decrease in Steam Flow. Downstream of MSIV and Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Interruption of Feedwater Flow Heat Removal 7 32 Inadequate Fee &ater Flow Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 36 Interruption of Feedwater Flow Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 11 Reactor Trip RT 1 Rapid Insertion of Positive Reactivity Reactivity Control . | |||
3 Rapid Insertion of a Little Negative Reaetivity Reactivity Control 4 Slow Insertion of Negative Reactivity Reactivity Control 5 Slow Insertion of Positive Reactivity Reactivity Control 6 Rapid Insertion of a lot of Negdtive Reactivity Reactivity Control 14 Decrease in RCS Inventory with No Coolant Spillage RCS Inventory Control 16 Increase in RCS Pressure with No Change in Inventory RCS Pressure Control 17 Decrease in RCS Pressure with No Change ia Inventory RCS Pressure Control 18 Decrease in Flow Rate Through Core Core Heat Removal i | |||
0580G101487PMR i | |||
TABLE 2-2 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 3 Group Initiating Event j Table 2-1 ey nc tion 3 Threatening Ef fect Number Grtup Name Number Threa tened 11 Reactor Trip 19 Decrease in Flow Rate Through Core - No Core Heat Removal (continued) RCP Speed Change Increase in RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control 20 Change in Flow Distribution - No RCP Speed Change Core Heat Removal 15 Loss of bus ATA AT 24 Initial Insuf ficient and Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Power Excessive Main Feed Flow Heat Removal 12 Turbine Trip TT 22 Decrease in Steam Flow, Downstream of MSIV Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 33 Interruption of Steam Flow Upstream Reactor Coolant System of Turbine, Turbine Bypass, and Heat Removal Atmospheric Dump Valves 9 Excessive Main EC 31 Excessive feedwater Flow Reactor Coolant System Feedwa ter Heat Removal m 4 Ver small VL 7 Very Small loss of RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control i | |||
Loss of RCS | |||
% Inventury 17 Loss of AC 38 Loss of Power Reactor Coolant System Offsite Power Heat Removal 5 Containment VS 15 Pedium Loss of RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control Bypass (outside containment) 8 OTSG Tube TR 13 loss cf RCS Inventory to Steam Generator RCS Inver.tccy Control Rupture 7 Steam Line SLT 21 Increase in Steam Flow, Downstream Reactor Coolant System Break in Turbine of MSIV, No loss of Inventory Heat Aemoval Building 27 Small Increase in Steam Flow Rev. tor Coolant System Downstream of MSIV with Loss of Heat Removal Secondary System Inventory 30 Large Increase in Steam Flow with Reactor Coolant System Loss of Secondary System Inventory, Heat Removal Isolable Outside Containment 01487PMR | |||
m TABLE 2-2 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 3 Group Initiating Event j Table 2-1 *I ""# " | |||
3 Threatening Effect Number Group Name Number Threatened 6 Steam Line Break SLI 25 Small Increase in Steam Flow, Upstream Reactor Coolant System in Intermediate of MSIV with Loss of Secondary Inventory Heat Removal Building Outside Containment 26 Small Increase in Steam Flow with Loss Reactor Coolant System of Secondary Inventory into Heat Removal Containment 28 Large Increase in Steam Flow Upstream Reactor Coolant System l cf MSIV with Loss of Secondary Inventory Heat Removal t | |||
29 Large Increase in Steam Flow with Loss Reactor Coolant System of Secondary Inventory Unisolable . Heat Removal Outside Containment 34 Interruption of PFW Flow to One Steam Reactor Coolant System Generator Heat Removal 35 Increase in Steam Flow, Upstream of PG' LIV, Reactor Coolant System ro Inside Containment with Interruption of MFW Heat Removal 5 19 Loss of River LRW 37 Loss of Essential Equipment Cooling Reactor Coolant System Water Heat Removal 14 Loss of Control LC 41 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Building Heat Removal Ventilation 16 Loss of one DC LD 39 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Power Train Heat Removal 13 Loss of Control FW 36 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Air Heat Removal 13 Lo.s of Nuclear LNS -40 Loss of Essential Equipment Cooling Reactor Coolant System Services Closed Heat Removal Cycle Cooling Water 4 | |||
0580G101587PMR | |||
- . _ . __. .__ _ . _ _ - - . _ _ - - . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - . - . , _ . - . . - _ . . _ . _ _ __ _ _ | |||
TABLE 2-3. TMI-1 INITIATING EVENT LIST Sheet 1 of 2 Distribution Group Initiating Event Group Number Group Name Code 5th 50th 95th Support System Frontline Percentile Pe nentile Percentile Run Number Event Tree 1 Large LOCA LL 7.3-6 7.4-5 5.2-4 1.9-4 1 LL 2 Medium LOCA R 1.9-5 1.9-4 1.3-3 4.2-4 1 R 3 Small LOCA SL 2.7-5 9.4-4 1.1-2 2.2-3 1 SB 4 Very Small LOCA VL 2.7-4 7.55-3 1.4-2 5.1.3 1 VSB 5 Inadvertent Opening Of VS 4.7-10 6.6-9 1.7-7 1.0-7 - - | |||
DHR Valves 6 Steam and Feedwater SLI 1.7-5 1.9-4 1.3-3 4.2-4 1 SLI Line Breaks 7 Steam Generator Tube Rupture TR 4 . 0-4 6.4-3 2.8-2 1.1-2 1 TR 8 Excessive Feedwater Flow EC 2.1-2 7.9-2 2.8-1 1.2-1 1 EXC 9 Total Loss of Main Feedwater FW 5.1-2 1.8-1 4.8-1 2.3-1 1 FW 10 Reactor Trip RT 6.7-1 1.4+0 2.2+0 1.4+0 1 GT 11 Turbine Trip TT 7.8-1 1.5+0 2.3+0 1.6+0 1 GT 12 Loss of Air System LA 2. -4 1.9-3 1.9-2 6.0-3 6 GT 13 Loss of Control Building LC 5.4 -5 1.4 -4 4.2-4 2.0-4 8 LC Ventilation | |||
* 14 Loss of ATA Power (ICS) AT 5.2-3 3.6-2 1. 7-1 5.4-2 5 ATA 15 Loss of DC Power Train A LD 3.7-3 1.9-2 6.0-2 2.8-2 3 GT 16 Loss of Offs'te Power AC 1.4-3 5.0-3 1.6-2 7.1-2 2 GT 17 Loss of Nuclear Services LNS 4.6-3 1.1-2 2.7-2 1.4-2 7 GT Closed Cooling Water 18 Loss of River Water | |||
* LRW 3.5-4 1.3-3 2.2-2 7.4-3 7 LRW | |||
*These initiating events include in their frequency the likelihood of successful manual actions to prevent plant trip. | |||
NOTE: Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviated form; i.e., 7.3-6 = 7.3 x 10-6, 0580 87PMR | |||
O. v TABLE 2-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 2 l Distribution Group Initiating Event Group Number Group Name Code 5th 50th 95th Support System Frontline Penentile Percentile Pe n entile Run Number Event Tree 19 Elevation 310' Flood * | |||
* 20 Fire in MCC Area F01 3.0-5 * * | |||
.(AB-FZ-6, scenario 1) 21 Fire in 1S Switchgear Room F02 2.0-5 * * | |||
(CB-FA-2b. scenario la) 22 Fire in B Battery Room F03 5.0-6 * * | |||
(CB-FA-2d, scenario 1) 23 Fire in IE Switchgear Room F04 1.5-4 9 GT (CB-FA-3a, scenario 2) 24 Fire in IE Switchgear Room F05 1.0-5 * | |||
* 7 (CB-FA-3b, scenario 1) | |||
U 25 Fire in ESAS Cabinet Area F06 2.0-5 * * | |||
(CB-FA-3c, scenario 1) 26 0.15g Earthquake EIS 1.09-3 10 GT 27 0.25g Earthquake E25 1.80-4 11 GT 28 0.4g Earthquake E40 3.42-5 12 GT 29 0.69 Earthquake E60 6.21-6 13 GT | |||
*These events lead directly to core damage and therefore were not modeled on an event tree. | |||
NOTE: Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviatd form; i.e., 3.0-5 = 3.0 x 10-5, 0580G101587PMR | |||
E acessive {cyef f offsete release Public impact OH I | |||
l Encessive E ncesseve ensierec t gapgg release Release pathway fJD I | |||
I C a tensive RCS pressure coee levelJ tauundaey Containment darnage featue, fauure Core radeonuclede baresers CD I I I 3 l l Insuff cient Insullecient lasuffecient reactevity Insuffecient Insurfaceent I"5"H'''"E gn,yg g,c,,n, INid coee heat inventory HCS heat RCS pressuee '"'""'c ent twessure and control removal contsol ermoval cone,og asdatson scenterature c,,,,,,,,,,,e q,, | |||
" 'Y control conuol func t.ons levels Accident-enetaatang events FIGURE 2-1. MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM e - - - - | |||
O O | |||
Il 3. SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL v | |||
This section describes the modeling of TMI-1 support systems that are required for successful operation of the frontline systems. F rontline systems are those systems that directly perform the critical reactor safety functions, such as core heat removal, RCS inventory control, RCS heat removal, containment isolation, and reactivity control. Support systems allow these frontline systems to act by providing electrical power, control and actuation signals, motor cooling, and heat removal. | |||
The purpcse of a separate support system event tree model is to reduce the number of event sequences that must be evaluated by identifying the most important combinations of support system success and failure states. | |||
This section describes how the many possible support stem success and failure perrmtations are reduced to a few important ones, referred to as support system states, and then quantified. The support system model is quantified, conditional on the occurrence of a specific initiating event. For example, the support model must be quantified once for a simple reacter trip initiator and, then, again for a loss of offsite power initiator. The support system mcdel is not conditional on the status of frontline systems The support model evaluMion follows the specification of the initiating event, but precedes the analysis of the frontline systems in the development of a complete accident sequence. | |||
The following sections describe the dependencies between support and frontline systems, the support model event tree structure, and the | |||
[()* support system quantification process, including the grouping of support model sequences into a reduced list of support system states. The frontline event trees are quantified later, conditional on the occurrence of these support system states. | |||
3.1 SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DI AGRAM The initial step in developing the support system model was to identify the specific intersystem dependencies that exist at TMI-1. Figure 3-1 illustrates the dependencies identified among mechanical systems. | |||
Support systems are indicated by rectangles and frontline systems by circles. River water systems are shown on the right side in the figure; the closed water systems they support are shown on the left. The connecting lines between systems indicate functional dependencies. This means that the system on the tail of the arrow is needed by the system at the arrowhead. The impact of failure of the systems at the tail of the arrows is not distinguished in the figure. Support systems that are deemed essential for system success, that are used only in a backup capacity, or whose failure would only result in a degradation in the availability as opposed to the total failure of the supported system, are indicated by the same type of lines in the figure. The types of dependencies are, however, important considerations in deciding how to best model the plant. For simplicity, the electrical system dependencies are not indicated in Figure 3-1; they are considered separately in Figure 3-2. | |||
O v | |||
3-1 0581G101387PMR | |||
Using previous experience as the starting point in an iterative process, the mechanical support systems in Figure 3-1 were grouped into separate top events for the support system event tree model. The important dependencies were preserved without making the event tree too complicated. Figure 3-3 shows how the support (and some of the frontline) systems were grouped into top events. In some cases, a support system that only supports one frontline system was analyzed as part of the frontline system's top event. Also, some support system actions are dependent on frontline system actions and are analyzed as separate support system top events in the (mostly) frontline trees. | |||
These support systems are analyzed with the frontline trees rather than with the support system event tree. The frontline top events involving the reactor building river water system and the atmospheric dump valves are of this type. A third example of this type of grouping involves the two support systems (i.e., secondary services closed cooling and secondary services river water) that are included in the frontline top event describing the performance of the main feedwater system; i.e. , too little feedwater flow MF . | |||
As Figure 3-3 indicates, not all of the intersystem dependencies identified in Figure 3-1 are explicitly accounted for in the support system model. Certain dependencies were broken to ensure that the support system top events are analytically separable, thereby simplifying the overall plant model. The dependencies broken are identified, and the reasoning behind their omission from the model are discussed in the following paragraphs. | |||
The pumphouse ventilation system is unnecessary to cool the river water pump motors because of the large size of the rooms involved and the cool river water passing through the many pipes in the building. Failure of the pumphouse screens to supply water to the river water systems is treated as an accident initiator. The contribution of pumphouse unavailability to any of the river water system failure frequencies, other than as ar. initiating event, is believed to be very small and is therefore neglected in the support system model. The deicing water available from nuclear services river water system is not accounted for in the support system model because it does not provide a backup for the pumphouse in the event of river water loss: it is only use.ful as a preventive measure. | |||
The cross-connects between secondary services river water and nuclear services river water are not included in the support model. Either river water system could physically be used as a backup to the other; however, the cross-connects are not considered because they require manual action i and because emergency procedures put some restrictions on their i implementation; i.e., nuclear services river water is prohibited from j being used as a backup to secondary services river water when the reactor is critical. The omission of the cross-connects also greatly simplifies , | |||
the model. Omission of the manual cross-connect to nuclear services I river water does not introduce too much conservatism because the nuclear l services closed cooling water system also has a one of three pump success i criteria and there is no backup to this system. | |||
O\: | |||
i l | |||
3-2 0581G101337PMR | |||
i The intermediate closed cooling system provides cooling water for the (m} | |||
- reactor coolant pumps' seal thermal barriers. This system is redundant to the very reliable, three-train makeup system that provides RCP seal ; | |||
The intermediate cooling system is not evaluated in the injection flow. | |||
support model. Instead, it is included as frontline. Top Event SE because , | |||
it is of interest only as far as it provides RCP thermal barrier i cooling. The dependency between the intermediate closed cooling water system in the main trees and the nuclear services river water system in the support system event tree is modeled. Intermediate cooling is assumed failed if either of the two systems (i.e., nuclear services river " | |||
water or nuclear services closed cooling), which are included in the r analysis of support model Top Event NS, should fail. ; | |||
The industrial cooler is assumed to isolate for any sequence in which the reactor building fans may be required. Therefore, this cooler is not ; | |||
considered as a backup water source for the reactor building fans in the I support model. Use of the industrial cooler is considered on a sequence-by-sequence basis, as an operator recovery action. ; | |||
The dependency of the instrument air compressors on the intermediate building ventilating system is not included in the support system model because of the large, open area around the instrument air compressors and , | |||
because cooling water is supplied to them from other systems; i.e., | |||
secondary services closed cooling or fire service water. Since the industrial cooler is not included in the model and the emergency feedwater pumps do not require ventilation, intermediate building | |||
(- ventilation is not necessary and, therefore, is not included in the | |||
\ support system model. : | |||
r In Figure 3-3, the two support systems that are included in the frontline , | |||
Top Event M- are not explicitly modeled in detail. The secc :dary servic. | |||
systems are modeled as a single event in the main feedwater system l analysis. The unavailability of the secondary closed and river water | |||
~ | |||
systems with all its support systems available is assumed to be equal to that for the nuclear services closed and river water systems with all their support systems available because the systems are so similar. Also included in the analysis of main feedwater are the circulating water , | |||
system, the condensate system, the condenser air removal system, and the . | |||
gland seal system. l A siegle valve between the redundant air cryers in the common compressed air header from the service air and instrument air compressors is modeled ' | |||
because it is an active, single failure point in the system. This valve - | |||
temporarily blocks off flow through beth dryers when it switches the compressed air flow from one dryer to the other. If the valve sticks in the intermediate position, all air flow may be lost. Failure of this single valve, if recovery is not successful, N modeled as a failure of ; | |||
compressed air. The redundancy afforded by the four air compressors indicates that the compressed air system at TMI-1 is otherwise very i reliable. Compressed air is modeled by support system Top Event AM, i | |||
3-3 05816101337PMR 1 | |||
The backup instrument air compressors are not modeled because they do not have sufficient capacity by itr ;f to operate the loads they supply. | |||
They were intended only to make up for air leakage during steady operation and not to operate equipment, which would be necessary following a plant trip. Dependencies among other systems involving compressed air are accounted for, as described below. | |||
The dependency of the turbine bypass valves on instrument air is treated at the frontline event tree level by assuming that the valves work only if main feedwater flow is successful and a vacuum is maintained in the condenser. The 2-hour bottled air system is included in the analysis of the emergency feedwater system. The emergency feedwater flow control valves require compressed air to open and to remain open. The atmospheric dump valves, which also require compressed air to open, are assumed to only have air available if either one of the main feedwater or emergency feedwater systems is successful. Since the atmospheric dump valves only need to open if one of these systems is working, there is no loss of accuracy by adopting this approach. The dependency of reactor building isolation on instrument air need not be modeled because the isolation valves do not need air to work (they must vent air to close). | |||
Because the instrument air compressors can be cooled by fire service water, or secondary services closed cooling, no dependence of ompressed air on cooling water was assumed. The redundancy provided by these systems for cooling was judged to mean that loss of all coolina water to the compressed air system would contribute negligibly to the total compressed air system unavailability. | |||
The dependency of reactor building spray, makeup, and decay heat removal pumps on auxiliary building ventilation (shown in Figure 3-1) was judged to be insignificant. The bearing and motor cooling for these pumps is provided by either nuclear services closed cooling water or decay heat closed cooling water. Since decay heat closed cycle cooling normaliy cools makeup pumps 1A and 1C, redundancy provided by the backup cooling path through the nuclear services closed cycle cooling system (that must be manually aligned) is not included in the model. However, makeup pump 1B is always assumed to be aligned to nuclear services closed cycle cooling. Motor cooling is necessary for these pumps to operate. Room ventilation is not required and cannot provide the motor cooling function. The power supplies to these pumps are located in the control building and are cooled by control building ventilation. | |||
The dependence of the decay heat closed cycle cooling and nuclear service closed cycle cooling water system pumps on the Class I auxiliary building ventilation system is not modeled. Although these pumps are not supplied bearing and motor cooling by separate systems, the increase in room temperature resulting from a loss of the room cooling system is judged insufficient to cause these pumps to fail. These pumps are located in side-by-side stalls, open on one side, in a common room with a high ceiling and open at one end. | |||
O 3-4 0581G101337PMR | |||
f s | |||
Figure 3-2 pictorially illustrates the electrical intersystem dependencies at TMI-1. This diagram can be thought of as an extension of Figure 3-1. These systems rely on the control building ventilation system for heat removal. Because it is so difficult to pictorially r represent all the dependencies of the mechanical support systems on these " | |||
electrical systems, these dependencies are not shown.- In Figure 3-4, the electrical systems are shown, grouped into top events for evaluation in the support model. | |||
The control building ventilation system Top Event CV depends on both power from train B of engineered safeguards power; (i.e., GB) and from vital instrument buses VBB and VBD. Both these vital instrument buses , | |||
also ultimately get their power from power train B of engineered I safeguards. These two buses supply control power to the dampers in the control building ventilation system. If control power is lost, these dampers close and result in a loss of ventilation to the rooms serviced. | |||
Vital instrument buses V8A and VBC are grouped together into Top Event [VA). These buses supply power to instrument bus ATA and for two l of the four emergency feedwater flow control valves; i.e. , EF-V-30A/C. ; | |||
Inverter 1E can tu aligned as a backup power supply to any one of the four vital instrument buses; i.e., VBA, VBB, VBC, or VBD. The model, however, only takes credit for it being used as a backup te VBB and VBD, as part of the analysis of Top Event VB. , | |||
Instrument bus ATA is modeled in Top Event AA. Vital instrument bus ATA, O fed from engineered safeguards power IA (i.e., GA), powers the integrated b control system and automatic pressure control, using the PORV. As the eng:neered safeguards actuation system deenergizes to actuate, its ! | |||
dependency on vital instrument buses is not modeled. ; | |||
Swing bus 480V MCC IC-ESV is assigned to a separate top event. This swing system is assumed initially aligned to train 8 of electric power. | |||
Initially, no credit is given for tile transfer to the opposite power supply if power is lost from the train B side. This is because the l transfer is precluded by the presence of an ESAS signal. The possibility , | |||
of transferring manually is considered only on a sequence-specific basis i as a recovery action. Swing DC panel IM is not modeled because the ! | |||
valves it serves fail to the safe position on loss of control power. , | |||
Occasionally, two trains of equipment are separated into two top events ; | |||
for a given grouping of systems as in Figures 3-3 and 3-4 This is necessary in order to preserve the train dependency of the systems i supported. For example, decay heat removal pump B is dependent on decay heat closed cycle cooling train B, but not on train A. This distinction is retained in the support system model. Similarly, train dependencies are modeled for the DC power system (DA, DB), the engineered safeguards actuation system (EA, EB), and the emergency diesel generators (GA and GB). On the other hand, train dependencies for the nuclear services systems were not retained because the pump trains all discharge into a ; | |||
common header; therefore, the supported systems do not rely on any one specific pump train alone, a | |||
3-5 0581G101387PMR | |||
Each of the top events that appear in the support system model are briefly described below. A total of 16 top events is included in the TMI-1 support system model. The analysis of the first nine top events are all presented in the electric power systems analysis (Section 2 of the Systems Analysis Report). | |||
e Top Event OP. This top event models the availability of AC electric power to the nonengineered safeguards loads from the auxiliary transformers for 24 hours. Success of Top Event OP implies that AC electric power remains available from the 230-kV substation (and offsite network), that auxiliary transformers IA and 1B continue to supply power to the 6.9-kV and 4,160V switchgear, and that the nonengineered safeguards system continues to supply power to the 6.9-kV reactor plant loads (reactor coolant pumps) for 24 hours. | |||
This event also includes the stability of the offsite power grid, given an initiating event that results in a turbine trip. For initiating events other then loss of offsite power, failure of this top event implies that plant trip was successful since it is the turbine trip that caused grid instability and failure. Success of this top event also means that normally operating systems (e.g., | |||
nuclear services closed cycle cooling) need only continue to operate to support plant operation. Failure of this top event means that such systems must also restart when power is restored to accomplish their functions. For the loss of offsite power initiating event, this top event is always failed. | |||
e Top Event DA. Top Event DA models the availability of DC electric power to the train A DC distribution loads from the station batteries and the battery chargers for 24 hours if a plant trip has occurred. | |||
The assumed battery life if AC power is not available (i.e., without the chargers) is 2 hours. Success of this top event implies that power is available to the loads supplied through DC distribution panels 1A,1C,1E,1H,1P, and DCA. For sequences without offsite power available, success of Top Event DA ensures that control power is available to start and load the train A diesel generator, e Top Event DB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event DA except that the opposite train of DC loads is supplied. Success of this top event implies that the station batteries and battery chargers supply power to DC distribution panels 18,10,1F,1J,10, and DCB for 24 hours. | |||
e Top Event GA. This top event models the availability of AC electric power to the train A engineered safeguards loads from either the auxiliary transformer or the diesel generator for 24 hours following a plant trip. Success of this top event implies that power is supplied to the train A engineered safeguards loads from 4,160V bus 1D; 480V buses IP,1R, and 1N; and 480V MCC 1A-ES, ES valve and heating 1A, and screenhouse IA-ES for 24 hours. Failure of this top event guarantees failure of all equipment powered from 4,160V bus 10. If power from the auxiliary transformer is not available, the diesel generator must start on demand (bus undervoltage), close its output circuit breaker, and continue to run for 6 hours for 3-6 0581G101337PMR | |||
O success of this top event. If offsite power is not recovered within U 6 hours, the diesel generator must run for the remaining 18 hours of the assumed 24-hour mission time, o Top Event GB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event GA I except that the opposite train of engineered safeguards loads is supplied. Success of.this top event implies that power is available to the train B loads from 4,160V bus 1E; 480V buses 15 and 1T; and 480V MCCs 18 ES,1B ES valve and heating,1B ES screenhouse, and ES valve and heating 1C for 24 hours, o Top Event VA. This top event models the availability of power to both 120V vital instrument buses VBA and VBC for the first 2 hours following a plant trip. Success of this top event means that power , | |||
is available from these buses to their respective loads immediately following a plant trip. Power to these buses can be provided from , | |||
either 125V DC main distribution panel 1A, DA, or via engineered > | |||
safeguards control center 1A, GA. Loss of AC supply power initially, | |||
* and eventual loss of 125V DC supply power after 2 hours, is not considered a failure of Top Event VA. | |||
e Top Event VB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event VA , | |||
except that it involves 120V vital instrument buses VBC and VBD. ; | |||
Success of Top Event VB requires that power is available at both VBB and VBD immediately af ter a plant trip and lasts for at least | |||
, 2 hours. | |||
o Top Event AA. Top Event AA models the availability of AC electric power to the vital instrument bus ATA loads. Power to bus ATA is modeled from two sources: from inverter 1A via bus VBA and from regulated transformer 1A via bus TRA. The automatic transfer from bus VBA to bus TRA is also modeled. If AC power from MCC 1A ES ; | |||
(evaluated in Top Event GA) is available, then Top Event AA is ! | |||
evaluated for 24 hours. If only DC power from DC main distribution ; | |||
panel 1A is available, then Top Event AA is evaluated for a mission time of only 2 hours, i.e., the battery capacity without AC changers. ' | |||
e Top Event IC. This top event models the availability of power to 480V MCC 1C-ESV for 24 hours. This swing bus is assumed initially aligned to train 8 of engineered safeguards power, GB, via 480V bus IS-ESSB. MCC 1C-ESV can also be fed from 480V bus IP-ESSA via an automatic transfer, liowever, because this automatic transfer is prevented if an ESAS signal is present, this transfer is ! | |||
conservatively not included in the plant model, e Top Event AM. This top event models the availability of compressed ' | |||
air from either service air or instrument air. Success of this top event implies that compressed air is available to all of the equipment normally supplied by instrument air. | |||
e Top Event EA. This top event models the availability of train A of the engineered safeguards actuation signal to each group of equipment required to actuate, given 1,600 psig of reactor coolant system d pressure. Success of Top Event EA implies that the normally 3-7 0581G101387PMR | |||
energized actuation relays are deenergized, which provides actuation signals to the appropriate equipment. Failure of Top Event EA inplies that all groups of train A actuated equipment fail to receive an automatic start signal from ESAS. | |||
e Top Event EB. This top event is similar to Top Event EA except that it depicts the actuation signals to train B of ESAS actuated equipment. | |||
e Top Event NS. This top event models the availability of two systems; nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water. Success of Top Event NS implies that the cooling functions performed by these systems are achieved. These cooling functions include the supply of cooling water to the NSCCW header for reactor building fan motor cooling, makeup pump 1B motor cooling, control building air conditioning chiller heat removal, and intermediate service cooler heat removal. Any one pump train of the three nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water trains can supply all the loads served. Complete failure of either of the two systems is assumed to result in the same impact as the failure of both systems. Since both of the systems modeled are normally running, they need only continue operating for 24 hours. Given loss of offsite power, the systems must restart and operate for 24 hours, e Top Event HA. This top event models the availability of trsin A of decay heat river water and decay heat closed cycle cooling water systems. Given an ESAS actuation signal, these systems must automatically start and operate for 24 hours for success of Top Event HA. Success implies that cooling water is supplied to the train A cooling loads, including decay heat removal cooler 1A, reactor building spray pump 1 A, decay heat removal pump 1A, and makeup and purification pump 1A. | |||
e Top Event HB. This top event is similar to Top Event HA except that it depicts the equipment that supplies train B cooling loads of decay heat river water and decay heat closed cycle cooling systems. | |||
Success of Top Event HB implies that cooling water is provided to decay heat removal cooler 1B, reactor building spray pump 1B, decay heat removal pump 18, and makeup and purification pump IC. | |||
e Top Event CV. Top Event CV models the availability of the control building ventilation system, including the normal duty supply fans, the emergency duty supply fans, the associated chilled water system, and the control tower instrument air system. Success of Top Event CV implies that adequate cooling is provided to the control room, the relay room, the 4,160V switchgear rooms, the instrumentation room, the 480V switchgear rooms, and the battery charger rooms. Failure of cooled air circulation to any of these rooms is considered a system failure. Failure of Top Event CV is assumed to result in an overheating of equipment in all of these rooms and the eventual failure of all equipment these rooms contain. Consequently, a failure of Top Event CV is assumed to result in a loss of all AC power. Since the control building ventilation system is normally operating, it need only continue to operate for 24 hours after a 3-8 0581G101337 PMR | |||
plant trip for success of Top Event CV. . If offsite power is lost, | |||
(- the system fans, chillers, and chilled water pumps must be manually restarted and operate for 24 hours for system success. Each train of control building ventilation supplies all the system loads, so th( | |||
train dependencies need not be tracked separately. Recovery actions, to establish a portable, alternate ventilation system, are modeled if the normal system fails. | |||
Table 3-1 illustrates the intersystem dependencies modeled between support systems. Unlike Figures 3-1 through 3-4, this table describes the intersystem dependencies in terms of tne support system top events just described. Single support system top event failures are listed down the side, and the impact of each of these failures on other support system top events is then indicated. For some top events, the impacts are broken down into partial impacts on a given top event. For example, failure of Top Event OP (i.e., loss of offsite power) eliminates power from auxiliary transformer 1A to train A of vital AC power (Top Event GA), but does not affect diesel generator A. Such partial system effects are accounted for in the support model when quantifying the split fractions for each branch point in the support system event tree. Top event failures that result in complete failure of another support model top event (e.g., failure of Top Event GA catses failure of Top Event AA) are modeled by not branching at the affected Top Event AA along the sequences that include failure of the events it depends on (i.e., Top Event GA). The relationship of the support model event tree structure to | |||
,, the intersystem dependencies presented in Table 3-1 is described more fully in the next section. | |||
Table 3-1 lists only the effects of single support system top event failures on the remaining support model top events. The effects of multiple support model top event failures can usually be determined by superimposing the effect of single top event failures. However, in one instance, the effects of multiple top event failures is greater than the superimposition of the indiv! dual failures. | |||
If both OP and DA are failed, then the normally running train of control building ventilation (i.e., train A chiller and fans) would also be failed because no control power would. be available to restart this equipment. If offsite power is available, DC control power is not , | |||
necessary because this equipment is already operating. Failure of l offsite power alone does not degrade the control building ventilation system because all of its equipment may be loaded manually onto the diesels. Thus, in this case, failure of OP or DA alone does not significantly degrade the system, but failure of both does prevent one train from receiving electric power. A similar situation would exist on the train 8 side if it had been assumed to be normally running. This effect is accounted for when split fractions are assigned at the time the support model event tree is quantified. | |||
The footnotes of Table 3-1 provide additional insights into the l intersystem dependencies indicated. | |||
( | |||
(.) l 3-9 0581G101337PMR l | |||
3.2 SUPPORT SYSTEM EVENT TREE The support system top events are shown in the event tree that is presented in Figure 3-5. This same event tree structure is used for all the initiating events, but is quantified under different boundary conditions for some initiating events. The ordering and definition of top events is very important. To quantify the support system event tree, each top event nust be dependent only on the preceding events, not on those that follow it in the tree. For this reason, the ordering of the support system top events was complicated by the circular dependencies that result when two systems depend upon each other for support. These loops are easily identified in Table 3-1. The dependencies that appear below the diagonal are of this type because of the order in which the top events are arranged. In particular, when power is lost from offsite, the emergency diesel generators require DC power to start, but the DC system also eventually requires recharging from the diesels. These dependencies were separated by conservatively assuming that both the battery chargers and the batteries must supply power to the main DC distribution panels when evaluating Top Events DA and DB. Failure of the battery chargers was assumed to eventually result in failure of the diesels since DC control power is needed for the diesels to continue to run. Although the battery chargers are not needed to start the diesel, they would be needed for control in the long term. | |||
The control building ventilation, Top Event CY, and the nuclear services water, Top Event NS, alco exhibit such circular dependencies. Control building ventilation is needed to prevent the failure of the electrical switchgear that controls Mower to the systems that make up Top Event NS, while nuclear services .iosed cycle cooling water, in turn, is needed for the control building ventilation chillers. This situation was modeled by asking the nuclear services Top Event NS first. The conditional split fractions for Top Event NS are then quantified, assuming that control building ventilation is available. The dependence of control building ventilation on nuclear services is then easily modeled. In support model sequences in which the control building ventilation system fails although the nuclear services system is successful, the dependence of nuclear services on control building ventilation is accounted for in the assignment of impacts for those particular sequences. This will become more apparent in the next section when the support system model end states are described. Thus, these circular dependencies were broken, and their important features were accounted for in the support system model. | |||
There are 16 top events and 6,513 sequences in the support system event tree illustrated in Figure 3-5. The decision not to branch at any point in the tree is dictated by the dependencies documented in Table 3-1. If a particular top event is guaranteed to fail, then no branch is provided in the tree and the top event is assumed to be failed when evaluating subsequent top events and when assigning the impacts on frontline systems. For example, in sequence 10 of the support model event tree, there is no brauch under Top Event HB, which represents train 8 of decay heat closed cooling, because the train B engineered safeguards actuating signal (i.e., Top Event EB) has failed. Also, if DC or AC power is failed, there is no branching under the corresponding trains of decay 3-10 0581G101337PMR | |||
[d heat closed cooling; i.e., Top Events HA or HB. Combinations of top event failures may also preclude the need to branch at subsequent top events. An example of this is under Top Event GA along reduced event tree sequence 138. Both Top Events OP and DA are failed. Therefore, as indicated in Table 3-1, power via both the auxiliary transformer from offsite and the. train A standby diesel generator is precluded. Top Event GA is then guaranteed to be failed. | |||
The support system model is quantified 13 times. Each of the initiating events identified in Section 2 is evaluated using one of the following support system model runs: | |||
Run 1. General Transients Run 2. Loss of Offsite Power Run 3. Loss of DC Power Train A Run 4. Loss of River Water Run 5. Loss of Vital Bus ATA Run 6. Loss of Instrument Air Run 7. Loss of Nuclear Services Closed and Nuclear Service = River Water Run 8. Loss of Control Building Ventilation Run 9. Fire in AB-FZ-6, Hazard Scenario 1 Run 10. Earthquake of 0.15g Run 11. Earthquake of 0.25g Run 12. Earthquake of 0.40g Run 13. Earthquake of 0.60g O | |||
b The support model event tree is quantified, conditi;nal on the occurrence of spectfic groups of initiators, using the results for the support system split fractions. Table 3-2 identifies the support system split fractions applicable at each branch point. | |||
Table 3-2 is divided into three parts. The first part identifies the split fractions used for evaluation of sequence 1 in the support model event tree; i.e., when all top events are successful. Part 2 identifies the conditions under which other split fractions are to be used as a result of the failures of preceding top events ir. the tree. For example, split fraction GAB is to be used for Top Event GA instead of GAA if Top Event OP has failed (indicated by "0P F" next to GAB), as is the case for reduced event tree sequence 130 in Figure 3-6. By using conditional split fraction GAB, the quantification accounts for the partial dependence of Top Event GA on Top Event OP, as was indicated in Table 3-1. If OP fails, there is no AC power available from the auxiliary transformer. Success of Top Event GA then relies on the train A diesel generator. The reduced redundancy caused by failure of OP is then reflected in the greater failure frequency of split fraction GAB versus GAA. Part 3 of Table 3-2 identifies the minor changes made to parts 1 and 2 that are needed to quantify the other seven initiator categories. | |||
O 3 3-11 0581G101337PMR m | |||
3.3 SUPPORT SYSTEM STATES, The many sequences in the support system model event tree are each assigned to one of 39 support system end states. Each of these 39 sy port system states represents different success and failure combinations of support systams that impose boundary conditions on the frontline systems. | |||
The support model sequences were assigned to a particular ene state by recognizing which sequences have the same impact on the frontline systems and by recognizing that mt.ny other support model sequences have negligibly low occurrence frequencies relative to other scenarios producing the same or greater impact on frontline systems. These observations are used in the following way to assign the approximately 6,500 sequences in the support model event tree into just 39 support system states. | |||
The dependency table presented as Table 3-3 identifies the impact of support system top event failures on frontline systems. The support system top event failures are listed down the left side. Identif'ers for frontline system impacts are listed cross the top. These identifiers are defined in the table legend. Caseaded intersystem dependencies, reflecting support-to-support dependencies, are generally not reflected in the table. For example, f ailure of Top Event GA also causes failure of support system Top Event HA. However, Table 3-3 would not indicate the cascaded effect of HA failure on the frontline systems if its impact was in some way greater than GA failure. This type of cascaded effect is accounted for in the support model event tree structure. A second type of cascaded support-to-support dependencies is included in Table 3-2. | |||
The cascaded effects of control building ventilation system failure on frontline systems are accounted for. This was necessary in order to break the circular dependency between CV and GA and GB. Therefore, the impacts on the frontline systems of CV failure, which follows Top Events GA and GB in the tree structure, also account for the impacts of GA and GB failure. All frontline system segments, which depend in some manner on the status of support system top events, are represented in the dependency table. | |||
Table 3-3 is read in the same manner as Table 3-1 for support-to-support system dependencies. Failed frontline system segments are indicated by a "1" in the appropriate column The symbol "*1" indicates that a diff? rent type of suppor'.-tm frontline system dependency exists. This symbol indicates that sujport system failures in that row cause failure of a frontline system segmet, which renders the state of other frontline systems indicated by "*1" irrelevant. Thus, "*1" impacts can be used to consider frontline-to-frontline system dependencies that are triggered by support system failures. Consider the row in which support system Top Event DA fails. Failure of Top Event DA causes failure of frontline system impacts LPA and CSA. Since low pressure injection and containment spray A trains are both failed, it does not matter whether sump valve DH-V6A (SA) is functional. Although the sump valve is not supported by Top Event DA, it is modeled as if the sump valve were failed anyway. This approach helps to reduce the number of support tree 3-12 | |||
&lG101387PMR | |||
i sequences with a unique set of frontline system impacts to those that d result in a truly unique impact on plant performance. Footnotes d3 scribing these "*1" dependencies ? 'e identified by letters, dote that in Table 3-3 multiple support system top event failures, as well as single top event failures, are listed. The multiple support system top event f ailures are given to properly account for the combined effects of such failures, which are not always obtained by the superposition of single top event failure effects. For example, neither , | |||
the failure of Top Event DA or DB results in the failure of any of the containment fan coolers; i.e. , CFA, CFB, or CFC. Together, however, they ; | |||
prevent both of the reactor river pumps from starting; i.e., RRA and RRB. Without these pumps available, the containment fan coolers cannot , | |||
function. Therefore, a "*1" dependency is identified for the CFA, CFB, i and CFC frontline system impacts when both DA and DB fail. | |||
The last two columns in Table 3-3 are not associated with frontline $ | |||
systems. Column "CV" tracks whether the accident sequence resulted in a loss of control building ventilation. All such failure scenarios are combined into a single impact vector; i.e., IV2. All such scenarios are : | |||
then assumed to result in a total loss of all vital AC. . | |||
Column "KEY" is concerned with those support model sequences that involve a failure of vital AC power train B (i.e., Top Event GB failure) and : | |||
success of Top Event 1C. Currently, the model conservatively assumes ; | |||
that IC-ESV MCC is initially aligned to the B power train and does not h | |||
d transfer if power is lost, because an ESAS signal is always assumed present. This assumption is implemented by assuming that Top Event 1C l | |||
fails with frequency 1.0 if Top Event GB fails. Thus, the frequencies of all sequences with GB failed and 1C success are currently 0.0. The recovery actions to complete the transfer of IC-ESV MCC to vital AC power train A may be considered on a sequence-specific basis in the future. | |||
The support model event tree is structured to consider such possibilities. t The dependencies presented in Table 3-3 were orepared as input to the computer program ETC9 (Reference 3-1). ETC9 sorts through the 6,513 sequences in the support nodel e"ent tree to identify thnse , | |||
sequences that result in a unique set of impacts on the frontline ; | |||
system. ETC9 also allows the user to specify frontline system impactt t that are synnetrical. Eleven sets of symmetrical frontline system : | |||
impacts were identified among the impacts listed in Table 3-3 Thes: ! | |||
sets are identified in Table 3-4. These sets of frontline systems ac,e i not separated by trains in the frontline event tree tops; therefore, it ! | |||
does not matter which segments are affected; e.g., CDA or CDB. What does ! | |||
matter is how many trains are impacted; i.e. , 0,1, or 2. When executing 7 ETC9 to determine the unique sets of frontline system impacts, only the i number of trains affected are tracked for these symmetrical impacts. i This feature further allows us to reduce the number of unique impact vectors to those that are truly of interest. Of the 6,513 sequences in the support model event tree, only 1,114 unique sets of frontline system impacts, or impact vectors, were idertified. | |||
3-13 0581G101337PMR , | |||
The 1,114 unique impact vectors must be further reduced to an important few to facilitate quantification of the frontline event trees. This further reduction is accomplished by frequency binning. ETC9 sums the frequencies of those sequences with identical frontline system impacts. | |||
Such calculations were performed for runs 1 and 2; i.e., the general transient and loss of offsite power initiators. The summation of these low frequency impact vectors is then assigned as the frequency of a single end state, which represents all of the impact vectors grouped in this manner. For this single end state, the impacts on frontline systems are conservatively assumed to be complete; i.e., everything is failed. | |||
This conservative approach assumes that by not processing each of these grouped impact vectors individually, no high risk sequences are inadvertently omitted. The degree of conservatism is controlled by user specification of the impact vector cutoff frequency. | |||
The assignment of each of the reclining unique impact vectors to each support state was done conservatively. This means that tne impact on the frontline systems represented by each support system scenario assigned to a particular support state is the same or greater than the impact of any single unique impact vector assigned to that state. The frontline system impacts of a representative irpact vector listed in Table 3-5 are used to represent the support system state. Of ten, no one scenario assigned to a particular support state conservatively bounds all the frontline system irpacts of all other scenarios in that support state. In such cases, the representative frontline system impacts for that support state had to be augnented so that the representative impacts would be conservative. | |||
Table 3-5 indicates the assignment of those unique impact vectors that remair after frequency binning to one of the 39 support states. All of the impact vectors that remain af ter frequency binning for the general transient quantification are listed. For the loss of offsite power quantification, only those unique impact vectors remaining af ter frequency binning thtt are different from those of the general transient quantification are listed. These impact vectors are indicated by "+" | |||
symbols next to the impact vector number. The frequencies that appear next to the impact vector numbers are the total conditional frequencies of occurrence for all support model sequences assigned to that vector. | |||
The frontline impact column headings in Table 3-5 have been changed somewhat from those originally identified in Table 3-5. The 11 column headings appearing in Table 3-5 that end with an "X" correspond to the 11 symetrical impact columns identified in Table 3-4. These impact tolumns replace the corresponding impact column headings identified in Table 3-4 Consider rupport state 3 in Table 3-5 as an example. Ten unique impact vectors have been assigned to support state 3. The impacts defined for support state 3 are then the union of the impacts for the individual impact vectort assigned to that state. Note, for example, that support state 3 is assigned as impacting frontline columns CDS, CAA, CSB, and DHB. Impact vector IV814 impacts columns CDS and CAA only, whreas impact vector IV895 impacts only CSB and DHB of the four. Support state 3, however, is conservatively assumed to im;Tct all four of those columns and therefore can be used to conservatively represent both of these impact vectors. | |||
O 3-14 0581G101337PMR | |||
A modification to this conservative assignment of impact vectors is made for selected impacts. For example, in support state 3, only two of the ; | |||
HPI pump trains are assumed impacted, even though all three HPI trains are ir:pacted by at least one of the unique impact vectors assigned to , | |||
that support state. This is because none of the impact vectors alone ' | |||
affects all three trains. In this case, it was judged to still he 4 conservative to assume in the definition of support state 3, that or.ly 1 two HPI traire are affected. Table 3-6 spells out the frontline systems assumed to be . ailed for each support system state. | |||
Although the grouping of unique impact vectors into a reduced list of i support states has been done conservatively, care was taken to ensure that the degree of conservatism introduced was minimized. This was accomplished by ensuring that impact vectors with little impact on : | |||
frontline systems, but with relatively high frequencies, are not combined . | |||
with low frequency impact vectors that have substantial impact on the ! | |||
frontline systems. This ensures that the frequency of support states with substantial impacts on frontline systems are not artificially : | |||
inflated. l l | |||
After defining the support states, the ETC9 computer program was again ! | |||
used to quantify the conditional frequencies of each of these 39 support system states for each of 13 runs. The split fractions assigned are the i same as those used to determine the frequencies of the unique impact i vectors; i.e., Table 3-2. In this quantification of the support model p event tree, however, the frequencies of all of the impact vectors that ; | |||
contribute to each support state are summed. The results are presented : | |||
in Table 3-7. The results in Table 3-7, together with the representative , | |||
frontline system impacts of each support state, are the key output of the ' | |||
support model analysis. The frontline event trees are quantified, j conditional on one of these support system state quantifications and dependent on the particular initiating event being considered. ' | |||
==3.4 REFERENCES== | |||
f 3-1. Buttemer, D. R. , F. R. Hubbard, and D. M. Wheeler, "ETC9 (Event i Tret Jode 9) Computer Code Users Manual," Pickard, Lowe and l Garrick, Inc., PLG-0466, April 1986. | |||
i l | |||
3-15 0381G101337PMR | |||
TABLE 3-1. SUPPORT MODEL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES (lf,(2 L Sheet 1 of 3 | |||
^ | |||
t OP DA AA DB 1C E " | |||
Auxiliary Diesel I?OV 480V Auxiliary Diesel Transformer Generator Battery Charger Transfo.mer Generator Ba ttery Charger Ur -- X X TTK -- X X | |||
'GK -- -- X X X TK -- -- X X AK X -- -- | |||
W -- | |||
X X W I X X w | |||
0 W - -- | |||
cn Ir -- | |||
M TK (4) | |||
IT (4) | |||
E ftk TF rds) X X r X X X x x X x J | |||
*See sheet 3 of this table for notes. | |||
LEGEND: | |||
X = Failure; DP = Electrical Distribution System: GA = Electrical Distribution 3ystem (Emergency Channel A); GB = Electrical Distribution System (Emergency 3annel B); CV = Control Building Ventilation: DA = Channel A DC Distribution System; DB = Channel B, DC Distribution System; EA = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel A: EB = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel B; NS = Nuclear River Water, and the Nuclear ServicJs Closed Cycle Cooling Systems; HA = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train A; HB = Decay Heat River Water cnd the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train B; VA = Vital Instrument Buses VBA, VBC; AA = Instrument Bus ATA; VB = Vital Instrument Buses VBB, YBC; it = 480V MCC IC-ESV Swing Bus; AM = Compressed Air. | |||
0582G101487 | |||
O O O | |||
~ | |||
TABLE 3-1 (Continued)* | |||
Sheet 2 of 3 m us(6) cy(7) | |||
Support ' | |||
System Instrument Air Service Air g g River Closed g g Chiller Dampers Top Event Pumps Pumps Fans Failures A B A B A B C A l. B C A B A B AC DC W (8) (8) X X X X (9) (9) | |||
W X X X (10) | |||
M X X X X X X X X (11) | |||
VK (12) (12) w 17lr X X X Y W X X X X X X X X C w (12) X X T X (11) (11) w -- -- -- -- | |||
'EK - | |||
X X Tir -- X 1rs- _ __ .. __ __ __ __ __ x X x(13) x(13) w _- | |||
N .. | |||
IT -- -- -- -- | |||
I | |||
*See sheet 3 of this table for notes. | |||
LEGEM8: | |||
X = Failure; OP = Electrical Distribution System; GA = Electrical Distribution System (Energency Channel A); GB = Electrical Distribution System (Emergency Channel B); CV = Control Building Ventilation: DA = Channel A, DC Distribution Syste.a; DB = Channel B, DC Distribut? m System; EA = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel A; EB = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel 8; s | |||
NS = Nuclear l'iver Water, and the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Systems; HA = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle f ooling System - Train A; 2 = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train B; VA = Vital Ins trument Ruses VBA, VBC; AA = Instrument Bus ATA; VB = Vital Instrument Buses VBB, VBD; IC = 480V MCC 1C-ESV Swing Bus; M = 0+5.ed Air. | |||
n --....., | |||
-. _ .._, .. .. .,,- . - . . . . - . . , , - , -. ---.,_,s .,_,,,..m, --, ,m,, ,y- . . , , ,._, . | |||
'lABLE 3-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 3 NOTES: | |||
: 1. All rupport system top events are described in Section 3.1. | |||
: 2. Cascaded dependencies are not indicated in this table. For example, IT results in U and W, which in turn results in WK and TIK and WS but 'he latter are not indicated in the row for W because they are a cascaded dependencies. | |||
: 3. 480V IC-ESV KC is, for the purposes of this matrix, assumed to be aligned to the B power train. However, the ESAS signals are assumed to be present so that no credit is taken for the automatic transfer. If power train B is lost, this bus is assumed deenergized. | |||
: 4. The automatic start signal from ESAS is only needed when offsite power is lost, but in this case the bus undervoltage provides a redundant start signal. Consequently, failure of the ESAS signal does not impact R or LT. | |||
: 5. The indirect effects of U on support system events are not Indicated in this row. Of rectly, CV only disables electrical equipment located in the control building. | |||
: 6. For the purpose of preparing the dependency matrix only, the A and C nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water pumps are assuned to be operating and selected to receive ESAS actuation. The B pumps are in standby and assumed aligned to electric power tiain A. The nuclear services river water discharge valve for pump B (NS-VlB) is normally aligned to electric power train B via 480V IC-ESV motor control center. Train B of auxiliary building ventilation is assumed to be normally operating with train A in standby. | |||
: 7. The A fan train of control building ventilation is assumed to be normally operating with the B fan train in standby. When offsite power is lost, manual start of the standby or restart of th? normally operating train is required. | |||
w 08. | |||
03 Assuming an ESAS signal is presen' the instrument air compressors must be manually restarted once AC power is restored. If an ESAS signal is not present, they are automatically restarted when power is restored. | |||
: 9. If no ESAS signal was present, then the operator would have to manually start these Class I auxiliary building ventilation fans from the control room. | |||
: 10. The A side chillers and fans are assumed to be normally operating for this matrix, thus the breakers on this train are already closed and DC power is not needed. | |||
: 11. Tne building teilet and outlet dampers, which close to place the control building ventilation system in the recirculation mode, are powered from 480V KC IC-ESV and IN 480V turbine or reactor and containment building heating bus. Bus IN is assumed fed from 4,160V engineered safeguards bus 1D; i.e., Top Eveet GA. On loss of IN, the dampers fall to the recirculation position but can still be manipulated from the control room. | |||
On loss of KC IC-ESV, the recirculation dampers fail as is and the outside air damper (AH-DS) closes. The operators must then locally reopen this damper. | |||
: 12. Given TKor W failure, the vital instrument buses would deenergize causing certain actuation of the corresponding channels (two of three required for ESAS train actuation). However, the causes of TK arm W may not be the same bus failures that result in deenergizing the vital instrument buses. Consequentlyg no credit is taken for these fr _ sees causing ESAS actuation. | |||
: 13. If the chillers are needed for control building ventilation (i.e., if the outside air temperature is greater than 84*F1 NS is required. | |||
058?G10148 | |||
O C . | |||
. TABLE 3-2. SPLIT FRACTIONS USED IN QUANTIFICATION OF THE SUPPORT MODEL-EVENT TREE FOR GENERAL TRANSIENTS PART R1M2 I, SPLIT FRACTIONS UsED SPLIT FRACTION NAME OF EVENT NAME OPA OFF-SaeC ELECTRIC POWER DAA DC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN A CAA iC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN A VAA '*/I T AL INSTRUMENT BUS VBA AND VBC AAA % ITAL INSTRUMEt4T BUS ATA DDA 13C ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN B CDA AC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN 8 VBA VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS VBB AND V9D ICA ES VALVES MCC IC AMA INSTRUMENT AIR AND RECOVERY EAA 1600 PSI ENGINEERED SAFECUARDS A EDA 1600 PSI ENCINEERED SAFECUARDS B NSA NUCLEAR SERVICES COOLING SYSTEM HAA DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SUPPORT TRAIN A HUA DECAY HEAT REf10 VAL SUPPORT TRAIN B CVA CONTROL BUILDINC VENTILATION SYSTEM Y | |||
G | |||
TABLE 3-2 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 2 PART 2 CONDITIONS FOR USING ALTERNATE SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR THE CENERAL TRANSIENT INITIATOR CAD OP F VAD DA F CA F AAD VA F AAC VA F CA F DDD DA F CDD CA F CDC OP F CDD OP F CA F VDD DA F CA F VDC DD F CD F ICD OP F DD F ICD CD F AMD OP F AMD CD F OP F AND CD D OP F AMD CA F OP F AMD CA D OP F AMC CA F CD F OP F AMC CA D CD F OP F AMC CA F CD D OP F AMC CA B CD D OP F EDD EA F NSD EA F FJSD ED F Gs tJSE EA F ED F | |||
[ NSD OP F o tJSC CA F NSC OP F DA F NSC CD F NSC OP F DD F FJSC DA F DD F tJSC DA F CD F NSC DD F CA F NSG CA F CD F HAD DA F HAD CA F HAD EA F HDD HA F DA S CA S EA S HDC DD F HDC CD F HDC ED F CVD OP F CVC CA F CVC DA F OP F CVD NS F CVE VD F CVF CD F CVF OP F DD F | |||
> VC NS F CA F CVC NS F DA F OP F O O O | |||
t TABLE 3-3. EFFECTS OF SUPPORT SYSTEM TOP EVENT FAILURES ON FRONTLINE SYSTEMS Sheet 1 of 13 FRONit.1NE SYSTEMS (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) | |||
SUPPORT SYSTEM CONDITIONS e CIA CIB CDS CAA CDA CDD CFA CFD CFC RRA RRD CSA CF9 DHA DHD DTV EPA EPB EVA EVD H1A HID HL1 HLA HLB e.......... pee...................eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee............................................... | |||
oP F e 1 (c) | |||
DA F e 1 1 1 1 el CA F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VA F e 1 AA F | |||
* 1 (B) (C) | |||
DD F e 1 1 1 1 *1 el CD F | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VD F | |||
* 1 , | |||
C F e 1 1 1 AM F e EA F e 1 ED F e (A) 1 NS F e 1 1 1 1 e1 *1 (38) (37) (C) | |||
HA F e 1 1 +1 HD F e 1 1 CV | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 F | |||
F (38) DD F e1(A).1(A).1 1 1 et(r)1 (g)(G)11 el(DTI *1 DA DA FD F e 1 B) (() | |||
1 en e(El) 1 el 1 el 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 1 1 1 | |||
1 et 1 1 | |||
1 1 el 1 el et 1 | |||
[ | |||
1 D9 F CA F e 1 1 el 1 +1 1 e1 *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 1 1 1 el el 1 e1 Y~ OP F DA F e 1 (E) 1 1 1 1 +1 et N OP F HA F e 1 1 1 et et | |||
" e el CB F HA F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 el 1 +1 ~ et 1 1C F DA F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 et IC F HA F e 1 1 1 1 et i et NS F DA F e 1 1 1 1 1 el 1 1 1 el el NS F HA F e 1 1 1 1 +1 et 1 1 og et . | |||
CA F CD F e 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 1 DA F HD F e 1 1 1 1 1 et I et el et el | |||
' et el et et CA F HD F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 HA F DD F e 1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 el el et et HA F CD F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 el 1 el el 1 HA F HB F e 1 1 1 1 el et el et +1 3 CD D 1C S e CD F IC S e 1 1 1 1 1 1 's 1 1 1 | |||
. - - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ - _ , - . _ , _ . . _ . . . _ . - . . _ . , _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . , _ . . _ . . _ . , _ . . . . . _.- _ _--_ . - .. - . . - _ . . . _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ . . . - - -~ . | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 2 of 13 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS (16) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (30) (31) | |||
SUPPORT SYSTEM CCNDITIONS | |||
* HP(16)PD(16)C AH HF LPA LPD MF+ F P T F1F- MR PO1 PDA RC HP SA SD SEA(27) | |||
INJ(17) SED{3128) | |||
. SA(29)16A 30 16D TC2 TH1 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee** esse ++eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee****ee OP F | |||
* 1 1 1 (I) 1 | |||
*1 1 1 DA F | |||
* 1 1 1 (H) 1 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 CA F 1 VA F | |||
* AA F | |||
* 1 1 1 (I) | |||
* 1 1 1 (H) *1 1 1 DD F 1 1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 1 *1 1 CD F 1 VD F | |||
* 1 1 e 1 1C F 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
* 1 AM F EA F e 1 1 1 ED F e 1 1 NS F * (37) 1 (37) (37) 1 (I) 1 1 HA <- e 1 1 +1 (I) | |||
HD F e 1 1 *1 (J) | |||
*1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1 CV F ( gg | |||
* 1 1 1 DA F Ch )F | |||
* 1 1 (K) 1 1 1 1 1 1 (N) e1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 DA F C1) F | |||
* 1 1 1 el 1 1 1 1 1 1(L)1(M) *1 et 1 1 (0) 1 1 1 e 1 +1 1 1 1 1 el 1 *1 *1 *1 1 +1 1 el 1 1 1 DD F CA F 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 1 OP F DA F 1 1 el 1 e 1 1 1 y OP F HA F 1 | |||
#1 *1 *1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 *1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 e CD F HA F 1 el 1 1 1 y IC F DA F | |||
* e 1 | |||
1 1 1 1 | |||
1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 3C F HA F 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 NS F DA F e 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 el 1 1 NS F HA F *1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 CA F CD F 1 | |||
*1 +1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA F HD F +1 1 | |||
* 1 =, 1 1 1 *1 1 *1 1 1 1 CA F HD F 1 1 | |||
*1 *1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 HA F DD F 1 | |||
#1 HA F GB F | |||
* 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 *1 1 e1 el 1 1 1 1 | |||
* 1 1 1 e1 +1 HA F HD F 1 CD D IC S | |||
* el 1 1 1 1 1 CD F 1C S | |||
* 1 1 1 1 O O e | |||
. _.. - .- . - . - . _ . . _ - _ . ~ . - - .. . - . . . - . - , . - . - . _ . - | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) . - . | |||
Sheet 3 of 13 , | |||
FRONTLINE SYSTEhS (32) e THA THD (33) TT (34) 2HR(35) | |||
MEY(;V36) | |||
SUPPORT SYSTEM CONDITIONS L 8 | |||
........................... ........ ..eeeeeen....eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeen................... | |||
DP F | |||
* DA F e 1 . | |||
CA F e 1 ; | |||
VA F e AA F e {p} | |||
DD F e el CD F e 1 VS F e 1C F e AM F e (p 1 i EA F e el) | |||
ED F e e | |||
el 'l NS F ! | |||
HA F | |||
* HD F e el CV F e 1 1 1 1 DA F DD F e el 1 j DA F CD F e el 1 1 (g) g DD F CA F e 1 el #1 OP F DA F e el 1 | |||
* OP F HA F e et ' | |||
g CD F HA F e el 'l s IC F DA F e el 1 i N 1C F HA F e +1 1 NS F DA F -e el 1 I | |||
HS F HA F e el CA F C8 F e 1 1 e I DA F HD F el 1 CA F HD F e 1 et HA F DD F e et HA F CD F e el 1 . | |||
HA F HD F e el . | |||
CD D AC S | |||
* 1 CD F 1C S e 1 1 i | |||
~l r | |||
i i | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 4 of 13 LEGEND: | |||
1 Indicates that the frontline equipment represented by this column is failed as a result of the loss of support systems indicated. | |||
*1 Indicates that a dependency between frontline columns exists. For example, if all three fan coolers cannot function because of loss of support systems, the status of the river water pumps is no longer important. The dependent columns are assigned an impact of "*1" in order to minimize the number of unique impact vectors to be assigned later to the support model tree sequences as end states. Such impacts are only assigned if no direct support to frontline column dependency exists. | |||
O O | |||
0582G101387PMR 3-24 | |||
- i TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
SUPPORT SYSTEM IMPACTS ON FRONTLINE SYSTEMS Sheet 5 of 13 Description of Equipment Failed UE " | |||
* p g CIA Motor-Dperated Containment Isolation Valves Powered Cl,C2 frcui Vital C Power Train A (AH-VlB, MU-V25, WDG V-3, and WDG-V-303) | |||
CIB Motor-0perated Containment Isolation Valves Powered C1,C2. ; | |||
from Vital AC Power Train B (AH-VIC, MUV-2A, 2B and MU V26) | |||
CDS Pressuriter Spray Valve and/or Reactor Coolant kumps (RC-V-1 CD RC P-I A, B, C, and D) | |||
CAA Control Power for the Atmospheric Dump Valves or for Automatic CD Control of the Pressurizer Spray Valve (MS-V-4A, 48, and RC-V-1) r CDA Motor-Operated Low Pressure Injection Valve DH-V4A CD QB Motor-Operated Low Pressure Injection Valve DH-V4B CD CFA Train A Containment Fan Cooler AH-E-lA) CF CFB Train B Containment Fan Cooler AH-E -18 ) CF ; | |||
CFC Train C Containment Fan Cooler AH-E-lC) CF ; | |||
RRA Reactor River Pump Train A (RR-PI A) CF RRB Reactor River Pump Train B (RR-PIB) CF l CSA Containment Spray Pump Train A (BS-PI A) CS : | |||
CSB Containment Spray Pump Train B (BS-P18) CS = | |||
DHA Rm Pump Train A (DH-P-1A) DH r DE RHR Pump Train 8 (DH.P-18) DH l | |||
DTV Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve (RC-Y4) and Dropline Valves j (DH-V1, 2, 3) DT e EPA Motor-Operated Emergency Feedwater Pump Train A (EF-P-2A) EF. ' | |||
EPB Motor-Operated Emergency Feedwater Pump Train B (EF-P-28) EF- i EVA EFW Flow Control Valves Powered from VBA (EF-V-30A/C) EF- . | |||
j EYB HIA EFW Flow Control Valves Powered from VBB (EF-Y-308/D) | |||
High Pressure Injection Yalves Powered from Vital AC Train A (MU-Y-16A/B) | |||
EF. | |||
HI I | |||
t HIB High Pressure injection Valves Powered from Vital AC Train B (MU-V-16C/D) HI HL1 Decay Heat Removal Dropline Valves (DH-Yl,2,3) HL HLA Piggyback Cooling Valves (DH-V7A) HL HLB Piggyback Cooling Valves (DH-V78) dL . | |||
HPA High Pressure Injection Pump Train A (MU-P-1A) HPA l HPB High Pressure Injection Pump Train B (MU-P-18) HPA , | |||
HPC High Pressure Injection Pump Train C (MU-P-lC) HPB INJ RCP Seal Injection Valves (MU V20,Y32) INJ LPA Automatic Initiation of Rm Pump Train A (DH.P-1 A) LP LPB Autorsatic Initiation of Rm Pump Train B (DH-P-18) LP MF+ Integrated Control System or MFW "alves (NYSA/B) MF+ | |||
FPT Power To Trip the Main Feedwater Pumps (FW-PIA /1B) MF+ l Main Feedwater System Ability To Provide (4PI A/lB, CO-PI A, B, O MF- MF-and CD-P2A, B, and C) Mequate Cooling to the Steam Generators ! | |||
MR Makeup Pump Recirculation Valves (%V36,37) MR i PD1 Autcasatic Pressure Control for the Power-Operated Relief Valve (RC-RY2) PO i PDA Manual Power-Operated Relief Valve Operation (RC-RV2) PO r RC Block Valve for the PDRV (RC-V-2) RC l RP Reactor Coolant Pump ( A, B, C, and D) RP SRA Reactor Building Sump Valve (DH-V6A) SA SRB Reactor Building Sump Valve (DH-V68) SB SEA Intermediate Closed Coolin SE Seals (IC-V-3 and IC-V-4) g Pump Train lA or Flow Path to the RCP SE , | |||
SEB Intermediate Closed Coolin ' | |||
Seals (IC-V-3 and IC-4-4) g Pump Train IB or Flow Path to the RCP St Main Steam Isolation Yalves (M'. Y-1 A, B, C, and D) SI ! | |||
SA Motor-Operated MVSA/MY92A and SLRDS ktuation SL i 16A Air-Operated FV-V17A/%V16A and SLRDS ktuation SL ) | |||
SB Motor Operated %V58/FW-V928 and SLRDS ktuation SL l 16B Air-Operated %V178/FW-Y168 and SLRDS ktuation SL TC2 Steam Line Valves to Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TC (MS-V-13A/B ,10A/B ) | |||
TH1 Makeup Valve (MU-V217) TH THA Train A HPI Injection Valves MU-VlM and B TH i Tm Train B HPI Injection Yalves MU-V16C and D TH I TT Mechanical Turbine Trip Signal TT l 2m Instrument Af r/ Service Air (Failure requires 2-hour bottles to function) EF. I (IA-PIA /lB and SA-PIA /lB) j i | |||
3-25 0582G101387PMR f | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 6 of 13 FOOTNOTES: | |||
: 1. Cascaded intersystem dependencies are not indicated in this table. For control building ventilation, however, it was required to list some cascaded dependencies to break the circular dependencies between it and the AC electric power systems. For example, although control building ventilation CV does not directly cool motor-driven energency feedwater pump A, represented by column EPA, a dependency is listed because it does cool the vital AC switchgear GA, which provides power to the pump. Top Event GA precedes Top Event CV in the tree structure, so the impacts of GA failure had to be listed as cascaded effects of CV failure. | |||
The following frontline top events are not modeled in this table because they do not depend on support systems for success: LT, PV, PW, RE, RV, 50, SV, BA, BB, BW, CA, CB, ID, RT, and TR. | |||
: 2. Containment penetrations modeled in Top Events C1, C2, and C3 are considered under these two frontline system designators. Each such penetration has two isolation valves, at least one of which is air-operated and fails closed on loss of air or control power. The impacts shown are only for the motor-operated isolation valves. CIA tracks those powered frc'n Train A of electric power, and CIB tracks those powered from Train B. The actuation signals are modeled as part of frontline Top Events CA and CB. The 1,600 psig actuation signal to this equipment is not modeled, so there is no dependence shown on EA or EB. | |||
3 For effective cooldown and depressurization using pressurizer spray, any one RCP must operate (i.e., OP and NS are required) and the operator must be able to position the pressurizer spray valve; i.e., GA is required. | |||
: 4. Column CAA tracks the atmospheric dump valves dependence on vital instrument bus ATA. If no power is available from ATA, the operator must align the 61 ternate supply from ATB to accomplish cooldown and depressurization. | |||
: 5. The low pressure injection valves, which must open for long-term low pressure core heat removal, only require vital AC power to function; i.e. GA and GB. | |||
: 6. The containment fan ecoler system is subdivided into three fan trains (CFA, CFB, and CFC) and two purp trains of river water (RRA and RRB). | |||
Failure of two or three fan trains or of both pump trains results in complete system failure. Actuation signals fcr this system are modeled in frontline Top Events CA and CB. | |||
9 0582G101587PMR | |||
r TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 7 of 13 | |||
: 7. The reactor building spray pumps must start automatically for success. | |||
The 4 psig spray valves actuation signals are modeled in frontline Top , | |||
Events (CA and CB), however, not EA or EB. The 30 psig spray pump actuation signal is analyzed in the spray system analysis. | |||
: 8. For the purpose of long-term decay heat removal, the LPI pumps are started manually. No dependence on ESAS is assumed. , | |||
: 9. Column OTV tracks the dependence of the auxiliary spray valve and the ; | |||
dropline valves on MCC IC-ESV. One of these flow paths is required to prevent long-term boron concentration effects. l | |||
: 10. The motor-driven EFW pumps require DC and AC power to start and run. ; | |||
Nuclear services closed cooling is used for pump room cooling, but the , | |||
pumps are assumed to be able to operate for long periods of time without it. The EFW pumps are started automatically on-low steam ! | |||
generator level. No dependence on ESAS is assumed since it'is not t required to start these pumps. No support systems are required for the ' | |||
turbine- driven EFW pump; i.e., MS-V6 fails open on loss of air or DC ; | |||
;;ower; also see footnote 30. | |||
: 11. Columns EVA and EVB track the dependence of emergency feedwater flow ! | |||
s control valves EF-V-30 A/C and EF-V-30 B/0, respectively, on vital ' | |||
instrument buses VBA and VBB, respectively. These valves fail closed , | |||
on loss of control power. Failure of both sets of vital instrument , | |||
buses immediately following a plant trip is very unlikely. However, ! | |||
failure of both A and B vital power trains, which would lead to failure ' | |||
of VBA and VBB is much more likely. Both immediate and delayed impacts '; | |||
of losing VBA and VBB are accounted for. However, if only one of EVA | |||
* and EYB are impacted, the effect is conservatively assumed to be immediate; if both EVA and EVB are impacted, both are assumed lost, but i only after 2 hours when the batteries drain down. The situation where both VBA and VBB are failed irrediately ,is neglected. l | |||
: 12. EFW isolation valvas EF-V52/55 and EF-V53/54 provide a redundant means f of isolating EFW from the steam generators should an EF-V30 valve fail > | |||
to adecuardy control flow. However, the motors from these valves are being removed so that nc support dependency is tracked. | |||
: 13. The HPI injection valves are tracked by columns HIA and HIB. The t MU-V16s require an ESAS signal and AC power for success of Top Event HI, 14 This column models the decay heat removal dropline valves, which are powered from 1C-ESV 480V FCC. The model assumes a local action is | |||
, required to open these valves if IC-ESV is not available, 1 | |||
b v , | |||
0582G101337PMR 3-27 | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 8 of 13 | |||
: 15. The piggyback valves DH-V7A and 78 require vital AC power to open. | |||
They must be manually opened for high pressure recirculation. An automatic actuation signal is not required. | |||
: 16. Pump B of HPI is powered from vital AC power train 8 but receives its supply of water for injection from the BWST via a valve that is powered from train A. Thus, the B pump train depends on both vital AC train A and B. The B pump is assumed normally operating so that it has no dependence on DC train B. The oil pumps for the HPI pump B are powered from IC-ESV 480V MCC. | |||
: 17. Column INJ accounts for the RCP seal injection line. Air-operated valve MU-V20 must remain open for system success. Loss of compressed air causes the valve to shut. Therefore, INJ is failed if AM fails. | |||
MU-V32, which is also included in the analysis of Top Event INJ, fails open on less of compressed air. | |||
: 18. The equipment represented by these columns (i.e., for LPA and IPB) is the same as for DHA and DHB except that automatic initiation signals are required. Thus, failure of EA or EB causes f ailure of LPA or LP8, respectively. | |||
: 19. Column MF+ models the equippent whose failure might result in an overfeeding of the steam generators by the main feedwater system after a plant trip. The feedwater block valves FW-V5A/B must close to prevent overfeeding. The feedwater control valves are assumed to leak too much to prevent overfeeding if only they are closed. Loss of GA or GB is therefore assumed to result in failure of NF+. Only if offsite power is lost as an initiator is overfeeding prevented despite failure of one of these block valves. If offsite power is lost subsequently, it is assumed to be lost too late to prevent the overfeeding. This is a conservative assumption because a fraction of the time OP may fail in time to prevent excessive cooling. | |||
The feedwater flow control valves fail to the midposition on loss of vital bus ATA, which is also assumed to result in failure of the integrated control system to adequately ramp back main feedwater. | |||
: 20. Column FPT tracks the dependence of main feedwater pump trip on DC power train B. If the feedwater pumps must be tripped in time to prevent overfeeding; DC power train B is required. | |||
: 21. Main feedwater is failed whenever offsite power is lost because the condensate and condensate booster pumps stop. DC power train A is needed to control the inlet valves for the condenser vacuum pumps. | |||
Without control power, these valves go shut and vacuum is lost in the condenser. Vital instrument bus ATA is needed to supply control power to keep the turbine bypass valves open. Main feedwater is assumed failed if flow through these valves cannot be maintained. Loss of air 3-28 0582G101387PMR | |||
i TABLE 3-3 (continued) i Sheet 9 of 13 fails the flow control valves as is and the feedwater pumps to the low , | |||
speed stop position. | |||
: 22. Column MR tracks the power requirements to reopen the HPI pumps' ! | |||
~ | |||
minimum-flow recirculation line' (1.e. , MU-V36, 37), which is required when throttling HPI. , | |||
: 23. The short-term dependence of the PORY on AA and VA for pressure relief , | |||
is modeled by P01. The long-term action necessary for cooldown and , | |||
depressurization or for bleed and feed cooling is modeled by PDA; AA : | |||
and VA are not needed for_ PDA. DC power train A (i.e., DA) is needed . | |||
to power the PORY solenoid valve. These dependencies only have an , | |||
impact if the support systems are lost before the PORY is demanded. l | |||
: 24. Column RC models the dependence of the motor-operated PORY block valve : | |||
RC-V-2 on IC-ESV-MCC. This valve need only function if the PORY fails ; | |||
to reseat. j | |||
: 25. The reactor coolant pumps require offsite power to operate. Nuclear- ! | |||
service NS is needed for RCP motor-cooling. The dependence of the RCPs ; | |||
for thermal barrier cooling on the intermediate closed cooling water - | |||
If compressed air O system is modeled in frontline systems SEA and SEB. | |||
is lost (i.e., AM failure), the intermediate closed cooling system isolation valves (IC-V3 and V4) fail closed, as does the seal injection i | |||
valve MU-V20. Therefore, since all seal cooling is lost if AM fails, the reactor coolant pumps automatically trip off on loss of both seal injection and intermediate closed cooling flow. - | |||
: 26. The sump valves (DH-V6A/B) only require vital AC power to operate. | |||
: 27. Columns SEA and SEB account for the intermediate clcsed cooling water system pump trains. Failure of compressed air; i.e., AM fails and t causes isolation valves IC-V3 and IC-Y4 to close. Valve IC-V3 is powered from DC train A and IC-Y4 is powered from DC panel 1M, but both ! | |||
valves fail open on loss of control power. Therefore, failure AM fails ! | |||
both columns SEA and SEB. | |||
If offsite power is lost, the standby-intermediate closed cooling water pump will start when power is l restored, provided an ESAS signal is not present. The dependence of l SEA and SEB is tracked by column RP. When RP is impacted and SEA and ! | |||
SEB are not, OP has failed. Under these conditions, the split fraction : | |||
for Top Event SE assumes the standby pump must start and run. The support systems for the flow path for seal injection to the reactor , | |||
coolant pumps are tracked in column INJ. DC power is not needed to start the pumps, so there is no dependence on DA or DB. l f | |||
O ; | |||
0582G101387PMR 3-29 l | |||
\ | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 10 of 13 | |||
: 28. The main steam isolation valves are powered from IC-ESV 480V MCC. The EF-V-30s depend on vital instrument buses VBA and VBB, but they fail closed on loss of power. Therefore, no dependence is modeled on these support systems for the steam generator isolation function. | |||
: 29. These four columns track the support dependencies for the two air-operated and the two motor-operated valves on each steam generator, which are closed by a SLRDS actuation signal (part of heat sink protection system) in the event of low steam generator pressure. | |||
Columns 5A and 16A track the support dependencies of the four valves on steam generator A. Columns 58 and 168 track the support dependencies of the valves on steam generator B. FW-V-92A (B) shares the same support dependencies as FW-V-5A(B), respectively. FW-V-17A(B) shares the same support dependencies as valve FW-V-16A(B), respectively. Vital instrument buses VBA and VBB provide the power for SLRDS actuation signals to the corresponding train of motor-operated isolation valves and to the opposite train of air-operated valves. However, loss of these control power sources actuates the SLRDS signal so that no dependency is shown in the matrix. Vital AC power is needed to close the corresponding motor-operated valves. Vital 125V DC power is needed to close the corresponding trains of air-operated valves. Closing of valves FW-V-17A/B alone is assumed sufficient to limit the potential for vessel failure as a result of a pressurized thermal shock condition. Leakage may occur past these valves, but this leakage is acsured to be insufficient to be of concern from a PTS standpoint. | |||
: 30. Column TC2 tracks the dependence of the air-operated MS-Y13s and the DC motor-operated MS-V10s on DC power for steam generator tube rupture events when they must close to isolate the affected rteam generator. | |||
Either DC train failing causes failure of TC2. Failure of either vital AC power trains would eventually result in failure of the corresponding DC trains, at which time the corresponding MS-V13 valve would open. | |||
The MS-Y13s fail open on loss of air and are not on the 2-hour bottles. | |||
31 Column TH1 tracks the support dependencies for make up valve MU-V217 This valve is powered from a non-vital bus (1A-auxiliary building H+V). If offsite power is failet af ter plant trip, it is assumed that the valve has been opened prior to the loss of power but may have no power to close subsequently in order to throttle HPI. The fraction of time OP fails prior to the demand to throttle is considered in the split fraction evaluation. | |||
32 Columns THA and THB track the dependencies of the MU-V16s on vital AC power, which is needed to accomplish throttling of HPI. | |||
: 33. This frontline system tracks the mechanical trip circuit dependence on DC power train A. Turbine trip is still possible using the electrical trip circuit without DC power train A. | |||
05B2G101587PMR | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) ! | |||
k v | |||
Sheet 11 of 13 | |||
: 34. If OP is failed and an engineered safeguards signal has occurred, the operators must manually load the instrument air compressors onto the i vital AC buses. If compressed air is not restored (i.e., AM fails) i within 20 minutes, then the emergency feedwater flow control valves must be supplied compressed air via the 2-hour bottles. Column 2HR ; | |||
tracks this dependency. ! | |||
: 35. For this analysis, MCC 1C ESV is assumed to~be initially aligned to f train 8 of vital AC power. Though IC has automatic bus transfer i capability, the presence of an ESAS signal prevents the_ transfer. No ! | |||
credit was conservatively assumed for the transfer. The event tree structure allows success of Top Event 1C in the event that the normal i power source is failed, but these sequences are currently assigned frequencies of zero. Column KEY tracks these zero frequency sequences.- | |||
: 36. Column CV tracks the sequences through the event tree that involve : | |||
failure of Top Event CV. All sequences involving CV failure are mapped + | |||
to the same support state. 1 t | |||
: 37. These pump rooms are cooled by the auxiliary building ventilation l system included in support system Top Event NS. No dependence is i O assumed because their motors are also cooled directly by systems ; | |||
included in Top Events HA and HB. i | |||
: 38. An eventual loss of all AC is assumed to result if control building , | |||
ventilation fails. The cascaded effects of this total loss of all AC are included in the table, j | |||
: 39. The following footnotes describe the frontline to frontline column l dependencies, which are indicated by "*1" in the table- ! | |||
A. The fans do not require DC power for control, whereas the river t water pumps do. An indirect effect is modeled for failure of NS. ! | |||
Since failure of NS fails all three fan trains, it does not matter ! | |||
if the river water pump trains are successful. To reduce the i number of unique impact vectors, the river water pump trains are ; | |||
modeled as impacted if NS fails. Similarly, if both RRA and RRB ' | |||
are impacted, the fan coolers cannot function. ; | |||
B. If HPI pump C is not available, then the status of the corresponding HPI injection valves is not important. (Note that by locally opening the crosstie valves, the A or B makeup pumps may ' | |||
inject through the MU-Y16C+D) | |||
C. If support conditions are such that one of the LPI pumps is not available, the availability of the piggyback valve for that train ; | |||
is not important. : | |||
O i 3'31 0582G101387PMR ) | |||
i | |||
~ - . . | |||
TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
Sheet 12 of 13 | |||
: 0. If support conditions are such that both LPI pumps are unavailable, the availability of the dropline is not important; therefore, the split fraction for 1C failure is used. | |||
E. If both RCP seal injection (i.e., columns HPA, HPB, and HPC) and thermal barrier cooling (i.e., columns SEA and SEB) are lost, then the RCPs must be shut down and RCS cooldown and depressurization using pressurizer spray is precluded. | |||
F. If all HPI pumps or both LPI pumps are unavailable, then RCS cooldown and depressurization using auxiliary pressurizer spray is precluded. | |||
G. If both HPI pumps A and B are unavailable, then the status of the corresponding HPI injection valves is not important. | |||
H. If column MF+ is failed, then MF- failure is assumed because either the operator must trip the feedpumps or the overcooling will eventually lead to failure of the purp turbines. | |||
I. If support conditions are such that a LPI pump is unavailable, the status of the corresponding containment sump valve is not important. | |||
J. MU-V-217 is powered from non-engineered safeguards bus IA auxiliary building H and V, the power to which is modeled by Top Event OP. | |||
Failure of CV does not cause failure of OP, but does fail power to all three makeup pumps. Therefore, the status of TH1 given CV failure is unimportant. | |||
K. If no HPI pumps are available, then the status of the RCP seal injection valves is not important. | |||
L. For support system conditions that ensure overcooling of the steam generators as a result of excessive main feedwater, automatic RCS pressure relief via the PORY is not important; i.e., MF+ and FPT are both impacted, j M. If HPI is not available either because the pumps are unavailable or ; | |||
the injection valves do not open, the capability to hold open the j PORY is not important because HPI cooling is not possible. I l | |||
N. The Top Event RP is asked to determine whether an ATWS can be I mitigated. If HPI is failed, ATWS was thought to not be mitigated; , | |||
therefore, column RP is assigned an impact. | |||
l l | |||
l l | |||
0582G101387PMR 3-32 | |||
/~' TABLE 3-3 (continued) | |||
L,)) | |||
Sheet 13 of 13 | |||
: 0. For support conditions where steam generator overcooling is assured, the status of main steam isolation or of SLRDS actuation is not important. Steam generator overcooling would occur if frontline columns MF+ and FPT are both impacted. An impact of MF+ | |||
means that overfeeding would occur, and an impact on FPT indicates that the control power to remotely trip the main feedwater pumps is lost. In evalu3 ting the likelihood of PTS-caused vessel failure, no distinction is drawn between continued overfeeding and a sequence involving steamline break without isolation. | |||
P. If the A or 8 side of HPI pumps fail, then the corresponding HPI pumps need not be throttled. | |||
Q. For support conditions where initial feedwater overcooling is assured, followed by a guaranteed loss of main feedwater, the status of turbine trip is not important. | |||
bl v | |||
9 V | |||
0582G101337PMR 3-33 | |||
TABLE 3-4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACTS COMBINED DUE TO SYMMETRY Combined Top Set of Top Event Events Designator Combined , | |||
CIX CI4 CIB COX CDA CDB CFX CFA CFB CFC RRX RRA RRB EYX EVA EVB EPX EPA EPB , | |||
HLX HLA HLB SLA 5A 16A SLB 5B 16B SEX SEA SEB THX THA THB O | |||
0582G101387PMR 3-34 | |||
h e e e e e e , | |||
e e e e . | |||
l | |||
-m s :. :e ! | |||
t e e , | |||
\s) e e ne e | |||
= - = = , | |||
e e | |||
de | |||
* e N | |||
e e e | |||
e ae go | |||
=== =========== aa === = == *** a a > | |||
o ee e o | |||
" *e ue a*** | |||
e aee m o + | |||
9 * <* | |||
E o Qe i: | |||
e to e e ) | |||
e =e , | |||
e e | |||
ce ===== == w w = = = www to e , | |||
e W e e ! | |||
& e 1e f p | |||
e e | |||
to e r g a t e i | |||
e n e = a wwww =amama == === a aa Maa *ma E e e | |||
Ree r W e he H e te W e Le , | |||
> e e < | |||
e e o | |||
+e | |||
=== *aa H :e Ie: i e m. ! | |||
O e te w a = = a A e Je i A e e D e (o , | |||
m e o to w = = = ** | |||
Je ! | |||
m u | |||
: ,: i 4 | |||
e z. | |||
m e | |||
-= ==--=--- == --- | |||
W e e e ue o | |||
e e | |||
go | |||
= - - = = | |||
e o c e o | |||
me , | |||
e ==w ===== == ==w wmmma === m | |||
* i z e e C e de | |||
- e n e w a = = | |||
m o 2ee ** , | |||
m o e me 4 ! | |||
o W | |||
e : Se e m. | |||
==== ( | |||
O e w e = = = = w H e to 6 Q e e | |||
e y de I a a H e o , | |||
e de t U e >e i a | |||
e em ceo ==== i E etce ; | |||
- ewre owoe | |||
= = = = = 6 em o > | |||
* e><o ! | |||
m emre = = = = | |||
I e | |||
ew e ce == 5 I | |||
M e2mo } | |||
e=me = = = = = . | |||
y eJuo + | |||
d e> e ! | |||
O eZ<o i | |||
< eome w = = = == | |||
H eave e st . | |||
e ( e , | |||
e to === , | |||
e ue === l e e , | |||
e me , | |||
e e | |||
ce m== ===== == === = == === = = j ve , | |||
e e | |||
oe o eoe eeeoeeoeeee eoe oe eoe eeoee eoe eoe ee e | |||
o e e o e >e = nh 4N44nnemAA nn e om nemN em om e ue o 00 o00000000 00 o 00 N | |||
* 2e t i e i s e i e e a t i e t i t 06o0 00 00 0 ! | |||
ww t i s Ti t e | |||
e we 5e w | |||
4 hh wwwwwwwwww ww op w ww wwww s i ww t i ww w n + | |||
i e ce e a4 re n m n n rd e m e a emenebnowN n | |||
n en e e rs e me Ne n ; | |||
e we = mm o rd mA e=ne en na e | |||
> = 8 8 e e rs te rv a no o o4 Nnow en ne n e | |||
e E e=e e' re i n ni 4 ei 4 4 . 4 ri ri m cli en4 e si 4 ri 4 6 e ri ti e' e en4 &v4 O ri i | |||
em e i i e o W 48no mane memna ra n n a m a m e mem m aW re e e i , | |||
/"N e e de | |||
.em - mmm = ng44NM | |||
= rare nmmo s M rd mnn= m edss N e mra re rd ae m4m WNO mNe m m i e ,e > >> 555 >>>>>> n >m >= | |||
> >> 8m 88 wo e ! | |||
(A e m e = == ========== == == | |||
==== | |||
== | |||
== | |||
= | |||
t e e i e | |||
de e w am nevemenehm en N 40 en=n >N ne e e o venn==44oo nn = om = c a==re em en= | |||
o 2e m == == = | |||
$ + +e | |||
( | |||
3-35 J | |||
e e e o e e e e o e e o e e e e e e e e e ( e = .e e | |||
e mo e | |||
o e Ue w e o ae .ee ====+==www mam === maan o e e N e e ,,,,, | |||
. e e ca e es e (e | |||
ca e . .e w = | |||
A e 4e o e e .e e e Oe .e a w* .e = .4 = == = | |||
e e | |||
ae o | |||
e o e Ct: * *e a w .e== | |||
o Eo e e e i e o to a w a == .e .e .e .e .e w w e j' e e o e se e Ae e .e .4 .= | |||
a we e e e + e e t.t e .e e .e w .e e | |||
e | |||
: f. ee e me e Ae == = = w == | |||
e .J e e e e ( e e cL e == =m . w = == = w m = | |||
e .J e e e m e '') e V | |||
o Ze ==== | |||
e -e 0 e e 3 e ve C e CL | |||
* a *e .e *e .* .* *= | |||
* ea ** ** ** | |||
.e e e a e e g e mo e cL e .e *eew O e go .e . == .e w U e e v e ( e tn e | |||
gee ==.e . == .e e e e m e e | |||
.e ye e | |||
= .e .a w | |||
CO e m.e | |||
. e = == w .= = =n .= .e .e | |||
.:t e : e H e e e | |||
e (ee | |||
* en = * .e m m e e o e e | |||
e | |||
>e ee = | |||
e Qo em e oEmo ey e . . = = = *= | |||
e .. Q e e 1A e e><e emIe .e .e .e . .- | |||
e oe eW e o | |||
e .Z. Oe me .e .e | |||
* .e | |||
* eJve | |||
. e o24e eooe 3 n; y e | |||
= .*== = .e w .e=== = = = == = = = == = | |||
e aw( | |||
o e ( e e | |||
w . .e e | |||
e ve o | |||
e me e oe =.=.=w.e .e = | |||
e ve o e o e4 eeee eoee eeeeeeeeeo eeeoe ee eeeoeo eee o e eeee o e e e e >e n C3 4 m CD CD s v 4 4 4 4 C CD n CD ~ 4444 e rv 4 4 W' O OO C3 4 4 e ve 000oo 000 00000o000 v000 O 00000 00 000 e Ze a e a i a a i e i a i e e i it a t t e i t iit i t t t | |||
* We WWWWW WWW WWWWWWWWW W WLA.W W W W W,W W t t WW WWW e 3e w 4 ed v v &4w 4 ts .e & v O 4 CD a nOn& rd 4 con 4m ooo I e Oe == w n n rd A o o re O CD 4 a 4o e We nv n on> 9 n Nvv66 n n w r.d. 4h n> | |||
e ee n re - n.=. | |||
==. rd | |||
. rd.a .*. . . | |||
. . v n n CD CD n.LJ 4e nOO on a CD CD. | |||
4=. | |||
e 6 o e i | |||
.* rd CD rd et CD i | |||
* rd n .*. . . . . | |||
= | |||
t | |||
==a.==nn> a- | |||
=w.' =w 4 | |||
a C" | |||
=99 b . . CD . . . | |||
=== = 4 .* | |||
* t t t i e m ==w eneo m & o A CD A CD w CD = 0mW i | |||
mnone.ee m i | |||
.e .. m ed n m o | |||
>ee m =rwe n. w m n d o o CD Co .e w CD me= u- moon m ee m s CD. | |||
r u .p.cDe no I | |||
o m> >a | |||
>>> nnn >>> >>>>>> | |||
s s m e> cD CD o.a .e w oo m ssrr v e n e. n n e c. re ss , | |||
e e .e e. | |||
.e e e ==== ' | |||
. e e = > c4 o re o - rd n - re 4 s o m o CD & o m no44s o= 8ms e es o n w a c) > n48 = = re rs o. ce re n n ) | |||
e Ze ce re w w. r.e . .. ra. n. n. e. C. o | |||
- n CD 4 ++4 4 4 I | |||
3-36 | |||
TABLE 3-5 (continued) | |||
Page 3 of 12 e e.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeeeeeeee ..eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.... ....... | |||
4 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. 1. V. FREQUENCY eCDS CAA CSA CSS DHA DHD DTV HIA HIB HL1 HPA HPD HPC INJ LPA LPB MF+ FPT MF- MR PO1 PDA RC RP SA eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee... | |||
SS-19 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I e 47 IV874 1.782E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
+ 39 IV904 2.160E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
+ 20 IV750 2.044E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 IV30 2.614E-OD e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 33 IV79 1.294E-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 75 IV449 1.615E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 137 IV794 1.89BE-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I | |||
119 IV796 3.6600-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 123 IVDO2 5.903E-08 e 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 134 VIO18 1.890E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 136 V1020 3.645E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20 e 1 1 I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 IVS 1.624E-03 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 IV41 6.278E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS IV254 1.819E-06 | |||
* I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-21 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 jJ 35 IV04 8.451E-05 | |||
* 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ca 70 IV332 9.464E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
'd 83 IV525 9.501E-05 + 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 95 IV611 9.524E-08 | |||
* 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-22 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 IV15 8.938E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 39 IV89 4.65tE-08 | |||
* 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-23 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 1 11 IV11 1.092E-04 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 SS-24 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
+ 79 VIO49 2.733E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 | |||
* 57 IV951 2.627E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
* SI IVD89 3.58DE-06 | |||
* I I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 | |||
+ 46 IV871 1.164E-07 e 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 IV25 8.962E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 't 1 30 IV76 9.281E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 37 IV87 5.175E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43 IV120 2 094E-08 e 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 48 IV130 8.05DE-08 e 1 1 1 % 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 51 IV164 1.537E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 61 IV260 1.223E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 68 IV324 1.039E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 72 IV446 1.158E-05 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 77 IV461 1.134F-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l' s BI IV492 1.355E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 86 IV529 2.463E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 93 IV59C 1.06DE-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 114 IV791 1.239E-06 e 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i | |||
121 IV799 3.855E-03 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
e e o e e e a e e e e e . | |||
e e o e o e e e e | |||
e | |||
<e mo | |||
. -= * == = = = = = | |||
e e o e | |||
: m. a. e . .- ==* a= | |||
- ee ge o e | |||
* e o O oe | |||
., ee aeo | |||
. m= = == = a e | |||
0 e m <e oe =. a a = | |||
2 e.e ae. | |||
o e e 0e aa a= * ** *= .* * * * * . * * * * | |||
* a *. | |||
e o | |||
aee o e e er e * ~ **= == = =* aaa e | |||
e teo e ee e ue * = =a am a= ** a *. | |||
* a a aaa a e | |||
o Ee e e. ee e | |||
e ae ge w m e e e + e e ge == == = === ==== = ==* | |||
e e | |||
ree e me e | |||
e | |||
: a. * ***.a a *. *. a a *. =* | |||
.J e e o e <e e ae n= = am = | |||
e .e e e e e "a e e e *= | |||
g e .r. eo w e e 3 e oe o e un annama munH wM m unn m H n | |||
- ~ | |||
. e | |||
+a e ae c , ge e n . . . . . == = | |||
O e y e e | |||
, e e | |||
<e4 = =. . . | |||
m : I:e i . | |||
eq e ge . . . . . | |||
y e | |||
e | |||
.o o | |||
a e e e e .a. e m .== =. . . . | |||
e 4. e. = ** = * | |||
* nw e Ie o e e | |||
e | |||
>e | |||
>. e w a= - | |||
e aee oO oEme ey e ===m = | |||
e~6e em e e><o eoT e = == . . = | |||
e 3e eu e e | |||
e .2. me mo mua m eJve e - e e2d o eOde egye | |||
=. = == | |||
eg e e <e e | |||
e | |||
<e uo | |||
.. ma = =. | |||
e e e me e oe === = a . | |||
e uo e oe ee eoeeee oeoeoeeoee eo e oeeoe eoe ee e o e e o e o >e 4 4 4 O CD CD 4 .e N N N N CD N e N CD 44AN4 AN N e | |||
e oe oa 00000 00000000000 00000 00 O 2e l a a 4 s i i e e i i i i i i I e i 4 a e i a t a we w WWyyy Wwwywywwwyw ygyyw wy y e 3e o 4 C) 6 (D w re n r1 e 0e N o re rd & rere nO wemO4Na.eoen e4= N er. O 4 4 hN&m M rs c> | |||
e we O 4 P CD 4 4 PMano40a*No N N CD N w w4 CD e | |||
e ge O , 4 N O . | |||
e wee id O fd 4 rd N CD CD (d (d fd | |||
* O rd npn rs CD n fd (d | |||
. Prd n 4 (*) N e i e i e o e m 00ONAM 00 m A m m 4 O CD O O 0 7 M CD C i | |||
m=4 mt e .e m o CD w N w n mNOM=0rdeM&>0 1/ re m rd e >eo fd CD N P .re n w n N N s.ed.4. o4 m .&e4CD e | |||
e e | |||
> O O w> O .=. | |||
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4..>..>.=>= | |||
N e o e o fd M N CD CD w ewN4&nOP e Ce 4NOne O0 rd CD n N n w gr rd v v gi o Cu e o e 2e | |||
+ | |||
= = ne | |||
& O r.t o 4 N CD n.r.er.d. | |||
CD e 3-38 | |||
e e o e e e e e e O : : | |||
V i e i | |||
o e | |||
e <e to e m . = ,. . = | |||
o e o e u o e, e . *w m= w= m a =====a e ge o le oe io e Ee e e g =e 4e oa * *. a = a 2: ea n. e e | |||
e a e o Oe .e = = .e a = aa a aa a *e a e a. e o e e e o er e = a a = = = e. | |||
e e Eee e i e e ue w m* m m * .e == n aaea e | |||
e Eee e >e e e, e *e a a e 4e e e e eo e ke a a * *. a a e | |||
e Ee e | |||
e ae e a. e = w = .e = | |||
o .J e e e e <e e a. e *= . .e ** aw e .,a e e e | |||
^ e 7e e =. w .e "O e 2. oe G) e e | |||
:3 e Ue C | |||
* 4e aaaaaa a a a .* *e . * = * . " "a | |||
.- e a e y e e e en e e a ww.. mu | |||
.=g w | |||
.e mm m m m .e O v.a m, | |||
e e | |||
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<e e | |||
c.t e Zee | |||
- = . m= .e .e m e e ye e | |||
= = = | |||
w : -l a . m. | |||
cc e == e . | |||
p e | |||
e Ze e | |||
e < e e o m = | |||
e e . | |||
2ee o | |||
o >a e >e . | |||
e em oeo etmo ewIe = = . | |||
e>Qo e | |||
e e2in. 4 e i e (n I e = n m | |||
\ | |||
e ow oee . 1 e me i e .2. to e n= =e = w . | |||
1 o .J u o i e> e 'i e24e e O (n e = = = . . . | |||
eaoe ew e e <e i e (e ve | |||
==== w= == = m I | |||
j | |||
.e e o me ) | |||
e oe a = *= = | |||
o uo e | |||
o oe e | |||
eoeeeeo eoeoe eoeeoee eoeoeo eoeeeoeeoeoeoe | |||
. e e e e >e 4 A 5 4 CD CD 4 hQ N44h 4 4 4 N CD e oe cooooo o oc cooo o (DT 4 N 4 4 A CD 4 N O N CD N CD e ze 6 a 6 Tt i i e Ti e i ococo 4 e i 6 6 ooooooooooono i e i t i Ti i 6 i t Ti e | |||
e e | |||
e bJWWWWW Wwww CD e = & | |||
wWWWyW s-+ o n & o o WywWW ywyyWywwwwwwy e o rd rdnM. | |||
fd . e(14 n .CD. fd o 4 (') = A e tP o e n o rd rd o e o w rde) e f4 N Q N O w e We w 4 4 rd CD P N CD G o fd fd M e f1 n e a fd fd CD P 4 =* 4 | |||
* O rd n o N e CD M (D e | |||
e Q: e = . | |||
we ti w fd. | |||
. fdo e. 4 n M | |||
. . . . . . v . . p . ** t.0 o o M o 4 M rd o G o CD e e i MO M =6 = n fd M 4 M (5 e .e i | |||
M e | |||
me (1 M ft M w fd. A fd .e 4 4 e | |||
nJfirmo fi i | |||
e m 4 M N e F4 e I/I 4 e th o eM ow Nf1 w h 4 rd e .e in CD O CC CD Q m 4 (D 4 m& N 4 m rd o 4 fi | |||
\ e >e o0400o N w rd O m fi (n CD fd rd N e fd w rd C e o == CD v e e >>> >>N $>>> NNS$N Oooh$=>we4h3oc e. | |||
e e | |||
- .>>--= | |||
>> >> (D rd N N >> > | |||
* e P rd N rd N CD FP w 6 e Oe fi w (D Pd ID fd (d 4 rd n &C4&P | |||
*e e o ti 4 w fi w (D e fe rd te e Ze (D (D & f.i. .w.. w. | |||
++ e o.. o o. P N N M M w N CD & | |||
* r.d. (1. . .w. | |||
+ + $$ + +4 + | |||
3-39 | |||
. e e | |||
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. Ae 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
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. e 2 Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
e Re f e 6 | |||
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* 1 1 1 1 e R. | |||
g. | |||
a e A. | |||
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1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pe e | |||
e P. | |||
1 e e O. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e P e | |||
e . | |||
e Re 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Me e e e | |||
e | |||
-e Fe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Me e e e T e e Pa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Fm e e e +e | |||
. Fe 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
. Me e e e De e Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Le e e e Ae e Pe 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Le | |||
) e e d e Je e e Ne 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 u e e | |||
I e e | |||
n e Ce i | |||
e Pe 1 | |||
* 1 1 f 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t e He 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n e e o e De c e Pe O | |||
1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 | |||
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. Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 | |||
e He e e e 1 e E . Le 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 L e He 1 1 1 1 B e e A e De T . I e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 He e | |||
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. He e | |||
Ve | |||
. T e ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
. De | |||
.S | |||
.MDe e | |||
.EHe | |||
.TDe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
.S | |||
.YAe e | |||
.SHe nE De e | |||
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 eNDe eI Se 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
. LCe eT e eNAe OSe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 | |||
: n. R C . 1 1 eF | |||
.e A. | |||
A. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
. C. | |||
S. | |||
D C | |||
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
. | |||
* e*e e e*eeeee eeee eeeeeeeeeeeee* | |||
. . eee eeee | |||
. Y ) | |||
6G0OO80O87 780 7767666666776 676667 C. | |||
N N0O0OO00O00 I - - | |||
000 0000000000000 000000 E DEECEEEEEEE EEE EEEEEECEEE LE EEEEEE U. | |||
G. | |||
S73G07651 05 S40O0679982 8D9 075 441 S355001 931 823841 1 1 1 0' 22 036301 003275 | |||
. E. | |||
R | |||
( | |||
6 04O51 93431 264 7245731744060 232002 | |||
. . . . - . . . . 7 . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . | |||
. F. 355621 32722 31 47. 31 21 . 21 421 4755 1 | |||
321 . 421 1 e. | |||
V. | |||
1 . | |||
S4 S1 61 390991 I 1 1 21 1 1 | |||
VVVVVVV1 V 797357N VI I I I I I I VI 2770D S31 9 E231 050 1 V1 VI V S | |||
9452 027I 3958 0 4 8 5 2 5 3.79OO766 S 74O900 VVI V1 1 2 II VI VVVI I sI I J DO455 VVVVVV 5042482 5335556 009V99 1 1 VVVV VVI I I I O-- | |||
2689366835 205 24700O1 26891 2 458912 - | |||
. O. 91 1 4561 1 34 783 37867O8333799 - | |||
. N. 1 1 1 1 775566 - | |||
+ + + + + + t + + + + + + + + + - | |||
J ,) - | |||
GjC | |||
~ m m _ U TABLE 3-5 (continued) i i | |||
Page 7 of 12 | |||
., see..ee.eeee.eeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeee.eeeeeeeeeee.e.eeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeece eeeeeeeeeeeeeeen FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREGUENCY eSD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR MEY CV CIX CDX d'' F X RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SET THX eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee..... eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeees.ee. .................... e 5d-1 e 1 IV1 9.186E-01 e i SS-2 e 1 3 2 2 6 IV6 Y.817E-05 | |||
* 3 2 2 NS 103 IV730 3.167E-07 e 1 3 2 2 OP.NS SS-3 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 | |||
; + 43 IVD14 1.962E-06 + 1 1 1 2 OP.AA.AM j + 44 IV83c3 3.105E-07 e 1 1 OP.VA.AA | |||
+ 54 IVD'4 1.748E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA.AM.HD 1 + 55 IVL 4 1.733E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 OP.VA.AM HA 4 13 IV13 1.995E-05 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 2 1 AM.HD 14 IVt4 1.972E-05 e 1 1 1 2 AM.HA 63 Iv262 2.234E-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 VA AM HD 64 IV263 2.200E-OO e 1 1 1 1 2 VA.A*t.HA 107 IV735 0.244E-07 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 i OP AM.H3 100 IV736 8.176E-07 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.AM.HA SS- 4 + 1 24 IVSO 3.550E-05 | |||
* 1 VD Y | |||
4 55 Iv?nt 1. 29E-03 e 1 VD.HB | |||
" e ' | |||
SS-5 1 1 2 12 IV12 5.055E-04 e 1 1 2 . t3 SS-6 e 1 1 1 3 2 2 106 IV734 2.089E-05 | |||
* 1 1 1 2 CP AM e 3 2 2 OP.AM NS 110 IV73Q 1.667E-OO 1 1 1 SS-7 e 1 1 1 1 19 IV22 4.749E-05 e 1 1 1C 65 IV271 5.319E-08 e 1 1 1 VA IC til IV742 2.052E-OO e 1 1 1 OP.1 C 125 IV886 4.444E-07 | |||
* 1 1 DP.VA SS-8 e 1 1 i9 IV726 3.969E-04 e 1 OP 112 IV750 1.534E-OO e 1 1 OP.VB SS-9 1 45 IV127 4.557E-05 | |||
* AA 124 IVF06 1.969E-08 e 1 OP.AA SS-10 e 1 4 IV4 3.583L- 2 + 1 HA I | |||
TABLE 3-S (continued) | |||
Page 8 of 12 | |||
.......................................................c........................................................................... | |||
FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREQUENCY .SD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLB SEX THX | |||
............s...................................................................................................................... | |||
SS-11 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 34 IVB3 2 154E-03 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD hb 41 IVIO1 0 326E-OO | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD VD hb 69 IV331 2.412E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VA.DD.hb 82 IVS24 2 154E-03 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA ha 90 IV544 8.324E-00 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.VD.3a SS-12 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 52 IV165 1.519E-00 . 1 1 VA AA.HA 60 IV259 1.3'SE-07 + 1 1 1 VA.EA ha 71 IV445 2.934E-04 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA ea.ha SS-13 . 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 o 22 IV759 1.146E -06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VD HD o 23 IV760 1.137E-06 + 1 1 1 1 OP.VD.HA o 41 IVOO7 1.471E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 OP.AA.HD o 42 IVBOS 1.459E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 OP.AA.HA Y | |||
126 IVOO7 1.754E-OO + 1 | |||
+ | |||
1 1 1 1 OP.VA.HD 127 IV8E8 1 740E-OO 1 1 1 1 CP.VA HA N | |||
130 V1014 3.126E-05 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.CA.ea ha 137 V1040 3.65GE-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VA aa.ea.ha(Cm/AA) 140 VIOO! 9.791E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.DA.ga.va.aa.ea ha SS-14 + 1 1 1 1 1 o 18 IV743 1.533E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.IC.HD o 19 IV744 1.5205-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 OP.IC.HA 20 IV23 1.875E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1C. HD 21 IV24 1.859E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1C.HA SS-15 + 1 1 10 IV10 1.2 2E-04 e 1 1 EA ha SS-16 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 3 IV3 3.626E-02 = 1 1 1 HD 25 IV39 1.401E-06 + 1 1 1 1 VD HD 26 IVSO 1.385E-06 e 1 a VD HA 56 IV252 4.060E-05 + 1 1 1 1 VA HD 57 IV253 4.013E-05 e 1 1 VA HA SS 17 + 1 1 1 1 100 IV727 1.566E-05 . 1 i 1 1 OP.HD 101 1V720 1.553E-05 | |||
* 1 1 1 OP.HA SS-10 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 17 IV2O 6.615E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 2 1 AM EA ha 38 IvDO 1.IO5E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 DB.AM hb 07 IV530 1.185E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 DA.AM ha e O O | |||
/* (Q ) | |||
\d v/ - ./ | |||
TABLE 3-5 (continued) | |||
Page 9 of 12 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREOUENCY .SD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SEX THX | |||
.....................................c,............................................................................................ | |||
SS-19 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 | |||
+ 47 IV874 1.782E-07 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.AA CD.1C.AM eb.hb | |||
+ 39 IV904 2 160E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.DB.gb.vb.1C.AM.eb.NS.hb i | |||
+ 20 IV750 2.044E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 OP.1C.AM , | |||
. 23 IV30 2.614E-(8 + 1 1 1 1 2 1C. AM 33 IV77 1.294E-07 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 CD.1C.AM.eb.hb 75 IV449 1.615E-07 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 2 1 CA.AM.ea.ha 117 IV794 1.890E-06 . I 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.hb 119 IV796 3 660E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.NS.hb 123 IV802 5.903E-08 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.DB.gb.vb.IC.AM.eb.hb 134 V1018 1.890E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.AM.ea.ha 136 V1020 3.645E-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.GA.AM.ea NS.ha SS-20 . 1 1 2 1 5 IV5 1.624C-03 + 1 2 1 HA.HD 27 IV41 6.278E-08 . I 1 2 1 VB.HA.HD t 58 IV254 1.819E-06 e 1 1 2 1 VA.HA.HD I SS-21 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 35 IV84 8 451E-05 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DD.HA.hb (a 70 IV332 9.464E-08 o 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 VA.DD.HA.hb | |||
, j, 83 IV525 8 301E-05 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DA.ha.HB to 95 IV611 9.524E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DA.VA.aa.ha.HD SS-22 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 15 IV15 8.93BE-07 . 1 1 1 2 2 1 AM.HA,HD 39 IVD9 4.651E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 DD.AM.HA.hb SS-23 + 1 2 2 11 IV11 1.092E-04 + 1 2 2 EA.ED.ha.hb/EA.ha,HD d | |||
SS-24 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 | |||
+ 79 V1049 2.733E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.CA.aa.ea.ha.HD.(VA/1) | |||
, + 57 IV951 2.627E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 OP.VA CD 1C.eb.HA.hb | |||
+ 51 IVD89 1.588E-06 +1 1 1 2 2 OP.VA.HA.HD.(1/EA.ED) | |||
+ 46 IVO71 1.164E-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.AA.CD.IC.eb.HA.hb 22 IV25 8.962E-08 . 1 i 1 2 2 1C.HA.HD/1C.EA.ED.ha.hb - | |||
30 IV76 9.281E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2. CD.IC.eb.HA.hb ' | |||
37 IV87 5.175E-07 + 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 DD.EA.ha.hb.(1/EDI 43 IV120 2.094E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 DD.CD.vb.1C.eb.HA.hb 48 IV130 8.05DE-08 | |||
* 1 2 1 AA.HA.HD i 51 IV164 1.537E-08 . I t 1 1 VA.AA.HD 61 IV260 1.223E-07 . I I 2 2 VA.EA ED.ha hb 4 | |||
68 IV324 1.039E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 VA.CD 1C.ch.HA.hb 72 IV446 1.158E-05 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 CA.ea.ha.HD 77 IV461 1.134E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 BA.vs.ea.ha 81 IV492 1.355E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 CA.AA.ha.HD ea.(1/VA) 86 IVS29 2.463E-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 DA'EA.ha.HD.(1/ED) 93 Iv390 1.068E-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.AA.ha 114 IV791 1.239E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP,"D.1C.eb HA.hb ' | |||
, 121 IV799 3.855E-08 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 OP.DD gb.vb.;C.eb.NS.hb k | |||
TABLE 3-5 (continued) | |||
Page 10 of 12 e...... e.ee.een.eeeeee..e. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.e.eeeeeeeeeeeee.e.e.e.eee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeee.eee FRONTLINE SYSTLMS NO 1 V. FREQUENCY eSD St TC2 TH1 TT 2HR AEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLE SEX THX eeeeeeeee.eea eeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeee.e.eeeemeses SS-25 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 IV2 5.075E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 CV SS-26 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 | |||
+ 83 V1080 6.625E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 OP.CA.aa CD.(VA/1).1c.am.ee 137 V1046 2.992E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 OP.CA CD.1c.am em eb. ns. h a 70 IV477 7.822E-08 e 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 CA CD.!C.am.ea eb.ns.ha.hb.c 139 V1047 8.613E-OO e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 OP.CA.DD.gb.vb.1c.am ea.eb n 144 Vin 13 8.606E-OD e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 SS-27 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
+ 45 IV870 2.94BF-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.AA.CD.1C.eb.hb 29 IV75 2.351E-04 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CD IC.eb.hb 40 IV93 1.1142-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD IC hb 42 IV119 5.305E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD.GB.vb.1C.eb.hb 54 IV207 1.069E-07 e 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 AA.DD.h) 67 IV323 2.633E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 VA.CD.1C.eb.hb 76 IV453 1.517E-08 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA.1C.ea.ha 89 IV536 1.114E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.IC.ha 113 IV790 3 140E-05 e . 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP CD.1C.eb.hb I45 120 IV798 9.766E-07 e 1 e 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
2 2 | |||
1 1 2 1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
OP.DD gb.vb.1C.eb hb OP.VA.CD.IC.eb.hb 129 IV950 3.516E-08 1 1 ts e 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20 1 1 46 IV120 1.799E-06 e 1 1 1 AA.HD 47 IV129 1.778E-06 e 1 AA.HA 50 IV163 3.894E-07 e 1 VA AA 85 IV528 2.712E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA EA.ha 94 IV610 2.413E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.VA.aa.ha SS-29 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 80 IV491 3.423E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA.AA.ea ha.(1/VA1 96 IV686 6.621E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA CA.va aa ea e. e SS-30 e 1 1 2 2 102 IV729 7.409E-07 e 1 1 2 2 OP.HA.HD.(1/EA.ED) 9 9 O | |||
e4 SN'e8'We ' A ' r 5 'VO 'dO I E I I I I I C C I I I I I . 80-3000'I C80!A CPI e 4 "N w e V3 dO I 2 I I I I C C I I I I | |||
* ZO-30CO'9 970!A 2CI 44 SN 43 '31 ' 4^ ' 9 5 ' gKg 'g) g a y g g g g g g 3 3 g g I g . 00-3Z80'I OOPAI CCI 44 SN Qa '3 g 03 y3 g g g 3 g g g g g ! g g g g . 40-3090'9 264AI CII e4 SN'e8'We'e^ VO VG I C I I I I I C C I I I I . 80-344C'I 009AI 06 e4'SN'VO I C I I i 2 C I I . 40-32 C 7: 92GAI #8 e4 TPJ va V3 I g g g g g g g g g g . 90-36C9'C itvAI C4 44 SN'48'3I 4^ 'US 'tKI I 44 SN UG i | |||
I C | |||
C I I i | |||
I I I I C C | |||
C C | |||
*i ! ! | |||
I I I . | |||
I | |||
* DO-3G2 'I ICIAI tt 20-32 C'C GBAI 9C 44 TRJ q a 3 g UD I 2 I I I I C C I I I I I | |||
* 90-3ttG't 44AI IC e4 * * ~ 31 VS 'dO I I I I I I c I I I I I . 90-3090'C 22OIA 14 + | |||
e4 va wy 3g V3 dO C I i ! I I z 1 ! ! ! ! I . ZO-36tO'1 92OIA C4 + | |||
e 4 SN ea WV ee e^ e5 Vc dO I 2 I I I I i E C I I i ! I I | |||
* 90-309I'2 ZGOTA 06 + | |||
I 2 I I I I C E C i I I i i i I i . CC-SS (03'V3/I)'UH TM WV'dO 2 C C I I I I . DO-32t6'C ZCLAI 601 (03 V3/I) 'CH VH'SN 2 2 2 C C I | |||
* 40-32CO'I 6AI 6 VH TH WV'dO I E I 2 C I I i . 90-3GCC't OtLAI 91 + | |||
UH'SN'WV'dO 1 2 I E C I I I I + 90-3Gt2'I 6CLAI CI + | |||
(83'V3/I) 'GH'VH'SN'dO C E C C C I E | |||
* 90-3 f C I 'I CCZAI 6 + | |||
2 2 C E C I I I I . DC-SS s.n VH tin'dO I E I C C I e 80-30tz'I 2CLAI COI UH'SN'dO I C I C C 1 I e OO-30GC't ICZAI DOI "O SN VA E I 2 C . ZO-3660'I CGOAI 6G VH'SN I 2 I C C e 90-3CtO'C Pf.! e UH 'SN i E I C C I . 90-3Gid 'C ZAI L SN'VA'dO C I E C I . IO-3t!4 9 060AI 2G + | |||
1 2 I I E C i I e CC-SS WV'VA'dO C i i i i . DO-36CC 1: #60AI 001 WV'VA E i I I . 40-3199'S 192AI 29 WY 'OA z 1 1 I e GO-3tG6't OtAI S2 WV'OA'dO E I I I I . 90-382G'I 99ZAI DC + | |||
2 1 I I I | |||
* CC-SS e4 ea uV ee en e5 'VO W i C I I I g g g g 3 g I Y I I e 80-3816'G GOOIA Ct! | |||
na e4 em 'ee en e5 TF dO 2 I I I C I I I I I I I I I I | |||
* 80-3G90 E 280!A it! | |||
OH e 4 'e* #0 'dO C I i E I I I I I I I I I . 90-3tC2'I GIOIA ICT CH e4 'ee we e^'VD VO 2 I I I 2 I I I i I I I I I | |||
* 80-3CI9 1: ZO9AI 46 (I/VA) '0H v4'e*'WV ee'VD'dO C C i E I I I I I I I I I I | |||
* ZO-30G9 i CGOIA 28 + | |||
GH'e4'e8 WV ee 'er e5 VG'dO g g 3 I g I I I I I I T I I I I . 90-322t'D 980!A 68 + | |||
2 E I I E i I I I I I I i I I I . IC-SS | |||
.............................................................s..................................................................... | |||
XH1 X35 G7S V7S X7H Xd3 XA3 XHU XJ3 XG3 XI3 A3 A3V BH2 11 IH1 231 IS OS. ADN3A03HJ 'A 'I ' ON SW31SAS 3NI71NOH3 ZI Jo II a6Pd (panutauoa) g-c 37gyi O O O | |||
TABLE 3-5 (continued) | |||
Page 12 of 12 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.... seeeeeeeeeeewee......eees FRONTLItJE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREGUENCY eSD St TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SEX THX | |||
....eeeeee...............e...................................eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.........................ee. | |||
SS-36(SSDIN) e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 | |||
+ 92 V1114 5.047E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 IV16 5.403E-00 e 1 1 3 2 2 AM.NS 10 Iv21 6.OOGE-OG e 1 1 1 2 2 2 AM.EA.ha.hb.(ED/1) 49 IV137 2.508E-08 e 1 1 2 AA AM 53 IV199 1.167E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AA.CD.1C.eb.hb 66 IV287 3.976E-OO e 2 VA.VD 116 IV793 2.395E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CD.IC.eb.NA.GA hb 110 IV795 7.491E-OO e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.GD.AC.AN.eb.HA hb 133 V1017 2.380E-00 e 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CA ea.NS.ha HD 145 IVDIN 2.125E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 SS-37 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 | |||
+ 72 V1023 1.2OGE-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.CA IC.ea.ha HD 08 IV531 4.670E-00 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 DA.AM.ha.HD 135 V1019 7.459E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 CP.CA.AM.ea.ha.HD SS-30 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 32 IV78 1.794E-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 f 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 CD.1C eb NS.HA.hb 74 IV440 2.234E-07 e 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 CA.ea.NS.ha.HD Y | |||
A | |||
+ 87 V1084 1.411E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DA ga va aa.ea NS ha HD | |||
+ 60 IV955 1.580E-07 * ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 OP.VA.CD IC.AM eb HA hb | |||
+ 70 V1021 2.723E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CA.AM.ca.NS.ha.HD | |||
+ 80 V1050 1.335E-06 e 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.aa.ea.NS.ha.(VA/1) | |||
+ 81 V1052 4.185E-06 e 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.aa.AN ea ha.(VA/1) | |||
+ 32 IV797 2.740E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.NA.HA hb | |||
+ 36 IVOO1 1.410E-06 | |||
* 1 1 1 4 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DD.gb.vb.1C,eb.NA HA hb | |||
+ 38 IV803 4.411E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DD.gb.vb.1C.AM eb.HA,hb 79 IV479 7.OODE-07 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 CA.DD.ca.NS ha.hb 91 IV565 5.621E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 DA CD.IC.eb NS ha hb 92 IV568 5. 21E-06 e 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 DA.DD.NS.ha.hb SS-39 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 ? | |||
+ 74 V1030 2.200E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 OP.CA VD.ea ha | |||
+ 75 V1034 1.303E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA VB.AM.ea.ha | |||
+ 50 IV952 1.206E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA CD IC.eb.NL.hb | |||
+ 59 IV954 4.023E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 DP,VA CD.IC.AM.eb.hb | |||
+ 61 IV958 2.070E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VA DD gb.vb.1C.eb hb | |||
+ 62 IV962 1.253E-07 e 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA.DD.gb.vb.1C.AM eb hb O O O | |||
TABLE 3-6. SUPPORT SYSTEM STATE IMPACTS ON FRPNTLINE SYSTEMS Page 1 of 2 | |||
..*.......................... ............... ........ ...... .ee..eeeemes....... wee...........e.ee....................ee.......... | |||
FRONTLINI SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREQUENCY #CDS CAA CSA CSB DHA DHD DTV HIA HIB HL1 HPA HPD HPC INJ LPA LPB MF+ FPT MF- MR PO1 PDA RC RP SA ' | |||
............................... .....se.eemme.....eee.eeeeeeeeee.eeee.e...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee................................ .. | |||
SS-1 e SS-2 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 SS-2 + 1 1 1 1 SS-3 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-4 e 1 | |||
.; SS-5 | |||
* 1 1 1 SC-6 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 SS-7 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-8 e 1 1 1 1 SS-9 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-10 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 SS-11 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-12 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-13 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-14 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-15 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-16 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-17 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 | |||
SS-18 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 g SS-19 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
$ SS-21 SS-22 | |||
+ | |||
1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 1 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
SS-23 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i SS-24 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-25 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , | |||
SS-26 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-27 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S5-28 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-29 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-30 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-31 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-32 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-33 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-34 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-35 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-36(SSDIN) | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-37 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-38 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 SS-39 | |||
* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
-- , _ . _ . . - . . , , . . . . . , ~ . , . - . . . , ~ . , , . . . - - - . . - - _ , ~, . . , | |||
$ e e e o e e e e e e o e e o e o e e e e o e e N e a w e o ee e | |||
e e | |||
N e e e | |||
g.e. . | |||
e | |||
.o A e e o e e o e e e o e e o e e o e e o e e M e o %o we se es we em see se M essesewecefdfdfdfdwecesefdfd ,e fd we g a fd N se o We e e o M e e We N rd N fd a= N (d fd e o N rd we ** rh fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd e U3 e o e e C2 e e Je m a =e == *e N 04 *e a a =a ** ** a N | |||
* e u) e e e e | |||
e <e e | |||
Je U) e | |||
.e a a a ce = * | |||
* a fd fd ** a a ** -e a fd | |||
* o e e M e e Je ce o Ie me se we ** *e re we we a e4 (d N fd N Cd fd N a a M fd N *e fd *e Id (d Id 'e o e e M e e o, e = = . = a= =a .e N rd == = a e We | |||
*e **aaNa e e | |||
^ e ?t e V o >e we ce ce se w we ce w w w we fd (d fd (d a M *e a a fd fd ** *e fd e We G) e e | |||
:3 e M e | |||
.C e ae fd fd ewa me N ee == w N N ** ee es fd fd fd Id me fd fd | |||
- o ae p e e g e M e O * | |||
* O O" """ O NnNN " " HNN N V | |||
e oe V | |||
e e e M e o Q$ = ce .* pe fd fd .e a ** a fd .* fd a LD e oe i e e m e e ue | |||
=== e y e oe | |||
=== a .e fd fd a a .e se rd .e ** a o e J e e CO e e ct e >e a se H e oe e e | |||
* >e e We os .= | |||
e 1e o e e 2e o Ie *e e w .= = .e** es .* == = .e e we .e e fd e o e e e e >= e me se ** es we ce se se se me se me we se e o e We e e e me e e Ze se a se we we se ee os os os se we ce e o me se we se se se os og we e o e we e o e Id e e !) e se we a == es we ce we me se es es ce ce se se se we og es se ,e ce se e >= e o e e o e me e we se os es es we we we se we me et e Me eM e eE o eWmo ** a a a a a a == == e == = e = = | |||
* we e *= .= we .e .o e>We e | |||
e> U)a eeeeoeeeeeeoee**eoeeeeeeeeaeeeoeeeoeeeoee e U) e e e eW>e A eZue Z e se Z e .- | |||
e .J W e e>3o C eZOe M eOWe U,3 e2mo O*rdn404N 4 N (D O e | |||
e u. E o ** rd n 4 0 4 N (D O' = a a = == es a = CD O' O =* Pd n 9 0 4 N O 0 O == rd n 4 4== a fd fd fd (d fd (d (d fd rd rd n n n n n n e e e i e I a 6 6 1 4 I I t i e t i I I I L t t i t t t t i t t t t t t i i i t i e e M M M M M M M M M M (T) M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M U) M M M M M M M e >e o M V) U1 (A U1 U1 U1 U) U) V) M M M M M M M M M U) M U) M U1 M M M M M U) M M U) U1 M M U10) W e .e e ** e o e o e o Oe e Ze 3-48 | |||
L | |||
} /9 O wJ G G TABLE 3-7. POINT ESTIMATE FREQUENCIES OF SUPPORT SYSTEM STATES VERSUS INITIATING EVENTS Conditional Frequency of Support State Given Occurrence of Initiator Support g Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of State 8' ' " ' Compressed Nuclear Control Room Fire Transient Bus ATA 0.15g 0.25g 0.4g 0.6g Number Power A Water Air Services Ventilation (F04) 1 . 91 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.47-4 3.47-4 6.5-2 3.5-4 2 1.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 9.17-1 0.0 0.0 4.50-6 4 .31 -6 6.2-5 6.2-7 3 2.5-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2-5 7.2-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.10-2 1.05-2 2.8-3 5.4-4 1 4 1.1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.29-3 1.29-3 6.8-2 1.3-3 5 1. 0-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 9.2-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.63-4 1.63-4 3.2-3 1. 6-4 6 2.2-5 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0 4.3-4 2.17-5 0.0 0.0 3.07-3 2.94-3 7.4-3 4.0-4 7 4.8-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.82-3 8.43-3 3.5-2 1.2-3 8 4.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.76-2 1.69-2 1.1-1 2.3-3 9 4.6-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 .91 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.95-7 2.83-7 6.6-6 5.4 8 10 3.6-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.35-5 1.35-5 2.5-3 1.4 5 11 4.3-3 0.0 9.6-1 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.50-6 6.50-6 5.4-4 6.5-6 12 2.9-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2. 21 -3 4.98-4 8.6-5 8.2-6 13 3.3-5 8.2-1 9.9-7 0.0 6.5-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.18-1 2.40-2 2.29-2 1.5-2 6.1 -4 14 3.7-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.99-7 2.86-7 5.4 -7 4.4-9 Y | |||
a 15 1.6-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.11-4 3.11-4 7.5-6 0.0 | |||
* 16 3.7-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.15-4 1.15-4 7.9-3 1.2-4 17 3.2-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.44-3 5.20-3 5.4-3 5.7-5 18 4.9-8 0.0 1.1-5 0.0 0 4.4-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.46-4 1.46-4 1.6-5 7.7-7 19 4.1-6 5.1-2 2.8-5 0.0 2.0-6 6.4 -4 4.07-6 0.0 5.12-2 2.27-3 1.41-3 1.7-3 1.6-4 ' | |||
20 1.6-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.90-6 2.90-6 2.?.4 2.9-6 21 1.7-4 0.0 3.8-2 0.0 1.0-7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.87-7 1.87-7 1.8-5 1.?-7 22 1.9-8 0.0 4.2-7 0.0 0 1.7-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.03-7 3.03-7 6.0-6 3.0-7 23 1.5-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 2.82-4 2.82-4 1.1-2 5.9-4 24 2.4-5 3.9-5 3.3-4 0.0 3.8-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.90-5 1.77-2 1.33-2 1.5-2 3.7-3 25 5.2-6 2.5-4 6.5 6 2.18-3 5.2-6 5.2-6 2.18-3 9.99-01 2.55-4 4.87-4 3.18-4 4.7-4 9.4 -5 26 3.3-6 7.9-2 3.9-5 3 .31 -6 3.2-6 7.2-5 3 . 31 -6 3 .31 -6 7.94-2 1.69 2.23-2 1.6-1 2.5-1 27 2.7-4 0.0 7.7-4 0.0 2.2-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.64-3 3.48-3 1.3-2 4.8-4 28 6.8-6 C.0 2.8-6 0.0 7.3-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.04-4 2.04-4 1.5-3 2.0-4 29 1.0-6 0.0 6.6-7 0.0 3.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.70-3 7.41-7 1.3-5 7.4-7 | |||
. 30 7.8-7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.55-3 4.35-3 1.2-2 1.3-3 31 1.4-6 3.2-2 1.3-7 0.0 2.1-7 1.1-6 0.0 0.0 3.25-2 1.72-4 1.67-4 3.3-4. 8.0-5 | |||
, 32 3.8-8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 1.1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 .21 -2 1.16-2 1.1-2 2.1 -3 33 8.2-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 7.34-2 0.0 0.0 1.15-5 1.10-5 3.7-5 1. 0-6 34 2.4-7 0.0 0.0 9 . 91 -1 0 8.5-7 1.77-3 0.0 0.0 2. 51 -3 2.40-3 1.3-3 6.9-4 35 1.2-5 1.6-2 1.2 -4 0.0 3.3-8 2.2-8 4.89-3 0.0 1.58-2 8.65-5 5.11-5 2.9-4 8.8-6 36 3.3-7 6.34-4 1.1-5 5.85-3 9.2-4 2.9-4 4.15-4 3.17-09 5.34-4 8.65-1 8.60-1 4.0-1 7.3-1 37 7.9-8 2.0-3 9.4-10 0.0 0 8.6-5 0.0 0.0 1.99 2.52-5 2.40-5 2.8-5 2.0-6 38 6.7-6 1.2-4 3.2-4 5.70-4 3.8-6 1.4-7 2.78-5 0.0 1.19-4 5.62-3 5.45-3 4.7-2 2.4-3 I 39 5.5-9 3.4-5 5.4-7 0.0 0 4.2-8 3.76-8 0.0 3.37-5 5.20-3 4.96-3 4.4-3 4.8-4 Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviated foru; i.e., 3.47 3.47 x 10-4 0582G101487PMR | |||
---.---_ -- - - -- - . ~ - - - - - - . ,. -- - .- - . . . - - . . - . - . . ,_ - ~ - , . . . . . . | |||
DECAY HEAT OECAy Hear | |||
* CLOSED CYCLE : RIVER WATER COOLING BOP IU BJNE SWITCH- OUILD!N GEAR y[g 7ggg7,G g SECONDARY S CONOARY MAIN SEF "1CES w SERVECES | |||
* FE E D. ~ | |||
CLObED RIVER WATER COOLsNG WATER i, | |||
BACMUP AIR | |||
-----~~T~~~- | |||
couewessa 8 2-HOUR - | |||
SERVICE IBOTTLES ~/ EFW AER y , FLOW r[CONTROt Pop.9pHOUSE VALVES 2 REACTOR " | |||
7 g BUILDING ADVs MFW h AR DECAY - CO RO( + SCREEN ANO | |||
* = VALVES PuupHog3g REM g o _ | |||
TBVs , ,, | |||
NAY w ' | |||
^ | |||
i NUCLLAR _ | |||
8 MAKEUP s> | |||
e e SERVnCES | |||
$ P,UMPSj: | |||
c CLOSED CYCLE ] | |||
(j FsRE SERVICE l | |||
I f COOLING % | |||
' WATER NUCLE Aa _ | |||
REACTOR SE VICES f INTERMEDIAT E h - | |||
COOLANT COOLtNG l AUX 1LIARY PUMPS W ATE R OUILDIN VENigg 47,G c3g MA;IEUP) = l I' | |||
Puup Gass a l ca mss i | |||
'8 ): l l u u I f INIt RMLOIATE EMER-(NOUSTRig | |||
+ | |||
UtDLING ~-%- | |||
- GENCy COOLER VE NitL AT ON ~ | |||
F E E D- | |||
] ct ass , ATER - EACTOR O'"O , | |||
ER 7 | |||
COMTROL g HulLDtNG - BurLDiNG VEN TILATION FANS CONTROt ROOM FIGURE 3-1. TMI-l PLANT MECHANICAL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES O O O | |||
O CM D1 V EL . | |||
5 N N 2 | |||
1 A LGIO P O RI NT TD A L . | |||
NLI OUI T _ | |||
CB N E V | |||
m f l | |||
S _ | |||
3 E I _ | |||
m, | |||
( , I I | |||
C N | |||
g 4 E _ | |||
D N | |||
D E . | |||
D N T D P N S D NT E CA R A N B T D _ | |||
ANE C N A D EG SE EE S V SB E | |||
VI R 1 | |||
MED S R MEV MA T M | |||
5R RUSN EUS , U E 2E A ERuA TRUA Y RS T 1 TH T Tc B RTBB TU S TC RS ES V SB Y A E N B VN V? V N S - | |||
B NI I N I R _ | |||
I E _ | |||
T _ | |||
N _ | |||
f+ > I _ | |||
S m" ' s b W i w | |||
e q | |||
) | |||
" M L | |||
A C | |||
I R | |||
T _ | |||
C E _ | |||
s L _ | |||
s , ) | |||
S R E . | |||
N R E V | |||
RV O YE W 1 EA0 1 E8 I | |||
T RM VO E8 0 - _ | |||
AI A R KP S 1 4 S I V G4 E g LO E M | |||
S S S H .S j T I F | |||
E | |||
: 9. T N .S T | |||
E A CV U SX BU NS6IS OV 0U LI T0 6 B V - | |||
0 C k gr UA A F N6 B 81 J CW1 S R F 1 | |||
4 4C S4 T O( 2 C - | |||
M 3 E | |||
R | |||
' U G | |||
I F | |||
DS EDN Y | |||
C S | |||
R GN NO _ | |||
RROS NL O I DT I | |||
EAIY T E ET LA _ | |||
EUAA I | |||
1 GSA RI ER I | |||
L NGUL E UI BT IETE ED G FCR M N E GE N | |||
NAA ES E G DV | |||
) . | |||
ab* | |||
( | |||
1 , ,l | |||
DECAY HE AT "^'" | |||
DECAY HEAT CLOSED CYCLE 4 RIVE R WATER COOtiNG SECONDARY SECONDARY MAIN SE RVICES SERVICES FEED-2 CLOSED 4 RIVER 4 | |||
WATER MF- COOLING WATER ffW SE RVIC E BOT ES 3 FLOW AIR CONTROL REACTOR VALVES | |||
$ AM ButLDING iSOL A TION | |||
~' | |||
ADVs INSTRUMENT | |||
#' F OW DECAY > CONTROL SCREEN AND HEAT F! ACTOR MI* VALVES 4 PUMPHOUSE ButLDING TBVs RE MOVAL ' | |||
SPRAY l- _ | |||
W 1 TREATED AS NUCLEAR SERVICES NS ACCf3ENT h | |||
N MAKEUP PUMPS CLOSED CYCLE INITIATOR ONLY COOLING 3' NUCLEAR I SERVICES 2 HlVER WATER REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS INT E RMEDIA T E 4 COOLING 'i MAKE UP M PUMP , | |||
}f | |||
' EMU CONTROL Sut*DsNG ,_ GENCY V E NTIL A TION ED gjype REACTOR 1f g5 BultDING -- | |||
RIVER RtACTOR CONTROL ELECTRIC BUit DrNG ROOM M POWER FANS FIGURE 3-3. TMI-1 PLANT MECHANICAL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES GROUPED INTO TOP EVENTS e _ _ - _ - _ . . | |||
9 9 | |||
O O O IC 480V 125V DC MCC IC-ESV DA,DB PAML W 2 | |||
dL ._ 125V DC | |||
'~ | |||
BATTERIES AND EA,EB CHARGERS , | |||
ENGINEERED ' ' | |||
SAFEGUARDS ACTtlATION VB | |||
( | |||
RELAYS INVERTER 1E AND lf INSTRUMENT -;( CONTROL BUMES ,? BUILDING VBR AND VBD VENTILATION EM RGENCY ' | |||
S TCHGEAR J= | |||
GENERATORS 4160V,480V VA w BUSES a | |||
(n INVERTERS AND W | |||
GA,GB j( j( INSTRUMENT | |||
@* BUSES | |||
* 6 VBA.VBC T | |||
DG BUILDING VENTILATION OP SUBSTATION, INSTRUMEN' 4y | |||
, AUXfLIARY BUS ATA TRANSFORMERS, 6.9 KV (OFFSITE POWER) | |||
AA i r s | |||
NON 1E 4160V,480V BUSES u-FIGURE 3-4. ELECTRICAL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES GROUPfD INTO TOP EVENTS | |||
- - - __ _ ___--_____--J | |||
it OP OA GA VA AA DI G3 VS IC M EA E9 kt HA HS CV $ES ENO STATE EE G l 1 1 I l pl i ell 4 )! ! 43 68 St i 1 11 1 30 I _ 2 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I , 3 I I I I I ! t I I I I I I I 1 4 l ! I t I I I I I I I I I I 3 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I_ 6 6 I I 1 I I I 't I I I I I I I 7 7 I I I I I ! I I I I I I I I_ e e I f I I I I I I I I I I l.,,,,,,,,,.. 9 AFRS 9 I f I I I I I I I I I I to 17 I I I I I I I I I I I I 11 !_ II 18 I I I I I I I I I I I I i 12 19 I t I I I I I I I i 1 3 1,,, 13 20 I I I I I I I I I I 3 I_. 34 IFR2 28 I I I I I I I I I I l_. IS 25 I I I I I I I I I I f I Di l_ le d6 | |||
! I I ! ! I I I I I I I 3 87 27 I I I I I I I I I I I I t_ le 28 1 3 I I I I I I I I I I 89 IFR3 29 I I i 1 ! I t ! ! I I 20 33 I I I I I I I I I ! 43 8,,,,,,,, al 34 I I I I I I I I I I I 22 35 I I ! I I I ! I I I l_ 23 36 I I I I I I I I I g_, 24 nFa5 37 I F I I I I I I l_. 25 IFR6 73 I I I I 'I I I f,,,,,,,,, 26 IFR7 149 I I 8 I I I I 27 299 I I I I I I 1 at te l 98 1 ft l_ 29 290 t I I I I 3 I I I I ! ! 29 291 1 I I I I t ! 1 1 I I l_ 30 292 I I I I I I I I I I !_. il IFRS 293 I I I I I I I I I I 32 297 1 I I I I I I I I I I_ 33 298 I I I I I I I I I I 34 299 I I I I I I I I I l_ 39 300 t I I i t ! I I l _. . 36 IFR9 308 I I I I I I I I _. , 37 IFRIO 383 I I I I I I I_. 38 IFRil 337 I I I I I I 29 385 I I I I I I I 158 141 &%I 1 tlI I 8_ 40 386 I I I I I I I ! I I I i 1 48 397 I I I I I I I I I I I I l_ 42 388 I I I I 1 I I I I I I I . 43 389 I I I I I I I I I I I a l_ 44 390 1 I I I I i 1 I I t ! I 43 391 3 ! 1 I I I I I I I I l_ 46 292 8 3 I I I I I I I I ! _. . 47 IFR28 393 I I i I I I I ; I I de 401 I I I I I I I I I I pt l_ 49 402 I I I I I I I I I I I SO 40 I I I 3 3 1 I I I I 1_ S1 oc | |||
! 1 1 1 i f i 1 1 $_. 52 IFR22 40 I I I I I I I t,,,,,,. 53 IFR23 409 I I I I I I I l_. 34 nFR24 433 I I I I I I I_. SS sFR25 del t 1 I I I I 56 RFRil $77 I I I I l_ 17 IFRI2 62S I I I I 59 ITAL 2 1249 I I I t_ 39 IFR12 1973 1 ! ! 60 2497 I I I til it! 468 1 851 141 lit I I__ el 249e | |||
! I I I I t I I I I I I 62 2499 I I I I I I I I I I I l_ 63 ?!00 I I I I I I 1 I ! ! ! 64 2503 I I I I I I I I I I I t_ 69 2502 I I I I I I I I I I I 66 2 >03 I I I I I I I I ! I 1 67 2504 I I I I I I I I I I 68 2505 I I I I I 1 I I I I 3 69 2506 I I I ! ! ! I I 1 I 70 2507 I I I I I I I I I I_ 78 2508 I I I I 3 I I I I 72 IFRl3 2$09 1 I I I I I I I _. . 73 IFRio 2321 I I I I I I t_. 74 arets 2S45 I I I I I I 75 2593 I I I I I I 76 2S+4 I I I i 1 . 77 2593 I I I 1 1 I %lI I t)I 191 I_ 70 2596 I I I I I I I ! ! 1. 79 2597 I I I I I I I I : l_ 90 2398 I I I I I I I I !_- 91 IFR29 2599 3 I I I I I I I B2 IF#29 2603 3 I I I I I I 83 IFR29 reti l | |||
I I I I I I I e4 ase29 2 39 j | |||
! I I I I !_. 83 IFR31 2627 1 | |||
! ! I I I 96 rest l t I I t_. 87 IFRi8 2660 I I I I 88 Frig 2b23 8 I 99 2966 I I I 413 4 11 3 1 Il l 66 1 3 4% I I S in t l_ 90 2987 I I I I I t ! I I I I I I 91 I 29e3 I ! I I I I I I I I I f_ 92 2909 I ! ! ! I I I I I I I t 93 nFare | |||
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O V 4. FRONTLINE SYSTEM MODEL 4.1 THE EVENT SE0VENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS The frontline system event sequence model consists of event trees developed from ESDs. ESDs were used to document the success paths available to alleviate the. consequences of an event. ESDs illustrate possible success paths given an initiating event has occurred. The expected response of the plant to a turbine trip or a reactor trip is indicated by the left-most vertical path in Figure 4.1-1. Figure 4.1-1 shows the general flow of the ESD. The detailed ESD is shown in Figure 4.1-2. Each block represents a system or group of. systems performing an alleviating action, as indicated by the description in the block. The line branching off from the middle of each block indicates an alternative success path, gives, that the expected action (s) fails or is not performed. As many possible alternate success paths as are available are shown to the right of each expected action. After the normal alleviatirg alternatives (usually safety and nonsafety actions within the normal design bases) are tried and none succeeds, a hexagon was used to indicate transfers to other pages or to special conditions, such as "Reactor Trip Failure," "HPI Cooling," etc. The systems required to alleviate these special conditions are shown on another page of the ESD, as indicated by the page number in the transfer symbol ("To Sheet. .."). | |||
(3 In addition to documenting the agreement on the expected plant response Q to each initiator, event sequence analysis: | |||
e Delineates required operator / system interactions for the human factors evaluation. | |||
e Disseminates information to all project participants about how the plant works. | |||
e Helps in coordinating the scenario developnent process by documenting for the systems analyst those systems included in each fault tree top event. Those systems are then incorporated into the logic model(s) for that top event. | |||
ESDs were developed for many of the initiating event groups that require a different response from the plant. The ESDs were all taken from the initiating event through to a stable end state. That end state was not shut down for the scenarios not requiring continued actions to maintain RCS inventory control, recirculation for those that require inventory control, and cold shutdown for those events during which the RCS must be cooled down to gain access to the component that must be fixed. These ESDs were used as a talking point around which to gain consensus on how the plant would normally respond and how it was assumed to respond when multiple systers fail. All the ways severe core damage could be produced were also indicated on the ESDs. l O | |||
v 4.1-1 0583G102687 | |||
4.1.1 GENERAL TRANSIENT EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Since the plant response varies only a little from initiator to initiator, most of the work in establishing a consensus on plant response was done using a general transient event sequence diagram. This ESD became a general transient event tree (see Figure 4.1-3), which, by adjusting the values of the split fractions applied to it, was used for both reactor and turbine trip initiating events, among others. This section describes this ESD in detail. This detailed plant response shown in Figure 4.1-2, can be viewed as a baseline for all other ESDs, which will not be described in such detail. It contains most of the action group blocks to be found in ESDs for all other transients. The order changes from initiator to initiator, and a few of the action blocks, which appear in this ESD, do not appear in the others, but they all share some similarities. | |||
4.1.1.1 Nominal Actions The furthest lef tmost actions on sheets 1 through 5 of the ESD in Figure 4.1-2 represent the nominal performonce of TMI-1 in response to the reactor or turbine trip initiator groups. This writeup describes these nominal action blocks first, then goes back to describe actions for responding to failures of nominal actions. These actions are described in order of appearance of the failures they mitigate. | |||
For the turbine trip initiating event group, the first responding system actions considered were those performed by the RPS and the control rod drives. These actions are collectively represented by the reactor trip RT action block. These actions were assumed to be initiated by the high RCS pressure or manually if the automatic reactor trip signal should fail. The RPS must issue a reactor trip signal to the control rod drive breakers, which in turn will open and interrupt power to the rod drive mechanisms. The unpowered mechanisms will release the rods and gravity will insert them into the core. If more than one rod group should stay out of the core, reactor trip failure is said to result. Special actions to mitigate reactor trip failure are shown on sheets 11 through 13 of Figure 4.1-2; these actions are discussed below. | |||
If the initiating event group being considered is reactor trip, then the first responding group of actions considered is turbine trip TT. | |||
(Reactor trip failure is not considered for these initiators because they are all assumed to start with the control rods being inserted. Without such insertion, the reactor would continue at power and a different initiating event or none would have occurred.) A direct turbine trip on reactor trip signal goes from the reactor trip breakers to the turbine EHC system. Within this system, either the electrically or the mechanically actuated dump valves will dump the control oil from the stop and control valves, and these valves are forced closed by springs. The stop and control /alves form two series sets of four parallel valves each. All of one set or the other of these valves must close to get successful turbine trip. Turbine trip failure will lead to special mitigating actions shown on sheets 1 and 2 of Figure 4.1-2. | |||
O 4.1-2 0583G102187PMR | |||
V The next group of actions demanded by these initiating event groups is secondary system steam relief SD. These actions. include first the turbine bypass and atmospheric dump valves and then all the main steam safety valves opening in response to a sudden increase in secondary | |||
* system pressure caused by closure of the turbine stop and control valves. Should too few of these valves open (SD failure), then the secondary system pressure will increase to a pressure higher than the shutoff head of the MFW and EFW pumps. These pumps will no longer feed i the steam generator and HPI cooling will be required to remove decay heat from the RCS. The actions necessary for successful HPI cooling are , | |||
described beginning on sheet 7. | |||
If the previous actions have all been successful, then the next group of ; | |||
actions to occur will be those required for MFW rampback MF+ and MF . i (The main feedwater rampback action blocks occurs on sheet 2.) The ; | |||
feedwater flow rate required for full power operation is far in excess of 1 that required for decay heat removal. Therefore, the ICS system will act > | |||
to ramp back feedwater flow by closing the control and bypass valves l until a lower steam generator level is attained and the flow matches the demand. If the ramp back is unsuccessful and too much feedwater flow , | |||
(approximately flow >6%) continues, then excessive main feedwater (MF+ failure) will result. If the rampback is unsuccessful and <6% flow ; | |||
remains, then insufficient main feedwater (MF- failure) will result. | |||
Both of these failures are dealt with on sheet 2 and will be discussed below. | |||
Following the main feedwater rampback, the next actions that will normally occur are those associated with reducing RCS heat removal TC. | |||
As the secondary system pressure falls after its initial rise caused by ; | |||
the mismatch between heat entering the secondary system and heat leaving it, the MSSVs, TBVs, and ADVs will close to reduce secondary system steam i relief. The MSSVs will all close first, and then the TBVs and ADYs will throttle down until their flow rate is just enough to remove de. cay heat. | |||
If these valves do not close sufficiently (TC failure), more heat will be removed from the RCS than is being put into it, resulting in an excessive cooldown. Actions to mitigate an excessive cooldown are shown on sheet 3. l The next ~ action that the operator.will take any time the plant , | |||
experiences a turbine / reactor trip is to increase makeup flow. He does l this by opening MU-V217, starting a second makeup pump, and providing the decay heat closed and river water support that this second pump requires. He must also be on alert for the increased rate at which the makeup tank level will fall so that the makeup pumps do not e in the : | |||
tank and burn up from lack of a suction source. Makeup is increased in l order to prevent the pressurizer level from dropping out of the normal j automatic level control range. These actions are not appu ently required i to prevent the RCS from reaching saturation conditions; therefore, the action block is shown with a dashed perimeter. This dashed box implies that although an action will almost certainly be performed and must, , | |||
therefore, be accounted for, it is not necessary and if not performed, , | |||
will not require additional mitigation actions. ' | |||
. i pd f 4.1-3 0583G101387PMR i I | |||
Because the operator is assumed to have successfully increased makeup flow, he must successfully close MU-V217 and thereby control makeup TH as shown on sheet 4. If the operator fails to control makeup, other mitigation actions are required, which are shown on this same sheet (4). | |||
Normally a minimum flow return line is available to divert flow back to the makeup tank when the operator throttles MU-V217; if it is not, then HPIP failure will result. | |||
At this point on the lef tmost path of the ESD, the plant is at 525'F. If the failure that caused the plant trip does not require the plant to be cooled down any further to fix it, then no other mitigating actionr are required. If something in the RCS, for instance, must be fixed, then the plant must be cooled to cold shutdown or refueling conditions. The action groups for this cooldown are shown on sheet 6. Cold shutdown is finally achieved on sheet 10. The only normally occurring actions not shown on the leftmost path on sheets 1 through 5 are the automatic containment isolation actions that occur on a reactor trip signal. These action groups, SV, C2, and C1, are shown on sheet 10. | |||
4.1.1.2 Actions To Cool Down To Cold Shutdown Sheet 6 contains the nominal actions required to cool the plant from 525'F to cold shutdown. First, the TBVs and ADYs are used to remove more than decay heat in order to cool down and to help depressurize the RCS. | |||
The auxiliary spray va he. which is used to depressurize the RCS, is also included in the cooldown ac # n group. At a temperature of 275*F and a pressure of 400 psig the closea loop decay heat removal system can be put into operation. While the cooldown is taking place, the HPIPs are used to inject sufficient boron into the reacter coolant to balance the negative temperature coefficient of reactivity and keep the reactor shut down. | |||
The low pressure emergency safety features that are encountered while the RCS pressure is being reduced must be bypassed in order to prevent their inadvertent actuation. The most annoying of these would be the core flood tanks that, if not blocked or the cover gas-vented, would tend to hold the pressure up to 600 psig. This action group block is dashed because, althoi!gh the CFTs discharging would delay depressurization, they would not prr. vent it altogether. Let down would have to be increased. | |||
When the DH1 entry conditions are reached, actions to open DHR dropline valves Hl. would have to be performed. These valves are opened manually from the control room P.id serve to prevent the normally high RCS pressure from being felt in the suction side of the OHR system. Once the RCS pressure has been reduced to 400 psig, the DHR system can take suction from it. | |||
Next, actions are taken to align the OHR pumps and heat exchangers OH. | |||
These actions include providing decay heat closed cooling water to the heat exchanger and pump motor coolers, opening the DHR injection valves, and starting the DHR pumps. The DHR system is then used to cool the RCS from the entry conditions to a temperature at which the RCS no longer 4.1-4 0583G101387PMR | |||
l-i f f V requires pressurization. The DHR system is then run long term to remove decay heat, while the RCS component is being repaired. | |||
If any of the actions on sheet 6 are not successful, then the operators will simply suspend cooldown until the action can be performed. Since , | |||
cooldown is only required in order to repair and there is no other unsafe condition developing, cooldown can be temporarily suspended in this fashion. | |||
4.1.1.3 Scenarios Involving HPI Cooling HPI cooling removes decay heat from the RCS by providing high pressure injection flow and opening the PORV/PSYs in response to the increased RCS pressure (due to lack of RCS heat removal through the secondary system) | |||
(see sheets 7 through 10 of Figure 4.1-1). HPI cooling is used only in ' | |||
cases where secondary cooling is unavailable (no main, MF + or MF- and no emergency feedwater flow, EF+ or EF- vailure, or there is no secondary system steam relief, SD failure) and tne RCS pressure increases to the , | |||
PORV/PSV setpoints. By procedure, the operator will stop three out of i four RCPs if.they are still running. The. operator will start an HPI ! | |||
train, HPA or HPB, within approximately 30 minutes if automatic initiation has not already occurred. Should neither PSV open, then the , | |||
operator is required to start two HPIPs in order to successfully prevent , | |||
the core from uncovering. The operator actions are in split fraction ; | |||
BW-2. (See Table 4.1-1). The success criteria are discussed in Section 4.1.3. j | |||
(] | |||
v During HPI cooling, decay heat is being released to the reactor building , | |||
atmosphere. Reactor building pressure will rise. At 4 psig, an ESAS . | |||
signal will be generated to initiate reactor building emergency ; | |||
cooling CF. When actuated, the reactor building emergency cooling water system will automatically supply cooling water to the reactor building i air handling units and reduce fan speed. Should a malfunction occur that i reduces the fan coolers' heat removal capacity, the reactor building < | |||
pressure will continue to rise but will not reach 30 psig until many hours later. At 30 psig, the ESAS will cause automatic initiation of reactor building spray CS. Failure of building spray under these ' | |||
circumstances would result in continued containment heatup and eventual i reactor building failure. | |||
i The rising pressure in the reactor building will also cause any open containment isolation valves to get a close signal. The most important such valves, because they lead to a direct release pathway, are in the ; | |||
top events: I e Containment Purge Valves C1 e Reactor Building Sump Drain i.f ne SV e Reactor Coolant Orain Tank Drain Line C2 e Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Return Line C3 ! | |||
e RC Drain Tank Vent Line also in C2 , | |||
4 A The RCP seal return line C3 is always open during normal operations and Q must, therefore, always be closed. It is c1: <ed either manually or when the reactor building pressure reaches 30 psio. The containment purge l | |||
l l | |||
4.1-5 0583G101387PMR i | |||
lines C1 may be open up to 100 hours a month. If they are open at event initiation, they must also be closed. They and the two waste drain lines get closing signals on 4-psig reactor building pressure or reactor trip. | |||
With HPI cooling in progress, the operator must take actions to go on to recirculation before depleting the borated water storage tank. Should the BWST become unavailable, BW failure, any time before going on sump recirculation, core damage without reactor building spray will occur. | |||
The operator cannot hold the PORY open while maintaining HPI flow to reach DHR entry conditions in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, he must align HPI and LPI pumps in the piggyback recirculation mode HL. To do this, the piggyback valves (DH-V7A and DH-V78) are opened to align the discharge of the LPI pumps and coolers to the suction of the HPI pumps. | |||
After this, the reactor building sump valves (DH-V6A and DH-V68) are opened, SA and SB, to provide a suction path from the reactor building sump to the LPI pumps, if secondary side cooling has not been regained in the mean time. | |||
The DHR pumps and heat exchangers DH must be aligned and operating to place the RCS in a stable condition at hot shutdown. If for any reason the plani cannot be placed on piggyback recirculation, core damage will result. | |||
4.1.1.4 Scenarios 'nvolving Reactor Trip Failure The response of TMI Unit 1 to a reactor trip failure is shown on Figure 4.1-1, pages 11, 12, 13, and 6 of the general transient ESD. If the control rods fail to enter the reactor core in response to a reactor trip signal, it will most likely occur because the trip breakers have not opened. If this is the case, the turbine will not receive a trip signal because it is generated on the basis of reactor trip breaker position. | |||
In either case, whether the turbine trips, TT success or failure, will not affect the subsequent performance of the plant. The reactor coolant pumps are expected to continue to run and will reduce the peak RCS pressures reached if they do. However, subsequent analysis has shown that they do not need to continue to run in order to prevent core damage following reactor trip failure (see Reference 4.1-1). The ESD hcs not yet been changed because of the relatively recent and tentative nature of this conclusion.) If sufficient secondary steam relief valves do not open SD failure, then core damage will also occur because feedwater will not be available and HPI cooling is insufficient to remove all of the energy still being generated in the core. Whether or not main feedwater ramps back correctly, MF+ and MF , is insignificant following reactor trip failure. This is because the higher MFW flow rate that would result after reactor trip failure would very quickly exhaust the condenser hotwell and the condensate storage tank. Emergency feedwater EF- is assumed to aNays be required for such scenarios. Without it, core damage will result. Either a primary safety valve, PV, and the PORV, P0, or both safety valves must cpen to relieve the sudden pressure build up following reactor trip failure. If only one valve opens, then the RCS pressure will build up to higher than the 3,200 psig shutoff head of the high pressure injection pumps, stopping their flow. Without HPI flow, the core will quickly uncover at high pressure and be damaged. | |||
4.1-6 0583G101387PMR | |||
U The relief of RCS inventory through the PORV/PSVs will quickly drive the reactor building pressure to 4 psig. The resulting 4 psig actuation signal CA/C8 will start the high pressure injection pumps and close the majority of the containment isolation valves. Since the 4-psig signal will isolate minimum-flow recirculation for the HPIPs and since the RCS pressure will go quite high, the operator must reestablish minimum flow in order to preserve the HPIPs. Following reactor shutdown due to the high concentration of boric acid injected by the HPIPs from the BWST, the operator will cool down and depressurize the RCS (see sheet 6). If this i is impossible, he will go into high pressure ("piggyback") recirculation t as shown on sheet 8. If one of the RCS. relief valves fails to reclose, he will probably go directly to piggyback. | |||
4.1.2 THE EVENT TREE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS Following extensive review of the general transient event sequence diagram outline by operational and engineering personnel, ESDs were used as the starting point for developing the event tree structures. ESDs progress in a roughly chronological order from event initiation until termination; an event tree is less chronological. Event trees are logical devices arranged so that the dependencies between top events is maintained and so that the tree has the minimum number of branches. For instance, any top event that affects another top event must occur prior to it on the event tree. Therefore, the more top events an event affects, the further to the left in the tree it will occur. In l 7 developing such logic, the event tree will begin to diverge from the (d order in the ESD. The event tree is a calculational convenience that explicitly models dependencies among systems. The ESD is a document l | |||
i containing all of the agreements made about how, on the intersystem l level, the plant performs. | |||
In developing an event tree from an ESD, the following process was followed: | |||
: 1. The blocks in the ESD became event tree top events in the order in which they occur on the ESD. First, the nominal, or leftmost, path on the ESD was plotted; i.e., top events and branch points were marked down. | |||
: 2. Next, the ESD was used to establish the logic following failure of each of the normal mitigating actions shown on the first line. This , | |||
process uses a windswept tree format and starts from the last, or ' | |||
rightmost, normal action and works its way back toward the lef t, i | |||
: 3. Wherever possible, the number of scenarios is kept to a miniinum by I combining any two top events that only depend on each other. That ! | |||
is, if the failure of a top event only changes the boundary conditions on one other top event, then they are combined into one top event even if they were represented by two separate blocks on the l | |||
ESD. | |||
1 4.1-7 - | |||
0583G101387PMR | |||
: 4. Because event trees that correctly model the dependencies between systems are often large, the device of transfers is used when branching logic is repeatN. This is shown by the dotted lines on the event trees that end w'th a "XFRn". The logic that is repeated is indicated by a number in the corner to the left of the transfer's furthest left branch elsewhere on the tree. For instance, the dotted part of scenario 17 that ends in XFR1 repeats all the logic to the right of the 1 marked under SE below scenario 1. Dotted scenario 17 represents scenarios 17 through 32 that are identical in structure and end state to scenarios 1 through 16, | |||
: 5. Only those actions on the ESD whose failure results in core damage or in changing the boundary conditions on others that do result in core damage become event tree top events. Dashed blocks on the ESDs do not become event tree top events. | |||
: 6. Only one failure effect came from each top event. | |||
Both event trees and ESDs were made for most of the initiating events in Table 2-3. (The main and the subtree actions for each initiating event group are shown on the same ESD.) | |||
Usually, the event tree top events are single systems. Single system tup events allow the effect of the failure of a system to be more clearly defined. Sometimes the top events included more than one ESD system or parts of a system; e.g., one train of a two-train system. The reason for including more than one system in a top event was to minimize the number of event tree branch points that lead to the same plant damage state. | |||
Minimizing the number of branches in the event tree will, in general, clarify the logic communicated by the tree. | |||
All the event tree top events and their split fraction names under different boundary conditions are listed in Table 4.1-1. Top events are used as the column headings on the event trees; split fractions are the names used to represent the actual numbers used in the event trees. The top events in each tree do not change and do not have values; the numbers used to quantify the event trees (the split fractions) are conditional on where they occur in the tree and on the support system state. The split fraction names are used in all references to event trees in this secticn. This method allowed the definition of the scenarios and their quantification to be somewhat independent. | |||
The event trees used in TMI-1 PRA (see, for instance, Figure 4.1-3) have the following special features: | |||
e They are "windswept"; that is, the nominal (or expected) plant performance is shown at the top of the tree as a straight line. At each top event in the first sequence that branches downward (indicating failure), the tree is developed further until all possible paths are exhausted. | |||
O 4.1-8 0583G102187PMR | |||
l O e The split fractions used for each top event on the event tree are , | |||
C/ shown in two ways. The default split fractions are indicated under 1 the top event headings at the top of the event tree if they are other than "A." (The default values are those split fractions used where no conditional split fraction applies, i.e., in most places in the , | |||
tree. The "A" means that Top Event RT uses a default split fraction ' | |||
of RTA. The conditional split fractions are different values used in places in the tree where system performance requirements are i dependent on previous system successes or failures.) The' conditional split fraction alues used in the tree are shown under the heading "Conditional Split Fractions" in the table (see Table 4.1-2) ' | |||
accompanying the event tree, o The name of each top event represented by a two or three-character , | |||
heading on the event tree is also defined in the table like Table 4.1-2 accompanying the event tree. | |||
e The numbers in parentheses on the scenarios indicate a clarifying note on the table of notes that accompany an event tree. These notes also help document the assumptions used. | |||
The quantification of the split fracticns in Table 4.1-1 are all ; | |||
described in the Systems Analysis Report and the values that resulted , | |||
from this quantification are all presented in Section 6 of this report. ; | |||
A Tables like Table 4.1-2 and 4.1-3 were used to indicate which of the i split fractions in Table 4.1-1 were used for each top event for each h sequence in the event tree. The split fractions can vary as a function of the initiating event, the position in the tree, and the support system i | |||
state for which the tree is being evaluated. Tables like Table 4.1-2 . | |||
define the split fraction changes as a function of position in each l tree. Tables like Table 4.1-3 are called "boundary condition tables" and ! | |||
define the split fraction changes as function of the support system state. When the same tree structure is used for different initiating events, the default values and any of the values indicated in the tables like Tables 4.1-2 and 4.1-3 may change. For instance, the reactor trip i initiating event group was evaluated using the general transient event tree structure shown in Figure 4.1-3 with default split fraction RTA (for i Top Event RT) set to RTD (=0.0, guaranteed success). As can be seen in Figure 4.2.11-1, "(D)" appears under the RT top event for the reactor trip tree and the split fraction RTD appears instead of RTA in the t boundary condition table (Table 4.2.11-2). ! | |||
Table 4.1-2 indicates conditional split fractions as a function of position in the event tree by indicating the top event success or failure , | |||
combinations for which the split fractions apply. For instance, top i event secondary steam relief, SD, uses a default split fraction of SDA, indicated by no letter appearing under the Top Event designator SD in Figure 4.1-3. When a reactor trip failure ("RT F") has occurred, split fraction SDB is used instead of SDA for top event secondary steam relief. Some conditionals are more complicated than this example. For instance, split fraction HPG is only used for top event high pressure Q injection pumps A and 8 HPA when there is too little emergency feedwater ; | |||
O ! | |||
0583G102187PMR | |||
("EF-F") and a PSV has failed to open ("PV F") and high pressure injection pump C HPB has failed to operate correctly ( HPB F"). Split fractions conditional on success of another top event are indicated with a "S" and those conditional on no branching at the top event at all are indicated with "8." | |||
Table 4.1. , the boundary condition table, indicates how the split fractions taange as a function of the support system state. All default and conditional split fractions appear in one line in this table. The five or six characters beginning each line indicate the split fraction (first three characters) and the top event (next two or three characters). The first two lines in the table heading indicate the ETC9 run numbers used for each support system state when the event tree was evaluated. The support system state for which each column in the tr 'e applies is indicated in the third row of the table heading. The dots in the table indicate that the split fraction does not change for the particular support system state. The letters indicate the last of the three-character split fraction designator to which a particular split fraction changes. For instance, split fraction MFA (for Top Event MF+) | |||
changes to MFC for support system state 3. | |||
The event tree in Figure 4.1-3 is in an abbreviated ("condersed") form wherein repeated logic is indicated with numbers to the lower left. The scenarios in the event tree used for turbine trip all end in either "S" or a subtree. The end state "S" means that the scenaria ends successfully and needs to be deseloped no further. The subtrees referenced are shown in Section 4.2. | |||
The specific split fractions used for reactor trip and turbine trip are shown in Sections 4.2.11 and 4.2.12. | |||
4.1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF BOUNDARY CONDITION TABLES Boundary condition tables were developed for each event tree to display the changes in split fractions that are caused by changes in support system states. The boundary condition tables like Table 4.1-3 were developed by extracting the appropriate lines from the split fraction translation table presented here as Table 4.1-4 One line was taken from Table 4.1-4 to Table 4.1-3 for each default and conditional split l fraction used by the general transient event tree by the TABLE program. | |||
The same was done for each main and subtree in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below. The run numbers on the boundary condition table were added by comparing vertical columns to find similar changes in split fractions. ) | |||
Only one run was made for each identical set of split fraction changes. | |||
1 As discussed in Section 3 of this report, each support system event tree l scenario was assigned a support system state. The frequency of each of ! | |||
these support system states was determined by summing the frequency of all scenarios going to that state. The impact of each support system state on the frontline systems is shown in Table 3-6 in terms of frontline system columns. These impacts, in terms of frontline system columns, were translated into impacts in terms of changes to split ! | |||
fractions, using the translation rules file shown in Table 4.1-5. | |||
I 4.1-10 0583G102187PMR | |||
[b Table 4.1-5 is used in the following way. The table is divided into sections according to top events. Within each top event section, all the split fractions that appear as default or conditional split fractions in any event tree are shown as headings in the right-hand column. The headings in the lef t-hand column correspond to the frontline system column headings in Table 3-6. Under each of these column headings, a 0, 1, 2, or 3 appears. Like a truth table, all the possible combinations of these numbers and headings appear. For each such combination, the last letter of the three character split fraction designator to which the split fraction changes is indicated. For instance, in the CD, CE top event section, the third combination has CDS=1, CDX=1, and CAA=0. This combination results in changing split fractions CDA to (CD)B, CEC to (CE)F, and CED to (CE)F. The center column of Table 4.1-5 indicates the support system states that are shown in Table 3-6 to have the particular combination of frontline impacts shown in the left-hand column. | |||
All of the center and right-hand columns in Table 4.1-5 are used to produce the lines in T;ble 4.1-4. The first three characters on each line of Table 4.1-4 are the same split fractions as those shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.1-5. The support system states that are the column headings in Table 4.1-4 are the same as those that appear in the center column of Table 4.1-5. | |||
4.1.4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM SUCCESS CRITERIA The proper choice of equipment that showed up on the ESD in response to O an event initiator was important to structuring the list of scenarios; a O source of information about how plant parameters vary was required. | |||
Chapter 14 of the FSAR was one source of such information. However, the usefulness of this information for the risk assessment process was severely limited for two main reasons-1 | |||
: 1. Very unrealistic assumptions were made about initial conditions and systems available at the initiation of the scenarios. | |||
: 2. Only a very small number of the scenarios defined in the PRA has over been analyzed in detail. | |||
Therefore, information was gathered from the abnormal transient operator guidelines, anticipated transient without scram, excessive cooldown, and other special issues analyses; expert judgment in concert with GPUN personnel was used to fill in the gaps. The responding systems delineated for the TMI-1 PRA were specified clearly on an ESD. All i assumptions were reviewed by individuals with extensive transient analysis experience and by individuals with operating and simulator experience. They expressed their state of knowledge about each such judgment, thereby characterizing the uncertainty. | |||
Assuming that a system was demanded (if there were doubt) would not necessarily have been conservative. The interactions among systems in any scenario are usually very complex. Thus, there is no way to have confidence that making an assumption that a system is operating is l_ conservative relative to the operation of other systems. For instance, (V to assume that containment sprays were actuated would be conservative 4.1-11 0583G101487PMR | |||
relative to the time available for the operator to switch to recirculation prior to emptying the BWST but not conservative relative to saying whether there is scrubbing of radioactivity from the containment atmosphere following extensive core damage. | |||
The success criteria used to specify the system actions necessary to prevent loss of control of each safety function are specified in Table 4.1-6. These success criteria specify the degree to which each system called upon to perform during a scenario must work in order to successfully accomplish each safety function. Table 4.1-6 also specifies the success criteria for preventing core damage. If control of one of the containment safety functions is lost, an er.cessive offsite r61 ease will occur. Success criteria for maintaining control of the containment safety functions are also specified in Table 4.1-6. | |||
Application of these success criteria to specific systems and their top events is described in the Systems Analysis Report. Systems are used in various combinations in each top event; therefore, the success criteria are specified by system and by type of scenario in which the system is i nvol ved. | |||
Descriptions of success criteria, as they are applied to some of the significant groups of scenarios, follow. | |||
4.1.4.1 Scenarios with Reactor Trip Failure The success criteria for each cafety function during scenarios with reactor trip failure were derived from previous PRAs. Three specific actions were needed to prevent severe core damage during such reactor trip failure scenarios: | |||
: 1. RCS heat remov. through the secondary system using enercency feedwater and steam relief. | |||
: 2. Reactivity and inventory control from the high pressure injection system actuated within 10 minutes. | |||
: 3. RCS pressure control using two PORV/PSVs. | |||
4.1.4.2 Scenarios with Relief Valve Opening Except in the reactor trip failure scenarios, no special actions were necessary to control RCS pressure. The reactor trip failure scenarios have already been discussed. In all other cases where the time lag between turbine and reactor trip causes the RCS pressure to rise to their opening setpoint, the PORV/PSV opening question is asked. This requires that the closing question be asked also. Failure of these valves to reclose would change the required RCS inventory control actions. Failure of these valves to or muld not result in adverse consequences. | |||
4.1.4.3 Excessive Co , Scenarios. | |||
The likelihood of havf excessive cooldown scenarios was examined in detail. These example. af too much, rather than too little, heat remo'.'' | |||
4.1-12 0583G101487PMR | |||
I | |||
[ | |||
smi from the.RCS were judged not to imperil the integrity of the reactor (d vessel unless excessive cooldown scenarios occurred more than twice in a-plant lifetime. In order to predict the total'possible frequency of such , | |||
scenarios, a number cf top events were defined and applied generally to most initiating event groups. These were: | |||
e F+ = excessive emergency feedwater. | |||
e F+ = exc( sive main feedwater, e TC = failure of the secondary steam relief valves to reclose. | |||
o TT = fsilure of the turbine to trip af ter reactor trip. , | |||
Initiating events were also defined that would lead only to excessive cooldown scenarics. These will include excessive main feedwater, steam line breaks, and loss of ATA. One concern from such events considered was that they . mld lead to a low RCS pressure (1,600 psi) signal ; | |||
followed by the necessity to throttle the high pressure injection system ; | |||
prior to water beino forced through the PORV/PSVs and reestabl shing minimum flow revrculation for the HPIPs. If water was forced through i them, the likelihood of the PORV/PSVs reclosing was foi nd to be less. In ; | |||
each situation where an excessive cooldown occurred, the likel%d of reactor vessel rupture RV was considered. The basis for this 11xelihood i is the pressuri;ed thermal stres;, analysis done by Baocock & Wilcox and [ | |||
GPUN and documented in the Systems Analysis Report, Section 19. | |||
) ! | |||
4.1.4.4 Loss of RCS Irventory Scenarios , | |||
The success criteris for cenarios that threaten RCS invent,ry control were irnport'.nt. It was decided to group such scenarios according to a : | |||
break si:.a equivalent to the rate at which inventory was being lost. For | |||
* instance, the success criterion for a PORV/PSV failing to reclose was the , | |||
same as that which would apply to a pipe break of equivalent flow area ' | |||
(0.007 to 0.1 square feet, small LOCA break size range). The DORY cooling scenarios were assumed to have similar inventory control | |||
.ctians. The inadvertent DHR valve opening scemrios will be cohservatively assumed to have the same inventory control requiraments as the, 0.1 to 0.o square feet, medium LOCA. This choice of success criteria is conservative because both LPI and HPI are require 1 to act to mitigate these scenarios. Other such scenarios as RCP seal failures and j those initiated by steam generator tube ruptures and very small pipe : | |||
breaks were assu ud to require HPI to act, odt not to be big enough to ; | |||
remove all decay hea+ through the opening in the RCS. Thus, for these scenarios, other aut u are required to control RCS heat removal. It was further assumea ! . t' - | |||
dium LF.A initiating events would all r require low pressurr . uit % stion, r N all other scenarios would t require high pressure (a wyback" .x ^ .:lation or cooldown to DHR | |||
*ntry conditions rnd - + ,W ':2 4.1.4.5 HPI Coolin p .g i n M The success criteria for ' <ing RCS heat removal using the N .- | |||
PORV/PSVs and the HPI systaa 1. ... )0RY and any one or' the PSVs 4.1-13 l 0583G101487PMR | |||
could open automatically at its normal setpoint; for the required eccompanying RCS inventcry control, one HPI pump must be started in the | |||
!njection mode within 30 minutes. One HPI pu p is enough if at least one FSV opens. If one PSV does not oper two HPI pumps are necessary. The H?I pumps are assumed to be actuated manually. ; | |||
P O | |||
3 058 M101487PMR | |||
t t | |||
t i | |||
1A3LE 4.1-1. EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS AND SPLIT FRACTIONS f | |||
i 9eet I of 15 f Event free Systees ' ihree Split - | |||
$400ft Tee Event Analtsis $rstees Craracter Frution Top Event ard Wies Srstees - | |||
une Section involved Designator Name Success Criteria Availatilitr :i t | |||
.p 14 .2 . Electric Availability of pc.er free tre ATA tus' Fceer t tid M-1 e All l tsB M-1(VA) e M AC A i I4 - M-1.0 te Instrant. l Service ait ; | |||
(M te-1 1/4 IA ueressors sasalir j loadef start at run. i wt M-1(W) DC t'a IM availatle l IdC te-l . 9 ~ karanttM f allwre l | |||
; M) M-l(6A/65) C6 er 6E faild l IA!E8 14 MT MT discharge valves (M-v5A iM 0458 (1) | |||
Otsc'4rge, retain cren, crect valves OH-V14A aM -! | |||
OMRS *H-V14B coen on desaid aN flov is asintained thrcur tree for 206:grs. l EAA,itA E!ct,E9-1 e All [ | |||
E!4 EA-1.4 6 arante+1 f ailee : | |||
EIS E3 EA) (saae vale as E3-11 l EEC E6-1.3 6.arantees f allure . | |||
EV 14 Mi, M1 brates vat 4r is available fece tre MT - | |||
mtil recirculaticn. | |||
fW EV1 Tyk 4M sistN - e All Ew Ta* and pising aN sanual start l | |||
FV-2 > | |||
of fl pur.ss at ocentN of i | |||
, iNection valves NN1(s) aM .t MT isolatim valves OD-Vits) i for WI tooling. Salve harNre f ailures not incl &$) | |||
., EW EM Af ter 144 recovery GE 1) success l M Ett Af ter fE0 recoverr GE-2) secess , | |||
EW EW-l(F0.KC) Line EV-1, tut mentor trasv. stcss .! | |||
WIflow EW EV-lMa) Like 6W-1, tut cserator irwtv. stces W! flov af ter wrr 54411 break LOCA. -( | |||
CA/C8 3 EMS (M CEA CA-1.CS-! 6emration of an actution 519 41 on 4 psig ientor ; | |||
tuiltiN pressare - f roa EMS r (or samalir given EMS ! allure.) | |||
CES CB-lfCA, 6iven f ailure of CA. j (18,CSC (A-2,CS-2 Pa%al actution ontt, in (2) i 14 sinutes af ter Mrsi signal l m!d have occured. l CSD C3-2tCA) Ghen f allwre of CA C14 CA-16 6aranteel f ative ! | |||
Cli (5-1.0 Garanteed failwre < | |||
l 3 | |||
4.1-15 i | |||
, ~ , < _ _ - . _ _ . . _ . _ _____ _ , ,_ . - , ,,__,.-_m.,, , _ . . . . - _ . , , . _ . - - , | |||
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 2 of 15 Lient free 5,stess ihree klit &ssort T* Event Analists $1stees Owatter Fraction ice Event at v.es Srstens | |||
%t.e Section Invohes Cesiyutor kine ?uccess Criteria Availabtittr 0,E 12 (Ns, Cccliva aM desressurtration of ee K3, Fressar1:er (inc1Anns recoverr). atra Cs .N (3) krar, Cecar Fresut:er scrar given rf! is aia'laole. | |||
h*at Fenoval Alw incl'Aes ccenes of t'e C4 etscharx Oischar9e salves (CH-WA 32 Crt in) aM t'e valve tardeare Valves CA CD-1 Af ter FI f allare e All CCS CJ-1((9) e 4 cffsite CC Ce' !UA) e 4 A!!. | |||
GC M-1(CA/T-)[like C-21 Af +er UR e M FGV cr 75V CED E-lGA)(lik e Q- G)] (4) e M ATA CEI G-lGF)(116 e (^rMf)1 e M offstte CEF G-1. 4 Garacte+d f 411 re Cf CC-1.6 Swa veed f ailure Ei E-1(1:1e CD-21 tif ter M~n e All od T-U 16 Fenctor Centaimt rett revval (in corQWLt;n B 11d19 with tcp ert (CSI) (ivitess wes CS Emergencr vrecessarr for t#at re<cval.1 C.;citr9 io of three reattor tulltr9 energency cxlig coils at f ai etts ccerat1N, tetN s.4slied cccitN veter free at least ore reactor river enter up (te of thre; exlers syk). | |||
CTA U-l e All 73 U-!G/CA/CEllC) e c.tr 1 train cf EP UC U-2 Cmator esta:119es reactor (17) tullhng (ccitrg ustN tr44 trial (:clets fell stN ICss of river water at f ailvre to recover it. | |||
UD CF-16 Gara, tees f allwre | |||
(? 15 Contwwnt pcte in Frwess at event initiation CFA W-1 11!) | |||
O 4.1-16 | |||
l \ | |||
9 TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 15 Evert Tree Srstess Thre) fellt em ort he irent Analysts Srstees (?e acter Fractice k9 Event aM Xtes 5, stets me Sectten Involved Cestrator 'tane eacess Criterta Availattlity CS/C2 17 Feactor Provides certatraent energy nes:real aM fissten (19) letletre prooxt scr@tr9 alts at least cre train of Strar Feactor D;113193 ff rar. | |||
Atuates aatcaatically. | |||
CM CS-1 e All CIS CS-It M/E) e All CSC CS-1( f a) Sue vale as CS-1(M/El e Celt I trun of cA CSi ($-1(56) caw vala as CS-1(M/E) 4tuat+1 wuillr: | |||
CSE CS-3 e All CSF CS-319/E) e All CQ C5-MM) saw vald as CS-hM/6E) 09: CS-3(58) stie vala as CS-3tM/E) | |||
,s CSJ C5-1.4 brantes f ailwre | |||
/ \ | |||
(#)' | |||
CV 6 Cetrol i~tidir 3 One train trovttes centrol tui'.dtng ve6ttlation for C4 hvs. | |||
untilatt:n CV4 CV-1 e All (W CV-1(7) e M effitte CVC CV-1(& 9) e EP train A om CZ CV-1M) | |||
CJ CV-it'a) | |||
C# Ch1W GB 10) | |||
CA CV-1(WE3 9) | |||
C,9 CV-1.9 Garave3 f all.re C1 15 Fenc tor 15:>latico of reactor Niletrn svge Sult at Eutl:ts) etad en ceeat at reatn is:latet etti Isolatico tre des 4M 15 rescves CIA (1-1 e All Cle Cl-1(M/E) e Cnh I train cf f4 CIC (1-1(CA) e 1 train of a 8 stral (10 (1-1(M E) e % AC cover CIE Cl-t(CA CB 7)=1.0 (16 (1-10 bracteed f ailu re COI 15 Feacter Isclati:n of MCT waste gas vent, lizard drain, Ectldtr9 m3 le'evn its IMlation CIA C-1 e All CS (2-1s M, b =Mi[C2 llM),C-1(2)) e (ely 1 train cf R CC C2 !ICA/Cl WIIG-1(CA1.C-!I CE O e I train of as itral CC C214 M Ei etK C3 (2-14 brante+1 f allere v' | |||
4.1-17 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
Steet 4 of 15 7 vent Tree $rstees Tr.ree istit i m rt ice Evect Analtsts $3stees Character Frac tion Tc9 Event ns Mtes Erste haae Sectten inwlves Cesintor uw Success Critetta Avatletitti C1 Feacter lulatten of KP seal rett tn br M cr Euti:its 7a (lcitng (af ter cere cauw) | |||
Islation C'A CJ-l e All C6 C3-l@) e Only B train of AC CX C3-1. 4 Gaarante+1 f ailee CA.C6 2 CC Fe=er, One train of t4tteries avattele etit vital R trer are distrarges her C4 CA-1 Availattltty of train A C4 CA-1. 4 bra-te+1 f ail /e CM Ci-1 Avalletlity of train 6 given trat train A is | |||
: 4. allele Cia C6-1(CA) Antletlitt of tratn B C4) given that train A tas iailed C(C C0-1.4 brarte+1 f ailvre N 14 Cec 47 h train cf 1* car r ent recal ens nj (21) eest test e> cran;4rs are casall, attatW aN seio.al ccerate for C4 to/s, incl Atri reccee'r | |||
(*advare ceb) | |||
M C+l e All C4 e | |||
" l@/2) e #1r 1 train of AC Cr0 C+MA) ?.ame vala as M ven tra;n SA is f ailed M C+1(!S) $re ola 45 CHE #en train 13 ts f ailes C4 C+l 4 bractees f ailee Ci 14 A> iliar y Oretat<r ut estelish &atltarr strar CC) | |||
Scear flce or ccen Pxitre to prevert 1:N Lire + >:o tern toron comentratica of fects eithin Lire C4 tors of tre LC(A CIA CT-1 CTC CT-14 brantees f allet EA/EB EIAS h train of estreered safepari actutica (lWt R$ is a. allele w:n oeuN Premre 5tpli E:4 EA-1 Availeility of cce train e All st,en tr.at tre ctrer is availacle. | |||
E4 EA-14 b arte+1 f atlure EEA E!-l Availao111tr of m train e All girtn t*41 tre otrer is avallele EEE ElIEA) A ailattitt, of train 8 (C1) stver. t*4t tratt A tas f aile1 C4 EA-14 brantees f allare O | |||
4.1-18 | |||
,rm I | |||
v) | |||
TABLE 4.1-1 (continuea) | |||
Mt 5 of 15 Evert free Syst4e5 Diree iclit Sscor t I@ Event Aca trsts Srstees Character Fraction T@ Event anj N:tes Srstees hae Section involved Cestrator Name Sxcess Critria Availabilitt EF+ 11 Energiv r Both trains of ETW ce controlles to prevent (24) | |||
Feehaar overcmitr9 tre srinary in the first hwr follcstrq event initiation given sucess of U-ETA EF+1 e All ETB EF+1(SS) e Oelr ore train of AC EF- 11 Eaergeur At least cre eeer9encr feehater w Feewater autaaticallt startes, sultes suf f tcieet ft+34ter to reeM ce<av tent frce t'e primarr systes for 24 hNfs t4 che out of two stene 9evators. | |||
ETC EF-1 e All ET1 EF-1GP M) (5) e 4) cf f site mer, ro ron-tottlej inst. att EFE EF-1(7 AM M/68) e Crly 1 train cf AC | |||
/^s EFF E~-ilG M GE) iO e %) t< r<me | |||
( ) U6 (1-1(13 7 MJ Af ter SLB in !ct. El:1 01) e %) AC roer s/ ETH EF-It@ M Vara) | |||
EFl EF-1.4 Laracte+1 fatis re ETJ EF-1(18 7 M CAlts) | |||
ER EF-itSLS W M M/W EF1 EF-1(SLB VA/O EF% Ei-ln9 M %3) | |||
F3 13 Fractice of tre reactor trips for #ich tre R$ | |||
sust te cooleJ 0:in aN decreswr1:t1 to cels 5%thm trct3rr to te f1 ej. | |||
FIA FI-l FIB FI-2 Lite F1-1 NL T; ms f atles FIC FI-4 4 hever FC FI-1. 4 A!.ars | |||
('x v | |||
4.1-19 | |||
t TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
N t 4 of 15' beat free $rstees inree Sollt ~ ' S49ert T* Event k.altsis Srstens Character Frattion Top Eitnt asi s:tes srstees we tection Involved Cesignator be $xcess Criterta Availability M/Gil 2 Diesel Ava112tlitt of r<ver free cre train of Clus G5) 5erentors. IE settch 9 ear. | |||
All si N Sotct9 tar Frce ettter diesel or offsite; GM G-1 Availabilttr cf train A EA E-1 Avaticiltt, of trun B e All given trat train A is avail 21e MS GE-1(M) Availatilitr of train 9 e All glien ttat train A tas faile1 Frce one diesel generators for 6 hrs: | |||
r46 M-1(@) Availatilitr of trun A GC E-1(&) Avatleility of trun 3 e M of f stte given that train A is | |||
: 4. allele GO i6-lim 0F) Avatleilitt from trun 6 e 'o of fitte snen train A wra atlele | |||
%C %-1 6 Sareteed fstiste EE 6?-l 6 5arantes fule re 4/4 5 Cecar Feat N train of cccitag mater to tre secar teat t1: sed Al ver Vater, trtle c:cler 11 avulele for 24 rws Cecar etat, Cl:ses Cycle Cccling n:A XA re-1, +1 A uletitti of one trun e All enen eat t'e otter is a. allele. | |||
n:6 4-16 Garanteed f allu i | |||
$8 +1N) Availabilitr cf trun 8 give9 trat e All train A tas falle2 4C rE-1 6 6.arantees f allure | |||
*! 13 M e# migh pressure tajettlen val es (RM165) ht-:satttally csen on EMS at star ecen for :4 Nurs. | |||
hA H A-1 CM cf to valves in t*4 A in;ection rata ('W164.El 6!B PIA-2 In cf to salves in tre A in;ection rath. | |||
MC n!!-l Cre of to valves in tre B injecticn rath IMMIK.0) | |||
MD W:8-2 In of to vahes in tre i Ifimiten rath P'!E d-l W cf to valves in tcta in;ectlen ratts (iMM19 ce !) | |||
44 W-VlfC or Diltwen tutte KF H-2 kr cre of 4 MMlis Mi W-16 Saretees f ailw re NH k > l @> ) !are vaiw as G-1 in MM6 fr 120 renveer MJ al4-!t LR) i4.e .ala as H&-1 in k.:-14 f:e L4 reccverr O | |||
4.1-20 | |||
I' ' | |||
TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) tat 7 cf is. | |||
Eient free $rstees Three Ssitt kuort ko Event Analtsis Srstas Craracter Fractice ko Event aM Mtes Srstees | |||
%w !actica Involved Cesipator haw success Crtteria Availattlttr rt 14 Cecar Nat Oseratcr acticn to line w tre CeA sista E wval for various t)$es of operation. | |||
H.A R-1 ftraal closed crcle (7) e All or IC ccoling - (ten tr.ree of faile1 tr.ree dropline valves free control r0:e ard Cre of tw) karbal valves locallr. Valves sat csen en &eams aN reenin cse9 for 24Wvs. | |||
including recevert. | |||
R It!C)=1.9 breta: f attare H.8 H.-2 Ftm-tack ucits - (A) e All (sei toth trates of pit;rtack valves @ '7Av ard CM7 Bland C+GA amd C*-W.Ef r.areva>e). | |||
M HA(SA) III sim-tack valves ccen HJ H.-:G) 1/1 pit;r-tatk valves esen rtC rL 1.9 bran 4e2 f ailure fa/49 13 ete Oseration of his crHsure inject.on nacsis) (;f) r Fress/e ass corresr4ndiN EG 54 tion valse a d l w) Injection centirtes cs+raticn fer 24 N:urs. | |||
Ore of te) pics ( A cr B) in train A and VV11A cre's 4A 4 A-1 e All di 4A-liCA/WI) Q) e (ely C(-6 40 VA-It49) fE 4A-1(41 EE) e 49 4A-l(48 CC e ;nly K-6 h VA-It!ES[saw brantes f ailee e. cast in !!$-;f vah.e as 401 vere is 40 for M6 rxo. err (aan acts in FE-li ass la !45-23 tere is 4M fv recoverr of cne train 41 4 A-1. 4 Cuarrteel f ailee 4K 4 A-lG /M) rft 4A-If GB) 49 4A-lO E/.) 4wal start of a pe4 en to astcoatic actation 44 4 A-l'EA G) Paral start of a pes seen to wtxatic actutten f0 fA-1(M CS) 8 esip conttrws to rA Fess A aM B teth r>rk at evi4A esens af ter C pm %s f alle$ | |||
rfi 4 A-2 e All 4 A-hCE/G/4) !4ae vals as 46 ! | |||
49 4A- M ) Af tee LN ruoserr e All Em C eM PO-Vl48 i l | |||
4t 49-1 e All l fj M-1 4 br;nue3 lallure j | |||
! \ , | |||
i 4.1-21 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 8 of 15. | |||
Tent free Srstas inree Et SJocrt ko frent kalists itstets Character Fractt03 I@ Event aN Mtes Sntets Name Secita Involved Ctsirator Name Success Crtleria Availaollity 10 19 Ccetrol 104 10-1 (Nrator ikotifits a stena Rxe instru- se erator tle reture as sentation sah; otherwise, crerator is assee) u take it for a vert satil LCCA I:6 10-1;&) (32) e M cf fitte 1:6DI:C 10-1 4 branteed f ailure N 13 Faa ce RCP stil injectico wintaired thro # MW;4 aN M1-V32 to all fcur FU5- Incis:es all cc+rator actices (incia:tro ccentrg sH.as) | |||
(ecessary to taletatn seal injecti:n I?a N-1 Vith lates fl:4 f rie trati A e b) Of fsite l'E N-1(M) (puno A or BL (33) e b) air N N-2 Vith wes flov from train B IT N-2(M) Ippo () incleftr9 crentN e %) air MM11B au tre nyes crcss-cerect 'MM's A,B) valres aN startiM tre sw N N-3 htth eases flew free train A N N-F M) - ro cserator actts to xen e s) air W14A is retirec. | |||
!?C N-4 With tales f cw f ry, train S, 1* N-4(M ) sestra cross- ce rect valves e 4) att tre celt csemer actici M taul actt:1 to cren Wil48 15 retire 2 hl N-1 4 Lardeed f atiste LP 14 Lcv Fressste ;re train of LPI actuates astcoatically G) | |||
Ir:ectica aN injects fer 24 bNrs, inclu:es Cr8MMB UA LF-1 e Als UB LF-1(GA/E) e (ne train UC U-1. 4 6,4< anteed f ailwee LFO LP-It!A)[same valve as Ut] bo train B a<ailele UE LF-1(14)(s;.ne valw as LFil Suno train A a<4tlele Li 14 Men to Ccerator stovides a lor 9 teen water strce EWMJT fer injection tv eitter refillits tre Mi or takes tai within 6\ tours LTA LT-1 During a nc.rtal@cxtov e All LIB LT-2 Af ter stene generator L2e estare e All LiC Li-1 ( brantees f tilwre O | |||
4.1-22 | |||
(, ,) TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) v Sreet i of 1$. | |||
. bent Tree irstees Tr,ree icitt $,soort ko beet Wltsis $rstees Craracter Fraction Tc9 6ent ans %tes Systeas | |||
%w !4(tien involved Ces19Fator haae fuccess Criteria A,ailabilitt Pf+ 16 Patn ath tratrs of tain leeMter ramo cack to tre Fee.%ater cctrect rate to pre,ent over coaliN of the ccre for first Nu, TA T+1 e All Pf3 T+1(W66) e Cte train TC PF+1t M) e M ATA to 103 TD T+1@P)=03 e No of fstte TP PF+-4 4 e % of fsite T- it satn PalafeeMter ra:ts teck to to less tra, tre (27) | |||
FwMter pr,:ser fla en at least ore steam sererator G4) to assure e#J;4te rett rewral free tre pritarr, or cserator attico to reestatitsh main fe+Mter flce af ter is:lation tr tre steam lite rwture detection sisten Pf6 T-1 e All T-1(Mint 0 e h> ATA T-IN#)st 6 e % of fsite T-It0Al=14 e % of fitte for f allve IC (Feedig cre steaa generator CS) | |||
,, enlr with cne TW pp4) af ter tr;asstN | |||
( j S00$ 15tlates tre otrer TJ T-2 e All T-FM)st 4 e % A?A T-2@=14 e o of f 51te T-37)s t . 6 e % of fstte FM T-3 s 16 Atter $LS 443 3LQi on tcta gevaters, xerator trpasses 5U0$ to fee 3156. | |||
TO T-14 brantees f allee rp g r$ TA 4-1 Frevia me.e tw rectrcwlaton br cretN WA 69137 (af ter ti sxtess ) | |||
49 T-14 karanteed f ailee PRC T-l@E) locallt aruallt omtN cee valve E 4 9xlear Cre train of coolig to tuclear services c1m! | |||
Rt er crcle ccci N srstee Ic43 for 28 roes Vater, , | |||
hx! ear G E-1 e All ' | |||
Services G %-1( J ) e % ef f site (lzes kK Ki-l%fs) e I train of I4 Crcle G E-l' EA EE ) e I train of AC Ccolim G M-liEA EE) e M [$.13 | |||
%6 M-14 branteed f atIte l | |||
l | |||
% l t : | |||
,v / | |||
l 4.1-23 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
'het it of 15 Event Tree irstees Three Selit S m it T* Eveet Analysis frstens Character Fraction T* Evert at notes Srstees Aue Se(tton lavched Destrator hae Success Crtterna Availabilitr | |||
& 2 Offsite WA &-1 Avalletlitr of of fstte e kn rN'd Fever Ever folla1N a turbine t r 10. | |||
US & 1.4 0;aranteel f ailure FC 12 kev FGV cretates on Stard for RCS preswre relief or KS cooltrn, (rtles ccen until cesaN ti reeoved PM F0-1 Fasses stoa e All PX Fb2 Fasses mater e All NE Fe r li4/VA) Operatar latcres mn e w ATA FGV fer il coo!trq PJ F9-16(40-1(CA)) 6;arante+3 f allee FV 12 FSV5 F5"5 wen on cesaw, ocle, at reuin e 4n rN'd wen et11 c,esaN is rew;ved: | |||
M PJ-l One passes steam FW Fv-2 T,) pass sten EvC Fv-3 Ore passes enter. | |||
P0 FV-1 te) rass eater. | |||
FW Pain ite.a F4-1 A steaalnw troieiin tre tuttine tvil:tN r.trs aN (4Aes tre unatfe<te3 Cii3 to te af f ected, i e , toth are los1N steas K 12 PM, KKV EctX F1Ys cicss v'en detand ts rese,es; e Mne rN'd KA M-1 Af ter pass 1N steam o W e FN'd EQ K-2 Af ter pass 1N water RC K-) Af ter pass 1N vater aN Gl 15 thrcttled Kf7 ticses een cesa'd 15 reo>ve2; ECO K-4 Af ter passtN steaa e All KJ R-illC) ( 31) s 1 train Of AC EM K-5 Af ter rassly veter. O All Ky K-Sil(s e 1 train cf AC V/ K-4 Af ter passty veter ass o All Et, FM IC) 41 is tr.rcttles e i train of AC All K5V aN Fivs clcse v een desaN is retovel K6 K-7 Af ter passirs stena e All M K-hlO e I train of R KM M-? Af ter passtN =ater. e All M.4 R .. lC, e 1 train of R M! K-) Af ter rasstN .ater 4N 41 e All is trrettles RO K-FICs e 1 train of R D N*I 4 hA'arteti f alIWre O | |||
4.1-24 | |||
l TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 94et 11 of 15 6ent free irstos three klit keert i:o Lent Aralvs;s $rstees 04racter Fra:tton is bent an1 Ws 5,s tas Anae fection 19volvH C+s t rator W bctess Craterta Availht111t r Fi Electric FIA FE-l tr+rator, d,rtN a station (14) | |||
Fever, blackwt, rece,ers 41 fla River kater af ter ECP seal f ailee er an!Clcse3 eeaAtton of tatterits CFCle (#1C*dver edsfe7 first) | |||
(0 lis At in itse to presert Vater (c*e catape. | |||
FG RE-2 Crerat:r, af ter 1:51 of ?!, (11) restares r ver sate tafere T0 sul f ailee FF RE-2t EF) L3 e EE-2, tot U- f allt3 FEC RE 1(EF) Lite FI-1, M EF- f aile2 (12) | |||
FD TE-1.0 bra-te+2 f ailee FEE FE-60 brant++: ss: cess 8!6 FE-3 F:#:cvery of cifstte cr strile /4 trate Tii F1-hi.F; L3e FE-3, ett%t EFd EP F03 FIA CJ-l All rats FU's stav rntN (13) | |||
FJS F#-l 6 barantet3 f allse Eft F1-l@) Enatrs tw:N fcr first It sin af ter C.$ | |||
FJO CP4 6 brantes sa: cess | |||
(~ | |||
f i Ei 7 Reac t.:e All (Ortrel ro asseglies e.cest ora | |||
(/ Protecton, trsert trto tre c:re on 0+=n3 . | |||
Cutrcl R>3 Crives RTA Ki-1 e 41 A *2 Ki-1@) e M OfIstte Fit ET-10 branta+1 f allee AfD AT4 0 Pt F?S ko rei.ctor vessel reture u ta: | |||
R(A FV 1 her(X1ir9 frc4 SL5 in 4N.rereos tar:gre Nil::N. | |||
P4 P/-2 Fatbre to c1 se sec:n:arv e A: 4 re-: : | |||
relief stic) | |||
P,t t<3 Fatise to tvettle trcreas+3 wesan1Finces AA P!-4 Failee to torottle ncreasei sees n2 FT/s cc+n (FJV 4:es st) | |||
F4 P/-5 Failee to tt-r:ttle txteises sees ns Ft/s cen iKP/ 0:es not). | |||
AW P/-3 Sall UXA syl Kv-9 ver, sull LMA R/J P!-10 Excessive sain fecater. | |||
RA F /-11 Ivetne tria f ail #e. | |||
l | |||
,m Q,) | |||
4.1-25 | |||
TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
Steet 12 of 15 isent free sistas inree iclit S m et T:o Ever.t Analrsis nstas Character Fraction Tco Event and %tes Srstas | |||
%ae Sectta Inwliej Cest;*.ater he %ccess Critetta Availahlttr | |||
'J/54 14 Fetctcr fullitN sw eM steers wrt M PutletN hrator w+ns A 3 tu twlation Sue valves af ter la level alare 4.J tefore sw cavitation. | |||
%) SA-1 Cap aN kWA vitt,tn I sin e All J | |||
'S 9-l@):1.6 kn wtalle, lxallitin sit) e W AC S/4 9-2 cae aN MTA vitran 14 ein. e All | |||
!!i Ski 9 brrtees f atla re eiA 12 -1 C+Wa vitNn cv etN'.e fi8 15-1(!A) | |||
ISC 'l-2 kWS witr.tn 14 stNtesispe as Sia) | |||
SEO !E-2i!A) | |||
EE 3E-1 4 baranteed f silee tif %-l@) Inclos inNal action e4 2 %-2$) | |||
10 9 Gs kfficient of the ntre PS!Vs oc eacn e %n rera steaa 9e erator >At wei c1 ottaN at remain wen until t9 desat t 5 t e*Ne1 5"4 10-1 One ser stew weeratcr | |||
.G 50-2 To ser steu g eratet | |||
'2 :li-3 Tw en one Oti4 (14) | |||
?CO ?>l 4 brateed f allee 2 13 O !*als teal intevr ttr is natntaiv$ | |||
tv r.sns of ICCV IEA $E-1 e All iEE it-l@!%) e i train of 4 | |||
#iC IE-14 brantees f ailee iC $E-!K# ku Paul start of 1/2 ::S rws fiE iE-It7 M GE) Paul start cf 1/1 !T. rm | |||
!! ) Pain steas $D 5! 1 Curator clcses rim for a:wnstrean treas | |||
!!B SI-2 Crerator cl:ses nim at EFTS & MW2 f ar wstreas crents SIC !!-14 Lara-tees f a1lare it Pain Steae !!eanlire ret re oetection trates crit to isolate OT% on f44 rst9 ugral | |||
'1A ci-1 Cm Otis avst twlate e All id it-l@/C6) Pcter cwate1 velves nat twlate e 1 train of X RC 1-It M Call (VA N)) C4 sue f allej vith av val e o.t en otter Oi% | |||
RL it-! M/',1) | |||
SLE 1-1M ',1) if it 14 bramee$ f ail.re O | |||
4.1-26 | |||
! 'l | |||
%_ J TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 13 of 1$ | |||
litot free if stets Ihrte f#11% SMort is Event Analisit Srstees Craracter Fraction ice Event aN %:tes bstees une sectico involied Cesigator me Success Critetta Availe111tr 7/ l$ $# dratt, valve f ece $ Sn to na. tu le.N tt civuj inthally tt pas Mses tiA Phi A.t:44ticallr e All | |||
?,5 SV-llCA/CS) e 1 train of E%3 to rhltCA CE) Cl: set initiallr 7,'. TV-2 Pnall! | |||
?# SV-l . 4 brantee! Iallee | |||
'B 19 Tuttire te efit ccoltr9 TEA ibi Af ter T & CD 6xcess IIS 76-1100 ) Af ter T sxcess, CO f allwre | |||
'iC ibl . 4 brante+3 f allste 70 9 RsVs All $$vs O!s, 6M TTis wst c!cse w;n (15) | |||
I65 recal of trattal des 4%1412 TWs KE7s sust star closeJ for C4 bNrs TCA TC-1 e 'll | |||
,m Stena to EF4 pm turttre fres offecte: stan | |||
( ) 9evrater mat also te is>lates N. _,/ | |||
TCS TC-2 a All ICC IC-1(%) | |||
ist TC-20.0 a 14 e M iMt att TCF TC C(9/CE914 e 148 stral Af ter loss of A'A :nitiattN eW event, f all close$ tal, ths never (sen, asi rGs clcu i testin 5) fcr C4 trf TCO TC-3 Af ter To f ail.re TC6 iC-4 e All i Af ter T+ f allste 4N stene to EFd emo Wrttre effectes sine 9ecentor met also de tulate1 af ter %it 70i TC-5 e all TC! TC-14 braatevi f ailwre k | |||
( ! | |||
\m/ | |||
4.1-27 | |||
TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 14 of 15 7.ent tree irstas ihree iflit 5Eort T:s E, tit kaltsis Systees &aracter Fraction im Event at kles $ > stas uw Section involve] Cestrator une Success Crtterla A'ill2 811tf Td 13 fl (terator throttles fl flow tefcre actrg csen MV/FSys with ater T4 T4-1 Throttle ustrg &V217- e All Tri T+1(2) is eet & f atisin:t LM) | |||
ES T&2 Throttle ust 4 W19, e All N 168, W 16C,&N M Ml(0. | |||
T4 T+;(6) e 1 trato of X Tr4 T+ 19) B >>e (cettw to run, Kwr to A-train PsMiss Icst (8 f rattt36 of time ccerator throttles tefort 9 f allee) | |||
T{ Tn-14 branteej f athre TrE TR ) brantees 5xcess 7 * | |||
.4tn Stau $teaa gevrate.r tutes teenin intact: e 47e rN'd | |||
: 31. I2-1 Dsta 1 e steaait e t, red 79 *R-2 Cnrits a wLa LEA TRC TF-1 4 barartet f ail /e ii 5 iw tiw All twrttre stc, valves er 5tco n1 all t-rtine ccattel ,alies Qtt a clese n f.eaaN | |||
='ai e T*A II l e All I'r, II-li'.O e N) X-A i'C Ti-;s 14 Af ter lii, tr<!vM likelthco3 Ili) trat RT ts f aile$ | |||
T*l} Ti-14 bratteef Iaihre iTE TT-4 4 barrtees 5xcess JA1 Electrical vital amtvent tuses k!A aN 4i054) | |||
CtstriMion sti as1 f3=,t) k#. 'v A-1 63ren ettfer X c3 Z E3 trath avallsle W W1e brneteed f atlee AA 't. 1 itsen estrer N or AC ES train avattele | |||
'48 it-1 4 brews f ative IC E3 Elect. G vclt m: tor control center IC-CW Ctstr atutten 101. 1C-1 108 1C-1 4 af tr las of X cr air, tm co-t4inty air c<erates 41,es vill vw w41 (with all snort siste=5 4<allelek 5:ht f rattt>M O | |||
4.1-28 | |||
,m | |||
( ) | |||
LJ TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) | |||
Nt 15 of 15 | |||
'a2cer Mtes (1) Success a toth suctica valres cceft. | |||
(2) Ne3 celt if svrge valves are ces. | |||
O) Aske3 af ter f is asAe2, tot ret v ene ACFs are stcsc+3 or M f aites. | |||
(4) thes a4Nal ic43er. | |||
(i) W lA tottles reese$ af ter 2 tars. | |||
(6) Onlr twe t14 FW avaticie. | |||
: 0) All crecitne valves at titter or tre t ) flce solittig valves. | |||
(3) f-strairer, 415) bcth valves (9) Incl >3es M heat entr4Ws 4N CH CIC$ej valves. | |||
(14) Ns 9 ta.rs. | |||
(11) Fi-2 f ailsre a core suge (12, Ns 444 a:Ntes. | |||
(12) Fallste a n sws trtsets for AI. | |||
(14) Af ter SLQ. | |||
(15) Ltseteet DAlation of IENS in T- at of fins in CD. | |||
(16) Asaec t.) f all for certain for nce. | |||
(17) Vse3 in 52 tree E C. | |||
i | |||
(!$) N!e 11:1t, us+3 to ra.e reye Nst y in cae sgr vees ta creck sntcers till Nallr cely 49ej ci a failure of R.E. f an (Mitng C9) ~6 asies af ts. C4 C1) M te;tctich valves in this cm. | |||
fm C f+tue cf IW inws ava114:le for recair is asu.e3 u cn!r ir<luse | |||
( ) to start in tre fint :4 tcurs CeceMs en It p:ver crir, if | |||
. (f 10 is /4vailable CT is f alle31 1 KTC). | |||
CD Ei ashes af ter EA. | |||
CA) itart LMlW3 in (F-1. | |||
C5) Of fitte Nwr avalla:llitr (m*.ere3 in (P. | |||
CO In:echon .al es not LNinj G7) T- f all:vs T* aN If T* fails CO TC wes tet.een T- 4 o (e. | |||
QD Cen't ne+2 9 f ailes case, tecue N-V14A vWt sen s.) tr.i, is see to te #4.alla:!e. | |||
CU ItM iTI43es Wltal bJses. | |||
: 01) Cc+sn't satter if R is lat c+ rot, treat as AC Icis. | |||
G2; Tre air ejetur a:ntters r:n't v)rk vitt/At ofIsite pcver elastratiN at twsttast cl* to urats ytr,9 on. | |||
(U) M failJre alTt te a dire (t C."Te3JefXe of tre stenaltre treak. | |||
G4i (An't Cl%e tio:k valve tut ran tr.rottle Ve W. | |||
14t@i7 Elh | |||
[^'g | |||
() | |||
4.1-29 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-2. GENERAL TRANSIENT TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS ti t ttt t m tu ts ti ttt t tun uuntut tuntuu tt utu ut t tuntunts tutuu tutsut ttt u ttt t tt tutu tutuu ttt t sut tis u t ta tun tunutuu t utu tt tun u ts u ts u ttut s titut ttt t ttitutt sti tt ttt t t tt*** u ut tt t ts a t tist it tu t s titt t t t tt tt tt tsutut ts u ts t ts uit TV ESTS: Cat!TI(vii RIT PXT!>ci: | |||
TOP RIT tiEA. VvE 1 T@ EOT EST FUCTICM C'XIIIM 6T COUA is/Vci!ENT 50 506 RT F Ri FIXTM TR Pil) TC TC6 T*F RP FfXiM C0tMT FW TK P(2) T- TJ TC F TT TJSIT TFIPin ti TTC si F 50 SECX#Y STUe FILIET(4) TH T4 iC F T+ W EICE55!4 M1% FEENTEMS) TH T4 T+F TC TU?!M'E SECX4V STEM SilIEF(6) TH T4 TT F 4- SJTICIST M 4 FEtuTE47) P0 K4 TH $ | |||
EF- SUFFICIST E'EEY. FEIMTEk81 F9 FM TH 8 EF | |||
* NO EXCE3514 Ef4EMY FEEMiEh9) W ht TH B TH T4CTTLE fl FLM14) W 69 FT F M F N PJV (f96(!!) W P/J TH F M F FV Ft.S WE%(12) W P4 TW F F9 F W F W FIMICA di FA!u'E Fk.fi FIM13) W P4 ET+FM F R0 K5V/PivS CLOSE(14) W b1 EF* F M F W F M 69AT% ElitellMS P!*-Fl(4t!5) W RJ EF- F N F SE Ird.GA*E Mic Co1N d'EM16) W E% EF- F N F FV F Fi FECWf(17) W PE to F N F W Evii A.AILlit.I(13) W Pra 53 F M F N F 49 h!6H Fiia5E NECTi> PM U19) W Pd TC F 4A HIM UESME NECTIM FWs A 5 B(M) W WJ T+F N FECM Cami PM ilti N121) W P.y TT F | |||
*1 M'M FiiMi NECil A VALVES (22) RC RCC NF F1 CXtDM TO Fit (23) Ed h6 T- F LF- F W E4 50 F 4A +6 EF- F N F 49 F | |||
$$ 41 EF+FN F49F 4A 44 50 F W F 49 F N N 4AF N INC TC F 4A 5 N I?O TC F 4 A F H! Plt 4A F H1 hlA 49 F HI HIE EF+ F FV F ml HIE EF- F FN F hl Hlf 50 F W F O | |||
4.1-30 | |||
5 TABLE 4.1-3. GENERAL TRANSIENT B0UNDARY CONDITIONS RA W s 1 3 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 12 31 33 35 . 37 19 2 4 6 8 16 12 14 16 18 N 22 24 25 28 36 32 34 ;4 25 , | |||
SF \$35= 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 916111213141516171819 26 2122 23 24 25 26 2128 23 34 3132 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 ' | |||
; i RTET . .. . . . . | |||
i . | |||
RK# . . . . , . . . ... . . . . ... .... | |||
TTATT . B B ,. B B BBBBBB BBBBBBBB. | |||
TTETT . . . . . | |||
SGMO . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . | |||
WW+ . .C | |||
. C CC . . N . C N N N N C.C C , NNCNN TCATC .. ..... .. ... . . . . . . .. . . ..... . .... | |||
WW- 00.00000 0000. . 0 0 0 . 0'0 0000000000.00000 EFCEF- HHD0HH E: E ,H NEHEN EFFEEE,EHH0EEEFE tFiGs .. .... . . . .. . . .. . . . . ...... | |||
T4TN FF. FFFF . .FF . F.F . FFFF . .FFFFFFFFFF N00 FF T F FFF .F FF F F F F F.F F FFF FFFFF Nfy . . . | |||
Rm USC , L ..L F L FLLLLF. . . LLLLL sta .. ..... BB. . .B . .BBBB B . B ... . B B B B B SEAIE DD DDDDD BED 000 0 ECDE B0000000000 . | |||
FEDF2 . | |||
Evu . . | |||
Woe 1 .J .....J. . . .JJCJJJJJJJJJ..JJ.JJCJJJJ ! | |||
WWA KK .KKKKBAlMll K IK0BB111IK lillKK!!IllK . | |||
1WilWJ E EE . ......EE. . E.EEE....EE.EEEEEE l H:FH1 IG ACCCCAACAAAA6666ACC66 A60666A ; | |||
$Mio . . . | |||
TC6TC .. ..... .. .. . . . .... .. . . . .. . . . . .... | |||
WJT- 00 00000 0000 000 00.0000000000 000$ 0 TTCTT . | |||
T4TH 6 6666 6664666 00066600 6060006 ' | |||
T4TH 6 6666 6666666 00066600 6060006 T4TH 6. . . | |||
6666 6666666 00066600.G060006 K#0 FF F F FFF F F F- F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF ' | |||
K#0 FF FF FFF F FF F. FFFFFF,FFF FFFFF ' | |||
PWfy . . . | |||
PM . . . . | |||
PM I , . . | |||
RG | |||
' N . . . . . . . r Psv . . . . | |||
) | |||
j tm rsy , | |||
I | |||
; m ' ' ' ' '' | |||
; N6FV l | |||
W . . . . | |||
WJW i y * * | |||
* WK | |||
, m . | |||
id(W .. ,.. .. . . . . | |||
49fA i1 1I11I . ...... .. .. . . . .. .... ... ; | |||
i II1I IIII1II1!!Ii1I1111IIIII 49fA !! 11III.1III 49fA i1 .I1111 IIII IIIIIIIIIIIi 111111II111 ' | |||
IG F FF Ii!IIIi1II1I11II11IIIII FF FFF,. FF 16 64 F | |||
FFFFFF 6 . . 66 .6 666 66.666666 12!hJ H HH. ..HH. .k. | |||
HHH . .HH .HHHHHH 8 | |||
) N14!6 6. .. 66C666646666. .66 6.. . .6666.4666. .66C6666 I | |||
hl4M1A .6666. 66666. | |||
kibi 466666666666666666666 } | |||
4 6666666 i i | |||
HIEH1 k!D1 666666666666666666666 6.6 6 6 6 6 6 ' | |||
466666666666666666666.6666666 i | |||
, i v : | |||
i | |||
} + | |||
i 4.1-31 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-4. SPLIT FRACTION TRANSLATION TABLE Sheet 1 of 5 SSS= 1 3 5 i 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 ?! 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 le 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 SF-TE BAABA EAEEA BEABB EEEEB EEGB EWasv EWBBW EWCEV EVDBW CAACA CABCA CACCA CE AC B CEBCB CECCB CEDCB CEECB .. .... ... . . . .. . .. ..... .... | |||
CCACD BB BBBB BBB B B D 8BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB CDBCD . | |||
CECCE EE EEEE FFE E F 0 FFFFEFEFEEEFFFFF CEDCE CEECE .. .... ... . . | |||
CEGCE EE EEEE FFE E F 0 FFFFEFEFEEEFFFFF CDF Q . . . . . .. .. .. . .. . ....... | |||
C FACF D DB BBBB BD BB DDDDBB B DDDDDDD CFC(F CFDCF CF ACP . | |||
CSACS B BBBBBBBBBBJJJEJJJBBBJJ BJBJJJB CSCC3 J . . | |||
. .JJCJJJJDJJJJ .JJ JJCJJJJ CSGC3 . | |||
J.JJJJ. .J JJJKJJJ.JJJJ .JJJJJ. | |||
CSECS F FFFFFFFFFFJJJ JJJFFFJJ FJFJJJF CEDCS J .J. . | |||
JJDJJJJ JJJJ..JJ JJDJJJJ CIACS J JJJJ J JJJ JJJ JJJJ JJJJJ CSJC5 .. . | |||
CI ACI BB B BDDB B B BDBDB C16C1 . | |||
DD. . . | |||
CICC1 GGGG CIDC1 G GG GG CIEC1 C1FC1 C1GC1 GG G GGG GG GGGG GAC2 6B BDDB B B GEC2 B BDBDB GCC2 | |||
.DD. . | |||
EE E EEEE E E EEEEE C2002 GEC 2 GFC2 6G BB G 655. GG GGGGF B BCCB E B BCBCB C2CC3 . .. . . . | |||
CMH CM CH K | |||
KKBBK KkKBFHHKJJJBKBFJ KFJJJJJ EmDCH DHEC+t N | |||
A KHKKKCNNkJNNHNJJJJ# ANN NNKJNJJ N v. J J N K k. N K N H H A J J J K H J N J >NJJJJk DTADT C C CCCCCCCCC CC CCCCCC DTCDT O | |||
4.1-32 | |||
g i i V TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 5 | |||
$55= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 29 30 32 34 36 33 SS-TE EFAEF+ | |||
EFBEF+ . | |||
EFFEF+ ...... ... . ..... ...... . ....-. . | |||
EFCEF- HHDDHH EEE H NEHEN EFFEEE EHHDEEEFE EFDEF-EFEEF- . | |||
EFFEF .. .. .... . ............ . ...-.... | |||
EFGEF- MM MM GJJJ M KJMJKGII11JJ JMMGKKJlK EFMEF-EFIEF-EFJEF-EFkEF-EFLEF-EFr*EF-eft.EF-FX4#X F1ESX FICFI .... . .... .. . . .... | |||
H!AHIA GGGG G GGGG GGGG GGGGG HIEHIA .GGGG..G....GGGG.GGGG .GGGGG. | |||
HIChlB G GGC6GGGGGG6G GG GGC6GGG HIDHIB G....GGDGGGGGGGGG..GG GGDGGGG HIEH1 GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG6 GGGGGGG Os HIFHI ACCCCAACAAAAGGGGACCGG AGCGGGA H MHI HIJHI 5555G5G55655555555555555555'S55555GG5555 G666GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGAGGGGG HLAHL . D . ..D . . .00D0 000D..DD .DDDDDD HLEA HLCHL E E EEE EEEEECC CCCEEEEC EEECCCE HLE4 . | |||
. ... CCCCCCC CCCC..CC.CCCCCCC HLFHL hFAhFA KK C .C.CCC. . | |||
CCC.CCC CCCCC.C.CCC . | |||
bFSHFA KKKKBA1M1I KIKDBB11IIK11!IKKIll1IK hFDHFA EL EEE FAIM!!AL1LFFFHI11LIIIIELIIIIIL hf EhF A HFFHFA HPIHF A 4WA HiLhFA .. ..... .... ....................... | |||
HF6HFA !! IIIII.IIII IIIIIIIIIIIIII1IIIIIIII HPFuPA .I1..I11.Ii111I.I.I!!IIIII11111IIM!!!!I HFhhPA IIIIII1IIi11IIIIIIIII!IMIHIII!!!IIIIIII HPO#B J J JJCJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJCJJJJ HPJHF B . . . ...... ........ ...... .... | |||
HF NHF A K1 KKK BB11II K KBB!!!IIKi!!!KKMKIIII IDAID ICelD IDCID .. .. . ... . . . . .. | |||
INAINJ E EE EE E EEE EE EEEEEE INEINJ . .. .. . ... . . . ... | |||
INBINJ F FF FF F FFF FF FFFFFF INFINJ - | |||
INCINJ 3 GG GG G GGG GG GGGGGG INGINJ . .. . . | |||
INDINJ H HH HH H HHH HH HHHHHH INHINJ INilNJ . | |||
LFALP B BBBeBBBBBBCCCCCCCBBBCC BCBCCCB | |||
% ./ | |||
4.1-33 | |||
TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 5 | |||
$$5= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 10 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 SI-TE LFELP CCCCCCCC CCC LMLP . . . ........ . .. .- | |||
&lP C .C....CCDCCCCCCCCC..CC CCDCCCC LPELP E CECCCC CECCCCCCCECCCC CCCCCE LTALT LTBLT LTCt' . . .. . .. . .. . . . | |||
MAMF+ C C CC N CNNNNCC C NNCNN MFEMF+ | |||
MFCMF+ | |||
MFCnF+ | |||
MF3.MF+ | |||
YFFMF+ .. . . . , ... ..- . . .. ........ . | |||
MFGMF- 00 00000 0000 000 00 0000000000 00000 Yfe%- | |||
MFIrf- .. .. . . . . ... . .. .. . . .. . ... | |||
PfJMF- 00 00000 0000 000 00 0000000000 00000 M rf-MFRrf-MFLMF-MFrMF. | |||
FF%F- .. . . ... | |||
PAMR BB B BBBB B B BBBBB MFEmR PACPI< . . . ... .. . . . .... | |||
PC#0 FF F F FFF F FF F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF FOC50 FF F F FFF F FF F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF F0EPO FifF 0 FVMV PVEfv FV(PV FvDFv FunFJ . . . . .. . ..... | |||
FCMC 66 GGGGG G G G GG6GGGG GG FCEAC HH HHHHH H H H HHHHHHH HH FC(AC . . . . .. .. .. | |||
M DRC J J D J DJJJJD JJJJJ FCJRC FCEAC r K E r EKrrKE kAKKA FOFC . | |||
FCIRC L L F L FLLLLF LLLLL MLFC . . | |||
RCr/C M M GM GMMMMG MMMMM MMRC . | |||
MHRC N N H N HNNNNH NNNNN Mt#C . . . ... , . | |||
FCIFC 0 0 1 0 100001 00000 RC(AC RCFRC . . .. ..... . . . . ......... . . .. .. . | |||
AEM E DDDDDDDDDCDDDDDDDDDDDDDGD DDDDDDDDDDDDD FEEAE . .. . .... . . . . . . . ..... . | |||
FECFE DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDHD DDDDDDDDDDDDD E EC+ E FEECE . .. . . . .. . . . | |||
REGAE DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDD SEGAE Fik;E . . . . . | |||
FF4 P BC E B B C E. CC CBC B CCCC CCCCCCCCCC H EAP 4.1-34 | |||
TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) | |||
Sheet 4 of 5 | |||
$$$= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 SF-TE FMRP , , | |||
RPORP RTART RTEAT . | |||
RTCRT RVARV T 55 55 5 CC C55 555555555C5555555B RVBRV . | |||
RVCRV , | |||
RVDRV RVERV RvFRV RVGRV RYHRV RVIRV , | |||
RVJRV , | |||
Rv> RV R'#AV .. ... . . $... | |||
SAA5A BB BBB B B BBBB | |||
!KSA BB BBB B B BBBB iAESA . .. .. .. | |||
9 SEAiB SEE!B iiC58 iEDiB GG E | |||
E E | |||
E EEEE EEEE EEEE EEEE G C A AEF | |||
.E.EE CfCEE | |||
.BB SEE5B . .... | |||
1E553 E EEEE SEGiB E EEEE ICAID SMSD SCC?O | |||
, 50010 .. ..... .. ... . .... ... ....... | |||
SEA!E DD DDDDD BED 000 D EDDE B000000D000 SEBSE SEC11 . . . ... . . ... | |||
$!ASI C C C ,CCCC CCCCC | |||
$1BSI C C C CCCC CCCCC SIC 3! ... . .. ...... . ..... | |||
ftASL BBB BB BB BFFBBB B ?8BFB SLE5L itCSL < | |||
SLDSL l SLEi.L SLFSL SVASV | |||
$VBSV I SVC$v SVDsV SVEiv SVF5V ... ..... .... ... .. ............... | |||
TEATB CCC CCCCC CCCC CCC CC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC i | |||
l TEBTB CCC CCCCC CCCC CCC CC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC l | |||
1 4.1-35 l | |||
r i | |||
TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) , | |||
Sheet 5 of 5 | |||
$55= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 3) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 j l | |||
TCATC . .. .. .. ......... ... ..... | |||
TCETC I II III I1 IIB 111!!I IIBIIII11 TCCTC i TCDTC ' | |||
TCETC T(FTC l | |||
TCGTC .. . .. ,. ......... ....... .. | |||
TChTC I II III II !!HII!!II IIHIi11II TCITC .. .... .. . . . ... .... . . ... | |||
THATH FF FFFF ..FF .F.F. . FFFF. .FFFFFFFFFF TH5TH G GGGG GGGGGGG DDD5GGDD GDGDDDG TMCTH ThDTH ibETH , | |||
TRATR TF5TR . . | |||
TTATT B B B B BBBBBB BBBBBBBB TTETT . | |||
TTCTT TTDTT TTETT O | |||
l 1 | |||
O 4.1-36 i | |||
4 | |||
/m 4 V) | |||
TABLE 4.1-5. SPLIT FRACTION TRANSLATION RULES FILE Shee_t_1 of __8 FRONTLINE M STEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO COND4T10NAL | |||
' OESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFtlT FRACTIONS I STATES I Top Event CD,CE----- - - ------ -------------------------------------------- | |||
COS CDA COB CAA I I CDA CEC cdx t t | |||
... ... ___ .._ i .._ ___ | |||
I 0 0 00 0 1 1,4,5,10,11,151 A C i l 16,10,00-23 1 1 0 00 0 1 2,3,6,7,8,14r I B E i 17,30,32-34 1 1 0 00 1 1 3,9,23 i B E 1 1 10 0 1 37 i B F 1 0 1 1 0 1 I B F 0 1 10 0 NONE I A C 0 0 1 1 0 1 NONF i A C 1 1 10 1 1 12,13,19,24,271 B F 1 29,31,35,39 1 1 0 1 1 1 ! i B F 0 1 21 0 ! NONE I B F 0 1 21 1 1 NONE 1 B F 1 1 21 0 i N0NE ! B F 1 1 21 1 : 25,26,36,38 ! B F 0 0 00 1 1 21,23 1 A 0 l i FR0NTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPP0RT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL | |||
! CESCRIF TION SYSTEM i 1 SPLIT FRACTIONS sV i STATES ! | |||
T o o E v e n t C F --- - --- ----- -- -- - -- - - -- - --- - - -- - - - - - ---- ---- - =- ----------.- | |||
CFA CFB CFC RRA RRB ! ! CFA cfx crx 1 1 | |||
--- ... ... ... ... I ___ | |||
I 0 0 00 0 00 1 1,3-5,G-10, 1 A i 15-17,20,23, I I S0,32 ! | |||
0 0 00 0 11 1 11,18,21,22,281 B 0 0 00 1 10 I " | |||
l B 1 0 10 1 10 i 12,13,29,31 1 B 1 0 10 0 11 ! " | |||
l B 0 6 1 1 1 10 t " | |||
l B 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 I l B 0 1 10 1 10 I | |||
! B 0 1 10 0 11 I I B 1 0 10 0 o0 I 7,14, I 4 0 1 10 0 00 l l B 0 0 1 1 0 00 I 1 B 0 1 21 0 11 1 24,27,37 1 0 1 0 21 0 11 l " | |||
l 0 1 1 20 0 11 I l D 0 1 21 1 10 1 i D 1 0 21 1 10 I l 0 1 1 20 1 10 1 I D 1 1 20 1 21 1 I O O 1 21 1 21 1 I O 1 0 21 1 21 I I o 1 1 31 1 21 1 2,3,19,25,26 I D I 33-36,33,33 I | |||
..... ...---== = ==......_______________. ___ ...__,_______,,,,,,,,, __,,_,, | |||
o 4.1-37 - | |||
TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 8 l i FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT i SUFFORT l CHANGE 3 TO C0N0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION l SYSTEM i SPLIT FFACT10NS I STATES I Top Event CS------------------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |||
CSA CSB I I css CSE CSC CiO CSG CSK | |||
: i ___ .__ ___ ___ .._ ___ | |||
0 0 1 1,2,4-9.32 i A E C D G K 1 0 1 10,12-15,18,281 8 F C D J J l 29,35 1 0 1 1 3,11,16,17,19,1 B F J J G K I 27,33,39 i 20-22,30,31, 1 J J J J J J j 1 1 24-26,34, l I j i 36-33 I | |||
( 1 1 1 23 1 E E D 0 K K l | |||
i 1 FRONTLINE SYSTEM !!1 PACT I SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEM ! SFLIT FRACTION 5 l l STATES i TopEventC:-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
CIA CIB GA GB l ! CIA C1C C1F C2A (2F C2C C3A cix l 1 | |||
... ___ ___ .__ g ;__. ... ... .__ -._ -.. ___ | |||
0 00 - - t 1-11,14-18, i A C F A F C A 1 20-23,23,30, t | |||
! 32-?4 1 1 1a 1 0 1 12,13,29,31,37: B C G B G E B 0 1 1 0 1 1 27,39 l & G F B F E 8 1 10 1 GR 1 24,35,19 i B G G B G E B 0 1 1 1 OR 1 I i 1 21 1 25,26,36,33 10 G G D G E C NOTE: In those support systera states that have some inpac t vectors with GA f a t ture and sorue with GB f ailure, a conservative assureot ton has t.een rance( suarant eed failure was used1for On-1(CA) and Cn-1(CB). | |||
i i ! | |||
FRC4TLINE SYSTEM IMF ACT I SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CONDIT!0NAL DESCRIPTION i SYSTEM i iPLIT FRACTIONS I STATES I Top Event DH-------------------------------------------------------------------- i OHA Ch5 EA EB 1 1 DHA OHO OHE | |||
: ; .._ ... ___ j 0 0 0 0 1 1,2,4-9,32 1 A 0 E l 1 0 0 0 1 3,10-14,28,29 i B D C { | |||
1 0 1 0 1 15 l A D E 0 1 0 0 1 16-19,27,33,351 B C E 1 1 0 0 : 20-22,24-26, I C C C I | |||
: 30,31,34,8 i 1 1 1 1 1 23 I A 0 E | |||
.... ..____........._____....________..____....____ ___________________________. j i ! I FRONTLINE 5YSTEM IMPACT : SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL ! | |||
CE5CRIPT!0N ! SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACTIONS l STATES I Top Event OT-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
OTV l l DTA 0 : 1-6,6-13,15-18: A | |||
: 23,29,32,33 1 1 l 7,14,19-27,20,t C I 31,34-39 i 4.1-3E | |||
O) | |||
\ | |||
v TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) | |||
.._ __S.h.e.e.t..3._o.f. 8 I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT 1 ClPPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESC RIPT10t4 i SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS l STATES I Top Event EF- - | |||
=------ =- - ===------------- ------------ ==------ | |||
EPA EFB EVA EVB 2kR 1 EFC EFG ep< evx I 1 sb | |||
; i ._ _.. | |||
0 00 0 00 0 i 1,2,7-10,15,17 C G 10,14.23,30 1 1 10 0 90 0 ! NONE I E J 0 1 1 0 00 0 i I E J 0 00 1 10 0 i 4,7,8,16,20,331 H M 0 00 0 1 1 0 1 I H H 0 00 0 00 1 1 6,5,34 i D G 1 21 0 00 0 i NONE i F 1 1 10 1 10 0 1 11-13,21,28,29: E J 0 11 1 10 0 t l E J 1 10 0 1 1 0 i 1 E J 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 t i E J 1 10 0 00 1 1 18,22 1 N K 0 1 1 0 00 1 I l N K rs 1 21 1 10 0 i NONE i F ! | |||
( 1 10 1 10 1 i 19,28,31,37 I E J | |||
\s 0 1 1 1 10 1 : | |||
* I E J 1 10 0 1 1 1 I 1 E J 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 I i E J 1 10 1 21 0 ! 24,27 I F !. | |||
0 1 1 1 21 0 i " | |||
l F 1 1 10 1 21 1 1 35,36,39 1 E K 0 1 1 1 21 1 1 i E K 1 01 0 1 1 0 i NONE I F ! | |||
1 21 1 10 0 1 NONE i F I 1 21 1 10 1 1 33 i F I 1 21 0 1 1 1 1 NONE I F i 1 21 1 21 0 N0NE I F ! | |||
1 21 1 21 1 1 25,26 i F I 0 00 1 10 1 ! 3,3' ' | |||
H N 0 00 0 1 1 1- l l H M 0 00 1 21 0 I t F ! | |||
0 00 1 21 1 i l F I I I FR0NTLINE SriTEM IMFACT I $UFFORT l CHAfYdi TO CON 0!TIONAL CESCRIPTION $YSTEM t $PLIT FRACTION $ | |||
1 iTATES Top Event HI-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
HIA HIB [ t HIA HIS HIC HID HIF. HIF l | |||
... ___ g 0 0 1 1-10,32 i A B C D E F 1 0 1 12-15,18,28,291 G G C D G C i | |||
i I 35 1 0 1 : 11.16,17,19-221 A B G G G A I 27,33,33 i 1 1 : 23-26,20,31, i G G G G G G 34.36 33 1 (m) v 4,1-39 i | |||
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) | |||
-----------_-_-_----.--------- ------------------------------------------~~----- | |||
Sheet 4 of 8 l t FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUFPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS i STATES l Top Event. HL------------------------------------------------ | |||
MLA HLB HL1 EA EB i ! HLA HLB H' E HL F hl< l 1 l 1 0 1/0 0 1 1-6,8-13, 1 A - - - | |||
1 15,16,10,33 1 1 0 0 t 7,14,17,19-22,1 0 - - - | |||
l 24-32,34,35,81 1 1 1 : 23 1 A - - - | |||
0 00 - | |||
0 0 1 1,2,4-9,11,32 1 - B E F 1 10 - | |||
0 0 l 3,10,12-14,28,t - | |||
E E C 1 29,32 i 1 10 - | |||
1 0 1 15 i - B E F 0 1 1 - | |||
0 0 1 16-19,27,33,351 - | |||
E C F 1 21 - | |||
0 0 1 20-22,24-26, l - | |||
C C C 30,31,34.8 i 1 21 1 1 : 23 1 - B E F i | |||
FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT l SUFFORT I CHANGES TO CON 0lT10NAL CEICRIPTION : SYSTEtt : $ FLIT FR4CT10N5 | |||
: STATES : | |||
Top Events HPA, rFE------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
HFA HF8 HPC i l HF A HFC HPO HPG HFH 0 0 0 l 1,4,5 i A C D G I 1 0 0 1 10 i B C F I I 0 1 0 l 2,6-3,32 1 K C E I 1 0 1 1 1 3,17,19,27,33,1 k J L 1 1 33 l 1 0 1 20-22 : B J F I 1 1 1 0 l 12-15,13,23,291 1 C 1 1 1 | |||
; 35 1 0 0 1 11,16 t A J A G 1 1 1 1 23-25,30,31,341 ! J I I ! | |||
56-38 1 1 1 1 : 26 : I J ! ! H | |||
! I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT l SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEtt i $PLIT F6 ACTIONS | |||
: STATES ! | |||
Tcp Event INJ------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
INJ ; I INA INB INC INO 0 1,2,4,7-17,20,1 A B C D i 21.23,27-30, i I 33 : | |||
1 : 3,5,6,18,19,22: E F G H I t 24-26,31,32, I l l 34-33 1 O | |||
4.1-40 | |||
t'n\ | |||
\ ) | |||
TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) | |||
Sh t5 f8 | |||
_._...._.._.......______..._...______........_....................___e__e___.o_... | |||
I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS 1 STATES I Top Event LP-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
LPA LPB l i LPA LPD LPE | |||
~~~ --- I --- --- --- | |||
1 0 0 1 1,2,4-9,32 i A D E 1 0 1 12-15,18,23,291 0 0 C 1 35 1 0 1 ! 3,11,16,17,19,1 B C E I 27,33,39 1 1 1 1 20-26,30,31, t C C C I 34,36-33 I | |||
._ ...._...._..... .___ ___.=_ _ | |||
l i FRONTLINE SYSTEN IMPACT i SUPPORT 1 CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION SYSTEM 1 SPLIT FRACTIONS I STATES 1 Top Events MF+,MF- --..-==- =--- ..-------- ------------- --..---------------- | |||
MF+ FFT MF- LOP l l MFA MFG MFJ 0 0 - - 1 1-9,10,11,14, 1 A - - | |||
1 15,17,20,21, I t 30,32-34 1 0 1 | |||
- - 1 18,21,22 i A - - | |||
1 0 - - i 9.12,13.16,23,I C - - | |||
N 1 26,28,29,31, t 35,8 1 y- - - l 19,24-25,27 i N - - | |||
1 1 0 - l 1,2,4,7,10,15,i - | |||
G J l 20,34 1 1 | |||
- i 3,5,6,8,9, 1 - 0 0 1 11-14,16-19, 1 I 21-33,35,8 1 1 1 1 0 Q Q 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS t STATES 1 Top Event MR- =-- ------- ------ ---------------------------------------- | |||
fM i i NRA O I 1-11,14-18, 1 A I 20-23,28,30, 1 i 32-34 i 1 112,13,19,24-27,1 B i 29,31,35-39 i | |||
: ! I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL ; | |||
CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTICNS i STATES I l Top Event RC----------------------------------------------- ----------------- | |||
RC l I RCD RCE RCF RCG RC H RCI 0 11-6,8-13,15-13,1 0 E F G H I I 20-23,23-34 1 1 :7,14.19,24-27, 1 J K L M N 0 1 I 24-27.35-39 t | |||
=______ ......_ | |||
l | |||
...._________ ....__.._____.. ..._______ ........______.....- l s I 1 | |||
i 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
l l | |||
4,1-41 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) | |||
Sheet 6 of 8 I ! | |||
FRONTL!t4E SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION i SYSTEM i $PLIT FRACTIONS l STATES i Tcp Event P0-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
1 I Pol PDA LDA 1 1 P0A P0C | |||
--- --_ ___ g --- --- | |||
0 0 0 1-3,5-8,14,15,1 A C 1 17,18,20,22, ! | |||
; 30,33-35 1 1 0 0 : 4,9,10,12,13, ! F F | |||
: 16,19,23,27, ! | |||
! 32 l 0 1 o i 26 1 F F 1 1 0 11,21,24,0$. | |||
i 28,29,31,B 1 i ! F F 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACT[0NS i STATE 5 t T:p EventRP-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
RP LOP OP t i RFA | |||
--- --- --- l l --- | |||
0 - | |||
0 1 1,4,7,9-12,15,1 A i 16,00,21 : | |||
1 0 2,5,6,18, ! B 1 22-25,27-29, i 33-35 B : | |||
1 - | |||
1 1 3,8,13,14,17, i C 1 19,26,30-32 1 1 - | |||
I B i ! | |||
1 1 FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT I SUFFORT CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL CEiCRIPT]QN 1 SYSTEM l SPLIT FRACTIONS l STATES 1 Tcp Ev+nt SE--------- ---------------------------------------------------------- | |||
SEA SEB kP : ! ?EA se< 1 I t --- | |||
0 00 0 1,4,7,9,10.15,1 A I 16.00 t 1 10 0 1 NONE t B 0 1 1 0 : NONE I B 1 21 0 1 5,6,11,12,21 1 C 0 00 1 1 S,14.17,10 1 0 1 10 1 i NONE : C 0 1 1 1 i NONE : C 1 21 1 ! 2,3,5,6,13,18,1 0 | |||
: 19,20-29, ; | |||
; 31-35.8 I O | |||
4.1-42 | |||
d R U/ TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) | |||
Sheet 7 of 8 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT ! SUPPORT i CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL i STATES I | |||
- = = = - = = = - ==------ == -------- | |||
Tcp Event S!-- ----------------== == | |||
$1 1 I SIA SIB | |||
... i 0 1 1-6,6-13,15, 1 A B 1 16,18,20-22, 1 I 29-34 1 1 1 7,14,17,19, I C C i 23-28,35,8 i | |||
. . . . --- ......_________ ....=-- | |||
I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACTIONS I STATES i Top Event FL-- - =- ==-- ------------------------------ -- =------------------ | |||
SA 16A SB 168 i i SLA sia slb I I | |||
___ ... ... ___ i ; ... | |||
0 00 0 00 1 1,3-10,14-17, 1 A I 20,23,30,32-34 1 10 0 00 1 12,13,18,22 1 8 0 1 1 0 00 I l B 0 06 1 10 1 11,21,27,23, I B 0 00 0 1 1 1 31,35 i B 1 10 1 10 1 2,19,24,25,29.1 B | |||
,C' 0 1 1 1 10 i B i B | |||
! 1 10 0 1 1 i i B | |||
\- | |||
* 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 I B 1 21 0 00 i NONE I F 0 00 1 21 i NONE I F 1 21 1 10 1 NONE I F 1 21 0 1 1 1 i F 1 10 1 21 i NONE 1 F 0 11 1 21 i 1 F 1 21 1 21 1 26 1 F 1 I , | |||
FRvNTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL i CEICRIPTION i SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS l i STATES I j Top Event SA,SB--= ---- - -------------------------------------------------- < | |||
SA $8 EA EB i 1 SAA SAC SBA SBB SEC $80 | |||
--- --- --- --- t I --- --- --- --- --- --- | |||
0 0 0 0 1 1-2,4-9,32 i A C A B C 0 1 0 0 0 1 3,10-14,28,29 ! B B A F C G 1 v 1 0 1 15 i B C A B C D 0 1 0 0 1 16-19,27,33,35! A C E E E E , | |||
1 1 0 0 1 20-22.24-26, i B B E E E E ! | |||
! 30,31,34,8 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 i B C E B C D | |||
('') | |||
V 4.1-43 | |||
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) | |||
Sheet 8 of 8 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT 1 SUFPORT 1 CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTION 3 i STATES I Top Event TC-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
TC2 I I TCO TCH 0 1 1,2,4,7-10, I B H I 14-17,20,30 I l 33,34 I t i 3,5,6,11-13, I I I i 18,19,21-29. I I 31,32,35,0 1 | |||
.------------------------------------------------_--_------~~---------------~~~- | |||
1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT I SUFPORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION 1 SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACT10NS I STATES I Top Event TH-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
TH1 THA THB LOP EA EB i i THA THB thx I I | |||
... --. --. ___ --- ---g g .-- -.- | |||
0 00 - | |||
0 0 1 1,2,4-11.32 l B | |||
1 10 - 0 01 3,12-14,16-21,1 - | |||
G t 27-29,33,35 1 0 1 1 - 0 0 l I - C 1 10 - | |||
1 0 1 15 1 - B 1 21 - | |||
0 0 1 22,24-26,20, 1 - 0 I 31, 34.8 i 1 21 - | |||
1 1 1 23 1 - | |||
B 0 - -- | |||
0 - - 1 ;,2,4,5,7, 1 A - | |||
! 9-12,15,16, I i 18,20-23,34,B1 1 | |||
0 - | |||
- 1 3,6,3,13,14, 1 F - | |||
1 17,19,24-33,35 0 - -- | |||
1 - | |||
- 1 I A - | |||
1 t - | |||
- 1 A _ | |||
i l FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDIT!nNAL DESCRIPTION 1 SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTION 3 i STATES I Top Event TT-------------------------------------------------------------------- | |||
TT I I TTA 1 i --- | |||
0 ! 1-10.12-20,22,1 A I 23,27,30,32-B 1 1 1 11,21.24-26, I B I 20-29,31 1 O | |||
4.1-44 | |||
rm S | |||
( ) TABLE 4.1-6. SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS CRITERIA Sheet 1 of 3 Inventory Control Injection | |||
: 1. During LOCAs. | |||
2 Large: 0.5 ft -1 LPI. | |||
Medium: 0.12-0.5 f t 2-1 HPI and either LPI . | |||
Smail: 0.02-0.12 ft 2-1 HPI. , | |||
2 Very Smail: 0.02 ft .7 gp;, | |||
: 2. SCTR - one HPI. | |||
: 3. One PSV or PORY fails to reclose - one HPI. | |||
: 4. HPI cooling - one HPI with 1 PSV. | |||
HPI cooling - two HPIs with no PSV. | |||
pl 5. RCP seal failure - one HP!. | |||
g | |||
: 6. Inadvertent DHR valve opening (IDHRVO) - one HPI and one LPI. | |||
Recirculation | |||
: 1. Large, medium LOCA, IDHRY0 - one LPI and one DHR heat exchanger. | |||
: 2. All other situations - one HPI and one LPI and one DHR heat exchanger. | |||
Reactivity Control | |||
: 1. Large, medium, small LOCAs - one LPI/one HPI pumping from BWST (large LOCA has assist from voids). | |||
: 2. All others - at least 59 out of 61 control rods insert or one HPI started within 10 minutes of turbine trip, i | |||
(a)> 1 0584G101387PMR 4.1-45 l | |||
TABLE 4.1-6 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 3 RCS Heat Removal Insufficient Decay Heat Removal | |||
: 1. Large, medium, small LOCAs, IDHRVO - through the break. | |||
: 2. All others, with RT- (main feedwater at least 87, or one EFW to one steam generator and one MSSV/0TSG or one ADV/0TSG or two T8Vs) or (PORV/PSV opens auto and HPI cooling inventory control). | |||
: 3. All others, without RT - (MFW 8% or one EFW to one steam generator) and (two MSSVs/0TSG or four TBVs/ADV). | |||
Insufficient Decay and Latent Heat Removal All cases - (MFW or one EFW to one steam generator) and (four TBVs/ADVs) or one PORY and PSV. | |||
RCS Pressure Cont <ol Hot Standby | |||
: 1. All requiring reactor trip after RT failure. | |||
: 2. Cooldown to cold shutdown - RCPs and pressurizer sprays, or auxiliary sprays. | |||
: 3. All others - none required. | |||
Core Heat Removal Decay All cases - (pool boiling and RCS heat removal through steam venting) or (subcooled natural circulation or forced circulation or reflux and RCS heat removal through secondary system). | |||
O 0584G101387PMR 4.1-46 | |||
1 | |||
() TABLE 4.1-6 (continued) , | |||
; 5.$3+ 3 of 3 , | |||
Containment Temperature / Pressure Control f | |||
: 1. During long-term RCS heat removal through break or HPI cooling : . | |||
two trains of fan coolers or (one train of CS or one train of ' | |||
recirculation and one DHR heat exchanger works with decay beat closed cooling water to it). | |||
: 2. All other cases - none. | |||
Containment Radioactive Material Control | |||
: 1. All cases, after severe core damage - one train of RBS or two trains of fan coolers. | |||
Containnent Isolation i | |||
() | |||
: 1. All cases - one valve in each containment purge line closed. | |||
one valve in sump drain, RCOT vent and drain and seal return line. | |||
J | |||
: 2. SGTR - in addition close all secondary system stiam release' paths. | |||
I 1 | |||
k i | |||
1 0584G101387PMR 4.1-47 5 | |||
--s a --, , y-,wy- ~ . - - . . . ,-,-y ,---em..- ..,e, - . . ,--e,...wwv., - m,.,y.,,een,,py--, ,a.,--,m,em-.-+.se e. | |||
9 O | |||
(, _ ,1,, | |||
) | |||
I tutti 1 $Nitt 11 1 - 1 Nm a si m , smi in - | |||
1 1 1 IntIf 3 $NitT 8 INIII 13 SNEIT 4 tutti 9 / | |||
CORI HwCI INIIT 6 | |||
!NEIT 5 Copt kett NOT 1NW1M INItf 14 Cett MwCI C- '-) -- | |||
FIGURE 4.1-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR GENERAll2ED TRANSIENT O | |||
4.1-48 | |||
O O O-I IURBINED I REACIORh | |||
( IRIP j ( | |||
TRIP j | |||
I AUIO.OF - | |||
REACIOR \m/ fI Ry | |||
[IURBINE P | |||
[RI] hg[\SH.1; g77;\ | |||
E o | |||
; S.S.SIEAM\ /HPI\ IEA/ 1699 PSIG \ | |||
l RELIEFj COOL) 5 >\SH.7A E | |||
SIGNAL | |||
/ | |||
[SD] y Apy3 l | |||
IISHI SH, NSSYS XeePPressureBelow SH. | |||
l 2A NFNPShutoffHead i 1/19/85 2B J | |||
FIGURE 4.1-2. EVENT SEQ flCE DIAG OR GENERALIZED TRANSIENT l | |||
SH. | |||
IA SH.\ | |||
IB | |||
/ | |||
s too little MFW [M-] , | |||
MFW (Flow ( 5% will open FORY/PSUT RAMPBACE includes toontichMFW[M+] _ _ will not isolate ICSfailures MANUAL MFW\ | |||
CONIROL y (SLRDS )-"" | |||
/~~ _ _ | |||
C $--" . | |||
(1600PSiG)1 S 4 SIGNAL E | |||
AgH \[EF- , oP EF+],/HPI,\ | |||
C99L includes | |||
_ CONIR0L j IX.7.A M - - _I ! a _ | |||
EF+ exc CD* will fail I.D. | |||
hi-level MANUALLY 3 \c gygp PitnP hy Water caPPyover if INI'R'PI /-> | |||
ctttoff MfN / notalreadyfailedbyMF+' | |||
.ASGS | |||
&op,willendEFWflow SH k eventitally fails both pttnps (seeATP-1210-3) 1/25/85 {* excessive cooldown May restilt in RU failure fran PIS FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 15) e -_ - - | |||
O O | |||
O O O SH. | |||
2 t | |||
REDUCERCS H0 | |||
[IC] | |||
HEAT/ REN. \Exc/ | |||
/ | |||
\ _ t_ | |||
\CD/ | |||
ALREADY? | |||
(gigggt1699PSIG) | |||
YES g | |||
7- | |||
? 1699psig SIGNAL | |||
\ | |||
YES U [ OpenMU-U217 StartsecondM/UPuMP INCREASE \ StartDCandDRsystans IHP-81 M/UFLOW | |||
/ (assunedtoalvagsoccur) | |||
UProvidecontinuouslytoseals i F | |||
! kH. | |||
) IISH3 4 i 5/24/85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 3 of 15) i | |||
1600psig '~s.YES signal y y HPI SIARIS\ | |||
[HP] | |||
+ RUNS i | |||
/ | |||
CLOSE | |||
\ j gysI \ [BW-4] BWSI | |||
\ > | |||
m | |||
? | |||
[IH-1] C0 /0/ } AVAILABLE)[BW-2] | |||
AVAILABLE | |||
/ " | |||
asstinesnin. EI refill rate P flowline insttfficient SIARI 3RD \ , /PR_OVIDEi/SH. __ \ | |||
normally for2HPIPs $'hgfE/IBW-3 \ / | |||
available fIHPIP h | |||
" PORU/PSYSor SH. P SH. | |||
! IISH4 SH. 50 Sealsis | |||
/SH.\ 5B 5/24/85 5A \5D/ Sttfficient FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 15) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/SH. SH. 'SH. IISH5 | |||
\ 4A 4C 4B 2/26/P5 | |||
\ | |||
m p | |||
REDUCE M/UFLOW | |||
\ / | |||
>4 | |||
/' REDUCE sHPIPFLOW | |||
/ o IIH-21 l | |||
4 YES;Ircs)500F, | |||
/WATERTHRU\ | |||
t [P0,PU] | |||
\ RELIEFS m | |||
/ s i /, | |||
y 7?)P-SHUI 0FFh FPPpts:0 i N0; FLOWSTOPS t- 'SIOPHPIPs CLOSEYALYs HPIPs( ) , | |||
RECRC , | |||
FaH r H. FSUBq | |||
[RC] | |||
! 4 '4 2 /SH.\ | |||
l " | |||
* Min-flonornally availablehere | |||
[ \40/ | |||
GINI. RCP\ - | |||
sinceno1600psig (500 F ) | |||
I-res) 3 signalgenerated. | |||
SEAL 4IIHICCW/ | |||
INTEG'Y)-+__fD.)>_ C. | |||
's_e | |||
: ( 200F ) [SE-1] tj FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 5 of 15) | |||
0D + CDachievedhgusingIBUs,ADUs,andsprag 79pHR{H EFR \ | |||
[CD] COND. / when secondary systen heat ren, is avail i | |||
\ | |||
block (BYPASS LO-PRESS | |||
/ | |||
ESFs CFIs K u T | |||
E | |||
'0 PEN DROP-\ | |||
gg_1)LINEVALUES/ | |||
> g"') | |||
Y | |||
/ALIGNHR\ | |||
PUNPS HEAT I | |||
[DH] (\ EXCH$GRs/ | |||
/4AIII0C/bg - | |||
\'T"" / ><Os_ > | |||
;g, (4, FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 6 of 15) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O SIOP3/4 ie., run one pump to promote Mixing in reactor vessel (RCPs alnadyl_ f t | |||
(if no\ forPISprevention, BWSI | |||
\PDS3x ggg AVAILABLE/ , | |||
* U I NEAL HPI | |||
'\ PDS 3x - 'y | |||
[HP] SIARI / 2/3 HPIPs available if M g | |||
1/3HPIPsavailableifMS | |||
[P0, 20RY+2HPIP$\ | |||
OR PDS 3x p" l PY] 1/2PY+1HPIf I HPIP in 30 nin if 1 PSU y | |||
: 1 2HPIPsifless .-~_ _ | |||
IISH7 <[ C. D.' > | |||
0 ~~ | |||
~- ' | |||
; 2/26/85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 7 of 15) i | |||
HI-RECRC RCSwillrapidly depressurizeafter coredamageduetoRY IGY-BACX \ | |||
RECIkc , | |||
YES PDS4x nelt-through. | |||
[HL-2] ALIGHH'I / NO Stuck open relief-+ | |||
!< rapiddepress,to LPIP discharge press LTisstillpossible_if RAIN \PDS 4x ; | |||
wecaneherefranIH, | |||
/ | |||
r CLOSED C2 FAILED, NO SPRAYS | |||
[SU) | |||
& T | |||
* HXsnotreallyneeded OPENSUMP\pps4x J, | |||
[SA/ ' | |||
sinceS.S.heatren. | |||
SB] RECIRC./ | |||
UALUES issti))possi31,, | |||
I butMustkeep E >\ | |||
I(300Forpumpseals | |||
[I N PDS 4X g Willfail, | |||
, [DH] PUMPS,HXs / , | |||
l /- | |||
6 85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 8 of 15) | |||
- - - - - - _ - - . _ - -- -. -- - _- -_u - - - - - _ - | |||
9 | |||
-------------m,.- - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _a - --,--_ | |||
e _ - - - - - - , - - | |||
O O O | |||
'Sn. | |||
8 | |||
" Itwilltakeupto2weeksto (jlP cool? | |||
cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, j hYES hut the pres. Will still be high. | |||
HSIGRESS\ | |||
HEATREN | |||
\ PDS & , | |||
.BEf01E E / , | |||
M E g ppg 4x ffhR | |||
[CDT INN | |||
/ " | |||
/EA! | |||
BY T | |||
SLO,g PRES ESFs j | |||
-=- m h . -% | |||
in ie <e> | |||
FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 9 of 15) | |||
SH. IISH10 6 or ( OPEN h 3/8/85 | |||
+ | |||
( | |||
R.B. | |||
j PurgeandRCdraintankline isolateon4psigsignalorRI; pg jgg,7,p\ . | |||
[C1/ ')- fj9 .. | |||
Sealreturnisolateson30psig 02] | |||
ONRI | |||
/ ,-, | |||
N0, large hole 2 YES s0 p m e [CA/ | |||
4 | |||
\ N[(REAC. | |||
liig$1 spee BLDG.) | |||
SIGNAL | |||
/ | |||
. r | |||
: CB] | |||
(REAC BLDC.h EA/EB (OPEN'N0'REAC. | |||
FANS) BLDG.\ | |||
Y I'2 RBFAN | |||
\( | |||
OPEN | |||
)4 ES ANUALRB SPRAYS | |||
[Fl/ | |||
F2] | |||
COOLERS | |||
/ FAN STARI / ( | |||
[CS] Manual no4psig if signal,p | |||
' 6' (SIABL AI ) | |||
COLD / (FAILURE 'j (SHUID0NN ) , | |||
i FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 10 of 15) | |||
! O O e | |||
O O O | |||
't s_BREAXEHFAILURE i | |||
--/ YES Ittrhine trip on reactor trip is l / IURBINE \ hasedonbreakerposition. | |||
IRIP / | |||
[II] \ 2 L' RCPs 'N__ YES | |||
; I IRIPPD / | |||
y N0 | |||
,Ls_ RCSreliefcoolingisnot i g,g, gygg | |||
> (,0. D.' > stifficient to i | |||
, ISD] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/ s' coolthecore, u | |||
/ | |||
MFW \ Power drops rapidly with HI' Loss of sec sys. ' | |||
RA MF- inventory | |||
; [MF]\_MPBACX , | |||
_ / | |||
y increasingRCStenp. .?WR in26nins. | |||
; IISH11 SH. Does lack of MFW change HPIP or PSY or EFW sitecess criteria? | |||
12 l 3/8/85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 11 of 15) | |||
) | |||
i t___-_-___- . _ _ _ _ | |||
~ | |||
I EF+ | |||
EFWFLOW \ | |||
IN5SEC.S) NI, Willgetto11in. | |||
m /'D.,- | |||
C. | |||
[EF] | |||
(fWRinabout1 Min. | |||
/ EF- - | |||
gj -/ | |||
2/3 PORY orPSUs \- | |||
[P0,PY.OPEN / | |||
u PDS 3x gi gggy . | |||
! [gy) / N0 SPRAYS u , , | |||
4PSIC ' | |||
[CA/ \.PDS3x ,,M 'D' .- ,.s SIcggL j r s'C. . | |||
CB] / '/ | |||
f IISW12 /$H. | |||
3/8/85_ \13 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 12 of 15) e 9 9 | |||
O O O SH, 12 t ON4PSIGSIGNAL 1 | |||
i AUIO. HPI \. | |||
IN 30 SEC. | |||
MANUAL \W __ C. D. ~ > | |||
^ | |||
-~ - | |||
S lI j HPIP ~ ' | |||
[HP-1]p'N}N/ [HP-3] ACIDATION / | |||
~- . | |||
t4 | |||
~ | |||
'PR0Yl')EHPIP MIN. K,~C.D.''> \ HPIPs burnup against pressure | |||
/ | |||
l FLOW ._- | |||
spike >theirshutoffhead | |||
[HR] | |||
: , t E PORU+FSYs \ >/'OCA L | |||
RECLOSE / \ | |||
; [RC] / \_ | |||
u f | |||
I' REDUCERCS _ _ _ 1600 psig signal equivalent actuation ~ | |||
l l [IC] (HEAT REMOYA has already been produced 4 psig signal so overcooling is uninportant g_____ ' | |||
TTSH13 SH. | |||
i 3/8/85 6 nouae 4.1-2 (sneet 1 or 1s) | |||
/SH.\ | |||
\12/ " | |||
I OH4PSIGSIGNAL MANUAL -~. | |||
AUIO. HPl I\N 30 SEC' | |||
.''v HPIP -: C . D . ', ) | |||
[HP-1] | |||
SJf'lI IN Z INS q | |||
/ [HP-3] ACIDATION PROVI)E | |||
\ -- s | |||
><'C.D.') HPIPs burnup against pressun | |||
~' | |||
[MR] HPIPMIN/ | |||
FLOW ~ s- spike)theirshutoffhead | |||
. I k | |||
~ PORU+PSYs \ jLOCA RECLOSE / ,s | |||
[RC) / \ | |||
d REDUCERCS | |||
_ _ _ 1699 psig signal equivalent actuation has alaady been produced 4 psig signal | |||
[IC] | |||
g_____ so overcooling is uninportant IISH13 SH.h 3/8/85 6/ | |||
FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 14 of 15) | |||
G G O | |||
; o o o | |||
' - I | |||
~'~C'li'V | |||
[not PDS1 I | |||
A_YES mr (nA,B.C,DJ SY,- >(notPDS) nB ) - | |||
t NO T C fpYESy REACIOR\ REACIOR\ li0 f pps 3 | |||
[C1/ BUILDING BUILDING I | |||
02] ISOLATION / [CS]sSPRAYS ' | |||
~- | |||
/ " | |||
( nF J , | |||
U Sb'__YES | |||
} g's._YES | |||
\ | |||
l r 'REACIOR r OPENSUMP 3 E [FI/ BUILDING YALUES PDS REACIOR , | |||
F2] FAN C'L'RS/ [sg) ( nD ) BUILDING | |||
~2~.YES s [CS] SPRQYS u N/ 1 | |||
'ALIGNibN [ PDS i\ | |||
REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING ( / | |||
[CS] SPRAYS / DHRHEAT | |||
[gj FCHANGERS/ | |||
nG | |||
~ | |||
t U 1 u IISH14f PDS} [ PDS | |||
) [ PDS 3 | |||
[ PDS ) [ PDS 3 | |||
2/26/85( nA ) ( nB ) ( nA J' '( nC J' \ nX ) | |||
FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 15 of 15) | |||
Int:4'11tittttllitttilastatunittlutstatatlt!*ltitittettttutiliitttttsliittatistittstist JarttittJillittttlitstituitttttutttill at af al' TTto 9 7C W-[f D*7W N N N $2 9 2 at te wil 44 N el F1 5(4 LW $'41 ut tal 141 i(i t() (C) t() tF) att f(# (F) t() | |||
1 $ 1 1 I I I I I 2; il t 2 Cl 2 l 1 ! ! I I I I ) $ ) | |||
I ! I I I I I I 1 t . 1,, , 4 GL 4 1 1 l l l ! 1 1 1 1 1.,,._ $ 4 5 1 1 1 I I I i 1 ! l I 6 9 6 I I i 1 1 l I I I l--- 7 I i l i l i i ! I I I I l 4 (C2 4 1 1 I l 1 ! ! 1 1 1 9 4 1 I I I I I I i 1 1 I le i 16 i ! I I i 1 1 1 ! 11 8 11 1 I i 1 l l 1 ( l I l .,,, 12 C2 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 i i ! .,_, 13 4 13 I l i I I I I I i 1 14 8 14 I I I I 1 1 1 1 I 15 9 il i I I I ! I L 1 16 ( 16 I I I I I I i 17 Ull 17 I I l I I I il Ji l 14 4 33 i i I I I I I I I I I I 19 8 M i i 1 I I I I I I I I M 4 M l i I l i 1 1 1 i ! l 21 8 X 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 I l- 22 4 37 I I I I t ! I I I I i 23 9 36 8 I i 1 l 8 I l I l +. t H I I I ! ! I I i 1 46 t i l I i l i I 41 1 1 1 I I I I I 42 l ! I 1 1 1 1 :-l 43 I I I I i 1 I ., 69 I i 1 I i l i i ki t$ | |||
I I I I i 1 2, Ifl2 47 I I I ! I 1 4 W4 173 1 | |||
i I i ! 61 + 4; 1 I 1 D E9 174 1 l 8 I l t I i 1 1 ! 34 W4 17% | |||
! l . I 1 : ! I I I I M H !?6 I I I ' | |||
I i i t i I A W4 in 1 1 . i l i i i 1 i l 27 El 1 74 I I I I I I I I l l_ _ _ , , , 38 FI 179 1 I I i i 1 1 I ! J'! WC IM i I t I 1 i i i u W4 131 | |||
! I I I l 1 1 I i 1 1, , 41 H lt2 I I I l 1 I ! i ! I _ 42 F) It3 I . 1 a i I 4 i ! _,_ 4) We if4 i l I 1 1 44 W) | |||
! I I I I I I l_ in I . I l 1 1- ,, 45 H lb I I I I I i 1 I . | |||
46 y( 167 i 1 i i ! ! 47 Ei. in i I I i 1 l ! ! 44 IT)$ 1% | |||
I ! I I I L ! _ | |||
41 y1 13 I I I I I I I I $4 WC 199 I I I I I I I il lik$ Jus | |||
! I I 1 ! 1 52 IN 29 2 i . i i ! u ni in | |||
! ! I i 1 4: I i $4 $ 247 4 I i i i 1 i i ! , i. u e2 24: | |||
I I i l I I 1 i i i ! ns $ 24e I I t . I 1 1 1 1 1 g_ $7 g 29 I I I l ! ! 1 1 1 l .. W$ 251 1 1 1 1 l 1 1 I ! 1.,,, it 8 252 1 1 l | |||
I I | |||
i 1 I I W( N I I I 1 l__ 61 $ N I I I I . I I I i . l_ 62 e2 N | |||
* 1 1 l ! ! 1 1 I W 3 N | |||
: 1 ! ! I l i I I 4 3 37 | |||
! l . 1 1 1 i p ( N I 1 ! ! I I is Im 3) | |||
I . I I l 67 tit? 26 1 l I i ! I w vn ui I 9: . | |||
69 1% 431 1 1 1 I 7e arr n i ! . n i.y e 1 1 i ! 72 titt 647 1 . . | |||
: 7) V% ici I ! | |||
74 UN l '.4 I . | |||
n v4 m i i i i w_ _ w 473 m | |||
. i 1 . :. _ _ n 12 w | |||
. I I i lil_ _.. 4 it) t4 1 1 I .. n ini, n L i is trnit tn ll Vhil law IJ L411 l$e; SJ tiill l&4 , | |||
. i ..iva.w w as via o.ain m ... u 4 FIGURE 4,1-3, GENERAL TRANSIENT EVENT TREE ! | |||
4,1-64 | |||
5 . | |||
('ss)/ 4.2 EARLY RESPONSE OR MAIN TREES ' | |||
The frontline system event tree descriptions are divioed into two sections, one for the early response trees, the "main trees," and one for the-late response or "subtrees." This section, 4.2, consists of one i section for each main tree. Almost every initiator described in Table 2-3 has a corresponding main tree. The only exceptions are those initiators that lead directly to core damage and therefore do not require an event tree to develop core damage scenarios: | |||
e Inadvertent opening of the DHR dropline valves, e Fire in the MCC area (Ad-FZ-6). | |||
e Fire in the 1S switchgear room (CB-FA-2b). , | |||
o Fire in the B battery room (CB-FA-2d). | |||
e Fire in the 1E switchgear room (CB-FA-3a, hazard scenario 3), | |||
e Very large fire in ESAS cabinet area (CB-FA-3c). , | |||
The steam line break in the turbine.ouilding was treated on the same main tree as the intermediate building steam line break because it was decided ' | |||
that no signficant differences in plant response existed. , | |||
The section for each main tree is indicated by a tab with the two or , | |||
three-character abbreviation given in the right-hand most column of ; | |||
Table 2-3. Each such section contains an event tree figure, a boundary condition table, and an event sequence diagram for the initiating event . | |||
if one was produced. The event sequence diagram includes both early and l'.3 late frontline system responses. Only the early frontline system | |||
\m / responses appear in the main trees. The late frontline system responses i appear in the subtrees. ! | |||
Table 4.2-1 describes the relationships between each main tree and I between the main and subtrees. The left-hand column of this table lists ' | |||
the initiating events, the middle column briefly describes the main tree used for the in tiating event, and the right-hand column shows the i | |||
subtrees referenced in each main tree and how~they are related to each other. | |||
The subtrees are all shown in Section 4.3. | |||
t gh ' | |||
V 4.2-1 OS85G101387PMR | |||
TABLE 4.2-1. EVENT TREE LAYOUT Sheet 1 of 4 Initiator Main Trees Subtrees | |||
: 1. Large LOCA (LL) Has Its Own (LL) LLA from MLA directly. | |||
MLC (same as used in ML). | |||
: 2. Medium LOCA (ML) Has Its Own (ML) MLA something like A, but with LP and DT and BA/BB instead of HL and DH. | |||
MLB something like B, without BA/BB with different PDSs. | |||
MLC from C with different PDSs. | |||
: 3. Small LOCA (SL) Has Its Own (SB) A,B,C (same as used in RT). | |||
: 4. Very Small LOCA Has its own (VSB) A,B C.BFA,BFB,R/2,RY3 (same (VL) as RV2,RY3 used in GT). | |||
: 5. Inadvertent No Event Tree Opening of OHR (just a scenario Oropline Valves into PDS 1H at IE (VS) frequency) | |||
: 6. Steam and Feed- Has Its Own (SLI) A,B,C,RV2,RV3,BFA,BFB,BFC, water Line RT4,RT2,RT3 (same as RTs). | |||
Breaks TC1,TC2,TC3 (same as TRs). | |||
: 7. Steam Genera'.or Has Its Own (TR) C,RV2,BFA,BFB,BFC (same as Tube Rupture 'TR) RTs). | |||
TR1 from CD1 with SA,SB, HL=1.0. | |||
TR2 from B with SA,SB=1.0. | |||
TC1 from CD1 like TR1 except C3=1.0 to simulate open reactor building (RB). | |||
TC2 from TR2 to TC1. | |||
TC3 from C with C3=1.0 to simulate open RB. | |||
RC2 from RV2 with C3=1.0 to sirrulate open RB, TC4 from TC3 but with high pressure end states. | |||
: 8. Excessive Main Uses GT with Same as GT. | |||
Feedwater (EC) MF+ = 1.0 0 | |||
0586G101487PMR | |||
I | |||
'S TABLE 4.2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 2 of 4 Initiator Main Trees Subtrees . | |||
: 9. Total Loss of Uses GT with Same as GT. ! | |||
Main Feedwater MF- = 1.0 and ' | |||
(FW) MF+ = 0.0 | |||
: 10. Reactor Trip (RT) Uses Cri with Same as GT, which means: | |||
RT = 1.0 RT = 1.0. | |||
A for continued inventory loss with HPIPs working. | |||
B for continued inventory ! | |||
loss with HPIPs not working. ! | |||
C for continued inventory - | |||
loss with the BWST not i available. ! | |||
RY2 from B with all PDS 4s i becoming 5s. ! | |||
RV3 = C. ! | |||
BFA,BFB are fdentical to A,8 for now (uses A,8 run . | |||
numbers). ! | |||
Except for: ; | |||
Os CD1 for situations where the i RCS must be cooled down to ! | |||
fix whatever problem ; | |||
tripped the reactor. ' | |||
CO2 from Col, but with only i one HPIP available for i cooldown and no accessible l RT subtrees. l 1 | |||
: 11. Turbine Trip (TT) Uses GT with A,B,C,RV2,BFA,BFB,BFC (same TT = 1.0 as used for GT). 1 RT4 from HPI parts of the main tree and from A I (currently uses A subtree I runs). ' | |||
RT2 from B (to simulate that RCS pressure is greater than the HPIP shutoff head) | |||
(uses B run numbers.). | |||
RT3 from C (uses C run nunters). | |||
C01,CO2 not accessible. | |||
l O | |||
V i | |||
'~ | |||
0586G101487PMR | |||
TABLE 4.2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 3 of 4 Initiator Main Trees Subtrees | |||
: 12. Loss of Air Uses GT with Same as TT. | |||
System (LA) Different Support System State Set | |||
: 13. Loss of Control Uses Its Own (LC) CB, which asks CP, C1, and SV Building Ventila- Which has only since they might be closed tion (LC) BW Top Event initially or fail closed (similar to subtree C). | |||
: 14. Loss of ATA Uses GT with Same as turbine trip. | |||
Power (AT) MF- = 1.0, MF+ = 1.0 | |||
: 15. Loss of Train A Uses GT and SSSs of DC Power (LD) Set Its Own | |||
: 16. Loss of Offsite Has Its Own with Same as turbine trip Power (AC) Changes from GT except for: | |||
for Recovery R1A, R1B, and R1C uses a run where GA is failed, but GB is all right (uses SSS 13). | |||
: 17. Loss of Nuclear Uses GT but with Same as turbine trip, Services Closed Correct SSS Set Cooling Water (LN) | |||
(LNS) | |||
: 18. Loss of River Uses Its Own (LR) C,RT2,RT3,RT4,RV2,RY3. | |||
Water (LRW) RWA uses subtree A for SSSs where river water is lost. | |||
RWB uses B for loss of river water support system states. | |||
RWC uses C with for loss of river water support system states. | |||
: 19. 0.15g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip. | |||
(E15) with Its Own MFF and Support System state Run | |||
: 20. 0.259 Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip. | |||
(E25) with Its Own MFF and Support System State Run 0 | |||
0586G101487PMR 4'2'4 | |||
TABLE 4.2-1 (continued) | |||
Sheet 4 of 4 Initiator Main Trees Subtrees | |||
: 21. 0.40g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip. | |||
(E40) with Its Own MFF and Support System State Run | |||
: 22. 0.60g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip. | |||
(E60) with Its Own MFF and Support System State Run | |||
: 23. Fire in IE Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip. | |||
. Switchgear (F04) with Its Own MFF Room (CB-FA-3a, and Support System Hazard State Run Scenario 2) | |||
O O | |||
0586G101487PMR 4.2-5 | |||
I l | |||
. -4.2.1 LARGE LOCA MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.1-1 presents the large loss of coolant accident frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.1-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.1-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will .ake place following a large RCS pipe break are the same as those shown on the general-transient ESD. | |||
Many of these actions, however, are not important to preventing core damage following a large pipe break. The only early action that is required to prevent core damage is the operation of the BWST [BW). The long-term sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, which determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a large pipe break leads, are shown .in the following subtrees: | |||
e LLA (see Section 4.3.4) when the BWST is available, e MLC (see Section 4.3.7) when the BWST is not available. | |||
O v | |||
4.2.1-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
l l | |||
l t | |||
O M | |||
H. | |||
++ | |||
C H | |||
M H. | |||
H m # | |||
= ++ | |||
o | |||
- 3 H +' | |||
- ++ | |||
Z L.L. | |||
W .+ | |||
Q ** | |||
W . & | |||
Z ++ | |||
W | |||
> U. | |||
W | |||
: c. U. | |||
N i o | |||
p | |||
+ H | |||
.+ | |||
+ x | |||
.=-* | |||
( | |||
u H. | |||
. W o y X N | |||
W w O. | |||
% N | |||
=J ** & | |||
dwU U [d | |||
$' g-7 9 | |||
E s "a W-N n | |||
E a | |||
h 5$ , | |||
W N | |||
O W | |||
& Q d u:,p C. | |||
9 4.2.1-2 | |||
_ - . . A _w - -_ - - - _ _ | |||
O I | |||
i J | |||
I 1 | |||
{ | |||
TABLE 4.2.1-2. LARGE LOCA B0UNDARY CONDITIONS l l | |||
I I | |||
i l | |||
33 31 31 !O! 31 271 !)1 Ng ?)[ 31 p)g p)g ,%) g yg ,3,g yg yg y D N 'I | |||
.31 31 31 N1 31 N1 N1 31 N1 31 Mg ;og ;gg ;;t yg ;c 3g 3g ;gg 3g | |||
, ,Si' | |||
: 1 234 5 6 7 8 910111213 ;415 L6171419 20 0122 :3 :4 ;5 26 ;7 29 ;P )) 3172 23 34 25 % 37 36 ?? | |||
IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , , , , , , , , , | |||
l | |||
\ | |||
4.2.1-3 | |||
O | |||
* Q 1 2 | |||
* E | |||
* S | |||
* E | |||
* T | |||
* A | |||
* T _ | |||
* S | |||
* AC m | |||
E L | |||
L1 | |||
* Q 1 2 _ | |||
* E | |||
* S - | |||
* E | |||
* E | |||
* R | |||
* T | |||
* T | |||
* N E | |||
V | |||
* E | |||
* A | |||
* C O | |||
* L | |||
* E G | |||
R A | |||
L O__ | |||
* 1 | |||
* 1 | |||
* 2 W l 4 | |||
* E | |||
* R | |||
* U | |||
* G | |||
* I | |||
* F | |||
* O | |||
*. . a | |||
4.2.2 MEDIUM LOCA MAIN TREE | |||
) | |||
Figure 4.2.2-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.2-2. Figure 4.2.2-2 presents the medium LOCA event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.2-3 presents the medium loss of coolant accident frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.2-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.2-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a medium RCS pipe break are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. | |||
Many of these actions, however, are not important to preventing core damage following a medium pipe break. The only early actions that are required to prevent core damage are the operation cf-the high and low pressure injection system and the BWST [BW). The long-term sump , | |||
recirculation actions and containment safety features, which determine to which plant dama.ge state a core damage scenario initiated by a medium pipe break leads, are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e MLA (see Section 4.3.5) when HPI is available. | |||
e MLB (see Section 4.3.6) when it is not. | |||
e MLC (see Section 4.3.7) when the BWST is not available. | |||
O V . | |||
5 O | |||
4.2.2-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
O S | |||
* N | |||
* O | |||
* I T | |||
* C | |||
* A | |||
* R | |||
* F | |||
* T | |||
* I | |||
* L | |||
* P | |||
* S | |||
* L | |||
* G A * : | |||
f 0 | |||
N | |||
* G I FFF O | |||
* t T AEB | |||
* 0 I PFP I | |||
* I D HHH T | |||
* C N I | |||
* T O | |||
* A C D | |||
* P N | |||
* F O * | |||
* T C | |||
* I | |||
* L D | |||
* P | |||
* S N | |||
* A | |||
* L A | |||
S | |||
* N N | |||
* O O N | |||
* I I CAD O | |||
* T TT - - - | |||
* I I C II P I | |||
* D LA HHH T | |||
* N PP I | |||
* O SF | |||
* C N | |||
* I F | |||
E D | |||
O T | |||
* T N * | |||
* N ) | |||
E | |||
* E 3 V | |||
* V ( | |||
* E B E * | |||
* G ) &) | |||
P | |||
* N 2 4 I ( A( | |||
O | |||
* T C S T | |||
* A SE I | |||
T PPV A | |||
C I | |||
N W FPV | |||
*t LA I | |||
O | |||
* NNN L | |||
* E OOO | |||
* E I I I | |||
* R) TTT M | |||
* T1 (CCC U | |||
* I * | |||
* TYIEE NTNt N D D | |||
* EII I I E | |||
* VL M | |||
* T N | |||
E V | |||
EIERR B | |||
AAL UV CLSSS EE | |||
. | |||
* E OI SSS 1 | |||
2 F | |||
O LAERE V | |||
MAFPF U | |||
E | |||
* E I THHH 2 | |||
* 1 M DWI E | |||
F EHHH 1 | |||
GGG I I 4 | |||
* E | |||
* L | |||
* T | |||
* N B | |||
* E 8A A | |||
* V | |||
* E 1 .WPPI 1 BHHH T | |||
* O PN"" | |||
b TABLE 4.2.2-2. MEDIUM LOCA BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 4 4 =+01 93 01 e42 609 611 613 412 617 317 til 62) e;4 617 612 6;4 (17 6il e;4 el7 02 01 w2 O2 619 612 412 616 619 6.4 $21 624 t;4 412 424 t02 424 6;4 6;4 Of | |||
. Siin 1 . 3 4 $6 7 9 9101112131415161713 !) .N 2122 :3 :4 25 ;6 ;7 23 ;9 30 213; 73 :43*3,273379 id?= . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
44 . J . . . . . . J . . . .J J C J J J J JJ J J ,, . . J J . J JCJ J J J . | |||
Java * < . . . . ( A 34 Ie! ! . A ! r 0 8 9 I i ! ! ( ! ! ! ! ( ( I I I i 1 < | |||
-Ile:4 . . . . . . . 0000. . 0 . . OGSG , OGG0 . SiGG i . . | |||
-;XS . . . . . . . G . . . G GC 36 000 0500 . . ) 0 03C 0000 . | |||
- N4 . . . . . . 0000 . G . . . . 0000 . 00GG . 3GGGG. . | |||
4: f4 i6 i ; i F 4 19 1 1 4 L !L F F F N 1 ! ! L I I ! !i L I i 1 ! L . | |||
I I | |||
4.2.2-3 | |||
m O MEDIUM P!PE BREAX SHEET 1 h | |||
$HEET 2 3HEET 3 f | |||
SHEET 4 9i SHEET 5 CORE DAMAGE COLD SHUTDOWN SHEET 5 FIGURE 4.2.2-1. ESO LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR MEDIUM LOCA O | |||
4.2.2-4 | |||
; O O O (MEDIUM h PIPE | |||
(, | |||
BREAX ) | |||
I REACIORon \ low RCS pressure, variable '_ low pressure,, | |||
,g'j_/ | |||
[RI] | |||
_ N_ | |||
[ or 4 psig R.B. pressure}IN 5 SEC.s/ | |||
h | |||
/ IURBINE \ ' | |||
73;p S.S.SIEAM'\ | |||
[II:\ _ _ | |||
_ / [ggj RELIEF | |||
/ | |||
E 1600PSIG\ | |||
[EA/ \ | |||
EB] RCS/4 SIGNAL R.B. / | |||
/O}5M\ | |||
RELIEF j IBUs | |||
[SD]\ e q ADUs MSSUS i MLSX1 SH. | |||
3/10/85 2 FIGURE 4.2.2-2. EVE SEQUENE DIAGRAM FOR MEDIUM LOCA | |||
(t) | |||
U | |||
/ MFW ~\ - | |||
RAMPBACH | |||
\ / | |||
a CFIs | |||
\ | |||
flSCHARGEAI 600PSIG | |||
/ | |||
. ,a 9 | |||
'0ISGIUBES\ | |||
REMAIN , | |||
[IR] INIACI/ | |||
Whetherornotthisoccursisinsignificant REDUC [RCS\ relativetocoredamage,butthis | |||
[IC] | |||
HEAT 90VO / failurewillleadtoadirectcontainMent N releasepathifanOISGtubehasfailed. | |||
MLSH2 SH.h (seesheetMLSH5) 3/10/85 3_/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.2-2 (Sheet 2 of 6) l 9 9 9 | |||
O O O | |||
'SH | |||
_2 | |||
' N0 | |||
: EB/ EAb d l . ' YES | |||
\ | |||
MANUAL HPI SIARIS\ HPI | |||
[HP] | |||
+ RUNS 4 HRS./ START | |||
/ | |||
T4 BNSI AYAILABLE / | |||
\ Nosprays | |||
; C | |||
; & [BW] / | |||
l I m | |||
. LPIPs SIART,RUN \ -s | |||
[Lp] 24 HRS./ >(C.D{> | |||
's_, | |||
I | |||
! MLSH3 SH. | |||
) 3/10/85 . | |||
4 j FIGURE 4.2.2-2 (Sheet 3 of 6) i | |||
SH. NLSH4 3 ( OPEN h 3/8/85 S JES IR& IC_sd | |||
+( R.B. | |||
j PttrgeandRCdraintankline isolateon4psigsignalorRI' | |||
.(- Seal retttrn isolates on 30 psig iggg[I'N\ )or Cl 'l | |||
[C1/ OF RB ON RI - | |||
' .) N0, large Imle i | |||
l C2] or 16001 9 | |||
/ YES 0 Fans httentip rtinning | |||
" at high speed, y l | |||
y [CA/ | |||
4PSIG SIGNAL | |||
\/ | |||
4600# | |||
N0(REAC. BLDG.) | |||
<> '[CA/ | |||
4PSfG SIGNAL C CB] / (REAC. BLDGBEA/EB (0 PEN'NOCB] FANS) | |||
I4 OPEN jhfy I - | |||
t | |||
! IfIl RBFAN COOLERS | |||
\\ | |||
/ | |||
NANUAL RB[F1\ | |||
> FAN SIARI / | |||
RBFAN COOLERS F2] / / F2] | |||
i td o a i | |||
/REACBLDG, (REAC.BLDC.h 4 | |||
: Nttst he nantial sprag valve | |||
[CS]\ \ SPRAYS( FAILURE ) alignnentifCA/CBfail. | |||
g | |||
:q Nttsthe2/2ifRIfails. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.2-2 (Sheet 4 of 6) i O O O | |||
O O O 1 | |||
SH. MLSH5 | |||
: 4 3/8/85 8UNP N\ PDS2H ,_,Cpx ' onotgoto l ngLUE | |||
; [SU) CLOSED T | |||
/ C2 failed, no sprays ' 'N ','e' MLSH6. | |||
OPEN SUMP \ | |||
\ PDS2x , | |||
ISR] RECIRC./NOSPRAYS | |||
.UALUES e t | |||
{ R\ PDS2x g | |||
/ | |||
nP) . | |||
T l | |||
PREVENI \ PDS2x , | |||
BORONPRECIP) | |||
; [31] IN CORE / n | |||
{ | |||
! ( COLD h - | |||
< ~-C.D.' ) | |||
v i | |||
(SHuirm ) | |||
l FIGURE 4.2.2-2 (Sheet 5 of 6) l | |||
ll JnotPDS T /notPDS) | |||
(IR & IC) or\ VES , | |||
'( nB ) '(nA,B,C,D/ | |||
! C[ or H? / bS'D'8 | |||
[g3;VES l 10 / pps 3 | |||
[C1/ REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING > | |||
u | |||
/ "y l . | |||
k | |||
! C2] ISOLATION / [CS] SPRAYS N VES m hs YES i FA/FB? | |||
y r Sp r ,, | |||
i C | |||
k IF1/ | |||
EACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ OPENSUNP YRUES r PDS 3 REACIOR BUILDING F2] FAN C'L'RS/ ( nD | |||
[SR] J[CS] SPRAYS E | |||
N) hpYES u f | |||
REACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ > | |||
ALIGNdDNl \ ,- | |||
( | |||
PDS 3 | |||
/ DHRHEAT nG J SPRAYS | |||
[CS] | |||
u | |||
[DH] XCHANGERS/ | |||
u r , - | |||
MLSH6 I | |||
PDS | |||
' I PDS 3 I PDS 3 I PDS 1 I PDS S | |||
l i | |||
2/15/85( nA ) ( nB ) ( nA ) ( nC J ( nX ) | |||
i FIGURE 4.2.2-2 (Sheet 6 of 6) | |||
.; o; i , ' * ' <i ' i | |||
! , I O * | |||
* Q 12345678 | |||
* E | |||
* S | |||
* E | |||
* T . | |||
* A - | |||
* T | |||
* S . | |||
E E MBAUA6BC. tt t f t | |||
t | |||
[1 t 1 | |||
* Q 123*S678 | |||
* E | |||
* S | |||
* E | |||
* E | |||
* R | |||
* T | |||
* I | |||
* H : : | |||
* 1 T | |||
_ | |||
* N | |||
_ | |||
* E | |||
* V | |||
* E A | |||
* C | |||
* O | |||
* L | |||
* M | |||
* A U O - | |||
W : : : l I | |||
D E | |||
M | |||
* 3 _ | |||
* 2 | |||
* 2 | |||
* B 4 W : : : : | |||
E | |||
* R U - | |||
* G | |||
* I | |||
* F | |||
* W : : : l : | |||
* t t | |||
O | |||
.L kL ~ | |||
4l:11!1!! , ilili;ii jj> l!}jii!l! i1' i!ikllii i1l1!!f !> | |||
4.2.3 SMALL LOCA MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.3-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.3-2. Figure 4.2.3-2 presents the small LOCA event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.3-3 presents the small loss of coolant accident frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.3-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.3-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a small RCS pipe break are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. | |||
Many of these actions, however, are not important to preventing core damage following a small pipe break. The only early actions that are required to prevent core damage are the operation of the high pressure injection system and the BWST [BW). The long-term high and low pressure ' | |||
sump recirculation actions ("piggyback") and containment safety features, which determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a small pipe break leads, are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. | |||
: e. B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not, o C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
O 1 | |||
O ; | |||
4.2.3-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
0 | |||
= | |||
3 2 | |||
,+ | |||
O z N" m ~ | |||
5 3 e | |||
s 5 | |||
u- # hN5 NO O | |||
n W s N | |||
-z vs | |||
* D 00 4 n_ $ | |||
++ | |||
ma : o o u. | |||
H s"Q 5 g N O wC Y | |||
~ = | |||
<< 0 wz . | |||
Eo | |||
* cp - | |||
- l$ | |||
+. e g- ++ - | |||
v 20 mo : o hm | |||
++ | |||
N w D | |||
e h a 9' * | |||
: 555 N c= | |||
d -QvM C.259 3 g m - l m $ Ah g g . "= 5q vM.g m s | |||
= * | |||
* nWWE a w d sss , | |||
= | |||
* E 5 $EEE i | |||
++ | |||
3 | |||
++ | |||
H & | |||
N h c | |||
.~+ | |||
G $W3@sE b O | |||
O O | |||
4.2.3-2 | |||
l 1 | |||
1 l | |||
l 1 | |||
P 1 | |||
f l | |||
l TABLE 4.2.3-2. SMALL LOCA BOUNDARY CONDITIONS i | |||
4 v2 *:40 !!2 260 lt '. .41 3'? 372 37 37t, 376 M I'32 132 !?6 371 !!2 376 377 Ii2 37o h1 M ?61 :t1 :6e 37 371 375 177 374 3io W. 355 371 !!2 hl M2 ??2 !i2 34 V :!!= 1 2 ? 4 56 ' i 510111; 12 la 151617 !! 19 N !! 12 23 ;4 25 ;* ;7 3 !? M 21 ?2 D 34 35 36 37 31 M Wi E DD DC DD: DDCD D*s DDDDDD 0 0: G D . DD DD DDDDDDDDD. | |||
lui. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
4C4i 4 . ... . J . . . J J CJ JJ JJ J J J J . . J V . J J CJ JJ J . | |||
-MA * ( , n /. e ( 5A I a | |||
* I K !t 0 3 8 I I I I | |||
* 1 1 1 I r *. 1 I I I Ia . | |||
aif ai . . . 4 ,C C 4 A C4 A A A 'GGGA .C GG , A GC00 3A | |||
*1 >:5 . . . . . . G. . .GG CGGGGGGGGG . . GG. GGC0050 | |||
-M4 . . . , , . . 6 GGG . . G . . . GGGG . GG GG . . GGG6 G . . | |||
/ | |||
1 b | |||
O 4.2.3-3 | |||
SMLL BRfAX LOCA P | |||
SHEET 1 SHEET 5 SHEET 2 $HEIT 6 SHEET 3 CORI DAMGE SHEIT 7 | |||
$HEET 8 C0RE DAMAGE SHEET 4 3HEET 9 FIGURE 4.2.3-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR SMALL LOCA O' | |||
4.2.3-4 | |||
O O O i | |||
/ sna;. . T area ( | |||
( ..oca -/ | |||
1 rescontinuous reactor \ | |||
trip depressurization / | |||
l / A . I | |||
/ N0 'jh3 | |||
- , reac ntby 1 < s (turbine trip / horon+ voiding | |||
-r- | |||
. hwst \ / ~ __ without y available/ | |||
~~ [)j'' sprays | |||
~ | |||
I 1600psig\ | |||
signal I | |||
/ 3 | |||
/ operator \ | |||
l hiauto\ '.-['j''>_' | |||
~ | |||
(starts hpj/ s. ' '- _- | |||
sg. art a | |||
/ | |||
. SLSH1 l 1/20/87 /sh \ | |||
\2 / | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR SMALL LOCA (Sheet 1 of 9) | |||
O PCs ~__ 9es presstirized PjI- CX \ pDS 4X CFI' S \ | |||
l [HL-2] ALIGNM'I r | |||
/ DISCHARGE / | |||
T-VALU | |||
\ PDS 4X | |||
/ SUMP DRAIN \ | |||
g | |||
[SU] CLOSED y | |||
/ C2 FAILED no sprags \ULUSCLOSED/ | |||
r OPENSUMP\pps4x s | |||
[SA/ RECIRC OPEN SUHP \ | |||
SB] UALUES / | |||
RECIRCVLUS/ | |||
' ALIGN DHR | |||
\ ppg 4x | |||
[DH] , PUMPS,HXs / , ' ___ | |||
i _s ( C.D._> ' | |||
87 .'. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 2 of 9) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O I (I'h (II I | |||
I " | |||
RESTORE PDS SS\ | |||
4x . | |||
; HEAT RP BEFORE o,/ | |||
/ | |||
LPI STARI + | |||
PUMPS \ | |||
J RUN I | |||
/ | |||
/ CD+ DEER IODHR | |||
'\ PDS 4x - | |||
,, / | |||
p ENTRY ALIGNDHR\ | |||
/ | |||
PUMPS,HX'S/ | |||
E _ I_ <jl-) | |||
; / BVPASS LO- \ | |||
i \ PRES ESPS / _ | |||
l T- --- I ('b)> | |||
,/3 }3 \ .,- | |||
\4/ | |||
i SLSH3 1/21/87 l | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 3 of 9) i | |||
/SH.\ SLSH4 3 er 1/21/87 9 | |||
( OPEN ) | |||
+( R.B. | |||
j PurgeandRCdraintankline isolateon4psigsignalorRI; | |||
[C1/ /RB IS0I/I'[\. | |||
Sealreturnisolateson30psig | |||
/ Ci'3-~ __ | |||
C2] \\ ONRI / ' | |||
N0, large liole a YES $ | |||
0 P | |||
C [CA/ g | |||
\ # | |||
NfREAC. BLDG.h a liigi spee I CB] s 31 | |||
/ (REAC BLDG.h NA/NBY"'" | |||
"8) */REAC. BLDG.\ | |||
b, OPEN 4 yj I | |||
\ SPRAYS / | |||
RBFAN \( ) 'HANUAL RB \ / | |||
h Manualif EFI/ COOLERS FAN STARI | |||
[CS] | |||
F23 / | |||
/ | |||
/ -no4psig | |||
, g signal.,, | |||
f (REAC BLDG.'1 (SIABLE AI $ | |||
COLD 4 (FAILURE j (SHUIDOWN ) y FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 4 of 9) | |||
# 9 e | |||
O O O if | |||
* ,.,BREAKERFAILURE VES Turbinetriponreactortripis IURBINE hasedonbreakerposition. | |||
\ | |||
f | |||
\ IRIP / | |||
l [II] g C u i e_ | |||
RCSreliefcoolingisnot | |||
; S.S. STEAM \ ' | |||
K_'C.D.'_) sufficientto | |||
[SD] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/ '-~- ' | |||
coolthecore. | |||
; / | |||
MFW \ MF+ | |||
Power drops rapidly with fil' | |||
. Lossofsec,sys. | |||
RA MF- inventory | |||
; [MF] \ _MPBACX _/ y increasingRCStenp. ?WR in26nins, i / | |||
SLSH5 j SH. DoeslackofMFWchangeHPIPorPSYorEFWsuccesscriteria? | |||
1/21/87 g6 | |||
) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 5 of 9) i l -. | |||
T, 5 | |||
f EFHFLOW \ IF+ | |||
IN5SEC.S) ^ ~ __ Willgetto11in. | |||
[EF] / | |||
' (gg, inaboltt1 Min. | |||
EF- " Ns ._ '_[' _ | |||
fWR | |||
; 94 2 | |||
/or/3 PSYsPORY \. | |||
[P0,PY'1 OPEN N | |||
/ | |||
v BysI \ PDS 3x y 4 [BH] /N0 SPRAYS t | |||
: s. PDS 3x . U~- | |||
[CA/ | |||
CB] s / N. | |||
_k'_!_* | |||
i SLSH6 1/21/87 (SH' 7 | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 6 of 9) i | |||
O O O (St i ON4PSIGSIGNAL ADIO. HPI \'IN 30 SEC' MANUAL \ _- . | |||
SJHI IN | |||
/ HPIP )-+-:.'C. D '_) | |||
! [HP-1] 3 ilNS ~~_' | |||
[HP-3] ACIDATION / - | |||
4 | |||
~ | |||
4 | |||
: -~.~ | |||
PROYI)E | |||
! HPIPMIN,\ , | |||
><fC.D, > HPIPs burnup against pressure | |||
~s-' | |||
~ | |||
[MR] FLOW / spike ) their shutoff head C t | |||
/' | |||
$ /PORU+PSUs \ plLOCA) | |||
[RC] \RECLOSE . | |||
/ \/ | |||
p REDUCERCS | |||
_ _ _ 1600 psig signal equivalent actuation HEATREMOYA | |||
! [IC] hasalreadsbeenproduced4psigsignal 1 | |||
so overcooling is uninportant l 4_____ | |||
i SLSH7 SH' 1/21/87 g FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 7 of 9) i | |||
/SH.\ | |||
\7i / | |||
CD+DE CD achieved by itsing IBYs, ADUs,and sprag 79 pHR N | |||
,PR \ | |||
when secondary systen heat ren. is avail | |||
[CD] COND. | |||
_/ | |||
i ' | |||
\ | |||
block (BYPASS LO-PRESS ESFs a | |||
/ | |||
CFIs E OPEN DROP-\ F h' | |||
[HL-H LINEYALUES | |||
/ N9 LIG DHR PUMPS HEAT | |||
[DH] EXCHGRs/ ,NAITTOC/h - | |||
TN 4 (EYENIUALLY )~- ' | |||
K~~C.D.'> - | |||
SLSH8 1/21/87 4 | |||
__/ | |||
\ FIX / | |||
, FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 8 of 9) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/^. 1 | |||
~ | |||
<~~.C ' D '). f not PDS \ | |||
. YES m >/notPDS1 T | |||
(nA,B,C,DJ SU ,. | |||
r ( nB J | |||
~ | |||
I YES t' N0 i CIP y i | |||
REACIOR\ REACIOR\ li0 f pps 3 | |||
[C1/ BUILDING BUILDING C2] ISOLATION / [CSIs SPRAYS / " | |||
t'- nF J 3 _ YES _ | |||
SR _ r y | |||
' - s_YES P SU/ | |||
\ ' | |||
C 'REACIOR OPENSUMP r 3 9 [F1/ BUILDING PDS I / REACIOR \ | |||
! : YALUES | |||
( nD I F2] AN C'L'RS/ [SR] . J ( BUILDING | |||
~~s._ YES [CS]\SPRQVS REACIOR\ ALIGNERON ( PDS p r\ J) i BUILDING ( | |||
/ DHRHEAT . | |||
nG | |||
~ | |||
[CS] SPRAYS | |||
[DH] ,EXCHANGERS/ | |||
t !! T U U l SLSH9 i | |||
f PDS 1 [ PDS 'l [ PDS T I PDS 1 | |||
/ | |||
PDS 'l 1/21/87( nA J \ nB J' \ nA ) (. | |||
nC J' 1 nX J l | |||
FIGURE 4.2.3-2 (Sheet 9 of 9) i i | |||
l | |||
O | |||
* Q 12345678 | |||
* E | |||
* S | |||
* E | |||
* T | |||
* A | |||
* T | |||
* S | |||
* O D ABA8A880 | |||
* Q 1 2345678 | |||
* E | |||
* S | |||
* E | |||
* E | |||
* R | |||
* T | |||
* T | |||
* I N | |||
* H : : : E | |||
* V | |||
* E | |||
* A | |||
* C | |||
* O . | |||
* L | |||
* K - | |||
* A | |||
* A E | |||
* F R | |||
* : l : : | |||
O I | |||
* B | |||
* L | |||
* L | |||
* A | |||
* M | |||
* S | |||
* B 3 | |||
* Pi f : l : : - | |||
* 3 | |||
* 2 | |||
* 4 E _ | |||
* R | |||
* U | |||
* G | |||
* I | |||
* V E : l : : : : : F - | |||
t t | |||
t . | |||
t t | |||
t i | |||
t | |||
* E - | |||
t R s | |||
i t | |||
t i | |||
t t | |||
i t | |||
l - | |||
t t | |||
8 | |||
* 5 t | |||
s n | |||
i O_ _ | |||
, 1* | |||
4.2.4 VERY SMALL LOCA MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.4-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.4-2.- Figure 4.2.4-2 presents the very small LOCA event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.4-3 presents the very small loss of coolant accident frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.4-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.4-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following 'a very small RCS pipe break are the same as those shown on the general transient' ESD. Most of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a very small pipe break. Unlike the general transient, early actions that are required to prevent core damage for this initiator include the operation of the high pressure injection system and the BWST | |||
[BW). The long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a very small pipe break leads, are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. | |||
e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not, e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RV2 (see Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured. | |||
e RT2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip and the high pressure injection have both failed, o RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed. | |||
O 4,2,4-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
O TABLE 4.2.4-1. VERY SMALL LOCA TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS atttttttit u tsu t tu tuts tu ttttt tatittttttttt ttt t ttis titittt tt t t ttu nts tit ttt t tt tttt tttt t tt t tt tt ttt:1 s tatttt t t tttit ut t t t tt t i sts: | |||
T7 EiBTS: COClilM Mli fiXi!N: | |||
TOP M !f tier. WE W T@ DDT EkDT FTXI!W COCli!M WB \UY WL191V LOCA 191TIATN DOT RT RIKiA TRIP (1) RV Ryl TH F FF FIXTM CMJai htf T1ilP (2) FY FW Ri F TT ftS$14E TRIP (3) Hi HlC WAF 50 $ECC*USY siEM FfL!EF (4) HI HIA 49F T* W EXCESSM 914 FEEMTU t5) +A 40 HBF T- SSTICIENT MIN FEIMiB (6) EJ EW T- F EF- F Ef- StFFICIE%T E*EE6ETY FIEMiG 17) EW EW $0 F EF* O EICE!SM E%EffXT FEEMID (8) E-J EW R1 F EV MT tValllitE (91 50 53 RT F 49 mIGH F5Ei95114.'ECil^A Pff C (14> | |||
44 klGH FAI5351 NECil0N Rff5 A & B (11) | |||
HI MIM FEfi351 NECfl% v4. sis (12) id T+)TTLE HIM Fifi&51 IARCil A FLW (13) | |||
EV CLXiM stSMI. FAiuGI fen FTS (14) ft R69 (fi% (15) | |||
FV P$v'$ OFO (16) | |||
* ( 1s arctate eef wlt wist fractiors which are rot A O | |||
4.2.4-2 | |||
l TABLE 4.2.4-2. VERY SMALL LOCA B0UNDARY CONDITIONS 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
1 l | |||
4 40C !;: !:4 *;6 !M m su !;4 sie m to !42 !44 544 to "o n: n4 :n !3 i | |||
!;i ?;3 !;$ 5;7 !;* $21 5:3 5;*, 537 539 541 !43 54 !41 544 n1 M3 93 94 !.N l 17 fisa 1 . 3 4 5 6 7 i 910111213141516171319 0 21 ;2 23 ;4 25 ;o ;7 ;6 ;7 % !! 12 32 ;415 lo 37 ;3 ;<9 ! | |||
r U .At . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
tain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
**4*i . . . . . . . . . . 3 . 3. . . . l . l . . IIII II II IIIII i . . l EN!3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 | |||
-:W . C . . . . C , . CC. . . . . N . . . C4 h % % CC . . . . N h ; * % . , | |||
FW- . w 0. 0 3 300 0000. . 000 . 00. s000300000. 00000 . l E.:...:.I - | |||
. 4 03**. . E EE. . * . % E*ER . EFFEEE. En *DEE EF E. | |||
t -:. . . . . . . . . . . . ............... . . . . . . . . . . ' | |||
. \ | |||
!=4= . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
80 85 . . v . . . . . . . w . . ..s J CJ J J J J JJ J J . , ,J . JJ C4 ss J . | |||
l 2 84 . <, . . s s n. i &A ! 4 1 1 a 1a 0 88 ! ! ! I a 1 ! ! I s. s ! ! ! ! I t . | |||
-I t- . . . . . . A CCCCA eCA A A A GG30A CCGG . 4 GC3) 3 4 . | |||
*-s** . ) . . . . . . O 3$0 . G00006 i . OLL0000L. ODG333S. | |||
5.-4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
8:41 . r s , , t . | |||
t . | |||
t ; ; ; , | |||
ap , | |||
, , . rp p ap r,ap e . | |||
p p r r s , | |||
@ tah 8 01 WY l | |||
4 | |||
.-Il . . . . . . G. . . . 40C000000000 . . 44. G6,GGG G. j | |||
-14 . . , . . . . . GG00. . G , . . . 4006. O GG4 . O G GJG . . 6 3; :4 . E . EE E . F A ! 9 1 ! A t !L F F F n I 1 !L i 1 1 1EL 1 ! 1 i ! L . ! | |||
!.He . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
l | |||
: s. ..r t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; | |||
l 1.if a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i | |||
...3 | |||
: 2. r > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
) i I | |||
i e | |||
2 1 | |||
4 4 | |||
l 1 | |||
1 J | |||
l l | |||
1 4.2.4-3 a | |||
S l | |||
. . . - _ _ , . , _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ . _ _ _ . - . _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , , , _ . _ _ _ ____m., _ _ _ , . , _ ,m. m.,,,_my y 7,. | |||
O | |||
( == ) 1 1RIIT 1 1 | |||
Inm 2 IntIf 19 1 1 tutIf 3 $ntif 11 tu m 4 Cott kNCE tutti 12 C0k1 HMCI tum 5 3REIT 13 | |||
/~T l | |||
inm . - sim 7 -- | |||
1 3REIT S CCRI MMCI INEIT 1 1 | |||
( con sman) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR VERY SMALL LOCA 4.2.4-4 | |||
O O O , | |||
IVergSMalh ' | |||
(breakloca/ | |||
J I'5CTloil5 fd.I lilCPea(Q I M, a (ellP_ | |||
_ flow | |||
/reactorf '/ 7' (on s | |||
1900i ps)aiP ? | |||
\ | |||
. T ftis ine~\ ,, | |||
; tPIP r | |||
/ | |||
t i | |||
S.S.SIEAM'\ ? | |||
fB l | |||
i [sp] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/ IVs ADY's q00LJNG | |||
! I MSSU's KEEPPRESSUREBELOW : | |||
USLSW1 /. | |||
! MFWPSHUI0FFHEAD i 2/4/87 ( SH. | |||
: \2A l FIGURE 4.2.4-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR VERY SMALL LOCA (Sheet 1 of 13) | |||
/ | |||
(SH,\le) | |||
\ / | |||
t MFW x too little MFW [H-] _ | |||
RAMPBACK f(Flow ( 5% will open FORU/PSVT inclttdes tooMttchMFW[M+] __ | |||
F will not isolate ICSfailttres KfK MANUAL MFW\ | |||
CONIROL | |||
( SLRDS h | |||
/~ y C N _-- " | |||
i 4 (1600PSiG)1 SIGNAL ESTABLISH \[EF- ot/HPI\ | |||
ineltides - | |||
EFW CONIR0L FLOW EF+],\ +/fCOOLy M- - II0 hi-level MANUALLY c, EF+ exc. CD will fail I.D. | |||
Hygp INI'R' PI pitMp h9 water carrgover if ctttoff MfW notalreadyfailedbyMF+' | |||
. SGs d | |||
top,willendEFWflow USLSH2 SH,k, eventttally fails both pttnps (seeAIP-1210-3) 3 2/4/87 7 FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 2 of 13) e . - . .. _. _. -. . _ | |||
O O | |||
O o O SH. | |||
2 | |||
: / | |||
4 | |||
[EA/ 1600PSIG\ | |||
Enj SIGNAL | |||
/ | |||
~ | |||
r | |||
~ | |||
m i IRENCE 55\ | |||
HE | |||
\ _AT REN. | |||
; nc) _ / | |||
.d l T i | |||
I 5H. | |||
YstsH3 2/4/87 4 l | |||
! FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 3 of 13) | |||
I i __ _ _ _ _ __ _ __ _ - - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ _ | |||
SH \ # | |||
'HPI' (1/ 'q00LJiG I | |||
HPI SIARIS\ | |||
MANUAL HPI | |||
\ | |||
/ | |||
[HP] | |||
+ RUNS | |||
/ sSIARI i | |||
M 9 | |||
BWSI AVAILABLE / | |||
\ Nospngs | |||
; [BW] / | |||
m AYAILABLf -f~)" :: :((ii,'s, | |||
\ | |||
~ | |||
YES 10 RCS USLSH4 RELIEF | |||
/ | |||
2/4/87 G (1)HPIP:1 (SH. | |||
5 FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 4 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O USLSH5 SH' 2/4/g7 I On19if i RCS is | |||
) /WAIERIHRU STOP RCPs | |||
\ saturated. \pgliggs\, | |||
i | |||
[P0,PU]' ' | |||
T- ""'" 8"8 | |||
/REDilCE \ /SIOPHPIPs\''CLOSEVALUs%Conro | |||
\ (200 F SUBQ IINI HPIPFLOW | |||
! [RC] | |||
/ anyway, | |||
~ | |||
/ | |||
u p n YES | |||
" N ? MP flQU.Ttah}e N at.equim JPlHM 7-Q . | |||
m3 p,~,u . , | |||
SH, ll-p (D HPI:2 - | |||
l 6 b}ECRf FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 5 of 13) i | |||
i i- - | |||
.i i- | |||
.0 -, | |||
OLNE_3 TES HEC CD + DEPR I0DHRIN \ | |||
[CD] COND. / | |||
t BYPASS | |||
\ CDachievedhgusingIBUs,ADUs,andspray block ' | |||
ESFs(LO-PRESS whensecondarysystenheatren,isavail | |||
. CFIs k I OPEN DROP-\ ,, | |||
AllcooldownactionsMusthe acconplishedbeforeBWSIdepletion. | |||
[HL-1] LINE / VALUES) | |||
Y | |||
/ALIGNDHR\ y | |||
[DH](PUMPSHEATEXCHGRs/ | |||
s PROVIDE L.I. WATER \ > | |||
g:H\ | |||
00 LING USLSHf> | |||
2/ # 87 (SH'\ | |||
9/ 4 SOURCE / $/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 6 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O l | |||
/HI-I | |||
: \RECRC RCSwillrapidly depressurizeatter T- coredanageduetoRY | |||
~PIGY-BACX RECIkc , | |||
\ YES PDS 4x nelt-through. | |||
[HL-2] ALIGilM'I / N0 Stuck open relief-> | |||
M rapiddepress,to | |||
$YALUE UMP DRAIN PDS 4x \ LPIP discharge press 4 LIisstillpossibleif c [SY] | |||
CLOSED 1 | |||
/ C2 FAILED,H0 SPRAYS wecaneherefron5. | |||
S llXsnotreallyneeded pDs 4x | |||
'0PEli SUMP \ | |||
sinceS.S.heatren. | |||
[SA/ 9 SB) | |||
RECIRC,/ | |||
YALUES isstillpossible, I butnustkeep | |||
; ;hNgBI,\ PDS 4X y I(300Forpunpseals PUNPS,HXs / , | |||
Wlllfail' ' | |||
[DH] y' I ~ | |||
-s. - | |||
l USLSH7 /SH.\ <'~ C D.[> | |||
~~~' | |||
2/4/87 \8/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 7 of 13) | |||
SH. | |||
. 1 NO ,;lihl | |||
~ | |||
cool? | |||
It will take tip to 2 weeks to | |||
- cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, | |||
., YES I Ltitthepress,willstillhehigh. | |||
RESIORE ppg 4, SS\ ' | |||
HEATREM > | |||
BEF0PE g3 3/ | |||
; i 6 'CinDEPR | |||
/10DHR \ ppg 4c tco) \ EHm m | |||
/ | |||
/ | |||
BYPASSLO,g PRESESFs | |||
\ _ w .-. / , | |||
~~ | |||
USLSH8 [SN'') c'~ ~C. D .~'% | |||
2/4/87 \ 9/ _ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 8 of 13) e O O | |||
: O O O | |||
/.SH USLSH9 6 or ( OPEN h 2/4/87 g | |||
R.B. ; PurgeandRCdraintankline 9 ( ' | |||
isolateon4psigsignalorRI; | |||
[C1/ RB 9g g ISOL'I'h) .f;__3 Sealreturnisolateson30psig C2] / , | |||
.- N0,largehole | |||
- YES F0 r m E [CA/ \ py# N[/REAC. BLDG,3ali speed | |||
/ | |||
i e CBJ\gicg (REAC, BLDG,1 EA/EB '50s PEN,N0 FANS) | |||
,, " ~ >/REAC. BLDC,\ | |||
RBFAN | |||
\( | |||
OPEN | |||
)4 y- j'' | |||
}fANUAL RB | |||
\ SPRAYS / | |||
III/ COOLERS / > FAN SIARI [CS] Nanualif f21 / no4psig I | |||
, 3q signal,y | |||
!i9 e I COLD ( | |||
FAILURE j | |||
)< | |||
l .(SilHIDOWN , | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 9 of 13) | |||
] | |||
r= | |||
RI | |||
~~* | |||
._ BREAKERFAILURE YES Turbinetriponreactortripis IURBINE s basedonbreakerposition. | |||
IRIP ) | |||
[II] ( _ _ | |||
+ 1 e ,, | |||
.~ | |||
; SS SIEAd ' | |||
-~ ~ | |||
RCSreliefcoolingisnot - | |||
REI,IEF K' C. D. ~) suffieientto | |||
/ | |||
[SD] | |||
~ - | |||
coolthecore, u | |||
/ | |||
HFW \ . | |||
Power drops rapidly with ill' Loss-ofsec,sys. | |||
RAHPBACK HF- inventorg | |||
[HF] \ / | |||
{ | |||
increasing RCS tenp. | |||
113 in 26 nins. | |||
USLSilig 'Sll. DoeslackofHFWchangeHPIPorPSUorEFWsuccesscriteria? | |||
2/4/87 11 FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 10 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O o O 1h t | |||
EF+ | |||
IFHFLOW \ | |||
IN5SEC.S) m f's.2 . | |||
gi,s Hi))getto11in. | |||
F] / EF- '' _C3 kHRfinaboutInin. | |||
(/ or 2/3 PSYs PORY \ | |||
, [F0,PY'1 OPEN u | |||
/ | |||
y ggsy \ PDS 3x ; | |||
[BH] / N0 SPRAYS | |||
[CA/ | |||
4 u | |||
SI | |||
\.PDS3x , ,. | |||
) __ | |||
'''' C. D. ._>, | |||
CBJ SICNAL | |||
/ | |||
/ ~ -._. ~~ | |||
USLSH11 /SH. | |||
2/4/87 \ 12 FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 11 of 13) | |||
I OH4PSIGSIGNAL F | |||
~- | |||
AUIO. | |||
S I HPI \ 30 SEC. | |||
IN HAHUAL - | |||
llPIP ><'~C . D'. ') | |||
[HP-1][IjIN/H// [IlP-3] ACIDATI0ll ~- | |||
y | |||
'PROUI)E | |||
\ - | |||
~ | |||
>:_'C.D. ~:, liPIPs httrattp against pressttre | |||
[HR] HPIP FLOW HIN. / ' | |||
~ ._' spike ) their shtttoff head C , | |||
I | |||
'e | |||
* FORU+PSUs\ | |||
/ | |||
>/LOCA | |||
\ | |||
tRC] | |||
RECLOSE | |||
/ \ z) ji REDUCE RCS ' - - | |||
[IC] (HEAI REH0 VAL}_ _ _ _1600 hasalreadybeenprodttced4psigsignal psig signal evttivalent a 4_____ so overcooling is ttninportant USLSH12 /SH.\ | |||
2/4/87 \6 / | |||
FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 12 of 13) 9 O O | |||
O O O | |||
~ | |||
2' 3 | |||
fnotPDST | |||
$ _- YES& l I.nA,B.C,D/ | |||
i not PDS | |||
\ | |||
SU _ | |||
r nB ) , | |||
; 2___ ' | |||
t'fN0 i Cp>YES; | |||
[C1/ REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING | |||
( | |||
/ REACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ 10 L | |||
/ | |||
\ | |||
PDS 3 | |||
02] ISOLATION / [CS]\ SPRAYS / nF ) | |||
h _ | |||
_ YES J i s_ | |||
SR _- r 1 - _ | |||
n g n ,J E S C | |||
't[F1/ | |||
'REACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ t | |||
/0 PEN SUMP \ | |||
,r PDS 3 | |||
/ REACIOR | |||
\ | |||
/)_ ( nD UALUES m F2] FAN C'IlRS/ [SR]\ ) ( BUILDING h- _ | |||
[CS]\SPR0VS | |||
. m DH ,_ YES i HEACIOR I 3 | |||
'ALIGNikUN m | |||
\ PDS | |||
; [CS] BUILDING [\ | |||
SPRAYS y u DHRHEAT | |||
[pH] ,EXCHANGERS/ | |||
> ( nG J 1 u u USLSX13 2/4/87 \ | |||
/ | |||
PDS 1 | |||
) | |||
[( PDS ) [( PDS | |||
) [ PDS | |||
) / | |||
PDS | |||
) | |||
nA nB ) nA ) ( nc _ ) ( nH / | |||
j FIGURE 4.2.4-2 (Sheet 13 of 13) 1 | |||
O lt tit **tttittttt t tttt tttt t t*** t t tt t t tt tttt t ttt tt t t tt ttt t t taltt tsti t t t tttiliit tt t t t itt t ttttis titsit ttt t tt t ttt t t ttt t tt tt tts a t ts t i ttil | |||
+ | |||
48 27 F# TT SD T* W- E7- (T+ iv WS IfA kl N RV P0 PV EQ E.4 STAT %) | |||
@ (6) (C) (F) (B) (H) 1A 1 1 1 1 1 1 2: 1 1 3: 1: 1 2 M 2 I I I 1 1 ! ! I I i 3 4 3 I I I I I i ! I ! l & M 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I : $ 8 5 | |||
! i l 1 l 1 1 I 6 A 6 1 ! : 1 I ! I I i ,. 7 py2 7 I I I ! ! 1 4 I 8 8 9 1 : I I l l 1 9 FAI ) | |||
I I I I I 4: i 14 g 13 3 I I I I l I , l' 8 14 1 I 1 1 1 1 gg | |||
[2 ( | |||
I 1 1 I I 13 IFR2 16 l l 1 i 61 l- la ifR3 31 1 : I I 1 5; : i 15 UA 36 I I I ! I 1 l l t 16 (fA 37 | |||
; 1 I i 1 l l 1 f. 17 EfB 36 | |||
' l ! l I l_ 13 sy2 y) | |||
: : : 1 I : i l- 13 ers a I I I t- N IFl4 41 i . . . . l_. 21 c 47 I I I I l 22 in5 43 f f' I l -.- - | |||
23 ITF6 L$ | |||
I 24 ins 114 I | |||
25 ITH 131 I | |||
N A LW I I i i i 1 I: 1 1 27 Rt2 131 l l | |||
{ 1 2 I I 1 3 A 132 ) | |||
I I I I I l i. 29 nr2 183 1 | |||
:' ! ! ! I I A A12 tit | |||
' I ' . l_. 31 IFn7 135 I I I l. 22 IFR7 IM | |||
' I : i | |||
' u at2 19s t I | |||
f' 3 | |||
34 RI) 1% < | |||
I l M RT2 137 j | |||
!' I | |||
! 8 x 673 in y Ins in i | |||
' % If41 291 l | |||
i FIGURE 4.2.4-3. VERY SMALL LOCA EVENT TREE l l | |||
l l | |||
4.2.4-18 ; | |||
:i ' f | |||
) | |||
4.2.5 INADVERTENT OPENING OF THE DHR VALVES As explained in Section 4.2 this initiating event was not analyzed using an event tree. Without any other alleviating system failures it will go directly to core damage. It is roughly equivalent to a medium LOCA that s | |||
.1 takes place outside containment. Because it takes place outside ; | |||
containment, this initiating event precludes recirculation from the sump , | |||
l and therefore eventually produces core damage. l 4 | |||
l E | |||
J [ | |||
t | |||
? | |||
i i i | |||
O l l | |||
l l | |||
1 1 | |||
] 1 l | |||
i 1 | |||
a 1 | |||
1 1 | |||
i I | |||
i | |||
{ 4.2.5-1 | |||
: 0587G102087PMR | |||
4.2.6 MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.0-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.6-2. Figure 4.2.6-2 presents the main steam line break in the intermediate building event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.6-3 presents the main steam line break in the intermediate building frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.6-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.6-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
The steam line break is assumed to be downstream of the main steam isolation valves (MS-V-1A/B/C/0). The operator can isolate the break (SI success) by shutting the appropriate isolation valves. For breaks upstream of the isolation valves that are unisolable SI = 1.0 (guaranteed failure). | |||
The first question asked for this initiator is: Did a reactor trip occur? Normally, a reactor trip will occur due to low RCS pressure or high reactor power caused by the steam line break overcooling the reactor coolant system. If a reactor trip did not occur during a steam line break event, the reactor continues to produce heat. The amount of heat produced is dependent on the core's reactivity coefficients. Eventually, boron injection via the high pressure injection system causes power to be reduced to decay heat levels. If HPI or emergency feedwater fails prior to the time that sufficient boron is injected, core damage will occur. | |||
If the reactor coolant pumps fail to continue to run (RP failure), it is O believed now that core damage will not result. (See Section 4.1.1.4 of the Plant Model Report for further discussion of reactor trip failure scenarios.) | |||
Af ter the reactor trip (RT) question, the next question asked is whether the turbine trips. During this initiating event, energy is being released out of the broken steam pipe at a rate that overshacows the consequences of turbine trip failure on the reactor coolant system. On the event sequence diagram, this is indicated by a dashed block ar.d/or by drawing the failure path returning to the success path line directly below the action block concerned. | |||
On a steam line rupture, the rupture detection s/ stem will actuate to isolate main feedwater to both steam generators within 1 second (Top Event SL). When SLRDS actuates and isolates both generators, the transient is limited and does not cause an excessive cooldown, as manifested by a low RCS pressure engineered safeguards actuation. The FSAR states that in less than 1 minute the steam generator with the ruptured line will blow dry. | |||
After SLRDS has operated and the steam generators boil down, emergency feedwater will be actuated automatically on low steam generator level. | |||
The operator can unisolate the intact steam generator and feed with the main feedwater system if it is available. MF+ and MF- signify proper main feedwater control, EF+ and EF- signify proper emergency feedwater control. | |||
O 4.2.6-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
Top Event SI models the operator action to shut the main steam isolation valves on the affected steam generator. Since these valves take nearly 2 minutes to stroke closed, the affected steam generator will be dry before they are fully closed. | |||
Top Event SD depicts the main steam safety valves operating on the intact steam generator to initially relieve the excess heat after the reactor trips or if reactor trip failure occurs. | |||
A normal cooldown using the intact steam generator (both if the break occurred downstream of the MSIVs and the operator closed them) can commence using main or emergency feedwater after the initial cooldown due to the break is brought under control. Top Event TC models the proper reclosure of the steam relief valves. | |||
To commence a normal cooldown, a path through the secondary system is required to remove the decay heat and sensible heat from the RCS. The normal path for this heat removal is via the turbine bypass valves or the atmospheric dump valves if the condensor is not available to accept steam from the turbine bypass valves. | |||
If a steam generator tube rupture occurs (TR failure) as a result of the high differential pressure across the empty generator, specific subtrees have been developed to model the plant response. These include the TRI and TR2 event trees. | |||
The remaining questions on the steam line break event tree deal with maintaining primary coolant inventor /, cooling the primary using high pressure feed and bleed if necessary, and cooling the reactor coolant pump seals. | |||
Top Event SE models the capability of the intermediate closed cooling system to cool the reactor coolant pump seals independently of the seal injection cooling provided by the makeup anc purification system. A portion of the makeup and purification system modeled as Top Events HPA and INJ provides injection and cooling water to the reactor coolant purp seals. Either SE or HPA and INJ provides adequate cooling to preclude seal failure. Failure to provide cooling to the seals causes them to overheat, resulting in loss of coolant through the seals following seal failure. The event tree model continues as subtree A (see Section 4.3.1) for scenarios where continued inventory control is required. | |||
Section 4.1.4.5 of the Plant Model Report includes a discussion of HPI tooling scenarios. | |||
On a ste m line break, the high pressure injection system receives a start signal due to the excessive cooldown and results in low RCS pressure caused by the break. This is modeled by Top Events HPA, HPB, HI, and [BW), which respectively model HP! train A pumps, the HPl train B pump, the HP! injection valves, and the water supply for the HPI system. | |||
BW failure models the possibility that the borated water storage tank may fail to supply water to the HPI system when needed. If that occurs, the event tree continues as subtree C (BWST unavailable) (see Section 4.3.3). All the end results from subtree C are various core damage states. | |||
4.2.6-2 0587G102087PMR | |||
r | |||
() Subtree B (see Section provide adequate cooling to4.3.2) models the core. the failure This happens as aofresu thet HPI of skstem to failure of the HPI puros (Top Events HPA and HPB) or failure of the ' | |||
HPI injection valves (Top Event HI). All the scenarios from subtree B result in core damcge end states. | |||
When HPI is initiated in an event that does not result in a loss of coolant accident, the water injected by the HPI system has to be i throttled by the operator (Top Event TH) or the primary system safety i valves (Top Event PV) and/or PORY (Top Event PO) have to open to remove ! | |||
the excess water. If the operator throttles, he is also re i reopen recirculation lines for the HPI pumps (Top Event MR) quired . Failuretoto provide this recirculation path will cause a loss of the HPI system. Top t Event RC is used to assign a probability to the satisfactory reclosing of ! | |||
the PORY and/or the primary safety valves if they were required to open during the event. [ | |||
Successful mitigation of a steam line rupture results in a success ("S") | |||
end state. | |||
A main steam line Strak can cause an excessive cooldown of the reactor i coolant system. This creates a possibility of a reactor vessel rupture j (modeled as Top Event RV). Top Event RV success denotes no rupture of ; | |||
the reactor vessel. Reactor vessel failure branches of this event tree continue to subtrees RY2 (see Section 4.3.10) or RY3 (see C subtree in Section 4.3.3), dependent on the availability of the BWST. If the BWST O | |||
is available, RV2 is used, which has different core damage end states i than RV3 (BWST unavailable), i i | |||
l l | |||
t i | |||
i | |||
[ | |||
i 4.2.6-3 0587G102087PMR 1 | |||
O TABLE 4.2.6-1. STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS tittt tt ttun tanttut t ert t t tttttttt t tive t ttt ttunntutt***nt t**ntttt ttt t** ** | |||
* tt t* * ** * **t s ** ** tit *** tit tt turant s tut s tit t t t ts TCP EiBTS: C00!T101 SPLli RKTIONS: | |||
TCP !PLIT ffER. VM CF TCP EkBT EWhT FRETICN C00!TIO6 GLI I%T GLIG STEM Efi/K IE 50 508 RT F RT REACim TRIP (l) TC TC6 T+F SP FEACT3 COCLMT PJP TRIP (2) rF- TJ TC F R RF03 KTUATICN(3) TH T2 TC F | |||
$1 CMRATM SHVTS Pti!V'S(4) 1H T% T+F SO SECOGAY STEM FalEF(S) PV FYC Td B T* h) EICESSIW MIM FEED ATER(6) FY h3 RT F F9 F TC TETcI%TE !EC0&eY STEM FalEF(7) W WA SL S Td F FC F T- 9fFICIENT MIN FEEDrATER(8) W AA 1 $ TH F FC F PV F EF- SLFFisIENT ENRGEhCY FEED.ATER(3) W pia R S EF+ F P0 F EF+ W EICESSIW ETFdINCY FEED.ATER(10) W FNA SL 9 E!+ F FC F W F TR STEM 6DERATM TJEES PININ 14 TACT (ll) W WA SL F4 S TH T49TTLE WI FLOJ(12) W WA SL F bl F N PCSV CliNS(13) W WA SL 3 EF- F F9 F FV FSV'S OFB(14) W WA SL S EF- F FC F W F W EEACIM WS$a FAlltFf FAM FTS(15) W RVA R S 50 F FC F K FGV/FSV'S FECLOSE(16) W WA 1 S 50 F N F W F PR FF%'!C( $EP FVP TCIRCU. Ail 0*17) W MA 1 S TC F GE IhTEI:EDIATE CLOSO C0(LIM 4ATER(18) RC KC F0 F W Ev3T AVAilletE(19) WA WG EF- F N F +9 F 49 kI6H F5ES%5E NECTICN RT C(29) WA WS eft F FV F 49 F 4A Hl3d FffSRSS NECTICtd RrPS ALB(21) WA W6 G) FFY FWSF N FfACTM COMT RT SElt N(22) N D6 WAF H! HIM FSISRFf NECTION VitWS(23) N I!C WAS | |||
+ ( ls iNicate def ault split f ractin sich are not A. | |||
O 4.2.6-4 | |||
. ._ _ . _ . _ - . _ . . . . . , ._ . . . _ - . ~ . . . _ _ . - - - . ~ . - . . _ . - - | |||
I t | |||
I 1 | |||
i 1 | |||
TABLE 4.2.6-2. STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING B0UNDARY CONDITIONS i | |||
% N0 e401 403 i$ 407 499 4l1 41? 415 4l7 419 ell 423 4;5 427 412 431 43) 435 437 All 432 464 4% 4M 419 4:2 414 416 419 420 422 44 4;5 4;i 4M 432 434 436 4;5 4 71 lJ 155= 1 234 56 7 8 9101112121415 a l' '317 2011 :2 23 :4 ;516 27 ~12710 il 3; 33 24 ;5 3+ 37 ;) 31 UW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
WP , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
184. . . . . . . . . . . S99 . . 6 9 . 99 . 9F F 095 . l . . . 4e5F 3 . | |||
1:A51 . . . . . C, , . . . . C . . . . C . . . . CC CC . . . . .CCCC . ; | |||
r-:D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : | |||
M. . . C . . . . C . . CC . . . . . 's . . . CN % N k CC , C . . % N C9 % . ! | |||
..r.a | |||
. TC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
TG=3- 00. 00000 . 00 00 000 . 00 0000000000 . 00000 . | |||
:W- -=DD~~ . Ei l . n . % i 4 i N . iF F Eii. En n DLEEF i . . | |||
re. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
W4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
-l'a . ) . . . 6GGG. GGG000 0. DDD000DD.ODGD LDG . | |||
m . | |||
* C : . i . F F E . F i - . C , . | |||
* F F F F F . F F C . F F - F F . ; | |||
: 3. 89 ' | |||
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n-14 . < . e. n | |||
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-iI . . . . . GGGGGGG6GGGGGGG000$GG G0 IGG GG . | |||
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.a. .e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
"? /c - . 00 0 0000 . 0000 . 000. 00 . 000 0 00000. 00000 . | |||
*15- . G . . GGGG . OG00000 . DDD G DD. G00 0I3G . | |||
'-3 N . 0 . . . . . 0000 0000000 . DDD6 00L0. GDGO: 3G PGv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
W.h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
: p. A8 / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
heb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
New . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
449 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
Wah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
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8'. 4% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
WA , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
ON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
: .c4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
b .w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
-e.w t . ! I I i ! | |||
! I 1 I i 1 i 1 i i 1 I I . ! ! . ! ! ! ! ! | |||
-8 W 4 . 1 I i ! i I . ! : I ; 1 1 i i ! ! ! ! ! ! ! I i ! 1 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! | |||
. ia ' | |||
sI 1 i i . I i 1 . : i ! I i ! ! ! ! ! . 1 I ! ! ! ! I i i t;s. . | |||
t | |||
. . . F r . . , , e r . . F F . | |||
s , s e : | |||
N !'*.' . i . . . G3 . J 0s 0 . 50 . O ii i | |||
-L:-:i . . . . ) . . . . OGC 10 i ', s GGG G , 9 . 5 SC . | |||
-:4 . 's iG . ) . . . . , i ) ) . 0 0 . | |||
I 4.2.6-5 | |||
ff If!lt s 1 IRIII 1 O | |||
1 inm : /T ri m : | |||
INm 3 CORI MMCI thEIT 9 | |||
/C0tt MMCI 1REIT 10 l | |||
I SMIII 4 !Nm 11 CCRI PAMCI (h | |||
sum s SMIIT 6 | |||
/ CCRI MMCI | |||
$Nm 7 SutIT 13 1 | |||
( CeuNu m | |||
) inm n FIGURE 4.2.6-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK IN INTERMEDIATE BUILDING 4.2.6-6 | |||
o O O | |||
/SIEAP LIN:s N .. . . | |||
-tnitiatar-nadorsteanlinebreak lREAXININTE)l- | |||
$EDIATEBLDG in t.1e intenediate | |||
-reactor trip ,tsed by low | |||
' I pressureorhihPower RsACI0F IRIP \ '- | |||
/\ | |||
E | |||
-Msune that he h otsy's initially | |||
.). owdown to ( 00 isolatebyslrds:psigand1/2see | |||
/ | |||
[RI] ACTIONS \/ -gpusad424hstatesthat I erv susten is capah A of | |||
; '[jg))R OperahnwithaMs..) in the l TRIP \ (:: interneciatebuilding y | |||
[II] ( ACIIONS / | |||
- - g- - | |||
r | |||
; 'LUS ISOLMES FWIOBOTH\ | |||
/ | |||
i OISG'S QL \ ,.. A{pl\ | |||
/ ' | |||
'q00llNG f | |||
i MSLBSX1 :: | |||
i 1/29/87 | |||
: SH i 2 FIGURE 4.2.6-2. EVENT S EEE D AG FOR STEAM LINE BREAK I | |||
/SH (*) the nfw pnps nag trip | |||
\ dtte to loss of stean sttpply afwp's trip start efw low otsg lvl also starts efw | |||
\ | |||
/ (*) | |||
(1) r.. | |||
/ | |||
/operatoractions 9 | |||
E:D19\[EF-orEF+1 DELIVER | |||
[SI] | |||
eleY#*t0 ' ! | |||
s.o. L f4' E /secondar ,.. V /HPI\ | |||
tsystenr 6- | |||
[SD/2]'qn good g.y \.h , | |||
eq0LIf I | |||
[nsN[tnent\'-.i ? 00IJ | |||
\ | |||
air j | |||
/ | |||
[ggj _ | |||
I MSLBSH2 (1)MFWsystenavailableand 1/29/87 operator tinisolates feedwater to intact otsg's FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 2 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
[SH 2 | |||
\ | |||
7 steaMgenerator | |||
/.60bresh tithes remain | |||
[EA,EB]U.S.activat'en > , intact yignalactifns f /operato? \ i s tar 9s ipi \ / | |||
I O (rtins..Ongte.fM | |||
- ?/ | |||
BWSI _ | |||
\ / 7p._ NO _ | |||
AVAILABL:\ , ' | |||
) ? r- I | |||
[BW] / , VES l' I , | |||
O s t S"Nin\ | |||
0 IkCP p pfb | |||
/ | |||
24 hottes SEALS | |||
[HP] s | |||
/ | |||
RCPSEAL l FAILURE | |||
, WITHOUT u HPI,ICCW p | |||
: MSLBSH3 ' | |||
l 1/29/87 SH' /SH 4 | |||
\4a\ / | |||
J FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 3 of 13) i | |||
SH 3 | |||
(1) HPI MIN FLOW (2) actions to reduce res heat T renovaltronintactotsg | |||
[IC-] | |||
(2) \ / | |||
/HPI\ | |||
fp0LIfiG (3) stop hpi pumps close reliefs hefore>200Fsubcooling | |||
/ | |||
.3 , | |||
actitisto' . | |||
throRehpl | |||
[IH] pumps ? | |||
N0 | |||
[s kater h\ | |||
prinary tarott!(h 9 N0 r.. r.. | |||
\ ,YES | |||
/ r | |||
? reliefs ll,4 i | |||
[MR) 3"pi g | |||
'.PP]iyggpf(POPU) punps , | |||
V YES j/ Maintain \' | |||
n" | |||
((e$g by / | |||
(3) \. . | |||
hern | |||
/ | |||
\. p | |||
., /7,\ [RC n ' | |||
MSLBSH4 2/2/87 | |||
\' / [ | |||
H , | |||
,( ~p;_j FIGURE 4.2.6- Sheet 4 of 13) | |||
~ | |||
I O O O | |||
(*) IF THE HPIPS kH ['HPtcoo,f-s hyr loc, FAIL SPLII FRACTION CDWhuLDHAVETO I INCLUDE CFI'S (1) | |||
\ (*) V V 10000LDOWNTODHR | |||
[CD-] | |||
/ ENTRYCONDITIONS I ~ | |||
V | |||
/Piggyba9Rs block h9 Pass \ <reo i | |||
CFI,S (:lowpress/res LS at.t | |||
[HL-2]\acgre lons / a.gn4nt | |||
- n | |||
= jypt | |||
: EHid)0fineyyg/ | |||
{kotioag en hap- tg\ \gggy i-ff 0 | |||
S " | |||
6h a, *-Ikf,d> | |||
N-4 (1) cooldown and devess to i MSLESH5 i.hrentryconi.ifions | |||
: 2/2/87 i | |||
j FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 5 of 13) l | |||
SH | |||
{SH s 5a/ | |||
\ 5h T :: | |||
aliga a A 'rb. sum | |||
[pgj PMPs, lea $ _ | |||
jdPpin !'pvs\ f i-l Nexccianget fg. . \ciosec. /[SU] | |||
l 1 ~%wn.' 1 . | |||
00n!:a:l0Meilt actionstg ;: | |||
iso..acion . | |||
Open sa pectrevyl[SA/SB] | |||
[C1' C2] .on RI y 9 | |||
7 . | |||
i 'OE ) | |||
u (C0CAIsMHI | |||
$H | |||
, \7 i - | |||
-- n | |||
.tc0 "RE _ | |||
MSMSH6 . | |||
C_'M9.V 2/2/87 - | |||
1 FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 6 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O . | |||
(1) STEAM IN RB ? | |||
/SH | |||
\6, H0 ' | |||
t) _-- | |||
1 YES u s | |||
N0_3I~- | |||
YES (4# rh press \ | |||
actttation gigna;actiy)ns ' | |||
i . I > ' | |||
\ | |||
$ feactorhldgs ,.. | |||
" i- | |||
[CF](fancoolers/ | |||
l (j | |||
;3eacer | |||
.)ttl..t.Ing \j > | |||
r, cor 3 l ,., , | |||
SPrags | |||
/ .)llic.Ing) fal tire | |||
: 6- u | |||
[CS] | |||
/stableatT MSLESH7 2/2/87 s t cold shtttd)wn i | |||
FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 7 of 13) i l | |||
l l | |||
'h/ | |||
RI t | |||
/ IURBINE IRIP I | |||
s PoPY co0.ing 5 SECONDARY \ PDS 3X _'C_OR f's_ not sufficien to SYSTEM y_31dAC I "I ""#" | |||
[SC] STD ElI c f accios:to\ | |||
esdalls1 etu EF- PDS3Xr.-chat __ .. | |||
[EF] i[ low in 5 njfr ? EF+ '''116AGI | |||
/ | |||
(* | |||
ii - | |||
.i i | |||
* HIGHERPOWERLEYEL MSLBSH8 'SH - | |||
2/2/87 k9 FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 8 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O SH t | |||
[P0'PU] | |||
PORU/PSU'hs PDS3X r.. | |||
2/3OPEN/ | |||
I .- | |||
i | |||
/ \ - | |||
; \ PDS3X ,.. / CORE ' ~ | |||
[BW) | |||
[BWSI '' ~ | |||
~-J)AMAGE. # | |||
gAVAILABLE/ no - | |||
C | |||
\ sprays v I ManualC.R. | |||
autostarttf ::: | |||
[HP-1] 1pi in 2 Miis f T | |||
SH 10 | |||
\ | |||
MSLESH9 2/2/87 4 | |||
FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 9 of 13) | |||
/SH | |||
\9 u | |||
PORY/PSY'S\ ,.. /LOCA\ | |||
[RC] s RECLOSE j' '' | |||
\'/ | |||
, u E | |||
/ ACTIONS TO\,. Insignificant | |||
\RDUCE SS ) <: | |||
[IC] \ EF / | |||
If | |||
. MSLBSH10 | |||
! 2/2/87 SH\ | |||
3/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 10 of 13) i O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/an\ | |||
c'901idg T | |||
5 (1 | |||
P001; N [CP'5 | |||
: a. Pqr r. | |||
t.- | |||
3 d_3 51;0PPed T' | |||
l . | |||
BWSI | |||
\ ,.. PDS3X TORE ''. . | |||
[BW] 3 / ~~ -JAMAGE > | |||
~~'' | |||
e 1 E 4antially s{rt ,.. PDS3X . | |||
1pl,Pitn i- | |||
.ongtern/- | |||
[HP] | |||
; I ,. - | |||
i [ffpl$\ p / CORE'' s | |||
! .P0,PY] | |||
[ opens l | |||
/ ' | |||
~~ h_AMAG.E | |||
~- ' | |||
MSLESHil ' | |||
i ' | |||
, 2/2/87 ' | |||
SH | |||
: ,5 i FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 11 of 13) i | |||
..__m ______--._____.________-___m | |||
-__,_-m - .____ - _..-- - _ _ . --___ _ ___ _ _ _____ | |||
' CORE ' , NSLBSK12 c ' 2/2/87 | |||
~~-Q AHAGE | |||
,.~~ | |||
T | |||
/ IlEAC"0l:: \ \ ,. . f not .))S 3 BUILDING < | |||
$A,B,C,or)D ISOLATION / . | |||
{ d;; YES | |||
! /.EAC"0;;: IuDG - | |||
FAN 5 r. f not Pl)S3 . | |||
10 | |||
/ l nB , | |||
s COOLERS (- J | |||
( | |||
I n | |||
* :?0SCEQP \ | |||
\ s. | |||
\ | |||
d,. A C,.0., ..4 | |||
\ s. /PDS 3 au) cing/ | |||
sprays BUILDING SPRAYS / '' ( nB j " | |||
r y | |||
2)S 3 | |||
/ | |||
PD3 3 I PDS T | |||
3 ':?'39"0P\ | |||
aul..c,Ing | |||
( nC j ( OF j I | |||
( | |||
gg | |||
./ | |||
J sprays V | |||
/ s. | |||
/. PDS 3 l '' | |||
/ | |||
, ('SH ( nD - | |||
\p0, FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 12 of 13) l O | |||
O O O MSLESH13 | |||
/SH 2/2/87 | |||
\ s12 | |||
$[> | |||
: 1 r l,' | |||
/ ACTIONS \\ ,.. / PDS T (TOOPEN "' | |||
nD j | |||
: \ SUMP YLYS/ i. | |||
_ L, l b f ignandrkn V 4 | |||
d \ r. . / PDS 3 l g IP ptlMP + / | |||
1eatXchgP "' | |||
( | |||
nC j I | |||
i 1I l' | |||
fPDS ') | |||
i i A, oh j 4 | |||
j FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 13 of 13) | |||
un s tu tat u ttsu ttt t t s titutts u ttt tttis traitt ttt t tt tutt a ta t tttt t t ttttttt titit tis ta t tris at t tt tt tt t:1 t t t ts stit t a tttt ttt t t ttiits t r o | |||
RI RT RP R 51 10 T+ TC W- EF- (1+ TR TH P0 W SV RC Pit M EV W9 ffA litJ HI E0 00 STATE SEQ (0) (6) (C) (B) -(C) (C) (E) 1 CD1 1 I i 1 : I i 13: 4: 121 !! 2 Col 2 l l 1 i ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 l l 3 A 3 I I I I i l 1 I I I I i I 4 0 4 l 8 l 1 1 I ! ! ! 1 1 1 5 Q1 5 1 1 ! ! l t l l ! l ! l 6 A 6 1 ! I l 1 I I I I i i I 7 0 7 I i 1 l L 1 ! l ! I I 8 Q1 8 I i ! l I i 1 1 I I l 1 9 A 9 1 1 : ! ! I 1 1 : 1 I t 14 8 16 1 1 1 ! l 8 1 : I : I 11 9 11 l i l I i i ! ! I i 12 C 12 i l 1 1 i 1 1 1 13 CD1 13 1 1 1 ! l l l l t 14 B 14 | |||
! 1 : I ! I I I i 15 C 15 I 1 l t : i I i 16 Iflit 16 l 1 l l ! I I 71 31 17 A 29 | |||
! 1 l 1 ! I I I I I I I i 18 8 29 | |||
: I : I ! l ! 1 i i i 19 A 36 I I l 1 l l ! I I I i 1 29 0 31 I i 1 : I I I I i l 1 21 A 32 I I l l l 1 1 I i 1 l 1 22 B 33 1 ! l l 8 ! l I I I : 23 8 34 1 i ! 1 I I I I I l 24 C 35 I I i l l l l 1 l- 25 Rv2 36 1 I l 1 1 : I i 5; 26 Av3 37 I l : l l i l l 27 IFR3 38 I I I I ! ! I 23 IFR12 64 l l 1 i : i i 29 IFRS 75 | |||
: I l l l t t 3) TR1 77 1 l ! ! 14; I I : l : 31 IR2 73 I I i 1 I I I I I I 22 'Al 73 l 1 l l ! ! I I I I 33 TR2 86 I l l l 1 I t 1 I I 34 TRI 81 l : : : : 1 : : i_ 25 TR2 82 I I i 1 ! l 1 1 ! ! 36 TR2 83 | |||
! 1 l t 1 : I I : 37 C 84 i ! i I I l 1 l- 33 TRI 85 i 1 : : : 1 l l 1 l_ 33 TR2 % | |||
i l l 1 ! I 1 : 44 TR2 87 I ! l 1 l l l t 1 41 TE! 88 l l 1 I l 1 I I i 1,., 42 TR2 g3 1 1 : ! ! ! ! I 1 CW M I I I f I I I t 44 C 91 | |||
: I : : I I 45 al 92 I I l l ! ! ! ! : I I : 46 TRI 93 l l l l 1 I l l 1 l l : 47 TR2 94 t I : : l t 1 : : I I o ni 95 3 : I l l 3 i ! : I. 49 TRI 96 i l 1 1 1 I I I i 1 54 TR2 97 l l I i I I 1 51 TR1 93 3 l l I ! l l l l l l 52 TRI t) l l l 1 I ; i ! l ; 53 TR2 100 I ! I I : 1 1 I i !_ $4 TR2 101 l l l l l 1 1 : MC 192 i | |||
! ! i ! : : 56 In5 193 | |||
. l l l 1 l l 57 TR2 165 | |||
: I ! l l l I 53 C IM | |||
: ! : l 5) IFils 197 i l : : : I : 64 Ini: it) ' | |||
; ; 1 ; i 61 EIA 217 I : : : i 6: : 2: : I !. 62 EfB 213 | |||
! : : l l : 1 I ! 63 EfA 219 l | |||
: : : i : : : : : : i. 64 erb m i | |||
: : : : : I 1 : 65 ETA 221 I ! I I ! ! ! l 1 i : M EfB 222 i ! l l l 1 ' l l l 67 E/B 223 l l 1 l l : | |||
1 , | |||
64 EFC 224 l l l l l l l l- () ETA 225 | |||
: : : : : : ; i :. 74 EfB 226 | |||
: : : l l l ! I i __. 71 ifB 227 l l l l l 1 : I 72 EFA 223 | |||
: : : : : I : : : :. n En m 1 1 : . 1 : I ! 74 EfB 23 FIGURE 4.2.6-3. STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING EVENT TREE (Sheet 1 of 2) 4.2.6-20 | |||
O O. nut tuntututtt tt tt ra tt ut ttuutttttt t t.t tt tttt tt ttttt ttt istit ** | |||
* t t in tttt itus nititt ttt tt t tt t t t t t t tistit * **tuti n t s tti t u tt | |||
+ | |||
al RT SP R SI S0 W+ TC W- U- U+ TR DI P0 W W RC HI E Ed HPS WA 141 HI SEQ 00 STATE EQ (0) (6) (C) (B) (C)- (C) (E) | |||
I i i i e . | |||
I I I. 1 I I I I - 75 EFC 231 I I I~li I I . . . . .. . ..... 76 IFR2 232 I I i l i I I I .. ... .. .. .... 77 IRS 214 I I I I I I i 78 8FB 242 1 1 1 1 I I i ! 79 . ETC 243 I I I I I I I .. .. .......... 84 Ins 244 1 1 1 1 I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 IE6 246 I I I I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. 82 IFR12 275 I i 1 1 I I si .l .. . . . . . . .. 63 IFRS 290 1 1 1 I I l I..................... . . . . , . 84 IFR7 272 1 1 11 1 1 65 TCt 353 I I I I I I I I -l ! ! M TC2 354 I I I ! I I i i ! l 87 - TCl 355 I i i 1 i l I i i I B3 TC2 356 I I I i i I i 1 1 69 TCl 357 I I I I I I I I i 1 96 TC2 353 1 I i i 1 1 ! ! ! 91 TC2 353 I I I I i l i ! 92 TC3 366 I I I I i i 1 $3 TCt 361 1 I I I i l l 1 I l_. 94 TC2 362 1 1 1 1 I i i i ! 95 TC2 363 1 I t i I I i 1 56 TCt X4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 97 TCl M5 I I I I I I I l 93 TCt M6 I I I I i 1 ! 99 TC3 367 I I I I I i 100 TCt 363 I I I I I I I I I I I let TCt 36) 1 I I I I I I I I I l_. 162 TC2 370 l I I i 1 1 I I I ! 163 TCt 371 I i l l I I I 1 I i 144 TCt 372 i 1 ! i l i 1 11 1 105 TC2 373 l t ! I I i i ! I in TCt 374 1 1 1 1 I I I l t i 197 TCl 375 I I I I I i 1 l t 1 163 TC2 376 1 1 1 I i 1 1 1 1 !?) TC2 377 I I I I I I i i 114 TC3 373 I i i i i 1 l . . . . . .. 111 1M5 379 i ! ! ! 1 1 112 TC2 381 l l 1 ! ! I I 113 TC3 332 1 1 I i ! ! . . . . . .. 118 M.: 333 1 1 1 1 1 .. . . . . ... , 115 IFR3 365 l 1 I l 91 I .. . . .. .... . . . . 116 IFR6 463 I I i 1 ! .. . . . ... 117 IFR6 4'f2 I I i 1 . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . !!3 IFR) 521 1 1 1 l- . .. . .. .. .. . , 11) 151 657 I I I . . . . . . . ... lit 156 733 1 I .. . .. . . . . . . . .. . . 121 1R1 922 1 ! . . . . . . .. ... . .. 122 IFR1 953 1 _. 123 RT4 1934 1 i i 1- 1 1 141 124 RT3 . It)5 1 ! ! I I i 125 RT2 les | |||
! I i 1 1 Ili IN RT3 It)7 | |||
. 1 I I I i 127 IFR14 1&M i ! I I I . 1 23 IFRll llN | |||
! l ! ! . . . 12) IFRit 1192 1 I I . . IM IFRll 1134 1 i .- 131 1FR11 11 % | |||
! . . 132 IFRll 1173 | |||
( | |||
\ FIGURE 4.2.6-3 (Sheet 2 of 2) 4.2.6-21 t | |||
4.2.7 STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING MAIN TREE No separate event tree was preserved for.this initiating event because~ of its similarity to the steam line break in the intermediate-building described in Section 4.2.6. Figure 4.2.7-1 presents the flow of the ' | |||
event sequence diagram shown in Figure 4.2.7-2. An event sequence-diagram, shown as Figure 4.2.7-2, was done for this initiating event. | |||
~ | |||
I I | |||
O . | |||
p 4 | |||
i 1 | |||
O 4.2.7-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
_ _ . . ~ . . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ - . _ , , _ _ . , _ . - _ , . , _ _ _ _ . _ , , , _ - _ . _ _ . . | |||
'} h 3 1 | |||
tu m 1 IE W 11 CCRI HMCI Sim 12 1NIIT 2 IIIIT 12 CORI MMCI INm 3 , | |||
!Nm 14 1NIIT 4 (CRI MMCI 0 | |||
1NIIT 5 SRIIT 1 CCRI HMCI tatIf 6 Su m 8 l | |||
I CCf! MMCI INIIT 1 CCRI MMCI l | |||
l | |||
$Nm 19 | |||
,c | |||
( _ ,._ ~) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.7-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR STEAM LINE BREAK IN TURBINE BUILDING 4.2.7-2 | |||
O O O a | |||
Ifpgf{fh Breakbetweenintermediatebldg.valland turbinestop/controlvalveswillfail: | |||
(IHRB. BLDG. ) | |||
i i -turbinebldg.valls | |||
! RHCTOR \f fh,l'\ -nainfeedvater R | |||
i IRIP andfillturb, bldg.withstean. | |||
[RU /or'\SH.1J/ | |||
_ l_ NANUAL | |||
/IURBINE\ Overcoolingalready | |||
; IRIP isoccurring. | |||
: [ffA, _ / | |||
E OITSITE PWR\ inspite of steam in huses ant / DGs SIART\ , | |||
C.D. | |||
RENAINS j' valls falling ANDRUN f, | |||
: [0P] [M/GB] \ ' | |||
OpenNU-Y217 l 1699PSIG} N0 / INCRBSE \ | |||
[H/ StartsecondN/Hpump i | |||
EBl SIGNAL | |||
/ OP N | |||
\ _/H 110W f StartDCandDRsystens | |||
! SBSX1 Sh JES SE 4CP SEAL) 2/19/85 2 fAILUREj FIGURE 4.2.7-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE TURBINE BUILDING q (Sheet 1 of 14) | |||
SH. | |||
10OIHER\ | |||
SLBsFROM | |||
[py) PIPE WHIP / PWWouldeffecthoth g steangenerators | |||
/ '\ ' | |||
Alreadyhaveadrasticcooldown 4 | |||
SLRDS so nope MFW won't Make things | |||
\__/ , | |||
Muchworse. | |||
b 1 OP. | |||
AILEAST CLOSES NO\ | |||
MOIOR RIVENEFWP | |||
\ jHPI\ | |||
C00L) | |||
[SI] IWO MSIYs/ PW | |||
[EF-] WORXS&/ 3H7A/ | |||
u YES V CONTROL / | |||
EF+ exc. C D will fail I.D. | |||
PuMPbywatercaPPyov3Pif fhAf$H[/ EF+]lH.7A[EF-od"00L\ | |||
C CONIROL ' | |||
notalreadyfailedbyMF+' | |||
r +op,willendEFWflow SBSX2 /SH.( (seeATP-1210-3) i 6/4/85 \ 3/' | |||
* excessive cooldown nag result in RU failure fran PIS FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 2 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
i O - | |||
O O (i"-) | |||
f NOR,Y, ^~ | |||
RUPIURETR > = ( C. D ,% | |||
j [SI-2] ERC00LI '_-- | |||
l t 4 | |||
l OISGIHBES\ | |||
REMAIN | |||
: [IR] INIACI/ | |||
! "4 | |||
{k S.S.SIEAM\ YES /HPI | |||
! RELIEF | |||
/IBYs \SI/ SH l ISD] ADUs V | |||
: MSSYs KeepPressureBelow N0 | |||
! MFWPShutoffHead u p | |||
! SBSH3 [SH,h l 5/24/85 \4 / | |||
FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 3 of 14) i L_____-_--__------ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
H\ | |||
- - YES SI & IR? / y REDUCERCS | |||
\ NO | |||
( OPEN h HEAT RIM. / ./ | |||
[IC] ' | |||
>ONIAINMENI) | |||
T4 - VES 4 | |||
HPI STARIS\ | |||
e [HP] | |||
T | |||
/ | |||
? | |||
BWSI | |||
\ > | |||
o EENI AYAILABLE | |||
/ HPI sitecess withotit BW sitecess leads to HPIP httenttp if ESAS started then. | |||
9 W > N0 g C D' 4 | |||
[MR] \ LINE / vES s_ , | |||
t SH. | |||
SBSH4 | |||
/SHh 5/24/85 \5A/ 5B | |||
] FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 4 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O H. SBSH5 N0 5/24/85 - | |||
>/ IA AFIER h2HRsorMAt\ /HPI COOL | |||
[EF-2(IP)]\[FW + ADUs/ >\S H7I (OPP g | |||
1 REDUCE | |||
\ ,/ WATER THRH\ | |||
y YES j | |||
l e HPIPFLOW | |||
/ r | |||
[P0,PU] | |||
RELIEFS | |||
/ u 0 | |||
y rt)P-SHUI 0FFh | |||
' g C , | |||
N0 ' FLOW STOPS ' | |||
' /SH. | |||
HPIPs (P-pts INC'S) | |||
\13E hCR C 0 E AL s FaH | |||
' " H.87 [RC] (200F SUB 2 /SH.\ | |||
l [ \4B/ | |||
; INI.RCP | |||
: P SEAL INTEG' C.D. | |||
! /SH.\ 'IIHICCW | |||
\_6f [SE-1] 2 | |||
; FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 5 of 14) | |||
/SH, CD achieved hg itsing IBYs, ADYs,and sprag | |||
\ when secondary systen heat ren, is avail Inclttded in CD are actions to start HPIP | |||
'CD + | |||
EFR \ toinjecthoronintothecoredttringC/D 79 pHR N 1 [CD) COND. | |||
g | |||
/ CFIs Mttst he available, if HPIPs aren't , | |||
forsitecess. | |||
5fPASS | |||
\ | |||
block (LO-PRESS ESFs | |||
/ | |||
4 CFIs W j}{I_tg | |||
? | |||
~ PEN DROP-\ > | |||
YES | |||
>(RECIR) sSH.S | |||
[HL-1] LINE YALUES/ N0 j t \ | |||
/ALIGNMR\ | |||
Igh HEAT >fla0CA ,H i' | |||
[DH] PUMPS,(GRs EXCH / RYES i -- | |||
1AITTOC/h - | |||
PROUIDE gf\' | |||
EYENIDALLY -><_'' C.D.') L.I. WATER SBSH6 - | |||
FIX - | |||
2/10/85 _/' | |||
y0 L. . | |||
sSOURCE FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 6 of 14) | |||
: 9 O | |||
e | |||
O O O | |||
! -. 3~- | |||
; STOP3/4 (i | |||
\ ie., run one punp to pronote nixing in reactor vessel (Rareadg forPISprevention. | |||
, 14 | |||
/ | |||
l BWSI | |||
\PDS3x AVAILABLE/ | |||
. [BW] / | |||
i l b y I | |||
IHP3 HPI STARIS\ MANUAL '\ PDS 3x J ANDRUNS / HPI j i / [HP] SIARI / | |||
! $H.$ y i | |||
\Ju' PORU+2HPIPS 1 | |||
) '\PDS3x 1 [P0, OR d i PU) 1/2PU+1HPIf 1 HPIP in 30 Min if 1 PSU g | |||
! - 2HPIPsifless -- _ | |||
~ | |||
SH. ,- | |||
l SBSH7 g <3.D.?.> | |||
i 1/27/85 | |||
! FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) | |||
? | |||
l HI'\ | |||
RECRC) RCSwillrapidly | |||
\ depressurizeafter T coredaMageduetoRV | |||
'PIGY-BACH \ PDS4x-RECIkc | |||
\ YES Melt-through. | |||
[HL-2] ALIGilH'I / gg p/ Stttok open relief-> | |||
M Papiddepress,to pps 4x LPIP discharge pressJ LIisstillpossibleif | |||
$VALUE UMP DRAIN \ | |||
* H | |||
[SU) CLOSED 1 | |||
/ C2 FAILED,H0 SPRAYS we caMe here f m 5 . | |||
XXsnotreallyneeded 5 '0PENSilllP\pps4x .. | |||
ISA/ RECIRC. p sinceS.S.heatren. | |||
SB] UALUES . | |||
/ isstillpossible, I httt ntist keep I(300Forpunpseals ShhN[EIskPDS4X pi g , | |||
willfail, | |||
[pg] PUHPS,HXs / ., | |||
U s_. | |||
t | |||
\ <' C . D .~> | |||
SBSH8 _ | |||
6/4/85 'SH./ | |||
9 . | |||
FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 8 of 14) | |||
O O | |||
e | |||
: O O O SH. | |||
8 | |||
/ | |||
N0 gjiPI cool 9 Itwilltake(tpto2weeksto | |||
~~- . cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, 4 YES httt the press, will still he high. | |||
/(HEAIREM RESTORE SS\ ppg g | |||
. \.BEFOREIC/ | |||
b ,%r y | |||
CD+DEPR 10DHR | |||
\ ppg g . | |||
>g l [CD] EHIhV m | |||
/ | |||
l i | |||
! / | |||
BYPASS LO g | |||
: \_w/ | |||
PRESESFs | |||
= 3 SH j SBSH9 g, <C . D .'') | |||
! 2/26/85 | |||
'l j FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 9 of 14) i | |||
SH. SBSX10 i 6or ( OPEN '1 2/10/85 j | |||
Mc +( VE R.B. PurgeandRCdraintankline IR & (SI or .- - | |||
isolateon4psigsignalorRI; ea re m solates on M psig | |||
[C1/ RBISOI'$\ or )orCID e N0,largehole ONRI C2] /' d YES E8 SIIAMINRB9 .;- | |||
Fansburnuprunning 4PSIG | |||
\ ,(REAC BLDG.hat high speed g | |||
~ | |||
NO CB] / '(0 PEN,N0 FANS) | |||
" /REAC. BLDG.\ | |||
T SPRAYS / | |||
[F1/ | |||
RBFAN COOLERS | |||
\ / | |||
/' MANUAL RB h FANSIARI [CS) | |||
Manualif F2] / \ no4psig | |||
; signal,m . | |||
P ' ' | |||
(RIAC. BLDG,h (SIABLE AI h FAILURE | |||
' ('-- | |||
COLD ) | |||
(SHUIDOWN I ) T FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 10 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
-\ | |||
RIj | |||
.s BREAHERFAILURE VES Ittrhine trip on reactor trip is IURBINE | |||
\ hasedonbreakerposition. | |||
IRIP | |||
[II] ( _ | |||
/ | |||
o 1 | |||
+ 4 4 | |||
3 ~ | |||
o 5 " RCSreliefcoolingisnot S.S. SIEnli\ ' | |||
-~- | |||
>< ' C . D . ~> stifficlent to | |||
; [sp] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/ _, | |||
~- - | |||
coolthecore. - | |||
"F* | |||
I / | |||
MFW \ , Lossofsec.sys. | |||
RAMPBACK MF- Power drops rapidly with fil'k inventorg | |||
: [MF] \ / | |||
} | |||
increasing RCS tenp. | |||
kNR/in26nins. | |||
94 l SBSH11 /SH- DoeslackofMFWchangeHPIPorPSUorEFWsitecesscriteria? | |||
{ 1/19/87 \ 12 | |||
, FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 11 of 14) i | |||
TT. | |||
11 i | |||
EF+ | |||
EFHFLOW \ | |||
Hillgetto11in. | |||
IN5SEC.S) | |||
[EF] / EF- m/j~~p~_'. | |||
" ' ~_ C (Jil'h flR/ in about I nin. | |||
orPSVs2/3PORY\ | |||
[P0,PUI OPEN / | |||
g 1r | |||
* g ggg7 \.PDS3x | |||
/ | |||
[Bg] N0 SPRAVS 1r | |||
[CA/ | |||
4PSIG SIGNAL | |||
\ / | |||
PDS 3x | |||
>C. C. D ~> | |||
1's CB] / ~_- _ | |||
t SBSH12 /SH. | |||
I 3/8/85 \l3 _ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) 4 9 | |||
e | |||
O O O | |||
(!h " | |||
t OH4PSIGSIGHAL AUTO ^ | |||
HPI \ IN 30 SEC HANUAL3 -- | |||
[HP-1] N 4 | |||
/ [HP-3] ACI . | |||
I OH | |||
~~ | |||
- I- | |||
'PR0YDE | |||
\ ~ | |||
><'C.D. ~> HPIPs httrattp against pressure | |||
; [Mg] HPIP FLOW MIN. / ~ - '_ spike ) their shtttoff head C t | |||
/ | |||
$ PORY+PSYs \ | |||
RECLOSE / >(LOCA | |||
; [RC] / \ / | |||
! d REDUCERCS | |||
_ _ _ 1600 psig signal equivalent actttation' HEATREM0YA | |||
[IC] has already been proditced 4 psig signal so overcooling is ttninportant l 4 _ _ _ _._ | |||
. SBSH13 SH. | |||
l 3/8/85 6 | |||
! FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 13 of 14) | |||
l l | |||
! N' ' m/notPDS' I notPDS; (nA,B,C,D) | |||
TR & (SI or ICl- YES > '( nB J YES (N0 i C " | |||
[C1/ | |||
REACTOR BUILDING | |||
\ REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING 10 f pps 3 l C2] ISOLATION / [CS SPRAYS / ( nF ) | |||
5 | |||
~ | |||
EACIOR | |||
\ | |||
OPEN SUNP \r f | |||
pyg 3 u | |||
REACIOR | |||
/' BUILDING I | |||
[F1/ BUILDING , | |||
yALUES | |||
( nD F2] FAN C'L'RS/ [SR] | |||
~ J'[CSl\ SPRAYS i | |||
- N YES | |||
, DH,- U | |||
!' REACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ ALIGNERUM , | |||
\ [ | |||
( | |||
PDS 3 | |||
/ DHRHEAT > nG J | |||
[CS] SPRAYS | |||
" m | |||
[DH] CHANGERS / | |||
o o | |||
: y SBSX14 I PDS 1 l I PDS 1 / | |||
PDS 1 I PDS 1 / | |||
PDS 1 l 2/19/85( nA ) i nB ) i nA J' ( nC _J \ nX J ricuat 4.2.7-2 heet 14 of 14) | |||
4.2.8 STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.G-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in ! | |||
Fi gure 4.2'.8-2. Figure 4.2.8-2 presents the steam generator tube rupture event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.8-3 presents its frontline, t early response event tree. Table 4.2.8-1 defines the top event codes and . | |||
conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.8-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a steam generator tube rupture are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. Some of these actions are different because a tube has ruptured and a low RCS pressure signal has been generated. As for a very ; | |||
small LOCA, the HPI system HPA/HPB must always work in the injection mode in order to prevent core damage. The event must be recognized as being different than a very small LOCA, so the operator does not try to switch over to recirculation from a dry sump 10. Cooldown to cold shutdown CE ' | |||
is always required in order to fix the broken tube and to reduce the RCS pressure to below the secondary pressure in order to stop the leak. If RCS pressure remains above the closing pressure of the lowest setpoint - l MSSV, the MSSVs will not close (TC failure) and the site boundary dose ; | |||
will continue. RCS heat removal through the secondary system will be , | |||
done by using only the unbroken steam generator; therefore, the MF, EF, and SD actions will be slightly different than those for the general ; | |||
transient initiators. HPI cooling will also lead to continued loss of inventory through the MSSYs. If core damage occurs and the MSSVs are O stuck open (also TC failure), the reactor building will not be isolated even if all the containment isolation valves close (assumed to leave the same sized hole in the reactor building as a C2 failure). | |||
l l | |||
t Long-term cooldown actions, high and low pressure sump recirculation actions, and containment safety features, when required, that determine i to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a steam i generator tube rupture leads are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e TR1 (see Section 4.3.14) for scenarios requiring continued cooldown when HPI is available. , | |||
i e TR2 (see Section 4.3.15) when continued cooldown is required and HPI ' | |||
is not available. | |||
o C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RV2 (see Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the ! | |||
BWST is available. ! | |||
e TC1 (see Section 4.3.11) for scenarios requiring continued cooldown when HPI is available, but the secondary system steam relief valves have not all successfully reclosed. | |||
. O 4.2.8-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
e TC2 (see Section 4.3.12) when continued cooldown is required, HPI is not available, and the secondary system steam relief valves have not all successfully reclosed, e TC3 (see Section 4.3.13) when continued cooldown is required, BWST is not available, and the secondary system steam relief valves have not all successfully reclosed. | |||
e RY2 (see Section 4.3.16) when reactor vessel rupture has occurred, HPI is therefore not effective, and the secondary tystem steam relief valves have not all successfully reclosed. | |||
e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available, e BF8 (see 8 described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is reautred but HPI flow is not available. | |||
e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required and the BWST is not available. | |||
O O | |||
4.2.8-2 0587G102087PMR | |||
t I | |||
r t | |||
^! | |||
A i | |||
TABLE 4.2.8-1. STEAM GENERATCR TUBE RUPTURE TOP EVENT i DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL. SPLIT FRACTIONS ! | |||
i I | |||
tit ttttttttttt tt t tttfittit$t tift t111111ti ttt t ttt t1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 TOP OSTS: COCIT!WI. SFLIT FMCTICMS: l TOP SFt!T f MER. WM & T& EWNT EWhT FMCTION CCN)lTIONS l TR STEM iiDGATOR TW RffW IE E EC T-F - | |||
KT RDCT3 TRIF(l) E E6 T-B e 13 (fGATOR ltOTIFIES AS %iR(2) kl HIA WS F > | |||
^ | |||
klC TAF i TT TW!E TRIP (3) HI 50 SECOOYtY STEM FELIEF(4) E- TJ TC F l T+ 2) EIESSIW Nl4 FEEDS 4TGt$) W R4 TC F TC TD31WE STEM FfLIEF(6) W WF T F EF+ F r | |||
T- SIEFICIBT $14 FEENATER(7) W WF T- F EF- F ! | |||
EF- SIFICIEhi EWiktY FEEWTG(9) W WI TH F l | |||
! EF+ w) CIES$14 ETVfKY FEEDeATG(9) TC TCH T+F i O E E4 49 WA COMCWt 40 CGESStF14(14) | |||
E4T WAILMLi(ll) | |||
HIGH PESSM ICECTION FW C(12) | |||
N15H FGES9M 10 PW$ A & 6(13) | |||
H! hlirt HfSSM ICECTI(M WLWS(14) | |||
N TMOTTLE WI FLMil) | |||
W EACTA WS. FAlltaE FFA PTS (16) i M PM @ ENS (17) ! | |||
W PSYS 0 ENS (ll) | |||
+ ( ls 1Nt:4te oefwlt split frictiors which are ret A. t t | |||
I i | |||
i I | |||
4 i | |||
i | |||
) | |||
I i | |||
4.2.8-3 | |||
O TABLE 4.2.8-2. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE B0UNDARY CONDITIONS t , W .40 44; 444 44 .. sy) 452 454 4S 459 48 42 4e 4 4u 4:4 4 t) 472 474 67 ) 4!! | |||
44L .4) 44$ 447 449 451 4$) 45$ 457 4?4 461 4+ 3 44 41 49 4 71 47) 4$3 4t4 4M tis 1 : 34 ? $ 7 i i 1011 :: 13141516171319 N Ol 22 23 ;4 ;5 3 !? !! !? h 31 !! 33 34 5 h 27 M H 4*W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:"J:; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
!'a'? . . . . . . . l . t . . . B . . l . I 8 I i 8 8 8 5 6 4i&4I . . | |||
I:;i; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
** m . . C. . . . C . CC . . . % . . . C% i9 % CC . C . . . 9 % C% % . | |||
*:3*C . . ! . I t . . . I ! ! . . . I 1 1 1 1 1 1 I ! ! ! 3 1 8 1 1 1 I I t . | |||
d:* - . 30. 000 0 3. 0 0 0 ) . 000 00 . 0000000000 . 00000 . | |||
E:: - -a 33a = . t ( i . . a . N ( 4 ( % . EF F E( ( t1 =0Ei( F i . | |||
!: if * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
ii:-:( . i. . E E ( i . | |||
* F E i . F . D . . F F 6 F E F iF ( ( EF 8 F F F . | |||
r .-i. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
d:~1 . J . . a J J C J J J J J ) J ' J J C J Jq J | |||
. . . . J . | |||
-444 . t . . r t . a 64 1 * ! ! s. !# 0 ) $ I ! it 1 1 [ { 6. t i i ! ! I a . | |||
'- . . . | |||
* C CC C 4 4 C 4 A e4 3 00 04 : C } G e FiC G G } a . | |||
'= . . . 5 5 G . GG GG G 3 D0D G G G D* G 0 ) OE i. | |||
::4: ; r , | |||
; ; r f r . r; e , r ; rap F p r rp rr s | |||
. . Ii . E i i . 8 3 I i F . L F F F F i F ( F [ t ir F asc | |||
:i::i .ii . Ii( E . F F i i i ; . F F F i( F iF ( ( ( i F F F F . | |||
-:b: A .. . . . G GGG . G . . G6 G G GG G G . . GGG GG . | |||
- -il . G . . . G GC0G G GGG i GG. GG . 0 3CGG ) 5 | |||
''M- ) , 2 ] 3 ) 0 . ] O S ) . . 000 00 . 0 0 000 3 00 0 0 . C 0000 | |||
- 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
* O ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
*. .1 I ! . i 1 I . . . I ! ! !* f I ! ! I ! . I ! a I ! ! 1 ! 1 i | |||
J O | |||
4.2.8-4 | |||
f q) | |||
) | |||
ifp(Cgginit 1 | |||
INIIT & $5EIT 11 1 I si m um a 1 1 IMEIT 3 $NT 13 i | |||
THEIT 4 # | |||
CORE temCI | |||
<s G-su m 5 '~T sum 7 tu m s zum : | |||
CORI HMCI $NEIT 9 | |||
/CORE NMC1 I | |||
COLD trJtDOWM FIGURE 4.2.8-1. | |||
(e) ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE 4.2.8-5 | |||
. ; ll l O | |||
e a | |||
u r | |||
e u | |||
a | |||
\/ t s | |||
u r | |||
' a | |||
} j H 'B o r | |||
n S 2 a e - | |||
n . | |||
e | |||
) c 1 n i | |||
jH S | |||
/] | |||
a e | |||
r s /\m ' A B s, . | |||
n EE a p e [ o mt w r, u | |||
py s od a n U | |||
/R MD s | |||
l BH e e ef n | |||
a c | |||
g O_ | |||
e 7dd 1 n n r | |||
u rf uo st g | |||
n 2 o a s s u e Y c s eh u eC e o | |||
- r rS c U sD p P s M P . | |||
t t S p pW 1 n _ | |||
n e | |||
pt t OSS r ar a C R | |||
v l | |||
a u | |||
n Ih P | |||
H X eF e M e | |||
v e | |||
l o | |||
n a j'\g s 2 | |||
On To U | |||
r o | |||
s sY YYS BDS IAM 8 | |||
2 4 | |||
A | |||
) \/ e | |||
', \/ \/ | |||
M a | |||
u N Ey _ R A c E | |||
G EU E | |||
R Sp A | |||
LEgy" O | |||
IP CI E | |||
N I | |||
PI EF I E S I i | |||
r M BI R AR t B R H A AUP E IU I Cg II g/ _ | |||
EI R | |||
R I U | |||
S .E | |||
.R S 2 I R I S . | |||
S | |||
( ( / \ , | |||
5 - | |||
3 7 | |||
g m | |||
] | |||
D S | |||
[ | |||
1/ | |||
X7 S2 8 | |||
O. | |||
g R/ | |||
I1 Ct l | |||
O O O | |||
/SH' /SH.' | |||
1A | |||
\ IB yp s too little NFW [M-] m | |||
{(Flow (5xwillopenPORV/PSV7 | |||
\RAMPBACH ' " | |||
will not isolate | |||
! too much MFil [H+] __ _ | |||
includes | |||
) | |||
ICSfailures 'MANUALMFH\ | |||
CONIROL s | |||
/-- | |||
y (SLHDS h" | |||
. 5 M--" | |||
iE llPI, a | |||
4 (1600PSIG)1 SIGHAL SIABLISHs \ [EF- o LOOL \ | |||
l includes 4 ifg EFWFLOW+/EF+] | |||
CONTROL H,7,A I hi-level / HANUALLY \sc, EF+ exc. CD* will fail I.D. | |||
> Pump by water carrgover If j " | |||
HFilP ctttoff \ INI' HFU R' PI f~ | |||
f notalreadyfailedbyMF+; | |||
i dSGS top,willendEFWflow | |||
/ | |||
' SH \ eventtially fails both punps (seeAIP-1210-3) | |||
! 1/25/85 / | |||
* excessive cooldown Mag restilt in RY failttre fron PIS i | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 2 of 14) | |||
e t s . | |||
nP t n | |||
aI cP e . | |||
iH n _ | |||
f , n - | |||
i e e ahi _ | |||
n g uuo s at r t a - | |||
i at t p n . | |||
s c p o) n e ud e c9 ib ra s 1 e afX _ | |||
s e el e oS l i gb R aul e eI . | |||
s mt l rr r a ud e vt i | |||
l ut e _ | |||
c h ni e c et e e rnf ah s _ | |||
o rn run s e ol i e e ) | |||
i fi are 4 h o at o s 1 t t df nf( f e o e n o t ed s c ro o v ei ei 3 . | |||
n iehtt nt ct a ht t e | |||
r ol et a rd o e l e _ | |||
h e ruin s rrabd ai e | |||
h S | |||
( | |||
2 9-8 . | |||
t , . | |||
e ht 2 - | |||
h /f _ | |||
W f r m1 4 | |||
E i R 92 U G | |||
G5 S ( I F | |||
sT) e0 l t e e ad es ov e l | |||
ot s c dl i eBI S pa | |||
. fHH f B O r | |||
\/ g' / o G | |||
I S | |||
C ' | |||
S PL I H H2 l | |||
I 9N A < m ER L[ H 4 S 9G C $ | |||
jIl . | |||
6I 1S gE-pH | |||
/(\ . | |||
f \ 5 8 | |||
3/ | |||
/i Eo I | |||
] | |||
C I | |||
[ | |||
H7 S2 R/ | |||
I1 9 | |||
:t | |||
; ' ;! ;li | |||
O O O i | |||
SH t | |||
j 16MPsif N NO . | |||
signal n , , | |||
i HPI STARIS\ | |||
IMlAL HPI | |||
\ | |||
[HP] | |||
+ RUNS | |||
/ START | |||
/ | |||
b MSI | |||
\ Nosprays i | |||
I IM] | |||
AYAIIABLE | |||
/ | |||
I m | |||
{ { to pups burning up\QInsufficient leakage l | |||
l | |||
':1R] LINE / b i | |||
j o i | |||
I TRSX4 SH. | |||
! 1/27/85 5 i | |||
f FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 4 of 14) i | |||
l SH. IRSH5 Onlyif 1/27/85 | |||
~ ~ | |||
SIOP | |||
\s u ated. WATER IHRU\ | |||
(RCPs / | |||
[P0,PU) kRELIEFS / | |||
T-1 L.I. inventory REDUCE | |||
\ /SIOP HPIPs)> control reg'd N | |||
[7gj HPIPFLOW | |||
/ (CLOSE (200F SUBGVALUs/ | |||
is RD9E9' b I r?)P-SHUI 0FFh ids \ | |||
l OP EUE$IAS \ Mistakes it for a FLOW STOPS ; | |||
[ID] scIg / U.Sn.LOCA. Thinks recirculationis (P pts INC'S) 2 possible. . | |||
BOIHSGs * ~ . _YES Moretubesfail ISOLAIED? ,f | |||
" H0 SH. 'HPI\ | |||
6 COOL > | |||
H.7E FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 5 of 14) | |||
O O O SH,\ CDachievedhgitsingIBUs,ADYs,andsprag 13 / whensecondarysystenheatren,isavail | |||
~ | |||
and RCPs are rtinning for sprays. | |||
9 pHR INR\ | |||
Allcooldownactionsnttsthe hCD+ | |||
[CD-3] COND. / acconplishedbeforeBWSIdepletion. | |||
ifPAS | |||
\ | |||
block (LO-PRISS | |||
-~ | |||
ESFs | |||
/ | |||
CFIs g l t | |||
~ OPEN DROP-\ "' | |||
/SH'\ | |||
[HL-U LINEYALUES | |||
/ >H YES \8 / | |||
i i N0 ALIGNDHR\ | |||
PUMPS, HEAT h | |||
I | |||
[DH] EXCHCRs/ - ~ | |||
i PROYIDE\k,.C.D.',> | |||
L.I.WAIER j | |||
IRSH6 2/25/85 SHT' 2 1gT [gy_1) SOURCE / . | |||
~- | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 6 of 14) | |||
I I | |||
SIOP 3/4 \ ie., rtin one ptinp to pronote Mixing in reactor vessel forPISprevention. | |||
area / | |||
-a-13 BWSI PDS3x | |||
, AVAILABLE | |||
[BW] | |||
[ k i t HPI SIARIS\ y | |||
~ | |||
[HP] HANUAL HPI \ PDS 3x > | |||
4 H.$\ | |||
ANDRUNS g | |||
[HP] SIARI i | |||
/ | |||
[P0, PORU+2HPIE4'\ | |||
OR PDS 3x p" PY] 1/2PUf1HPIf 1 HPIP in 30 Min if 1 PSVy i 2HPIPsifless _is. - | |||
SH. | |||
IRSH7 0 | |||
(C.D._.> | |||
1/27/85 -- | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
/HI-f | |||
\RECRC RCSwillrapidly depressurizeafter coredaMageduetoRU PIGY-BACX \ | |||
RECIltc | |||
\ YES PDS 4x Melt-tllrougli. | |||
[HL-2] ALIGNM'I M | |||
/ N0 Stuck open relief--> | |||
rapiddepress,to i | |||
$YALYE UMP DRAIN PDS 4x\ LPIP discliarge press. | |||
'n LIisstillpossibleif | |||
,? | |||
. [SY] CLOSED 1 | |||
/ C2 FAILED, N0 SPRAYS | |||
'' we cane liere fron lii, 5 HXsnotreallyneeded | |||
'0PBISUMP\pps4x ,, | |||
sinceS.S.lieatren, l [SA/ p i SB] | |||
RECIRC,/ | |||
YALUES isstillpossible, o | |||
I(3 Fo punp seals | |||
[hE[I'\PDS4X Willfail, | |||
[DH] PUNPS,HXs / ,, | |||
f A IRSH8 | |||
('C,i,'S | |||
: [SH.\ ~ | |||
~~ ' ' | |||
i 6/4/85 \9/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 8 of 14) | |||
I __ _-_-_______-_ ______- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - - __ _ _ - _ - _ . . - - - - - _ _ - . - . . - _ . . . - .- - | |||
SH.\ | |||
8 s | |||
H0 g, j[PI cool? | |||
Itwilltakeupto2weeksto | |||
'c . | |||
cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, uYES hutthepress,willstillbehigh, | |||
/RESIORE ppg 47' SS\ | |||
(HEAI REM -> | |||
\BEFORE3/ | |||
k h /fg*hE \ PDS4x y | |||
[CD]kEHIRY If | |||
/ | |||
/ | |||
BYPASS LO g PRESESFs | |||
\_ y= _i . m SH ~ | |||
IRSH9 <(,C D ~> | |||
1f 2/26/85 ~~-_ '. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 9 of 14) e - - -- --- | |||
9 9 | |||
O O O SH. IRSH10 6 or ( OPEN h 2/25/85 9 | |||
y( '' | |||
) | |||
PtirgeandRCdraintankline NO | |||
.yf d ._ | |||
Isolateon4psigsignalorRI; Seal rettirn isolates on 30 psig IC or Cih ISOL'I'N \ .' | |||
[C1/ OF RB ON RI | |||
- N0, large hole C2] s or 1600# / YES N Fans trip if rtinning | |||
/REAC. BLDG.hathighspeed | |||
~ [CA/ | |||
4PSIG | |||
\ q0 PEN,N0 FANS)EAC SIGNAL | |||
/ BLDG.\ | |||
CB] | |||
NAEALRB SPRAYS | |||
/ | |||
ff1/ | |||
RBFAN | |||
\ FANSIARI [CS] Nantial if no4psig | |||
: f2] | |||
COOLERS | |||
/ g signal,p . | |||
l g (REAC.BLDGh l (SIABLEAI$ | |||
COLD ( FAILURE ) | |||
(SHUIDOWN )4 ' | |||
FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 10 of 14) | |||
Ei | |||
._BREAHERFAILURE Iurhinetriponreactortripis YES IURBINE s basedonbreakerposition. | |||
IRIP ) | |||
LIll ( , | |||
t , | |||
, u | |||
$ g,3, 37pglf\ __ | |||
__.__ _ RCSreliefcoolingisnot | |||
><'~ | |||
._ C.D?~> | |||
sufficient to | |||
[SD] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/ ._ | |||
ceolthecore, u | |||
/ | |||
HFW \ , , | |||
Lossofsec,sys. | |||
RAHPBACK HF- Power drops rapidly with HI' inventorg | |||
[HF] increasing RCS tenp. | |||
__ , ,__. / { ?HR in26nins, f, | |||
IRSH11 /SH. Does lack of HFW change HPIP or PSU or EFW success criteria? | |||
1/19/87 \ 12 FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (5heet 11 of 14) e __ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ - _ | |||
G G | |||
O O O V, | |||
11 1 , | |||
EF+ | |||
EfWFLOW \ | |||
IN5SEC.S} , , ^._ Willgetto~11in, | |||
[ggy / " '~ __ | |||
(gi,h EF- _'V_ | |||
.filR/ in about 1 Min. | |||
9 2/3PORV\ | |||
orPSUs | |||
/ | |||
. IP0,PY1 OPEN | |||
~ | |||
u | |||
? | |||
ggst \ PDS 3x y IBHJ / N0 SPRAVS | |||
: U ., | |||
4S A- | |||
\PDS3x | |||
[CA/ | |||
: CB] / 'I {.D)> | |||
s , | |||
i J_ | |||
: IRSH12 /SH, 3/8/85 \ 13 | |||
{ FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) | |||
SH. | |||
12 H | |||
\ ' | |||
C.D' HPIPsburnupagainstpressure spike)theirshutoffhead | |||
[ygj FLg H' /' | |||
o c | |||
' PORY+PSYs \ jLOCA e RECLOSE / m | |||
\ | |||
5 [RC] / \ | |||
t 4 | |||
REDUCERCS - - | |||
A1699psigsignal | |||
[fC](gg7ggg___hasalreadilbeenproduced m 4 _ _ _ _ _ so overcooling is uninportant SH. | |||
IRSX13 6 | |||
1/27/85 FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 13 of 14) l e e - | |||
e | |||
O O O f | |||
''' /notPDST | |||
-NYES , (nA,B,C,D/ | |||
' p(f DBnotPDS) J YES | |||
[C1/ REACf0R\ | |||
MIDIE | |||
/ REACIOR 5 MIDING | |||
\ 10 f pps 3 | |||
: C2] IS0IAIION/ [CS:\ SPRAYS / ( nF ) | |||
) A YES a | |||
,~ | |||
.P 8 ' | |||
m u 5 IFI/ | |||
Cf0R MIDIE ( OPENSUNP \ | |||
HMES Qr PDS 3 REACIOR MIDIE FAN C'I/RS[ ( nD i | |||
F2] [SR) / )[CS] SPRAYS 4 | |||
A YES | |||
" E u | |||
! / | |||
REACf0R\ ALIGN +MN \ > m | |||
[ PDS 1 | |||
l MIDIE MRHEAT ( nG ICS] SPRAYS | |||
/ [g] CHAMERS/ | |||
J P T | |||
! IRSX14 I PDS 3 I PDS 3 | |||
1 I | |||
PDS 3 -f PDS 3 I PDS 3 | |||
1/27/8 R nA J \ nB J' 1 nA ) ( nc ) ( nX J FIGURE 4.2.8-2 (Sheet 14 of 14) | |||
12 titstiltslutatttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttttittttttttttttiliittttttttttttttistatti liitttattalttsitttttttttttttttttttttttti | |||
+ | |||
IIt ET 10 11 to W+ TC T EF- ET+ (t N W$ WA N1 TH W F9 W SU ET STATE E (B) (6) (C) (6) (C) (F) ll) 00 1 31 1 1 1 1 1 I I I I I i ! I I I 2 W2 2 I I I I I t i ! I : ! I 1 3 TRI 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 I i ! ! I I I 4 RY2 4 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I i 1 5 TU S I I I I I I I t i i 1 6 31 6 I I I l 1 i i ! I i 1 7 W2 7 I t ! I I I I 1 1 1 8 TU $ | |||
1 1 1 : 1 1 I I I I ... $ 131 $ | |||
1 I I I i ! I i i i i 16 D2 13 I I I I I i ! I I I 11 TU 14 i i t i I t i i I . | |||
12 C 15 1 1 1 1 1 I I i 13 E/A 16 i ! I I I I i 1 1 I I i 1 14 ETA 17 1 1 1 I ! ! I I I i ! ! I 15 t/B 14 I I t i 1 t ! I i ! ! ! 16 W2 19 I i ! I I I I 1 i l i 17 18 24 1 1 1 1 I I I I I i 18 U112 21 1 I I I L ! ! I i i 13 EfB 25 1 ! ! ! ! ! 1 I I 26 IFR12 26 | |||
! I I I ! 1 I I I l 21 EfB M i l I I i ! i ! ! 22 EO 31 1 I I i 1 1 1 i U ITC 32 l 1 1 I i l l 24 ITU 33 1 ! I 1 I I I I 25 1R5 65 I I 1 I I i l- 26 135 82 1 1 1 1 1 I 27 TCl M i i I ! 1 1 1 I i ! ! I I 29 W2 IN 1 I i l i l i I I I ! ! 3 TC) 141 1 I ! I I i 1 1 1 I I I 36 fv2 142 1 1 I I I 1 i i I 31 702 10 1 1 ! 1 : 1 I I i l 12 TCl 104 i l i 1 i i 1 1 1 1 1 3) W2 195 I i i I ! I i i i I 34 TC2 in i l 1 i i i ! ! I 35 ITR1 167 1 1 I i ! I 1 i ! ! % TC2 111 i 1 1 1 I I I i ! 37 TC2 112 I i i t i I I I 33 TC3 113 1 1 I I I I I M TC4 114 I ! I I i 1 44 tR7 115 1 i l 1 1 1 1 41 TCt 131 1 I i i t ! I I I I I I 42 402 132 1 1 I I I I I I I t I l 43 TC) 133 1 1 1 I i l i l I i I 44 K2 134 t i I ! 1 I I i 1 1 45 TC2 135 I I I I I i i I i 44 TCt 1% | |||
i l i t I i l I I i ! 47 TCl 137 I I i 1 1 I t i I i 1 O TC2 133 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43 FC2 IM i i ! I 1 I I i t 54 K2 144 I i : i i ! I t 51 TCl 141 1 I I I I l l 1 1 1 1 52 K2 142 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 53 TCt 143 I i 1 1 i i t I i 1 54 K2 144 i I I I i i I ! $5 702 145 I i 1 1 I I I I M TC2 146 I I I I I 1 I _ | |||
57 T03 147 | |||
! 1 1 1 I i 53 ITk) 143 | |||
: 1 1 1 1 59 IGli 165 | |||
! ! 1 1 1. 64 1411 215 I I I I 61 100 31 1 1 ! 1.. 62 trill NG l 1 +3 1R14 XJ l I l.. 64 1011 414 1 65 TU 49 I i 1 MC M1 1 I 67 TC2 H2 1 : 63 TC3 433 | |||
: 69 143 &?4 FIGURE 4.2.8-3. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT TREE 4.2.8-20 | |||
i j I | |||
( 4.2.9 EXCESSIVE MAIN FEE 0 WATER MAIN TREE i Figure 4.2.9-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in i Figure 4.2.9-2. Figure 4.2.9-2 presents the event sequer,*e diagram for l the excessive main feedwater initiating event. Figure 4.2.9-3 presents l | |||
< the excessive main feedwater frontline, early response event tree, i | |||
; Table 4.2.9-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions j i . used in the event tree. Table 4.2.9-2 is the boundary condition table t i for this event tree. ! | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following an ! | |||
: excessive main feedwater initiating event are the same as those shcwn on j the general transient. ESD. All of these actions are important to , | |||
preventing core damage following an excessive main feedwater initiating ! | |||
event except.the excessive main feedwater action. Top Event MF+ is made ! | |||
a guaranteed failure by ?he initiating event; therefore, the default split fraction MFQ for guaranteed failure is used instead of MFA. | |||
i Long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and . | |||
i containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by excessive main feedwater ; | |||
leads, are shown in the following subtrees: , | |||
- r | |||
, o A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. ( | |||
e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available. l l | |||
e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
I e RVB (see RY2 described in Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available. | |||
e RVC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ! | |||
l ruptured and the BWST i:t not available. . | |||
1 e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HP! cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available. | |||
l | |||
; o BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required | |||
; but HPI flow is not available. | |||
i | |||
~ | |||
e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required ! | |||
and the BWST is not available. l e RT4 (see Section 4.3.9) when reactor trip has failed and all other ! | |||
: alleviating systems have operated correctly. ! | |||
1 ! | |||
, o P.T2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip i 1 and the high pressure injection have both failed. ; | |||
1 e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed, i | |||
lO | |||
\ | |||
1 | |||
, i 1 4.2.9-1 | |||
! 0587G102087PMR l. | |||
O TABLE 4.2.9-1. EXCESSIVE MAIN FEE 0 WATER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL $PLIT FRACTIONS uttautttttttttttuutitttttuttutatutututtutt 7" attutittunu ttults tat s ts ta tt su ttattttu tts tattutat*** | |||
* tits tu TJ D OTS: CC41 TIM. RIT FTACTIN: | |||
TCP SFt!T M(A MT W f# GBT EiB7 FW!'A CC@lf!% | |||
Ett Et;tliM C01191 IE 50 16 RT F si RIETA it:Pt!) U- Un FT F EP ffXTM Co1MT PW in!P(2) N PvA TH 6 71 T(531'( TRIP (3) N h% ET F N F 1 SUCS NT' Ail (M4) K KC NF 9 MCatur 5 tre salem 4A 4$ EF- F N F 49 F TC TE' ENTE WC(K4Y STEM FR!U@ MA 45 % F N F di F U- SJilCIENT ETFIVY FECuiEh7) N 14 4AF U* W) Ettfi$ht LTWiXT FECW1R(1) N IT TC F 4 A $ | |||
IM T4tTTLE fl FLCwm N !$ TC F MF4 F N Esv w m lei al k!C 44 F N PWS (69t 11) kl M:A 49 F SY ffXTM \t!5EL Fall,'M FFA FTi(12) kl NIL EF+ F N F E 0.5N/PW'S SECLCr:4(13) hl MIE Et F N F 9 F5WI;( NoU PN SEC!K1Ai!Atle) ml >!E 50 FN F f( WDOla!E CLE CoCM s'U(15 N PA R F TC F Fi FECCN9Y(16) kV in IT F W Mi A',4!Uitill7) 49 FlW F(f5SM NECT!:9 P N Cill) | |||
+4 >!GM F51535i NECT!:* PWS t!f t19) | |||
N FIXTM COUAT PM Mr NQt) kl MM HiiK51 NEC11 A v.U($Q1) | |||
O i | |||
4.2.9-2 l | |||
f h | |||
I I | |||
I i | |||
i i | |||
I I | |||
? | |||
I 7% ' 9-2. EXCESSIVE FEEDWATER B0UNDARY CONDITIONS l l | |||
l | |||
,i l | |||
1 b v3 .*+0 562 k4 57G 572 574 576 573 '20 'J2 'A 4 '!4 'M 5% !?2 584 54 573 5 in J !44 571 573 575 57/ 579 Sit 533 *i4 !i? Sit fit 593 59 !!4 !60 J iM i 2 3 4 56 7 s 91G 11101314151617 il 19 20 2112 23 :4 23 :e 17 i;9 3G 311213 34 35 M 17 li 79 i i | |||
raf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:*U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
M . . . . . B . 9 . . B . . B . . BB B B B i . B 3 989688. . | |||
kAs. . . . Bi 3. . . . 88 . 98 . 9FF 898 . 8 . . . 6iBF ! . | |||
m . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , | |||
. ..A..u . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., | |||
. a a ] La m . : i E * . =E1 E4 . EF - !c . i *e DEEEF E . j iFCi.:- | |||
...r | |||
: v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i t-i T * . G . . . GGG G GGGGGGG . DD000G3D . "s DGD0DG. I 13?C F ' . C C , C C i . | |||
c . FF , F . F F F FF F F F . FF F F V . l I | |||
AN . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
., .m e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . | |||
:8C . P . . . . a . 3 . 9 . . GM M 9 M 6 . . . . . 9 9 9 1 3 . | |||
* M . . . . . . I' I . . . . B . . . . B B Bi . & 5 . . . I68 i 8 t | |||
~ . .t . | |||
00 3 DL 5 . . E i0 00D D. i 0t ! | |||
. 9DLL D DDE 3DD | |||
:5 s . . . . . s . . . a C > J JJ a J s a J . a J J a i J J J J . | |||
4A . | |||
. r * +1 8a1 d i i e i s 0 BB i . I ! A I i 1 ! t K I I t I r. | |||
. + c.; e. . | |||
. t r t- . | |||
E. e- e c . . . -e a- . E E .- r.t - | |||
E | |||
-!! . . . . . G ) G i GGG SSGG GG GG G i GGi 3 . GGGGGGG. | |||
. f s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i*-i* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:. 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
: . P/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
: a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
di o I I ! ! | |||
I i ! ! . I 1 I i ! ! ! I 1 ! ! I ! ! l ! ! ! ! 1 ! ! ! | |||
GA . i . . I 1 ! . I ! i i I I i ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! I i ! ! ! ! ! ! I ' | |||
IN , i . I - . . . , . . F F . F . F F F . FF iiii F F . | |||
NN G GG. . . . . . . . Gv G. GGG . . GG , GGGGGG. | |||
;tN n . a a . . . n , , * .**g . . n , m a n a n 4 | |||
-S-il . . . . . G . . . . GG GGGGGGG 3G . . G. GGC GGGG . | |||
-:4 . . . . . . 's GGG . G. . . G GG 3 . G GGG . . 33GGG . . | |||
- :- . . . . . . GGG iGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG . GGGSG GG, | |||
*i- . . . . . . . GG9 ) GGGGCGGGGGG GGG GG . GGGGGG G | |||
- d- I . . . . . G 340GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG. GGGGGGG, | |||
., ;v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
- t' I d . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i 4.2.9-3 | |||
O (mus) 1 INIIT 1 " | |||
INE 11 1 1 IIm 2 !I m ? CORI HMCI INIIT 12 | |||
!sIIT 3 SN m 13 | |||
!NIIT 4 tWIIT 6 (CRI MMCI O | |||
!NIIT 14 SEIIT 5 !sIIT 4 2 h"' CORI 14 MCI INIII 9 C07I MMCI IIIIT 19 1 | |||
('"MM* ) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR EXCESSIVE MAIN FEE 0 WATER FLOW 4.2.9-4 | |||
O - | |||
O O A | |||
( UCESS h Hill Yalves fail Open ECSH1 (C00LillG ) 1/27/87 I AUT0. Old HEACTOR jji q7j IRIP Q(Sil.lj or y 'MlAL ' | |||
jl600 PSIG IURBillE \ - | |||
SIQ aL m | |||
IRIP | |||
/ uAi\ | |||
D1 4 | |||
! I __ _L. __ | |||
; / H00 PSIG\ sll' l | |||
\SIGML P 2B l [EA/EB] | |||
i a- ^ l Sll i | |||
20 i | |||
! FIGURE 4.2.9-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR EXCESSIVE FEEDWATER FLOW ; | |||
(Sheet 1 of 14) ' | |||
i i | |||
i i | |||
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ - . . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . _ . . - . _ _ . . _ . _ . _ . ._ | |||
til \ 'Sil \ | |||
k1A/ IB i _1._ Regttired if SCllH25 _ _ | |||
doesnotisolate EFil | |||
/ OPERATOR \ / \ | |||
[IlRCP-1] \ TRIPS RCP'S/ \ SLRDS f | |||
y d 4 4 | |||
'ESTABLISil \[EF- or y EF+wil1failI,D,pttM h water EF+] /, IIPI\ | |||
carrfoverifnotalreao? fa l | |||
[\C0HTHOL EFil" FL0ll +/ | |||
COOL | |||
\.SH7/ hyH+;op.WH1 throttle e EFHflov(ATP1210-3) | |||
\ | |||
E | |||
[IlFil-2 Ilf0-Il or f IERHINATE | |||
\OVERSPEED | |||
/ *- | |||
) | |||
g 1 I OPERATOR TRIPS HFil PilHPS ' | |||
lORSLRDSORHSPS | |||
: ECSH2 /g .ISOLATESFEEDilhTER 1/27/87 Qll\,I L FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 2 of 14) | |||
: O O O | |||
O O O l | |||
/SH. | |||
2 y | |||
REDUCERCS H0 | |||
[TC) | |||
HEAT REM. \ / / | |||
t | |||
/ Exc/ | |||
CD ALREfDY? | |||
(1600PSIG) gigggg | |||
" YES 4 4 l @ 1600psig "~~s._,YES | |||
-[ | |||
~ | |||
j SIGNAL OpenNH217 l | |||
Start second M/U pitmp i | |||
INCREASE ' | |||
\ StartDCandDRsystens | |||
[HP--8] | |||
M/U FLOW | |||
/ (assttned to always ocette) | |||
UProvide continttottsly to seals j p | |||
! SH. | |||
l ECSH3 4 ,. | |||
; 1/27/87 / | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 3 of 14) | |||
1600psig ___ YES signal - | |||
g NO | |||
'HPI SIARIS\ | |||
+ RUNS / | |||
[HP] / | |||
T CLOSE | |||
\ / BUST \ IBII-43 AVAILABLE)[Bil-2] | |||
BilSI AVAILABLE | |||
\ Y | |||
[IH-1]C01b'U/ / /_ | |||
asstinesHin. HUI refill rate F 4 flowline instifficient 'STARI 3RD ,,,\ / MPROVIDE M | |||
\ >/SH.\ | |||
norMally available for 2 HPIPs h'l;jglRifBK-3 \ {jj! ./ \ | |||
H - | |||
Flowthrtt P 1 HPIP 1 PORU/PSYSor | |||
/gg, m | |||
/gg, Sealsis ECSil4 1/27/87 SH. | |||
5A \ 50 SH. | |||
5D 5B Sttfficient l | |||
FIGURE-4.2.9-2 (Sheet 4 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O i | |||
/. | |||
SH | |||
/SH. ECSil5 SH.\ ' | |||
4A , \4C j 4Bj 1/27/87 m , | |||
REDUCE \' / REDUCE M/UFLOW / >4 sHPIPFLOW | |||
/ p [IX-21 l | |||
4 | |||
/ WATER THRU'\YES;Ircs)500F, kRELIEFS tPr-pts:0 | |||
> ; [P0,PU) " | |||
/ 'tjin/, | |||
u | |||
* r?)P-SHUI 0FF) | |||
N0; | |||
/II4 /SIOPHPIPs\ HPIPs(. | |||
FLOWSTOPS j | |||
(RECR4 CLOSEUALUs} 200F SUBG, FaH r | |||
sSH.S | |||
[RC] | |||
4 '4 | |||
/SH. | |||
4 | |||
* Min-flonorMally p \4D i o availablehere liAINI.RCP - | |||
i | |||
/500 F ) | |||
N sinceno1600psig SEAL INTEG'\ Y)-+-:'' C. D.'~> | |||
I-res) signalgenerated, FIIH ICCW / ~~ / | |||
j ( 200F ) [SE-1] | |||
Lu l | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet S of 14) i l | |||
SH. | |||
13 CD + | |||
9pHR R\ CD achieved by itsing IBUs, ADUs,and sprag | |||
[CD) \ COND. / when secondary systen heat ren. Is avail i | |||
BYPASS | |||
\ | |||
block (LO-PRESS ESFs | |||
/ | |||
t p CFIs s | |||
OPEN DROP-\ 3\ | |||
>,/ | |||
\g j;'/ | |||
[HH] LINE YALUES/ | |||
H l 'ALIGNDilR\ | |||
HEAT , | |||
[DH] PUHPS[1GRs/ | |||
EXCH | |||
:AITTOC/bg - | |||
S N ffN -- | |||
i FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 6 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
4 O O O | |||
> ._. T _ | |||
e., rtin ne pttnp to promote Mixing in reactor vessel (RCP i ! | |||
forPISprevention. | |||
- already) no/ | |||
. r-lh BWSI \PDS3x ggg) | |||
AVAILABLE ' | |||
/ | |||
C U | |||
% llANUAL\PDS3x r | |||
HPI $ | |||
! [HP] STARI / 2/3 HPIPs available if H.S m 1/3HPIPsavailableifMS PORU+2HPIh\ PDS 3x | |||
, [P0, OR >" | |||
! PU) 1/2PU+1HPI/1HPIPin30minif1PSU ,, | |||
! _L 2HPIPsifle~ss A SH. | |||
ECSH7 8 | |||
<7'C | |||
'' . D . ~> | |||
l 1/27/87 FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) | |||
. _ __ _ -- - - - - - . _.-------,------_------__su | |||
/4 HI (RECRC) RCSwillrapidly k | |||
'PICY-BACH \ | |||
depressurizeafter core damage dite to RU s YES PDS 4x Melt-throttyh. | |||
RECIhc | |||
[HL-2] ALIGilM'I / gg y/ Sttt ek open relief--> | |||
M rapiddepress,to | |||
$UllP DRAIN PDS\ 4x LPIP discharge press, . LTisstillpossibleif VALUE *4 | |||
[SYJ CLOSED y | |||
/ C2 FAILED, N0 SPRAYS we cane here f m h . | |||
HXsnotreallyneeded | |||
$ [SA/ '0PENSUHP\pps4x J RECIRC sinceS.S.heatren. | |||
SB] YALUES / " | |||
isstillpossible, I Litt ntist keen h;hfNfj IEIs\PDS4X fg I ( 300 F orI ptinp seals g | |||
[DH] PUHPS,HXs f | |||
/ ~' | |||
g | |||
~. | |||
willfail, | |||
< C. D.'_ ) | |||
/SH.\ | |||
ECSil8 . | |||
~ ' | |||
~ ' ' | |||
1/27/87 \9/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 8 of 14) | |||
O O e - - - - | |||
O O O ST 8 | |||
_m ItwilltakeLtpto2weeksto H0 g,iiPI cool? | |||
cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, s.YES httt the press, will still he high. | |||
RESTORE ppg | |||
/HEAIREM SS\g > | |||
; .BEFORE IE / | |||
,c ): ' | |||
t | |||
'CD+DEPR 10 DllR | |||
\ ppg g | |||
>g | |||
[CD] ENTRY o | |||
/ | |||
'BYPASSLO,g | |||
! PRES ESFs / | |||
. ~3 ~ 'SH , | |||
! ECSH9 < f, { _,. | |||
: 1/27/87 $ ~~ -/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 9 of 14) | |||
/SH.\ ECSH10 60r) 9 | |||
[ OPEll i 1/2?/87 - | |||
( | |||
R.B. | |||
j Pttrge and RC drain tank line islateon4psigsignalorRI' fC1/ RB ISOL'I'i\ - | |||
Seal retttrn isolates on 30 psig ONRI Cff> fl0, large liole 02] /' - | |||
YES V0 f,, y C | |||
[CA/ | |||
CB]kgigtt | |||
\/ | |||
N[r'REAC, BLDG,1 a liigli speed 5 ' (REAC, BLDGd /REAC, BLDG,\ | |||
N RBFAN OPEN | |||
)4 yy EA/EB " | |||
(OPEN,N0 SPR AYS | |||
/ | |||
) FANS Ef/ COOLERS | |||
\( 'NANUAL RB \ | |||
[CS] Nanttal if j/ | |||
4 f2 FAN STARI [no4psig signal,p y | |||
(REAC, BLDG,'1 l (SIABLEAI1 COLD | |||
( FAILURE j | |||
)q QSllUID0NN , | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 10 of 14) | |||
! O O O w _ _ -_- _- -- - -_ - -- | |||
O O O M | |||
s s BREARER FAILURE i - - /- YES Turbinetriponreactortripis | |||
, IURBINE hased on breaker position. | |||
\ | |||
IRIP | |||
[II] k / | |||
y 4- 4 b ^ RCS relief cooling is not S.S. SIEAlf\ - ~. | |||
i 6: | |||
RELIEF / | |||
k'.' C. D, ~) | |||
sufficientto | |||
~ | |||
ISD] / -' coolthecore, u | |||
/ | |||
HFW \ MF+ | |||
' Lossofsec,sys, RA HF- Puer drops rapidly with HI'h inventorg | |||
[MF] \_MPBACK_ | |||
y increasingRCStenp. k]HR/in 26 nins, i | |||
i __ / | |||
l' SH- DoeslackofMFWchangeHPIPorPSUorEFWsuccesscriteria? | |||
ECSH11 1/27/87 \ 12 | |||
; FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 11 of 14) l 1 | |||
IT. | |||
11 i | |||
/ EFHFL0lj\ EF+ | |||
IN5SEC.S) </~' - jifl3 Willgetto11in, | |||
,EF] | |||
t / EF- ''-!_'D____V QilR/ in about i nin. | |||
2/3PORY\ | |||
orPSys | |||
[P0,PY1 OPEN n | |||
/ | |||
c | |||
, I gggy k.PDS3x g; | |||
/ | |||
[gg] N0 SPRAVS n | |||
4PSIG 1 | |||
[CA/ gigggg | |||
\, PDS 3x p:;,, C. D. ~> | |||
~ - | |||
CBJ / ~- | |||
t ECSill2 /. tH 1/27/87 \ -13 FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) 9 - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ | |||
9 e | |||
O O O | |||
/SH.\ | |||
\12/ " | |||
l t Oli 4 PSIG SIGilAL | |||
\ | |||
'AUT0 ^ ~- | |||
HPI \. Ili 30 SEC. /HAIIVAL - | |||
SA HPIP K C.D.> | |||
[Hp-1] | |||
i I | |||
y N | |||
/ [ LIP-3] ACIDATION . | |||
~ | |||
'PR0YI)E HPIP HIN | |||
\ - | |||
K_'C.D,~y llPIPs httrattp against pressttre | |||
; [Hg) FLOW / ~_' | |||
~- | |||
- spike ) their shtttoff head | |||
! .- t . | |||
!E FORU+PSYs \ / \ | |||
!" RECLOSE / KLOCA) | |||
! [RC] / \ / | |||
b REDUCERCS l -- | |||
1600 psig signal eqttivalent actttation' HEAT REMOYAL has already been prodttced 4 psig signal | |||
[IC] | |||
so overcooling is uninportant | |||
; 4_____ | |||
! ECSill3 SH. | |||
! 1/27/87 6 FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 13 of 14) | |||
~~- | |||
, __ i! | |||
c',~ C , D .') - | |||
~- | |||
' no | |||
'InotPDS) (no,t PDS') | |||
B,C,D/ | |||
~~'SY,": _ YES > '\ | |||
nB ) h__ YES r N0 f C1.9 ; | |||
REACIOR\ "i0 f pps 3 | |||
[C1/ BUILDING j/REACIOR\, | |||
s BUILDING "y l | |||
\ | |||
C2] ISOLATION / [CS]\ SPRAYS / | |||
2__ YES SB,3 $ | |||
h_YES J . | |||
' g 'y - | |||
'REACIOR | |||
\ r - | |||
s[F1/ | |||
I | |||
~ F2] | |||
BUILDING FAN C'I/RS/ [gg)\ | |||
[0PENSUHP URYES | |||
( | |||
PDS nD ) ( | |||
/ REKIOR BUILDING | |||
\g y | |||
[CS]\SPR$YS / | |||
" is__DH,_YES y REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING , | |||
%LIGH$UN \ | |||
\ | |||
' [ PDS 3 | |||
[CS] SPRAYS | |||
/ DllRHEAT | |||
[pll] ,EXCHANGERS/ | |||
t | |||
( nC J | |||
U T t | |||
[ | |||
3 / | |||
') ') [ | |||
I ECSill4 [ PDS nn PDS PDS | |||
) PDS PDS ; | |||
1/27/87( ) ( nB ) ( nA ) ( nC 1 ( nll / | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 14 of 14) e O O | |||
tunuutustuutitartterstrtstatatt*stitatutttratutattutut**t**stattuttataatstatututtauttta | |||
+ | |||
Jtttunnuttututut**sts EIC RT IF TT R 50 TC EF- EF+ TH F9 PV 8V RC m E RE W ifB IfA Inl HI EQ 00 STATE EQ (0) (C) (B) d)(6) (D) (C) '(E) 1 I i ! Ill i I i 191 11 2 S 2-1 I I i l l I i 1 1 I I I 3 A 3 I I I I i i ! ! ! ! I I I- 4 9 4 1 1 1 I I I I I i i ! l 5 3 5 i 1 l l 1 i I i i i i i 6 A 6-1 I I i 1 I I I I I i 1 7 8 7 I I I i l i i ! -l 1 l- 8 S S 1 i i i l i l 1 I i i i 9 4 9 1 i l l I I I I I I I l It - B 16 - | |||
1 I I I I I I I I I I 11 B 11 I i 1 -l i l l I i i 12 C 12 1 1 1 ! I 1 1 1 1 13 $ 13 1 1 I I I t i I i 14 8 14 I I I I I I i l i 15 C 15 1 1 I I I I I l .. .. . . . . . 16 IFR1 16 I ! I I I I I 61 31 1 17 A 28 I I I I I I I I i l 1 I i 18 B 29 1 1 1 ! ! l 1 I i 1 1 1 19 A 36 I I i 1 1 1 1 I t- 1 I ! 29 8 31 I i ! I I I i i i I l- 21 A 32 i ! I I I I I I I I i 1 22 B 33 1 1 ! l I 1 i ! i i ! D 8 M i i I I i i i i i ! 24 C 35 I I I I I I i i 1 25 R/2 36 i l I I i ! ! I 48 26 ilV3 37 1 I i ! i i ! l . . . .. 27 IFR3 38 1 1 1 1 1 l i I . . . 29 IFR16 64 1 1 I I i ! ! I . . . 29 IFR4 75 I i 1 1 1 1 1 M $ U I I I I I I 51 1 1 I I l 31 B 78 I I I I I I I I l l l M S M i ! I I 1 l i i i l i ! ! ! | |||
i l f 33 8 M | |||
! ! l l 34 S 81 I 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 I i- 35 B 82 I I ! l ! | |||
O I I 1 1 1 36 - B 83 1 1 1 1 ! ! I I i 37 C 64 I I I l l ! I 1 33 WA 85 i ! I I I l i 1 i I l 39 EB 86 I I I I I i i ! ! ! 44 KB 87 1 1 l I i 1 1 1 ! il FA M. | |||
I I I ! I I I I I l 42 ER 89 | |||
! I i ! i i I I I 43 EFB 96 1 I i i 1 I i 1 14 EC 91 1 I i l 1 1 l- . 45 IFR2 ~ 92 1 ! I l l I I I . 46 IFRA 160 l i l i l 1 I I i 1 1 I 1 | |||
. 47 E8 102 I l_ . 43 WC 163 I ! ! 1 I ! i . 49 IFR4 164 1 1 1 I 1 I . .. .. .. . .... . 54 IFRS 106 I I I I l 51 IFRit 135 I I I I I I il I . 52 IFR4 154 I I I i 1 1 1.. . . . 53 IFR6 152 I I ! ! I I 54 IFRS 213 I I l 1 I 55 IFRS 242 i ! ! I . . 56 IFRS 271 1 1 1 . . . 57 IFRll Me | |||
! 1 1.. . . | |||
58 IFR!l 576 1 ! | |||
1 | |||
: 5) IFR7 84 4 64 RT4 913 1 1 1 1 ! 8l 61 RT3 919 I I I I I 62 RT2 929 I I I I 91 63 RT3 921 I I I I I | |||
64 IFP3 922 I I I 65 IFR9 M4 I i 1 I l-66 IFR) %6 I | |||
67 IFR) 928 | |||
. 64 1FFS 9M | |||
+ ( ls ifotate defwlt $ slit fractices eith are ret A. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.9-3. EXCESSIVE MAIN FEE 0 WATER EVENT TREE 4.2.9-19 I | |||
l . | |||
(qj 4.2.10 TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEE 0 WATER MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.10-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.10-2. Figure 4.2.10-2 presents the event sequence diagram for the total loss of main feedwater initiating event. Figure 4.2.10-3 presents the total loss of main feedwater frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.10-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.10-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a total loss of main feedwater initiating event are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. All of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a total loss of main feedwater initiating event except the sufficient main feedwater action. Top Event MF- is made impossible by the initiating event; therefore, the default split fraction MFQ for guaranteed failure is used instead of MFG. Long term high and lou pressure sump recir:ulation actions and containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a loss of main feedwater leads, are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. | |||
e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available. | |||
A Q e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RVB (see RY2 described in Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available, e RVC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is not available, o BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available. | |||
e BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required but HPI flow is not available. | |||
e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required and the BWST is not available. | |||
e RT4 (see Section 4.3.9) when reactor trip has failed and all other l alleviating systems have operated correctly. l l | |||
e RT2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip i and the high pressure injection have both failed. l e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed. | |||
O ! | |||
4.2.10-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
O TABLE 4.2.10-1. LOSS OF FEEDWATER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS tunt ttttutte ntttntututtit**ttrinttnuttttuttut t ut ttutttnitt t tttu t s titus t at tt tttuttttt s utn a nts tuttt t u tut ** | |||
TOP nais: CCt0ITICML SPLIT FFXTIM: | |||
TCP SFt!T lifR. Yd & TOP DDT GUT FRXTION C7CITIM RT FEXTOR Tli!P IE SO O RT F RT FIXim T91P(!) TC TC6 W+F FF FEXT'A C0CUaT PM TRIP (2) NI HE I iW F TT i(F21T TRIP (3) TT tie RT F SD SECCtC#Y STEM FfLIEF(t) TH M TC F MF+ % E)255!W M;N FEEWTEMS) TH ThB W+F TC TU31MTE SECCPC4T STEM FELIEF(6) TH M TT F W- 9fFICIEkT MIN FEEMia(7) P0 P04 Td S EF- SEFICIDT DC4fNCY FEENTEn(E) N NA TH 8 EF+ W Et25514 ES62XV FE2WTER(9) FV WA TH B TH Tf9TTLE fl FLMit) W M RTFP0 F P9 PCR/ (iE W 11) W R4 TH F F9 F FV F?4 WGs(12) N R,E ik F M F W F W FfXiCA W3. FAILWI FO FTS(13) W RJ EF+ F M F K PAV/F?4 CLCM(It) W P4 EF+ F F9 F W F rA (591.TM Eiitit!!4i MI+tLM15) W WF EF- F F9 F SE WTEFEIATE CLOV.D Cf/AI% WiD(16) W M EF- F P0 F W F RE FfMEM(17) W R6 50 F F9 F W EVST inAIU6tE(18) W R4 $0 F N F W F 49 HM F5E5aFi NECTI(ai PM C(13) W R.S TC F 4A MM MISSff NECTION PMS A & 6(24) W WJ rF+ F N FIXi(A OXUAT PM SEtt 10.(21) W RN TT F "I MGH MESS.Fi NECTION VfLWS(22) K Rf.C NF FI C00M TO F11(23) N M PF- F ? - F E4 M 50 F 4A W6 EF- F N F fB F 4A 193 ET+ F W F if9 F WA W6 10 F N F MS F N 12 WAF N N, TC F 4 A $ | |||
N !@ TC F f A F H! HIC fAF H! HA HS F HI HIE EF* F N F H! HE EF- F FV F O | |||
4.2.10-2 | |||
. --. -- . . . . ~ . . . - _ - _ - _ _ _ | |||
i l | |||
l I | |||
I t i I i | |||
i t | |||
i i | |||
TABLE 4.2.10-2. LOSS OF FEEDWATER B0UNDARY CONDITIONS f I | |||
f 1 | |||
I t ll O W *!;0 122 124 126 1:3 130 l '2 114 th 11S 10 142 144 144 149 150 1:2 154 155 !?) | |||
. .;1 .23 1:5 1;' 13 131 133 125 137 l'd 141 143 144 147 148 151 153 1!5 144 1;9 9 53S= 1 ; 3 4 54 7 i 91011121314151617181F 20 ;12; ;3 :4 25 ;$ 27 ;S 09 20 313; 13 24 ;5 ".4 27 ;$ ;4 | |||
<-..f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
.~.P T*MT . . . . . . . B . 6. . . . B . B B888 99 . E E5 ti Ie5. | |||
. 43. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . f 94.. | |||
s !s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
W- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I UET- , =DD==. ; IE. . n . 4 En E% . EFF EE E . E a n D EEF i v ..+ | |||
W. F F . F F F F . . . F F F F . . . F FF F , , F F F F F F a F F F . | |||
3:M i V . . F . , F F F . F . F . . F . . c F F F c,F F F , F 9 5 i ? | |||
WJY , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
W4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
E- . . . . s . . . . . L . . F . t. . . . F L LL - - . . . . . . . . L L . | |||
;W . . . . . . 9 6. . . . . l . . . B5iB . i i i i B ti . t | |||
:IMi ; ; ? . D DD. IEL t00 . O i LDi . 8DDDDDL0DCD f | |||
= ,; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
Mi. i | |||
~ : ;? . . J . . > > . e J J JJ JJ J a . . J J > !C i a a J . | |||
= ! , 9 4 6 1 1 1 I t i ! ! 1 * . | |||
. 4 34 | |||
. . s . . < < r B6 . l ! . . I 1 1 . | |||
cE !. EE IE i ( ! .. s.E | |||
. .e.; : : : . . . . . . . . . . a. . . . . . | |||
'e | |||
. . . . . 4 CC CC a i. t 4 4 4 4 GSG04 : C06. 4 0 . i ;G | |||
:v::n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
ii3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
-., - [ | |||
* i*- | |||
. . . . . . . . GGGG . GGGGS00 0 C tl G GDD GEGD* C0 , | |||
. . ,-v- | |||
. > . . . . . G.> u >> > -> > 's G u. u . 3 D e. v s a D. , >u. v. .s D 3 | |||
. a. . | |||
*-e'. . | |||
*, . . . . . . G G G. G6 600GG . DDD GG &D. GLG* C D5. | |||
:n.:-) . F , F . F . F + F , F GF . F . . F F F F F F . F : F F F F F : . | |||
8:C . F F . F F . F F F F , FF . F . F F F F F F ,F F F , F F F F F | |||
.'. iJ d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
Od . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
s | |||
* s.J4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
.i; d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
.W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I | |||
: .G: t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s | |||
. . . i | |||
: e. es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ' | |||
: .'.J e . . . . . . | |||
i ;,raj . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t | |||
. . . ..v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
.Es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; | |||
.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
* ,. W . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
l | |||
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j Mie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ! | |||
: .r - s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ) | |||
. s. . | |||
6 . a .. | |||
4 I . .. . .: 4. .e. a, . I . , | |||
a . . . . | |||
4 s. .,4 . . 1 I | |||
44 I ! . ! 1 I i i . 1 1 1 i ! I 1 i ! I I I | |||
. . ..m. . . . . . | |||
I I . | |||
. . . . 4 I . 1 1 | |||
. !. I i . . . .a . | |||
. t.6 | |||
. . i I i | |||
D. . | |||
* , . . . F | |||
* 2 : F : : . , : : : . : , | |||
... . 's) .2 2 9 . 't "2 . 1 s ') 2 2 ; . L & | |||
* .*8. ~ . . | |||
. .J J .J | |||
'o 'l 'l 6 . . .J | |||
't J .* .1 uG t | |||
e- e , . . . 4 J ') ) . U . . . ') . | |||
J | |||
* G . , J .J l | |||
. . . . , . . . . I | |||
.b %* 'J .B i .i .2 3 Q .3 ? 'l J -4 's .1 2 2 | |||
. . . G *> } i }G G s G G } } t | |||
*.t* . . r . 1 1 .2 | |||
. | |||
* 1 4 2 19 il 2 'J 4 .) ) J J .J J 2 . | |||
4.2.10-3 | |||
O ThU 1 | |||
ix m i ams 1 i Sa m 2 SMIIT t 1 | |||
SRm 10 CCRI PAMCI INm 3 3NIIT 12 1 1 l | |||
IN m 4 (CPI I4 MCI 1R m 13 1MIIT 5 13IIT 11 l | |||
..m . __ | |||
l l | |||
l se m 7 i | |||
(cetonutm) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.10-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER 4.2.10-4 | |||
O O O | |||
/ 10SSOF 'T | |||
; (nainfdwtr/ | |||
. -cattsed hg loss of IA i or SSCCW or POWDEX failttre | |||
/ | |||
: r. /v -RI cattsed hg anticapatory IRIl ( REACIOR \ " tri?.if FilP's trip off i T IRIP | |||
/ \^ or ugh RCS pressttre I ' | |||
i 5 IURBINE \ r.. | |||
5 [II] s IRIP | |||
/ | |||
f | |||
! [SD] | |||
(IS.SIEAN\ | |||
NRELIEF / | |||
r- | |||
"' /k | |||
\ pool [EA,EB] | |||
kh!Itio\ | |||
signalf* | |||
y ::; ::: | |||
SH i | |||
2 I | |||
LOFWSH1 FIGURE 4.2.10-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRM TOTAL LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER l | |||
'SH \ /IPlh I/ excessive \I coo .c oWn 0 | |||
[EF-1)er,tablish Actions) t6 (1)excessivecooldoWn | |||
[EF-5](se w flow / already ocettred I | |||
Actions tds | |||
[EF+] (pr. event exqes- | |||
\siveefW/ | |||
E T 9 | |||
go facnonj t'o | |||
[TC-lh['eNk reNkl \(1)' | |||
Iran ecs ' \/ \ | |||
o ,,, | |||
9VES [jynfl16g8# | |||
s ii | |||
/ . | |||
/SH , V , | |||
\3 " " | |||
LOFWSH2 1/28/87 ricuac 4.2.10-2. (sneet 2 or 13) e O 9 | |||
O O O (1)1600# signal LOFWSH3 l | |||
H\ (2)excessivecooldown 1/28/87 2/ - | |||
yes (3)hPegh<Pipwinc.ow(nakttp pos | |||
) / | |||
cooldown ybelow HPI | |||
) ':- | |||
oPenMu-y-2'?StaP1: second 4 | |||
actions Ta Mit PMP start dc + c.P systems l dncPgtse Ma,iar - | |||
'!!P OW - | |||
l:: u j no(fA (*)Manuallystart3rdhpiPMpfroM BWSI \ ,.. | |||
! e BWSI,startDC,DRsysteMs no(![p | |||
'AVAILABLE/'- | |||
h | |||
~ | |||
g r.. I_ | |||
l I | |||
\ [HR] Proylde \, [:: | |||
; throttle \ /roide. | |||
P / (*) | |||
M;.n1MitM i | |||
Mapeup | |||
/ | |||
\corIntting~\ | |||
Ma:<ettp | |||
/ | |||
( | |||
\ | |||
' ..ow y | |||
/ | |||
I | |||
\] | |||
:: ::] | |||
:J jAci: ions th) | |||
, /Peiuce ,.. s pec,uc,e | |||
; e ; -> \g(ettP i | |||
/ , | |||
y 1P1 glow / | |||
u I | |||
E\/ ::: | |||
6 E (l") (ll) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 3 of 13) i i | |||
SH 3a SH) 3h SH 3c (SH) s 3d, Waterthrobsh ges b ,. | |||
y [P0,Eqvigr9{ | |||
p t | |||
9 / g | |||
" no 6: | |||
\ b | |||
(*) / | |||
[RC] | |||
/ V E kinNyrityMaigtaids I s | |||
& (m on.( | |||
/ | |||
t.: | |||
Ops q V V | |||
;. 4 | |||
'~~- . | |||
p' < C.D. : | |||
c (1)Minflow _ | |||
l H | |||
(*) stop HPI ptinps close reliefs LOMSH4 f5 before ) 200F sithcooling 1/28/87 FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 4 of 13) l O O O | |||
O O O gg gpfg '"7s c3jtcheivfdbyitsing UY 5 ac.Y 4 00J 100,d . | |||
[sec,000,5+spraysilng.availabl 1: | |||
T. In,Jept10n WilIL 00 .0n | |||
)pl cog,.ing,tintle n a | |||
\ | |||
[' (1) p lin11.. aWst eXIlatts .ec. | |||
\ / | |||
I ' | |||
V h9 Pass g 499ha9R PDS2x ecirca.gaiat h block r CFI,S (:L.Spait(res low Press f actions / | |||
C , :l | |||
? 'acticgs tA | |||
> /HPf1 i [HM] 0[@eIIs~/ | |||
3 \000) | |||
U V | |||
( | |||
i /gj \ 'SH O | |||
\6a) <i{f4(> | |||
! LOFWSH5 (1) cooldown and depress to 1/28/87 che entry conc.ifions FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 5 of 13) 1 | |||
/SH"\ SH \ | |||
E y -a | |||
/a;.ign ihA r;> sitMp | |||
[pgj (PMPs, .ieapp PDS 2X _ | |||
drain ulvs [39j sexc.1 angel) _qq s_, c osec. | |||
I)M$61' iil_.Y lons Opell sll c | |||
[C1' C2]sonRT | |||
(/00nl:a10Me' 150..at10n pecire v}py | |||
[3Rj b | |||
0?ls H (C0 T kENI pH | |||
\7 LOFWSH6 1/28/87 FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 6 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
l O O O | |||
/8H \ | |||
\6 / | |||
N0 / | |||
N0 | |||
\, | |||
:::}'[ | |||
T 's. HS I | |||
(4R rh press)) | |||
actitation . | |||
91gna.actlpns | |||
. I b E feactorhldhi | |||
! [F1,T2] | |||
ancoolers/ | |||
l | |||
::] | |||
:?eaHor all1,c,Ing \j i.: | |||
/;seactor 3 spra9s / l\fal ,ttre]lli,.c,Ing / | |||
l | |||
?g . | |||
[CS] | |||
l LOFWSH7 | |||
/stableat3 1/29/87 (cold shtttd)wn I | |||
j FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 7. of 13) l 1 | |||
? | |||
RI IURBINE . | |||
TRIP I | |||
porv coq:ing s SECONDARY}\ | |||
SYSTEM PDS 3X r. 'CORf _, not stif-1cien "Ul "' | |||
to | |||
[SC] SIEA' GLI:9' ' '3%GE'' | |||
t I Z - | |||
acti!ms estatis1 etu:to EF- | |||
\ PDS 3X ,. - | |||
-CORf - | |||
[EF] i(low in 5 njfs ::: EF+ '' 300E' p- m , | |||
V ::: | |||
LOFWSH8 SH 1/29/87 9 FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 8 of 13) l | |||
O O O | |||
\ | |||
SH | |||
,4l | |||
[pg'pgj PORU/PSU'k PDS 3X ,.. | |||
2/3OPEN/ | |||
I .. | |||
\ | |||
~ | |||
BWSI PDS3X ,.. - | |||
'' IORE ' J' 3 | |||
y | |||
[BW] | |||
AVAILABLE' | |||
/ no sprays I)AMAGE.- | |||
~~- r I | |||
Mantial attto start iC.R. f '- | |||
; [HP-1] )piin2 mins i T ~ | |||
l SH 10 | |||
) | |||
l LOFWSH9 1/29/87 FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 9 of 13) | |||
l SH 9 | |||
u PORU/PSU'S\ /LO.Cd | |||
[RC] RECLOSE | |||
/ \f C | |||
p u | |||
'ACIIONSTO\ Insignificant | |||
[TC) | |||
REDUCESS | |||
[II / | |||
LOFWSH10 1/29/87 SH 3 | |||
FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 10 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/( HPI c'9.01i.i9 P ,d . f02,5 00 0 alPqr J 500 Peed T * - | |||
s ._ | |||
\ PDS3X - CORE' . | |||
BWSI > | |||
[BW] / ~~ ~- | |||
DAMAGE E T Z PDS3X (naouallys.trt lpl, Pun | |||
[gp] sfongtern/ | |||
I ._ | |||
i Ufp$\ '' YORK''' ,. | |||
/ | |||
IP0,PU] 'open5 ''h_AMAG_E.' | |||
LOFWSH11 i | |||
1/29/87 gg i 5 | |||
) | |||
j FIGilRE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 11 of 13) | |||
) | |||
1 | |||
< CORE ' ',. - | |||
LOFWSH12 | |||
$ ./MAGE 1/29/M I | |||
;7AC"0;' | |||
NilLDING | |||
\ \ ~. | |||
./not P:)S T pA,B,C,oPjD ISOLATION / ' | |||
I . | |||
VES | |||
;;iA C " 0;; LDG . | |||
E . | |||
r not P;)S) 5 r.. | |||
FAN " .T0 | |||
[ COOLERS | |||
/ ( | |||
nB j , | |||
p | |||
[ I ;?eNt0P \ | |||
) | |||
liAC"01 \\ ~. . | |||
f PDS 3 | |||
.)tti .c.Ing s spPays / | |||
BllILDING SPRAYS / "' ( nB j i . | |||
y H r PDS | |||
, [ PDS i r ppg 3 | |||
:sea 0p | |||
( nG j \ pF j i | |||
A. Db | |||
) | |||
.]lll{c.Ing[\ | |||
sSPPaS5 f | |||
v PDS r.. | |||
} | |||
"~ | |||
\ nD j | |||
[SH s13 / | |||
\ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 12 of 13) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O SH LOFWSH13 12 1/29/87 Y[.) | |||
1r 17 ACTIONS \ " | |||
TOOPEN \ ,.. ( PDS i | |||
; SUMP YLUS/ | |||
\ nD j l | |||
~. | |||
. D - | |||
! y Y \ ( | |||
C . , 17 | |||
.190 anc PSD . . | |||
e \ r- f PHS T i | |||
I (iPPLlMP+/ | |||
.1eatXchgr '' | |||
( | |||
nC j l | |||
If i /PDS 3 | |||
! ( DA j l | |||
l FIGURE 4.2.10-2 (Sheet 13 of 13) | |||
sitetstasta u s tatitu tsu nu t uts trals tat t ua n tit u tina tu nnu s s utstis t a tt u s u t tsu tta s i ttaus t u ntz au s u tuuntnu tsts: | |||
s ET ST O T1 SD C+ f( PF. E. E. TH FC N N AC $ M FI F4 4144 N C:1 FI R D0STAtt EQ tt) (0) (O (C) (C) (C) ,C) (F) (0) (C) (F) (C) | |||
! $ 1 i ! i i 6 2 1: I 2 C1 2 1 1 1 i I 3 5 3 1 1 1 1 I i ! I I I I I 4 Cl 4 i ! ! I I ! l 1 ! ! ! 5 A 5 I I I l t I i 1 1 1 6 8 6 | |||
? ! 1 1 1 : 1 1 1 ! 7 5 7 | |||
. t I i 1 I l ! 1 1 1 4 C2 8 I I I i l 1 1 1 ! l 9A 1 | |||
: 1 I i ! ! I I I i 14 0 14 i ! 1 ! l 1 i i ! 11 5 11 1 ! ! I I I I I I l 12 C2 12 1 1 1 1 I i l i I 13 4 13 I t i i 1 1 1 I I i 14 8 14 I i i : I 1 1 1 15 8 .. | |||
I i 1 1 I I I 16 C 16 1 ! t ! I f 17 Kft! 17 1 1 1 8 t I 7: 3; i 18 4 33 1 i I t i 1 I . i 6 19 8 34 I I I I I t i I I ! M A M i i i ! ! t 1 1 I I 21 8 % | |||
: I I I t ! l ! I 22 4 37 | |||
! ! 1 i i l i i I . M 8 'A i 1 : 1 I t 1 I : 24 8 13 1 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! 25 C 40 1 1 I i l i i 1 26 15 9 41 | |||
: 1 i l t i 1 i 27 INC 42 | |||
! ! ! ! i 1 ! 29 ISTd 43 | |||
: ! ! : I i 2) 1A1 69 | |||
! l I I 1 1 I M IF35 85 | |||
: : : 1 I ! 31 IFR2 $7 i l l ! I i 32 VA 173 i 1 i 4 i I 6 ! 4; . : . 33 FB 174 | |||
: i ! ! : 8 I I i l : 34 F4 175 i ! i l 1 ! | |||
l ! i I 35 FB 1 76 | |||
: 1 : I i I I i i '6 J SFA 1 77 | |||
: 1 I I I l : i 1 37 FB 174 I l ! ! ! l ! ! 38 EQ 17) | |||
: i ! l t I ! ! l 39 ffC IM t 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 44 IFA 131 | |||
. l 1 I l l 1 I . ! 41 ifl 182 | |||
: 1 I I : I I I i l 42 60 133 1 1 i i ! ! I i . 43 F4 14 | |||
! I I ! ! I 1 ; : 44 VI IM i l . . I I I I 1 45 fil 136 I i i I i i ! : 46 FC 187 1 1 1 ' i 1 1 47 Ina 1 38 I l ! I I I ii 13 LG.$ 1% | |||
l i 1 i i 1 1 49 [fB 1% | |||
I i i t I I t le EFC 199 I I i 1 I i $1 IFR$ 2te | |||
: 1 ! I i 52 196 N2 i t i . | |||
53 IFR1 211 8 I I I I 6: 1 1 54 5 247 I l i ! I ! l 6 i 1 1 $5 C2 243 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I t ! 56 5 24 ) | |||
I 1 ! : I i ! i i ! 6 57 8 254 I I ! I I I I i W $ | |||
1 1 31 | |||
: : 1 i i . 1 I i 59 8 252 i l I ! ( ! | |||
i l l ! i | |||
! ! 4 C N 1 3 I l 1 1 I 61 $ 29 1 i i 1 1 1 1 1 i 62 C2 35 1 i ! 1 I 63 8 2% | |||
I ! ! I ! I I I t 4 1 i ! ! 1 37 I i l l 65 C 254 | |||
: I . ! : I I 66 IFR5 259 1 i 1 1- 67 afR7 | |||
' N1 I I i | |||
! i 1 68 IG3 331 9 . | |||
1 : 1 1 ' O 106 431 I . I 7e IF4 di,4 71 IFT6 &N I i : | |||
1 1 I i | |||
72 ITIS 647 | |||
! l 73 IR6 fv5 74 IFE9 414 I | |||
75 Rio ?*: | |||
. . te; 76 5t3 933 1 6 1 I i 77 Ri2 M4 4 I i ! 1ll 73 RT3 93 1 : i 79 an;# % | |||
t ! | |||
64 anll t2 | |||
$1 IFill 169 2 ani t*2 | |||
$J IFEll led | |||
. _ . ~ _ _ - . - , | |||
O FIGURE 4.2.10- 3. LOSS OF MAIN FEEDWATER EVENT TREE 4.2.10-18 | |||
4 l | |||
4.2.11 REACTOR TRIP MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.11-1 presents the reactor trip frontline, early response event I tree. Table 4.2.11-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split ' | |||
fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.11-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a reactor trip initiating event are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. All of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a reactor trip initiating event except the reactor trip ' .; | |||
action itself. Top Event RT is not required and therefore the default i split fraction RTD for guaranteed success is used instead of RTA. Unlike the general transient event tree, the reactor trip main tree considers ; | |||
cases where the reactor coolant system must be cooled down in order to be ! | |||
fixed. These cases are indicated by failure of Top Event FX; the i fraction of the time when such cooldown is required is indicated by split ! | |||
fraction FXA, The cooldown actions and long-term high and low pressure l sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, when ! | |||
required, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage > | |||
scenario initiated by a reactor trip leads, are shown in the following , | |||
subtrees' ! | |||
e CD1 (see Section 4.3.8) when cooldown is required and both trains of I HPI are available. ; | |||
e CO2 when cooldown is required and only one train of HPI is avaiable, e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. ! | |||
e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available. . | |||
e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RVB (see RV2 described in Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available. | |||
e RYC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is not available. | |||
e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available. j e BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required but HPI flow is not available. l e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required l and the BWST is not available. : | |||
l l | |||
l 4.2.11-1 ! | |||
0587G102087PMR I | |||
__ __ _J | |||
O TABLE 4.2.11-1. REACTOR TRIP TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS tut **u tututttttt ttuutut* *ututtu tuttuo t t* | |||
* t tut tuun tu t tut tttutttttu ttu t tttt t ttu tt u t tt ttt tit t t t ttt tta tuttutt T7 Emis: C00li!M. SFtli FMCTICMi; TOP Sit!T AEst. VM MTOPEDT EDT FMCTIM CUClilWS ET FfACTM TRIP IE 50 508 RT F RT FfXi% TR:F(l) TC TCd T+F F# FIACTM C0Q1.47 P# TRIPt2) T- TJ TC F TT TW514 TAIF(3) TT TTC RT F SO SECCW STEM E!ET(4) TH T4 TC F PF + 4) E123514 M14 FEENTUts) TH T4 T+F TC TU3NTE SECOC4f STEM Ellr(6) TH T4 TT F T- SJFICIEhT $!N FEEMTUt7) P0 PGA TH $ | |||
EF- 9FFICIDT DEFDCY FEEM'UtS) P0 PGA T4 8 Ef+ W EIGS$14 ETHOU FEENTGt9) W PYA TH B TH T4tTTJE WI FLW(16) N P.9 RT F M F P0 FW/ Wi W 11) R/ R.0 TN F P0 F N F?4 GEN 5(12) N PE TH F M F W F N FIXi% VES Fl!LJf FM PT5(13) W PE EF+ F P0 F K PCP//PI/S CUME(14) W RW - EF+ F N F W F T UtuTM Esit&IM3 'UMMIS) W PE EF- F P0 F SE %iUS! ATE CLOSO Coral % W'ER(16) N F% EF- F M F N F RE FICWERfil7) W PE 9FNF EV E4T A,4!LMtf(19) N P4 50 F N F W F 49 hlirt FRE55L51 ICECTIM PM Ct19) W R1 TC F 44 HIM F'f195f ICECTION PN$ A n $l29) N WJ T+F N FIXTM CXtMT PM IUt N.(21) W RA TT F HI HIM F51395E 1%JECTIM Vf0ES(22) K KC P0 F FI COMnN TO Filt23) N EW T- F EF- F W h6 50 F WA Wi EF- F N F 49 F HA 41 EF+ F N F HS F TA W$ SOFW F49F IM !M TAF ikJ INC TC F WA S N N) TC F 44 F HI HIC 4AF M1 HIA 49 F N1 h!E ET+ F W F H! HIK EF- F W F H1 Hit $0 F W F O | |||
4.2.11-2 | |||
_______s, I I | |||
a l | |||
b l | |||
, t i | |||
l l TABLE 4.2.11-2. REACTOR TRIP BOUNDARY CONDITIONS i | |||
l. | |||
I 344 W 14 50 3'2 ta V ND ':: E4 m ?;9 ID 1:4 3h ill 140 34 3'A :'4 3M I | |||
!!: 323 .' 3:7 33 331 3D iM 517 2M 341 34) 244 30 349 Mt 33 :*.5 144 1.4 J it; ! 34 * | |||
* 7 8 910111; 1314 d 161718 t' ;0 21 :2 23 :4 25 :6 27 28 D 30 3122 33 :4 M 16 37 34 M J | |||
9.. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
1 WU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
T*Ait . . . . . . . . . 3 . 8 . . . l.. 8 . . 8888i9. 8I98IIl8. . | |||
. GD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
l | |||
' W . . C . . . C. . CC. . . . . % . . . C4 4 4 % CC . C. . . 4 4 C4 N . | |||
"A.. | |||
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: I 1 i . I 1 1 63 8 N I . t I t t t I 64 8 37 | |||
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. t 74 IG9 tid I 75 Rie M2 i I i 1 . 14; 76 RI) b3 1 ! : 1 i 77 ti2 tM I I . I !!: 74 ti) in | |||
: ! ! . 79 1All 94 1 1 : I W 1411 in i !! Ulti lau I I 82 1911 law 2 1 | |||
43 1Tt11 1m4 | |||
. _._t_._..._. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.11-1. REACTOR TRIP EVENT TREE 4.2.11-4 | |||
t | |||
-i i-i 4.2.12 TURBINE TRIP I4AIN TREE Figure 4.1-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in , | |||
Figure 4.1-2. Figure 4.1-2 presents the event sequence diagram for the turbine trip initiating event. Figure 4.2.12-1 presents the turbine trip frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.12-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. ' | |||
Table 4.2.12-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
fiost of the alleviating actions that will take place following a turbine trip initiating event are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. All of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a turbine trip initiating event except the turbine trip action itself. Top Event TT is not required; therefore, the default l split fraction TTE for guaranteed success is used instead of TTA. | |||
Long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and ; | |||
containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant j damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a turbine trip leads, i are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available. | |||
e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available. ! | |||
e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. ! | |||
Q y e RYB (see RY2 described in Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has I | |||
i ruptured and the BWST is available. l e RYC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and.the BWST is not available. | |||
e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available. [ | |||
t e BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required l | |||
. but HPI flow is not available. ! | |||
e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required ! | |||
and the BWST is not available. ! | |||
e RT4 (see Section 4.3.9) when reactor trip has failed and all other i alleviating systems have operated correctly. l l | |||
e RT2 (see the 8 subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip , | |||
and the high pressure injection have both f ailed. ' | |||
e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both f ailed. ) | |||
i 1 | |||
4.2.12-1 ) | |||
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O TABLE 4.2.12-1. TURBINE TRIP TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS m n n ""m uunttttutttututu ttutututut tttts tittututtuu t tuttitut ttuts tttt tt ts t a ttituu tunuts ut tut t t tt t tu s T& ESTS: Cte0ITIN. Ali FMCTICki: | |||
77 Ali ER VM CFT7 EOT EST FMCTICM (CtCIT10tS RT FOCTA n!P IE 50 T6 AT F AT ETM TElF(li TC TC6 T*F FP FfXTM C0127 PW TRIP (2) T- TJ TC F TT TJSIE TRIF(3) TT Tit RT F 50 SECCWY STEM E!U(4) TH T4 TC F T+ hc E CEislW Mit FEEN. TERT 5) N T4 T+F TC TU.91WE SECCWY SrtM ele (6) N T4 TT F T- SHICIEhY V.I4 FEVTER(7) P0 MA N$ | |||
ET- SEFICIEhi DOffKY FEEMIER(8) M MA TH 8 U+ 0 E CES$14 ETJGEC FiLVIERt3) FY WA N6 N TETTLE W! FLW(14) N P4 RT F P0 F 90 K64 Wiki(ll) W P/0 N FP0F W P3YS WEN. 3(12) W R4 N F N F FV F W Fii4TM VES FAIUff FW PTS (l)) W R5 U+ F F0 F M PFi/FSS CLME(14) W R4 EF* F M F W F MR JIMiM Eiitit!&ES PIW(%t15) N R5 U-FP0 F SE !%TUS!ATI CLMED CalNG WiU(16) W P4 U-FM FW F Fi ifC0&f(17) W R5 50 F P0 F h EviT M!UetE(18) W R4 50 F P0 F W F 49 HIW4 F5ESSFi 14JECTICH PM Cil3) W R4 TC F 4A H!v FCESSIE NECTIM PMS A n 6C4) W WJ T*F N ETM CA:AT PM SE4. !W (21) W RA TT F HI kIM HIS3Ji IklECTIA vuSC) K KC P0 F FI CO.G4h TO FII(M) W M T- F EF- F EW N8 50 F WA Wi EF- F W F 41 F fA fi EF* F W F WS F WA W$ S0 F W F 49 F 141 1% WAF N INC TC F W A 5 14J IW TC F H A F N1 WIC 44 F HI HIA 49F H! HIE EF* F W F HI HIE EF- F W F kl H:E SO F W F | |||
+ ( )s tNitate def esit salit f racti:n #tch are ret A O | |||
4.2.12-2 | |||
e - .. _._. - ~ __.~.- - -.-._-. ~ - - _-.-.-~_.--- - ~ - .-._.- -.__....--.- -. - -- - .-. | |||
I l i | |||
l t 1 | |||
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1 l | |||
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l i | |||
TABLE 4.2.12-2. TURBINE TRIP B0UNDARY CONDITIONS 1 | |||
i i, I 1 I n | |||
iP I | |||
i I 64 at O 44 2 6'4 M6 611 6M 6?2 654 656 sta a) M2 644 Me 651 6N d' C4 M6 634 3 I 641 643 44$ 647 69 451 653 455 657 65) ut %) 44 M7 66 7 61 7 63 4 75 t:4 46) 5F SSS: 1 2 34 56 7 4 i LO 111213141516171419.N t ;2 *3 ;4 M 26 27 Of 2710 3132 3314 35 36 U 19 39 | |||
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T'ETT . . ..................................... | |||
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9 ie . C. . . . . C. . CC. .. . . 4 . . . C4 m4 9 CC. C . . . mN C% N . | |||
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8 . . . . . . . . . . i i . . . . 8 F * . . . . 8 r . t | |||
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l -:t-; . . . . . . . . OG GGG 0000e66 505s00 sGG . 2 0 0 G S i G , | |||
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l 4.2.12-3 1 | |||
1 4.... . , _ _ _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . - __ -------..-.-.-.__.~w-.,_,.e _ , , - _ - _ ~ - , _ e | |||
titttattitt31utstt'.1111 stittttisitstiastsattilstatttttttuttatattist!!statatttttlttutsiintittltittititittistattut31stitt:188348 li A1 $7 TT 50 O TC T- (f- (Fe id M PV H RC 91 2 Rt id 44 44 N hl FI $(Q N siA*I St9 | |||
@ it * (6) (C) (C) (C) (C) IF) @ (C) tF) (C) 1 $ 1 | |||
$ 8 . . 1 : . 2. Il 1, 2 C1 2 l 1 l l ! I 1 1 3 $ 3 I I 1 i i t I ; I I : 4 (21 4 l l . ! l 6 1 1 1 1 : 5 A i 1 ! ! ! l t I ! ! ! I 6 4 6 I I I i 1 i i : i l 7 $ 7 1 I I I i i 1 I . i 4 C2 4 I i 1 L 1 1 1 : : 1 1 4 9 i 1 I : I ! t i 6 le i le i t ! ! : I 1 I 11 5 11 | |||
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! l i i t i t t i i 1. 21 8 % | |||
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! l : I ! I i i 27 P.C 42 1 1 ! t l l t 29 IR3 43 i l i ! ! 29 Ifil 69 | |||
: I 1 l i ! 30 Inl (6 I l l l l l 31 FR 41 | |||
! ! 1 1 I I 72 if4 173 1 l ! ! . 6; ; 4; 6 1 1 33 EF) 1 74 | |||
: i i ! ! ! I 1 14 VA 175 | |||
: i l I I I : 1 1 i 35 EF) 176 I i ! l : ! I ! % (fA 177 l l 1 1 ! ' | |||
! ! I 6 37 [fl 1 73 l l 1 I I 1 ! ! ; M Ifl 179 I . l l l l t i i M (FC lie | |||
: . l 1 : : 1 : at IFA til 1 1 l 1 1 ! ! 6 . . 41 fft !?2 i I 1 1 I I I 42 F) 133 | |||
. . i i ! I I . 43 ETA IM | |||
! I i l 1 l . . 44 14 IM e . : 1 . l ! ! 45 IIB 186 i ! . I i 46 FC la? | |||
: I . ! : : 47 Ina IM i i l i 1 i i I L3 tR5 1% | |||
i ! ! I t ! l 49 E6 IM i i ! ! ! l . W VC in 1 : : : . : I 51 Ins ow I ! I i ! ! | |||
52 1N 242 l . I I I M pl D1 | |||
: I l . I 8: I 6 54 5 247 I I I ! I l I i & i i M C2 !s8 1 1 1 I l l t I ! ! % $ 249 i : : i I i ! I i 1 1 57 i N I I ! l t I i ! i M $ 31 i : I : : 1 1 : I 59 8 252 I i I : ! I I 64 C 29 | |||
! l l l ! l l 61 $ 254 1 l l 1 I l l . I i t 62 C2 2% | |||
! : : I i l l 1 63 0 256 I I ! ! l t I I 64 9 257 1 . . ! l . : i 65 C 258 i ! l ! : 64 FT5 39 l | |||
l l. 67 131 N1 1 ! . 68 tM 331 | |||
! l l . 9. i 69 13 6 4 31 l l l l . N In6 44 I l 73 ITR9 &M l l l . 72 IN 47 | |||
. . . 73 IN V' | |||
. l 74 IN ta 75 Rio 932 I I . I | |||
. 19: N tt3 M3 | |||
. I : 77 5t2 K4 l ! 11: 78 ET) b5 6 l l 79 in te 94 | |||
: . iw 1n11 9M il 1411 Ime I2 af til IW2 83 tull Iwo FIGURE 4.2.12-1. TURBINE TRIP EVENT TREE 4.2.12-4 | |||
i I | |||
4.2.13 LOSS OF IN3TRUMENT AIR MAIN TREE The loss of instrument air initiating event dces not directly fail any I frontline system. It only fails Top Event AM in the support system event ; | |||
: tree; therefore, the general transient event tree (Figure 4.1-2), default j | |||
. split fractions -(Table 4.1-2), and boundary condition table -(Table 4.1-3) l are used for this initiating event in corabination with the appropriate. , | |||
set of support. system state frequencies (see Section 3), j i i f | |||
I | |||
~ | |||
l 2 i | |||
) ! | |||
1 s | |||
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1 i | |||
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4.2,13-1 1 0587G102087PMR l l | |||
l 4.2.14 -LOSS OF CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.14-1 presents the loss of control building ventilation frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.14-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.14-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a loss of control building ventilation are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD, None of these actions, however, are important to preventing core damage following a loss of control building ventilation. | |||
Possible manual actions to initiate control building cooling following either the loss of both chillers or the loss of all ventilation fans and before plant trip are included in the frequency of the initiating event. | |||
Actions to recover ventilation following plant trip are included in the support system event tree. Therefore, by the time that the main tree is reached no further recovery actions are possible. The only early action that is asked in this main tree is the operation of the BWST. However, whether Top Event BW succeeds or fails, this dummy main tree leads to core damage and subtree CB. The containment safety features that determine to which plant damage state that the core damage scenarios initiated by a loss of control building ventilation lead are asked in subtree CB described in Section 4.3.20. (The artifice of having a dummy main tree was used because some kind of main tree is required for every sequence assembled by the MAXIMA computer code.) | |||
O 4.2.14-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
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4.2.14-2 | |||
I f | |||
l i | |||
j 1 | |||
I l | |||
I l | |||
1 i | |||
TABLE 4.2.14-2. LOSS OF CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION B0UNDARY CONDITIONS 1 | |||
s.3 v) =>it eji g; $31 $3; g31 et t sit ett ett e41 4.li til att da til tii e41 Q1 c.11 | |||
:n :51 ti; til til t-il :(1 til til 644 Hi 416 bil di tsi ill 631 til MI til 1 | |||
3r 33;, ; ;34 3g 7g9 40 it t; g) 1415 to 1711 ni ,% ;l ;; ;) ;4 ;; ;6 ;* ;3 ;* % 31 !! ' 34 A :1 ;+ 37 M ;9 i .:.s. .... . . . . . . . . . . . . ................ . . . . | |||
1 i | |||
1 J | |||
1 4 | |||
1 | |||
,i 1 | |||
j i | |||
j 4.2.14-3 4 | |||
e | |||
* Q 1 2 | |||
* E | |||
* S t | |||
s t | |||
* E | |||
* T | |||
* A | |||
* T | |||
* S t O D CG B | |||
* E | |||
* E | |||
* Q 1 2 R | |||
* E | |||
* S T | |||
* T | |||
* N | |||
* E | |||
* V | |||
* E | |||
* N | |||
* 0 | |||
* 1 | |||
* T A | |||
* L | |||
* I | |||
* T | |||
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i t G N | |||
I t D | |||
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* I U | |||
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i B | |||
t t L i | |||
t O | |||
s R _ | |||
1 T N - | |||
t O i C - | |||
t | |||
* F t V O t E l | |||
* S | |||
* S | |||
* O | |||
* L t 1 t - | |||
i t 4 | |||
* 1 | |||
* 2 | |||
* 4 | |||
* E | |||
* R | |||
* U | |||
* G | |||
* I | |||
* F t | |||
1 t | |||
8 3 | |||
8 1 | |||
t C | |||
* L . | |||
"." Ya | |||
4.2.15 LOSS OF ATA MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.15-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in ! | |||
Figure 4.2.15-2. Loss of ATA ESD shown in Figure 4.2.15-2 outlines the i plant response in the event of loss of the 120Y AC vital bus ATA. ATA : | |||
powers the integrated control system through five subpower sources; l namely, automatic, hand, hex, hey, and auxiliary power. Table 4.2.15-1 ' | |||
shows the plant conditions irmosed by loss of ATA. In developing the r i loss of ATA ESO, the general transient event sequence diagram shown in . | |||
Figure 4.1-1 was altered to account for the conditions listed in ! | |||
Table 4.2.15-1 j Figure 4.2.15-3 presents the loss of ATA initiating event frontline, ! | |||
early response event tree. Table 4.2.15-2 defines the top event codes ! | |||
and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.15-3 : | |||
is the boundary condition table for this event tree. [ | |||
For the loss of ATA initiating event, the first responding system actions considered were those performed by the RPS and control rod drives. These actions are collectively represented by the reactor trip. | |||
The reactor trips (item 4 of Table 4.2.15-1) due to high pressure in the primary system. Assuming that items 1A and 10 of Table 4.2.15-1 have occurred as a result of loss of ATA, then the feedwater flow will be , | |||
l reduced significantly. The reduced feedwater flow and the reactor power j (assumed at 100%) will be mismatched. The steam renerator water level ; | |||
will quickly boil down. The reduced OTSG 1evel will not be able to l 4 | |||
remove the necessary heat from the RCS which results in high pressure in ! | |||
the RCS. The RPS senses this high pressure and trips the reactor. All l trippable control rods will insert into the core. If more than one rod i group stays out of the core, then a reactor trip failure is said to l result. Actions to alleviate reactor trip failure are thown on sheets 11 < | |||
through 13 of the general transient ESD. The turbine trips on the ! | |||
control rod drive breaker trip. Actions mitigating turbine trip failure ; | |||
are shown on sheet 1 of Loss of ATA ESD. | |||
4 l | |||
t Following a turbine trip, the next group of actions demanded by loss of { | |||
1 ATA is secondary steam relief (50). 50 will be established by the main ; | |||
P steam safety valves opening in response to the sudden increase in ! | |||
secondary system pressure caused by closure of the turbine stop and i control valves and/or by the operator action using a manual loader to ! | |||
open the atmospheric dump valves that fail closed on loss of ATA. The ; | |||
turbine bypass valves will not be used to remve steam because they will l fail to their (latched) closed position. (Refer to 500-621-B, ! | |||
Section 2.0, Revision 0, June 15, 1981.) l In addition to opening the ADVs, the operator is required to shut off the main feedwater pumps. Stopping the MFWPs should automatically start the l emergency feedwater system. (Refer to TMI-1 Ernergency Procedure 1202-40, l | |||
. "Total Loss of ICS/NNI Power," Revision 6. June 28,1985.) Once EFW ficw ! | |||
to OTSG is established, then the OTSG 1evel will be controlled with the ! | |||
EF-V30 valves using signals from the heat sink protection system. j i | |||
I ! | |||
4.2.15-1 l 0587G102087PMR j l | |||
Should the MSSVs fail to open, or the operator fails to open the ADVs, then the secondary system pressure will increase to a pressure higher than the shut off head of the EFWPs. These pumps will not be able to feed the OTSG, and high pressure injection cooling will be required to remove heat from the RCS. HPI cooling will also be required if control of EFW flow f ails. The actions required for successful HPI cooling are described on sheet 3 of Loss of ATA ESD. | |||
If the MSSYs and the ADVs do not close sufficiently (TC failure), more heat will be removed from the RCS than is being put into it, resulting in excessive cooldown. Actions to mitigate an excessive cooldcwn are shown on sheet 2 of Loss of ATA ESD. | |||
The next operator action is to increase makeup flow. These actions are described on sheet 2 of Loss of ATA ESD. | |||
If the operator properly controls the makeup flow, then the plant will be at hot shutdcwn, as shown on sheet 2. If something in the RCS f atis and rust be fixed, then the plant must be brought to cold shutdown in order to fix it. | |||
There is no obvious problem in the RCS resulting from loss of ATA; therefore, actions to cooldcwn to cold shutdown will not be required. | |||
With exception of the PORY being only manually operable, the HPI cooling scenarios for loss of ATA initiating event are the same as the general transient ESD scenarios. | |||
Long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant damage state a core darage scenario initiated by loss of ATA leads are shcwn in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available, o B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available. | |||
e C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RY2 (see Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available, o RV3 (see Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is not available. | |||
e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available, e BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required but HPI flow is not available. | |||
O 4.2.15-2 0587G102087PMR | |||
(O | |||
_/ e AFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is reautred and the BWST is not available. | |||
e RT2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip and the high pressure injection have both f ailed. | |||
e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed. ,- | |||
[ | |||
i O . | |||
2 1 | |||
l l | |||
O , | |||
4.2.15-3 0507G102087PMR | |||
TABLE 4.2.15-1. COMPONENTS / SYSTEMS STATES RESULTING FROM LOSS OF ATA Number Component / System Description Failed Position Reference Remarks 1. | |||
A. Turbine Bypass Valve (TB?V) Closed (Latched) 1 MS-V3A-F B. Fee.lwater Startup Valves Half Open 1 FV-V16A/B C. Main Feedwater Valves llalf Open 1 (FW-V17/B) | |||
D. Main Feedwater Block Closed 1 Valves (FW-V5A/B) | |||
E. Let down Block Valves Closed 1 (MU-VIA/B) | |||
F. Letdown Block Valves Closed I (Mu-v3) | |||
C. Letdown Valve Hall Open 1 a (Mu-vs) | |||
~ | |||
II . Make Up Valve Half Open 1 (MU-V17) m 1. Seal Injection Valve Half Open 1 E (MU-V32) | |||
J. FORV Closed 1 Manually 0 F r sble (RC-RV2) | |||
K. Spray Valve Closed 1 Manually Operable (RC-VI) | |||
: 2. Main Feedwater Pumps 4100 RPM | |||
: 3. Pressurizer Heaters Off 4 Reactor Trips | |||
: 5. Turbine Trips | |||
: 6. Atmospheric Dump Valves Closed 3 Will Be Controlled fADVD By Manual Leader e- - - | |||
O O | |||
O t | |||
TABLE 4.2.15-2. LOSS OF ATA POWER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS unuuuuuuuuuuumminuusututunumunu.wmsmumaninumutuuntuuttunnummun.utuu TCP ESTS: CMIT!WL WLITFWTIM; TCP SPLIT Est. WE OF TOP EST EST FWCTIM CMITIM RT FOCTM TRIP IE SD SOS RT F RT REXid TRIP (l) TC TCG W+F SP REACTut COUWT ATP TRIP (2) W- WJ TC F TT MSIE TRIP (3) TT TTE RT F SD SECWARY S~EM FELIEF(4) N- M TC F W+ W EIG551W MIN FEE:WiERtl) N TW W+F TC TEIPIMTE SECW#1 STEM SELIU(6) TH M TT F W- SLf71CIENT MI4 FEDWTU(7) P0 PCA N$ | |||
EF- SEFICID(T ESDCY FEEWTG(8) P0 P0A TH 8 U+ W D3S514 ESDCY FEEWTU(9) W PVA N6 TH TETTLI WI FLMit) N M RT F M F l M K M cf0ti(ll) W M N F P0 t N PSYS OFOiS(12) W M N F P0 F W F W REXTM WS. FAMPE FM PTS (13) W RJ EF+ F P0 F RC K5ViPSYS CLOSE(14) W M EF+ F P0 F W F i M (59ATM EST!a!$41 PIN-FLCw(15) W F# EF F P0 F Si !NIATE CLOSC C01N WTD(16) W M UFMFWF F1 5I00 0f(17) W RE SD FP0F W MT AAlliaEtti) W M St,FP0 FW F W1 kliH F#ESME NECil'A PW C(19) W M TC F WA HIGH FT59Af NECTIM PJf1 A & f(29) W WJ W+F N FfMIM C0CUAT PWP SDL N.(!!) W M TT F HI MIGH FMS9JE NECTION RES(22) RC RCC P0 F FI CDAICA TO FII(23) W E4 W- F U- F W NB $0 F WA W6 EF- F N F WB F WA H EF+FN F WF WA WS SOFN FW9F 10 It WAF N INC TC F WA $ | |||
10 It TC F W F HI k!C WAF Ml H!A WSF FI HIE EF+ F PV F H! HIE EF- F N F P! HIE S0 F W F 1 | |||
4.2.15-5 | |||
( | |||
I l | |||
\ | |||
I TABLE 4.2.15-3. LOSS OF ATA POWER BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 4 9 a 40 6; .. .$ 44 9 '; !4 h !! W 6; to e6 el ') '; '4 7e 9 | |||
.: O 5 47 44 51 ti IS !? !* tl 43 24 67 e4 '; *] 'S 24 => | |||
/ iiis a ' | |||
) . ! t 7 i t to 1812131415 in !? it 1* :J :. : 23 :4 ;t .* U ;I :5 x 3; i: M 24 ;! H I? : :* | |||
6:48 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
, . . . . . . 4. 3 . l . I 9 8 9 688 8 B I II I I 6 | |||
". 4M | |||
:....3, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
C.''.. . C. . . . . C . . CC . . . s . C 4 4 S 4 .C . C 9 iC s . | |||
. . .=s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
94 ) 0. ] , ) 0 000 0 <0 ) . CC . ) 30090 J 000 . 00 2. ? . | |||
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2 8 , , t + > c , , , t F . , F c , , S T ? 9 . F F F F 5 F F F F t D . | |||
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4:4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
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44 . . . 8 i . . . l . . . . I i 8 5. 3 - . l. . . 8II83 it.a s D | |||
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W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
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.Se . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
: 49. . . . . . . . . . . | |||
ev 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:,54, , . . . . . . . . | |||
..4, . . | |||
4, . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i | |||
::t: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i..et. | |||
F .H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
+4 1 i i i l . 1 ! i . I 1 i i . ! . . . ! ! 1 . ! : i ! . . | |||
;We i . . i . . . . i . I 1 1 1 1 I i ! ! ! 1 1 . i ! . . I ! . | |||
1 a wa a i . 1 . t ' | |||
i . ! 1 1 . ! | |||
i i i . 1 . I ! | |||
i l | |||
: .; , . , . : C . | |||
.a + e . r . | |||
... . , , a, . . . , ., 2 . . as . > , , , 1 | |||
\ | |||
; s, . , . . . . ... . . | |||
. ., . , . 2 i , > > , u , > , , , | |||
\ | |||
. . .. . . v . . . . v e i | |||
. . . . , . l l | |||
1 2 2 | |||
* 2 2 ) ) 4. .) 4 1 D 2 1 ) .t l | |||
. 1 F 3 2 J s J | |||
. , , , a > , , | |||
i i | |||
1 4 | |||
4.2.15-6 l I | |||
.,--wy w,w---- -,y y- - -- | |||
g -----,----wrw we-m-wim=mye-er--m--m-'r-wme._ .w-mm-r** mws--W e----*------*wy*-- - - - m m wwd | |||
r~~%, | |||
! \ | |||
\' '' | |||
LO!! et ATA 1 __ | |||
3em 1 stm 11 1 I tum a am a 1 1 i | |||
tim 3 fXIIT ? IIIIT 13 J | |||
l i IntIf 4 TIIIT tutif 6 I | |||
!stIt 5 r | |||
(h 4 CCRI HMCI !NIIf 8 (CAI NmCI IRITT 9 | |||
/ Cett M*CI ta[IT 84 te m te 1 | |||
COL) SNUTM FIGURE 4.2.15-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR LOSS OF ATA 7-O 4.2.15 7 | |||
l I LOSSOF h AIA , | |||
k, / | |||
t- - 1AUI00[_g | |||
/ REACIOR \ "I RI x gg73 \ IRIP 9 | |||
MANUAL | |||
/ or m/(SH.1;/ | |||
. \ | |||
/ IURBINE IRIP | |||
\/ i 9 [II:\ / | |||
5 9 m' | |||
_ V S.S.SIEAM\ ,/HPI RELIEF | |||
[EA/ \ | |||
(/1600 gigggt | |||
/ PSIG \ | |||
s | |||
/'IBYs'\f,hg ' | |||
EB] | |||
[SD] j ADUs gi AIASH1 \ | |||
MSSV5 ReeP Pressure Below SH. | |||
: 3/3/87 /SH./ | |||
\,2A .MFWPShutoffHead s2B FIGURE 4.2.15-2. EVE SEQUENCE GRAM FOR LOSS OF ATA O O O | |||
O O O | |||
'SH. / SH l .\, | |||
le IB 8 i \i U | |||
ggy s too little MFW [M-] , | |||
j | |||
)_(Flow ( 5'./ will open PORU/PSUT | |||
\RAMPBACK includes tooMtichMFW[M+] _U _ will not isolate ICSfailttPes MANUAL MFW\ | |||
CONTROL y | |||
( SLRDS | |||
)-- W" | |||
/~ _ _ | |||
D--" | |||
b )l600 PSI - | |||
I 4 | |||
\ SIGNAL)j GAB @H \[EF- ot/HPI,\ | |||
, C99L incltides N_ _ _ _ | |||
CONTROL /EF+] NH.7.A l lii-level / MANUALLY g fl8 PttMPEF+exc.CD*willfailI.D. | |||
by water caPP90veP if MFWP. ( INI'R'PI .> | |||
ctttoff \ MFW , | |||
notalreadyfailedbyMF+' | |||
b1 fop.WillendEFWflow i | |||
AIASH2 H- eventuallyfailsbothpumps 3/3/87 3 f, . | |||
(seeAIP-1210-3) | |||
/ | |||
* excessive cooldown nag result in RU failttre fron PIS FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 2 of 14) | |||
/SH. | |||
\2 . | |||
t | |||
' REDUCE RCS\ H0 HEAT REM / " | |||
[IC] / \Exc/ | |||
\CD, ALREADY? | |||
(1600 PSI ~G) | |||
SIGNAL mVES s - | |||
v 1600psig ~~ s_ YES 5 | |||
SIGNAL | |||
/ N0 OpenHU-Y217 StartsecondM/UpuMP INCREASE \ StartDCandDRsystens | |||
[HP-8] | |||
M/UFLOW | |||
/ (assuMedtoalwaysoccur) | |||
"Providecontinuouslytoseals F | |||
/5H.\ ' | |||
kIASH3 3/3/87 4) | |||
/ | |||
5 FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 3 of 14) e O O | |||
O O O 1600psig ___ YES signal - I N0 | |||
'HPI STARIS\ | |||
+ RUNS / | |||
[HP] / | |||
u y CL0S ggq27 \ j BWSI \ [BW-4] BWSI | |||
\ ,, | |||
l E | |||
~ | |||
[IN-1] CONI'L NU/ } AVAILABLE)[BW-2] " | |||
AVAILABLE | |||
/ _ | |||
u | |||
! assunesnin. HUIrefillrate ' | |||
flowline insufficient / PROVIDE \' /SH nornal19 for2HPIPs | |||
'SIARI HPIP,DCDR 3RD FROMBN$I[gg_3) | |||
/ \, MIN-FLOW | |||
\ .LINE _, ./ >\ | |||
5$ | |||
available | |||
/ , | |||
: j1HPIP Flowthru t | |||
s FORY/PSYSor SH. SH. . | |||
A!4SH4 H. 50 5B Sealsis | |||
! 3/3/87 SH.\ | |||
5A 5D/ Sufficient FIGURE 4.2.1S-2 (Sheet 4 of 14) | |||
SH.\ /'SH.\ 'SH.\ AIASH5 3/3/87 4A/ \4C/ 4B/ | |||
m p | |||
REDUCE M/UFLOW | |||
\/ | |||
E4 | |||
/' REDUCE sHPIPFLOW | |||
/ " [IH-2:h | |||
~ | |||
I 4 YES' Ires >500F, | |||
/ WATER THRU\ ' | |||
n/, yPr-pts:0 | |||
[P0,PY] | |||
\ RELIEFS p/ | |||
g " | |||
u r?)P-SHUI 0FF') | |||
I | |||
'" II-f\ /SIOPHPIPs). jPs( | |||
FLOWSTOPS RECRC4 , m H,8/ [RC] >CLOSEVALUsf 00 8"$ | |||
4 'i /SH,j 4 | |||
*Hin-flonorMally p \40 / | |||
y availablehere hAINI RCP\ | |||
/500 F ) ) sinceno1600psig I-res) signalgenerated, (SEAL | |||
}lIIH ICCW / INTEG'Y)->c.' -'_ | |||
(. 200F ) [SE-1] U g | |||
FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 5 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/SH.\ | |||
\13/ | |||
i | |||
/CD + DEPR \ - CD achieved by using IBUs, ADUs,and sprag (T0DHRIN ) when secondary systen heat ren, is avail | |||
[CD) \ COND. / -If HPI cooling continues until i BWST is exhattsted, then 'piggsback' recire,alignmentswillhemate block ( jiPASS LO-PRESS ESFs | |||
) -note: on loss of AIA, the A3Y'S will be controlled by the Manttal loader fron the | |||
:~ CFTs k u control roon, but the IBY's will fail | |||
! OPEN DROF-\ >/gh,\ | |||
and nust he controlled Manually | |||
[HL-1]LINEUALUES/ / | |||
\g / | |||
t | |||
'ALIGH DHR \ | |||
PUMPS, HEAT y | |||
! [DH] EXCHjGRs / | |||
/1AIT TO C/h . -~. | |||
-h EYMM \ K U . __>_ | |||
/ v_ | |||
: AIASH6 /SH.u FIx | |||
! 3/3/87 l | |||
\V FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 6 of 14) i | |||
_, _/ | |||
STOP3/4\ ie.,runonepuMPtoproMoteMixinginreactorvessel (Ra rea , | |||
forPISprevention. | |||
1C BWSI \ PDS 3x gggy AVAILABLE,/ | |||
9 | |||
[ / HANUAL HPI | |||
\ PDS 3x ds | |||
[HP] SIARI / 2/3 HPIPs available if MS | |||
,, 1/3HPIPsavailableifMS PORU+2HPIPS pps ax | |||
[P0, OR | |||
'\ >' | |||
PU) /2PU+1HPI?' 1 HPIP in 30 Min if 1 PSU .. | |||
l | |||
_l- 2HPIPsifless .- _ | |||
AIASH7 /SH. <C , | |||
~~ | |||
. D' . '_> | |||
3/3/87 \_8 _ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
: /4HI (RECRC) | |||
RCSwillrapidly depresstirizeafter k' core damage dtte to RU PDS4x | |||
['PIGY-BACK\ | |||
RECIkc YES nelt-through. | |||
[HL-2]\ALIGNM'I | |||
/ NO - | |||
Stttek open relief--> | |||
Papiddepress,to UMP DRAINPDS\4x LPIP discharge press y LIisstillpossibleif VALUE b | |||
[SU] CLOSED V | |||
/ C2 FAILED,N0 SPRAYS we cane h m from 5 , | |||
HXsnotreallyneeded 5 OPENSUMP\ppS4x , | |||
[SA/ J sinceS.S.heatren, SB] | |||
RECIRC,/ | |||
UALUES isstill.possible, I httt nttst keep | |||
'AhhNljRI,\ PDS 4X y I ( 300 F or ptinp seals i | |||
f , | |||
willfail, | |||
[pH] PUMPS,HXs / 5 , | |||
--ll l . | |||
AIASH8 /SH.\ <:_' C.D | |||
~' ' | |||
3/3/87 \9/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 8 of 14) | |||
SH.\ | |||
8 N0 gjih} | |||
cool? | |||
Itwilltakeupto2weeksto | |||
- cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, | |||
_, YES T butthepress,willstillhehigh. | |||
RESIORE ppg g SS\ | |||
HEATREM > | |||
BEFOREF3/ ~ | |||
p m v CD+DEPR g pps q s 10DHR >9 | |||
[CD] ENIRY m | |||
/ | |||
~~ | |||
'BYPASSLO,3 PRES ESFs j | |||
\_y __ m AIASH9 /SH, g {,g _, | |||
3/3/87 \al -'_. | |||
FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 9 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O SH. | |||
g7gggig 60r 3/3/87 9 | |||
( OPEN h t \ R.B' j Pttrge and RC drain tank line isolateon4psigsignalorRI' | |||
[C1/ RB ISOL'I'h - | |||
Seal rettien isolates on 30 psig ONRI ,/ C17.:: N0,largehole C2] ' | |||
2 YES s0 r t N0(REAC. BLDG.ha "lig speed E. [CA/ g | |||
?# ' | |||
? | |||
CB]\ gic / ( REAC. BLDG.s ) | |||
EA(#EB (OPEN,H0 FANS) */REAC. B I', 4 RBFAN | |||
\! . | |||
OPEN | |||
) YI'S | |||
' MANUAL RB \ SPRAYS | |||
/ | |||
[p1f [CS] Manttalif F2] | |||
COOLERS | |||
/ > FAN SIARI y signal,m no4psig a | |||
A . | |||
f (REAC. BLDG.'1 (SIABLEAI}a ' FAILURE | |||
) | |||
j' COLD ' | |||
l.,SHUIDOWN ! | |||
FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 10 of 14) | |||
.--,-e.,-,----..--m ,,------.w,-,-,-en,-s,e--n,r---,,n---,,c.-ws.- | |||
[Hib | |||
\ / | |||
,BREARERFAILURE | |||
'!ES Ittrhine trip on reacto . tripis IURBINE hasedonbreakerposition. | |||
\ | |||
TRIP | |||
[II] ( / | |||
4- 4 | |||
.- RCSreliefcoolingisnot h S.S. STEAD \ - | |||
K'C.D.. > stifficient to i RELIEF i . | |||
~~ | |||
[SD] / coolthecore. | |||
/ | |||
MFW \ MP~ | |||
' Lossofsec,sys. | |||
RA MF- inventorg | |||
[MF] \ _MPBACK _/ p Power drops rapidly increasingRCStenp. with fil'f' k]WRin26 Mins. | |||
v ,, | |||
AIASH11 /' SH. Does lack of MFW change HPIP or PSY or EFW sttecess criteria? | |||
3/3/87 \ 12 FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 11 of 14) e - - _-___-___-_ | |||
O O | |||
i O O O | |||
\. | |||
11 / | |||
/ | |||
l t EF+ | |||
EFWFLOX \ ' | |||
IN5SEC.S} | |||
u- C.D.,' - | |||
/HI' Will9etto11in. | |||
[EF] / s inahottt1 Min, | |||
, g EF-- | |||
~_- \fWR 2/3PORY\- | |||
orPSUs l | |||
[P0,PUI OPEN / | |||
b U . | |||
! gyg7 \.PDS3x i | |||
: [ggj U | |||
/ N0 SPI;AVS | |||
; [CA/ | |||
4PSIG SIGNAL | |||
\/ PDS 3x K C.D. > | |||
A | |||
's. | |||
- N' CB] / - | |||
t | |||
! AIASH12 /$H. | |||
: 3/3/87 \l3 FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) i l | |||
@ t ON4PSIGSIGNAL AUTO. HPIIN\ 30 SEC. MANUAL .^- ~_ | |||
/ HPIP S -:_ C . D . _> | |||
[HP-1]JAjI}N N | |||
[HP-3] ACIDATION ~/ ' | |||
M ' | |||
/PR0YI:)E | |||
\ ' | |||
.. - ~- | |||
>< C.D.') HPIPs burnup against pressure | |||
[MR]FLOW \HPIP HIN. / '- ~ - | |||
/ spike > their shutoff head C i b / | |||
s 'PORU+PSUs \ LOCA aC] | |||
RECLOSE | |||
/ >'\ ' | |||
i f | |||
R C RCS | |||
_ _ _ 1600 psig signal equivalent actuation RE9 | |||
[IC] (HE hasalreadybeenproduced4psigsignal so overcooling is unimportant l 4_____ | |||
AIASH13 SH. | |||
3/3/87 6 FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 13 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
/ __ p | |||
'2' | |||
_ '!['> f [notPDST i | |||
'h _ YES m p(notPDS) (nA,Bg S U _____-r nB J - | |||
T' N0 i CIDYES ; | |||
[C1/ | |||
,REACIOR BUILDING | |||
\ ' REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING 10 / ppg 3 C2] ISOLATION / [CS SPRAYS s~ | |||
/ " | |||
U "y J YES y | |||
SR 3 r 3 __ YES | |||
\ r REACIOR OPENSUMP 3 __. | |||
? PDS | |||
[F1/ BUILDING UALUES I REACIOR , | |||
" ( / I F2] , FAN C'L'RS/ [sR] | |||
nD BUILDING 3 _ | |||
_ YES [CS]\ SPh')YS | |||
. p DH, _- t | |||
,f REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING nLIGNikUN \ ' | |||
PDS | |||
) | |||
i 1. | |||
/ DHRHEAT 4 | |||
nG J i | |||
[CS] SPRAYS | |||
[DH] ,EXCHANGERS/ | |||
t U T U 1 AIASX14 f PDS 'l [ PDS | |||
} ( PDS | |||
) / | |||
PDS ) ; | |||
f PDS 3 | |||
3/3/87'( nh J ( nB J ( nA J ( nc ) i nX J FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 14 of 14) | |||
tatt**tststs talit u uts* tit ttstitttattititt t ttt tt t tt ttitutu tstis u tsu tststitittista ntistitstu ttt tt tsstast a tis tat atu stituita tts t | |||
27 Rf RP f1 50 T* fC T U- U+ tl P0 P/ Pd C 0 E F1 IN 414A N kt FI si9 M 5tA1 at LO) (Rt (6) (C) (C) (Cl (C) (F) (0) (C) (FI (C) 1 5 I I I I I I I il il I 2 (Cl 2 I I I I I i 1 1 3 5 3 I I i l ! l I i l i i 1 4 (01 4 1 1 ! ! I i 1 1 1 1 1 5 & 5 1 1 I t i i 1 1 I I I 6 8 6 I I I I I I I I i 1. 7 5 7 1 1 I l 1 I I I I 6 l_ 8 CO2 8 I I 1 1 1 i I ! I t 9 4 9 I i i I I 1 I i i i le 8 le | |||
! ! 1 1 1 1 I t 1 11 5 !! | |||
! I I I I I I I I I ! 12 C2 12 I i i 1 I I i ! I t 13 4 13 I I I I I I I i i l 14 8 14 8 I I ! l l i I t._ 15 8 15 I t i I I ! I t 16 C 16 I I I I i 1 1 17 FR1 17 I I I I I I ?! 31 1 18 A 33 I i ! I i l 1 1 I I I i 19 8 34 I I I I I I I I l 1 1 M A M I I I I I I 1 1 I I I 21 8 J6 1 ! ! I i 1 1 1 l i 22 4 37 I I I I i ! t i l 1 1 D l- M i l 1 1 i l I i i i 24 8 M i I I I i I i 1 ! 25 C 40 I I I t i I I I 26 P4 41 1 ! ! 1 I I I I 27 Pit 42 8 I I I i l i 23 IFR3 0 1 I I I i l I 23 IFRt 69 1 i ! I I l ! J6 IF35 65 I I I i i 1 31 Iff.2 87 I I I I I I l . 32 VA 173 1 1 I I i 1 61 1 41 1 8 I 33 ES 174 I I I I i 1 1 I I I I 34 WA 175 I i i i I I I I I I I 35 E8 176 I I I I I I I I I l % WA 177 1 1 1 1 I I I I I I i 37 EFB 178 I I i i ' | |||
I ! I I I 38 fEB 179 l t 1 1 1 I I i 1 M UC iS6 1 1 I I I I I I de CTA 181 1 1 1 1 I i 1 I t t t di F8 !$2 1 ! ! I I I I I i ! 42 FB 183 I I i ! I i i I ! 43 UA liJ l ! I I i 1 1 1 1 1 44 FB 185 i 1 1 1 l 1 I I I 45 El 1% | |||
i ! ! I I I I l 46 WC 187 1 I I I I ! 47 ITF4 1 38 I ! I I I I I I O IFR5 1% | |||
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 49 FB 1 38 I I I I 1 1 I i 54 FC 193 I I I I I I I $1 IFAS 2W I i 1 1 I I 52 trks 29 2 I i 1 1 IJ IFEl 231 1 I I i 1 81 I i 54 5 247 1 I I i 1 ! ! ! I I I l 55 C2 243 I I I 1 ! 1 I I I I I % 5 249 I I I t ! ! I I I i 1 57 8 29 1 1 I I I i 1 I i I W 5 Mt i 1 1 4 I i 1 1 1 1 53 8 252 1 ! l i 1 ! I i 1 64 C 253 1 1 I I I I I I il 5 254 1 1 1 I I I I I I t I_ 62 CO2 255 4 1 1 i i l i i I ! 63 8 2% | |||
! i ! I I a l i 1 4 8 37 1 1 1 I i ! I I 65 C 255 1 1 I I I I I 66 IrR5 25) | |||
I I I l.. 67 IFE7 31 1 . ! I 68 IN 331 1 1 1 I 9; I 6) IFE6 431 | |||
: 1 I I I 74 trE6 464 1 1 1 1 71 ITF) 4?) | |||
1 1 I 72 LM 64 7 i i I 73 IFK6 te5 1 I 74 IFk) 6.14 1 ?S Rf4 932 I . , I . It; 76 ET) H3 | |||
. I I I I 77 Af2 Ma l i I I Ill T3 ST) t:5 I i 1 1 ?! Ittle 9% | |||
i ! l I N IFLil tM i I I 61 IFEll 1% | |||
i ! 82 Irl[1 te2 1 | |||
$3 II A11 l*4 | |||
.t _ . ~ ,.,,, . _ . ,A 0 4 FIGURE 4.2.15-3. LOSS OF ATA POWER EVENT TREE 4.2.15-22 | |||
I 4.2.16 LOSS OF DC POWER TRAIN A MAIN TREE -l The loss of DC power train A initiating event does not directly fail any | |||
~ | |||
frontline system. It.only fails Top Event DA in the support system event tree; therefore, the ' general ' transient event tree (Figure 4.1-2), default split fractions (Table 4.1-2), and boundary condition table (Table 4.1-3) are-used for this initiating-event in. combination with the appropriate , | |||
set of support system state frequencies (see Section 3). | |||
l. | |||
5 l | |||
t I | |||
O 1 l | |||
i l | |||
4 i i | |||
O 4.2.16-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
., -.... - - ,- ........ . . . - - . - . . . , , . . . - . - . - - - . . . - , - - . . . . - - . - - - . - - - . =.- - .. .- | |||
4.2.17 LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.17-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.17-2. Figure 4.2.17-2 presents the loss of offsite power event sequence diagram, while Figure 4.2.17-3 presents its frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.17-1 defines the top event codes and the conditional split fractions used in the event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.17-2 is the boundarv enndition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that take place following a loss of offsite power are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD, Some of these actions are precluded by the fact that offsite power was lost at event initiation. Reactor trip is made easier by the fact that the rod drive mechanisms become unpowered, and the trip requires them just to disengage from the rods thereby alleving the rods to fall into the core. Main feedwater becomes unavailable because condensor vacuum is lost, and the condensate pumps lose power; therefore, emergency feedwater actions are always required. | |||
Diese; generators must start in order for the safety features buses to be powered. If neither generator starts, station blackout conditions then exist and the ESD transfers to sheet 8. Initially, the turbine-driven emergency feedwater pump EF- works to provide feedwater until the batteries and air accumulators become depleted, requiring manual flow control. After emergency feedwater ceases flowing, the PORY opens and 3 decay heat is removed by losing RCS inventory into the containment. | |||
.j | |||
' Recovery of electric power to at least one high pressure injection pump within 2 hours RE will prevent core damage from loss of inventory control. The HPI punp, once it has power reestablished to it, must start HPA/HPB and the BWST must be available BW. | |||
The loss of offsite power event tree in Figure 4.2.17-3 illustrates the way in which the recovery RE top event was used. This top event was placed in all main trees in order to incorporate scenario-specific manual actions to prevent core damage. Station blackout recovery of at letst one train of electric power to a high pressure injection pump and its required support systems is used 6s an illustration. The logic used to apply recovery to this situation is as follows: | |||
: 1. For all support system states except 26, the split fraction used for RE in the AC tree is RED (failure frequency = 1.0). For SSS-26, split fraction REA was used for top event RE. (REA represents the likelihood that the operator successfully recovers at least one train of electric power. ) The split fractions used for RE in each SSS can be seen in the boundary condition Table 4.2.17-2. This means that the (reduced) tree scenarios 2 through 9, those that end in RIA, R18, and RIC, can only be reached in SSS-26 when RE succeeds. In all other cases, when EF+ or EF- fails, RE automatically fails and the tree always goes to scenarios 10 through 20 | |||
: 2. The subtrees R1A, R18, and R1C are evaluated only as if one train of electric power is available since recovery (REA) has been successful. One run of these subtrees was made for SSS-13. In 4.2.17-1 l 0587G102087PMR | |||
( . | |||
MAXIMA, this run is combined with the sequences from the loss of offsite power in SSS-26 that go to these three subtrees. | |||
: 3. The split fractions for the HPA, HPB, and HI top events that follow successful recovery of one train of electric power must also be modified from the values that would normally be used in SSS-26. This is done by inserting entries in the conditional split fraction list that choose split fractions to be used after RE success. | |||
Other long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a loss of main feedwater leads, are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e A (see Section 4.3.1) when HPI is available, e B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not available, o C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RV2 (see Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available. | |||
e RV3 (see Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is not available, e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available, e BFS (see B described in Secticn 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required but HPI flow is not available, o BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required and the BWST is not available. | |||
e RT4 (see Section 4.3.9) when reactor trip has failed and all other alleviating systems have operated correctly. | |||
e RT2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip and the high pressure injection have both failed. | |||
e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed. | |||
O 4.2.17-2 0587G102087PMR | |||
l t | |||
I v | |||
TABLE 4.2.17-1. TMI-1 LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS tutstuttuttttaututs tututttuttutttttrt tutstit***** *****ttt** ****t***st itttut tttut t**t t tttt tts stitt****ttt tsu t*****tttts 17 EVENTS: CMITIOWL SFi!T FRACTIONS: | |||
f TOP SFili G. VM 0F TOP EiDT ENUT FFACTION COM)!TIONS fC LOSS OF 0FFSITE PWER !E E EA U-S RT FEACTOR TRIP (l) E EA EF+ S i | |||
FP FEACTOR C00LMT PW TRIP (2) E FEC EF- F TT TW51( TRIP (3) FE FfC U+F S0 SEComY STEM RELIEF (4) SO SOB RT F ' | |||
W+ NO EICESSIVE MIN FEENATER(5) TC TC6 T+F TC TEie!MTE SECOGY STEM FfLIEF(6) W- WJ TC F ', | |||
W- SLEFICIEhT MIN FEENATER(7) TT TTC RT F ! | |||
EF- SIEFICIENT EEMEMY FEENATER(8) TH T)6 TC F ' | |||
EF+ NO EICESSIVE ETMEKY FEEDWTER(9) TH T)6 W+F TH TIR0TT11 WI FLN(14) TH T16 TT F O P0 N | |||
RV RC PMV 0FDS(ll) | |||
PSYS OFDS(12) | |||
EXTOR VES. FAILWS FRM PTS (13) | |||
POW /FSVS CLOSE(14) | |||
P0 FY F4 W | |||
P0A WA PVC FNO RT F TH B RT F M F TH F M F l MR (GATM ESita19ES MIN-Fl0W,5) RV RW TH F FC F W F SE IhTEFEDIATE CLOSED C00llhG d?ER(16) W M EF+FN F Ff FfCMGY(17) RV M EF+ F P0 F PV F EV EWST AVAllALE(18) RV M EF- F FC F WB HIGH FffSSWE ILT(fl(N F99 C(19) W RY6 EF- F PC F N F 44 HIGH PFESSWE ICECTION F9f1 A & 6(20) W M $0 F M F 10 EACTM C0(LMT PW SEAL 10.(21) RV RYG S0 F P0 F N F HI HIGH FfESSWE ILTCTICH vees (22) W M TC F W RYJ T+F W M TT F RC RCC PC F N E90 W- F EF- F N M 30 F WA WS EF- F FY F 49 F WA W6 EF+ F W F 49 F ! | |||
WA WS 50 F W F M9 F WA WH RE S HS F 10 I2 WAF 10 INC TC F WA S 10 !M) T; F HA F Hi HIC 4AF HI kl4 49F HI HIE U+ F W F kl HIE EF- F PV F Fl HIE $0 F N F kl HIH 49FES i O | |||
4.2.17-3 | |||
TABLE 4.2.17-2. LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER B0UNDARY CONDITIONS | |||
% W = 01 9) <5 v? (4 11 t) 15 17 19 21 ;) .5 ;7 ;) 31 23 35 "x 1) 02 c4 sb G 10 12 14 16 18 23 :2 24 26 ;$ X ; 14 h ;5 0 53 Mia 1 2 3+5 6 7 3 910111: 131415161714 li ?> 2122 ;3 24 25 2a ~7 3 : 9 'i> 1132 33 .'4 35 h 37 :3 D I l | |||
A'.Hf ... | |||
Tn*T . . . . . i ! . . . 9 . B . . I B 6 5 9 8 . 3 3 835 ! t4 . | |||
s. | |||
. -:.s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
4;c. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
, . ,C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
TM- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
U'Er. , . % . 3;, a . . EE E . a N Ea EN . EF | |||
* E EE , Ea LEEEF E , | |||
6- ' * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
* -47= .F F . | |||
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4:;t0 ..: # . | |||
t : | |||
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*-h *= 0 . . . OG G^ 0 } O 0 00 LLDG 30DD. 9L0 J D 0 | |||
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a d N | |||
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h . Y . Y | |||
* t,.h. | |||
9 | |||
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J | |||
't e & | |||
h h h u 4 | |||
.J J ,J | |||
-J | |||
'a | |||
.a J h | |||
d .J | |||
* 4 ') | |||
* b ** 9 . . 3 .J . | |||
j .i 4 .i | |||
'J . | |||
J 4 | |||
'o 2 .3 4 .0 4 4 | |||
'd | |||
'.o a | |||
. '.J . . . . | |||
L J J | |||
. p | |||
'a 'd 'l 't & 2 4 1 't I a 4.2.17-4 | |||
I l | |||
i n' f D -Lo!! 0F PWR TO .! | |||
l MY,1NF' r Rs i : | |||
Inm 1 | |||
* INm 11 I | |||
~! | |||
I i 1' i | |||
!sm 2 !#m 12 f | |||
1 i f | |||
IRm 15 CORE MMCI Illm 13 l | |||
1 i k | |||
32m & CORI M MCE l | |||
tum 3 Coat pact sNm 7 CORE NmCI IN m 14 O | |||
I ILDT 4 1 _. | |||
j 35m 5 sum 8 l l | |||
1 l | |||
2hi* ta m 9 CORE Nect I | |||
I I | |||
q INEIT 10 ' | |||
b 1 | |||
CCL3 !#E!Miel O FIGURE 4.2.17-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR LOSS OF NUCLEAR l | |||
SERVICES CLOSED C0OLING WATER ; | |||
i 4.2.17-5 ! | |||
-I | |||
/ LOSS OF PWh IOBOIHAUX, GRANSF'M'Rs) | |||
REACIOR \ Rod drives unpw&/- \ SH.11 R | |||
[RI] | |||
IRIP y | |||
/ 'K ,/ | |||
[IURBINE\ | |||
\ IRIP / | |||
. [II:\ J | |||
$ y | |||
~ S.S.SIEAM\/HPI 1600 PSIG \ | |||
[SD] | |||
RELIEF | |||
/'IBUs\C00) | |||
ADUs SH 7 SI6NAL 2 | |||
/ | |||
MSSUs u Keep Pressure Below u gg,\MFWP Slitttoff Head gg, ACSHI 2A ) 2B 1/25/85 / ' | |||
FIGURE 4.2.17-2. EVENT SE EEE DI GR FOR LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER O O O | |||
l o o o SH. SH. | |||
IA IB i | |||
n | |||
.G.sSTARI\ jSB0\ ( SLRDS h -- | |||
I6 | |||
) ANDRUN/ ]H.lf __ _ | |||
l X I --- | |||
HPI' e SIABLISH \ \ [EF- ogCOOL\ | |||
'y | |||
~ | |||
IFWFLOW+/EF+],MX.7.A CONTROL EF+exc.CD*WillfailI.D. | |||
PunP by water carrgover if notalreadyfailedbyNF+' | |||
u top.WillendEFWflow (seeAIP-1210-3) | |||
SH. | |||
i ACSX2 3 | |||
.'6/4/85 *excessivecooldownmayresultinRUfailurefromPIS FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 2 of 15) l | |||
/SH.\ | |||
2 | |||
\) " | |||
Exc N0 | |||
~ | |||
CD REDllCERCS g HEAI REN. \ / 'YES (1600PSIG SIGNAL / | |||
[IC] / | |||
j h RESIORE sHPIPs fai1 -{p . _._ , | |||
SEAL INJ. )HPIPs work, lineup 's'' fails m/tH.\ cont'd loss of C ' | |||
/ '\ 8 / RCS inventorg h 1600psig 's.__ YES SIGNAL OpenMU-Y217 StartsecondM/Upump | |||
/ INCREASE StartDCandDRsystens | |||
\ M/UFLOW) g (assunedtoalwaysoccur) 1 | |||
/ | |||
ACSH3 ( sH.\ | |||
4 1/25/85 \, | |||
/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 3 of 15) i G G S | |||
: O O O l /SH\ | |||
\jl/_' | |||
1600psig __ YES signal - | |||
T N0 | |||
'f HPI SIARIS\ | |||
.' + RUNS / | |||
[HP] / | |||
1 i MUU217, \j BWSI \ [BW-4] | |||
CLOSE \ | |||
e | |||
-/ BWSI ,, | |||
n AVAILABLE)[B!!-21 Y | |||
/ | |||
4 (AVAILABLE E [IH-1] sCONILM/U/ s ,. [BW-1] | |||
assunesnin. MUIrefillrate l - | |||
I I | |||
\ | |||
flowline insufficient | |||
'SIARI3RD\ | |||
,, ' PROVIDE /SH.' | |||
nornally for2HPIPs available h'hgfR/BW-3 \ ./ / | |||
Flowthru F 1 HPIP 'l | |||
,' / PORU/PSYSor SH. SH. | |||
i ACSH4 SH. 5C SH. 5B Sealsis | |||
: 1/28/87 5A 5D Sufficient j FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 4 of 15) | |||
/ | |||
/SH.\ SH \ /SH. ACSil5 4A, ) 4C/ \ 4Bj\ 1/28/87 REDUCE | |||
\ j/ REDUCE | |||
\ | |||
/ | |||
r, M/UFLOW | |||
" [IH-21 sHPIPFLOW I | |||
/ | |||
4 YES;Ircs)500F, | |||
/WATERTHRU\ | |||
'c | |||
\ | |||
[P0,PU) | |||
RELIEFS m | |||
/ $1W, fd yPr-pts:0 r?)P-SHUI 0FF) | |||
N0; I }{I-p FLOWSTOPS | |||
/SIOP HPIPs)\ | |||
/CLOSEVALUs HPIPs. . | |||
/, | |||
(RECRC< | |||
Fail r SH.Q.' [RC]\(200 F SUBQ/ | |||
4 '4 /SH.\ | |||
*Hin-flonorMally \40/ | |||
availablehere fiAINI. RCPT .. | |||
/500 F ) N sinceno1600psig SEAL INIEG' YM-:_' C.D.') | |||
~~ - | |||
I-res) signalgenerated, IIH ICCW / _ | |||
( 200F ) [SE-1] tg FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 5 of 15) | |||
O O O | |||
1 O O O SH. | |||
~ | |||
13 | |||
, i | |||
/CD + DEPR \ CDachievedbyusingIBYs,ADUs,andsprag x | |||
(T0DHRIN | |||
[CD] \ COND. / when secondary systen heat ren, is avail | |||
\ | |||
. blockg (BYPASS LO-PRESS ESFs | |||
/ | |||
l; CFIs ,, | |||
j '0 PEN DROP-\ /SH | |||
[HL-1] LINE UALUES/ p Sg ' | |||
l i | |||
H ALIGNDHR\ | |||
PUMPS HEAT i | |||
IDH] EXCHNGRs/ | |||
l | |||
:4AIT TO C/fA .. | |||
q EjNTUM IX K.((L.D [_;, | |||
A]jg7(8H f 1p l | |||
I I FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 6 of 15) | |||
U SB0 | |||
, x ICA/ | |||
DCs SIARI \ | |||
/ | |||
AC POWER | |||
\/ | |||
PDS 3x GB] AND RUN / [RE]RIC0YERY / | |||
t.;. | |||
I 3usr | |||
\PDS3x ; | |||
[BW] / | |||
- I y AjyY g '\ PDS 3x y | |||
[HP] HPIPs / 2/3 HPIPs available if MS 1/3HPIPsavailableifMS PORY HPIFj\ PDS 3x | |||
[P0, g PU) ,1/2PU+1HPIf I HPIP in 30 Min if 1 PSY i 2HPIPsifless m( | |||
8 ' | |||
1/2585 FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 7 of 15) | |||
O O O | |||
i O O O | |||
/-HI RCSvillrapidly RECRC | |||
/ depressurize after 1 T-i coredanageduetoRV | |||
' /PIGY-BACH RECIhc | |||
\ YES PDS4x nelt-tlirongli, | |||
[HL-2]kALIGNM'I T4 | |||
/ NO Stuck open relief-> | |||
rapiddepress,to SUMP DRAIN PDS 4x \ | |||
LPIP discharge press.g LIisstillpossibleif UALUE we cane le fron H, | |||
/ r 1 | |||
l, [SY] CLOSED C2 FAILED,N0 SPRAYS b i XXsnotreallyneeded f | |||
"' OPEN SUMP PDS \4x J, sinceS.S.heatren, | |||
[SA/ ' | |||
! SB] | |||
REC'lC,/ | |||
UALUES isstillpossible, | |||
! I hutMustkeep AgNgRI,\ ppg 4x , I(300Forpungseals PUMPS,HXs / | |||
' willfail. | |||
i [DH] \ | |||
; I . ~s~ | |||
~ | |||
i SH, <~~~ C D '> | |||
ACSH8 _ | |||
~~' _ | |||
; 1/28/87 9 FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 8 cf 15) i i | |||
_ . _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ . . _ _ _ _ - ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . , .__ | |||
SH. | |||
8 | |||
~ | |||
N0 | |||
<jiPI | |||
_ cool? Itwilltakeunto2weeksto | |||
~~ | |||
- cooldowntheRCStoDhRlevel, | |||
.YES U hutthepress,willstillbehigh. | |||
' RESTORE SS\ | |||
\ PDS h HEATREM > | |||
.BEFOREII/ | |||
2 g ppg g ,, | |||
[CD+DEPR IODHR '" | |||
cCD)\ENIRY / ' | |||
H | |||
/ | |||
BYPASSLO,g PRES ESFs / | |||
'-w-m ';y ._' | |||
~ | |||
SH.\ ( C . D .~~> | |||
ACili9 v28ts7{JV '.- | |||
~- | |||
FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 9 of 15) 4 O O O | |||
O O O | |||
: /SH.\ ACSH10 6 or/ ' | |||
[ OPEN h 1/28/87 | |||
+(' | |||
R.B. ; PurgeandRCdraintankline islateon4psigsignalorRI' RB ISOL'I'f | |||
\ - | |||
[C1/ Sealreturnisolateson30psig C2] | |||
0 RI | |||
,N'f;N0,largeliole . | |||
2 YES 10 P l C [CA/ sig \ # | |||
NQ(REAC. BLDG.) a liigi spee j l CB] / (REAC. BLDGh NA/E[L | |||
) */IlEAC. BLDC\ | |||
I',' I OPEN y- d \ SPRAYS ) | |||
)4 RBFAN \ / | |||
; s III/ \i 'NANUAL RB[CS] (Nanual if i F2]s COOLERS | |||
/ | |||
/ FANSTARI | |||
/ no4psig signal,e 2 g, i , - | |||
i f r'REAC BLDC.') | |||
! (SIABLEAI) ' | |||
l COLD | |||
(' | |||
FAILURE j | |||
(SHUIDOWN | |||
, ) ; | |||
f FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 10 of 15) i | |||
Rf IURBINE g IRIP | |||
[II] ( -. | |||
u | |||
/ | |||
n S.S.SIEAk PORYcoolingisnot ' | |||
EM sufficientto | |||
[333 /' coolthecore. | |||
S DCsSIARI\ | |||
[Ch/ AND RUN j ' | |||
h' GB] | |||
I I ACSHit SH') | |||
5/24/85 12f FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 11 of 15) | |||
O | |||
O o O (I[) | |||
EF+ | |||
/EFWFLOW \ | |||
m {Is h Willgetto11in. | |||
'' /'D, | |||
[EF]\IN5SEC.S) / EF- _C, _._2 | |||
({?HR/ in ahottt 1 Mi | |||
: u. . | |||
/2/3PORY\. | |||
(orPSYs | |||
/ | |||
[P0,PU'1 OPEN | |||
; u i ! gyg7 k.PDS3x y | |||
[gW) n | |||
/ N0 SPRAYS i | |||
[CA/ | |||
4PSIG SIGNAL | |||
\/ PDS 3x ~. | |||
>::__C.D.'> | |||
CB] / _- | |||
l | |||
! ACSX12 (sH. | |||
l 1/28/87 -n x13 i FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 12 of 15) i i a i | |||
/SH} | |||
\12, f OH4PSIGSIGNAL U MANUAL ''- | |||
AUTO. HPI IN\ 30 SEC. - | |||
[HP-1] N M - | |||
/ [HP-3] ACT - | |||
I ON | |||
~ | |||
~~I_I- | |||
'PROVI:)E | |||
\ ><'C.D.~> | |||
HPIPs burnup against pressure | |||
[MR] | |||
HPIP FLOW MIN, / ~~ | |||
~-_ - | |||
spike ) their shutoff head e $ | |||
C / | |||
[FORU+PSUs \ >/LOCA E | |||
aC) \ | |||
RECLOSE | |||
/ \< | |||
p REDUCERCS 1600 psig signal equivalent actuation (HEATREMOUA hasalreadybeenproduced4psigsignal | |||
[IC) so overcooling is uninportant 3_____ | |||
ACSX13 SH.\ | |||
u28/87 6/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 13 of 15) e - - - _ _ _ _ _ | |||
G 9 | |||
O O O 1 | |||
< ~ C.D.) | |||
e notPDST lnotPDS1 (ne,B,C,D/ | |||
~~5_ YES > | |||
; SU,3 p\ nB J ' | |||
'a. YES t' N0 f C1.f3 ; | |||
[C1/ | |||
REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING REACTOR BUILDING | |||
\ / | |||
10 ( | |||
t' pps nF 3 | |||
C2] ISOLATION / [CS]\ SPRAYS / J | |||
'h - | |||
SR,._YES J r | |||
' s._YES F SU _ | |||
\ | |||
REACIOR /0PENSUMP ' -' | |||
3 1 9 [F1/ BUILDING PDS REACIOR UALUES u" l F2] , FAN C'L'RS/ [SR] | |||
nD J BUILDING | |||
~3~ YES [CS]\ SPR$YS / | |||
y DH,3 i REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING A'LIGNiUN \> , , f PDS | |||
) | |||
( nG | |||
/ DHRHEAT J | |||
[CS] SPRAYS [DH] ,EXCHANGERS/ | |||
, m , | |||
i f '' / 3 ACSW14 f PDS | |||
} PDS I ( PDS | |||
} f PDS | |||
} PDS | |||
! 1/28/8h. nA - ) (. nB j i. nA J ( nC J knX J | |||
! FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 14 of 15) | |||
EFWUSING USINGI.D. | |||
[EF-] PUMP o | |||
s.~ | |||
AC REC'R'Y\ | |||
10PREVENI | |||
> :(0. D. ~ > | |||
[RE] CORE DAM. / | |||
E k | |||
II | |||
[HPIPsSIARf | |||
\AND RUN 1r ACSHlii .\ | |||
1/25/85 /SH./ | |||
\6 FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 15 of 15) | |||
O O O | |||
44uutunnunutistautuustuttuutu stutustruutunuun tunuatustu tuu s sunnistusuuussu n uu uu unnu AC af IP TT 50 We TC 4- F. F* TX PO PV W 4 | |||
* St it W 4% WA 14 til $tt DC Statt . SE41 til (0) (0) . @ (C) (C) (( sC) tF) (Op. LC) - (F) 1 5- 'l I i . 1 8 1 1. 11 2 A14 2 I I i 18; 136 L 1 f 3 alt 3 | |||
' gIl i 1 ' I 1. | |||
t i I f 1 1 1 1 1 4 R1A 4 1 I I .I 1 1 1 l- ! I 1 5 All 5- | |||
-' I ! 1 -1 t i 1 i t i 6 RlA 6 | |||
, i I I l I i 1 1 I I l_ -7 Ril 7 1 11 I I I i i l I 4 All 8 I l 1 1 1. 1 1 I I $ Alt 9 I 1 1 I i i ! .1 to 5 le t 'l i i t 1 1 121 1 I i 11 4 11 4 1 1- 1 I I I I t-I l 12 8 12 1 ! I t 1 1 i I i i 13 $ 13 1 11 I .I ! t. I i 1 14 4 14 I I L ! ! 1 1 1 t- I 15 8 il i 1 _1 I i i t '1 I le 1 16 1 I i 1 i ! I I I i 17 A 11 8 t i. !- t I.I I 1 .t 18 8 -18 I '8 I t i I I I t 19 9 19 I i'l I 'l 1 I t MC M i' I I I I I ! 21 $~ 11 I t t ! I t ?! 31 1 I.. . 22 FRit 22 - | |||
t i I I I I 1 I I 23 F113 41 | |||
! I i 1 1 I t 1 i 24 ' A 49 8 1 1 1 -l i i 1 I.I i 1 25 8 54 I I i l l I I t i 1 1 26 A 51 I i l i t I 1 I I i t 27 8 52 1 I t I t i i 1 1 I 20 A 53 1 I i t i t ! I I' 4 1 29 8 $4 1 1 1 1 1 1 I i i ! 36 8 55 1 1 1 I i 1 i t 1 31 C E I 1 1 1 1 i i I 32 Rv2 57 I I i 1 1 1 1 5 33 Rv3 54 I I I I t i l__... 34 IFR3 59 1 8I I i 1 i 35 1 97 I i 1 1 1 1 1 1.. . 36 IFRll 98 1 I I i t i 1 - 37 FE5 117 I I I i 1 1 38 FR13 119 I i 1 1 1 6i I 41 39 ffA 1" 1 I l 1 1- 1 1 171 1 8 t_ 44 FB .28 1 I i ! ! l t 1 1 1 41 FA 129 I I I I I t i I i 1 42 FB 136 I i i i I i 1 1 I 43 FA 131 1 I t 1 I l i l 1 1 44 FB 132 I I i i i ! ! I 1 45 F9 133 I I I I i i ! I 46 FC 134 I I t 1 1 1 l 47 RIA 135 1 -l 1 l I i 141 8 I i 8 44 RIB L36 l 1 1 l 1 1 1 1 1 1 49 Ril 137 | |||
( l 1 1 1 t i i 1 54 ELA 138 I l l I 1 1 I I I I 51 . Ril 139 , | |||
I i l 1 i 1 ! I- t 52 R!S 144 I i I I i i i t 53 RIC 141 l | |||
l 1 t 1 1 1 1 54 FA 142 1 11 1 l l l t I t M F8 143 | |||
! l I I I i 1 I i 56 Fi 144 I . 1 1 i l ! t 57 FA 145 1 1 t 4 : 1 I t l_ 54 Fi 1E | |||
! ! ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 59 Fi 147 4 1 1 I i 1 1 I 64 FC 143 1 1 I I I I , 41 FR4 149 t i I I t I i -_ 62 FR5 165 1 1 1 1 1 1 63 F1 167 1 i l l t til I 64 FC 164 I I l I I I , 65 FR$ 169 t i 1 t i 66 1A6 L71 | |||
, i 11 ' | |||
67 5 23 1 ! ! ! 48 1 1 .. 64 IFRit 224 I I t I i 1 1 61 5 243 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 74 8 244 I t 1 1 1 1 I 71 C 245 I I I i i 1 72 Ins 24 ; | |||
I I I t I.. . 73 FR7 248 i l 1 i I , 74 133 346 I I I i 91 I 75 F14 469 I | |||
I I I i 168 1 76 1314 455 I I I I I 77 134 4 99 1 1 i i t t 79 FIS 515 i i i I t I.. , 79 I 4 15 517 ; | |||
I I I I 80 FL16 521 i 1 1 . il If4 573 I I , 82 131 625 | |||
! . 83 tid (52 | |||
, q t t i i 4 to: 54 Af3 853 I I I t ss st2 654 I I I L lit % ET) 655 8 L ! l 67 Ift10 $M i ! i 1 SS F311 %) | |||
I i 1 99 1Ril 144 1 3 4 Fill %2 I 51 1311 44 e 1 i='ve MW eelit betim vien m = = a FIGURE 4.2.17-3. LOSS OF 0FFSITE POWER EVENT TREE 4.2.17-21 | |||
4.2.18 LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICES CLOSED COOLING WATER MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.18-1 presents the total loss of nuclear services closed cooling water frontline, early response event tree. Table 4.2.18-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.18-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a total loss of nuclear services closed cooling water initiating event are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. All of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a total loss of nuclear services closed cooling water initiating event. The A subtrees in the general transient event tree were changed to ANS, a version to allow for specific recovery actions that are accounted for in the support system event tree. | |||
O 1 | |||
4.2.18-1 OS87G102087PMR | |||
O TABLE 4.2.18-1. LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICES CLOSED COOLING WATER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS tutt ttut tti tti t er**n tututtuttu tu tt t tt tut tautttt* ***ttuttttuttunt** ut tsuut tutut ttttut tatttu tuttuttttt titutt* | |||
DDT M CF EiDT VLIT C00!TIMS FFACTION LM LOSS (F ME;A SEWlES lhlTIAT1% BDT RT FIACTA TRIPil) SH RT F | |||
@ REXTA CAMT P# TRIP (2) TC4 64 TT 1 Wilt TRIFt3) T-J TC F SO SECC*CMY STEM FILIEF(4) TT4 RT F W+ 4) EICE351W Mh FEE"WiER(5) TH TC F TC Tuft!%TE ?ECC*t4Y STEM FfLIEF(6) TH4 T4 W- 9fFICIENT MIN FEEMTER(7) TH TT F EF SJFICIEkT 9EDGEKY FEEMTER(8) PH N$ | |||
EF+ 4) EtCESSI'd ETMENCY FEEWTER(9) PH NB TH T40TTLE MIGH PPl5$tSi ICECTICN FLW(16) N-A TH PC PJV (fGS(11) W-C RT F P0 F W PiV5 (fS5(12) W-0 TH F P0 F W FIACTA Witil FAILyf FM PT3(13) W4 TH F P0 F W F K KWiPiVS CL(riE(14) W4 EF4 M F M JFATOR ESi!A!!+(5 MWfLN(15) W4 EF4 N F W F it thief.CIATE CLOSE3 CMI% WTEP16) W4 EF4 P0 F Ei RIC04Rf(17) W4 EF4 P0 F W F E4 Eni A.' AIL /4WlB) W4 50 F P0 F WS PIM FEfiRFI NECTIM P.fP C(13) W4 50 F M F W F 4A HIb F5I5SJf NECTIM htP3 A & St29) W4 TC F N Pit <TA CowT PM SEtt ICEtil><21) W-J T4 H1 a:6H FffSkFi NECTIM VUES(22) W-K TT F FI MWw TO Fill 23) RC4 P0 F EH W4 EF4 N4 $0 F | |||
+4 f.F4 N F W1F | |||
@4 EF4 N F WiF fi to F W F MfF IH WW IN-C TC F WAS IN-0 TCFWV HI-C WCf Hl-4 dif H14 EF4 W F Hl4 EF4 W F M1-E 50 F W F F1-C TC F O | |||
4.2.18-2 | |||
u 1 | |||
i, t | |||
1 i | |||
i I | |||
1 TABLE 4.2.18-2. LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE COOLING WATER j B0UNDARY CONDITIONS > | |||
). | |||
l 4 ho =N2 :34 ;% De 210 12 214 !6 :19 :D :.". 2:4 ;3 ::t 0.1 ti: 04 M 34 20 t N3 M ;07 OM 211 !!) 215 09 :19 221 23 205 ;3 2.% 31 3) :$ M7 23 202 l 1 | |||
5/ sus 1 234 S4 7 i | |||
* 10111: 131411161718 9 M t 22 :3 :4:53 7 :1 9 to 313: n ;4 35 h it M it i 4*MT ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ! | |||
me ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
t i | |||
fitif ......................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . , | |||
t WiS .......... . .................. . . . . . . | |||
4W ..( . . . . . C. . CC . . . . . 4 . . .C% % % N CC. C. . . h h C% 4 . | |||
: 4. . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , | |||
WW . 00. 00000. 0000. . 000. 00. 0000000000.00000. > | |||
. . d a DBg a . . 6EE . . *.*Ed it . ( | |||
* 8 f( E. ( | |||
* n D( EEF i . ; | |||
.F,CU-L e* * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l M'= F i . . F : cF . . . t C . . F . | |||
c . . . F cF t . . 9 9 i t FcFF Fi , | |||
W) . . F F . . F . | |||
E . CCF . . F . 5 t . F . . 9 C F F F F , F 9 F . FF F t F , | |||
hN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . c i | |||
MW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ; | |||
W3C . . . . . . L . . . 6 . . F . L . . . FL L L L F . . . . . L LL L L . l | |||
%W . . . . . . . . . 68. . . . . l. . . . 1985 . 1. 6. . 355 55 i tait . D . 3DDD 3 . . l!D. . L 89. L. ( 0DI. IDDDDDEDC LD. ! | |||
w4 | |||
.- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i l | |||
PWu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
+M . . . . . . . . . J . . . . J J C J J J J v JJ J J. . J J . JJ CJ J J J . | |||
, -wa , 6 < ., 4 . s e la! = I1 . s ; <0Ig! ! ! 1( t t t t( s 1 1 1 ! t( . | |||
14N . . : . EE . . . . . . . . Et . E . ( Et . . . EE . i i tite. | |||
1 a. ' ! . . . . . . . 4 CCCCA A C A | |||
* A 4 G004A CC00. A0C0004 . | |||
+ | |||
6 Fh t . . . . . . | |||
4 a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
e.~.s u .",. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
ww . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
8.c- . 30. 30 0Gi 0 00 . 300 } 0 . ) 3 00000030 . G 00C G . | |||
a- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
] 7-P- . . ) . . . . . Gs G6. iG04 i i 6. 0L ) G 30D 50 3000 G. . | |||
t-9 7- . . G. . . . . . 0) GG . GGG0044. LLL316LL. G L 3L3: 3 . | |||
[ | |||
'-8 % . . G . . . . . . ^ 3 4. G 600 G DDD400DD. 3 00DLDG. i | |||
. %w) . 5 4 . . F i . : t t . . i , cF . F . . F F t E F t . cC i . F F t ? t . | |||
b W) . . i . . C . i . | |||
+ 3 . . F , F i . ! . F F F i FF . F F F i t G c e , | |||
, hw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
! UW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
. WV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i M4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
354 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
4Gv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
,  . . . . . . ......................... . . . . | |||
<W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . | |||
l J4 . . . . . . . ..................... . . . . . . | |||
IMv . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
814 . . . . . . . .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
44 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
*i'4 . . . . . . . .......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
e.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
j i.H. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i Wie . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
1 " M4 . ! . ! ! : . .! ! 1 1 . ; 1 1 1 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! . | |||
2 4d 4 . . . ! ! ! ! ! I ! ! ! I ! ! ! . I I ! ! ! l i ! ! I l 1 1 1 1 1 1 dws . 1 . . ! I l ! I . i l ! . | |||
! ! ! ! ! ! ! !i l l i ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! . | |||
NN . . . | |||
. ! . . . . . . . . . . 5 4 . F F F i .. . * | |||
* F ccce i , | |||
RN . 9G . . . . . . . G0. . 0. 300. . . . GG. 006G ) G . | |||
NW . . . . .. . . . . . a * . . * . a a . . . . .m . a n o n = w . | |||
-; M . . . . . . . ) . . 66C0G $ G60660. . GG GGC 40 ) G . | |||
n -:6 . . . . . 06 3 i 4 . . 34G 4 0005 . . Gi404 . . | |||
; .:( ! . . . . . . . GG6 300 } 0 06 06G +G'GS 40 . GGv GSG . | |||
4 H-i . . . i4 G GG 6 6 i 9 iiG 4i ii Gi. G JGG ) G G. | |||
j ;i-1 . . . . . . O G 406 04' - i i e G GG. G6G ^GG06 3 } . | |||
I I | |||
4 1 | |||
. 4.2.18-3 I | |||
,- --, -.- - . . ,-- - -- wm,-_n---,-- r-~ n ,----,n,,,, .,n | |||
,n_ - , - - - | |||
tun t u tt t ttitu ttt** u ttttt tutu t tut ***t tuttt ttttituut t t tu tsu tutts u t t a t ts uts utt t tttt tt t t tttt ttau t ttt t tu ts ta tt u tt us Lki AT FP iT !0 W+ TC 6- ET- EF+ TW F0 PV W RC S SE RE rd 49 WA IM nl FI MQ 00 STATE !a 1 S 1 1 1 : : i 1 21 11 1._. 2 (01 2 1 : 1 1 i I i ! 3 $ 3 l l l 1 ! I I i i i I ; 4 (01 4 1 1 I i i l ! I I i 1 5 W 5 l i l 1 1 1 1 ! I I I 6 8 6 1 I I I t i i i ! l 7 5 7 I I I ! ! ! I I I i 1 8 CO2 8 1 1 1 1 i i I I I I 9 W5 9 | |||
! ! ! ! ! 1 1 1 I 1. 16 8 16 1 1 1 i I 1 l 11 $ 11 1 I I I I 1 1 l__1 1 1 12 CO2 12 I i i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 E 13 1 I I i l i l i l 1 14 8 14 I I I I I I I I I _ __ | |||
15 B 15 I I i i 1 ! ! ! 16 C 16 | |||
: l l l 1 1 1 17 IFR1 17 I I I i l 1 Ti 3; i 13 W 33 I I 1 1 1 1 1 I i i i ! 19 8 34 i 1 i ! ! I 1 I I I N N 35 1 1 ! ! l l t 1 1 1 1 21 B 36 i ! ! i i I i I I l_ 22 W 37 I l 1 i I i t i I : 23 8 33 I I i l I 1 i l 1 24 8 7) 1 ! l 1 I I 25 C 46 I l l I I I ! I 26 Ev2 41 1 I 1 1 1 1 51 27 W3 42 1 ! I i i i 28 IFR3 43 | |||
: I 1 1 I i 29 KFR1 6) i I i ! ! ! N IFFS 65 I t ! I I i ?! IFR2 87 I I I 1 1 1 32 ETA 173 i 1 i : 6: I 41 i 1 33 EIB 174 i i I I i : 1 : 1 I 34 ETA 175 I i t ! I I t i I i 1 35 EIB 176 | |||
: 1 I I i 1 1 I I . M ETA 177 1 I ! I I I I I i ! 37 EfB 178 l l l 1 l 1 i I i 33 EI6 179 | |||
! 1 1 I i ! i ! I _ | |||
23 EfC IN i i l i i I i I 44 ETA 181 1 I I I i i 1 i ! 41 EfB 162 1 1 1 1 i ! I I i 1 42 EfB 10 1 ! I i i I ! 1 I 43 ETA 184 1 1 1 1 : I ! i I I 44 EFB 165 l l l l I 1 i i 45 EfB 196 i I 1 I t 1 46 EFC 187 i i l 1 I t ! 47 IFF4 !!:3 | |||
: 1 i l i i i 43 XFR5 1% | |||
i ; i ! I I 4) EfB 1 93 | |||
: i ! l 1 1 ; I 56 EFC IH 1 i l i l i 51 IFF5 M | |||
: 1 I I I . 52 IFF6 N2 | |||
: l l l t 53 IFR1 231 1 i ! I i 8I I i 54 S 247 1 : ! I t i I I 55 B 243 I i i ! i i i 54 B 24) | |||
I i : ; i ! i, 57 C 25t | |||
; I i 1 1 l l 53 IFAS 251 | |||
: : : I !. . 53 IFR7 253 | |||
: : : : 1 id ITi3 323 | |||
: : i 91 1 61 *FF6 415 l l ! ! 1 62 IFE6 444 i i 63 IFE) 473 i ! i ! (4 IFE) 623 I i ! (5 IFF6 773 1 1 64 1FR) 542 1 67 Ef4 952 l . : : 10: _ f4 RT) %) | |||
I : i I () Ei2 554 l l l l 11: 74 E13 ?SS l l !__ 71 LFild v% | |||
i I 1 .. 72 IFEll 958 l : 1 73 | |||
* Fill N4 1 ; . 74 1 Fill %2 l -= | |||
75 IF All M4 FIGURE 4.2.18-1. LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICES CLOSED COOLING WATER EVENT TREE 4.2.18-4 | |||
. M' % | |||
( j 4.2.19 TOTAL LOSS OF RIVER WATER MAIN TREE Figure 4.2.19-1 presents the flow of the event sequence diagram in Figure 4.2.19-2. Figure 4.2.19-2 presents the event sequence diagram for the total loss of river water initiating event. Figure 4.2.19-3 present. | |||
the total loss of river water frontline, early response event tree. | |||
Table 4.2.19-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions used in the event tree. Table 4.2.19-2 is the boundary condition table for this event tree. | |||
Most of the alleviating actions that will take place following a total loss of river water initiating event are the same as those shown on the general transient ESD. All of these actions are important to preventing core damage following a total loss of river water initiating event except the main feedwater actions. Top Events MF+ and MF- are made impossible by the initiating event and therefore do not appear in this event tree. | |||
Recovery actions evaluated as split fractions REB and REF are used in this event tree to allow the operators to recover river water after plant trip, but prior to core damage. Long-term high and low pressure sump recirculation actions and containment safety features, when required, that determine to which plant damage state a core damage scenario initiated by a loss of river water leads are shown in the following subtrees: | |||
e RWA (see Section 4.3.17) when HPI is available af ter successful e recovery. | |||
(\ - '') e RWB (see Section 4.3.18) when it is not available after successful recovery. | |||
e RWC (see Section 4.3.19) when the BWST is not available a'ter successful recovery. ' | |||
s C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available. | |||
e RV2 (see Section 4.3.10) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is available. | |||
e RV3 (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when the reactor vessel has ruptured and the BWST is not available. | |||
e BFA (see A described in Section 4.3.1) when HPI cooling is in progress and the HPIs are available. | |||
e BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required but HPI flow is not available. | |||
e BFC (see C described in Section 4.3.3) when HPI cooling is required and the BWST is not available, o RT4 (see Section 4.3.9) when reactor trip has failed and all other 7 | |||
alleviating systems have operated correctly. | |||
( 4 4.2.19-1 0587G102087PMR | |||
5 e RT2 (see the B subtree described in Section 4.3.2) when reactor trip and the high pressure injection have both failed. | |||
e RT3 (see the C subtree described in Section 4.3.3) when reactor trip and the BWST have both failed. | |||
O O | |||
0587G102087PMR | |||
V TABLE 4.2.19-1. LOSS OF RIVER WATER TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL _ SPLIT FRACTIONS n'* * 'i ntit** ******nte rmentst***ntm'titut**ntietts t emmit enest eetee t* ** ' tut ***uttu nuutin************ ******nutt C04!T!0til SFt!T FRATC10NS: | |||
EST Wtf & EST inti COCITims FRET!0N LR LOSS W R!G WTER INITIATING EST RT REXTCR TE!P (1) E4 - EF4 TT TWSIT Tli1P (2)' SH RT F 10 SECOGRY STEM FELIEF (3) RV-C TH F TC TE*c!MTE SECOCW S'EM FELIEF (4) W4 TW F M F EF- S.FFICIENT ETRBCf FEEMTER (5) W4 Th F P0 F W r EF+ W EXCES$14 E.'OGENCY FEEMTER (6) W-0 GtF P0 F TH TWTTLE HIM FE5541 !LTCTIM RW (7) W4 EF4 P0 F PV F M PWV (fE6 (9) W4 EF4 P0 F N PM (fEW (9) PM EFf P0 F W F W E. ACTOR WS5EL FAILW1 FROM PTS (161 W4 TC F . | |||
RC P%V/PM CL(GE (11) W4 TC F TH F r tft Ffoi!OE HIM FFIS9ff NECTION r. ' 12) W4 TC F TH F P0 F E ECWEPv (13) Rv4 TC F TH F P0 F W F l SE IN' DILATE CLCED CWJL!% MTER (14) FV-A TT F N E4T t.V*ILIAE (15) W4 S0 F P0 F p 49 WA HIM Fff53AE NECTION PIM C (16) klM FfE554f ILTCTim P#$ A 14 (17) | |||
Pv4 AC C 50 F M F PY F P0 F i | |||
N FfXTM CVJLMT PM SEAL NECTION (18) RC4 PY F HI HIM F9E55t$E NECTION WLWS (19) Ev4 SD F FI C01DM 70 FII (h.' W4 WFWW W4 EF4 N F W W W4 EF4 N F WV W4 50FNF45 W-N Fi S W4 E5NFWV W4 E$G4NF$5 W4 E S G4 N F WW W4 FE S W F N F WW IN4 WF 4 !!K TC F H3 IM4 TC F WV N1-A WW HI-J E$ | |||
N! J E $ WW i HI J E | |||
* U4 PV F k! J F1 $ EF4 W F Hl-J RE S 50 F N F N-4 TH 8 PH EF4 PH TH $ | |||
PH TH B 1 | |||
O | |||
. 4.2.19-3 | |||
TABLE 4.2.19-2. LOSS OF RIVER WATER B0UNDARY CONDITIONS h 4 a:A ;4; ;34 ;4 ;4) ;*4 ;*2 ;!4 ;56 ;* 3 ;t0 ;62 ;64 :n ;v) ;N l'2 ;74 2'5 ;' . | |||
;41 ;43 ;15 ;47 ;43 ;$1 ;53 .5 * ;57 ;9 ;61 ;>3 ;W ;67 ;49 ;71 ?) ;'5 ta .?* | |||
35i91 ; 34 5 e 7 4 * .2 !! 12 t) 141516 !? 1819 N ;l ;2 ;) ~4 ;5 26 27 .'9 ;? 10 31 ;0 33 34 35 24 2713 3) | |||
...T | |||
: 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
?*A'1 . . . . . . . . . 3 . l. . . 6 . . n..I b i 886 . IIi66 III . | |||
A0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i'.4.C JCU- a =0La * . EiE . d . % ( a E4 . EF F EEi . i a a 0( EEF E . | |||
t....v e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
* -A i. F F . . F F r F . . F F F -. . . F F F F ,. F 8 F F F F F t i F , | |||
n Xeo . F F . | |||
c . F , F F . . F , F F . F . . F F F F F F , 1 F F . FF F FF . | |||
N:N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
O; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
M . . . . . . BB . . . . l . . . . 8&3 8 . 9 . 5 . . I i i i & . | |||
Fi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
WE D D, D3000 . . I E D. . ; 3 0. . L , i I DI &D D30DCD3L . | |||
: win . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:'l . 4 . . . . . . . J . J J C J J J J J J J - ) . J J . 2 ) C J J J ) . | |||
J a-3 4 < < . . - . 6 4 1 | |||
* I I . A ! . C i 9 I i i !a ! ! ! I e ( ! ! ! ! ! < | |||
: .4 N . E i i . . . . . . . . . E ! .. E i Ef . . EE i i!EiE . | |||
e; a! . . . 4 CCC . 4 A C 4 4 4 4 G G GGA C C 3) , 4 000 ) GA . | |||
301 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
"I ; SD 0300D D0 ') : D00$000 ; & D 32 0 *) 030003. Ot: OD . | |||
:;f D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
L.tk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
W . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
4 .v .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
i4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
' O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
I 4 ;4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
l 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
'.14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
MN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
t . 5, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
1 ~.?- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
l l . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
'' . t . . F t . . . * - L L t 8 . . . . . ..L . t , | |||
i.H. . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . | |||
:' 31 I . I I I i i i ! . I I I I 1 ! ! 1 ! i ! ! ! ! ! 1 I ! ! ! ! I i W4 ! l . I I I I ! ! 1 ! ! I i 1 ! ! 1 i 1 1 1 I i ! I i i i ! ! . | |||
Ava ! . I 1 I i i . . I i 1 1 1 I ! i i ! ! I i 1 1 ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ; I ! : | |||
i -3 W4 . . I I i 1 1 I i i ! I . I i ! ! I I 1 i ! ! ! ! 1 I . ! ! I i 1 1 ! . | |||
;wa . ! . s . # 6 . ! I I e | |||
> i i ! I 1 i i s ! I I I . | |||
* 7 | |||
* I t 1 I l . . | |||
3; :a . I i i ! . I I I I I I ! . I I ! ! ! ! ! I I 1 1 ; a ! ! t i ! . | |||
mA ' | |||
I . ! ! ! ! ! I i ! I i i 1 i ! ! ! I i ! ! ! ! 1 9 I I I I ! . | |||
: :4 . i 1 . I i ! ! . I i i ! ! ! 1 I i i ! I i 1 I a i I 1 I . | |||
:: ;4 1 1 1 1 1 i I 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1 ! ! I i ! t 1 9 i 1 1 1 I l | |||
1 1 1 . . . | |||
NN . 3 . . . . . F F , | |||
* , + F F . F i . F J t F F NN . 4 i . . . . . . i 0 . 0 00 0 . . 3S . 0 0 i00 . | |||
.;N . .. , . , . . , | |||
. 4 , | |||
. . . .i . . | |||
-w;4 . . 3u 5 4 5 0 . G s 90 0 . | |||
. 4 ) ) 6 6 iiv ' :s ) ,, as a0 0 J4 9 , v a< >0 0 9 | |||
- -! i > i 9 4 ) ; 9 u ) 0 0 0 0 s ; G G ) 10 0s G 1 G i | |||
. .: i i G G ) G u i 2 0 i G0 6 si i 4 , ) ) i | |||
-: X , , G i G0 i 3 v G S0 0 t " i G iu G G ; 4 ) G S0 > | |||
-H s ) . i ) 3 i G ) G U s i G# G i ) i e = i i ie a ss . . . . . . . | |||
l | |||
;+ . . . . | |||
l -w a : . F F . | |||
e . F F , F . F . F F . : . - e F | |||
. , . ' . F . , | |||
, F s # . F . 4 e a 5 1 | |||
1 I | |||
4.2.19-4 | |||
%./ | |||
'lllIdid' I | |||
sum i su m it i l su m a sum 12 | |||
~ | |||
l 1 sum sum t sum is sum 4 ceu react : | |||
ex., | |||
( ! | |||
sa m 4 | |||
'' sum is I | |||
sam s in m : | |||
I | |||
~ | |||
'" 'r w' 'r"' ' ceu auct su m , /conunct sair,s. | |||
I cots susen l | |||
l 7- FIGURE 4.2.19-1. ESD LAYOUT DIAGRAM FOR LOSS OF RIVER WATER O l l | |||
4.2.19-5 1 | |||
' ( 'lintakescreensblocked+screensnotclearedintineto 10IALLORW preventdaMagefortttrhtrip(6indiffacttiators) | |||
( _ | |||
) screenwash, lain diff alarns locally and in cent rn f | |||
[ note 1: \ | |||
AP1203-21 decreaselok AP1203-19 | |||
\ _ | |||
I | |||
/ | |||
on SSCCW | |||
/ | |||
hlace stnd}) | |||
GscoWatt.it;.\Xch | |||
\1nservice/'. | |||
b i G 5 | |||
4 Mantial titch\ | |||
triu /atttoII\ | |||
n high tenP/ | |||
/' Mantial RI | |||
/ | |||
? < < | |||
REACIOR \ AUTO ON /RI\ | |||
IRIP or | |||
[RI] | |||
- / IIMANUAL \sh/11 al I | |||
note ssee 1: start additio$ve+ | |||
pttnps+va LORKSH1 /sh \ coolerstonalntain 1/22/87 | |||
\2 / aceqttate cooling FIGURE 4.2.19-2. EVENT S UEEE D AG FOR LOSS OF RIVER WATER O O O | |||
O O O s i IBU'S SSSTEAX Ah,h}lPI | |||
! [SD) | |||
, RELIEF s \j0 | |||
; /HANUAL \' | |||
withNSRWfailedr RCP'S are trip ifnotorstatorcenp>1500orno$ed orhearing | |||
\.RCPIRIP / | |||
\ - tenp)195F(ap1203-20) | |||
- - 4 | |||
;p i j ttto efw pulpt, , | |||
,, /nanual efw | |||
~ | |||
\ pitMF start l | |||
\ht on qp9 1fi I , d | |||
/ESIABLISH \[g op/jjpI\ | |||
g COOL'; | |||
Efil FL0ll + | |||
( M_ L ___/sg;j 7; / EF+] | |||
LORilSil2 1/23/87 sh]\ | |||
3 FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 2 of 14) | |||
SH. | |||
2 m | |||
REDUCE RCS\ H0 IIC] | |||
HEAT REH | |||
/ (Exc/ | |||
.,CD. | |||
_t_ | |||
1600PSIGs ALREADY? | |||
(gigggt ) | |||
VES p | |||
E < ,4 . | |||
^ | |||
5 1600psig ~ ~ ' . VES SIGNAL /N0 OpenNH217 StartsecondH/Upttnp IUCREASE\ StartDCandDRsystens | |||
[HP-8] H/UFLOW / (asstined to always ocettr) 1 Provide continttottsly to seals A | |||
IH.\ | |||
L0EWSH3 1/22/87 | |||
: 4) / | |||
nouu 4.2.19-2 (sneet 3 or 14) e O | |||
* i O O O l SH , | |||
9_ | |||
1600psig __ | |||
_ Y E S signal y- T N0 ' | |||
'HPISIARIS\ | |||
+ RUNS T | |||
/ | |||
! C CLOSE Muy217,>s/ \. | |||
BWSI \ [BW-1] | |||
AYAILABLE)AYAILABLE /[BW-1] | |||
BWSI | |||
\ > | |||
s [IH-1] CONI L M/U/ s / / | |||
assunesnin, MUIrefillrate I i flowline insufficient 3' ROYIDE | |||
\ >/SH, | |||
) | |||
nornally available for2HPIPs mig 0W \ 5D l < | |||
~~ | |||
) | |||
i U SH. U SH.\ | |||
! LOBHSH4 | |||
/SH.\ 50 /SH'\ 5B > | |||
1/22/87 / | |||
\5A / \5D/ | |||
l FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 4 of 14) i | |||
SH. SH, L0EWSH5 | |||
/SH. 1/22/87 4A 4C | |||
\4B I t t (1) | |||
EELORWSH5 ,, | |||
REDUCE M/UFLOW | |||
\/ Ei / REDUCE sHPIPFLOW | |||
\ | |||
y / p [IH-21 i l 4 | |||
/WAIER THRU\ YES'Ircs)500F, (2) \(**) (RELIEFS ' | |||
/ | |||
$10/* | |||
Il0 | |||
" PP-pts:0 | |||
- [P0,PY]' | |||
{EE LORWSH5f-(_N> e s 0)P-SHUI 0FF''3 | |||
! 9 hl-f\ /SIOP FLOWSTOPS | |||
< HPIPsh IPs (- | |||
[RECRC CLOSEYALYs m | |||
\ (200F ssH 8,j IRC3 SUBq) Fall r 4 '4 4 | |||
* Min-flonorMally y | |||
/SH.)\ | |||
\40 availablehere - | |||
AINI. RCP\ ____ - | |||
/500F) ') sinceno1600psig EAL INTEG' Y)-+C' C.D. > | |||
I-res) | |||
^ | |||
signalgenerated. IIH ICCW / _ | |||
( 200F ) [SE-1] tg FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 5 of 14) | |||
; e e e | |||
O . | |||
O O | |||
(*) STOP Hil-PIB & START Hil-PIA; ALTERNATE OPERATING IINE BEIllEEN A,B,&C MAHEllP PilHPS TO HINIMIZE IIEAT LOAD OH NSCC l | |||
C (n)LEAKRATEIS20GPMPERPilMPFORFIRSTTENHOURS | |||
}g THENINCREASETO300GPHPERPilHP i | |||
(1) ALTERNATE INSERVICE TIME ON MAKEllP PilMPS TO EXTEND RECOUERY TIME i | |||
(2) ACTIONS TO RESTORE RIVER llATER BEFORE SEAL INJECTION IS LOST FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 5' of 14) i | |||
: LORWSH5a l 1/23/87 | |||
/SH \ | |||
\13/ | |||
i CD1 +ItiDEPR \ CDachievedbyttsingIBUs,ADUs,andsprag | |||
[ D] 0 / when secondary systen heat ren, is avail i | |||
BYPASS | |||
\ | |||
block (LO-PRESS ESFs | |||
/ | |||
g CFIs h , , | |||
@ OPEN DROP-\ | |||
" > g" ' | |||
gg _g LINEVALUES | |||
/ | |||
1 ~ | |||
LIGN DilR \ | |||
PuliPS HEAI' I | |||
[DH] EXCHIGRs/ flAIITOC/h . | |||
E H | |||
4 | |||
];I y K.)]_:_) | |||
f]Sh6 FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 6 of 14) 9 _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ . | |||
9 --_--_ _ _ | |||
e | |||
O O O f7\ | |||
k_h,_/ | |||
SIOP 3/4 \ ie. , run one punp to pronote Mixing in reactor vessel forPISprevention, | |||
; a rea/ "f A | |||
/ BWSI | |||
\PDS3x 739)\AVAILABLE/ | |||
,c : | |||
;y N ffAL '\ PDS 3x "g i [HP] SIARI / 2/3 HPIPs available if MS | |||
) , , 1/3HPIPsavailableifMS PORY+2HPIPh'' pps 3x m i [P0, OR 9 | |||
! FYJ 1/2PY+1HPIf 1 IIPIP in 30 nin if 1 PSY g | |||
_.L 2HPIPsifless _ | |||
! SH, LORWSH7 <f ~C. D ' , | |||
~> | |||
; 8 ~- | |||
1/22/87 _ | |||
1 | |||
; FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) i | |||
ECh RCSwillrapidIg depressurizeafter T core danage dtte to RU | |||
/, RECIlic PIGY-BACH, | |||
\ YES PDS4x .- nelt-throttgh. | |||
[HL-2]\ALIGilM'I Stttok open relief-> | |||
/ Il0 rapiddepress,to M | |||
$UllP PDs 4x DRAltl\ | |||
LPIP discharge press. LIisstillpossibleif VALUE 4 | |||
* wecaneherefran5. | |||
c 5: | |||
[SYJ CLOSED I | |||
/ C2 FAILED,fl0 SPRAYS i llXsnotreallyneeded pps 4x ,, | |||
[SA/ | |||
'0PEll RECIRC SullP \ p sinceS.S.heatren. | |||
SB] YALUES / isstillpossible, I httt ntist keep | |||
/;hII[EIs\PDS4X y I(300Forpttnpseals willfail, | |||
[pll] \PUllPS,HXs / | |||
8 f ~__ | |||
LOMSH8 H, <: C.D. > | |||
~' - | |||
1/22/87 9 FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 8 of 14) | |||
O O e | |||
O O O SH. | |||
8 H0 g,lihI cool? | |||
Itwilltakeupto2weeksto l - | |||
__ cooldowntheRCStoDHRlevel, DYES httt the press, will still be high. | |||
IESIORE pps 4', | |||
SS\ | |||
HEAIREM > | |||
JEFORE lE / | |||
; pg | |||
; 4 'CD+DEPR ppg g g | |||
10 DllR >g | |||
[CD] ENIRY / , | |||
y | |||
'BYPASSLO,g j PRES ESFs / | |||
"^ _ 0 ., _ | |||
.Sh. ' | |||
LORWSH.9 la < C. D.') | |||
1/22/87 ' | |||
~~--_ | |||
i FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 9 of 14) 1 | |||
SH.\ L0EllSH10 1/22/87 6er/ | |||
9 OPEl{ 3 i, R.B. ; PurgeandRCdraintankline t ' ' | |||
1 isolateon4psigsignalorRI; | |||
[C1/ RB ISOL'I'h ~. Sealreturnisolateson3(1psig C2] | |||
Oli RI | |||
/ ' | |||
C!_t,. | |||
110,largehole | |||
,, 1ES yo I' a Fans trip if running | |||
\ | |||
" 4PSIG 460g# ll0(REAC. BLDG.'iat high speed | |||
[CA/ | |||
h CB] / (REAC BLDC.'3 EA/NB | |||
' J | |||
~ / EEAC. BLDC.\ | |||
I4 I RB Fall | |||
\(. | |||
OPEll | |||
)4 y'd \ SPRAYS | |||
' / | |||
Ifl COOLERS / >/lloilHAL | |||
\foilSIARI F RB \ | |||
[CS] llanual if F2] / s / no4psig y signal,m I' ' | |||
(REAC, BLDG.') | |||
(SIABLEAI'l FAILURE COLD 4 (. ) | |||
l.,SilDID0Hil ) y FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 10 of 14) | |||
O O O (H | |||
' s. s BAEoHERFAILilHE YES Turbinetriponreactortripis | |||
, IllRBIHE | |||
\ hased on breaker position, IRIP | |||
[II] k / | |||
y 4- 4 | |||
: u E - | |||
' RCSreliefcoolingisnot 6 S.S. SIEAN'\ - | |||
sufficientto RELIEF | |||
/ | |||
K~C ~ . D . ~> | |||
[SD] ~/~ | |||
coolthecore. | |||
\ | |||
gr.i. | |||
, / | |||
MFH \ .u Loss 0.f sec s9s. | |||
MF-Powerdropsvaridlywith411'hinventorg | |||
[MF] \RAMPBACK | |||
/ increasing RCS tenp. | |||
_6 | |||
} kNR/in26 Mins. | |||
LORWSHil /SH. DoeslackofMFWchangeHPIPorPSVorEFWsuccesscriteria? | |||
\ 12 l1/22/87 (IGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 11 of 14) 1 | |||
y, 11 i | |||
EFilFL0lj\ EF+ | |||
[EFJ IN5SEC.S) | |||
/ | |||
m /' y- | |||
^ C,D :- (jiFh llill get to 11 in. ' | |||
EF-- | |||
tif '- | |||
filR/ in about I nin. | |||
2/3PORY\ | |||
or PSN | |||
[P0,PY1 OPEN / | |||
C 1r | |||
$ ! k.PDS3x BHST g | |||
[Bg] | |||
II | |||
/ N0 SPRAVS | |||
/ 4PSIG '' | |||
[CA/ gigggt | |||
\j PDS3x p; C.D. ') | |||
CB] / _' | |||
f LOEllSIll2 /SH,\ | |||
1/22/87 \13/ | |||
FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) | |||
O O O | |||
O O O | |||
@ I OH4PSIGSIGilAL P | |||
^ | |||
'AUT0, HPI \ IN 30 SEC, /HANUAL - | |||
s SMN / HPIP K C.~ D _.> | |||
/ | |||
[HP-1] | |||
III [HP-3]hACIDAII0H ~_' -- | |||
4 , | |||
'PR0YI)E | |||
[HPIP MIN, / | |||
\ ' | |||
~- | |||
---vc_'C.D.'~> HPIPs httrattp against pressttre | |||
[Mg] \ FLOW | |||
~~ - | |||
spike ) their shtttoff head 5 i | |||
? - | |||
/' | |||
PORY+PSYs \ >/ LOCA | |||
[RC] | |||
RECLOSE | |||
.a | |||
/ | |||
/ | |||
\_]) | |||
~ | |||
l' | |||
,REDUCERCS kHEAT REMOYAL_ -- | |||
\ 1600 psig signal eqttivalent actttationn has already been proditced 4 psig signal so overcooling is tininportant 4_ _ _ _ _ | |||
L0ENSH13 H. | |||
1/22/87 6 FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 13 of 14) | |||
'j~_j-]' ' ',' | |||
s_ ~,- | |||
_ ,. /notPDST | |||
~ 3 | |||
~_ | |||
(nn,B,C,D/ | |||
SY,__YES r m t'( not PDS | |||
) | |||
nB h YES r N0 i C1t_: T | |||
; [C1/ REACIOR\ | |||
BUILDING | |||
/ REACIOR | |||
( BUILDING | |||
\ "10 / | |||
1 l | |||
ppS "y | |||
3 C2] ISOLATION / [CS]\ SPRAYS / l | |||
'5~ YES J S E '__ | |||
3-l . | |||
5 SY JES | |||
\ | |||
9 'REACIOR | |||
?[F1/ | |||
OPENSUMP r PDS 3 - | |||
BUILDING /REACIOR YALUES m | |||
* F2] FAN C'L'RS/ [gg) , | |||
, ( nD J (ggILDIgg\j h _ | |||
_ YES [CS]\ SPRI)YS / | |||
n DH, _- | |||
f 3 REACIOR\ PDS | |||
[DHRHEAT' ALIGN $UN\ | |||
BUILDING I [CS] SPRAYS / [pll] \EXCllANGERS/ | |||
> ( nG J t U _f V 3 I 3 / 3 LORUSH14 / PDS PDS PDS / | |||
PDS T I PDS 3 | |||
1/22/87 ( no ) ( nB ) ( nA ) ( nC . | |||
) ( nH ) | |||
FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 14 of 14) e .. . - . . . | |||
e _ _ _ _ - _ __ _ - | |||
O | |||
- -. - - - , _ - .. .~ - . . . . . . . . - - | |||
unstu tuutu tttsu u un ts u tuu tst ttis utt ustita ttsuut tant s t** ut**ttantins t a tst a u un tstu ttantsantuntstat until Ut li TT 50 TC U* U* TH 89 P/ EV 3C PR SE W 14 IM W 141 WI fl !(Q EW STAft itt i i ! ! I .I I i 168 18 1 1 ~2 M 2 | |||
-\ | |||
Q' l i I I 1 | |||
I I 1 8 I | |||
I I | |||
I | |||
! I I I l' | |||
i 1 ! 1 1 3 | |||
4 M M 3 4 | |||
11! I i i ! I l i I I I ! 5 M 5 I I I l 1 1 1 1~1 I I f I 4 M 6 I I'l 1 8 I l- 1 l i i 1 7 5 7 i ! I I i 1 8 I i i l 1 i 8 M 8 I I I I I l ! ! I l- 1 I 9 M 9 1 1 1 I l'I I I ! I I i 16 M it i I i 1 1 I ! 1 1. I f 11 5 11 | |||
! I i i l 4 I l i ! ! I i 12 M 12 1 1 1 I I'1 I I I I I i 13 . M 13 I I I I I I I I l-1 1 1 14 M 14 I i 1 I I I i ! I i ! 15 M. 15 1 1 I I i I i ! l. I 16 M 16 I i l 1 I i 1 1 1 17 C 17 8-1 I I I i 1 ! 18 5 18 8 I i ! I l I i i 1 19 M- 19 1 ! ! I I i ! ! 1 MM M i l I I I I i 1 1 21 M 21 1 1 I t i 1 ! 1 D C U | |||
! I I I I l 1 23 Mt 23 I I I i 1 1 61 21 i 24 M 44 1 8 I ! ( i i i I 8 1 i ! 3 M el 1 ! l I I I I I I I I I MM 42 | |||
, i 1 ! I I I t ! I I I , | |||
27 M 43 1 1 1 I I i ! l I f I MM 44 i t ! ! 1 I i I I i I i 23 M. 45 I I i 1 1 I I i 1 I i 36 M 46 I I I I I I i 1 8 I 71 M 47 8 I I I I I I I I 22 C 4 i l i 1 I i i ! 33 IN2 49 I I I i 1 ! I I al_ 34 Ev3 $$ | |||
1 ! 1 I I I I ! 35 C 51 - | |||
I I I I i ! I . 36 FR2 52 1 ! I I l 1 1 37 Filt $1 1 I I i i l I , 38 F14 143 8 1 1 I i 1 39 C 195 l 1 I I t ! de M 186 s 1 1 1 1 I 5' I I 31 8 8 . 41 M 167 1 1 I i 1 i ! i t i I 42 ' M 163 1 1 I i i i l I . I e 43 M lt) | |||
I t t t ! I i 1 1 1 44 - M lit i 1 1 1 1 I I i l 1 I 45 M 111 I I l I i l i i I t 46 M 812 I I i 1 8 I I 1 l 47 M 113 1 t i I I I f 13 C 114 1 1 1 ) 1 1 1 43 M 115 3 I I I I ! I I 8 8 8 54 M !!6 i i l 1 1 ! l l ! ! $1 M ll? | |||
I ! 1 I i 1 1 3 ! $2 M lit | |||
! ! 1 8 1 1 1 ! I t_ $3 M lit 1 I I I I I I i l_ _ $J M IM l 1 l i ! i i I $5 M 121 I I I i 1 1 ! $6 C 122 1 1 1 1 1 I $7 ER3 123 I I 1 ! ! I i 1 58 C 131 l ! ! I I I ! $$ U14 IM i l i i i l i 64 C 134 I I I l ! 1 - 61 M 135 | |||
! I I I I I 8 8 62 M 136 f I I I I I l 63 C. 137 1 1 I I I i 64 F14 138 1 1 1 1 1 1 65 C Ito 1 1 I I I 66 FE5 til I : 1 1 67 Fil 176 1 1 3 i I 71 1 68 E4 193 8 1 ! I l 1 1 ' 69 C 195 8 I I i 1 1.. ,, 76 FE6 196 I ! ! I I 71 Fil 273 1 I i I 72 FE$ 314 I I I 7J ITIS 38) | |||
I 74 IF11 SM l- 75 Af4 487 1 1 I 88 76 ff) in | |||
! I I i 77 C t?) | |||
i I t 78 Ef2 4M 1 i S: 7) #f3 - | |||
i i | |||
Se F'4 . All 492 I (1 C 434 d | |||
82 F5-) 495 i | |||
l 83 C 417 FIGURE 4.2.19-3. LOSS OF RIVER WATER EVENT TREE 1 | |||
4.2.19-21 | |||
l j'} | |||
() 4.2.20 0.15g EARTHQUAKE MAIN TREE The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented in Figure 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a 0.15g earthquake. The process used for tais earthquake and for the other three described in the following sections was unlike that used for any of the other initiating events considered in this report. The process was: | |||
e First, the equations for each split fraction presented in the systems analysis report were modified to inciJde the structural conponents for which seismic fragilities were presented in Section 2 of the environmental and external hazards report. These revised split fractions retained the same names used in the rest of the plant model described in this plant model report. (All split fractions used are defined in Table 4.1-1 of this report. Their point estimate values, as used for all of the other nonseismic analyses, are given in the master frequency file presented in Table 6-1 of this report.) | |||
e Second, the fragilities of the seismic structures were evaluated at four different, discrete earthquake intensities (0.15g, 0.25g, 0.4g, and 0.69 ). These values are presented in Table 2-5 of the EEHR. | |||
e Then, all of the split fractions were reevaluated four times using the split fraction equations with the scismic structures in them. | |||
3 This process produced a new master frequency file for each of the (Q earthquake intensities. The master frequency file used for the 0.15g evaluation is presented here as Table 4.2.20-1. Those produced for , | |||
the other three earthquake intensities are presented in the next three sections of this plant model report. | |||
^ | |||
e Next, the support system model described'in Section 3 of this report was reevaluated four times, once with each of the four seismic master frequency files. The support system state frequencies produced by these four runs are presented in Table 3-7 of this report. | |||
e The general transient main tree and the appropriate subtrees referenced in the general transient tree were also evaluated four times, once with each master frequency file. | |||
e Finally, the results of these support and frontline system event tree runs and the frequencies of each of the four different earthquake intensity ranges from EEHR Table 2 . were combined using a single MAXIMA run. The results of this run are presented in Section 6 and Appendix A.2 of this report. | |||
This seismic calculation process is also described in more general terms in Appendix B.4.4 of the technical summary report, q 4.2.20-1 0587G102687PMR | |||
TABLE 4.2.20-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR 0.159 EARTHQUAXE SHEET 1 0F 8 SF TE FREGUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAILABLE (VA)$ | |||
AABAA 3.7670E-04 AA-1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA Fa.ILED$ | |||
AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ | |||
AMAAM 5.0260E-06 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAILS AMBAM 5.2010E-02 AM-1(CP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES AMDAM 5.914 0E-02 AM-1(OP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ | |||
BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN A$ | |||
BABBA 1.0000E+00 BA-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN BS BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ | |||
BBCBB 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BWABW 1.7310E-03 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ | |||
BWBBW 3.9780E-02 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROT$ | |||
BWCBW 7.2320E-02 BW-3 BWST FICW AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-1 SUCC)$ | |||
BWDBW 2.9350E-03 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBC RECOV (RE-2 SUCC) $ | |||
BWEBW 5.4740E-03 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 5.4740E-03 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND No INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLING $ | |||
CIACl 2.8290E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISCLATION, LARGE HOLES C1BC1 2.7430E-03 Cl-1(GA/GB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWNS CICCl 6.2560E-03 Cl-1(CA/CB) IARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS Dom 4$ | |||
C1DCl 5.3200E-03 Cl-1(GA.CB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC POWER AVAILABLES CIEC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1(CA.CB.CP) IARGE HOLE, NO ESAS, PURGE GOINGS ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C2AC2 3.1910E-05 C2-1 CONTAINMENT ISCLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWN $ | |||
C2BC2 4.4580E-03 C2-1(GA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7.6910E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWNS C2DC2 4.5770E-03 C2-1(GA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- No AC POWER $ | |||
C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C3AC3 1.3840E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAILS C3BC3 3.5620E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN ISOLATION,EP TRAIN A DOWNS C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
CAACA 8.8400E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CABCA 2.7870E-01 CA-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CACCA 1.0 M3E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8. 8wCE-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAIIABLES CBBCB 8.0930E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AVAIIABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAIIABLES CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
C"ACD 2.9730E-04 CD-1 COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ | |||
CDBCD 6.6180E-03 CD-1(CP) S14W C00LDOWN CHLY, 36 HOURS $ | |||
CDDCD 3.0650E-04 CD-1(AA) SLOW C00LDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ | |||
C0FCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CECCE 2.7640E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID COOLDOWN, TBV'S AND PORV NOT AVAIL $ WA CEDCE 2.8310E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1.0650E-01 CE-1(OP) RAPID C00LDOWN WITHOUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ | |||
CEGCE 5.0140E-03 CE-1 RAPID C00LDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAIL $ | |||
G 4.2.20-2 | |||
5 ! | |||
TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) i | |||
? | |||
F | |||
-SHEET ' OF 8 f SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION :l | |||
..... .......... ......... .....................--....----------- .....-- r | |||
~ | |||
CFACF 5.7350E-03 CF-1 l ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABL2$ | |||
CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(GA/GB) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ Jj CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 .USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS AFTER LORWS ; | |||
CFDCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ l CMNCS 5.6710E 05 ECHO OF CCHMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION IILES CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESSS i CSACS 1.0360E-03 CS-1 10F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAIL $ . I CSBCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ONE DG DOWN$ i CSCCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SA) 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWNS ., | |||
CSDCS 4.7690E-01 CS-I(SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH ' DOWNS ; | |||
CSECS 4.6560E-01 CS-3 MANUAL ACT OF 10F 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAIL $ ! | |||
CSFCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3 (CA/CB) LIKE- CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF LP AVAILS 7 CSGCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 OF 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ ! | |||
CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ h CSKCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUMP TRAIN B IS FAILID$ v CVACV 4.1590E-06 CV-1 COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, ALL SS AVAILS I CVBCV COOLING To ALL VITAL EQPNT, NO OP AVAILS - t | |||
: 1. 4 2 60E-04 CV-1(OP) | |||
CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING To ALL VITAL EQPRT, EP TRAIN A DOWN$ ' | |||
CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $- | |||
CVECV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) LOSS OF VITAL INST BUS VB3 OR VBD$ | |||
, CVFCV 1.6120E-03 CVal(GB.3P.lC) . TRAIN B AND CP ICSTS | |||
( ]s j CVGCV 2.3290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILEL3 1.0000E+00 CV-1.0 CVHCV GUARANTEED FAILURES ! | |||
CVPCV 2.0710E-04 LOCV CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ l DAADA 1.6720E-02 DA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ '! | |||
DABDA 1.0000E+00 DA-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $' ! | |||
DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ i DBBDB 8.6760E-01 DB-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A FAILED $ l DBCDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ I DHADH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 1 OF 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAIL $ i DHBDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(GA/GB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQ'D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ i 1.0000E+00 DH-1.0 DHCCH GUARANTEED FAILURE $ . | |||
DHDDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF DMR REQ'D,.A SUCTION PATH DOWNS i DHEDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS i DHFDH 9.9060E-02 DH-1(MA.HB) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB,ALL SS. AVAILS f DHHDH 5.9030E-02 DH-1(HA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 DHR TRAIN,1 DC TRAIN DOWN$ l DHJDH 1.0000E+00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILURES ; | |||
DMKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ F DHLDH 8.8720E-03 CH-1(GA) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DNR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ l CHMDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(CA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1.SS TRN DOWNS : | |||
CHNDH 2.5860E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS j DHODH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS i DHPDH 1.7770E-02 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RCVRY OF 1 MA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ l DHQDH 1.4620E-04 DH-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS i DHRDH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN,ALL SS AVAILS DHSDH 1.0600E-04 DH-1 24 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DNR TRN,)LL SS AVAIL $ | |||
DHTDH 6.9450E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAILS i DMUDH 6.3240E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAILS ; | |||
i 5 | |||
i 4.2.20-3 | |||
, , - - - -. . . . , , , - , - -- - . , _ , , . , , . , - , - - , ,.n. , , , , - . .n,n - - - - - , , - - , - , , . n n ,,n.,c.- | |||
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 3 OF 8 | |||
.----.. .--.---------------------~~ ------------------------------------------- | |||
SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION | |||
----- ---------- --------- -------------------------~~------------------- | |||
DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ | |||
DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.8320E-04 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUPES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEKS AVAILABLE$ | |||
EBBE3 3.7390E-01 EB-1(FA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FAILED $ | |||
EBCIB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFAIF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
IFBEF+ 1.29 50E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ | |||
EFCEF- 2.5600E-05 EF-1 1 or 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
EFCEF- 1.7790E-03 EF-1(OP.AH) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUHENT AIR $ | |||
EFEEF- 2.4560E-03 EF-1(GA/GB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LCIAS EFFEF- 5. 54 4 0E-02 EF-i(CA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ | |||
EFGEF- 4.0310E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAH LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDGc LOSPS ETHEF- 2.2660E-03 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ | |||
EFIEF- 1.0000E+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.0220E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKIF- 4.2200E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS ETHFF- 2.8510E-03 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAINS EFNEF- 1.9710E-03 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOS P, LOIAS FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ | |||
FXCFX 0.0000E-01 FX-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES GAAGA 3.1320E-04 GA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
GABGA 7.2 590E-02 GA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILED $ | |||
CACGA 1.0000E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
GBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN B$ | |||
GB BGB 2.51303-04 GB-1(CA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAILS GBCGB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ | |||
GBDGB 7.8460E-02 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN * *TH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ | |||
GBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
HAAHA 3.7820E-02 HA-1 1 0F . J'AIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
KABHA 1.0000E+00 MA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ 1 HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAIL $ ' | |||
HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS l HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ | |||
HIBMI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ . | |||
HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ l HICHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HIEHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 1 0F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ | |||
HIFHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ | |||
HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HIHHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ | |||
HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATEh$ | |||
0 4.2.20-4 | |||
-_ . . .. . --- -. . - . - . . . - . - - -~ . - . .. - . | |||
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 4 0F 8-SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLYS AND 1/2 MANUAL ~ VLV CPEN$. | |||
MLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 OR 10F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPEN$ | |||
HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(IC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ | |||
HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HPAMPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B)$ | |||
HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/MA)10F 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/MA HAS FAILED $ | |||
HPCMPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C) $ | |||
HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HP3.OP) 1 OF 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ ' | |||
HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS CIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILID$ | |||
HPGMPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUTS HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ | |||
HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF CP OR NS$ | |||
HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ | |||
HPMHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(OP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND CA(MAN START HUP-B)$ | |||
HPNMPA 1.9970E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN$ | |||
""N HPCHPA 1.34 30E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB) B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATES (d' \ HPPHPA HPCHPA IAAIA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 1.4980E-03 HPA-1(LR) 2.000CE-03 LOIA 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ | |||
DIFFEP1NT SFT FOR LRW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ | |||
LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 CPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCHS | |||
-IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $ | |||
IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUHP C AVAIL $ | |||
INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-1 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INFINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL'SS AVAILS LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(GA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWNS LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS LPELP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 OPERATOR PROVIDES I4NG TERM MAKEUP-NORMALS LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ | |||
LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES | |||
\ | |||
l 1 | |||
4.2.20-5 | |||
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) | |||
SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMT+ 1.3980E-03 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF KFW RAMP BACK$ | |||
MF BMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ | |||
MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM MFW PUMPS $ | |||
{ MFDMF+ | |||
0.0000E-01 MT+1(LCSP) OFFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ | |||
MFEMT+ 1.0270E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVENTED $ | |||
MFFMF+ 6. 4340E-02 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LCSS OF MS PRESS CONTROLS MFGMF- 1.4030E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFIMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(CP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SG$ | |||
MTKMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFLMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (OP) MF-2 BUT NO OP (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYPASSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED)$ | |||
MFNMF+ 1.1650E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS MFW WITHOUT FW PUMP TRIPS MTOMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ | |||
MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MT-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISOLATION OF 1 SGS MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MREMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
MRCMR | |||
: 3. 62 50E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINE W/0NE TRAIN DOWNS NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NS-1(CP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(GA\GB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DORN$ | |||
NSDNS NSENS | |||
: 1. 0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
l NSTNS 1.0660E-04 1.4750E-02 NS-1(EA.EB) | |||
LO;;S LIFE NSA EXCEPT BOTM TRAINS OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
LO3S OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
NSGNS 1.0000E+00 NS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
OPAOP 6.2200E-02 CP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ | |||
OPSOP 1.0000E+00 CP-1 0 GIVEN LCSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES POAPO 7.5200E-02 PO-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAM $ | |||
POBPO 1.4100E-01 Po-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, NO AUTO CONTROL $ | |||
POCPO 7.5200E-02 PC-2 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PCFPO 1.0000E+00 PC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE, DA FAILS $ | |||
PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 CF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING STEAMS PVB PV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING STEAM $ | |||
PVCPV 1.5860E-05 PV-3 1 CF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PVDPV 5.8880E-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STEAM LINE WHIPS, BREAKS OTHER$ | |||
RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 RECOVERY OF IA AFTER LCSPC 1 | |||
4.2.20-6 l | |||
i i | |||
/~ \ $- | |||
V TABLE 4.2.20-1(continued). ; | |||
~ | |||
SHEET 6 0F 8 - | |||
i SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION i RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH PSV'S CLOST AFTER ' PASSING STEAM $ I RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 B01H PSV'S CICSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ | |||
RCCRC 2.8520E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MfST MANUALLY BE THROTS | |||
* RCDRC 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAM $ [ | |||
RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ ; | |||
RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS RCGRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER STEAMS RCHRC 2.0430E-01 RC BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORY CLOSE AFTER WATER $ ' | |||
RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-9 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROT$ | |||
RCJRC 2.0930E-03 RC-4(lC) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ l RCKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(lC) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ' | |||
RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(lC) LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILID$ | |||
2.4340E-02 RC-7(IC) LIKE RC-7, BUT 1C-To BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS RCMRC RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC) LIKE RC-8, BUT IC To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ i RCCRC 3.854 0E-01 RC-9(lC) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILEDS ! | |||
RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ! | |||
RCQRC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTL3 LOOPS r REARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER L'PI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FATLURES REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLE$ | |||
i | |||
/"'% RECRE 1.5520E-01 RI-1(E-) LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $ | |||
('% f/ REDRE REERP 1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $' | |||
GUARANTEED SUCCESS $- | |||
REFRE 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILIDS e REGRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 kESTORE OP OR 1 DGS - | |||
REHRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3(E-) RESTORE OP OR 1 DG W/0 EFW$ | |||
REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ | |||
RPARP RPBRP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS . | |||
GUARANTEED FAILURES ! | |||
RPCRP 6.94 3 0E-03 RP-1(OP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ , | |||
RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RP-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RTART 1.7830E-04 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ . | |||
RTBRT 3.5760E-06 RT-1(OP) 0FFSITE POWER LOST $ ! | |||
RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ' | |||
RTDRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM SLB IN TBS RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TC FAILURES , | |||
RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORV$ . | |||
RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSVS$ f RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???$ ' | |||
RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROH HPI COOLING & No PORV$ | |||
PVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND No PORV/PSV$ | |||
RVHRV 4.95905-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ | |||
RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ | |||
1.7500E-10 RV-10 RVJRV VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ ' | |||
RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURE $ . | |||
RVLRV 4.!300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, DA/DB$ | |||
RVhRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS VA/VB$ | |||
RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ r b | |||
fb a | |||
t i | |||
4.2.20-7 | |||
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 7 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTICN SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL OPENING OF DH-V6 W/IN 1 MINS SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SAISA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISCL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, SHORTS SBBSB 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS CIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ | |||
SBCSP 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONGS SBDSB 1. 3 600E-01 SB-2 (S A) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, LCNGS SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBFSB 5.1220E-02 SB-1(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES SBGSB 3.9230E-03 SB-2(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SDASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMAND $ | |||
SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-2 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMAND $ | |||
SCCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs CN ONE OTSGS SDDSD 1. 0 0 0 0 E+ 0 0 S D-1. 0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 CNE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$ | |||
SEBSE 1. 0190E-02 SE-1(CA/CB) LIKE SE-1 BUT ONLY CNE TRAIN OF AC AVAIL $ | |||
SECSE 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEDSE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 0F 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(CP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 OF 1 PUMP MANU/L RESTARTS SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-l OPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ | |||
SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 OPER ISOL SLB UFSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ | |||
SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
S LASL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1 ISOLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ | |||
SLBSL 7.8070E-03 SL-1(DA/DB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
S LCSL 7. 8 07 0E-0 3 SL-1(VB. DA/VA. DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL BUS DOWN$ | |||
S LDSL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1(VA/VB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWNS S LESL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1(VA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWN$ | |||
SLFSL 1.0000E+00 SL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAILS SVBSV 1. 618 0E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) SUMP DAAINS, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ | |||
SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
SVDSV 5. 9 52 0E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP DRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLOSED $ | |||
SVESV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, KANUALLY$ | |||
SVFSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE CCOLING,MF & CD SUCCESS $ | |||
TBBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TURBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ | |||
TBCTB 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, GUARANTEED FAILURI$ | |||
TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDEDS TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG GIVEN STEAM FLCW ISOL FAIL $ | |||
TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLGsE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ 1 TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY 1 TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ j TCGTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER MF+ FAILURES l TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER HF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ l TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES l | |||
l l | |||
till l l | |||
l 1 | |||
4.2.20-8 i | |||
s , | |||
TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) i SHEET 8 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION TRATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLCW USING HU-V217$ , | |||
THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI USING HU-V16A/B/C/D$ ; | |||
THCTH 4.5910E-02 TH-2(GB) OPER THROT HPI W/HU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ i THDTH 1.0000t+00 TM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES THETH 0.0000E-01 TH-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
THFTH 4.1800E-02 TH-1(OP) OPER THROTTLIS GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IES TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TH-2(CA) OPER THROTTLES W/HUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ | |||
THHTH 5.2890E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE FOR LOOP IN S-26$ , | |||
TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SLB$ | |||
TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR-2 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - HLOCAS TRCTR 1.0000Z+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSES TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ No DCA$ ; | |||
TTCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, No SIGNAL GENERATED $ | |||
TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ , | |||
VAAVA 1.5600E-02 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLE$ ' | |||
VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILED $ | |||
VBAVB 1.4540E-02 VB-1 GIVEN (DA OR GA) AND (DB CR GB) AVAILS | |||
[ VBBVB 1.5600E-CJ VB-1(DA.GA) GIVEN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB CR GB AVAILS | |||
* VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DB AND GB FAILED $ ' | |||
1CA1C 5.1700E-05 1C-1 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B AVAILS 1CBIC 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B FAILIDS | |||
+ | |||
1 a | |||
h I | |||
i I | |||
\ ' | |||
6 4.2.20-9 | |||
r 1 | |||
4.2.21 0.25g EARTHQUAXE MAIN TREE-The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented in Figure 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a 0.25g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process was described in some detail in Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix B.4.4 of the technical summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.25g earthquake case is presented in Table 4.2.21-1. | |||
O O ! | |||
4.2.21-1 0587G102687PMR | |||
TABLE 4.2.21-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR 0.25g EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAILABL2 (VA)$ | |||
AABAA 8.4960E-04 AA-1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ | |||
AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ | |||
AMAAM 4.8800E-04 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAILS AMBAM 5.2470E-02 AM-1(CP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES AMDAM 5.9590E-02 AM-1(CP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ | |||
BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN AS BADBA 1.0000E+00 BA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN B$ | |||
BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ | |||
BBCBB 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BWABW 6.3900E-02 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ | |||
BWBBW 9.9580E-02 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW l.3010E-01 BW-3 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-1 SUCC) $ | |||
BWDBW 6.5030E-02 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBC RECOV (RE-2 SUCC) $ | |||
BWEBW 6.7410E-02 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 6.7410E-02 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND NO INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLING $ | |||
CIACl 2.8230E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES ClBC1 2.74 30E-03 Cl-1(GA/GB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWN$ | |||
CICCl 6.2560E-03 Cl-1(CA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ | |||
ClDCl 5. 3200E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC POWER AVAILABLE$ | |||
ClEC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1(CA.CB.CP) LARGE HOLE, NO ESAS, PURGE GOINGS ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C2AC2 3.1910E-05 C2-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWNS C2BC2 4. 4 58 0E-03 C2-1(GA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7. 6910E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
C2DC2 4.5770E-03 C2-1(GA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ | |||
C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C3AC3 1.3840E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
C3BC3 3.5620E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN ISOLATION,EP TRAIN A DOWN$ | |||
C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.8400E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CABCA 2.7870E-01 CA-2 KANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.8400E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ | |||
CBBCB 8.0930E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLES CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CDACD 2.9730E-04 CD-1 C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ | |||
COBCD 6.6180E-03 CD-1(OP) SLOW C00LDOWN ONLY, 36 HOURS $ | |||
CDDCD 3.0650E-04 CD-1(AA) SLCW C00LDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ | |||
C0FCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CECCE 2.7640E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORV NOT AVAILS WA CEDCE 2.8310E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1. 0650E-01 CE-1(CP) RAPID C00LDOWN WITHOUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ , | |||
CEGCE 5.0140E-03 CE-1 RAPID C00LDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS ! | |||
1 l | |||
l l | |||
4.2.21-2 j | |||
,& v . | |||
I ) | |||
V TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 2 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION CFACF 6.3360E-02 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(GA/GB) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ | |||
CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS AFTER LORW$ | |||
CFDCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES 1 CMNCS 5.6710E-05 ECHO OF CCHMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILE $ | |||
CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ | |||
CSACS 1.0360E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAILS CSBCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 1 OF 2 TRAINS REQD, ONE DG DOWNS CSCCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SA) 10F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWN$ | |||
CS DCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A DOWNS CSECS 4.5560E-01 CS-3 HANUAL ACT OF 1 OF 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
CSFCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(GA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS CSGCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ | |||
CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
CSKCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUHP TkAIN B IS FAILIDS CVACV 4.1590E-06 CV-1 COOLING To ALL VITAL EQPHT, ALL SS AVAILS CVBCV 1. 4 2 6 0E-04 CV-1 (OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPHT, NO CP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPHT, EP TRAIN A DOWN$ | |||
CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $ | |||
CVECV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) LOSS OF VITAL INST BUS VBB OR VBDS | |||
/~'g CVFCV 1. 612 0E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.1C) TRAIN B AND OP LOST $ | |||
t CVGCV 2.3290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $ | |||
V) CVHCV 1.0000E+00 CV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
CVPCV 2.0710E-04 LOCV CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
CAADA 1.5020E-01 DA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
DABDA 1.0000E+00 DA-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILIDS DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ | |||
DBBDB 9.8730E-01 DB-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A FAILED $ | |||
DBCDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILID$ | |||
DHACH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
DHBDH 2. 4100E-02 DH-1(CA/GB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ | |||
DHCCH 1.0000E+00 DH-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES DHDDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
CHECH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS CHFDH 9.9060E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF HA CR HB, ALL SS AVAILS , | |||
DHHDH 5.9030E-02 DH-1(HA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 DHR TRAIN,1 DC TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
DHJCH 1.0000E+00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILL'RES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS i DHLDH 8.8720E-03 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHMDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHODH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHPDH 1.7770E-02 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS ] | |||
DHQDH 1.4620E-04 DH-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER CHR TRN, AIL SS AVAILS DHRCH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN,A.'1 SS AVAIL $ | |||
DHSDH 1.0600E-04 DH-1 24 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DMR TRN, AIL SS AVAIL $ , | |||
DHTCH 6.9450E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS ! | |||
CHUDH 6.3240E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAIL $ , | |||
1 1 | |||
l l | |||
l i | |||
0 p r% | |||
\~ / | |||
l 4.2.21-3 1 | |||
5 TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FPEQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION EfrADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ | |||
DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.8320E-04 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EBBEB 3.7390E-01 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FA* 'D$ | |||
EBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFAEF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EFBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ | |||
ETCEF- 2.5600E-05 EF-1 1 0F 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES ETDEF- 1.7790E-03 EF-1(OP.AH) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ | |||
EFEEF- 2. 4 560E-03 EF-1(CA/CB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LOIAS EFFET- 5. 54 40E-02 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ | |||
EFGEF- 4.0310E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAM LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDG, LOSP$ | |||
ETHEF- 2.2660E-03 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ | |||
EFIEF- 1.0000E+00 ZF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.02 20E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAIN $ | |||
EFKEF- 4.2200E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS EFHEF- 2.8510E-03 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAINS ETNE - 1.9710E-03 EF-1(DA/DB) IASS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOSP, 14IAS FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ | |||
FXCFX 0.00J0E-01 FX-0.0 CUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES GAAGA 7.8610E-04 GA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
GABGA 1.1320E-01 GA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILED $ | |||
GACGA 1.0000E+0C GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
GBAGB 2.513CE-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN BS GBBGB 6.0180E-01 GB-1(GA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ | |||
GBCGB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ | |||
GBDGB 4.3630E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ | |||
CBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITI ALLY FAILED $ | |||
HAARA 3.7820E-02 MA-1 1 OF 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HABHA 1.0000E+00 KA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWN$ | |||
HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SU? PORT SYSTEMS YAILED$ | |||
HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES I:: INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ | |||
HIBHI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'O$ | |||
HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HIDHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HIEHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 10F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ | |||
HITHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 1 0F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ | |||
HIGHI 1.000CE+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
HIHHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 10F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ | |||
HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 10F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATER $ | |||
1 l | |||
1 4.2.21-4 | |||
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 4 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 KANUAL VLV OPEN$ | |||
HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 CR 10F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPEN$ | |||
HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL 1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(lC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ | |||
HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HPAHPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1 10F 2 PUMPS (A CR B)$ | |||
HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)1 OF 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILID$ | |||
HPCHPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C)$ | |||
HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 10F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILID$ | |||
HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 10F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ | |||
HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 OF 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ | |||
HPGHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAI120$ | |||
HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUT $ | |||
HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ | |||
HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURI 0F HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(CP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP OR NS$ | |||
HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ | |||
HPMHPA HPNHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(CP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND GA(MAN START MUP-B) $ | |||
1.9970E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORI % VAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN$ | |||
\ HPCMPA 1.3430E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB)B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATE $ | |||
HPPHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ | |||
HPQHPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LRW (SAME ECNS AS HPA)$ | |||
IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LOIA LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCHS IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR-IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $' | |||
IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A OR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAILS INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-l WITH IA FAILIDS INTINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(CA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWNS LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
LPELP 1.9170E-C2 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS RIQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 OPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NOPRALS LTBLT 6.5570E-C2 LT-2 OPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ | |||
LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES | |||
( | |||
4.2.21-5 | |||
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
O SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 1.3980E-03 MF+1 BOTH TRAINS OF MFW RAMP BACKS MFBMT+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(GA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS MFCMF+ 1.1250T-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTH MFW PUMPS $ | |||
MFDMF+ 0.0000E-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ | |||
MTEMF+ 1.0270E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERCOOLING PRIVINTED$ | |||
MFFMF+ 6.4340E-02 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LOSS OF MS PRESS CCNTROLS MFGMF- 1.4030E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MFHMF- 1.0000E+00 MF.1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFIMF- 1.000CE+00 MF-1(OP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SGS MFEMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFLMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (CP) MF-2 BUT NO OP (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYPASSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED) $ | |||
MFNMT+ 1.1650E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS MFW WITHOUT FW PUMP TRIP $ | |||
MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ | |||
MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISOLATION OF 1 SG$ | |||
hFQMF- 1.0000E+00 MF.1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MRBMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
MRCMR 3.6250E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINE W/CNE TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NE-1(OP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(CA\GB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DOWN$ | |||
NSDNS 1.0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
NSENS 1.0660E-04 NS-1(EA.EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT BOTH TRAINS CF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
NSFNS 1.4750E-02 LONS LCSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
NSGNS 1.0000E+00 US-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES OPAOP 3.4930E-01 OP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ | |||
OPBOP 1.0000E+00 OP-1.0 GIVEN LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES PCAPO 7.5200E-02 PC-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAMS PCBPO 1.4100E-01 PC-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, NO AUTO CONTROL $ | |||
PCCPC 7.5200E-02 PO-2 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PCFPC 1.0000E'00 PO-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE, DA FAILS $ | |||
PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 OF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING STEAM $ | |||
PVBPV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING STEAMS PVCPV 1.5860E-05 PV-3 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PVDPV 5.8880E-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATERS PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STF3M LINE WHIPS, BREAKS OTHER$ | |||
RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 RECOVERY CV IA AFTER LOSPS i | |||
tilll 4.2.21-6 | |||
l 1 | |||
i | |||
) | |||
i Q(% | |||
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued)- | |||
SHEET 6 0F ' 8 ; | |||
SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING STEAMS RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ | |||
RCCRC 2.8520E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MUST KANUALLY BE THROTS RCCRC 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORV CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAMS RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORV CLCSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ | |||
RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST KANUALLY BE THROT$ | |||
RCGRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV's AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER STEAMS RCHRC 2.0430E-01 RC-8 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PCRV CLOSE AFTER WATER $ | |||
RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-9 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS RCJRC 2.0930E-02 RC-4(lC) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS ! | |||
RCKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(1C) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ | |||
RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(1C) LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS RCMRC 2.4340E-02 RC-7(IC) LIKE RC-7, BUT IC TO BLOCK VALVE FAILID$ | |||
RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC) LIKE RC-8, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ | |||
RCCRC 3.8540E-01 RC-9(IC) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ | |||
RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RCORC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTER LOOPS l RIARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER HPI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FAILURES REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLIS l O | |||
t / | |||
RECRE REDRE 1.5520E-01 RE-1(E-) | |||
1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $ | |||
GUARANTEED FAILURES l | |||
U REERE 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RETRE 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILED $ | |||
RECRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 RISTORE OP OR 1 DGS RIHRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3(E-) RESTORE OP OR 1 DG W/0 EFWS REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ l RPARP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS RPERP 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
RPCRP 6.9430E-03 RP-1(CP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ | |||
RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RP-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RTART 1.1180E-02 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
RTBRT 3. 5760E-06 RT-1(OP) CFFSITE POWER LOST $ | |||
RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RTCRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM SLB IN TBS RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TC FAILURES RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORV$ | |||
RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSYS$ | |||
RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???$ | |||
RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROM HPI COOLING & NO PORV$ | |||
RVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND NO PORV/PSV$ | |||
RVMRV 4.9590E-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ | |||
RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ l RVJRV 1.75002-10 RV-10 VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ | |||
RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURE $ i RVLRV 4.5300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, DA/DBS I RVMRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, VA/VBS I RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ | |||
4.2.21-7 4 | |||
, - , , , - - , - , - - - ,, ,- , . - - - --, .- -~, - - | |||
e | |||
O TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 7 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTE $ (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL CPENING OF DE-V6 W/IN 1 MIN $ | |||
SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SAESA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, SHORTS SBBSD 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ | |||
SBCSB 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONG$ | |||
SBDSB 1.3600E-01 SB-2(SA) TRAIN D WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, LONG$ | |||
SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
SBFSB 5.1220E-02 SB-1(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTE $ | |||
S BCS B 3.9230E-03 SB-2(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SDASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACM SG OPEN CN DEMAND $ | |||
SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-L 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG CPEN ON DEMAND $ | |||
S DCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs CN ONE OTSGS SDDSD 1.0000E+00 SD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES S EASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 ONE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$ | |||
SEBSE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(GA/GB) LIKE SE-1 BUF CNLY ONE TRAIN OF AC AVAILS SECSE 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEDSE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 0F 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 0F 1 PUMP MANUAL RESTART $ | |||
SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-1 OPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ | |||
SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 OPER ISOL SLB UPSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ | |||
SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES S LASL 7.5950E-04 SL-1 ISOLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPORT AVAILABlIS SLBSL 7.8070E-03 SL-1(DA/DB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
S LCS L 7. 7 3 4 0E-0 3 SL-1(VB. DA/VA. DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL BUS DOWNS SLDS L 7.5950E-04 S L-1 (VA/VB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWNS S LESL 7.5950E-04 SL-1(VA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWNS SLFSL 1. 0 0 0 0 E+ 0 0 S L-1. 0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISCLATION, ALL SS AVAILS SVBSV 1.6180E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) SUMP DRAINS, 1 TRAIN OF LSAS IS DOWNS SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
SVDSV 5.9520E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP DRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLCSEDS SVISV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, MANUALLY $ | |||
SVFSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURI$ | |||
TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE C00 LING,MP & CD SUCCESS $ | |||
TBBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TURBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ | |||
TBCTS 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, GUARANTEED FAILURES TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDED$ | |||
TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG GIVEN STEAM FLOW ISOL FAILS TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLOSE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ | |||
TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY l TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ | |||
TCCTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER HF+ FAILURES TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER MF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ | |||
TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O | |||
4.2.21-8 | |||
/'~5g q (s / ' | |||
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 8 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION , | |||
THATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLOW USING MU-V217$ l THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2 OPERATOR THROTTLIS HPI USING MU-V16A/B/C/D$ | |||
THCTH 4.5910E-02 TH-2(GB) OPER THROT HPI W/MU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ | |||
THDTH 1.0000E+00 TH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ ' | |||
THETH 0.0000E-01 TH-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ ' | |||
-TEFTH 4.1800E-02 TH-1(OP) OPER THROTTLES GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IE$ | |||
TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TH-2(GA) OPER THROTTLIS W/MUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ | |||
THHTH 5.2890E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE FOR LOOP IN $=26$ | |||
TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SL3$ | |||
i TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR-2 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - HLOCAS TRCTR 1.0000E+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES , | |||
TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSES TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV's OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ NO DCA$ | |||
'ITCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, No SIGNAL GENERATED $ 7 TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $- ' | |||
TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
VAAVA 1.4200E-01 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLES VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILED $ I VBAVB 1.4100E-01 VB-2 GIVEN (DA OR CA) AND (DB OR GB) AVAILS ! | |||
VBBVB ' | |||
1.4200E-01 VB-1(DA.GA) GIVIN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB OR GB AVAILS VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DB AND GB FAILIDS | |||
) 1CAIC 5.1700E-05 1C-1 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B AVAILS I | |||
/ ICB1C 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN AC EL TRAIN B FAILED $ , | |||
i t | |||
I i | |||
F b | |||
o ) | |||
\s / , | |||
4.2.21-9 | |||
7 | |||
? | |||
4.2.22 0.4g EARTHQUAKE MAIN TREE The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented ; | |||
in Figure 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and ; | |||
quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a-0.4g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process.was described in some detail in i Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix 8.4.4 of the technical l summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.4g earthquake | |||
. case is presented in Table 4.2.22-1 i i | |||
l 6 | |||
l I | |||
O ! | |||
t I | |||
O | |||
~ | |||
4.2.22-1 0587G102687PMR | |||
- - - _ _ , _ . _ . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , , _____,__,_,_.,,_._,,,,,,1 | |||
TABLE 4.2.22-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS O | |||
FOR 0.49 EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAILABLE (VA)$ | |||
AABAA 4.2360E-02 AA.1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ | |||
AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ | |||
AMAAM 4.7900E-02 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAILS AMBAM 9. 74 2 0E-02 AM-1(OP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES AMDAM 1. 04 2 0E-01 AM-1(OP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ | |||
BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN AS BABBA 1.0000E+00 BA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN B$ | |||
BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ | |||
BBCBB 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURE$ | |||
BWABW 2.3300E-01 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ | |||
BWBBW 2.6220E-01 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW 2.8720E-01 BW-3 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBO RECOV (RE-1 SUCC) $ | |||
BWDBW 2.3390E-01 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-2 SUCC) $ | |||
BWESW 2.3590E-01 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 2.3590E-01 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND No INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLING $ | |||
CIACl 2.8290E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES ClBC1 2.74 3 0E-03 Cl-1(GA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWNS CICC1 6. 2 560E-03 Cl-1(CA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWNS C1DCl 5.3200E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC PCWER AVAILABLIS CIEC1 1. 000 0E+0 0 Cl-1 (CA. CB. CP) LARGE HOLE, NO ESAS, PURGE GOING $ | |||
ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C2AC2 3.1910E-05 C2-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWN $ | |||
C2BC2 4.4580E-03 C2-1(CA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7.6910E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWNS C2DC2 4.5770E-03 C2-1(GA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ | |||
C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 CUARANTEED FAIUURES C3AC3 1.3840E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
C3BC3 3.5620E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN ISOLATION,EP TRAIN A DOWN$ | |||
C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.8400E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CABCA 2.7870E-01 CA-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.8400E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CBBCB 8.0930E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT CIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CDACD 2.9730E-04 CD-1 C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ | |||
CDBCD 6.6180E-03 CD-1(OP) SLOW COOLDOWN ONLY, 3 6 HOURS $ | |||
CDDCD 3.0650E-04 CD-1(AA) SLOW C00LDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ | |||
CDFCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
CECCE 2.7640E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORV NOT AVAILS WA CEDCE 2.8310E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1. 0 6 5 0 E-01 CE-1 (OP) RAPID COOLDOWN WITHOUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ | |||
CEGCE 5.0140E-03 CE-1 RAPID C00LDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS O | |||
4.2.22-2 | |||
G TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 2 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION CFACF 2.3490E-01 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(GA/GB) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS ATTER I4RWS CFDCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CMNCS 5.6710E-05 ECHO OF COMMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILES CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ | |||
CSACS 1.0360E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAILS CSBCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, CNE DC DOWNS CSCCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SA) | |||
CSDCS 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWNS 4.7690E-01 CS-3 (SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A DOWNS CSECS 4.6560E-01 CS-3 MANUAL ACT OF 10F 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAILS CSTCS CSGCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3 (GA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ | |||
CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUFES CSKCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUMP TRAIN B IS FAILED $ | |||
CVACV 4.1590E-06 CV-1 COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
CVBCV 1.4260E-04 CV-1(OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, NO CP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, EP TRAIN A DCWN$ | |||
CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $ | |||
CVICV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) | |||
CVFCV I4SS OF. VITAL INST BUS VBB CR VBD$ | |||
1.6120E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.lC) TRAIN B AND OP LOST $ | |||
CVGCV 2.3 290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $ | |||
, CVHCV 1.0000E+00 CV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CVPCV 2.0710E-04 I4CV CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
DAADA 3.6740E-01 DA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
DABDA 1.0000E+00 DA-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ | |||
DBBDB S.9610E-01 DB-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A FAILED $ | |||
D3CDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
DHADH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 i DHBDH 1 0" 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS l 1.4100E-02 DH-1(GA/GB) 1 0'.' ? TRAINS REQ ' D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ | |||
DHCDH 1.0000E+00 DM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ l DHDDH 1. 4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF CHR REC'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS ) | |||
DHEDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS t | |||
DHFDH 9.9060E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAILS ) | |||
DHHDH 5.903 0E-02 DH-1(HA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 DHR TPAIN,1 DC TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
CHJDH 1.0000E+00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILURES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DER TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHLDH 8.8720E-03 DH-1(CA) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 CHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHMDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HS TRN,2 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHODH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/9B TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS ! | |||
DHPDH 1.7770E-C2 DM-1(GA) 24 HR. RC7RY OF 1 HA/HW TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHQDH 1.4620E-04 DH-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER CHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS ; | |||
DHRDH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS DHSDH 1.0600E-04 DM-1 24 HR. itCVRY DF E77MR DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS l DHTDH DHUDH 6.94 50E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB ALL SS AVAILS 6.324 0E-01 CH-1(HA.HB) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS O | |||
4.2.22-3 4 | |||
O TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS IANG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ | |||
DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.3760E-01 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EBBEB 9.9930E-01 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE CIVEN EA FAILED $ | |||
EBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ETAEF+ 3.9250E-05 ET+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
EFBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAX AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABL2$ | |||
EFCEF- 3.5120E-02 EF-1 1 0F 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ | |||
EFCEF- 3.6820E-02 EF-1(OP.AM) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ | |||
EFEEF- 3.7470E-02 EF-1(GA/CB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LOIA$ | |||
EFFEF- 8.8590E-02 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ | |||
EFGEF- 4. 2 4 00E-01 EF-1(SB.CP) STEAH LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDC, 14SP$ | |||
ETHEF- 3.7290E-02 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ | |||
EFIEF- 1.00CCE+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.2320E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKEF- 4.4230E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS ETMEF-EFNET-3.7850E-02 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND 14SS OF 1 INST TRAINS 3.7000E-02 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOSP, LOIA$ | |||
FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FFACTION OF RLJ FAILL* REG REQ'G COLD S/D$ | |||
TXCFX 0.0000E-Ol FX-0.0 GU..RANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
GAAGA 1.4390E-01 GA-1 CIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
GABGA 3.8690E-01 CA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILEDS CACCA 1.0000E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILIDS GBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN B$ | |||
CBBGB 9.9810E-01 GB-1(GA) | |||
GBCGB GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ | |||
7.2 530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ | |||
CBDG B 8.9930E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ | |||
GBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
RAAHA 3.7820E-02 RA-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS KABRA 1.0000E+00 HA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 1 or 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ | |||
HIBHI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ | |||
HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HICHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 CF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HIIHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 1 CF 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ | |||
HIFHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ | |||
HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HIMMI HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 10F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ | |||
1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATERS I | |||
1 tilli l l | |||
4.2.22-4 l | |||
i l | |||
1 | |||
, i lv ;I 5 | |||
TABLE 4.2.22-1(continued) | |||
SHEET 4 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 MANUAL VLV OPEN$ | |||
HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 OR 1 OF 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPENS HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(IC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ | |||
HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HLFML 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HPAMPA 1.4983E-03 HPA-1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A CR B)$ | |||
HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)10F 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILED $ | |||
HPCMPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C)$ | |||
HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 OF 2 PUMPS (A Ch B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ | |||
HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ | |||
HPGHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACK 0UTS HPIMPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ | |||
HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP Ok NS$ | |||
HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ | |||
HPMHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(OP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND GA(MAN START MUP-B) $ | |||
HPNHPA 1.9970E-02 HPA-L(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN $ | |||
(A)\s - | |||
HPOMPA HPPHPA 1.3430E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB) B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATE $ | |||
1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 OF 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ | |||
HPQHPA 1.49POE-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LAW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ | |||
IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LOIA LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCH$ | |||
IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILID$ | |||
IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUAPANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP LEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAIL $ | |||
INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-1 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUCED$ | |||
INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-1 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INFINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ | |||
INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(GA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ | |||
LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1. 9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
LPELP 1. 9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NORMAL $ | |||
LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ | |||
LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES 1 | |||
('~~\, | |||
rl l | |||
\ | |||
l 4.2.22-5 l | |||
l | |||
O TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) | |||
SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 3.6450E-02 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF HFW RAMP BACKS MTBMF+ 1.12 50E-01 MT+1(GA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ | |||
MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM MFW PUMPS $ | |||
MFDMF+ 0.000nE-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILLRE (GUARANI 2ED SUCCESS)$ | |||
MTEMF+ 4.1220E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVENTED $ | |||
MFFMF+ 9.654 0E-01 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LCSS OF MS PRESS CONTROLS MFGMF- 4.7720E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MTEMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFIMF- 1. 0000E+00 MF-1(OP) No CFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SG$ | |||
MFFMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARAPTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFLMF - 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (OP) MF-2 BUT NO 'P (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYP.JSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED) $ | |||
MTNMT+ 4. 6340E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS HFW WITMOUT FW PUMP TRIP $ | |||
MFOMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ | |||
MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISCLATION OF 1 SGS MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1 0 GUARANTEED FAILURES MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MRBMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES MRCMR 3. 62 50E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIPC LINE W/0NE TRAIN DOWN$ | |||
NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NS-1(OP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS A'/ AIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(GA\CB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DOWN$ | |||
NSDNS 1.0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DCWNS NSENS 1.066CE-04 NS-1(EA.EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT BOTM TRAINS OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
NSTNS 1.4750E-02 LONS LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENTS NSGNS 1.0000E+00 NS-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURES OPACP 6.2820E-01 OP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ | |||
OPBOP 1.0000E+00 CP-1.0 GIVEN LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES PCAPO 7.5200E-02 PO-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAMS PCBPO 1.4100E-01 PC-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, No AUTO CONTROLS PCCPO 7.5200E-02 50-4 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PCFPO 1.0000E+00 PC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE, DA IAILS$ | |||
PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, l'A5 SING STEAMS PVBPV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 rSI S OPEN, PASSING STEAM $ | |||
PVCPV 1.586CE-05 PV-3 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, ?ASSING WATER $ | |||
PVDPV 5.888CE-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATER $ | |||
PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STEAM LINE WMIPS, BREAKS OTMEk$ | |||
RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 REcov?TY OF IA AFTER LCSP$ | |||
0 4.2.22-6 | |||
r r | |||
/''N (s_sl' r | |||
TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) . | |||
i 4 | |||
SHEET 6 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION f r | |||
RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH FSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING STEAM $ , | |||
RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ | |||
RCCRC 2.85202-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS I RCDRC. 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAM $ | |||
RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ j RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS ! | |||
RCCRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORY CLOSE AFTER STEAHS .g RCERC 2.0430E-01 RC-8 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER WATER $ ; | |||
RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROT$ > | |||
RCJRC 2. 09 3 0E-02 RC-4 (1C) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ - | |||
ROKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(1C) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ! | |||
RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(1C) _LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ i RCMRC 2.4340E-02 RC-7(1C) LIKE RC-7, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ | |||
LIKE RC-8, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ [ | |||
RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC)' | |||
RCORC 3. 8 5 4 0E-01 RC-9 (1C) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ! | |||
RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 ' GUARANTEED FAILURES ! | |||
RCCRC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTER LOOP $ ! | |||
REARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER HPI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FAILURES i REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLI$ ' | |||
O RECRE 1. 5 52 0E-01 12-1(E-) LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $ ; | |||
& REDRE 1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES t REERE 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ i REFRZ 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILED $ ; | |||
RIGRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 RESTORE OP CR 1 DGS l RINRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3 (E-) RESTORE OP CR 1 DG W/0 EFW$ | |||
REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ i RPARP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS i RPBRP 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RPCRP l 6.9430E-03 RP-1(CP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ j RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RF-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
RTART 1.0500E-01 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS RTBRT 3.5760E-06 RT-1(OP) 0FFSITE POWER LOST $ | |||
RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUREW RTDRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED FICCESS$ l RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESCEL RUPTC d TROM SU IN TB$ ' | |||
RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM 'IC FAILURES RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORVS | |||
* RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSYS$ i RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???O RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROM HPI COOLING & No PORV$ ! | |||
RVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND NO PORV/PSV$ ! | |||
RVERV 4.9590E-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ ; | |||
RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ ! | |||
RVJRV 1.7500E-10 RV-10 VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ | |||
l RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURES } | |||
RVLRV 4.5300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPI, TC FAILS, DA/DB$ | |||
. RVMRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, VA/VB$ f f RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ i t | |||
\ r i | |||
i e | |||
4.2.22-7 | |||
9 TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 7 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND LH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL OPENING OF DH-V6 W/IN 1 MINS SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SAESA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V0B OPENS, SHORT$ | |||
SBBSB 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ | |||
SBCSB 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONGS SBDSB 1.3600E-01 SB-2(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN. LONG$ | |||
SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARAFIEED FAILURES SBTLB 5.1200E-02 SB-1(CA) SUMP Abb DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES S BOS B 3.9230E-03 SB-2(CA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ | |||
SCASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMANDS SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-2 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG CPEN ON DEMANDS SCCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs ON ONE OTSGS SDDSO 2.0000E+00 SD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES | |||
' RASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 ONE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$ | |||
?SE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(GA/GB) LIKE JE-1 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF AC AVAILS | |||
;;E 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES | |||
_:SE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 OF 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(CP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 0F 1 PUMP MANUAL RESTART $ | |||
SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-l CPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ | |||
SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 CPER ISOL SLB UPSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ | |||
SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
S LAS L 3.5830E-02 SL l ISCLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPCRT AVAILABLE$ | |||
S LBS L 4.2910E-02 SL-1(DA/DB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWNS S LCSL 4.2270E-02 SL-l f VB.DA/VA.DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL EUS DOWN$ | |||
SLOS L 3.5830E-02 SL-1(VA/VB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWN$ | |||
S LESL 3.58 3 0E-02 SL-1(iA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWN$ | |||
S LFS L 1.0000E+00 SL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
SVBSV 1.6180E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) 6 UMP DRAINS, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWNS SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
SVDSV 5. 9520E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP CRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLOSED $ | |||
SVESV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, MANUALLY $ | |||
SVTSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE COOLING,MF & CD SUCCESS $ | |||
TDBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TUPBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ | |||
TBCTB 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, CUARANTEED FAILURES TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDED$ | |||
TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG CIVEN STEAM FLOW ISOL FAILS TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLOSE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.00001+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ | |||
TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY l TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ | |||
TCGTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER MF+ FAILURES TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER MF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ | |||
TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUPIS O | |||
4.2.22-8 | |||
h i | |||
p i | |||
TABLE 4.2.22-1(continued) ; | |||
I v | |||
t SHEET 8 CF 8 [ | |||
i SF TE TREQUENut SF NAME DESCRIPTION , | |||
..... .......... ......... .............................................. j THATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLOW USING HU-V217$ i THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2. OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI USING HU-V16A/B/C/D$ -! | |||
THCTH 4.5910E-02 TM-2 (GB) OPER THROT HPI W/HU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ | |||
THDTH 1.0000E+00 TH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES THETH 0.0000E-01 TM-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $' | |||
THFTH 4.1800E-02 TM-1(CP) OPER THROTTLES GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IES I TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TM-2(GA) OPER THROTTIES W/NUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ 1 THHTH 5.2390E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE TOR LOOP IN S-26$ ! | |||
TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SLB$ | |||
TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT + MLOCAS i TRCTR 1.0000E+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES i TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE$ '+ | |||
TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ No DCAS -r TTCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, NC SIGNAL GENERATED $ | |||
TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES { | |||
TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ + | |||
VAAVA 3.4950E-01 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLE$ ! | |||
VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILEDS i VBAVB 3.4880E-01 VB-1 GIVIN (DA CR GA) AND (DB OR GB) AVAILS t VBBVB 3.4950E-01 VB-1(DA.GA) GIVEN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB CR GB AVAIL $ : | |||
VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 O 1CA1C 1CBIC 5.1700E-05 1C-1 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN BOT!* DB AND GB FAILED $ | |||
GIVEN AC FS TRAIN B AVAILS GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B FAILED $ | |||
f | |||
? | |||
? | |||
< r i | |||
j 4 | |||
1 l | |||
t I | |||
l' 1 > | |||
I t | |||
f i | |||
i l | |||
I ! | |||
r d a 6 | |||
e 4.2.22-9 f | |||
- - - -- -. --_ . - . -.-t | |||
4.2.23 0.6g EARTHQUAKE MAIN TREE The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented in Figure 4,1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a 0.6g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process was described in some detail in Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix B.4.4 of the technical summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.69 earthquake case is presented in Table 4.2.23-1. | |||
t | |||
[ | |||
d O | |||
l. | |||
O 4.2.23-1 0587G102687PMR | |||
s G | |||
TABLE 4.2.23-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR 0.69 EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 0F 8 SF TE FRIQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAIIABLE (VA)$ | |||
AABAA 2.6930E-01 AA-1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ | |||
AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ | |||
AMAAM 3.1900E-01 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAIL $ | |||
AMBAM 3.5440E-01 AM-1(OP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURIS AMDAM 3. 5930E-01 AM-1(OP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ | |||
BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN A$ | |||
BAB BA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN BS BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ | |||
BBCBS 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BWABW 5.6000E-01 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ | |||
BWBBW 5.7680E-01 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW 5.9110E-01 BW-3 BWST FL.W AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-1 SUCC)$ | |||
BWDBW 5.6050E-01 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBC RECOV (RE-2 SUCC)$ | |||
BWEBW 5. 6160E-01 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 5.6160E-01 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND NO INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLINGS CIAC1 2.8290E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES C1BC1 2.7130E-03 Cl-1(GA/GB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWNS CICC1 6.2250E-03 Cl-1(CA/CL) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ | |||
ClDCl 5.4080E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC POWER AVAILABLE$ | |||
ClEC1 1. 0000E+00 Cl-1( CA.CB.CP) LARGE HOLE, No ESAS, PURGE GOINGS ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED rAILURES C2AC2 3.1890E-05 C2-1 CONTAIUMENT ISCLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWN $ | |||
C2BC2 4.4 590E-03 C2-1(GA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7. 6870E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ | |||
C2DC2 4.58 60E-03 C2-1(CA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ | |||
C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 GUARANTIED FAILURES C3AC3 1.3910E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAILS C3BC3 3.5730E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN IS01ATION,EP TRAIN A DOWNS C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.3380E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS CABCA 2.9470E-01 CA-2 KANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.3380E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS CBBCB 9.ll40E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AV?.ILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLIS CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT GIVEN CA FAILED $ | |||
CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURES CDACD 2.9930E-04 CD-1 COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ | |||
COBCS 6.4670E-03 CD-1(CP) SLOW COOLDOWN ONLY, 36 HOURS $ | |||
CDDCD 3.0250E-04 CD-1(AA) SLOW COOLDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ | |||
C0FCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CECCE 2.7690E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORY NOT AVAIL $ WA CEDCE 2.8200E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1.0670E-01 CE-1(CP) RAPID C00LDOWN WITIZUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ | |||
CEGCE 5.0120E-03 CE-1 RAPID COOLDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS i | |||
O 4.2.23-2 | |||
O) | |||
TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) , | |||
SHEET 2 0F 8 , | |||
t SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION q ..... .......... ......... ....-......................................... . | |||
CTACF 5.8530E-01 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ i CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(CA/G3) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS AFTER LORWS CFDCT 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES l CMNCS 5.7000E-05 ECHO OF CCHMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILES i CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINHENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ | |||
CSACS 1.0353E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
CSBCS 2.2460E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQD, ONE DG DOWN$ | |||
CSCCS 2. 2 4 60E-02 CS-1(SA) 1 CF 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWNS CSDCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3(SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A.DOWN$ | |||
CSECS 4.6470E-01 CS-3 MANUAL ACT OF 10F 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAILS CSTCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3(CA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS CSGCS 2.2460E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 or 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ | |||
CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $' | |||
CSKCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3 (SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUMP TRAIN B IS FAILED $ | |||
CVACV 4.1590E=06 CV-1 COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPNT, ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
CVBCV 1.4 2 60E-04 CV-1(OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, NO OP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, EP TRAIN A DOWNS CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $- | |||
CVECV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) LOSS OF VITAL INST BUS VBB CR VBD$ | |||
CVFCV 1.6120E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.1C) TRAIN B AND CP LCST$ | |||
CVCCV 2.3290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $ | |||
CVHCV 1.0000E+0L V-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O CVPCV DAADA DABDA 2.0710E-04 uCCV 6.7880E-01 DA-1 1.0000E+00 DA-1 0 CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ | |||
GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ l DBBDB 9.98905-01 D8-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A TAILED $ 1 DBCDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY TAILED $ . | |||
CHADH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS DMBDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(CA/CB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQ'D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ | |||
DHCDH 1.0000E+00 DH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES d | |||
DHDDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ | |||
DMEDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 T?AIN OF DMR REQ'D, O 6 LOTION PATH DOWNS CHFDH 9.9 060E-02 DH-1(RA.HB) 6 RR. RECOVERY OF HA CR HB, ALL SS AVAILS DRHDH 5.9 030E-02 DH-1(RA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 CHR TRAIN,1 DC TRAIN DCWN$ | |||
DHJDH 1.0000E*00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILURES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DNR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHLDH 8.0720E-03 DH-1(GA) 12 KR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DKNDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(CA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DMR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(CA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ | |||
DH0DH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 RA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ - | |||
DHPDH 1.7770E-02 CH-1(GA) 24 HR. ACVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ I CHQDH 1.4620E-04 DM-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS . | |||
DMRDH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 KR. RCVRY . EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS l DMSDH 1.0600E-04 DH-1 24 KR. RCVRY of EITHER DHh TRN, ALL SS AVAILS , | |||
DHTDH 6.9450E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 KR.RECuYERY OF MA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS ' | |||
DKUDH 6.3240E-02 DH-1(RA.hB) 24 MR.RIC0VERY OF RA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS l | |||
l l | |||
i 1 | |||
N l 1 | |||
l l l | |||
i 4.2.23-3 | |||
O TABLE 4 2.23-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION | |||
..... .. ...--.- ..-- .... ..........-------..........------ -~.-------. | |||
DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECT9$ | |||
DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 6.1230E-01 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
EBAEB 2.3110E=04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSitMS AVAILABL2$ | |||
EBBEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FAILED $ | |||
IBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 t.,UARANTIED FAILURES EFAEF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ | |||
ETBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLES ETCEF- 1.8670E-01 EF-1 1 0F 3 PCMPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EFDEF- 1.8800E-01 EF-1(OP.AM) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ | |||
EFEEF- 1.8860E-01 EF-1(GA/GB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LCIA$ | |||
EFFEF- 2.3170E-01 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ | |||
EFGEF- 5.1460E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAM LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDG, LOSP$ | |||
EFHEF- 1.8840E-01 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ | |||
EFIEF= 1.0000E+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 5.1410E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKIF- 5.3030E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS EFMEF- 1.8910E-01 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAIN $ | |||
EFNEF- 1.8820E-01 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOS P, LCIAS TXAFX 1.0000E-02 TX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ | |||
FXCFX 0.0000E-01 FX-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ | |||
FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURE$ | |||
CAAGA 6.5190E-01 CA-1 GIVIN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ | |||
GABGA 8.7860E-01 CA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILEDS GACGA 1.0C00E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
CBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN BS GBBGB 9.9980E-01 GB-1(GA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ | |||
CBCOB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILIDS GBDGB 9.9 410E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ | |||
CBEGB 1. 0t 00E+00 GB-1. 0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ | |||
KAAHA 3.7 40E-02 KA-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS MABRA 1.0000E+00 RA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HBAHB 3.7750E-02 MB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4 . 314 0 E-O ' ''* '. ( HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ | |||
HIAHI 1.4440E-C4 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ | |||
HIBMI 7.3010E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'DS HICHI 1.4440E-04 HIB-1 1 or 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ | |||
HICHI 7.3010E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IF INJECTION PATH B REQ'DS HIEHI 2.318CE-04 HI-1 10F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ | |||
HIFHI 5.7020E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ | |||
HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEID TAILURES HIKHI 1.4440E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 1 or 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ | |||
HIJHI 1.4440E-04 HIA 1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATER $ | |||
9 4.2.23-4 | |||
TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) | |||
SHEET 4 0F 0 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HIAHL 4.1230E-04 HL.1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 MANUAL VLV CPEN$ | |||
HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 1 0F 2 OR 1 0F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPENS HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4. 6020E-03 HL-1(lC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ | |||
HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGCY-BACK VALVES $ | |||
HPAHPA 1.5200E-03 HPA.1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) $ | |||
HPBHPA 4.8360E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)10F 1 PUHP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILIDS HPCHPS 8.0960E-03 HPB.1 1 PUHP(C)$ | |||
HPDHPA 1.3060E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 0F 2 PCHPS (A CR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPEMPA 5.27 60E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 1 0F 2 PUHPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILID$ | |||
HPFHPA 1.4640E-0J HP)(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ | |||
HPGHPA 1.3490E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ | |||
HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUTS HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ | |||
HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.096CE-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP OR NS$ | |||
HPLEPA 8.0960E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF'AC POWER $ | |||
HPHHPA 2.3980E-02 HPA-1(CP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF CP AND CA(HAN START MVP-B)$ | |||
HPNMPA 1.9130E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWNS HP0HPA 1.3480E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB)B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATES s_,/ HPPHPA 1.3490E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ | |||
HPQHPA 1.5200E-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LRW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ | |||
IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LCIA LOSS OF I"STRUHENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2680E-04 ID-1 CPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCH$ | |||
IDBID 1.5100E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $ | |||
IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUARANTEED FAIL 7RES INAINJ 3.3560E-03 INJ-1 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.2470E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAILS INCINJ 3.2290E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT No CPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INDINJ 1.2660E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT No CPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ | |||
INEINJ 9.2000E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-l WITH IA FAILIDS INFINJ 9.6890E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILIDS INGINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAIL 2DS INHINJ 1.0130E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILIDS INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ | |||
LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAIL $ | |||
LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ | |||
LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS LPELP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NORMAL $ | |||
LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKIUP-SGTR$ | |||
LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O | |||
t | |||
%.) | |||
4.2.23-5 | |||
TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) | |||
SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 1.8710E-01 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF MFW RAMP BACK$ | |||
MTBMT+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ | |||
MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM HFW PUMPS $ | |||
MFDMF+ 0.0000E-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ | |||
MFEMT+ 1.7710E-01 XFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVINTEDS MFFMF+ 9.9430E-01 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LOSS OF MS PRESS CONTROL $ | |||
MFCMF- 1.9570E-01 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK To SUFFICIENT FLOW $ | |||
MFHMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MFIMF- 1. 0000E+00 MF-1(OP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ | |||
MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SGS MTKMF. 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ | |||
MF LMF- 1.00}} |
Latest revision as of 03:06, 17 December 2020
ML20155J931 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Three Mile Island ![]() |
Issue date: | 11/30/1987 |
From: | Garrick B, Hubbard F, Iden D PLG, INC. (FORMERLY PICKARD, LOWE & GARRICK, INC.) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20155J777 | List: |
References | |
PLG-0525, PLG-0525-V03, PLG-525, PLG-525-V3, NUDOCS 8806210073 | |
Download: ML20155J931 (713) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:_. l Copy Copyright 01987, by PLG-0525 l , GPU Nuclear Corporation Volume 3 l l 1 Three Mile Island Unit 1 ! Probabilistic Risk Assessment PLANT MODEL REPORT Project Director B. John Garrick Project Manager Douglas C. Iden Principal Investigator Frank R. Hubbard Task Leaders Mardyros Kazarians Ali Mosleh Harold F. Perla Martin B. Sattison Donald J. Wakefield Prepared for GPU NUCLEAR CORPORATION Parsippany, New Jersey November 1987 8806210073 DR 880212 p AncCN 05000239 I O Pickarc.,Lowe anc Garrick,Inc. Engineers e Applied Scientists e Management Consultants Newport Beach, CA Washington, DC
l i l l l l l NOTICE l This is a report of work conducted by individual (s) and contractors for use by GPU Nuclear Corporetion. Neither GPU Nuclear Corporation nor the authors of the report warrant that the report is complete or accurate. Nothing contained in the report establishes company policy or constitutes a commitment by GPU : Nuclear Corporation. l 1 l
SUMMARY
OF CONTENTS ~ O EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
REPORT Volume 1 Acknowledgment Foreword TECHNICAL
SUMMARY
REPORT Volume 2 PLANT MODEL REPORT Volume 3 SYSTEMS ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 4 OATA ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 5 HUMAN ACTIONS ANALYSIS REPORT Volume 6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND EXTERNAL HAZARDS REPORT Volume 7 O , O 0540G123186
..y, + sa S a as i. ~
CONTENTS
.G '
Section Page LIST OF TABLES .i LIST OF FIGURES ix LIST OF ACRONYMS xi 1 PLANT MODEL OVERVIEW ' l-1 2 DEFINITION OF INITIATING EVENTS 2-1 2.1 Master Logic Diagram 2-1 2.2 Initiating Event List 2-2 2.3 Initiating Events Caused by Internal and _ External Hazards 2-4 2.3.1 Loss of Reactor Coolant System
- Inventory .
2-4 2.3.2 Loss of Electric Power- 2-5 2.4 Grouping of Initiators 2-5 2.5 Initiating Event Group Frequer!cies 2-6 3 SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL 3-1 3.1 Support System Dependency Diagram 3-1 3.2 Support System Event Tree 3-10 3.3 Support System States 3-12 3.4 References 3-15 4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM MODEL 4.1-1 1 4.1 The Event Sequence Analysis Process 4.1-1 I 4.1.1 General Transient Event Sequence Diagram 4.1-2 4.1.1.1 Nominal Actions 4.1-2 4.1.1.2 Actions to Cool Down to Cold Shutdown 4.1-4 4.1.1.3 Scenarios Involving HPI Cooling 4.1-5 4.1.1.4 Scenarios Involving Reactor i Trip Failure 4.1-6 ! 4.1.2 The Event Tree Development Process 4.1-7 1 4.1.3 Development of Boundary Condition Tables 4.1-10 4.1.4 Frontline System Success Criteria 4.1-11 4.1.4.1 Scenarios with Reactor Trip Failure 4.1-12 4 4.1.4.2 Scenarios with Relief Valve Opening 4.1-12 ] 4.1.4.3 Excessive Cooldown Scenarios 4.1-12 1 4.1.4.4 Loss of RCS Inventory Scenarios 4.1-13 4 4.1.4.5 HPI Cooling Scenarios 4.1-13 4.2 Early Response or Main Trees 4.2-1 4.2.1 Large LOCA Main Tree 4.2.1-1 ; 4.2.2 Medium LOCA Main Tree 4.2.2-1 ' O 4.2.3 Small LOCA Main Tree 4.2.3-1 iii 0594G102787PMR
CONTENTS (continued) {g Section >
.P..
4.2.4 Very Small LOCA Main Tree 4.2.4-1 4.2.5 Inadvertent Opening of DHR Valves 4.2.5-1 4.2.6 Main Steam Line Break in Intermediate Building Main Tree 4.2.6-1 4.2.7 Steam Line Break in Turbine Building Main Tree 4.2.7-1 4.2.8 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Main Tree 4.2.8-1 4.2.9 Excessive Main Feedwater Flow Main Tree 4.2.9-1 4.2.10 Total Loss of Main Feedwater Main Tree 4.2.10-1 4.2.11 Reactor Trip Main Tree 4.2.11-1 4.2.12 Turbine Trip Main Tree 4.2.12-1 4.2.13 Loss of Instrument Air Main Tree 4.2.13-1 4.2.14 Le of Control Building Ventilation Main Tree 4.2.14-1 4.2.15 Loss of ATA Main Tree 4.2.15-1 4.2.16 Loss of DC Power Train A Main Tree 4.2.16-1 4.2.17 Loss of Offsite oower Main Tree 4.2.17-1 4.2.18 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Main Tree 4.2.18-1 4.2.19 Loss of River Water Main Tree 4.2.19-1 4.2.20 0.159 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.20-1 4.2.21 0.259 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.21-1 4.2.22 0.49 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.22-1 4.2.23 0.69 Earthquake Main Tree 4.2.23-1 4.3 Late Response or Subtrees 4.3.1-1 4.3.1 Subtree A 4.3.1-1 4.3.2 Subtree B 4.3.2-1 4.3.3 Subtree C 4.3.3-1 4.3.4 Subtree LLA 4.3.4-1 4.3.5 Subtree MLA 4.3.5-1 4.3.6 Subtree MLB 4.3.6-1 4.3.7 Subtree MLC 4.3.7-1 4.3.8 Subtree CD1 4.3.8-1 4.3.9 Subtree RT4 4.3.9-1 4.3.10 Subtree RY2 4.3.10-1 4.3.11 Subtree TC1 4.3.11-1 4.3.12 Subtree TC2 4.3.12-1 4.3.13 Subtree TC3 4.3.13-1 4.3.14 Subtree TR1 4.3.14-1 4.3.15 Subtree TR2 4.3.15-1 4.3.16 Subtree RC2 4.3.16-1 4.3.17 Subtree RWA 4.3.17-1 4.3.18 Subtree RWB 4.3.18-1 4.3.19 Subtree RWC 4.3.13-1 4.3.20 Subtree CB 4.3.20-1 4.3.21 Subtree ANS 4.3.21-1 5 PLANT DAMAGE STATES 5-1 l iv 0594G102787PMR
c CONTENTS (continued) Section Page 6 PLANT MODEL ASSEMBLY AND QUANTIFICATION 6-1 6.1 Point Estimate Quantification and Assembly 6-1 6.1.1 Matrix Results 6-2 6.1.2 Dominant Scenarios 6-2 6.1.3 Dominant Systems 6-3 6.2 Propagation of Uncertainties through Dominant Scenarios 6-3 6.3 Caveats 6-4 APPENDIX A: MAXIMA RESULTS A-1 A.1 MAXIMA for Internal Events and F04 A-2 , A.2 MAXIMA for Earthquakes A-80 , APPENDIX B: DOMINANT SCENARIO EQUATIONS B-1 B.* Equations Used for Propagating Core Damage Frequency Uncertainties B-2 , B.2 Plant Damage State Equations Used for Propagating Uncertainties - B-17 O v l i l l l l l l m , (d V l 0594G102887PMR
LIST OF TABLES Table Page O 2-1 TMI-1 Initiating Event List 2-7 2-2 Event Grouping for Scenario Development 2-13 2-3 TMI-1 Initiating Event List 2-16 3-1 Support Model Intersystem Dependencies 3-16 3-2 Split Fractions Used in Quantification of the Support Model Event Tree for General Transients 3-19 3-3 Effects of Support System Top Event Failures on Frontline Systems 3-21 3-4 Frontline System Impacts Combined Due to Symmetry 3-34 3-5 Impact Vectors Assigned to Each Support System State 3-35 3-6 Support Sp tem State Impacts on Frontline Systems 3-47 3-7 Point Estimate Frequencies of Support System States Versus Initiating Events 3-49 4.1-1 Event Tr 3 Top Events and Split Fractions 4.1-15 4.1-2 General Transient Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.1-30 4.1-3 General Transient Boundary Conditions 4.1-31 4.1-4 Split Fraction Translation Table 4.1-32 4.1-5 Split Fraction Translation Rules Firle 4.1-37 4.1-6 Safety Function Success Criteria 4.1-45 4.2-1 Event Tree Layout 4.2-2 4.2.1 1 Large LOCA Top Event Definitions 4.2.1-2 4.2.1-2 Large LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.1-3 4.2.2-1 Medium LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.2-2 4.2.2-2 Medium LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.2-3 4.2.3-1 Small Break LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.3-2 4.2.3-2 Small LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.3-3 4.2.4-1 Very Small LOCA Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.4-2 4.2.4-2 Very Small LOCA Boundary Conditions 4.2.4-3 4.2.6-1 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.6-4 4.2.6-2 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Boundary l Conditions 4.2.6-5 4.2.8-1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Top Event Definitions I and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.8-3 4.2.8-2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Boundary Conditions 4.2.8-4 i 4.2.9-1 Excessive Main Feedwater Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.9-2 4.2.9-2 Excessive Feedwater Boundary Conditions 4.2.9-3 4.2.10-1 Loss of Feedwater Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.10-2 4.2.10-2 Loss of Feedwater Boundary Conditions 4.2.10-3 4.2.11-1 Reactor Trip Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.11-2 O vi 0594G102887PMR
i LIST OF TABLES (continued)- Table Page 4.2.11-2 Reactor Trip Boundary Conditions 4.2.11-3 4.2.12-1 Turbine Trip Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.12-2 4.2.12-2 Turbine Trip Boundary Conditions 4.2.12-3 ! 4.2.14-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Top Event Definitions 4.2.14-2 4.2.14-2 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Boundary Conditions 4.2.14-3 4.2.15-1 Components / Systems States Resulting from Loss of ATA 4.2.15-4 4.2.15-2 Loss of ATA Power Top Event Definitions and Conditional-Split Fractions 4.2.15-5 : 4.2.15-3 Loss of ATA Power Boundary Conditions 4.2.15-6 ! 4.2.17-1 TMI-1 Loss of Offsite Power Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.17-3 ; 4.2.17-2 Loss of Offsite Power Boundary Conditions 4.2.17-4 4.2.18-1 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.2.18-2 4.2.18-2 Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water Boundary Conditions 4.2.18-3 ; 4.2.19-1 Loss of River Water Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions - 4.2.19-3 4.2.19-2 Loss of River Water Boundary Conditions 4.2.19-4 r 4.2.20-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.159 Earthquake 4.2.20-2 ! 4.2.21-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.25g Earthquake 4.2.21-2 ; O 4.2.22-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.4g Earthquake 4.2.23-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions for 0.69 Earthquake 4.2.22-2 4.2.23-2 l 4.3.1-1 Subtree A Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split i Fractions 4.3.1-2 ! 4.3.1-2 Subtree A Boundary Conditions 4.3.1-3 4.3.2-1 Subtree B Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.2-2 i 4.3.2-2 Subtree B Boundary Conditions 4.3.2-3 ! 4.3.3-1 Subtree C Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions j 4.3.3-2 < 4.3.3-2 Subtree C Boundary Conditions 4.3.3-3 i 4.3.5-1 Medium LOCA Subtree A Top Event Definitions and l Conditional Split Fractions- 4.3.5-2 ; 4.3.5-2 Subtree MLA Boundary Conditions 4.3.5-3 ; 4.3.6-1 Medium LOCA Subtree B Top Event Definitions and l Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.6-2 ; 4.3.6-2 Subtree MLB Boundary Conditions 4.3.6-3 l 4.3.7-1 Medium LOCA Subtree C Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.7-2 4.3.7-2 Subtree MLC Boundary Conditionc 4.3.7-3 : 4.2.8-1 Subtree CD1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split 1 Fractions 4.3.8-2 l 4.2.8-2 Subtree CD1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.8-3 l 4.3.10-1 Subtree RV2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split 1 Fractions 4.3.10-2 ' 4.3.10-2 Subtree RV2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.10-3 vii i 0594G102887PMR
LIST OF TABLES (continued) Table Page O 4.3.11-1 Subtree TC1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.11-2 4.3.11-2 Subtree TC1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.11-3 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.12-2 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.12-3 4.3.13-1 Subtree TC3 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.13-2 4.3.13-2 Subtree TC3 Boundary Conditions 4.3.13-3 4.3.14-1 Subtree TR1 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.14-2 4.3.14-2 Subtree TR1 Boundary Conditions 4.3.14-3 4.3.15-1 Subtree TR2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.15-2 4.3.15-2 Subtree TR2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.15-3 4.3.16-1 Subtree RC2 Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.16-2 4.3.16-2 Subtree RC2 Boundary Conditions 4.3.16-3 4.3.20-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilatic>n Subtree Top Event Definitions 4.3.20-2 4.3.20-2 Loss Control Building Ventilation Subtree Boundary Conditions 4.3.20-3 4.3.21-1 Subtree ANS Top Event Definitions and Conditional Split Fractions 4.3.21-2 4.3.21-2 Subtree ANS Boundary Conditions 4.3.21-3 5-1 TMI-1 PRA Plant Damage State Matrix 5-4 6-1 Mean Values of Split Fractions 6-6 6-2 Plant Matrix 6-14 6-3 Plant Damage State Frequencies 6-21 6-4 Contributions to Core Damage Frequency from Those Initiating Events for Which Event Trees Were Used 6-22 6-5 Summary for Plant Damage 6-23 6-6 Support System Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-48 6-7 Frontline, Early Response Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-49 6-8 Frontline, Late Response Event Tree Top Event Importance 6-50 6-9 Distributions Propagated through Core Damage Frequency Equations 6-51 O viii 0594G102987PMR
LIST OF FIGURES O -; t Figure Page 1-1 Structure of PRA Model 1-4 1-2 Three-Tree Structure 1-5 2-1 Master Logic Diagram 2-18 , 3-1 TMI-1 Plant Mechanical Intersystem Dependencies 3-50 i 3-2 TMI-1 Electrical Intersystem Dependencies 3-51 e 3-3 TMI-l' Plant Mechanical Intersystem Dependencies Grouped into Top Events 3-52 j 3-4 Electrical Intersystem Dependencies Grouped into Top Events 3-53 3-5 TMI-1 PRA Support System Reduced Event Tree 3-54 i 4.1-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Generalized Transient 4.1-48 4.1-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Generalized Transient 4.1-49 : 4.1-3 General Transient Event Tree 4 1-64 - 4.2.1-1 Large LOCA Event Tree 4.2.1-4 4.2.2-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Medium LOCA 4.2.2-4 ( 4.2.2-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Medium LOCA 4.2.2-5 ; 4.2.2-3 Medium LOCA Event Tree 4.2.2-11 4.2.3-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Small LOCA , 4.2.3-4 l 4.2.3-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Small LOCA 4.2.3-5 L 4.2.3-3 Small Break LOCA Event Tree 4.2.3-14 ! 4.2.4-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Very Small LOCA 4.2.4 4 .
/ 4.2.4-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Very Small LOCA 4.2.4-5 l C 4.2.4-3 Very Small LOCA Event Tree 4.2.4-18 .
4.2.6-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Main Steam Line Break in L Intermediate Building 4.2.6-6 [ 4.2.6-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Line Break 4.2.6-7 , 4.2.6-3 Steam Line Break in the Intermediate Building Event Tree 4.2.6 4.2.7-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Steam Line Break in Turbine ! Building 4.2.7-2 - 4.2.7-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Line Break in the Turbine Building 4.2.7-3 , 4.2.8-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2.8-5 ! 4.2.8-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Steam Generator Tube Rupture 4.2.8-6 > 4.2.8-3 Steam Generator Tube Rupture Event Tree 4.2.8-20 : 4.2.9-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Excessive Main Feedwater Flow 4.2.9-4 . 4.2.9-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Excessive Feedwater Flow 4.2.9-5 l 4.2.9-3 Excessive Main Feedwater Event Tree 4.2.9-19 ! 4.2;10-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Total Loss of Main Feedwater 4.2.10-4 ! 4.2.10-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Total Loss of Main Feedwater 4.2.10-5 4.2.10-3 Loss of Main Feedwater Event Tree 4.2.10-18 l 4.2.11-1 Reactor Trip Event Tree 4.2.11-4 i 4.2.12-1 Turbine Trip Event Tree 4.2.12-4 , 4.2.14-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Event Tree 4.2.14-4 ! 4.2.15.1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of ATA 4.2.15-7 l 4.2.15-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Loss of ATA 4.2.15-8 ( 4.2.15-3 Loss of ATA Power Event Tree 4.2.15-22 O 4.2.17-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water 4.2.17-5 ; I i ix 0594G102787PMR t l
LIST OF FIGURES ll Figurc Page 4.2.17-2 Event Sequence Diagram for Loss of Offsite Power 4.2.17-6 4.2.17-3 Loss of Offsite Power Event Tree 4.2.17-21 4.2.18-1 Loss of Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Event Tree 4.2.J8-4 4.2.19-1 ESD Layout Diagram for Loss of River Water 4.2.19-5 4.2.19-2 Event Sequence Diagram for loss of River Water 4.2.19-6 4.2.19-3 Loss of River Water Event Tree 4.2.19-21 4.3.1-1 Subtree A Event Tree 4.3.1-4 4.3.2-1 Subtree B Event Tree 4.3.2-4 4.3.3-1 Subtree C Event Tree 4.3.3-4 4.3.5-1 Medium LOCA Subtree A Event Tree 4.3.5-4 4.3.6-1 Medium LOCA Subtree B Event Tree 4.3.6-4 4.3.7-1 Medium LOCA Subtree C Event Tree 4.3.7-4 4.3.8-1 Subtree CD1 Event Tree 4.3.8-4 4.3.10-1 Subtree RV2 Event Tree 4.3.10-4 4.3.11-1 Subtree TC1 Event Tree 4.3.11-4 4.3.12-1 Subtree TC2 Event Tree 4.3.12-4 4.3.13-1 Subtree TC3 Event Tree 4.3.13-4 4.3.14-1 Subtree TR1 Event Tree 4.3.14-4 4.3.15-1 Subtree TR2 Event Tree 4.3.15-4 4.3.16-1 Subtree RC2 Event Tree 4.3.16-4 4.3.20-1 Loss of Control Building Ventilation Subtree Event Tree 4.3.20-4 4.3.21-1 Subtree ANS Event Tree 4.3.21-4 6-1 Probability of Plant Damage State Frequency 6-59 l 9 l 1 X l l 0594G102787PMR
t g- LIST OF ACRONYMS
.U ]
Abbreviation Definition l ADY atmospheric dump valve ! ATWS. anticipated transient without scram- : BWST borated water storage tank CFT core flood tank , CR0 control rod drive - ' CRDS control rod drive system l CSP containment spray pump , DHR decay heat removal ! ECCS emergency core cooling system : CFW emergency feedwater l EHC electrohydraulic control ; ESAS engineered safeguards actuation system ! i ESD event sequence diagram i j ESF engineered safety feature i j ESV engineered safety valve i 1 i FPR fission product removal FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GPUN GPU Nuclear Corporation f HPI high pressure injection ! HPIP high pressure injection pump '
- HVAC heating, ventilating, and air conditioning i
\
ICCW intermediate closed cooling system t LPI low pressure injection i LPIP low pressure injection pump ! LORW loss of river water LOSP loss of offsite power l j MFLIV main feedwater line isolation valve j MCC motor control center 3 MFW main feedwater MFWP main feedwater pump MLD master logic diagram MSIV main steam isolation valve NSLB main steam line break MSSV main steam safety valve NSCC nuclear services closed cooling 0TSG once-through steam generator l xi :
- 0594G102787PMR
.. ,. )
l
LIST OF ACRONYMS (continued) Abbreviation Definition PDS plant damage state PLG Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. PORY power-operated relief valve PRA probabilistic risk assessment PSV pressurizer safety valve PTS pressurized thermal shock R8HVAC reactor building heating, ventilating, and air conditioning RCP reactor coolant pump RCS reactor coolant system RPS reactor protection system SLB steam line break SLRDS steam line rupture detection system SSCC secondary system containment cooling SSCCW secondary system containment cooling water SSS support system state TBY turbine bypass valve TCV turbine control valve TSV turbine safety valve O 1 l l O xii 0594G102787PMR
f) V
- 1. Pl. ANT MODEL OVERVIEW This section develops the plant model described in Section 3 of the Technical Summary Report and presupposes that the reader is familiar with Section 4 of the Technical Summary. The plant model defines scenarios that translate initiating events into plant damage states. To develop scenarios from an initiating event, the expected plant response must be carefully delineated. Scenarios other than the expected ones can then be postulated as a result of the initiator and failure of one (or perhaps !
more) of the normally responding systems. Only after all the PRA team members have agreed to the expected plant performance can a realistic plant model be developed. Event sequence analysis and the support system dependency matrix were used to document this agreement. Detailed technical review of these results was vital in making the plant model realistic. In response to any of the scenario initiators considered, all the safety functions indicated in Table 3-1 of the Technical Sumary must be accomplished. TMI-1 is designed so that there are two or more ways to accomplish each safety function; that is, there is more than one possible success path per scenario initiator. The plant model, which was described in the PRA Methodology Overview section as being one of three parts of the PRA model, was itself subdivided into three parts as shown in Figure 1-1. Splitting the plant A model portion of each scenario was a calculational convenience. The V three-plant model parts were split to quantify the scenario frecuencies for the same reason a risk model would be split. The frontline systems were considered in a combination of one main tree and one or more subtrees. In addition, the support systems are treated in another, separate event tree described in Section 3. The main trees and subtrees for each initiator are discussed in Section 4 How the plant model end states, the plant damage states described in Section 3 of the Technical Summary, were chosen is described in Section 5. Section 6 assembles the three parts of the plant model and produces the frequency of the most important plant model scenarios. The process used for splitting the plant model is illustrated in Figure 1-2. Only 3 of the 16 support system Top Events OP, GB, and HB are shown in the first event tree. The outcome of each branch of the support system tree was designated as a support system state; e.g., SSS-1 and SSS-4 in the figure. The support system model is conditional on the initiating event. (Two initiating events are discussed in this illustration.) llhen evaluated for the first initiator shown, turbine trip, Top Event OP (offsite power) is possible, and its success leads to SSS-1 and SSS-4 as shown. For the second initiating event, loss of offsite power, Top Event OP is impossible because there is no offsite power. The dotted lines in the O O 1-1 0578G101387PMR
support tree IM* show that for the loss of offsite power initiating event, the first two branches cannot be reached. Failure of Top Event OP has changed the boundary conditions for decay heat closed / river water train B, Top Event HB, as indicated by the split fraction HB-2 instead of the HB-1 appearing in the scenarios above. GB-1, HB-2, etc. , indicate the split fractions; they denote values for each down branch (failure) likelihood used at each point in the tree to quantify the scenario frequency under different boundary conditions. This should be interpreted to mean that in the case of offsite power, the likelihood of failure of HB is HB-2, and not HB-1. Thus, the support system scenarios going to SSS-4 now have tha frequency. (freQtosp) - [1-(GB-li) - (HB-2) Next, the main (early response, frontline) tree for each initiating event is evaluated for each SSS. The turbine trip main tree in Figure 1-2 is shown evaluated for the supoort system states SSS-1 and SSS-4. For SSS-1, all support systems are available; therefore, all scenarios in the main tree are possible and tne Top Events MF , EF , and HP can be unavailable only due to failures within themselves. On the other hand, for 555-4 the decay heat river and closed cooling water system, train B HB is unavailable, making high pressure injection cooling ("bleed and feed") unavailable even without failures in HP itself since high pressure injection is unavailable as a result of being in SSS-4 The high pressure injection pumps need motor coolers; without them, the pumps will stop working after a few minutes and the system will become unavailable. The arrows indicate the fate of each main tree scenario. The first two scenarios for SSS-1 recuire no further analysis; i.e., they go to PDS S. The third scenario goes to subtree A and the fourth one to subtree B. In the third scenario, emergency feedwater has failed, but HPI cooling is working. Reactor coolant system heat removal is under control through the power-operated relief valve or pressurizer safety valves with RCS inventory control being maintained by the HPI purps. If "HPI cooling" is to be maintained for more than 12 to 13 hours, however, a recirculation water source will have to be provided for long-term RCS inventory control. The long-term inventory control and possible subsequent top events appear in subtree A. Subtree A first asks if "piggyback" recirculation alignment HL is successful. If it is (first scenario in subtree A), containment sprays are not necessary and only the sump valves SR need to operate for the scenario's outcome to be :uccessful (PDS S). If the sump valves do not open, core damage results and the scenario is sent to the centainment event tree for plant damage state 48 (high pressure >: ore melt with water in the surp and fan coolers operating, but sprays have failed).
- IM, NN, etc., are in figure for clarity, but will not appear in the event trees in Section 4 0578G101337PMR
-l O A complete plant model ' scenario as discussed above and.shown highlighted on Figure 1-2 consists of -
One scenario to PDS 48 = TT Initiating Event OP HB From Support System Model TF- ET- HP From Main Tree-HL 3R From Subtree Note: Bars above top event names indicate failure; no bars indicate success. The frequency of this scenario can be calculated from (freqTT) . [1 (op.1)) . [1-(HB-1)] - (MF-1)
- (EF-1) - [1-(HP-1)] - [1-(HL-1)] - (SR-1).
where the (HL-1) terms are split fraction values. In general, subtrees must be evaluated conditional on the support system state, the initiating event, and the scenario that calls them. In , practice, all possible main tree scenarios did not require unique O subtrees. O 1-3 0578G1013S7PMR
V COtJTAltJMEtJT
^ HAD ACTIVE ItJITIATirJG PLAtJT E
MATERIAL PierJT (ACTIVE _ , DAr. G RELEASE , DY EA EVEtJTS SYSTEMS) MODEL DAMAGE CATEGOnlES DISPERSIOtl AND PnOGRESSIOtJ ^ "' ^ EFFECT TYPE STAT ES t.tODEL MODEL (flot presently part of TPRA model) { W FAQa tTLitJE FAOtJTLitJE SYST D.I - UP ORT YST EMS - fy5, St>PPORT g SUOTAFE , COf TA PJ (Erli SYS T E u nESPOtJSE TRLGUEtJCIES ' S AF ETY MODEL FEAmnES STAT ES MODEL RESPOtJSE
,MODEL j FIGURE 1-1. STRUCTURE OF PRA MODEL e 9 9
f) f'~% f'%
% b)
INITB ATING FRONTt.lNE SYSTEMS: EVENT SUPPORT SYSTEMS: . SHORT TERM AND INKCTION LONG TEHM AND RECIRCULATION BE OP GB HB M F-- EF- HP HL CS SR PDS I,$P'"'"' 3 j 118-1 3mSSS i MF-1 M 2 h E $$a"TR$"*"'" S
; TT- uAiN TREE rOR SSS-1 EF- 8'"E g .- -w m -- ,.,.....y g L .~ -
- u. ,3g_t (EGENo: IIP-1 l 7, 4 OP = OFFSITE POWER G8 -
01ESEL GENER ATOR THAfN 8 A -SU8 TREE FOR $$f_ } Hs - 3 4A DECAY HE AT CLOSED /HIVEH WATER TRAIN 8 MF = TOO LITTL E MAIN FEEDWATER FLOW CS-1 SR-2 EF = TOO LITTLE EMEPGENCY FIEDWATER FLOW A HP = 48 HIGH PH E SSLI*1E f ri)ECT aON HL = HIGH Pf 4 ESSURE Rf C8HCULATION CS - CON T AINMENT SPRAY n g 4g SR = SUMP RECIHCUL AT80N
~ PDS =
PL ANT DAMAGE STAT E
. -, 2 -
1 3A Pm = NoT NECESSAHY u, ,u . ,MPOSS e p t E I SR-1 IN = INCONSE QUE N TI A L 2 38 SSS = SUPPOni Sv5TEu STATE B - SUBTHEE FOR suPoSSistE SCENARIO SSS-1 as
-] 3 g SS4 -
M 1h NO CORE DAMAGE rr- ualN TREE FOR SSS-4
; F,1 ]W NO CORE DAMAGE LOSS Or OF FSITE POWER @ -h - - ~~ l SSS-I ,g _ _ _y{- 22:D CAfrT GET TO A1 - -2 SSS-4 T10 C 3 SSS-6 r ---1.0g1. 0 , -3 34 GB-1 ne2 - "
4 SSS-4 B -SUITREETOR
'bbb-4 3 5 SSS-7 8 3 as L 2 L 3 L 1 v 2
v SUPPORT SYSTEM TREE MAIN TREE SUBTREE FIGURE l-2. THREE-TREE STRUCTUtlE
A p 2. 9EFINITION OF INITIATING EVENTS As discussed in Section 4 of the Technical Summary Report, a risk , analysis can be characterized as a listing of r.11 possibic core damage scenarios with an assessment of their frequency, uncertainty, and damage. The first' step in developing the set of scenarios was to define a set of scenario initiators or initiating events.* This was done using i a master logic diagram based on the hazards and safety functions described in Sect.cn 2.2 of the Technical Summary. The master logic , diagram allowed the choice of a set of initiating events that was as ' complete u possible. 2.1 MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM A master logic diagram (similar to a fault tree) was constructed to guide the effort of searching for ways in which the hazard of radioactive material release may become an unacceptable risk by loss of control of the essential safety functions, The master logic diagram is shown in Figure 2-1.
- The events in the master logic diagram are identified by the level at which they appear in the tree with the top event being Level 1. The tree '
has been classified into levels as an ordering technique to assist in-locating events by approach to an offsite release. In principle, the i strategy is to achieve completeness of events by level. The event.
"Excessive Offsite Release," is the top undesired event. Excissive *O offsite release, Level 1, can result from either (OR gate) an "Excessive Direct Release" or an "Excessive Indirect Release." These and only these release paths exist from TMI-1, so they constitute a Level 2 of completeness.
Excessive direct release wou;d come from such sources as the spent fuel pool and the waste tanks and has been generally agreed, based on previous PRAs, to be an insignificant contributor to risk and therefore will not be further developed here, , 4 To occur, an excessive indirect releast would require "Extensive Core Damage," "Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Failure," and "Containment Failure" (AND gate). In other words, in order for radioactivity to escape to the environment, it must first escape the fuel cladding, pass out of the reactor coolant system, and finally penetrate the reactor containment building. Only if i i
*The definition for initiating event used here is: Sone single occur- l rence, usually a system malfunction or misoperation or internal or ;
external hazard, that starts a disturbance in the nuclear power plant and ! j eventually perturbs the reactor coolant system or in some other way can i y lead to a large release of radioactivity; i.e., it starts a scenario, i 2-1 0579G101387PMR
all three of these barriers to core fission product release are violated would there be an offsite release of the radioactivity contained in the fuel rods in the reactor core. Therefore, these three events form a Level 3 of completeness. As discussed in Section 3.2 of the Technical Summary Report, in order to have extensive core damage, one of five safety functions must not be adequately performed, as required by the conditions in the plant. That is, extensive core damage will result if any of the following occurs:
- 1. The core reactivity is irsufficiently controlled so that more heat is generated than can be removed ("Insufficient Reactivity Control")
- 2. The heat is coming from the reactor fuel faster than it can be transferred out to other systems ("Insufficient Core Heat Removal")
- 3. The heat transfer medium (coolant) in the RCS is not sufficient to remove all the heat generated in the core ("Insufficient R; i Inventory Control")
- 4. The coolant is not in the proper state [e.g. , the void fraction is too high] ("Insufficient RCS Pressure Control")
- 5. The heat transferred from the RCS through the int rfaces with other heat removal systems is not sufficient ("Insufficient RCS Heat Remova l ")
Reactor coolant system pressure bound:ry Toilure would only occur as a result of insufficient RCS pressure control; e.g., the pressure results in stresses in excess of the strain that the pressure boundary will endure or the relief valves open and remain open. Failure of the reactor containment can result from either failing to close penetrations through the containment ("Insufficient Isolation") or a break in the containment. A break or crack in the containment can result ' am failure to control the temperature and prasure of the air and steam in the containment ("Insufficient Pressure / Temperature Control") or from failure to keep hydrogen gas below the limit for its ignition ("Insufficient Ccabustible Gas Control"). Should hydrogen concentration exceed 15 to 17%, ignition of the hydrogen may releas: sufficient energy to break the containment. The events in Level 3 can only take place if one of eight safety functions it insufficiently accomplished; therefore, nonperformance of the safety functions constitutes a Level 4 of completeness. The events that have been describ'd constitute a complete set of events for Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4. 2.2 INITIATING EVENT LIST At Level 5 in the master logic diagram, the question is, "What equipment malfunction or misoperation could threaten the accomplishment of each 2-2 0579G101387PMR
/^N safety function?" All such scenario initiators considered for TMI-1 are -() listed in Table 2-1 accordmg to the safety function they threaten. Under each safety function is the category "other," which is to be interpreted simply as "all initiating events not otherwise included in the list." The master logic diagram is complete at Levels 1 through 4; with the inclusion of "other" categories, it can logically he said that the search for initiating events is also complete at Level 5. That is, any initiator that can cause a level 4 event is included somewhere in the , list of scenario initiators, either specifically or in the "other" category. . By inclusion of the "other" categ /, the question of "completeness" has been changed. Instead of asking, "What about the things that have been forgotten?"--a question that has a lot of emotional content to it--the t question becomes, "What numerical value shall be assigned to the frequency of occurrence of the 'other' scenarios?" The frequency of the "other" category of initiators was not quantified, it was used to remind the TMI-1 PRA team to include a term in the final quantification process (Section 6 below) that would account for all scenarios that might be started by initiating events not appearing explicitly in the list in Table 2-1. In this form, the question of completeness is more amenable I for handling in a rational, quantitative fashion. In fact, the question becomes entirely the same as for any other scenario that was considered i explicitly; namely, "What is the frequency?" The answer is given in the form of a probability curve against frequency, with the probability curve V reflecting all evidence, knowledge, and experience. This argurrent is - valid because we have already been complete in specifying all possible threatening effects. The list of initiating events in Table 2-1 is the result of an exten- ; sive analysis by the TMI-1 probabilistic risk assessment team, backed up ; by many years of reactor safety research by the government and private industry. The list was produced by a detailed review of the plant design and industry operating experience. The plant design review included - material contained in the systems descriptions in the Systems Analysis Report. The initiators in Table 2-1 are grouped according to the way that they affect accomplishment of the particular safety function. These effect groupings serve the purpose of facilitating the scenario development process described in Section 4 as well as organizing the search for scenario initiators. I i The idea of grouping by effect can be better understood by considering at least two more levels of the master logic diagram between Levels 4 and 5, Levels 4' and 4". In der to threaten the control of a safety function, an initiator will result in either too much or too little RCS heat l removal for instance. Steam line breaks remove too much heat from the l RCS; a_ turbine trip causes too little to be removed. Thus, Level 4' is "too little" or "too much." Since only certain ways exist for threatening each safety function, a Level 4" suggests itself. For 1 2-3 l 0579G101387PMR H
instance, only steam flow and feed flow can effect the removal of heat from the RCS. Thus, thinking of Levels 4' and 4" together, we can be sure to be complete if we consider all initiators that result in "too little" or "too much" steam flow or "too little" or "too much" feed flow. In terms of mitigating the effects of "too much" steam flow, for instance, it may matter whether secondary system inventory is lost as well or whether this loss of inventory takes place inside or outside containment. Table 2-1 categorizes all the things that can initiate scenarios into groups which have the same effect. These threatening affects groups were occasionally further collected to form those groups discussed as pinch point I in Section 3.2 of the Technical Sumary. This further grouping for the scenario definition and quantification process is described in Sectiori 2.4. 2.3 INITIATING EVENTS CAUSED BY INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL HAZARDS At the cause level in Table 2-1, initiating events may occur because of mechanical component failures, human errors, or internal or external hazards. Internal hazards, such as fire, ficoding, steam leaks, pipe whip, or explosions, can initiate challenges of one or more of the safety functions included in Level 4 of the master logic diagram. External hazards such as earthquakes, high winds, river flooding, etc., can also initiate zcenarios that threaten the control of safety functions. For example, if one RCS dropline isolation valve opens due to a hot short in control ci.cuitry caused by a fire and the other due to disk failure, RCS Inventory Control will be threatened. Internal and external hazards are described in detail in tne Spatial Interactions ' ort. Of all these hazards, only fires and earthquakes were deterr to be sufficiently important risk contributers to be analyzed with i.. .nt trees and have their sce iarios compared in detail against 1 c;e from other causes. The following information sources were used, in conjunction with the master logic diagram approach, to characterize these initia~cing events: o Previously Experienced Plant Events e Comparison With Other PRAs e Feedback From Other Parts of the Risk Model As long as the most freauent intitiating events caused by internal and external hazards are identified, the significance of the "other" initiating events and associated causes can be minimized. 2.3.1 LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM INVENTORY There are several potential leak paths connected to the RCS that, if exposed to an internal hazard 2nd opened during normal reactor operation, could lead to loss of RCS inventory. In the analysis, we have assumed that pipes that have a check valve are not susceptible to being opened by a failure of power or control system. In the TMI-1 plant, a loss of both reactor coolant pump seal injection from the makeup pumps and intermediate closed cooling water can cause substantial physical damage to the RCP seals. Such seal damage will 2-4 0579G101387PMR
O eventually result in loss of RCS inventcry control because seal injection U is provided by the same pumps that maintain RCS inventory control the high pressure injection pumps. RCP seal injection can fail by failing power cables to all three makeup pumps, MU-P1A, MU-PIB, and MU P1C, or by f ailing power or control circuitry to air-operated valve MU-V20, a fail closed type isolation valve. The same hazard could fail intermediate cooling 'yu severing power ; cables to both intermediate cooling pumps or' by causing hot shorts in valve control circuitry, which close one of the following. valves: IC-V4, IC-V79A, IC-V798, IC-V79C, IC-V790, IC-V2, or IC-V3. Closure of IC-V2, IC-V3, or IC-V4 would stop all intermediate cooling flow to the RCP seal 1 coolers. Closure of IC-V79A, B, C, or 0 stops flow to its one respective - RCP bearing cooler. Any internal hazard affecting cables or panels i containing circuitry associated with the above-mentioned components can , potentially cause an RCP seal failure and potentially result in core damage if it has also caused the three makeup pumps to become unavailable. 2.3.2 LOSS OF ELECTRIC POWER Internal hazards in several areas in the plant can cause the loss of AC l or DC power. Internal hazards affecting major cable chases have the potential of severing the connections of the unit auxiliary transformers with the vital switchgear. An internal hazard in the control room, cable i spreading room, or switchgear room can cause an inadvertent trip of the unit auxiliary transformer breakers. Si tilarly, internal hazards can p) 'n. damage breaker control circuitry or power cables resulting in the loss of an AC or DC electric power train. 2.4 GROUPING 0F Ird (IATORS ' In Section 2.2, initiators were defined and grouped in terms of their threat to safety functions. This preliminary grouping facilitated completeness; i.e., it helped find them all. However, during the definition of the scenarios that arose from each initiator, it was convenient in some cases to collect these threatening effect groups into what are called "Initiating Event Groups." That is, we formed groups of initiators, which we assumed initiated identical plant response sequences. This represents the process described as pinch point I in Figure 4-4 of the Technical Sumary Report. The formation of initiating event groups was done in various ways. : Sometimes distinctions between threatening effect groups were treated l explicitly by making each such group into a separate initiating event , group, and, in other cases, distinctions between such groups were tracked through insertion of questions in the event trees. These questions served, for instance, to split steam line breaks into those in the intermediate and turbine buildings. This was done for convenience in defining scenarios. All of the threatening effect groups are shown as they were collected into initiating event groups in Table 2-2. As can be seen, many threatening effect groups were collected in the reactor trip initiating l 2-5 ! 0576 ' J1387PMR I l
event group. A short description of why this could be done will serve to illustrate this grouping process. The reactor trip group came about because a single common system, the reactor protection system, protects against a number of threatening effects. If it works, and this is highly iikely, then all of these threatening effects will be arrested in the same manner. For instance, although they threaten different safety functions, a rapid insertion of positive reactivity (even: 1) and a decrease in flow rt.te through the core (event 18) will both result in a reactor trip cnd otherwise will require no different alleviating actions. (The difference is in the parts of the RPS trip logic that are used. The differences in RCS flow rate and initial rod position are insignificant.) If the RPS does not work, the safety function threatening effects of the initiating event will become clearer. The colloquial initiating event group names in Table 2-2 were used to describe the plant model initiating event pinch point I groups from this point on. It should be kept continuously in mind, however, that each name refers to a group of initiators. All scenarios developed and frequencies calculated are assumed to be valid for all initiators in the group. Such a grouping was made as a modeling and calculational conven-ience only and introduces some approximations into the scenarios. Such errors are believed to be small. 2.5 INITIATING EVENT GROUP FREQUENCIES Some initi: ting event group frequencies were calculated from data, from systems equations, and from the seismic analysis. Those calculated from data were derived using the two-stage Bayesian procedure, which combines TMI-1 site-specific information and generic industry experience fron other pressurized water reactors. Details of how the initiating event frequencies ware quantified using data are presented in the Data Report. Those calcult ad from system equations were analyzed in the same manner as the split fractions; i.e., w'th b,0ck diagrams and boolean equations. Details of how this was done appear in the Systems Analysis Report. The seismic initiating event frequencies are the frequency of earthquakes in a particular intensity range and their derivation is found in the Seisnic Analysis Report. The fire frquencies were all calculated based on historical data and their derivation is found in the Spatial Analysis Report. All of the initiating event frequencies are presented in Table 2-3. O 2-6 0579G101387PMR
O U O G J
)
TABLE 2-1. Td!-l INITIATING EVENT LIST Sheet 1 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: ""E ** Source of Threat Threa tened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Reactivity Control 1 RT Rapid insertion of positive Uncontrolled Group Withdrawal CRDCS Failure reactivity. Internal Hazard 2 SL Rapid insertion of positive Control Rod Ejection CRD Weld Failure reactivity and small loss of RCS inventory. 3 RT Rapid insertion of a little Control Rod Prop CRD Power Supply Failure negative reactivity. Internal Hazard 4 RT Slow insertion of negative Inadvertent Boration Makeup and Purification reactivity. System Malfunction Internal Hazard 5 RT Slow insertion of positive Inadvertent Deboration Makeup and Purification reactivity. System Malfunction Internal Hazard 6 [RT] Rapid insertion of a lot Inadvertent Reactor Trip Instrumentatio", Noise l 7 u of negative reactivity. Inaavertent reanual Scram RPS Test Errors s Othe r. RCS Inventory Control 7 [VL] Very small loss of RCS Very Small Pipe Breaks Loss of Seal Cooling inventory. RCP Seal Failure Internal Hazard 7A [SL] Small loss of RCS inventory Small RCS Pipe Breaks Internal Hazard (nonisolable, inside Inadvertent PSV containment) . 8 [ML] Intermediate loss of RCS Meditsa RCS Pipe Breaks inventory (nonisolable, inside containment). LEGEND: [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. 0580G101487PMR _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . - ._ . _ . . ._ _ . . , . . _ . . ~ , _ . _ .. . . . . . . _ _
TABLE 2-1 (continued) Sheet 2 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of S MTW Threa tened Tree Threatening Ef fect Cause of Threat 9 RCS Inventory Control [LL] Large loss of RCS inventory Large RCS Pipe Breaks (continued) (nonkolable, inside con. Inment). 10 SL Isolable loss of RCS Inadvertent PORV or High Internal Hazard inventory inside Point Vent Valve Opening containment. 11 SL Isolable loss of RCS Letdown or Sample Lire inventory outside Break contain:nent. 12 [LL] Loss of RCS inventory and Reactor Vessel Rupture ECCS flow to core. 13 [TR] Loss of RCS inventory to Steam Generator Tube Rupture steam generator. 14 1:T Decrease in RCS inventory Charging letdown Internal Hazard with no coolant spillage. to 15 [VS]* Medium icss of RCS inventory Break in DHR Drop 11ne Internal Hazard (outside containment). Dropline Valve Failure Other. LPI Line Valve Failure [Fl] Very smalllossofRC$ complete RCP Seal failure Various Fires [F2] inventory. and Failure of HPIPs Ottie r. RCS Pressure Control 16 RT Increase in RCS pressure Pressurizer Heater Control System Malfunction with no change in inventory. Failure Internal Hazard 17 RT Decrease in RCS pressure Pressurizer Spray Ce ntrol System Malfunction with no change in inventory. Failure Internal Hazard Othe r.
- Treated without an event tree.
LEGEND: [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. 101487PMR
TABLE 2-1 (continued) Sheet 3 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of Source of Threat Threa tened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Core Heat Removal 18 RT Decrease in flow rate RCP Trip Inadvertent Breaker ; through core. Opening RCP Shaft Seizure / Break Loss of Lube Oil Cooling Internal Hazard 19 RT Decrease in flow rate Core Internals Vent Yalve through core - no RCP Fails Open speed change. 20 RT Change in flow distribution, Core Flow Blockage Corrosion no RCP speed change. Crud Buildup Othe r. Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal m 21 SLI Increase in steam flow, Turbine Control Valve Turbine Pressure e
- dcwnstream of MSIV, no Opening Regulator Failure loss of inventory. Inadvertent TBV Opening ICS Malfunction Increase in Electric Demand Internal Hazard 22 [TT] Decrease in steam flow, TSVs Close (equipment Turbine Generator 60wnstream of MSIV. protection turbine trip) Malfunction or TCVs Throttle EHC System Malfunction Internal Hazard 23 FW Decrease in steam flow, Loss of Condenser Vacuum Loss of Cf rtulating Water downstream of MSIY and Vacuum pump Failure interruption of feedwater. Internal Hazard 24 [AT] Initial insufficient ICS Failure ICS Bus Pr Supply, and subsequent excessive [ATA] Faflure main feed flow. Internal Hazard LEGEND:
{ [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. l . 4 j 0580G101487FMR
TABLE 2-1 (continued) Sheet 4 of 6 Safety Function Event Initiating Event Groups: Examples of Number Source of Threat Threatened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat 25 Reactor Coolant SLI Small increase in steam Small SLB Intemal Hazarc System Heat Removal flow, upstream of MSIV, Inadvertent Opening of (continued) with loss of secondary ADV Or MSIV inventory outside containment. 26 SLI Small increase in steam Sau11 SLB Jnside flow with loss of secondary Containment inventory into containment. 27 SLI Small increase in steam Small SLB Outside flow downstream of MSIV Containment with loss of secondary Inadvertent N)V Opening system inventory. 28 [SLI] Large cease in steam Large Steam Line Break flow ,. Jeam of MSIV Inside Containment with loss of secondary inventory. ~ O 29 SLI Large increase in steam flow large Steam Line Break Outside with loss of secondary Containment Upstream of MSIVs inventory, unisolable, outside containment. 30 [SLI] Large increase in steam flow large Steam Line Break Outside with loss of secondary Containment Downstream of system inventory, isolable. MSIVs outside containment. 31 [EC] Excessive feedwater flow. MFM Pump Speed Increase Control System Malfunction NW Control Valve Opening Internal Hazard above Demand 32 [W] Inadequate feedwater flow. MFW or Booster Pump (s) Internal Hazard Trip MW Control Valve Closure MW Isolation valve Closure LEGEND: [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from watch the ir4f tiating event group derives its title. 101487FNR
O O O TABLE 2-1 (continued) Sheet 5 of 6 ey n on hent InWadng hent %ups:
- Number Source of Threat Theeatened Tree Threatening Eft ect Cause of Threat 33 Reactor Coolant TT Interruption of steam flow Inadvertent MSIV Closure Internal Hazard System Heat Removal upstream of turbine and Lcontinued) turbine bypass and atmos-pheric dump valves.
34 SLI Interruption of feedwater Feedwater Line Break Upstream flow to one steam generator. of MFLIV 35 SLI Increase in steam flow, Feedwater Line Break Down-downstream of W LIV, inside stream of MFLIVs containment with inter-ruption of MFM. 36 FW Interruption of feedwater loss of Control s.ie Air Header Failure flow. Internal Hazard 37 [LR] Loss of all essential Loss of River Water System Screen Blockage equipment cooling. Internal Hazard y 38 [AC] Loss of power to auxiliary Loss of Offsite Power Grid Collapse e transformers. 39 [LD] Loss of essential equipment Loss of DC Power Internal Hazard control. Train A. 40 [LNS] Loss of essential equipment loss of Nuclear Services Internal Hazard cooling. Closed Cycle Cooling Equipment Failure 41 [LC] Slow loss of essential loss of Control Building CV Power Failure equipment power. Ventilation Chiller Failure Other. Containment Isolation 42
- Direct release to the Failure of the Reactor environment. Building Isolation
*These scenarios are modeled as top events in the event trees.
LEGEND: [ ]s indicate the threatening effect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. 0580G101487PMR
TABLE 2-1 (continaed) Sheet 6 of 6 Safety function Event Initiating Event Groups- Examples of Number Source of Threat Threatened Tree Threatening Effect Cause of Threat Containment Pressure / Temperature Control 43
- Loss of containment Inadvartent Reactor Building pressure / tempera ture Spray control.
44
- Loss of containment loss of Nonnal Containment RBHVAC Malfunction pressure / tempera ture Cooling control.
Control of Excessive Direct Releases
** Spent Fuel Element Cladding 45 Release of spent fuel Dropping of a Fuel fission products. Failure Element During Refueling Operation Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling N 46 ** Release of stored radio- Waste Gas / Liquid Tank Diversion Valve i
N active wastes. Mal func tion
*These scenarios are modeled as top events in the event trees. **The consequences resulting from the loss of these functions are not significant compared to the other safety functions and, therefore, are not modeled further.
LEGEND: [ ]s indicate the threatening ef fect group from which the initiating event group derives its title. t 2101487PMR
O ' fN b TABLE 2-2. EVENT GROUPING FOR SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT Sheet 1 of 3 Group Initiating Event Table 2-1 ety nction 3 Tt.eatening Ef fect Number Group Name Number Threatened 1 Large Loss of LL 9 Large Loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, inside RCS Inventory Control RCS Inventory containment) 2 Medium ML 8 Intermediate loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, RCS Inventory Control Loss of RCS inside containment Inventory 3 Small Loss of SL 2 Rapid Insertion of Positive Reactivity and Small Reactivity Control RCS Inventory Loss of RCS Inventory 7A Small Loss of RCS Inventory (nonisolable, inside RCS Inventory Control containment) 10 Isolable Loss of RCS Inventory Inside Containment RCS In-entory Control 11 Isolable Loss of RCS Inventory Outside Containmant RCS Inventory Control 10 Loss of Main FW 23 Decrease in Steam Flow. Downstream of MSIV and Reactor Coolant System Feedwater Interruption of Feedwater Flow Heat Removal 7 32 Inadequate Fee &ater Flow Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 36 Interruption of Feedwater Flow Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 11 Reactor Trip RT 1 Rapid Insertion of Positive Reactivity Reactivity Control . 3 Rapid Insertion of a Little Negative Reaetivity Reactivity Control 4 Slow Insertion of Negative Reactivity Reactivity Control 5 Slow Insertion of Positive Reactivity Reactivity Control 6 Rapid Insertion of a lot of Negdtive Reactivity Reactivity Control 14 Decrease in RCS Inventory with No Coolant Spillage RCS Inventory Control 16 Increase in RCS Pressure with No Change in Inventory RCS Pressure Control 17 Decrease in RCS Pressure with No Change ia Inventory RCS Pressure Control 18 Decrease in Flow Rate Through Core Core Heat Removal i 0580G101487PMR i
TABLE 2-2 (continued) Sheet 2 of 3 Group Initiating Event j Table 2-1 ey nc tion 3 Threatening Ef fect Number Grtup Name Number Threa tened 11 Reactor Trip 19 Decrease in Flow Rate Through Core - No Core Heat Removal (continued) RCP Speed Change Increase in RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control 20 Change in Flow Distribution - No RCP Speed Change Core Heat Removal 15 Loss of bus ATA AT 24 Initial Insuf ficient and Subsequent Reactor Coolant System Power Excessive Main Feed Flow Heat Removal 12 Turbine Trip TT 22 Decrease in Steam Flow, Downstream of MSIV Reactor Coolant System Heat Removal 33 Interruption of Steam Flow Upstream Reactor Coolant System of Turbine, Turbine Bypass, and Heat Removal Atmospheric Dump Valves 9 Excessive Main EC 31 Excessive feedwater Flow Reactor Coolant System Feedwa ter Heat Removal m 4 Ver small VL 7 Very Small loss of RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control i Loss of RCS % Inventury 17 Loss of AC 38 Loss of Power Reactor Coolant System Offsite Power Heat Removal 5 Containment VS 15 Pedium Loss of RCS Inventory RCS Inventory Control Bypass (outside containment) 8 OTSG Tube TR 13 loss cf RCS Inventory to Steam Generator RCS Inver.tccy Control Rupture 7 Steam Line SLT 21 Increase in Steam Flow, Downstream Reactor Coolant System Break in Turbine of MSIV, No loss of Inventory Heat Aemoval Building 27 Small Increase in Steam Flow Rev. tor Coolant System Downstream of MSIV with Loss of Heat Removal Secondary System Inventory 30 Large Increase in Steam Flow with Reactor Coolant System Loss of Secondary System Inventory, Heat Removal Isolable Outside Containment 01487PMR
m TABLE 2-2 (continued) Sheet 3 of 3 Group Initiating Event j Table 2-1 *I ""# " 3 Threatening Effect Number Group Name Number Threatened 6 Steam Line Break SLI 25 Small Increase in Steam Flow, Upstream Reactor Coolant System in Intermediate of MSIV with Loss of Secondary Inventory Heat Removal Building Outside Containment 26 Small Increase in Steam Flow with Loss Reactor Coolant System of Secondary Inventory into Heat Removal Containment 28 Large Increase in Steam Flow Upstream Reactor Coolant System l cf MSIV with Loss of Secondary Inventory Heat Removal t 29 Large Increase in Steam Flow with Loss Reactor Coolant System of Secondary Inventory Unisolable . Heat Removal Outside Containment 34 Interruption of PFW Flow to One Steam Reactor Coolant System Generator Heat Removal 35 Increase in Steam Flow, Upstream of PG' LIV, Reactor Coolant System ro Inside Containment with Interruption of MFW Heat Removal 5 19 Loss of River LRW 37 Loss of Essential Equipment Cooling Reactor Coolant System Water Heat Removal 14 Loss of Control LC 41 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Building Heat Removal Ventilation 16 Loss of one DC LD 39 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Power Train Heat Removal 13 Loss of Control FW 36 Loss of Essential Equipment Control Reactor Coolant System Air Heat Removal 13 Lo.s of Nuclear LNS -40 Loss of Essential Equipment Cooling Reactor Coolant System Services Closed Heat Removal Cycle Cooling Water 4 0580G101587PMR
- . _ . __. .__ _ . _ _ - - . _ _ - - . ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . , _ _ . _ _ . _ _ - . - . , _ . - . . - _ . . _ . _ _ __ _ _
TABLE 2-3. TMI-1 INITIATING EVENT LIST Sheet 1 of 2 Distribution Group Initiating Event Group Number Group Name Code 5th 50th 95th Support System Frontline Percentile Pe nentile Percentile Run Number Event Tree 1 Large LOCA LL 7.3-6 7.4-5 5.2-4 1.9-4 1 LL 2 Medium LOCA R 1.9-5 1.9-4 1.3-3 4.2-4 1 R 3 Small LOCA SL 2.7-5 9.4-4 1.1-2 2.2-3 1 SB 4 Very Small LOCA VL 2.7-4 7.55-3 1.4-2 5.1.3 1 VSB 5 Inadvertent Opening Of VS 4.7-10 6.6-9 1.7-7 1.0-7 - - DHR Valves 6 Steam and Feedwater SLI 1.7-5 1.9-4 1.3-3 4.2-4 1 SLI Line Breaks 7 Steam Generator Tube Rupture TR 4 . 0-4 6.4-3 2.8-2 1.1-2 1 TR 8 Excessive Feedwater Flow EC 2.1-2 7.9-2 2.8-1 1.2-1 1 EXC 9 Total Loss of Main Feedwater FW 5.1-2 1.8-1 4.8-1 2.3-1 1 FW 10 Reactor Trip RT 6.7-1 1.4+0 2.2+0 1.4+0 1 GT 11 Turbine Trip TT 7.8-1 1.5+0 2.3+0 1.6+0 1 GT 12 Loss of Air System LA 2. -4 1.9-3 1.9-2 6.0-3 6 GT 13 Loss of Control Building LC 5.4 -5 1.4 -4 4.2-4 2.0-4 8 LC Ventilation
- 14 Loss of ATA Power (ICS) AT 5.2-3 3.6-2 1. 7-1 5.4-2 5 ATA 15 Loss of DC Power Train A LD 3.7-3 1.9-2 6.0-2 2.8-2 3 GT 16 Loss of Offs'te Power AC 1.4-3 5.0-3 1.6-2 7.1-2 2 GT 17 Loss of Nuclear Services LNS 4.6-3 1.1-2 2.7-2 1.4-2 7 GT Closed Cooling Water 18 Loss of River Water
- LRW 3.5-4 1.3-3 2.2-2 7.4-3 7 LRW
- These initiating events include in their frequency the likelihood of successful manual actions to prevent plant trip.
NOTE: Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviated form; i.e., 7.3-6 = 7.3 x 10-6, 0580 87PMR
O. v TABLE 2-3 (continued) Sheet 2 of 2 l Distribution Group Initiating Event Group Number Group Name Code 5th 50th 95th Support System Frontline Penentile Percentile Pe n entile Run Number Event Tree 19 Elevation 310' Flood *
- 20 Fire in MCC Area F01 3.0-5 * *
.(AB-FZ-6, scenario 1) 21 Fire in 1S Switchgear Room F02 2.0-5 * *
(CB-FA-2b. scenario la) 22 Fire in B Battery Room F03 5.0-6 * * (CB-FA-2d, scenario 1) 23 Fire in IE Switchgear Room F04 1.5-4 9 GT (CB-FA-3a, scenario 2) 24 Fire in IE Switchgear Room F05 1.0-5 *
- 7 (CB-FA-3b, scenario 1)
U 25 Fire in ESAS Cabinet Area F06 2.0-5 * * (CB-FA-3c, scenario 1) 26 0.15g Earthquake EIS 1.09-3 10 GT 27 0.25g Earthquake E25 1.80-4 11 GT 28 0.4g Earthquake E40 3.42-5 12 GT 29 0.69 Earthquake E60 6.21-6 13 GT
*These events lead directly to core damage and therefore were not modeled on an event tree.
NOTE: Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviatd form; i.e., 3.0-5 = 3.0 x 10-5, 0580G101587PMR
E acessive {cyef f offsete release Public impact OH I l Encessive E ncesseve ensierec t gapgg release Release pathway fJD I I C a tensive RCS pressure coee levelJ tauundaey Containment darnage featue, fauure Core radeonuclede baresers CD I I I 3 l l Insuff cient Insullecient lasuffecient reactevity Insuffecient Insurfaceent I"5"H"E gn,yg g,c,,n, INid coee heat inventory HCS heat RCS pressuee '"'""'c ent twessure and control removal contsol ermoval cone,og asdatson scenterature c,,,,,,,,,,,e q,,
" 'Y control conuol func t.ons levels Accident-enetaatang events FIGURE 2-1. MASTER LOGIC DIAGRAM e - - - -
O O
Il 3. SUPPORT SYSTEM MODEL v This section describes the modeling of TMI-1 support systems that are required for successful operation of the frontline systems. F rontline systems are those systems that directly perform the critical reactor safety functions, such as core heat removal, RCS inventory control, RCS heat removal, containment isolation, and reactivity control. Support systems allow these frontline systems to act by providing electrical power, control and actuation signals, motor cooling, and heat removal. The purpcse of a separate support system event tree model is to reduce the number of event sequences that must be evaluated by identifying the most important combinations of support system success and failure states. This section describes how the many possible support stem success and failure perrmtations are reduced to a few important ones, referred to as support system states, and then quantified. The support system model is quantified, conditional on the occurrence of a specific initiating event. For example, the support model must be quantified once for a simple reacter trip initiator and, then, again for a loss of offsite power initiator. The support system mcdel is not conditional on the status of frontline systems The support model evaluMion follows the specification of the initiating event, but precedes the analysis of the frontline systems in the development of a complete accident sequence. The following sections describe the dependencies between support and frontline systems, the support model event tree structure, and the [()* support system quantification process, including the grouping of support model sequences into a reduced list of support system states. The frontline event trees are quantified later, conditional on the occurrence of these support system states. 3.1 SUPPORT SYSTEM DEPENDENCY DI AGRAM The initial step in developing the support system model was to identify the specific intersystem dependencies that exist at TMI-1. Figure 3-1 illustrates the dependencies identified among mechanical systems. Support systems are indicated by rectangles and frontline systems by circles. River water systems are shown on the right side in the figure; the closed water systems they support are shown on the left. The connecting lines between systems indicate functional dependencies. This means that the system on the tail of the arrow is needed by the system at the arrowhead. The impact of failure of the systems at the tail of the arrows is not distinguished in the figure. Support systems that are deemed essential for system success, that are used only in a backup capacity, or whose failure would only result in a degradation in the availability as opposed to the total failure of the supported system, are indicated by the same type of lines in the figure. The types of dependencies are, however, important considerations in deciding how to best model the plant. For simplicity, the electrical system dependencies are not indicated in Figure 3-1; they are considered separately in Figure 3-2. O v 3-1 0581G101387PMR
Using previous experience as the starting point in an iterative process, the mechanical support systems in Figure 3-1 were grouped into separate top events for the support system event tree model. The important dependencies were preserved without making the event tree too complicated. Figure 3-3 shows how the support (and some of the frontline) systems were grouped into top events. In some cases, a support system that only supports one frontline system was analyzed as part of the frontline system's top event. Also, some support system actions are dependent on frontline system actions and are analyzed as separate support system top events in the (mostly) frontline trees. These support systems are analyzed with the frontline trees rather than with the support system event tree. The frontline top events involving the reactor building river water system and the atmospheric dump valves are of this type. A third example of this type of grouping involves the two support systems (i.e., secondary services closed cooling and secondary services river water) that are included in the frontline top event describing the performance of the main feedwater system; i.e. , too little feedwater flow MF . As Figure 3-3 indicates, not all of the intersystem dependencies identified in Figure 3-1 are explicitly accounted for in the support system model. Certain dependencies were broken to ensure that the support system top events are analytically separable, thereby simplifying the overall plant model. The dependencies broken are identified, and the reasoning behind their omission from the model are discussed in the following paragraphs. The pumphouse ventilation system is unnecessary to cool the river water pump motors because of the large size of the rooms involved and the cool river water passing through the many pipes in the building. Failure of the pumphouse screens to supply water to the river water systems is treated as an accident initiator. The contribution of pumphouse unavailability to any of the river water system failure frequencies, other than as ar. initiating event, is believed to be very small and is therefore neglected in the support system model. The deicing water available from nuclear services river water system is not accounted for in the support system model because it does not provide a backup for the pumphouse in the event of river water loss: it is only use.ful as a preventive measure. The cross-connects between secondary services river water and nuclear services river water are not included in the support model. Either river water system could physically be used as a backup to the other; however, the cross-connects are not considered because they require manual action i and because emergency procedures put some restrictions on their i implementation; i.e., nuclear services river water is prohibited from j being used as a backup to secondary services river water when the reactor is critical. The omission of the cross-connects also greatly simplifies , the model. Omission of the manual cross-connect to nuclear services I river water does not introduce too much conservatism because the nuclear l services closed cooling water system also has a one of three pump success i criteria and there is no backup to this system. O\: i l 3-2 0581G101337PMR
i The intermediate closed cooling system provides cooling water for the (m}
- reactor coolant pumps' seal thermal barriers. This system is redundant to the very reliable, three-train makeup system that provides RCP seal ;
The intermediate cooling system is not evaluated in the injection flow. support model. Instead, it is included as frontline. Top Event SE because , it is of interest only as far as it provides RCP thermal barrier i cooling. The dependency between the intermediate closed cooling water system in the main trees and the nuclear services river water system in the support system event tree is modeled. Intermediate cooling is assumed failed if either of the two systems (i.e., nuclear services river " water or nuclear services closed cooling), which are included in the r analysis of support model Top Event NS, should fail. ; The industrial cooler is assumed to isolate for any sequence in which the reactor building fans may be required. Therefore, this cooler is not ; considered as a backup water source for the reactor building fans in the I support model. Use of the industrial cooler is considered on a sequence-by-sequence basis, as an operator recovery action. ; The dependency of the instrument air compressors on the intermediate building ventilating system is not included in the support system model because of the large, open area around the instrument air compressors and , because cooling water is supplied to them from other systems; i.e., secondary services closed cooling or fire service water. Since the industrial cooler is not included in the model and the emergency feedwater pumps do not require ventilation, intermediate building (- ventilation is not necessary and, therefore, is not included in the \ support system model. : r In Figure 3-3, the two support systems that are included in the frontline , Top Event M- are not explicitly modeled in detail. The secc :dary servic. systems are modeled as a single event in the main feedwater system l analysis. The unavailability of the secondary closed and river water
~
systems with all its support systems available is assumed to be equal to that for the nuclear services closed and river water systems with all their support systems available because the systems are so similar. Also included in the analysis of main feedwater are the circulating water , system, the condensate system, the condenser air removal system, and the . gland seal system. l A siegle valve between the redundant air cryers in the common compressed air header from the service air and instrument air compressors is modeled ' because it is an active, single failure point in the system. This valve - temporarily blocks off flow through beth dryers when it switches the compressed air flow from one dryer to the other. If the valve sticks in the intermediate position, all air flow may be lost. Failure of this single valve, if recovery is not successful, N modeled as a failure of ; compressed air. The redundancy afforded by the four air compressors indicates that the compressed air system at TMI-1 is otherwise very i reliable. Compressed air is modeled by support system Top Event AM, i 3-3 05816101337PMR 1
The backup instrument air compressors are not modeled because they do not have sufficient capacity by itr ;f to operate the loads they supply. They were intended only to make up for air leakage during steady operation and not to operate equipment, which would be necessary following a plant trip. Dependencies among other systems involving compressed air are accounted for, as described below. The dependency of the turbine bypass valves on instrument air is treated at the frontline event tree level by assuming that the valves work only if main feedwater flow is successful and a vacuum is maintained in the condenser. The 2-hour bottled air system is included in the analysis of the emergency feedwater system. The emergency feedwater flow control valves require compressed air to open and to remain open. The atmospheric dump valves, which also require compressed air to open, are assumed to only have air available if either one of the main feedwater or emergency feedwater systems is successful. Since the atmospheric dump valves only need to open if one of these systems is working, there is no loss of accuracy by adopting this approach. The dependency of reactor building isolation on instrument air need not be modeled because the isolation valves do not need air to work (they must vent air to close). Because the instrument air compressors can be cooled by fire service water, or secondary services closed cooling, no dependence of ompressed air on cooling water was assumed. The redundancy provided by these systems for cooling was judged to mean that loss of all coolina water to the compressed air system would contribute negligibly to the total compressed air system unavailability. The dependency of reactor building spray, makeup, and decay heat removal pumps on auxiliary building ventilation (shown in Figure 3-1) was judged to be insignificant. The bearing and motor cooling for these pumps is provided by either nuclear services closed cooling water or decay heat closed cooling water. Since decay heat closed cycle cooling normaliy cools makeup pumps 1A and 1C, redundancy provided by the backup cooling path through the nuclear services closed cycle cooling system (that must be manually aligned) is not included in the model. However, makeup pump 1B is always assumed to be aligned to nuclear services closed cycle cooling. Motor cooling is necessary for these pumps to operate. Room ventilation is not required and cannot provide the motor cooling function. The power supplies to these pumps are located in the control building and are cooled by control building ventilation. The dependence of the decay heat closed cycle cooling and nuclear service closed cycle cooling water system pumps on the Class I auxiliary building ventilation system is not modeled. Although these pumps are not supplied bearing and motor cooling by separate systems, the increase in room temperature resulting from a loss of the room cooling system is judged insufficient to cause these pumps to fail. These pumps are located in side-by-side stalls, open on one side, in a common room with a high ceiling and open at one end. O 3-4 0581G101337PMR
f s Figure 3-2 pictorially illustrates the electrical intersystem dependencies at TMI-1. This diagram can be thought of as an extension of Figure 3-1. These systems rely on the control building ventilation system for heat removal. Because it is so difficult to pictorially r represent all the dependencies of the mechanical support systems on these " electrical systems, these dependencies are not shown.- In Figure 3-4, the electrical systems are shown, grouped into top events for evaluation in the support model. The control building ventilation system Top Event CV depends on both power from train B of engineered safeguards power; (i.e., GB) and from vital instrument buses VBB and VBD. Both these vital instrument buses , also ultimately get their power from power train B of engineered I safeguards. These two buses supply control power to the dampers in the control building ventilation system. If control power is lost, these dampers close and result in a loss of ventilation to the rooms serviced. Vital instrument buses V8A and VBC are grouped together into Top Event [VA). These buses supply power to instrument bus ATA and for two l of the four emergency feedwater flow control valves; i.e. , EF-V-30A/C. ; Inverter 1E can tu aligned as a backup power supply to any one of the four vital instrument buses; i.e., VBA, VBB, VBC, or VBD. The model, however, only takes credit for it being used as a backup te VBB and VBD, as part of the analysis of Top Event VB. , Instrument bus ATA is modeled in Top Event AA. Vital instrument bus ATA, O fed from engineered safeguards power IA (i.e., GA), powers the integrated b control system and automatic pressure control, using the PORV. As the eng:neered safeguards actuation system deenergizes to actuate, its ! dependency on vital instrument buses is not modeled. ; Swing bus 480V MCC IC-ESV is assigned to a separate top event. This swing system is assumed initially aligned to train 8 of electric power. Initially, no credit is given for tile transfer to the opposite power supply if power is lost from the train B side. This is because the l transfer is precluded by the presence of an ESAS signal. The possibility , of transferring manually is considered only on a sequence-specific basis i as a recovery action. Swing DC panel IM is not modeled because the ! valves it serves fail to the safe position on loss of control power. , Occasionally, two trains of equipment are separated into two top events ; for a given grouping of systems as in Figures 3-3 and 3-4 This is necessary in order to preserve the train dependency of the systems i supported. For example, decay heat removal pump B is dependent on decay heat closed cycle cooling train B, but not on train A. This distinction is retained in the support system model. Similarly, train dependencies are modeled for the DC power system (DA, DB), the engineered safeguards actuation system (EA, EB), and the emergency diesel generators (GA and GB). On the other hand, train dependencies for the nuclear services systems were not retained because the pump trains all discharge into a ; common header; therefore, the supported systems do not rely on any one specific pump train alone, a 3-5 0581G101387PMR
Each of the top events that appear in the support system model are briefly described below. A total of 16 top events is included in the TMI-1 support system model. The analysis of the first nine top events are all presented in the electric power systems analysis (Section 2 of the Systems Analysis Report). e Top Event OP. This top event models the availability of AC electric power to the nonengineered safeguards loads from the auxiliary transformers for 24 hours. Success of Top Event OP implies that AC electric power remains available from the 230-kV substation (and offsite network), that auxiliary transformers IA and 1B continue to supply power to the 6.9-kV and 4,160V switchgear, and that the nonengineered safeguards system continues to supply power to the 6.9-kV reactor plant loads (reactor coolant pumps) for 24 hours. This event also includes the stability of the offsite power grid, given an initiating event that results in a turbine trip. For initiating events other then loss of offsite power, failure of this top event implies that plant trip was successful since it is the turbine trip that caused grid instability and failure. Success of this top event also means that normally operating systems (e.g., nuclear services closed cycle cooling) need only continue to operate to support plant operation. Failure of this top event means that such systems must also restart when power is restored to accomplish their functions. For the loss of offsite power initiating event, this top event is always failed. e Top Event DA. Top Event DA models the availability of DC electric power to the train A DC distribution loads from the station batteries and the battery chargers for 24 hours if a plant trip has occurred. The assumed battery life if AC power is not available (i.e., without the chargers) is 2 hours. Success of this top event implies that power is available to the loads supplied through DC distribution panels 1A,1C,1E,1H,1P, and DCA. For sequences without offsite power available, success of Top Event DA ensures that control power is available to start and load the train A diesel generator, e Top Event DB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event DA except that the opposite train of DC loads is supplied. Success of this top event implies that the station batteries and battery chargers supply power to DC distribution panels 18,10,1F,1J,10, and DCB for 24 hours. e Top Event GA. This top event models the availability of AC electric power to the train A engineered safeguards loads from either the auxiliary transformer or the diesel generator for 24 hours following a plant trip. Success of this top event implies that power is supplied to the train A engineered safeguards loads from 4,160V bus 1D; 480V buses IP,1R, and 1N; and 480V MCC 1A-ES, ES valve and heating 1A, and screenhouse IA-ES for 24 hours. Failure of this top event guarantees failure of all equipment powered from 4,160V bus 10. If power from the auxiliary transformer is not available, the diesel generator must start on demand (bus undervoltage), close its output circuit breaker, and continue to run for 6 hours for 3-6 0581G101337PMR
O success of this top event. If offsite power is not recovered within U 6 hours, the diesel generator must run for the remaining 18 hours of the assumed 24-hour mission time, o Top Event GB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event GA I except that the opposite train of engineered safeguards loads is supplied. Success of.this top event implies that power is available to the train B loads from 4,160V bus 1E; 480V buses 15 and 1T; and 480V MCCs 18 ES,1B ES valve and heating,1B ES screenhouse, and ES valve and heating 1C for 24 hours, o Top Event VA. This top event models the availability of power to both 120V vital instrument buses VBA and VBC for the first 2 hours following a plant trip. Success of this top event means that power , is available from these buses to their respective loads immediately following a plant trip. Power to these buses can be provided from , either 125V DC main distribution panel 1A, DA, or via engineered > safeguards control center 1A, GA. Loss of AC supply power initially,
- and eventual loss of 125V DC supply power after 2 hours, is not considered a failure of Top Event VA.
e Top Event VB. This top event is similar to that for Top Event VA , except that it involves 120V vital instrument buses VBC and VBD. ; Success of Top Event VB requires that power is available at both VBB and VBD immediately af ter a plant trip and lasts for at least , 2 hours. o Top Event AA. Top Event AA models the availability of AC electric power to the vital instrument bus ATA loads. Power to bus ATA is modeled from two sources: from inverter 1A via bus VBA and from regulated transformer 1A via bus TRA. The automatic transfer from bus VBA to bus TRA is also modeled. If AC power from MCC 1A ES ; (evaluated in Top Event GA) is available, then Top Event AA is ! evaluated for 24 hours. If only DC power from DC main distribution ; panel 1A is available, then Top Event AA is evaluated for a mission time of only 2 hours, i.e., the battery capacity without AC changers. ' e Top Event IC. This top event models the availability of power to 480V MCC 1C-ESV for 24 hours. This swing bus is assumed initially aligned to train 8 of engineered safeguards power, GB, via 480V bus IS-ESSB. MCC 1C-ESV can also be fed from 480V bus IP-ESSA via an automatic transfer, liowever, because this automatic transfer is prevented if an ESAS signal is present, this transfer is ! conservatively not included in the plant model, e Top Event AM. This top event models the availability of compressed ' air from either service air or instrument air. Success of this top event implies that compressed air is available to all of the equipment normally supplied by instrument air. e Top Event EA. This top event models the availability of train A of the engineered safeguards actuation signal to each group of equipment required to actuate, given 1,600 psig of reactor coolant system d pressure. Success of Top Event EA implies that the normally 3-7 0581G101387PMR
energized actuation relays are deenergized, which provides actuation signals to the appropriate equipment. Failure of Top Event EA inplies that all groups of train A actuated equipment fail to receive an automatic start signal from ESAS. e Top Event EB. This top event is similar to Top Event EA except that it depicts the actuation signals to train B of ESAS actuated equipment. e Top Event NS. This top event models the availability of two systems; nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water. Success of Top Event NS implies that the cooling functions performed by these systems are achieved. These cooling functions include the supply of cooling water to the NSCCW header for reactor building fan motor cooling, makeup pump 1B motor cooling, control building air conditioning chiller heat removal, and intermediate service cooler heat removal. Any one pump train of the three nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water trains can supply all the loads served. Complete failure of either of the two systems is assumed to result in the same impact as the failure of both systems. Since both of the systems modeled are normally running, they need only continue operating for 24 hours. Given loss of offsite power, the systems must restart and operate for 24 hours, e Top Event HA. This top event models the availability of trsin A of decay heat river water and decay heat closed cycle cooling water systems. Given an ESAS actuation signal, these systems must automatically start and operate for 24 hours for success of Top Event HA. Success implies that cooling water is supplied to the train A cooling loads, including decay heat removal cooler 1A, reactor building spray pump 1 A, decay heat removal pump 1A, and makeup and purification pump 1A. e Top Event HB. This top event is similar to Top Event HA except that it depicts the equipment that supplies train B cooling loads of decay heat river water and decay heat closed cycle cooling systems. Success of Top Event HB implies that cooling water is provided to decay heat removal cooler 1B, reactor building spray pump 1B, decay heat removal pump 18, and makeup and purification pump IC. e Top Event CV. Top Event CV models the availability of the control building ventilation system, including the normal duty supply fans, the emergency duty supply fans, the associated chilled water system, and the control tower instrument air system. Success of Top Event CV implies that adequate cooling is provided to the control room, the relay room, the 4,160V switchgear rooms, the instrumentation room, the 480V switchgear rooms, and the battery charger rooms. Failure of cooled air circulation to any of these rooms is considered a system failure. Failure of Top Event CV is assumed to result in an overheating of equipment in all of these rooms and the eventual failure of all equipment these rooms contain. Consequently, a failure of Top Event CV is assumed to result in a loss of all AC power. Since the control building ventilation system is normally operating, it need only continue to operate for 24 hours after a 3-8 0581G101337 PMR
plant trip for success of Top Event CV. . If offsite power is lost, (- the system fans, chillers, and chilled water pumps must be manually restarted and operate for 24 hours for system success. Each train of control building ventilation supplies all the system loads, so th( train dependencies need not be tracked separately. Recovery actions, to establish a portable, alternate ventilation system, are modeled if the normal system fails. Table 3-1 illustrates the intersystem dependencies modeled between support systems. Unlike Figures 3-1 through 3-4, this table describes the intersystem dependencies in terms of tne support system top events just described. Single support system top event failures are listed down the side, and the impact of each of these failures on other support system top events is then indicated. For some top events, the impacts are broken down into partial impacts on a given top event. For example, failure of Top Event OP (i.e., loss of offsite power) eliminates power from auxiliary transformer 1A to train A of vital AC power (Top Event GA), but does not affect diesel generator A. Such partial system effects are accounted for in the support model when quantifying the split fractions for each branch point in the support system event tree. Top event failures that result in complete failure of another support model top event (e.g., failure of Top Event GA catses failure of Top Event AA) are modeled by not branching at the affected Top Event AA along the sequences that include failure of the events it depends on (i.e., Top Event GA). The relationship of the support model event tree structure to ,, the intersystem dependencies presented in Table 3-1 is described more fully in the next section. Table 3-1 lists only the effects of single support system top event failures on the remaining support model top events. The effects of multiple support model top event failures can usually be determined by superimposing the effect of single top event failures. However, in one instance, the effects of multiple top event failures is greater than the superimposition of the indiv! dual failures. If both OP and DA are failed, then the normally running train of control building ventilation (i.e., train A chiller and fans) would also be failed because no control power would. be available to restart this equipment. If offsite power is available, DC control power is not , necessary because this equipment is already operating. Failure of l offsite power alone does not degrade the control building ventilation system because all of its equipment may be loaded manually onto the diesels. Thus, in this case, failure of OP or DA alone does not significantly degrade the system, but failure of both does prevent one train from receiving electric power. A similar situation would exist on the train 8 side if it had been assumed to be normally running. This effect is accounted for when split fractions are assigned at the time the support model event tree is quantified. The footnotes of Table 3-1 provide additional insights into the l intersystem dependencies indicated. ( (.) l 3-9 0581G101337PMR l
3.2 SUPPORT SYSTEM EVENT TREE The support system top events are shown in the event tree that is presented in Figure 3-5. This same event tree structure is used for all the initiating events, but is quantified under different boundary conditions for some initiating events. The ordering and definition of top events is very important. To quantify the support system event tree, each top event nust be dependent only on the preceding events, not on those that follow it in the tree. For this reason, the ordering of the support system top events was complicated by the circular dependencies that result when two systems depend upon each other for support. These loops are easily identified in Table 3-1. The dependencies that appear below the diagonal are of this type because of the order in which the top events are arranged. In particular, when power is lost from offsite, the emergency diesel generators require DC power to start, but the DC system also eventually requires recharging from the diesels. These dependencies were separated by conservatively assuming that both the battery chargers and the batteries must supply power to the main DC distribution panels when evaluating Top Events DA and DB. Failure of the battery chargers was assumed to eventually result in failure of the diesels since DC control power is needed for the diesels to continue to run. Although the battery chargers are not needed to start the diesel, they would be needed for control in the long term. The control building ventilation, Top Event CY, and the nuclear services water, Top Event NS, alco exhibit such circular dependencies. Control building ventilation is needed to prevent the failure of the electrical switchgear that controls Mower to the systems that make up Top Event NS, while nuclear services .iosed cycle cooling water, in turn, is needed for the control building ventilation chillers. This situation was modeled by asking the nuclear services Top Event NS first. The conditional split fractions for Top Event NS are then quantified, assuming that control building ventilation is available. The dependence of control building ventilation on nuclear services is then easily modeled. In support model sequences in which the control building ventilation system fails although the nuclear services system is successful, the dependence of nuclear services on control building ventilation is accounted for in the assignment of impacts for those particular sequences. This will become more apparent in the next section when the support system model end states are described. Thus, these circular dependencies were broken, and their important features were accounted for in the support system model. There are 16 top events and 6,513 sequences in the support system event tree illustrated in Figure 3-5. The decision not to branch at any point in the tree is dictated by the dependencies documented in Table 3-1. If a particular top event is guaranteed to fail, then no branch is provided in the tree and the top event is assumed to be failed when evaluating subsequent top events and when assigning the impacts on frontline systems. For example, in sequence 10 of the support model event tree, there is no brauch under Top Event HB, which represents train 8 of decay heat closed cooling, because the train B engineered safeguards actuating signal (i.e., Top Event EB) has failed. Also, if DC or AC power is failed, there is no branching under the corresponding trains of decay 3-10 0581G101337PMR
[d heat closed cooling; i.e., Top Events HA or HB. Combinations of top event failures may also preclude the need to branch at subsequent top events. An example of this is under Top Event GA along reduced event tree sequence 138. Both Top Events OP and DA are failed. Therefore, as indicated in Table 3-1, power via both the auxiliary transformer from offsite and the. train A standby diesel generator is precluded. Top Event GA is then guaranteed to be failed. The support system model is quantified 13 times. Each of the initiating events identified in Section 2 is evaluated using one of the following support system model runs: Run 1. General Transients Run 2. Loss of Offsite Power Run 3. Loss of DC Power Train A Run 4. Loss of River Water Run 5. Loss of Vital Bus ATA Run 6. Loss of Instrument Air Run 7. Loss of Nuclear Services Closed and Nuclear Service = River Water Run 8. Loss of Control Building Ventilation Run 9. Fire in AB-FZ-6, Hazard Scenario 1 Run 10. Earthquake of 0.15g Run 11. Earthquake of 0.25g Run 12. Earthquake of 0.40g Run 13. Earthquake of 0.60g O b The support model event tree is quantified, conditi;nal on the occurrence of spectfic groups of initiators, using the results for the support system split fractions. Table 3-2 identifies the support system split fractions applicable at each branch point. Table 3-2 is divided into three parts. The first part identifies the split fractions used for evaluation of sequence 1 in the support model event tree; i.e., when all top events are successful. Part 2 identifies the conditions under which other split fractions are to be used as a result of the failures of preceding top events ir. the tree. For example, split fraction GAB is to be used for Top Event GA instead of GAA if Top Event OP has failed (indicated by "0P F" next to GAB), as is the case for reduced event tree sequence 130 in Figure 3-6. By using conditional split fraction GAB, the quantification accounts for the partial dependence of Top Event GA on Top Event OP, as was indicated in Table 3-1. If OP fails, there is no AC power available from the auxiliary transformer. Success of Top Event GA then relies on the train A diesel generator. The reduced redundancy caused by failure of OP is then reflected in the greater failure frequency of split fraction GAB versus GAA. Part 3 of Table 3-2 identifies the minor changes made to parts 1 and 2 that are needed to quantify the other seven initiator categories. O 3 3-11 0581G101337PMR m
3.3 SUPPORT SYSTEM STATES, The many sequences in the support system model event tree are each assigned to one of 39 support system end states. Each of these 39 sy port system states represents different success and failure combinations of support systams that impose boundary conditions on the frontline systems. The support model sequences were assigned to a particular ene state by recognizing which sequences have the same impact on the frontline systems and by recognizing that mt.ny other support model sequences have negligibly low occurrence frequencies relative to other scenarios producing the same or greater impact on frontline systems. These observations are used in the following way to assign the approximately 6,500 sequences in the support model event tree into just 39 support system states. The dependency table presented as Table 3-3 identifies the impact of support system top event failures on frontline systems. The support system top event failures are listed down the left side. Identif'ers for frontline system impacts are listed cross the top. These identifiers are defined in the table legend. Caseaded intersystem dependencies, reflecting support-to-support dependencies, are generally not reflected in the table. For example, f ailure of Top Event GA also causes failure of support system Top Event HA. However, Table 3-3 would not indicate the cascaded effect of HA failure on the frontline systems if its impact was in some way greater than GA failure. This type of cascaded effect is accounted for in the support model event tree structure. A second type of cascaded support-to-support dependencies is included in Table 3-2. The cascaded effects of control building ventilation system failure on frontline systems are accounted for. This was necessary in order to break the circular dependency between CV and GA and GB. Therefore, the impacts on the frontline systems of CV failure, which follows Top Events GA and GB in the tree structure, also account for the impacts of GA and GB failure. All frontline system segments, which depend in some manner on the status of support system top events, are represented in the dependency table. Table 3-3 is read in the same manner as Table 3-1 for support-to-support system dependencies. Failed frontline system segments are indicated by a "1" in the appropriate column The symbol "*1" indicates that a diff? rent type of suppor'.-tm frontline system dependency exists. This symbol indicates that sujport system failures in that row cause failure of a frontline system segmet, which renders the state of other frontline systems indicated by "*1" irrelevant. Thus, "*1" impacts can be used to consider frontline-to-frontline system dependencies that are triggered by support system failures. Consider the row in which support system Top Event DA fails. Failure of Top Event DA causes failure of frontline system impacts LPA and CSA. Since low pressure injection and containment spray A trains are both failed, it does not matter whether sump valve DH-V6A (SA) is functional. Although the sump valve is not supported by Top Event DA, it is modeled as if the sump valve were failed anyway. This approach helps to reduce the number of support tree 3-12 &lG101387PMR
i sequences with a unique set of frontline system impacts to those that d result in a truly unique impact on plant performance. Footnotes d3 scribing these "*1" dependencies ? 'e identified by letters, dote that in Table 3-3 multiple support system top event failures, as well as single top event failures, are listed. The multiple support system top event f ailures are given to properly account for the combined effects of such failures, which are not always obtained by the superposition of single top event failure effects. For example, neither , the failure of Top Event DA or DB results in the failure of any of the containment fan coolers; i.e. , CFA, CFB, or CFC. Together, however, they ; prevent both of the reactor river pumps from starting; i.e., RRA and RRB. Without these pumps available, the containment fan coolers cannot , function. Therefore, a "*1" dependency is identified for the CFA, CFB, i and CFC frontline system impacts when both DA and DB fail. The last two columns in Table 3-3 are not associated with frontline $ systems. Column "CV" tracks whether the accident sequence resulted in a loss of control building ventilation. All such failure scenarios are combined into a single impact vector; i.e., IV2. All such scenarios are : then assumed to result in a total loss of all vital AC. . Column "KEY" is concerned with those support model sequences that involve a failure of vital AC power train B (i.e., Top Event GB failure) and : success of Top Event 1C. Currently, the model conservatively assumes ; that IC-ESV MCC is initially aligned to the B power train and does not h d transfer if power is lost, because an ESAS signal is always assumed present. This assumption is implemented by assuming that Top Event 1C l fails with frequency 1.0 if Top Event GB fails. Thus, the frequencies of all sequences with GB failed and 1C success are currently 0.0. The recovery actions to complete the transfer of IC-ESV MCC to vital AC power train A may be considered on a sequence-specific basis in the future. The support model event tree is structured to consider such possibilities. t The dependencies presented in Table 3-3 were orepared as input to the computer program ETC9 (Reference 3-1). ETC9 sorts through the 6,513 sequences in the support nodel e"ent tree to identify thnse , sequences that result in a unique set of impacts on the frontline ; system. ETC9 also allows the user to specify frontline system impactt t that are synnetrical. Eleven sets of symmetrical frontline system : impacts were identified among the impacts listed in Table 3-3 Thes: ! sets are identified in Table 3-4. These sets of frontline systems ac,e i not separated by trains in the frontline event tree tops; therefore, it ! does not matter which segments are affected; e.g., CDA or CDB. What does ! matter is how many trains are impacted; i.e. , 0,1, or 2. When executing 7 ETC9 to determine the unique sets of frontline system impacts, only the i number of trains affected are tracked for these symmetrical impacts. i This feature further allows us to reduce the number of unique impact vectors to those that are truly of interest. Of the 6,513 sequences in the support model event tree, only 1,114 unique sets of frontline system impacts, or impact vectors, were idertified. 3-13 0581G101337PMR ,
The 1,114 unique impact vectors must be further reduced to an important few to facilitate quantification of the frontline event trees. This further reduction is accomplished by frequency binning. ETC9 sums the frequencies of those sequences with identical frontline system impacts. Such calculations were performed for runs 1 and 2; i.e., the general transient and loss of offsite power initiators. The summation of these low frequency impact vectors is then assigned as the frequency of a single end state, which represents all of the impact vectors grouped in this manner. For this single end state, the impacts on frontline systems are conservatively assumed to be complete; i.e., everything is failed. This conservative approach assumes that by not processing each of these grouped impact vectors individually, no high risk sequences are inadvertently omitted. The degree of conservatism is controlled by user specification of the impact vector cutoff frequency. The assignment of each of the reclining unique impact vectors to each support state was done conservatively. This means that tne impact on the frontline systems represented by each support system scenario assigned to a particular support state is the same or greater than the impact of any single unique impact vector assigned to that state. The frontline system impacts of a representative irpact vector listed in Table 3-5 are used to represent the support system state. Of ten, no one scenario assigned to a particular support state conservatively bounds all the frontline system irpacts of all other scenarios in that support state. In such cases, the representative frontline system impacts for that support state had to be augnented so that the representative impacts would be conservative. Table 3-5 indicates the assignment of those unique impact vectors that remair after frequency binning to one of the 39 support states. All of the impact vectors that remain af ter frequency binning for the general transient quantification are listed. For the loss of offsite power quantification, only those unique impact vectors remaining af ter frequency binning thtt are different from those of the general transient quantification are listed. These impact vectors are indicated by "+" symbols next to the impact vector number. The frequencies that appear next to the impact vector numbers are the total conditional frequencies of occurrence for all support model sequences assigned to that vector. The frontline impact column headings in Table 3-5 have been changed somewhat from those originally identified in Table 3-5. The 11 column headings appearing in Table 3-5 that end with an "X" correspond to the 11 symetrical impact columns identified in Table 3-4. These impact tolumns replace the corresponding impact column headings identified in Table 3-4 Consider rupport state 3 in Table 3-5 as an example. Ten unique impact vectors have been assigned to support state 3. The impacts defined for support state 3 are then the union of the impacts for the individual impact vectort assigned to that state. Note, for example, that support state 3 is assigned as impacting frontline columns CDS, CAA, CSB, and DHB. Impact vector IV814 impacts columns CDS and CAA only, whreas impact vector IV895 impacts only CSB and DHB of the four. Support state 3, however, is conservatively assumed to im;Tct all four of those columns and therefore can be used to conservatively represent both of these impact vectors. O 3-14 0581G101337PMR
A modification to this conservative assignment of impact vectors is made for selected impacts. For example, in support state 3, only two of the ; HPI pump trains are assumed impacted, even though all three HPI trains are ir:pacted by at least one of the unique impact vectors assigned to , that support state. This is because none of the impact vectors alone ' affects all three trains. In this case, it was judged to still he 4 conservative to assume in the definition of support state 3, that or.ly 1 two HPI traire are affected. Table 3-6 spells out the frontline systems assumed to be . ailed for each support system state. Although the grouping of unique impact vectors into a reduced list of i support states has been done conservatively, care was taken to ensure that the degree of conservatism introduced was minimized. This was accomplished by ensuring that impact vectors with little impact on : frontline systems, but with relatively high frequencies, are not combined . with low frequency impact vectors that have substantial impact on the ! frontline systems. This ensures that the frequency of support states with substantial impacts on frontline systems are not artificially : inflated. l l After defining the support states, the ETC9 computer program was again ! used to quantify the conditional frequencies of each of these 39 support system states for each of 13 runs. The split fractions assigned are the i same as those used to determine the frequencies of the unique impact i vectors; i.e., Table 3-2. In this quantification of the support model p event tree, however, the frequencies of all of the impact vectors that ; contribute to each support state are summed. The results are presented : in Table 3-7. The results in Table 3-7, together with the representative , frontline system impacts of each support state, are the key output of the ' support model analysis. The frontline event trees are quantified, j conditional on one of these support system state quantifications and dependent on the particular initiating event being considered. '
3.4 REFERENCES
f 3-1. Buttemer, D. R. , F. R. Hubbard, and D. M. Wheeler, "ETC9 (Event i Tret Jode 9) Computer Code Users Manual," Pickard, Lowe and l Garrick, Inc., PLG-0466, April 1986. i l 3-15 0381G101337PMR
TABLE 3-1. SUPPORT MODEL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES (lf,(2 L Sheet 1 of 3
^
t OP DA AA DB 1C E " Auxiliary Diesel I?OV 480V Auxiliary Diesel Transformer Generator Battery Charger Transfo.mer Generator Ba ttery Charger Ur -- X X TTK -- X X
'GK -- -- X X X TK -- -- X X AK X -- --
W -- X X W I X X w 0 W - -- cn Ir -- M TK (4) IT (4) E ftk TF rds) X X r X X X x x X x J
*See sheet 3 of this table for notes.
LEGEND: X = Failure; DP = Electrical Distribution System: GA = Electrical Distribution 3ystem (Emergency Channel A); GB = Electrical Distribution System (Emergency 3annel B); CV = Control Building Ventilation: DA = Channel A DC Distribution System; DB = Channel B, DC Distribution System; EA = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel A: EB = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel B; NS = Nuclear River Water, and the Nuclear ServicJs Closed Cycle Cooling Systems; HA = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train A; HB = Decay Heat River Water cnd the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train B; VA = Vital Instrument Buses VBA, VBC; AA = Instrument Bus ATA; VB = Vital Instrument Buses VBB, YBC; it = 480V MCC IC-ESV Swing Bus; AM = Compressed Air. 0582G101487
O O O
~
TABLE 3-1 (Continued)* Sheet 2 of 3 m us(6) cy(7) Support ' System Instrument Air Service Air g g River Closed g g Chiller Dampers Top Event Pumps Pumps Fans Failures A B A B A B C A l. B C A B A B AC DC W (8) (8) X X X X (9) (9) W X X X (10) M X X X X X X X X (11) VK (12) (12) w 17lr X X X Y W X X X X X X X X C w (12) X X T X (11) (11) w -- -- -- --
'EK -
X X Tir -- X 1rs- _ __ .. __ __ __ __ __ x X x(13) x(13) w _- N .. IT -- -- -- -- I
*See sheet 3 of this table for notes.
LEGEM8: X = Failure; OP = Electrical Distribution System; GA = Electrical Distribution System (Energency Channel A); GB = Electrical Distribution System (Emergency Channel B); CV = Control Building Ventilation: DA = Channel A, DC Distribution Syste.a; DB = Channel B, DC Distribut? m System; EA = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel A; EB = Engineered Safeguards Actuation System Channel 8; s NS = Nuclear l'iver Water, and the Nuclear Services Closed Cycle Cooling Systems; HA = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle f ooling System - Train A; 2 = Decay Heat River Water and the Decay Heat Closed Cycle Cooling System - Train B; VA = Vital Ins trument Ruses VBA, VBC; AA = Instrument Bus ATA; VB = Vital Instrument Buses VBB, VBD; IC = 480V MCC 1C-ESV Swing Bus; M = 0+5.ed Air. n --.....,
-. _ .._, .. .. .,,- . - . . . . - . . , , - , -. ---.,_,s .,_,,,..m, --, ,m,, ,y- . . , , ,._, .
'lABLE 3-1 (continued)
Sheet 3 of 3 NOTES:
- 1. All rupport system top events are described in Section 3.1.
- 2. Cascaded dependencies are not indicated in this table. For example, IT results in U and W, which in turn results in WK and TIK and WS but 'he latter are not indicated in the row for W because they are a cascaded dependencies.
- 3. 480V IC-ESV KC is, for the purposes of this matrix, assumed to be aligned to the B power train. However, the ESAS signals are assumed to be present so that no credit is taken for the automatic transfer. If power train B is lost, this bus is assumed deenergized.
- 4. The automatic start signal from ESAS is only needed when offsite power is lost, but in this case the bus undervoltage provides a redundant start signal. Consequently, failure of the ESAS signal does not impact R or LT.
- 5. The indirect effects of U on support system events are not Indicated in this row. Of rectly, CV only disables electrical equipment located in the control building.
- 6. For the purpose of preparing the dependency matrix only, the A and C nuclear services river water and nuclear services closed cooling water pumps are assuned to be operating and selected to receive ESAS actuation. The B pumps are in standby and assumed aligned to electric power tiain A. The nuclear services river water discharge valve for pump B (NS-VlB) is normally aligned to electric power train B via 480V IC-ESV motor control center. Train B of auxiliary building ventilation is assumed to be normally operating with train A in standby.
- 7. The A fan train of control building ventilation is assumed to be normally operating with the B fan train in standby. When offsite power is lost, manual start of the standby or restart of th? normally operating train is required.
w 08. 03 Assuming an ESAS signal is presen' the instrument air compressors must be manually restarted once AC power is restored. If an ESAS signal is not present, they are automatically restarted when power is restored.
- 9. If no ESAS signal was present, then the operator would have to manually start these Class I auxiliary building ventilation fans from the control room.
- 10. The A side chillers and fans are assumed to be normally operating for this matrix, thus the breakers on this train are already closed and DC power is not needed.
- 11. Tne building teilet and outlet dampers, which close to place the control building ventilation system in the recirculation mode, are powered from 480V KC IC-ESV and IN 480V turbine or reactor and containment building heating bus. Bus IN is assumed fed from 4,160V engineered safeguards bus 1D; i.e., Top Eveet GA. On loss of IN, the dampers fall to the recirculation position but can still be manipulated from the control room.
On loss of KC IC-ESV, the recirculation dampers fail as is and the outside air damper (AH-DS) closes. The operators must then locally reopen this damper.
- 12. Given TKor W failure, the vital instrument buses would deenergize causing certain actuation of the corresponding channels (two of three required for ESAS train actuation). However, the causes of TK arm W may not be the same bus failures that result in deenergizing the vital instrument buses. Consequentlyg no credit is taken for these fr _ sees causing ESAS actuation.
- 13. If the chillers are needed for control building ventilation (i.e., if the outside air temperature is greater than 84*F1 NS is required.
058?G10148
O C .
. TABLE 3-2. SPLIT FRACTIONS USED IN QUANTIFICATION OF THE SUPPORT MODEL-EVENT TREE FOR GENERAL TRANSIENTS PART R1M2 I, SPLIT FRACTIONS UsED SPLIT FRACTION NAME OF EVENT NAME OPA OFF-SaeC ELECTRIC POWER DAA DC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN A CAA iC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN A VAA '*/I T AL INSTRUMENT BUS VBA AND VBC AAA % ITAL INSTRUMEt4T BUS ATA DDA 13C ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN B CDA AC ELECTRIC POWER TRAIN 8 VBA VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS VBB AND V9D ICA ES VALVES MCC IC AMA INSTRUMENT AIR AND RECOVERY EAA 1600 PSI ENGINEERED SAFECUARDS A EDA 1600 PSI ENCINEERED SAFECUARDS B NSA NUCLEAR SERVICES COOLING SYSTEM HAA DECAY HEAT REMOVAL SUPPORT TRAIN A HUA DECAY HEAT REf10 VAL SUPPORT TRAIN B CVA CONTROL BUILDINC VENTILATION SYSTEM Y
G
TABLE 3-2 (continued) Sheet 2 of 2 PART 2 CONDITIONS FOR USING ALTERNATE SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR THE CENERAL TRANSIENT INITIATOR CAD OP F VAD DA F CA F AAD VA F AAC VA F CA F DDD DA F CDD CA F CDC OP F CDD OP F CA F VDD DA F CA F VDC DD F CD F ICD OP F DD F ICD CD F AMD OP F AMD CD F OP F AND CD D OP F AMD CA F OP F AMD CA D OP F AMC CA F CD F OP F AMC CA D CD F OP F AMC CA F CD D OP F AMC CA B CD D OP F EDD EA F NSD EA F FJSD ED F Gs tJSE EA F ED F [ NSD OP F o tJSC CA F NSC OP F DA F NSC CD F NSC OP F DD F FJSC DA F DD F tJSC DA F CD F NSC DD F CA F NSG CA F CD F HAD DA F HAD CA F HAD EA F HDD HA F DA S CA S EA S HDC DD F HDC CD F HDC ED F CVD OP F CVC CA F CVC DA F OP F CVD NS F CVE VD F CVF CD F CVF OP F DD F
> VC NS F CA F CVC NS F DA F OP F O O O
t TABLE 3-3. EFFECTS OF SUPPORT SYSTEM TOP EVENT FAILURES ON FRONTLINE SYSTEMS Sheet 1 of 13 FRONit.1NE SYSTEMS (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) SUPPORT SYSTEM CONDITIONS e CIA CIB CDS CAA CDA CDD CFA CFD CFC RRA RRD CSA CF9 DHA DHD DTV EPA EPB EVA EVD H1A HID HL1 HLA HLB e.......... pee...................eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee............................................... oP F e 1 (c) DA F e 1 1 1 1 el CA F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VA F e 1 AA F
- 1 (B) (C)
DD F e 1 1 1 1 *1 el CD F
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VD F
- 1 ,
C F e 1 1 1 AM F e EA F e 1 ED F e (A) 1 NS F e 1 1 1 1 e1 *1 (38) (37) (C) HA F e 1 1 +1 HD F e 1 1 CV
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 F
F (38) DD F e1(A).1(A).1 1 1 et(r)1 (g)(G)11 el(DTI *1 DA DA FD F e 1 B) (() 1 en e(El) 1 el 1 el 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 1 1 1 el 1 el et 1 [ 1 D9 F CA F e 1 1 el 1 +1 1 e1 *1 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 1 1 1 el el 1 e1 Y~ OP F DA F e 1 (E) 1 1 1 1 +1 et N OP F HA F e 1 1 1 et et
" e el CB F HA F 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 el 1 +1 ~ et 1 1C F DA F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 et IC F HA F e 1 1 1 1 et i et NS F DA F e 1 1 1 1 1 el 1 1 1 el el NS F HA F e 1 1 1 1 +1 et 1 1 og et .
CA F CD F e 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 et 1 1 DA F HD F e 1 1 1 1 1 et I et el et el ' et el et et CA F HD F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 HA F DD F e 1 1 1 1 1 +1 1 el el et et HA F CD F e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 el 1 el el 1 HA F HB F e 1 1 1 1 el et el et +1 3 CD D 1C S e CD F IC S e 1 1 1 1 1 1 's 1 1 1
. - - , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . _ . _ _ _ - _ , - . _ , _ . . _ . . . _ . - . . _ . , _ . _ . . _ _ . _ _ . . . . . . . . . . . . . , _ . . _ . . _ . , _ . . . . . _.- _ _--_ . - .. - . . - _ . . . _ _ . ~ _ _ _ _ . _ . - _ . _ . . . - - -~ .
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 2 of 13 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS (16) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (30) (31) SUPPORT SYSTEM CCNDITIONS
- HP(16)PD(16)C AH HF LPA LPD MF+ F P T F1F- MR PO1 PDA RC HP SA SD SEA(27)
INJ(17) SED{3128)
. SA(29)16A 30 16D TC2 TH1 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee** esse ++eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee****ee OP F
- 1 1 1 (I) 1
*1 1 1 DA F
- 1 1 1 (H) 1 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 CA F 1 VA F
- AA F
- 1 1 1 (I)
- 1 1 1 (H) *1 1 1 DD F 1 1 1 1
- 1 1 1 *1 1 CD F 1 VD F
- 1 1 e 1 1C F 1 1 1 1 1
- 1 AM F EA F e 1 1 1 ED F e 1 1 NS F * (37) 1 (37) (37) 1 (I) 1 1 HA <- e 1 1 +1 (I)
HD F e 1 1 *1 (J)
*1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 +1 CV F ( gg
- 1 1 1 DA F Ch )F
- 1 1 (K) 1 1 1 1 1 1 (N) e1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 DA F C1) F
- 1 1 1 el 1 1 1 1 1 1(L)1(M) *1 et 1 1 (0) 1 1 1 e 1 +1 1 1 1 1 el 1 *1 *1 *1 1 +1 1 el 1 1 1 DD F CA F 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1
- 1 1 1 OP F DA F 1 1 el 1 e 1 1 1 y OP F HA F 1
#1 *1 *1 1 1
- 1 1 *1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 e CD F HA F 1 el 1 1 1 y IC F DA F
- e 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 3C F HA F 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 1 1 1 NS F DA F e 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 el 1 1 NS F HA F *1 +1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 *1 1 CA F CD F 1
*1 +1 1 1
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA F HD F +1 1
- 1 =, 1 1 1 *1 1 *1 1 1 1 CA F HD F 1 1
*1 *1 1 1
- 1 1 1 1 HA F DD F 1
#1 HA F GB F
- 1 1 1 +1 1 1 1 *1 1 e1 el 1 1 1 1
- 1 1 1 e1 +1 HA F HD F 1 CD D IC S
- el 1 1 1 1 1 CD F 1C S
- 1 1 1 1 O O e
. _.. - .- . - . - . _ . . _ - _ . ~ . - - .. . - . . . - . - , . - . - . _ . -
TABLE 3-3 (continued) . - . Sheet 3 of 13 , FRONTLINE SYSTEhS (32) e THA THD (33) TT (34) 2HR(35) MEY(;V36) SUPPORT SYSTEM CONDITIONS L 8
........................... ........ ..eeeeeen....eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeen...................
DP F
- DA F e 1 .
CA F e 1 ; VA F e AA F e {p} DD F e el CD F e 1 VS F e 1C F e AM F e (p 1 i EA F e el) ED F e e el 'l NS F ! HA F
- HD F e el CV F e 1 1 1 1 DA F DD F e el 1 j DA F CD F e el 1 1 (g) g DD F CA F e 1 el #1 OP F DA F e el 1
- OP F HA F e et '
g CD F HA F e el 'l s IC F DA F e el 1 i N 1C F HA F e +1 1 NS F DA F -e el 1 I HS F HA F e el CA F C8 F e 1 1 e I DA F HD F el 1 CA F HD F e 1 et HA F DD F e et HA F CD F e el 1 . HA F HD F e el . CD D AC S
- 1 CD F 1C S e 1 1 i
~l r
i i
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 4 of 13 LEGEND: 1 Indicates that the frontline equipment represented by this column is failed as a result of the loss of support systems indicated.
*1 Indicates that a dependency between frontline columns exists. For example, if all three fan coolers cannot function because of loss of support systems, the status of the river water pumps is no longer important. The dependent columns are assigned an impact of "*1" in order to minimize the number of unique impact vectors to be assigned later to the support model tree sequences as end states. Such impacts are only assigned if no direct support to frontline column dependency exists.
O O 0582G101387PMR 3-24
- i TABLE 3-3 (continued)
SUPPORT SYSTEM IMPACTS ON FRONTLINE SYSTEMS Sheet 5 of 13 Description of Equipment Failed UE "
- p g CIA Motor-Dperated Containment Isolation Valves Powered Cl,C2 frcui Vital C Power Train A (AH-VlB, MU-V25, WDG V-3, and WDG-V-303)
CIB Motor-0perated Containment Isolation Valves Powered C1,C2. ; from Vital AC Power Train B (AH-VIC, MUV-2A, 2B and MU V26) CDS Pressuriter Spray Valve and/or Reactor Coolant kumps (RC-V-1 CD RC P-I A, B, C, and D) CAA Control Power for the Atmospheric Dump Valves or for Automatic CD Control of the Pressurizer Spray Valve (MS-V-4A, 48, and RC-V-1) r CDA Motor-Operated Low Pressure Injection Valve DH-V4A CD QB Motor-Operated Low Pressure Injection Valve DH-V4B CD CFA Train A Containment Fan Cooler AH-E-lA) CF CFB Train B Containment Fan Cooler AH-E -18 ) CF ; CFC Train C Containment Fan Cooler AH-E-lC) CF ; RRA Reactor River Pump Train A (RR-PI A) CF RRB Reactor River Pump Train B (RR-PIB) CF l CSA Containment Spray Pump Train A (BS-PI A) CS : CSB Containment Spray Pump Train B (BS-P18) CS = DHA Rm Pump Train A (DH-P-1A) DH r DE RHR Pump Train 8 (DH.P-18) DH l DTV Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray Valve (RC-Y4) and Dropline Valves j (DH-V1, 2, 3) DT e EPA Motor-Operated Emergency Feedwater Pump Train A (EF-P-2A) EF. ' EPB Motor-Operated Emergency Feedwater Pump Train B (EF-P-28) EF- i EVA EFW Flow Control Valves Powered from VBA (EF-V-30A/C) EF- . j EYB HIA EFW Flow Control Valves Powered from VBB (EF-Y-308/D) High Pressure Injection Yalves Powered from Vital AC Train A (MU-Y-16A/B) EF. HI I t HIB High Pressure injection Valves Powered from Vital AC Train B (MU-V-16C/D) HI HL1 Decay Heat Removal Dropline Valves (DH-Yl,2,3) HL HLA Piggyback Cooling Valves (DH-V7A) HL HLB Piggyback Cooling Valves (DH-V78) dL . HPA High Pressure Injection Pump Train A (MU-P-1A) HPA l HPB High Pressure Injection Pump Train B (MU-P-18) HPA , HPC High Pressure Injection Pump Train C (MU-P-lC) HPB INJ RCP Seal Injection Valves (MU V20,Y32) INJ LPA Automatic Initiation of Rm Pump Train A (DH.P-1 A) LP LPB Autorsatic Initiation of Rm Pump Train B (DH-P-18) LP MF+ Integrated Control System or MFW "alves (NYSA/B) MF+ FPT Power To Trip the Main Feedwater Pumps (FW-PIA /1B) MF+ l Main Feedwater System Ability To Provide (4PI A/lB, CO-PI A, B, O MF- MF-and CD-P2A, B, and C) Mequate Cooling to the Steam Generators ! MR Makeup Pump Recirculation Valves (%V36,37) MR i PD1 Autcasatic Pressure Control for the Power-Operated Relief Valve (RC-RY2) PO i PDA Manual Power-Operated Relief Valve Operation (RC-RV2) PO r RC Block Valve for the PDRV (RC-V-2) RC l RP Reactor Coolant Pump ( A, B, C, and D) RP SRA Reactor Building Sump Valve (DH-V6A) SA SRB Reactor Building Sump Valve (DH-V68) SB SEA Intermediate Closed Coolin SE Seals (IC-V-3 and IC-V-4) g Pump Train lA or Flow Path to the RCP SE , SEB Intermediate Closed Coolin ' Seals (IC-V-3 and IC-4-4) g Pump Train IB or Flow Path to the RCP St Main Steam Isolation Yalves (M'. Y-1 A, B, C, and D) SI ! SA Motor-Operated MVSA/MY92A and SLRDS ktuation SL i 16A Air-Operated FV-V17A/%V16A and SLRDS ktuation SL ) SB Motor Operated %V58/FW-V928 and SLRDS ktuation SL l 16B Air-Operated %V178/FW-Y168 and SLRDS ktuation SL TC2 Steam Line Valves to Turbine-Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump TC (MS-V-13A/B ,10A/B ) TH1 Makeup Valve (MU-V217) TH THA Train A HPI Injection Valves MU-VlM and B TH i Tm Train B HPI Injection Yalves MU-V16C and D TH I TT Mechanical Turbine Trip Signal TT l 2m Instrument Af r/ Service Air (Failure requires 2-hour bottles to function) EF. I (IA-PIA /lB and SA-PIA /lB) j i 3-25 0582G101387PMR f
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 6 of 13 FOOTNOTES:
- 1. Cascaded intersystem dependencies are not indicated in this table. For control building ventilation, however, it was required to list some cascaded dependencies to break the circular dependencies between it and the AC electric power systems. For example, although control building ventilation CV does not directly cool motor-driven energency feedwater pump A, represented by column EPA, a dependency is listed because it does cool the vital AC switchgear GA, which provides power to the pump. Top Event GA precedes Top Event CV in the tree structure, so the impacts of GA failure had to be listed as cascaded effects of CV failure.
The following frontline top events are not modeled in this table because they do not depend on support systems for success: LT, PV, PW, RE, RV, 50, SV, BA, BB, BW, CA, CB, ID, RT, and TR.
- 2. Containment penetrations modeled in Top Events C1, C2, and C3 are considered under these two frontline system designators. Each such penetration has two isolation valves, at least one of which is air-operated and fails closed on loss of air or control power. The impacts shown are only for the motor-operated isolation valves. CIA tracks those powered frc'n Train A of electric power, and CIB tracks those powered from Train B. The actuation signals are modeled as part of frontline Top Events CA and CB. The 1,600 psig actuation signal to this equipment is not modeled, so there is no dependence shown on EA or EB.
3 For effective cooldown and depressurization using pressurizer spray, any one RCP must operate (i.e., OP and NS are required) and the operator must be able to position the pressurizer spray valve; i.e., GA is required.
- 4. Column CAA tracks the atmospheric dump valves dependence on vital instrument bus ATA. If no power is available from ATA, the operator must align the 61 ternate supply from ATB to accomplish cooldown and depressurization.
- 5. The low pressure injection valves, which must open for long-term low pressure core heat removal, only require vital AC power to function; i.e. GA and GB.
- 6. The containment fan ecoler system is subdivided into three fan trains (CFA, CFB, and CFC) and two purp trains of river water (RRA and RRB).
Failure of two or three fan trains or of both pump trains results in complete system failure. Actuation signals fcr this system are modeled in frontline Top Events CA and CB. 9 0582G101587PMR
r TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 7 of 13
- 7. The reactor building spray pumps must start automatically for success.
The 4 psig spray valves actuation signals are modeled in frontline Top , Events (CA and CB), however, not EA or EB. The 30 psig spray pump actuation signal is analyzed in the spray system analysis.
- 8. For the purpose of long-term decay heat removal, the LPI pumps are started manually. No dependence on ESAS is assumed. ,
- 9. Column OTV tracks the dependence of the auxiliary spray valve and the ;
dropline valves on MCC IC-ESV. One of these flow paths is required to prevent long-term boron concentration effects. l
- 10. The motor-driven EFW pumps require DC and AC power to start and run. ;
Nuclear services closed cooling is used for pump room cooling, but the , pumps are assumed to be able to operate for long periods of time without it. The EFW pumps are started automatically on-low steam ! generator level. No dependence on ESAS is assumed since it'is not t required to start these pumps. No support systems are required for the ' turbine- driven EFW pump; i.e., MS-V6 fails open on loss of air or DC ;
;;ower; also see footnote 30.
- 11. Columns EVA and EVB track the dependence of emergency feedwater flow !
s control valves EF-V-30 A/C and EF-V-30 B/0, respectively, on vital ' instrument buses VBA and VBB, respectively. These valves fail closed , on loss of control power. Failure of both sets of vital instrument , buses immediately following a plant trip is very unlikely. However, ! failure of both A and B vital power trains, which would lead to failure ' of VBA and VBB is much more likely. Both immediate and delayed impacts '; of losing VBA and VBB are accounted for. However, if only one of EVA
- and EYB are impacted, the effect is conservatively assumed to be immediate; if both EVA and EVB are impacted, both are assumed lost, but i only after 2 hours when the batteries drain down. The situation where both VBA and VBB are failed irrediately ,is neglected. l
- 12. EFW isolation valvas EF-V52/55 and EF-V53/54 provide a redundant means f of isolating EFW from the steam generators should an EF-V30 valve fail >
to adecuardy control flow. However, the motors from these valves are being removed so that nc support dependency is tracked.
- 13. The HPI injection valves are tracked by columns HIA and HIB. The t MU-V16s require an ESAS signal and AC power for success of Top Event HI, 14 This column models the decay heat removal dropline valves, which are powered from 1C-ESV 480V FCC. The model assumes a local action is
, required to open these valves if IC-ESV is not available, 1 b v , 0582G101337PMR 3-27
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 8 of 13
- 15. The piggyback valves DH-V7A and 78 require vital AC power to open.
They must be manually opened for high pressure recirculation. An automatic actuation signal is not required.
- 16. Pump B of HPI is powered from vital AC power train 8 but receives its supply of water for injection from the BWST via a valve that is powered from train A. Thus, the B pump train depends on both vital AC train A and B. The B pump is assumed normally operating so that it has no dependence on DC train B. The oil pumps for the HPI pump B are powered from IC-ESV 480V MCC.
- 17. Column INJ accounts for the RCP seal injection line. Air-operated valve MU-V20 must remain open for system success. Loss of compressed air causes the valve to shut. Therefore, INJ is failed if AM fails.
MU-V32, which is also included in the analysis of Top Event INJ, fails open on less of compressed air.
- 18. The equipment represented by these columns (i.e., for LPA and IPB) is the same as for DHA and DHB except that automatic initiation signals are required. Thus, failure of EA or EB causes f ailure of LPA or LP8, respectively.
- 19. Column MF+ models the equippent whose failure might result in an overfeeding of the steam generators by the main feedwater system after a plant trip. The feedwater block valves FW-V5A/B must close to prevent overfeeding. The feedwater control valves are assumed to leak too much to prevent overfeeding if only they are closed. Loss of GA or GB is therefore assumed to result in failure of NF+. Only if offsite power is lost as an initiator is overfeeding prevented despite failure of one of these block valves. If offsite power is lost subsequently, it is assumed to be lost too late to prevent the overfeeding. This is a conservative assumption because a fraction of the time OP may fail in time to prevent excessive cooling.
The feedwater flow control valves fail to the midposition on loss of vital bus ATA, which is also assumed to result in failure of the integrated control system to adequately ramp back main feedwater.
- 20. Column FPT tracks the dependence of main feedwater pump trip on DC power train B. If the feedwater pumps must be tripped in time to prevent overfeeding; DC power train B is required.
- 21. Main feedwater is failed whenever offsite power is lost because the condensate and condensate booster pumps stop. DC power train A is needed to control the inlet valves for the condenser vacuum pumps.
Without control power, these valves go shut and vacuum is lost in the condenser. Vital instrument bus ATA is needed to supply control power to keep the turbine bypass valves open. Main feedwater is assumed failed if flow through these valves cannot be maintained. Loss of air 3-28 0582G101387PMR
i TABLE 3-3 (continued) i Sheet 9 of 13 fails the flow control valves as is and the feedwater pumps to the low , speed stop position.
- 22. Column MR tracks the power requirements to reopen the HPI pumps' !
~
minimum-flow recirculation line' (1.e. , MU-V36, 37), which is required when throttling HPI. ,
- 23. The short-term dependence of the PORY on AA and VA for pressure relief ,
is modeled by P01. The long-term action necessary for cooldown and , depressurization or for bleed and feed cooling is modeled by PDA; AA : and VA are not needed for_ PDA. DC power train A (i.e., DA) is needed . to power the PORY solenoid valve. These dependencies only have an , impact if the support systems are lost before the PORY is demanded. l
- 24. Column RC models the dependence of the motor-operated PORY block valve :
RC-V-2 on IC-ESV-MCC. This valve need only function if the PORY fails ; to reseat. j
- 25. The reactor coolant pumps require offsite power to operate. Nuclear- !
service NS is needed for RCP motor-cooling. The dependence of the RCPs ; for thermal barrier cooling on the intermediate closed cooling water - If compressed air O system is modeled in frontline systems SEA and SEB. is lost (i.e., AM failure), the intermediate closed cooling system isolation valves (IC-V3 and V4) fail closed, as does the seal injection i valve MU-V20. Therefore, since all seal cooling is lost if AM fails, the reactor coolant pumps automatically trip off on loss of both seal injection and intermediate closed cooling flow. -
- 26. The sump valves (DH-V6A/B) only require vital AC power to operate.
- 27. Columns SEA and SEB account for the intermediate clcsed cooling water system pump trains. Failure of compressed air; i.e., AM fails and t causes isolation valves IC-V3 and IC-Y4 to close. Valve IC-V3 is powered from DC train A and IC-Y4 is powered from DC panel 1M, but both !
valves fail open on loss of control power. Therefore, failure AM fails ! both columns SEA and SEB. If offsite power is lost, the standby-intermediate closed cooling water pump will start when power is l restored, provided an ESAS signal is not present. The dependence of l SEA and SEB is tracked by column RP. When RP is impacted and SEA and ! SEB are not, OP has failed. Under these conditions, the split fraction : for Top Event SE assumes the standby pump must start and run. The support systems for the flow path for seal injection to the reactor , coolant pumps are tracked in column INJ. DC power is not needed to start the pumps, so there is no dependence on DA or DB. l f O ; 0582G101387PMR 3-29 l
\
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 10 of 13
- 28. The main steam isolation valves are powered from IC-ESV 480V MCC. The EF-V-30s depend on vital instrument buses VBA and VBB, but they fail closed on loss of power. Therefore, no dependence is modeled on these support systems for the steam generator isolation function.
- 29. These four columns track the support dependencies for the two air-operated and the two motor-operated valves on each steam generator, which are closed by a SLRDS actuation signal (part of heat sink protection system) in the event of low steam generator pressure.
Columns 5A and 16A track the support dependencies of the four valves on steam generator A. Columns 58 and 168 track the support dependencies of the valves on steam generator B. FW-V-92A (B) shares the same support dependencies as FW-V-5A(B), respectively. FW-V-17A(B) shares the same support dependencies as valve FW-V-16A(B), respectively. Vital instrument buses VBA and VBB provide the power for SLRDS actuation signals to the corresponding train of motor-operated isolation valves and to the opposite train of air-operated valves. However, loss of these control power sources actuates the SLRDS signal so that no dependency is shown in the matrix. Vital AC power is needed to close the corresponding motor-operated valves. Vital 125V DC power is needed to close the corresponding trains of air-operated valves. Closing of valves FW-V-17A/B alone is assumed sufficient to limit the potential for vessel failure as a result of a pressurized thermal shock condition. Leakage may occur past these valves, but this leakage is acsured to be insufficient to be of concern from a PTS standpoint.
- 30. Column TC2 tracks the dependence of the air-operated MS-Y13s and the DC motor-operated MS-V10s on DC power for steam generator tube rupture events when they must close to isolate the affected rteam generator.
Either DC train failing causes failure of TC2. Failure of either vital AC power trains would eventually result in failure of the corresponding DC trains, at which time the corresponding MS-V13 valve would open. The MS-Y13s fail open on loss of air and are not on the 2-hour bottles. 31 Column TH1 tracks the support dependencies for make up valve MU-V217 This valve is powered from a non-vital bus (1A-auxiliary building H+V). If offsite power is failet af ter plant trip, it is assumed that the valve has been opened prior to the loss of power but may have no power to close subsequently in order to throttle HPI. The fraction of time OP fails prior to the demand to throttle is considered in the split fraction evaluation. 32 Columns THA and THB track the dependencies of the MU-V16s on vital AC power, which is needed to accomplish throttling of HPI.
- 33. This frontline system tracks the mechanical trip circuit dependence on DC power train A. Turbine trip is still possible using the electrical trip circuit without DC power train A.
05B2G101587PMR
TABLE 3-3 (continued) ! k v Sheet 11 of 13
- 34. If OP is failed and an engineered safeguards signal has occurred, the operators must manually load the instrument air compressors onto the i vital AC buses. If compressed air is not restored (i.e., AM fails) i within 20 minutes, then the emergency feedwater flow control valves must be supplied compressed air via the 2-hour bottles. Column 2HR ;
tracks this dependency. !
- 35. For this analysis, MCC 1C ESV is assumed to~be initially aligned to f train 8 of vital AC power. Though IC has automatic bus transfer i capability, the presence of an ESAS signal prevents the_ transfer. No !
credit was conservatively assumed for the transfer. The event tree structure allows success of Top Event 1C in the event that the normal i power source is failed, but these sequences are currently assigned frequencies of zero. Column KEY tracks these zero frequency sequences.-
- 36. Column CV tracks the sequences through the event tree that involve :
failure of Top Event CV. All sequences involving CV failure are mapped + to the same support state. 1 t
- 37. These pump rooms are cooled by the auxiliary building ventilation l system included in support system Top Event NS. No dependence is i O assumed because their motors are also cooled directly by systems ;
included in Top Events HA and HB. i
- 38. An eventual loss of all AC is assumed to result if control building ,
ventilation fails. The cascaded effects of this total loss of all AC are included in the table, j
- 39. The following footnotes describe the frontline to frontline column l dependencies, which are indicated by "*1" in the table- !
A. The fans do not require DC power for control, whereas the river t water pumps do. An indirect effect is modeled for failure of NS. ! Since failure of NS fails all three fan trains, it does not matter ! if the river water pump trains are successful. To reduce the i number of unique impact vectors, the river water pump trains are ; modeled as impacted if NS fails. Similarly, if both RRA and RRB ' are impacted, the fan coolers cannot function. ; B. If HPI pump C is not available, then the status of the corresponding HPI injection valves is not important. (Note that by locally opening the crosstie valves, the A or B makeup pumps may ' inject through the MU-Y16C+D) C. If support conditions are such that one of the LPI pumps is not available, the availability of the piggyback valve for that train ; is not important. : O i 3'31 0582G101387PMR ) i
~ - . .
TABLE 3-3 (continued) Sheet 12 of 13
- 0. If support conditions are such that both LPI pumps are unavailable, the availability of the dropline is not important; therefore, the split fraction for 1C failure is used.
E. If both RCP seal injection (i.e., columns HPA, HPB, and HPC) and thermal barrier cooling (i.e., columns SEA and SEB) are lost, then the RCPs must be shut down and RCS cooldown and depressurization using pressurizer spray is precluded. F. If all HPI pumps or both LPI pumps are unavailable, then RCS cooldown and depressurization using auxiliary pressurizer spray is precluded. G. If both HPI pumps A and B are unavailable, then the status of the corresponding HPI injection valves is not important. H. If column MF+ is failed, then MF- failure is assumed because either the operator must trip the feedpumps or the overcooling will eventually lead to failure of the purp turbines. I. If support conditions are such that a LPI pump is unavailable, the status of the corresponding containment sump valve is not important. J. MU-V-217 is powered from non-engineered safeguards bus IA auxiliary building H and V, the power to which is modeled by Top Event OP. Failure of CV does not cause failure of OP, but does fail power to all three makeup pumps. Therefore, the status of TH1 given CV failure is unimportant. K. If no HPI pumps are available, then the status of the RCP seal injection valves is not important. L. For support system conditions that ensure overcooling of the steam generators as a result of excessive main feedwater, automatic RCS pressure relief via the PORY is not important; i.e., MF+ and FPT are both impacted, j M. If HPI is not available either because the pumps are unavailable or ; the injection valves do not open, the capability to hold open the j PORY is not important because HPI cooling is not possible. I l N. The Top Event RP is asked to determine whether an ATWS can be I mitigated. If HPI is failed, ATWS was thought to not be mitigated; , therefore, column RP is assigned an impact. l l l l 0582G101387PMR 3-32
/~' TABLE 3-3 (continued) L,)) Sheet 13 of 13
- 0. For support conditions where steam generator overcooling is assured, the status of main steam isolation or of SLRDS actuation is not important. Steam generator overcooling would occur if frontline columns MF+ and FPT are both impacted. An impact of MF+
means that overfeeding would occur, and an impact on FPT indicates that the control power to remotely trip the main feedwater pumps is lost. In evalu3 ting the likelihood of PTS-caused vessel failure, no distinction is drawn between continued overfeeding and a sequence involving steamline break without isolation. P. If the A or 8 side of HPI pumps fail, then the corresponding HPI pumps need not be throttled. Q. For support conditions where initial feedwater overcooling is assured, followed by a guaranteed loss of main feedwater, the status of turbine trip is not important. bl v 9 V 0582G101337PMR 3-33
TABLE 3-4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACTS COMBINED DUE TO SYMMETRY Combined Top Set of Top Event Events Designator Combined , CIX CI4 CIB COX CDA CDB CFX CFA CFB CFC RRX RRA RRB EYX EVA EVB EPX EPA EPB , HLX HLA HLB SLA 5A 16A SLB 5B 16B SEX SEA SEB THX THA THB O 0582G101387PMR 3-34
h e e e e e e , e e e e . l
-m s :. :e !
t e e ,
\s) e e ne e = - = = ,
e e de
- e N
e e e e ae go
=== =========== aa === = == *** a a >
o ee e o
" *e ue a***
e aee m o + 9 * <* E o Qe i: e to e e ) e =e , e e ce ===== == w w = = = www to e , e W e e !
& e 1e f p
e e to e r g a t e i e n e = a wwww =amama == === a aa Maa *ma E e e Ree r W e he H e te W e Le ,
> e e <
e e o
+e === *aa H :e Ie: i e m. !
O e te w a = = a A e Je i A e e D e (o , m e o to w = = = ** Je ! m u
- ,: i 4
e z. m e
-= ==--=--- == ---
W e e e ue o e e go
= - - = =
e o c e o me , e ==w ===== == ==w wmmma === m
- i z e e C e de
- e n e w a = =
m o 2ee ** , m o e me 4 ! o W e : Se e m.
==== (
O e w e = = = = w H e to 6 Q e e e y de I a a H e o , e de t U e >e i a e em ceo ==== i E etce ;
- ewre owoe = = = = = 6 em o >
- e><o !
m emre = = = = I e ew e ce == 5 I M e2mo } e=me = = = = = . y eJuo + d e> e ! O eZ<o i
< eome w = = = ==
H eave e st . e ( e , e to === , e ue === l e e , e me , e e ce m== ===== == === = == === = = j ve , e e oe o eoe eeeoeeoeeee eoe oe eoe eeoee eoe eoe ee e o e e o e >e = nh 4N44nnemAA nn e om nemN em om e ue o 00 o00000000 00 o 00 N
- 2e t i e i s e i e e a t i e t i t 06o0 00 00 0 !
ww t i s Ti t e e we 5e w 4 hh wwwwwwwwww ww op w ww wwww s i ww t i ww w n + i e ce e a4 re n m n n rd e m e a emenebnowN n n en e e rs e me Ne n ; e we = mm o rd mA e=ne en na e
> = 8 8 e e rs te rv a no o o4 Nnow en ne n e
e E e=e e' re i n ni 4 ei 4 4 . 4 ri ri m cli en4 e si 4 ri 4 6 e ri ti e' e en4 &v4 O ri i em e i i e o W 48no mane memna ra n n a m a m e mem m aW re e e i ,
/"N e e de .em - mmm = ng44NM = rare nmmo s M rd mnn= m edss N e mra re rd ae m4m WNO mNe m m i e ,e > >> 555 >>>>>> n >m >= > >> 8m 88 wo e !
(A e m e = == ========== == ==
==== == == =
t e e i e de e w am nevemenehm en N 40 en=n >N ne e e o venn==44oo nn = om = c a==re em en= o 2e m == == =
$ + +e
( 3-35 J
e e e o e e e e o e e o e e e e e e e e e ( e = .e e e mo e o e Ue w e o ae .ee ====+==www mam === maan o e e N e e ,,,,,
. e e ca e es e (e
ca e . .e w = A e 4e o e e .e e e Oe .e a w* .e = .4 = == = e e ae o e o e Ct: * *e a w .e== o Eo e e e i e o to a w a == .e .e .e .e .e w w e j' e e o e se e Ae e .e .4 .= a we e e e + e e t.t e .e e .e w .e e e
- f. ee e me e Ae == = = w ==
e .J e e e e ( e e cL e == =m . w = == = w m = e .J e e e m e ) e V o Ze ==== e -e 0 e e 3 e ve C e CL
- a *e .e *e .* .* *=
- ea ** ** **
.e e e a e e g e mo e cL e .e *eew O e go .e . == .e w U e e v e ( e tn e
gee ==.e . == .e e e e m e e
.e ye e = .e .a w
CO e m.e
. e = == w .= = =n .= .e .e .:t e : e H e e e
e (ee
- en = * .e m m e e o e e
e
>e ee =
e Qo em e oEmo ey e . . = = = *= e .. Q e e 1A e e><e emIe .e .e .e . .- e oe eW e o e .Z. Oe me .e .e
* .e
- eJve
. e o24e eooe 3 n; y e = .*== = .e w .e=== = = = == = = = == =
e aw( o e ( e e w . .e e e ve o e me e oe =.=.=w.e .e = e ve o e o e4 eeee eoee eeeeeeeeeo eeeoe ee eeeoeo eee o e eeee o e e e e >e n C3 4 m CD CD s v 4 4 4 4 C CD n CD ~ 4444 e rv 4 4 W' O OO C3 4 4 e ve 000oo 000 00000o000 v000 O 00000 00 000 e Ze a e a i a a i e i a i e e i it a t t e i t iit i t t t
- We WWWWW WWW WWWWWWWWW W WLA.W W W W W,W W t t WW WWW e 3e w 4 ed v v &4w 4 ts .e & v O 4 CD a nOn& rd 4 con 4m ooo I e Oe == w n n rd A o o re O CD 4 a 4o e We nv n on> 9 n Nvv66 n n w r.d. 4h n>
e ee n re - n.=.
==. rd . rd.a .*. . . . . v n n CD CD n.LJ 4e nOO on a CD CD.
4=. e 6 o e i
.* rd CD rd et CD i
- rd n .*. . . . .
=
t
==a.==nn> a- =w.' =w 4
a C"
=99 b . . CD . . . === = 4 .*
- t t t i e m ==w eneo m & o A CD A CD w CD = 0mW i
mnone.ee m i
.e .. m ed n m o >ee m =rwe n. w m n d o o CD Co .e w CD me= u- moon m ee m s CD.
r u .p.cDe no I o m> >a
>>> nnn >>> >>>>>>
s s m e> cD CD o.a .e w oo m ssrr v e n e. n n e c. re ss , e e .e e.
.e e e ==== ' . e e = > c4 o re o - rd n - re 4 s o m o CD & o m no44s o= 8ms e es o n w a c) > n48 = = re rs o. ce re n n )
e Ze ce re w w. r.e . .. ra. n. n. e. C. o
- n CD 4 ++4 4 4 I
3-36
TABLE 3-5 (continued) Page 3 of 12 e e.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee eeeeeeeeeeeeeee ..eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.... ....... 4 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. 1. V. FREQUENCY eCDS CAA CSA CSS DHA DHD DTV HIA HIB HL1 HPA HPD HPC INJ LPA LPB MF+ FPT MF- MR PO1 PDA RC RP SA eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee... SS-19 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I e 47 IV874 1.782E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ 39 IV904 2.160E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 + 20 IV750 2.044E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 IV30 2.614E-OD e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 33 IV79 1.294E-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 75 IV449 1.615E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 137 IV794 1.89BE-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I
119 IV796 3.6600-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 123 IVDO2 5.903E-08 e 1 I I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 134 VIO18 1.890E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 136 V1020 3.645E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20 e 1 1 I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 IVS 1.624E-03 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 27 IV41 6.278E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS IV254 1.819E-06
- I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-21 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 jJ 35 IV04 8.451E-05
- 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ca 70 IV332 9.464E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
'd 83 IV525 9.501E-05 + 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 95 IV611 9.524E-08
- 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-22 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 IV15 8.938E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 39 IV89 4.65tE-08
- 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-23 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a 1 1 1 1 11 IV11 1.092E-04
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 1 1 1 SS-24 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
+ 79 VIO49 2.733E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1
- 57 IV951 2.627E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
- SI IVD89 3.58DE-06
- I I i 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3
+ 46 IV871 1.164E-07 e 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 22 IV25 8.962E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 't 1 30 IV76 9.281E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 37 IV87 5.175E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 43 IV120 2 094E-08 e 1 1 1 1 8 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 48 IV130 8.05DE-08 e 1 1 1 % 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 51 IV164 1.537E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 61 IV260 1.223E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 68 IV324 1.039E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 72 IV446 1.158E-05
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 77 IV461 1.134F-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l' s BI IV492 1.355E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 86 IV529 2.463E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 93 IV59C 1.06DE-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 l 114 IV791 1.239E-06 e 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i
121 IV799 3.855E-03
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e e o e e e a e e e e e . e e o e o e e e e e
<e mo . -= * == = = = = =
e e o e
- m. a. e . .- ==* a=
- ee ge o e
- e o O oe
., ee aeo . m= = == = a e
0 e m <e oe =. a a = 2 e.e ae. o e e 0e aa a= * ** *= .* * * * * . * * * *
- a *.
e o aee o e e er e * ~ **= == = =* aaa e e teo e ee e ue * = =a am a= ** a *.
- a a aaa a e
o Ee e e. ee e e ae ge w m e e e + e e ge == == = === ==== = ==* e e ree e me e e
- a. * ***.a a *. *. a a *. =*
.J e e o e <e e ae n= = am =
e .e e e e e "a e e e *= g e .r. eo w e e 3 e oe o e un annama munH wM m unn m H n
- ~ . e
+a e ae c , ge e n . . . . . == = O e y e e
, e e <e4 = =. . .
m : I:e i . eq e ge . . . . . y e e
.o o
a e e e e .a. e m .== =. . . . e 4. e. = ** = *
- nw e Ie o e e
e
>e >. e w a= -
e aee oO oEme ey e ===m = e~6e em e e><o eoT e = == . . = e 3e eu e e e .2. me mo mua m eJve e - e e2d o eOde egye
=. = ==
eg e e <e e e
<e uo .. ma = =.
e e e me e oe === = a . e uo e oe ee eoeeee oeoeoeeoee eo e oeeoe eoe ee e o e e o e o >e 4 4 4 O CD CD 4 .e N N N N CD N e N CD 44AN4 AN N e e oe oa 00000 00000000000 00000 00 O 2e l a a 4 s i i e e i i i i i i I e i 4 a e i a t a we w WWyyy Wwwywywwwyw ygyyw wy y e 3e o 4 C) 6 (D w re n r1 e 0e N o re rd & rere nO wemO4Na.eoen e4= N er. O 4 4 hN&m M rs c> e we O 4 P CD 4 4 PMano40a*No N N CD N w w4 CD e e ge O , 4 N O . e wee id O fd 4 rd N CD CD (d (d fd
- O rd npn rs CD n fd (d
. Prd n 4 (*) N e i e i e o e m 00ONAM 00 m A m m 4 O CD O O 0 7 M CD C i
m=4 mt e .e m o CD w N w n mNOM=0rdeM&>0 1/ re m rd e >eo fd CD N P .re n w n N N s.ed.4. o4 m .&e4CD e e e
> O O w> O .=. ==
4..>..>.=>= N e o e o fd M N CD CD w ewN4&nOP e Ce 4NOne O0 rd CD n N n w gr rd v v gi o Cu e o e 2e
+ = = ne & O r.t o 4 N CD n.r.er.d.
CD e 3-38
e e o e e e e e e O : : V i e i o e e <e to e m . = ,. . = o e o e u o e, e . *w m= w= m a =====a e ge o le oe io e Ee e e g =e 4e oa * *. a = a 2: ea n. e e e a e o Oe .e = = .e a = aa a aa a *e a e a. e o e e e o er e = a a = = = e. e e Eee e i e e ue w m* m m * .e == n aaea e e Eee e >e e e, e *e a a e 4e e e e eo e ke a a * *. a a e e Ee e e ae e a. e = w = .e = o .J e e e e <e e a. e *= . .e ** aw e .,a e e e
^ e 7e e =. w .e "O e 2. oe G) e e
- 3 e Ue C
- 4e aaaaaa a a a .* *e . * = * . " "a
.- e a e y e e e en e e a ww.. mu .=g w .e mm m m m .e O v.a m,
e e o e e
<e e
c.t e Zee
- = . m= .e .e m e e ye e = = =
w : -l a . m. cc e == e . p e e Ze e e < e e o m = e e . 2ee o o >a e >e . e em oeo etmo ewIe = = . e>Qo e e e2in. 4 e i e (n I e = n m
\
e ow oee . 1 e me i e .2. to e n= =e = w . 1 o .J u o i e> e 'i e24e e O (n e = = = . . . eaoe ew e e <e i e (e ve
==== w= == = m I
j
.e e o me )
e oe a = *= = o uo e o oe e eoeeeeo eoeoe eoeeoee eoeoeo eoeeeoeeoeoeoe
. e e e e >e 4 A 5 4 CD CD 4 hQ N44h 4 4 4 N CD e oe cooooo o oc cooo o (DT 4 N 4 4 A CD 4 N O N CD N CD e ze 6 a 6 Tt i i e Ti e i ococo 4 e i 6 6 ooooooooooono i e i t i Ti i 6 i t Ti e
e e e bJWWWWW Wwww CD e = & wWWWyW s-+ o n & o o WywWW ywyyWywwwwwwy e o rd rdnM. fd . e(14 n .CD. fd o 4 (') = A e tP o e n o rd rd o e o w rde) e f4 N Q N O w e We w 4 4 rd CD P N CD G o fd fd M e f1 n e a fd fd CD P 4 =* 4
- O rd n o N e CD M (D e
e Q: e = . we ti w fd.
. fdo e. 4 n M . . . . . . v . . p . ** t.0 o o M o 4 M rd o G o CD e e i MO M =6 = n fd M 4 M (5 e .e i
M e me (1 M ft M w fd. A fd .e 4 4 e nJfirmo fi i e m 4 M N e F4 e I/I 4 e th o eM ow Nf1 w h 4 rd e .e in CD O CC CD Q m 4 (D 4 m& N 4 m rd o 4 fi
\ e >e o0400o N w rd O m fi (n CD fd rd N e fd w rd C e o == CD v e e >>> >>N $>>> NNS$N Oooh$=>we4h3oc e.
e e
- .>>--= >> >> (D rd N N >> >
- e P rd N rd N CD FP w 6 e Oe fi w (D Pd ID fd (d 4 rd n &C4&P
*e e o ti 4 w fi w (D e fe rd te e Ze (D (D & f.i. .w.. w. ++ e o.. o o. P N N M M w N CD &
- r.d. (1. . .w.
+ + $$ + +4 +
3-39
. e e
e e. e e e e
.e e
e e e O
. Ae 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . Se . e . e 2 Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
e Re f e 6
- o. C.e. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
- 1 1 1 1 e R.
g. a e A. D. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 a1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Pe e e P. 1 e e O. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e P e e . e Re 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Me e e e e
-e Fe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Me e e e T e e Pa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Fm e e e +e . Fe 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . Me e e e De e Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Le e e e Ae e Pe 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 e Le
) e e d e Je e e Ne 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 u e e I e e n e Ce i e Pe 1
- 1 1 f 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 t e He 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n e e o e De c e Pe O
1 1 1 1 1 1 ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 ( e He
. e 5 . Ae . Pe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
e He e e e 1 e E . Le 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 L e He 1 1 1 1 B e e A e De T . I e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 He e
. Ae . 1 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . He e
Ve
. T e ' 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 . De .S .MDe e .EHe .TDe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .S .YAe e .SHe nE De e
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 eNDe eI Se 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. LCe eT e eNAe OSe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 : 1 1 1
- n. R C . 1 1 eF
.e A.
A. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
. C.
S. D C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
.
- e*e e e*eeeee eeee eeeeeeeeeeeee*
. . eee eeee . Y )
6G0OO80O87 780 7767666666776 676667 C. N N0O0OO00O00 I - - 000 0000000000000 000000 E DEECEEEEEEE EEE EEEEEECEEE LE EEEEEE U. G. S73G07651 05 S40O0679982 8D9 075 441 S355001 931 823841 1 1 1 0' 22 036301 003275
. E.
R ( 6 04O51 93431 264 7245731744060 232002
. . . . - . . . . 7 . . 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 . . . F. 355621 32722 31 47. 31 21 . 21 421 4755 1
321 . 421 1 e. V. 1 . S4 S1 61 390991 I 1 1 21 1 1 VVVVVVV1 V 797357N VI I I I I I I VI 2770D S31 9 E231 050 1 V1 VI V S 9452 027I 3958 0 4 8 5 2 5 3.79OO766 S 74O900 VVI V1 1 2 II VI VVVI I sI I J DO455 VVVVVV 5042482 5335556 009V99 1 1 VVVV VVI I I I O-- 2689366835 205 24700O1 26891 2 458912 -
. O. 91 1 4561 1 34 783 37867O8333799 - . N. 1 1 1 1 775566 - + + + + + + t + + + + + + + + + -
J ,) - GjC
~ m m _ U TABLE 3-5 (continued) i i
Page 7 of 12 ., see..ee.eeee.eeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeee.eeeeeeeeeee.e.eeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeece eeeeeeeeeeeeeeen FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREGUENCY eSD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR MEY CV CIX CDX d F X RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SET THX eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee..... eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeees.ee. .................... e 5d-1 e 1 IV1 9.186E-01 e i SS-2 e 1 3 2 2 6 IV6 Y.817E-05
- 3 2 2 NS 103 IV730 3.167E-07 e 1 3 2 2 OP.NS SS-3 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
; + 43 IVD14 1.962E-06 + 1 1 1 2 OP.AA.AM j + 44 IV83c3 3.105E-07 e 1 1 OP.VA.AA + 54 IVD'4 1.748E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA.AM.HD 1 + 55 IVL 4 1.733E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 OP.VA.AM HA 4 13 IV13 1.995E-05
- 1 1 1 1 2 1 AM.HD 14 IVt4 1.972E-05 e 1 1 1 2 AM.HA 63 Iv262 2.234E-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 VA AM HD 64 IV263 2.200E-OO e 1 1 1 1 2 VA.A*t.HA 107 IV735 0.244E-07 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 i OP AM.H3 100 IV736 8.176E-07 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.AM.HA SS- 4 + 1 24 IVSO 3.550E-05
- 1 VD Y
4 55 Iv?nt 1. 29E-03 e 1 VD.HB
" e '
SS-5 1 1 2 12 IV12 5.055E-04 e 1 1 2 . t3 SS-6 e 1 1 1 3 2 2 106 IV734 2.089E-05
- 1 1 1 2 CP AM e 3 2 2 OP.AM NS 110 IV73Q 1.667E-OO 1 1 1 SS-7 e 1 1 1 1 19 IV22 4.749E-05 e 1 1 1C 65 IV271 5.319E-08 e 1 1 1 VA IC til IV742 2.052E-OO e 1 1 1 OP.1 C 125 IV886 4.444E-07
- 1 1 DP.VA SS-8 e 1 1 i9 IV726 3.969E-04 e 1 OP 112 IV750 1.534E-OO e 1 1 OP.VB SS-9 1 45 IV127 4.557E-05
- AA 124 IVF06 1.969E-08 e 1 OP.AA SS-10 e 1 4 IV4 3.583L- 2 + 1 HA I
TABLE 3-S (continued) Page 8 of 12
.......................................................c...........................................................................
FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREQUENCY .SD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLB SEX THX
............s......................................................................................................................
SS-11 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 34 IVB3 2 154E-03
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD hb 41 IVIO1 0 326E-OO
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD VD hb 69 IV331 2.412E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 VA.DD.hb 82 IVS24 2 154E-03
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA ha 90 IV544 8.324E-00
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.VD.3a SS-12 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 52 IV165 1.519E-00 . 1 1 VA AA.HA 60 IV259 1.3'SE-07 + 1 1 1 VA.EA ha 71 IV445 2.934E-04 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA ea.ha SS-13 . 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 o 22 IV759 1.146E -06
- 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VD HD o 23 IV760 1.137E-06 + 1 1 1 1 OP.VD.HA o 41 IVOO7 1.471E-06
- 1 1 1 1 OP.AA.HD o 42 IVBOS 1.459E-06
- 1 1 1 OP.AA.HA Y
126 IVOO7 1.754E-OO + 1
+
1 1 1 1 OP.VA.HD 127 IV8E8 1 740E-OO 1 1 1 1 CP.VA HA N 130 V1014 3.126E-05 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.CA.ea ha 137 V1040 3.65GE-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VA aa.ea.ha(Cm/AA) 140 VIOO! 9.791E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.DA.ga.va.aa.ea ha SS-14 + 1 1 1 1 1 o 18 IV743 1.533E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.IC.HD o 19 IV744 1.5205-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 OP.IC.HA 20 IV23 1.875E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 1C. HD 21 IV24 1.859E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1C.HA SS-15 + 1 1 10 IV10 1.2 2E-04 e 1 1 EA ha SS-16
- 1 1 1 1 3 IV3 3.626E-02 = 1 1 1 HD 25 IV39 1.401E-06 + 1 1 1 1 VD HD 26 IVSO 1.385E-06 e 1 a VD HA 56 IV252 4.060E-05 + 1 1 1 1 VA HD 57 IV253 4.013E-05 e 1 1 VA HA SS 17 + 1 1 1 1 100 IV727 1.566E-05 . 1 i 1 1 OP.HD 101 1V720 1.553E-05
- 1 1 1 OP.HA SS-10
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 17 IV2O 6.615E-08
- 1 1 1 2 1 AM EA ha 38 IvDO 1.IO5E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 DB.AM hb 07 IV530 1.185E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 DA.AM ha e O O
/* (Q ) \d v/ - ./
TABLE 3-5 (continued) Page 9 of 12 FRONTLINE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREOUENCY .SD SI TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SEX THX
.....................................c,............................................................................................
SS-19
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1
+ 47 IV874 1.782E-07 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.AA CD.1C.AM eb.hb + 39 IV904 2 160E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.DB.gb.vb.1C.AM.eb.NS.hb i + 20 IV750 2.044E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 OP.1C.AM ,
. 23 IV30 2.614E-(8 + 1 1 1 1 2 1C. AM 33 IV77 1.294E-07 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 CD.1C.AM.eb.hb 75 IV449 1.615E-07 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1 2 1 CA.AM.ea.ha 117 IV794 1.890E-06 . I 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.hb 119 IV796 3 660E-08
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.NS.hb 123 IV802 5.903E-08 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.DB.gb.vb.IC.AM.eb.hb 134 V1018 1.890E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.AM.ea.ha 136 V1020 3.645E-OO + 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.GA.AM.ea NS.ha SS-20 . 1 1 2 1 5 IV5 1.624C-03 + 1 2 1 HA.HD 27 IV41 6.278E-08 . I 1 2 1 VB.HA.HD t 58 IV254 1.819E-06 e 1 1 2 1 VA.HA.HD I SS-21
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 35 IV84 8 451E-05 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DD.HA.hb (a 70 IV332 9.464E-08 o 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 VA.DD.HA.hb
, j, 83 IV525 8 301E-05
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DA.ha.HB to 95 IV611 9.524E-08
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 DA.VA.aa.ha.HD SS-22 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 15 IV15 8.93BE-07 . 1 1 1 2 2 1 AM.HA,HD 39 IVD9 4.651E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 DD.AM.HA.hb SS-23 + 1 2 2 11 IV11 1.092E-04 + 1 2 2 EA.ED.ha.hb/EA.ha,HD d
SS-24
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2
+ 79 V1049 2.733E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.CA.aa.ea.ha.HD.(VA/1)
, + 57 IV951 2.627E-06 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 OP.VA CD 1C.eb.HA.hb
+ 51 IVD89 1.588E-06 +1 1 1 2 2 OP.VA.HA.HD.(1/EA.ED) + 46 IVO71 1.164E-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.AA.CD.IC.eb.HA.hb 22 IV25 8.962E-08 . 1 i 1 2 2 1C.HA.HD/1C.EA.ED.ha.hb -
30 IV76 9.281E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2. CD.IC.eb.HA.hb '
37 IV87 5.175E-07 + 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 DD.EA.ha.hb.(1/EDI 43 IV120 2.094E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 DD.CD.vb.1C.eb.HA.hb 48 IV130 8.05DE-08
- 1 2 1 AA.HA.HD i 51 IV164 1.537E-08 . I t 1 1 VA.AA.HD 61 IV260 1.223E-07 . I I 2 2 VA.EA ED.ha hb 4
68 IV324 1.039E-08
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 VA.CD 1C.ch.HA.hb 72 IV446 1.158E-05 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 CA.ea.ha.HD 77 IV461 1.134E-08 + 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 BA.vs.ea.ha 81 IV492 1.355E-08
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 CA.AA.ha.HD ea.(1/VA) 86 IVS29 2.463E-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 DA'EA.ha.HD.(1/ED) 93 Iv390 1.068E-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.AA.ha 114 IV791 1.239E-06
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP,"D.1C.eb HA.hb '
, 121 IV799 3.855E-08
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 OP.DD gb.vb.;C.eb.NS.hb k
TABLE 3-5 (continued) Page 10 of 12 e...... e.ee.een.eeeeee..e. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.e.eeeeeeeeeeeee.e.e.e.eee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeee.eee FRONTLINE SYSTLMS NO 1 V. FREQUENCY eSD St TC2 TH1 TT 2HR AEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLE SEX THX eeeeeeeee.eea eeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeee.e.eeeemeses SS-25 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 IV2 5.075E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 CV SS-26 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
+ 83 V1080 6.625E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 OP.CA.aa CD.(VA/1).1c.am.ee 137 V1046 2.992E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 OP.CA CD.1c.am em eb. ns. h a 70 IV477 7.822E-08 e 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 CA CD.!C.am.ea eb.ns.ha.hb.c 139 V1047 8.613E-OO e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 OP.CA.DD.gb.vb.1c.am ea.eb n 144 Vin 13 8.606E-OD e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 SS-27 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 + 45 IV870 2.94BF-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.AA.CD.1C.eb.hb 29 IV75 2.351E-04 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CD IC.eb.hb 40 IV93 1.1142-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD IC hb 42 IV119 5.305E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DD.GB.vb.1C.eb.hb 54 IV207 1.069E-07 e 1 1 7 1 1 1 1 AA.DD.h) 67 IV323 2.633E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 VA.CD.1C.eb.hb 76 IV453 1.517E-08 e 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA.1C.ea.ha 89 IV536 1.114E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.IC.ha 113 IV790 3 140E-05 e . 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP CD.1C.eb.hb I45 120 IV798 9.766E-07 e 1 e 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.DD gb.vb.1C.eb hb OP.VA.CD.IC.eb.hb 129 IV950 3.516E-08 1 1 ts e 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20 1 1 46 IV120 1.799E-06 e 1 1 1 AA.HD 47 IV129 1.778E-06 e 1 AA.HA 50 IV163 3.894E-07 e 1 VA AA 85 IV528 2.712E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA EA.ha 94 IV610 2.413E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA.VA.aa.ha SS-29 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 80 IV491 3.423E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 CA.AA.ea ha.(1/VA1 96 IV686 6.621E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DA CA.va aa ea e. e SS-30 e 1 1 2 2 102 IV729 7.409E-07 e 1 1 2 2 OP.HA.HD.(1/EA.ED) 9 9 O
e4 SN'e8'We ' A ' r 5 'VO 'dO I E I I I I I C C I I I I I . 80-3000'I C80!A CPI e 4 "N w e V3 dO I 2 I I I I C C I I I I
- ZO-30CO'9 970!A 2CI 44 SN 43 '31 ' 4^ ' 9 5 ' gKg 'g) g a y g g g g g g 3 3 g g I g . 00-3Z80'I OOPAI CCI 44 SN Qa '3 g 03 y3 g g g 3 g g g g g ! g g g g . 40-3090'9 264AI CII e4 SN'e8'We'e^ VO VG I C I I I I I C C I I I I . 80-344C'I 009AI 06 e4'SN'VO I C I I i 2 C I I . 40-32 C 7: 92GAI #8 e4 TPJ va V3 I g g g g g g g g g g . 90-36C9'C itvAI C4 44 SN'48'3I 4^ 'US 'tKI I 44 SN UG i
I C C I I i I I I I C C C C
*i ! !
I I I . I
- DO-3G2 'I ICIAI tt 20-32 C'C GBAI 9C 44 TRJ q a 3 g UD I 2 I I I I C C I I I I I
- 90-3ttG't 44AI IC e4 * * ~ 31 VS 'dO I I I I I I c I I I I I . 90-3090'C 22OIA 14 +
e4 va wy 3g V3 dO C I i ! I I z 1 ! ! ! ! I . ZO-36tO'1 92OIA C4 + e 4 SN ea WV ee e^ e5 Vc dO I 2 I I I I i E C I I i ! I I
- 90-309I'2 ZGOTA 06 +
I 2 I I I I C E C i I I i i i I i . CC-SS (03'V3/I)'UH TM WV'dO 2 C C I I I I . DO-32t6'C ZCLAI 601 (03 V3/I) 'CH VH'SN 2 2 2 C C I
- 40-32CO'I 6AI 6 VH TH WV'dO I E I 2 C I I i . 90-3GCC't OtLAI 91 +
UH'SN'WV'dO 1 2 I E C I I I I + 90-3Gt2'I 6CLAI CI + (83'V3/I) 'GH'VH'SN'dO C E C C C I E
- 90-3 f C I 'I CCZAI 6 +
2 2 C E C I I I I . DC-SS s.n VH tin'dO I E I C C I e 80-30tz'I 2CLAI COI UH'SN'dO I C I C C 1 I e OO-30GC't ICZAI DOI "O SN VA E I 2 C . ZO-3660'I CGOAI 6G VH'SN I 2 I C C e 90-3CtO'C Pf.! e UH 'SN i E I C C I . 90-3Gid 'C ZAI L SN'VA'dO C I E C I . IO-3t!4 9 060AI 2G + 1 2 I I E C i I e CC-SS WV'VA'dO C i i i i . DO-36CC 1: #60AI 001 WV'VA E i I I . 40-3199'S 192AI 29 WY 'OA z 1 1 I e GO-3tG6't OtAI S2 WV'OA'dO E I I I I . 90-382G'I 99ZAI DC + 2 1 I I I
- CC-SS e4 ea uV ee en e5 'VO W i C I I I g g g g 3 g I Y I I e 80-3816'G GOOIA Ct!
na e4 em 'ee en e5 TF dO 2 I I I C I I I I I I I I I I
- 80-3G90 E 280!A it!
OH e 4 'e* #0 'dO C I i E I I I I I I I I I . 90-3tC2'I GIOIA ICT CH e4 'ee we e^'VD VO 2 I I I 2 I I I i I I I I I
- 80-3CI9 1: ZO9AI 46 (I/VA) '0H v4'e*'WV ee'VD'dO C C i E I I I I I I I I I I
- ZO-30G9 i CGOIA 28 +
GH'e4'e8 WV ee 'er e5 VG'dO g g 3 I g I I I I I I T I I I I . 90-322t'D 980!A 68 + 2 E I I E i I I I I I I i I I I . IC-SS .............................................................s..................................................................... XH1 X35 G7S V7S X7H Xd3 XA3 XHU XJ3 XG3 XI3 A3 A3V BH2 11 IH1 231 IS OS. ADN3A03HJ 'A 'I ' ON SW31SAS 3NI71NOH3 ZI Jo II a6Pd (panutauoa) g-c 37gyi O O O
TABLE 3-5 (continued) Page 12 of 12 eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee. eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.... seeeeeeeeeeewee......eees FRONTLItJE SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREGUENCY eSD St TC2 TH1 TT 2HR KEY CV CIX CDX CFX RRX EVX EPX HLX SLA SLD SEX THX
....eeeeee...............e...................................eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee.........................ee.
SS-36(SSDIN) e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 1 2 1 1 2 2
+ 92 V1114 5.047E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 16 IV16 5.403E-00 e 1 1 3 2 2 AM.NS 10 Iv21 6.OOGE-OG e 1 1 1 2 2 2 AM.EA.ha.hb.(ED/1) 49 IV137 2.508E-08 e 1 1 2 AA AM 53 IV199 1.167E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 AA.CD.1C.eb.hb 66 IV287 3.976E-OO e 2 VA.VD 116 IV793 2.395E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CD.IC.eb.NA.GA hb 110 IV795 7.491E-OO e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.GD.AC.AN.eb.HA hb 133 V1017 2.380E-00 e 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CA ea.NS.ha HD 145 IVDIN 2.125E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 SS-37 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 + 72 V1023 1.2OGE-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 OP.CA IC.ea.ha HD 08 IV531 4.670E-00 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 DA.AM.ha.HD 135 V1019 7.459E-08 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 CP.CA.AM.ea.ha.HD SS-30 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 32 IV78 1.794E-07
- 1 1 1 1 f 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 CD.1C eb NS.HA.hb 74 IV440 2.234E-07 e 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 CA.ea.NS.ha.HD Y
A
+ 87 V1084 1.411E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DA ga va aa.ea NS ha HD + 60 IV955 1.580E-07 * ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 OP.VA.CD IC.AM eb HA hb + 70 V1021 2.723E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CA.AM.ca.NS.ha.HD + 80 V1050 1.335E-06 e 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.aa.ea.NS.ha.(VA/1) + 81 V1052 4.185E-06 e 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA.aa.AN ea ha.(VA/1) + 32 IV797 2.740E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 OP.CD.1C.AM.eb.NA.HA hb + 36 IVOO1 1.410E-06
- 1 1 1 4 1 1 3 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DD.gb.vb.1C,eb.NA HA hb
+ 38 IV803 4.411E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 OP.DD.gb.vb.1C.AM eb.HA,hb 79 IV479 7.OODE-07
- 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 CA.DD.ca.NS ha.hb 91 IV565 5.621E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 DA CD.IC.eb NS ha hb 92 IV568 5. 21E-06 e 1 1 1 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 DA.DD.NS.ha.hb SS-39 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 1 1 1 1 2 ?
+ 74 V1030 2.200E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 OP.CA VD.ea ha + 75 V1034 1.303E-07 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 OP.CA VB.AM.ea.ha + 50 IV952 1.206E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA CD IC.eb.NL.hb + 59 IV954 4.023E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 DP,VA CD.IC.AM.eb.hb + 61 IV958 2.070E-06 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 OP.VA DD gb.vb.1C.eb hb + 62 IV962 1.253E-07 e 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 OP.VA.DD.gb.vb.1C.AM eb hb O O O
TABLE 3-6. SUPPORT SYSTEM STATE IMPACTS ON FRPNTLINE SYSTEMS Page 1 of 2
..*.......................... ............... ........ ...... .ee..eeeemes....... wee...........e.ee....................ee..........
FRONTLINI SYSTEMS NO. I . V. FREQUENCY #CDS CAA CSA CSB DHA DHD DTV HIA HIB HL1 HPA HPD HPC INJ LPA LPB MF+ FPT MF- MR PO1 PDA RC RP SA '
............................... .....se.eemme.....eee.eeeeeeeeee.eeee.e...eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee................................ ..
SS-1 e SS-2
- 1 1 1 1 SS-2 + 1 1 1 1 SS-3
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-4 e 1
.; SS-5
- 1 1 1 SC-6
- 1 1 1 1 1 SS-7 . 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-8 e 1 1 1 1 SS-9
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-10
- 1 1 1 1 1 SS-11
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-12 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-13 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-14 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-15 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-16
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-17 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
SS-18
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 g SS-19
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-20
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
$ SS-21 SS-22 +
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-23 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 i SS-24 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-25 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 , SS-26 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-27 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 S5-28
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-29
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-30
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-31 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-32 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-33 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-34
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-35 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-36(SSDIN)
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-37 e 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 SS-38
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 .1 1 1 1 SS-39
- 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
-- , _ . _ . . - . . , , . . . . . , ~ . , . - . . . , ~ . , , . . . - - - . . - - _ , ~, . . ,
$ e e e o e e e e e e o e e o e o e e e e o e e N e a w e o ee e
e e N e e e g.e. . e
.o A e e o e e o e e e o e e o e e o e e o e e M e o %o we se es we em see se M essesewecefdfdfdfdwecesefdfd ,e fd we g a fd N se o We e e o M e e We N rd N fd a= N (d fd e o N rd we ** rh fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fd e U3 e o e e C2 e e Je m a =e == *e N 04 *e a a =a ** ** a N
- e u) e e e e
e <e e Je U) e
.e a a a ce = *
- a fd fd ** a a ** -e a fd
- o e e M e e Je ce o Ie me se we ** *e re we we a e4 (d N fd N Cd fd N a a M fd N *e fd *e Id (d Id 'e o e e M e e o, e = = . = a= =a .e N rd == = a e We
*e **aaNa e e
^ e ?t e V o >e we ce ce se w we ce w w w we fd (d fd (d a M *e a a fd fd ** *e fd e We G) e e
- 3 e M e
.C e ae fd fd ewa me N ee == w N N ** ee es fd fd fd Id me fd fd
- o ae p e e g e M e O *
- O O" """ O NnNN " " HNN N V
e oe V e e e M e o Q$ = ce .* pe fd fd .e a ** a fd .* fd a LD e oe i e e m e e ue
=== e y e oe === a .e fd fd a a .e se rd .e ** a o e J e e CO e e ct e >e a se H e oe e e * >e e We os .=
e 1e o e e 2e o Ie *e e w .= = .e** es .* == = .e e we .e e fd e o e e e e >= e me se ** es we ce se se se me se me we se e o e We e e e me e e Ze se a se we we se ee os os os se we ce e o me se we se se se os og we e o e we e o e Id e e !) e se we a == es we ce we me se es es ce ce se se se we og es se ,e ce se e >= e o e e o e me e we se os es es we we we se we me et e Me eM e eE o eWmo ** a a a a a a == == e == = e = =
- we e *= .= we .e .o e>We e
e> U)a eeeeoeeeeeeoee**eoeeeeeeeeaeeeoeeeoeeeoee e U) e e e eW>e A eZue Z e se Z e .- e .J W e e>3o C eZOe M eOWe U,3 e2mo O*rdn404N 4 N (D O e e u. E o ** rd n 4 0 4 N (D O' = a a = == es a = CD O' O =* Pd n 9 0 4 N O 0 O == rd n 4 4== a fd fd fd (d fd (d (d fd rd rd n n n n n n e e e i e I a 6 6 1 4 I I t i e t i I I I L t t i t t t t i t t t t t t i i i t i e e M M M M M M M M M M (T) M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M M U) M M M M M M M e >e o M V) U1 (A U1 U1 U1 U) U) V) M M M M M M M M M U) M U) M U1 M M M M M U) M M U) U1 M M U10) W e .e e ** e o e o e o Oe e Ze 3-48
L
} /9 O wJ G G TABLE 3-7. POINT ESTIMATE FREQUENCIES OF SUPPORT SYSTEM STATES VERSUS INITIATING EVENTS Conditional Frequency of Support State Given Occurrence of Initiator Support g Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of Loss of State 8' ' " ' Compressed Nuclear Control Room Fire Transient Bus ATA 0.15g 0.25g 0.4g 0.6g Number Power A Water Air Services Ventilation (F04) 1 . 91 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.47-4 3.47-4 6.5-2 3.5-4 2 1.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 9.17-1 0.0 0.0 4.50-6 4 .31 -6 6.2-5 6.2-7 3 2.5-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2-5 7.2-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.10-2 1.05-2 2.8-3 5.4-4 1 4 1.1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.29-3 1.29-3 6.8-2 1.3-3 5 1. 0-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 9.2-1 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.63-4 1.63-4 3.2-3 1. 6-4 6 2.2-5 0.0 0.0 0.0, 0 4.3-4 2.17-5 0.0 0.0 3.07-3 2.94-3 7.4-3 4.0-4 7 4.8-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.82-3 8.43-3 3.5-2 1.2-3 8 4.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.76-2 1.69-2 1.1-1 2.3-3 9 4.6-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 .91 9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.95-7 2.83-7 6.6-6 5.4 8 10 3.6-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.35-5 1.35-5 2.5-3 1.4 5 11 4.3-3 0.0 9.6-1 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.50-6 6.50-6 5.4-4 6.5-6 12 2.9-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.3-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2. 21 -3 4.98-4 8.6-5 8.2-6 13 3.3-5 8.2-1 9.9-7 0.0 6.5-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.18-1 2.40-2 2.29-2 1.5-2 6.1 -4 14 3.7-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.99-7 2.86-7 5.4 -7 4.4-9 Y
a 15 1.6-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.11-4 3.11-4 7.5-6 0.0
- 16 3.7-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.15-4 1.15-4 7.9-3 1.2-4 17 3.2-5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.44-3 5.20-3 5.4-3 5.7-5 18 4.9-8 0.0 1.1-5 0.0 0 4.4-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.46-4 1.46-4 1.6-5 7.7-7 19 4.1-6 5.1-2 2.8-5 0.0 2.0-6 6.4 -4 4.07-6 0.0 5.12-2 2.27-3 1.41-3 1.7-3 1.6-4 '
20 1.6-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.90-6 2.90-6 2.?.4 2.9-6 21 1.7-4 0.0 3.8-2 0.0 1.0-7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.87-7 1.87-7 1.8-5 1.?-7 22 1.9-8 0.0 4.2-7 0.0 0 1.7-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.03-7 3.03-7 6.0-6 3.0-7 23 1.5-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0. 0 0.0 2.82-4 2.82-4 1.1-2 5.9-4 24 2.4-5 3.9-5 3.3-4 0.0 3.8-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.90-5 1.77-2 1.33-2 1.5-2 3.7-3 25 5.2-6 2.5-4 6.5 6 2.18-3 5.2-6 5.2-6 2.18-3 9.99-01 2.55-4 4.87-4 3.18-4 4.7-4 9.4 -5 26 3.3-6 7.9-2 3.9-5 3 .31 -6 3.2-6 7.2-5 3 . 31 -6 3 .31 -6 7.94-2 1.69 2.23-2 1.6-1 2.5-1 27 2.7-4 0.0 7.7-4 0.0 2.2-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.64-3 3.48-3 1.3-2 4.8-4 28 6.8-6 C.0 2.8-6 0.0 7.3-2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.04-4 2.04-4 1.5-3 2.0-4 29 1.0-6 0.0 6.6-7 0.0 3.0-4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.70-3 7.41-7 1.3-5 7.4-7
. 30 7.8-7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.55-3 4.35-3 1.2-2 1.3-3 31 1.4-6 3.2-2 1.3-7 0.0 2.1-7 1.1-6 0.0 0.0 3.25-2 1.72-4 1.67-4 3.3-4. 8.0-5
, 32 3.8-8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 1.1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 .21 -2 1.16-2 1.1-2 2.1 -3 33 8.2-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 7.34-2 0.0 0.0 1.15-5 1.10-5 3.7-5 1. 0-6 34 2.4-7 0.0 0.0 9 . 91 -1 0 8.5-7 1.77-3 0.0 0.0 2. 51 -3 2.40-3 1.3-3 6.9-4 35 1.2-5 1.6-2 1.2 -4 0.0 3.3-8 2.2-8 4.89-3 0.0 1.58-2 8.65-5 5.11-5 2.9-4 8.8-6 36 3.3-7 6.34-4 1.1-5 5.85-3 9.2-4 2.9-4 4.15-4 3.17-09 5.34-4 8.65-1 8.60-1 4.0-1 7.3-1 37 7.9-8 2.0-3 9.4-10 0.0 0 8.6-5 0.0 0.0 1.99 2.52-5 2.40-5 2.8-5 2.0-6 38 6.7-6 1.2-4 3.2-4 5.70-4 3.8-6 1.4-7 2.78-5 0.0 1.19-4 5.62-3 5.45-3 4.7-2 2.4-3 I 39 5.5-9 3.4-5 5.4-7 0.0 0 4.2-8 3.76-8 0.0 3.37-5 5.20-3 4.96-3 4.4-3 4.8-4 Exponential notation is indicated in abbreviated foru; i.e., 3.47 3.47 x 10-4 0582G101487PMR
---.---_ -- - - -- - . ~ - - - - - - . ,. -- - .- - . . . - - . . - . - . . ,_ - ~ - , . . . . . .
DECAY HEAT OECAy Hear
- CLOSED CYCLE : RIVER WATER COOLING BOP IU BJNE SWITCH- OUILD!N GEAR y[g 7ggg7,G g SECONDARY S CONOARY MAIN SEF "1CES w SERVECES
- FE E D. ~
CLObED RIVER WATER COOLsNG WATER i, BACMUP AIR
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couewessa 8 2-HOUR - SERVICE IBOTTLES ~/ EFW AER y , FLOW r[CONTROt Pop.9pHOUSE VALVES 2 REACTOR " 7 g BUILDING ADVs MFW h AR DECAY - CO RO( + SCREEN ANO
* = VALVES PuupHog3g REM g o _
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i NUCLLAR _ 8 MAKEUP s> e e SERVnCES $ P,UMPSj: c CLOSED CYCLE ] (j FsRE SERVICE l I f COOLING %
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REACTOR SE VICES f INTERMEDIAT E h - COOLANT COOLtNG l AUX 1LIARY PUMPS W ATE R OUILDIN VENigg 47,G c3g MA;IEUP) = l I' Puup Gass a l ca mss i
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O CM D1 V EL . 5 N N 2 1 A LGIO P O RI NT TD A L . NLI OUI T _ CB N E V m f l S _ 3 E I _ m, ( , I I C N g 4 E _ D N D E . D N T D P N S D NT E CA R A N B T D _ ANE C N A D EG SE EE S V SB E VI R 1 MED S R MEV MA T M 5R RUSN EUS , U E 2E A ERuA TRUA Y RS T 1 TH T Tc B RTBB TU S TC RS ES V SB Y A E N B VN V? V N S - B NI I N I R _ I E _ T _ N _ f+ > I _ S m" ' s b W i w e q
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DECAY HE AT "^'" DECAY HEAT CLOSED CYCLE 4 RIVE R WATER COOtiNG SECONDARY SECONDARY MAIN SE RVICES SERVICES FEED-2 CLOSED 4 RIVER 4 WATER MF- COOLING WATER ffW SE RVIC E BOT ES 3 FLOW AIR CONTROL REACTOR VALVES
$ AM ButLDING iSOL A TION ~'
ADVs INSTRUMENT
#' F OW DECAY > CONTROL SCREEN AND HEAT F! ACTOR MI* VALVES 4 PUMPHOUSE ButLDING TBVs RE MOVAL '
SPRAY l- _ W 1 TREATED AS NUCLEAR SERVICES NS ACCf3ENT h N MAKEUP PUMPS CLOSED CYCLE INITIATOR ONLY COOLING 3' NUCLEAR I SERVICES 2 HlVER WATER REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS INT E RMEDIA T E 4 COOLING 'i MAKE UP M PUMP ,
}f ' EMU CONTROL Sut*DsNG ,_ GENCY V E NTIL A TION ED gjype REACTOR 1f g5 BultDING --
RIVER RtACTOR CONTROL ELECTRIC BUit DrNG ROOM M POWER FANS FIGURE 3-3. TMI-1 PLANT MECHANICAL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES GROUPED INTO TOP EVENTS e _ _ - _ - _ . . 9 9
O O O IC 480V 125V DC MCC IC-ESV DA,DB PAML W 2 dL ._ 125V DC
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BATTERIES AND EA,EB CHARGERS , ENGINEERED ' ' SAFEGUARDS ACTtlATION VB ( RELAYS INVERTER 1E AND lf INSTRUMENT -;( CONTROL BUMES ,? BUILDING VBR AND VBD VENTILATION EM RGENCY ' S TCHGEAR J= GENERATORS 4160V,480V VA w BUSES a (n INVERTERS AND W GA,GB j( j( INSTRUMENT
@* BUSES
- 6 VBA.VBC T
DG BUILDING VENTILATION OP SUBSTATION, INSTRUMEN' 4y , AUXfLIARY BUS ATA TRANSFORMERS, 6.9 KV (OFFSITE POWER) AA i r s NON 1E 4160V,480V BUSES u-FIGURE 3-4. ELECTRICAL INTERSYSTEM DEPENDENCIES GROUPfD INTO TOP EVENTS
- - - __ _ ___--_____--J
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O V 4. FRONTLINE SYSTEM MODEL 4.1 THE EVENT SE0VENCE ANALYSIS PROCESS The frontline system event sequence model consists of event trees developed from ESDs. ESDs were used to document the success paths available to alleviate the. consequences of an event. ESDs illustrate possible success paths given an initiating event has occurred. The expected response of the plant to a turbine trip or a reactor trip is indicated by the left-most vertical path in Figure 4.1-1. Figure 4.1-1 shows the general flow of the ESD. The detailed ESD is shown in Figure 4.1-2. Each block represents a system or group of. systems performing an alleviating action, as indicated by the description in the block. The line branching off from the middle of each block indicates an alternative success path, gives, that the expected action (s) fails or is not performed. As many possible alternate success paths as are available are shown to the right of each expected action. After the normal alleviatirg alternatives (usually safety and nonsafety actions within the normal design bases) are tried and none succeeds, a hexagon was used to indicate transfers to other pages or to special conditions, such as "Reactor Trip Failure," "HPI Cooling," etc. The systems required to alleviate these special conditions are shown on another page of the ESD, as indicated by the page number in the transfer symbol ("To Sheet. .."). (3 In addition to documenting the agreement on the expected plant response Q to each initiator, event sequence analysis: e Delineates required operator / system interactions for the human factors evaluation. e Disseminates information to all project participants about how the plant works. e Helps in coordinating the scenario developnent process by documenting for the systems analyst those systems included in each fault tree top event. Those systems are then incorporated into the logic model(s) for that top event. ESDs were developed for many of the initiating event groups that require a different response from the plant. The ESDs were all taken from the initiating event through to a stable end state. That end state was not shut down for the scenarios not requiring continued actions to maintain RCS inventory control, recirculation for those that require inventory control, and cold shutdown for those events during which the RCS must be cooled down to gain access to the component that must be fixed. These ESDs were used as a talking point around which to gain consensus on how the plant would normally respond and how it was assumed to respond when multiple systers fail. All the ways severe core damage could be produced were also indicated on the ESDs. l O v 4.1-1 0583G102687
4.1.1 GENERAL TRANSIENT EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM Since the plant response varies only a little from initiator to initiator, most of the work in establishing a consensus on plant response was done using a general transient event sequence diagram. This ESD became a general transient event tree (see Figure 4.1-3), which, by adjusting the values of the split fractions applied to it, was used for both reactor and turbine trip initiating events, among others. This section describes this ESD in detail. This detailed plant response shown in Figure 4.1-2, can be viewed as a baseline for all other ESDs, which will not be described in such detail. It contains most of the action group blocks to be found in ESDs for all other transients. The order changes from initiator to initiator, and a few of the action blocks, which appear in this ESD, do not appear in the others, but they all share some similarities. 4.1.1.1 Nominal Actions The furthest lef tmost actions on sheets 1 through 5 of the ESD in Figure 4.1-2 represent the nominal performonce of TMI-1 in response to the reactor or turbine trip initiator groups. This writeup describes these nominal action blocks first, then goes back to describe actions for responding to failures of nominal actions. These actions are described in order of appearance of the failures they mitigate. For the turbine trip initiating event group, the first responding system actions considered were those performed by the RPS and the control rod drives. These actions are collectively represented by the reactor trip RT action block. These actions were assumed to be initiated by the high RCS pressure or manually if the automatic reactor trip signal should fail. The RPS must issue a reactor trip signal to the control rod drive breakers, which in turn will open and interrupt power to the rod drive mechanisms. The unpowered mechanisms will release the rods and gravity will insert them into the core. If more than one rod group should stay out of the core, reactor trip failure is said to result. Special actions to mitigate reactor trip failure are shown on sheets 11 through 13 of Figure 4.1-2; these actions are discussed below. If the initiating event group being considered is reactor trip, then the first responding group of actions considered is turbine trip TT. (Reactor trip failure is not considered for these initiators because they are all assumed to start with the control rods being inserted. Without such insertion, the reactor would continue at power and a different initiating event or none would have occurred.) A direct turbine trip on reactor trip signal goes from the reactor trip breakers to the turbine EHC system. Within this system, either the electrically or the mechanically actuated dump valves will dump the control oil from the stop and control valves, and these valves are forced closed by springs. The stop and control /alves form two series sets of four parallel valves each. All of one set or the other of these valves must close to get successful turbine trip. Turbine trip failure will lead to special mitigating actions shown on sheets 1 and 2 of Figure 4.1-2. O 4.1-2 0583G102187PMR
V The next group of actions demanded by these initiating event groups is secondary system steam relief SD. These actions. include first the turbine bypass and atmospheric dump valves and then all the main steam safety valves opening in response to a sudden increase in secondary
- system pressure caused by closure of the turbine stop and control valves. Should too few of these valves open (SD failure), then the secondary system pressure will increase to a pressure higher than the shutoff head of the MFW and EFW pumps. These pumps will no longer feed i the steam generator and HPI cooling will be required to remove decay heat from the RCS. The actions necessary for successful HPI cooling are ,
described beginning on sheet 7. If the previous actions have all been successful, then the next group of ; actions to occur will be those required for MFW rampback MF+ and MF . i (The main feedwater rampback action blocks occurs on sheet 2.) The ; feedwater flow rate required for full power operation is far in excess of 1 that required for decay heat removal. Therefore, the ICS system will act > to ramp back feedwater flow by closing the control and bypass valves l until a lower steam generator level is attained and the flow matches the demand. If the ramp back is unsuccessful and too much feedwater flow , (approximately flow >6%) continues, then excessive main feedwater (MF+ failure) will result. If the rampback is unsuccessful and <6% flow ; remains, then insufficient main feedwater (MF- failure) will result. Both of these failures are dealt with on sheet 2 and will be discussed below. Following the main feedwater rampback, the next actions that will normally occur are those associated with reducing RCS heat removal TC. As the secondary system pressure falls after its initial rise caused by ; the mismatch between heat entering the secondary system and heat leaving it, the MSSVs, TBVs, and ADVs will close to reduce secondary system steam i relief. The MSSVs will all close first, and then the TBVs and ADYs will throttle down until their flow rate is just enough to remove de. cay heat. If these valves do not close sufficiently (TC failure), more heat will be removed from the RCS than is being put into it, resulting in an excessive cooldown. Actions to mitigate an excessive cooldown are shown on sheet 3. l The next ~ action that the operator.will take any time the plant , experiences a turbine / reactor trip is to increase makeup flow. He does l this by opening MU-V217, starting a second makeup pump, and providing the decay heat closed and river water support that this second pump requires. He must also be on alert for the increased rate at which the makeup tank level will fall so that the makeup pumps do not e in the : tank and burn up from lack of a suction source. Makeup is increased in l order to prevent the pressurizer level from dropping out of the normal j automatic level control range. These actions are not appu ently required i to prevent the RCS from reaching saturation conditions; therefore, the action block is shown with a dashed perimeter. This dashed box implies that although an action will almost certainly be performed and must, , therefore, be accounted for, it is not necessary and if not performed, , will not require additional mitigation actions. '
. i pd f 4.1-3 0583G101387PMR i I
Because the operator is assumed to have successfully increased makeup flow, he must successfully close MU-V217 and thereby control makeup TH as shown on sheet 4. If the operator fails to control makeup, other mitigation actions are required, which are shown on this same sheet (4). Normally a minimum flow return line is available to divert flow back to the makeup tank when the operator throttles MU-V217; if it is not, then HPIP failure will result. At this point on the lef tmost path of the ESD, the plant is at 525'F. If the failure that caused the plant trip does not require the plant to be cooled down any further to fix it, then no other mitigating actionr are required. If something in the RCS, for instance, must be fixed, then the plant must be cooled to cold shutdown or refueling conditions. The action groups for this cooldown are shown on sheet 6. Cold shutdown is finally achieved on sheet 10. The only normally occurring actions not shown on the leftmost path on sheets 1 through 5 are the automatic containment isolation actions that occur on a reactor trip signal. These action groups, SV, C2, and C1, are shown on sheet 10. 4.1.1.2 Actions To Cool Down To Cold Shutdown Sheet 6 contains the nominal actions required to cool the plant from 525'F to cold shutdown. First, the TBVs and ADYs are used to remove more than decay heat in order to cool down and to help depressurize the RCS. The auxiliary spray va he. which is used to depressurize the RCS, is also included in the cooldown ac # n group. At a temperature of 275*F and a pressure of 400 psig the closea loop decay heat removal system can be put into operation. While the cooldown is taking place, the HPIPs are used to inject sufficient boron into the reacter coolant to balance the negative temperature coefficient of reactivity and keep the reactor shut down. The low pressure emergency safety features that are encountered while the RCS pressure is being reduced must be bypassed in order to prevent their inadvertent actuation. The most annoying of these would be the core flood tanks that, if not blocked or the cover gas-vented, would tend to hold the pressure up to 600 psig. This action group block is dashed because, althoi!gh the CFTs discharging would delay depressurization, they would not prr. vent it altogether. Let down would have to be increased. When the DH1 entry conditions are reached, actions to open DHR dropline valves Hl. would have to be performed. These valves are opened manually from the control room P.id serve to prevent the normally high RCS pressure from being felt in the suction side of the OHR system. Once the RCS pressure has been reduced to 400 psig, the DHR system can take suction from it. Next, actions are taken to align the OHR pumps and heat exchangers OH. These actions include providing decay heat closed cooling water to the heat exchanger and pump motor coolers, opening the DHR injection valves, and starting the DHR pumps. The DHR system is then used to cool the RCS from the entry conditions to a temperature at which the RCS no longer 4.1-4 0583G101387PMR
l-i f f V requires pressurization. The DHR system is then run long term to remove decay heat, while the RCS component is being repaired. If any of the actions on sheet 6 are not successful, then the operators will simply suspend cooldown until the action can be performed. Since , cooldown is only required in order to repair and there is no other unsafe condition developing, cooldown can be temporarily suspended in this fashion. 4.1.1.3 Scenarios Involving HPI Cooling HPI cooling removes decay heat from the RCS by providing high pressure injection flow and opening the PORV/PSYs in response to the increased RCS pressure (due to lack of RCS heat removal through the secondary system) (see sheets 7 through 10 of Figure 4.1-1). HPI cooling is used only in ' cases where secondary cooling is unavailable (no main, MF + or MF- and no emergency feedwater flow, EF+ or EF- vailure, or there is no secondary system steam relief, SD failure) and tne RCS pressure increases to the , PORV/PSV setpoints. By procedure, the operator will stop three out of i four RCPs if.they are still running. The. operator will start an HPI ! train, HPA or HPB, within approximately 30 minutes if automatic initiation has not already occurred. Should neither PSV open, then the , operator is required to start two HPIPs in order to successfully prevent , the core from uncovering. The operator actions are in split fraction ; BW-2. (See Table 4.1-1). The success criteria are discussed in Section 4.1.3. j (] v During HPI cooling, decay heat is being released to the reactor building , atmosphere. Reactor building pressure will rise. At 4 psig, an ESAS . signal will be generated to initiate reactor building emergency ; cooling CF. When actuated, the reactor building emergency cooling water system will automatically supply cooling water to the reactor building i air handling units and reduce fan speed. Should a malfunction occur that i reduces the fan coolers' heat removal capacity, the reactor building < pressure will continue to rise but will not reach 30 psig until many hours later. At 30 psig, the ESAS will cause automatic initiation of reactor building spray CS. Failure of building spray under these ' circumstances would result in continued containment heatup and eventual i reactor building failure. i The rising pressure in the reactor building will also cause any open containment isolation valves to get a close signal. The most important such valves, because they lead to a direct release pathway, are in the ; top events: I e Containment Purge Valves C1 e Reactor Building Sump Drain i.f ne SV e Reactor Coolant Orain Tank Drain Line C2 e Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Injection Return Line C3 ! e RC Drain Tank Vent Line also in C2 , 4 A The RCP seal return line C3 is always open during normal operations and Q must, therefore, always be closed. It is c1: <ed either manually or when the reactor building pressure reaches 30 psio. The containment purge l l l 4.1-5 0583G101387PMR i
lines C1 may be open up to 100 hours a month. If they are open at event initiation, they must also be closed. They and the two waste drain lines get closing signals on 4-psig reactor building pressure or reactor trip. With HPI cooling in progress, the operator must take actions to go on to recirculation before depleting the borated water storage tank. Should the BWST become unavailable, BW failure, any time before going on sump recirculation, core damage without reactor building spray will occur. The operator cannot hold the PORY open while maintaining HPI flow to reach DHR entry conditions in a reasonable amount of time. Therefore, he must align HPI and LPI pumps in the piggyback recirculation mode HL. To do this, the piggyback valves (DH-V7A and DH-V78) are opened to align the discharge of the LPI pumps and coolers to the suction of the HPI pumps. After this, the reactor building sump valves (DH-V6A and DH-V68) are opened, SA and SB, to provide a suction path from the reactor building sump to the LPI pumps, if secondary side cooling has not been regained in the mean time. The DHR pumps and heat exchangers DH must be aligned and operating to place the RCS in a stable condition at hot shutdown. If for any reason the plani cannot be placed on piggyback recirculation, core damage will result. 4.1.1.4 Scenarios 'nvolving Reactor Trip Failure The response of TMI Unit 1 to a reactor trip failure is shown on Figure 4.1-1, pages 11, 12, 13, and 6 of the general transient ESD. If the control rods fail to enter the reactor core in response to a reactor trip signal, it will most likely occur because the trip breakers have not opened. If this is the case, the turbine will not receive a trip signal because it is generated on the basis of reactor trip breaker position. In either case, whether the turbine trips, TT success or failure, will not affect the subsequent performance of the plant. The reactor coolant pumps are expected to continue to run and will reduce the peak RCS pressures reached if they do. However, subsequent analysis has shown that they do not need to continue to run in order to prevent core damage following reactor trip failure (see Reference 4.1-1). The ESD hcs not yet been changed because of the relatively recent and tentative nature of this conclusion.) If sufficient secondary steam relief valves do not open SD failure, then core damage will also occur because feedwater will not be available and HPI cooling is insufficient to remove all of the energy still being generated in the core. Whether or not main feedwater ramps back correctly, MF+ and MF , is insignificant following reactor trip failure. This is because the higher MFW flow rate that would result after reactor trip failure would very quickly exhaust the condenser hotwell and the condensate storage tank. Emergency feedwater EF- is assumed to aNays be required for such scenarios. Without it, core damage will result. Either a primary safety valve, PV, and the PORV, P0, or both safety valves must cpen to relieve the sudden pressure build up following reactor trip failure. If only one valve opens, then the RCS pressure will build up to higher than the 3,200 psig shutoff head of the high pressure injection pumps, stopping their flow. Without HPI flow, the core will quickly uncover at high pressure and be damaged. 4.1-6 0583G101387PMR
U The relief of RCS inventory through the PORV/PSVs will quickly drive the reactor building pressure to 4 psig. The resulting 4 psig actuation signal CA/C8 will start the high pressure injection pumps and close the majority of the containment isolation valves. Since the 4-psig signal will isolate minimum-flow recirculation for the HPIPs and since the RCS pressure will go quite high, the operator must reestablish minimum flow in order to preserve the HPIPs. Following reactor shutdown due to the high concentration of boric acid injected by the HPIPs from the BWST, the operator will cool down and depressurize the RCS (see sheet 6). If this i is impossible, he will go into high pressure ("piggyback") recirculation t as shown on sheet 8. If one of the RCS. relief valves fails to reclose, he will probably go directly to piggyback. 4.1.2 THE EVENT TREE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS Following extensive review of the general transient event sequence diagram outline by operational and engineering personnel, ESDs were used as the starting point for developing the event tree structures. ESDs progress in a roughly chronological order from event initiation until termination; an event tree is less chronological. Event trees are logical devices arranged so that the dependencies between top events is maintained and so that the tree has the minimum number of branches. For instance, any top event that affects another top event must occur prior to it on the event tree. Therefore, the more top events an event affects, the further to the left in the tree it will occur. In l 7 developing such logic, the event tree will begin to diverge from the (d order in the ESD. The event tree is a calculational convenience that explicitly models dependencies among systems. The ESD is a document l i containing all of the agreements made about how, on the intersystem l level, the plant performs. In developing an event tree from an ESD, the following process was followed:
- 1. The blocks in the ESD became event tree top events in the order in which they occur on the ESD. First, the nominal, or leftmost, path on the ESD was plotted; i.e., top events and branch points were marked down.
- 2. Next, the ESD was used to establish the logic following failure of each of the normal mitigating actions shown on the first line. This ,
process uses a windswept tree format and starts from the last, or ' rightmost, normal action and works its way back toward the lef t, i
- 3. Wherever possible, the number of scenarios is kept to a miniinum by I combining any two top events that only depend on each other. That !
is, if the failure of a top event only changes the boundary conditions on one other top event, then they are combined into one top event even if they were represented by two separate blocks on the l ESD. 1 4.1-7 - 0583G101387PMR
- 4. Because event trees that correctly model the dependencies between systems are often large, the device of transfers is used when branching logic is repeatN. This is shown by the dotted lines on the event trees that end w'th a "XFRn". The logic that is repeated is indicated by a number in the corner to the left of the transfer's furthest left branch elsewhere on the tree. For instance, the dotted part of scenario 17 that ends in XFR1 repeats all the logic to the right of the 1 marked under SE below scenario 1. Dotted scenario 17 represents scenarios 17 through 32 that are identical in structure and end state to scenarios 1 through 16,
- 5. Only those actions on the ESD whose failure results in core damage or in changing the boundary conditions on others that do result in core damage become event tree top events. Dashed blocks on the ESDs do not become event tree top events.
- 6. Only one failure effect came from each top event.
Both event trees and ESDs were made for most of the initiating events in Table 2-3. (The main and the subtree actions for each initiating event group are shown on the same ESD.) Usually, the event tree top events are single systems. Single system tup events allow the effect of the failure of a system to be more clearly defined. Sometimes the top events included more than one ESD system or parts of a system; e.g., one train of a two-train system. The reason for including more than one system in a top event was to minimize the number of event tree branch points that lead to the same plant damage state. Minimizing the number of branches in the event tree will, in general, clarify the logic communicated by the tree. All the event tree top events and their split fraction names under different boundary conditions are listed in Table 4.1-1. Top events are used as the column headings on the event trees; split fractions are the names used to represent the actual numbers used in the event trees. The top events in each tree do not change and do not have values; the numbers used to quantify the event trees (the split fractions) are conditional on where they occur in the tree and on the support system state. The split fraction names are used in all references to event trees in this secticn. This method allowed the definition of the scenarios and their quantification to be somewhat independent. The event trees used in TMI-1 PRA (see, for instance, Figure 4.1-3) have the following special features: e They are "windswept"; that is, the nominal (or expected) plant performance is shown at the top of the tree as a straight line. At each top event in the first sequence that branches downward (indicating failure), the tree is developed further until all possible paths are exhausted. O 4.1-8 0583G102187PMR
l O e The split fractions used for each top event on the event tree are , C/ shown in two ways. The default split fractions are indicated under 1 the top event headings at the top of the event tree if they are other than "A." (The default values are those split fractions used where no conditional split fraction applies, i.e., in most places in the , tree. The "A" means that Top Event RT uses a default split fraction ' of RTA. The conditional split fractions are different values used in places in the tree where system performance requirements are i dependent on previous system successes or failures.) The' conditional split fraction alues used in the tree are shown under the heading "Conditional Split Fractions" in the table (see Table 4.1-2) ' accompanying the event tree, o The name of each top event represented by a two or three-character , heading on the event tree is also defined in the table like Table 4.1-2 accompanying the event tree. e The numbers in parentheses on the scenarios indicate a clarifying note on the table of notes that accompany an event tree. These notes also help document the assumptions used. The quantification of the split fracticns in Table 4.1-1 are all ; described in the Systems Analysis Report and the values that resulted , from this quantification are all presented in Section 6 of this report. ; A Tables like Table 4.1-2 and 4.1-3 were used to indicate which of the i split fractions in Table 4.1-1 were used for each top event for each h sequence in the event tree. The split fractions can vary as a function of the initiating event, the position in the tree, and the support system i state for which the tree is being evaluated. Tables like Table 4.1-2 . define the split fraction changes as a function of position in each l tree. Tables like Table 4.1-3 are called "boundary condition tables" and ! define the split fraction changes as function of the support system state. When the same tree structure is used for different initiating events, the default values and any of the values indicated in the tables like Tables 4.1-2 and 4.1-3 may change. For instance, the reactor trip i initiating event group was evaluated using the general transient event tree structure shown in Figure 4.1-3 with default split fraction RTA (for i Top Event RT) set to RTD (=0.0, guaranteed success). As can be seen in Figure 4.2.11-1, "(D)" appears under the RT top event for the reactor trip tree and the split fraction RTD appears instead of RTA in the t boundary condition table (Table 4.2.11-2). ! Table 4.1-2 indicates conditional split fractions as a function of position in the event tree by indicating the top event success or failure , combinations for which the split fractions apply. For instance, top i event secondary steam relief, SD, uses a default split fraction of SDA, indicated by no letter appearing under the Top Event designator SD in Figure 4.1-3. When a reactor trip failure ("RT F") has occurred, split fraction SDB is used instead of SDA for top event secondary steam relief. Some conditionals are more complicated than this example. For instance, split fraction HPG is only used for top event high pressure Q injection pumps A and 8 HPA when there is too little emergency feedwater ; O ! 0583G102187PMR
("EF-F") and a PSV has failed to open ("PV F") and high pressure injection pump C HPB has failed to operate correctly ( HPB F"). Split fractions conditional on success of another top event are indicated with a "S" and those conditional on no branching at the top event at all are indicated with "8." Table 4.1. , the boundary condition table, indicates how the split fractions taange as a function of the support system state. All default and conditional split fractions appear in one line in this table. The five or six characters beginning each line indicate the split fraction (first three characters) and the top event (next two or three characters). The first two lines in the table heading indicate the ETC9 run numbers used for each support system state when the event tree was evaluated. The support system state for which each column in the tr 'e applies is indicated in the third row of the table heading. The dots in the table indicate that the split fraction does not change for the particular support system state. The letters indicate the last of the three-character split fraction designator to which a particular split fraction changes. For instance, split fraction MFA (for Top Event MF+) changes to MFC for support system state 3. The event tree in Figure 4.1-3 is in an abbreviated ("condersed") form wherein repeated logic is indicated with numbers to the lower left. The scenarios in the event tree used for turbine trip all end in either "S" or a subtree. The end state "S" means that the scenaria ends successfully and needs to be deseloped no further. The subtrees referenced are shown in Section 4.2. The specific split fractions used for reactor trip and turbine trip are shown in Sections 4.2.11 and 4.2.12. 4.1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF BOUNDARY CONDITION TABLES Boundary condition tables were developed for each event tree to display the changes in split fractions that are caused by changes in support system states. The boundary condition tables like Table 4.1-3 were developed by extracting the appropriate lines from the split fraction translation table presented here as Table 4.1-4 One line was taken from Table 4.1-4 to Table 4.1-3 for each default and conditional split l fraction used by the general transient event tree by the TABLE program. The same was done for each main and subtree in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below. The run numbers on the boundary condition table were added by comparing vertical columns to find similar changes in split fractions. ) Only one run was made for each identical set of split fraction changes. 1 As discussed in Section 3 of this report, each support system event tree l scenario was assigned a support system state. The frequency of each of ! these support system states was determined by summing the frequency of all scenarios going to that state. The impact of each support system state on the frontline systems is shown in Table 3-6 in terms of frontline system columns. These impacts, in terms of frontline system columns, were translated into impacts in terms of changes to split ! fractions, using the translation rules file shown in Table 4.1-5. I 4.1-10 0583G102187PMR
[b Table 4.1-5 is used in the following way. The table is divided into sections according to top events. Within each top event section, all the split fractions that appear as default or conditional split fractions in any event tree are shown as headings in the right-hand column. The headings in the lef t-hand column correspond to the frontline system column headings in Table 3-6. Under each of these column headings, a 0, 1, 2, or 3 appears. Like a truth table, all the possible combinations of these numbers and headings appear. For each such combination, the last letter of the three character split fraction designator to which the split fraction changes is indicated. For instance, in the CD, CE top event section, the third combination has CDS=1, CDX=1, and CAA=0. This combination results in changing split fractions CDA to (CD)B, CEC to (CE)F, and CED to (CE)F. The center column of Table 4.1-5 indicates the support system states that are shown in Table 3-6 to have the particular combination of frontline impacts shown in the left-hand column. All of the center and right-hand columns in Table 4.1-5 are used to produce the lines in T;ble 4.1-4. The first three characters on each line of Table 4.1-4 are the same split fractions as those shown in the right-hand column of Table 4.1-5. The support system states that are the column headings in Table 4.1-4 are the same as those that appear in the center column of Table 4.1-5. 4.1.4 FRONTLINE SYSTEM SUCCESS CRITERIA The proper choice of equipment that showed up on the ESD in response to O an event initiator was important to structuring the list of scenarios; a O source of information about how plant parameters vary was required. Chapter 14 of the FSAR was one source of such information. However, the usefulness of this information for the risk assessment process was severely limited for two main reasons-1
- 1. Very unrealistic assumptions were made about initial conditions and systems available at the initiation of the scenarios.
- 2. Only a very small number of the scenarios defined in the PRA has over been analyzed in detail.
Therefore, information was gathered from the abnormal transient operator guidelines, anticipated transient without scram, excessive cooldown, and other special issues analyses; expert judgment in concert with GPUN personnel was used to fill in the gaps. The responding systems delineated for the TMI-1 PRA were specified clearly on an ESD. All i assumptions were reviewed by individuals with extensive transient analysis experience and by individuals with operating and simulator experience. They expressed their state of knowledge about each such judgment, thereby characterizing the uncertainty. Assuming that a system was demanded (if there were doubt) would not necessarily have been conservative. The interactions among systems in any scenario are usually very complex. Thus, there is no way to have confidence that making an assumption that a system is operating is l_ conservative relative to the operation of other systems. For instance, (V to assume that containment sprays were actuated would be conservative 4.1-11 0583G101487PMR
relative to the time available for the operator to switch to recirculation prior to emptying the BWST but not conservative relative to saying whether there is scrubbing of radioactivity from the containment atmosphere following extensive core damage. The success criteria used to specify the system actions necessary to prevent loss of control of each safety function are specified in Table 4.1-6. These success criteria specify the degree to which each system called upon to perform during a scenario must work in order to successfully accomplish each safety function. Table 4.1-6 also specifies the success criteria for preventing core damage. If control of one of the containment safety functions is lost, an er.cessive offsite r61 ease will occur. Success criteria for maintaining control of the containment safety functions are also specified in Table 4.1-6. Application of these success criteria to specific systems and their top events is described in the Systems Analysis Report. Systems are used in various combinations in each top event; therefore, the success criteria are specified by system and by type of scenario in which the system is i nvol ved. Descriptions of success criteria, as they are applied to some of the significant groups of scenarios, follow. 4.1.4.1 Scenarios with Reactor Trip Failure The success criteria for each cafety function during scenarios with reactor trip failure were derived from previous PRAs. Three specific actions were needed to prevent severe core damage during such reactor trip failure scenarios:
- 1. RCS heat remov. through the secondary system using enercency feedwater and steam relief.
- 2. Reactivity and inventory control from the high pressure injection system actuated within 10 minutes.
- 3. RCS pressure control using two PORV/PSVs.
4.1.4.2 Scenarios with Relief Valve Opening Except in the reactor trip failure scenarios, no special actions were necessary to control RCS pressure. The reactor trip failure scenarios have already been discussed. In all other cases where the time lag between turbine and reactor trip causes the RCS pressure to rise to their opening setpoint, the PORV/PSV opening question is asked. This requires that the closing question be asked also. Failure of these valves to reclose would change the required RCS inventory control actions. Failure of these valves to or muld not result in adverse consequences. 4.1.4.3 Excessive Co , Scenarios. The likelihood of havf excessive cooldown scenarios was examined in detail. These example. af too much, rather than too little, heat remo'. 4.1-12 0583G101487PMR
I [ smi from the.RCS were judged not to imperil the integrity of the reactor (d vessel unless excessive cooldown scenarios occurred more than twice in a-plant lifetime. In order to predict the total'possible frequency of such , scenarios, a number cf top events were defined and applied generally to most initiating event groups. These were: e F+ = excessive emergency feedwater. e F+ = exc( sive main feedwater, e TC = failure of the secondary steam relief valves to reclose. o TT = fsilure of the turbine to trip af ter reactor trip. , Initiating events were also defined that would lead only to excessive cooldown scenarics. These will include excessive main feedwater, steam line breaks, and loss of ATA. One concern from such events considered was that they . mld lead to a low RCS pressure (1,600 psi) signal ; followed by the necessity to throttle the high pressure injection system ; prior to water beino forced through the PORV/PSVs and reestabl shing minimum flow revrculation for the HPIPs. If water was forced through i them, the likelihood of the PORV/PSVs reclosing was foi nd to be less. In ; each situation where an excessive cooldown occurred, the likel%d of reactor vessel rupture RV was considered. The basis for this 11xelihood i is the pressuri;ed thermal stres;, analysis done by Baocock & Wilcox and [ GPUN and documented in the Systems Analysis Report, Section 19.
) !
4.1.4.4 Loss of RCS Irventory Scenarios , The success criteris for cenarios that threaten RCS invent,ry control were irnport'.nt. It was decided to group such scenarios according to a : break si:.a equivalent to the rate at which inventory was being lost. For
- instance, the success criterion for a PORV/PSV failing to reclose was the ,
same as that which would apply to a pipe break of equivalent flow area ' (0.007 to 0.1 square feet, small LOCA break size range). The DORY cooling scenarios were assumed to have similar inventory control
.ctians. The inadvertent DHR valve opening scemrios will be cohservatively assumed to have the same inventory control requiraments as the, 0.1 to 0.o square feet, medium LOCA. This choice of success criteria is conservative because both LPI and HPI are require 1 to act to mitigate these scenarios. Other such scenarios as RCP seal failures and j those initiated by steam generator tube ruptures and very small pipe :
breaks were assu ud to require HPI to act, odt not to be big enough to ; remove all decay hea+ through the opening in the RCS. Thus, for these scenarios, other aut u are required to control RCS heat removal. It was further assumea ! . t' - dium LF.A initiating events would all r require low pressurr . uit % stion, r N all other scenarios would t require high pressure (a wyback" .x ^ .:lation or cooldown to DHR
*ntry conditions rnd - + ,W ':2 4.1.4.5 HPI Coolin p .g i n M The success criteria for ' <ing RCS heat removal using the N .-
PORV/PSVs and the HPI systaa 1. ... )0RY and any one or' the PSVs 4.1-13 l 0583G101487PMR
could open automatically at its normal setpoint; for the required eccompanying RCS inventcry control, one HPI pump must be started in the
!njection mode within 30 minutes. One HPI pu p is enough if at least one FSV opens. If one PSV does not oper two HPI pumps are necessary. The H?I pumps are assumed to be actuated manually. ;
P O 3 058 M101487PMR
t t t i 1A3LE 4.1-1. EVENT TREE TOP EVENTS AND SPLIT FRACTIONS f i 9eet I of 15 f Event free Systees ' ihree Split -
$400ft Tee Event Analtsis $rstees Craracter Frution Top Event ard Wies Srstees -
une Section involved Designator Name Success Criteria Availatilitr :i t
.p 14 .2 . Electric Availability of pc.er free tre ATA tus' Fceer t tid M-1 e All l tsB M-1(VA) e M AC A i I4 - M-1.0 te Instrant. l Service ait ;
(M te-1 1/4 IA ueressors sasalir j loadef start at run. i wt M-1(W) DC t'a IM availatle l IdC te-l . 9 ~ karanttM f allwre l
- M) M-l(6A/65) C6 er 6E faild l IA!E8 14 MT MT discharge valves (M-v5A iM 0458 (1)
Otsc'4rge, retain cren, crect valves OH-V14A aM -! OMRS *H-V14B coen on desaid aN flov is asintained thrcur tree for 206:grs. l EAA,itA E!ct,E9-1 e All [ E!4 EA-1.4 6 arante+1 f ailee : EIS E3 EA) (saae vale as E3-11 l EEC E6-1.3 6.arantees f allure . EV 14 Mi, M1 brates vat 4r is available fece tre MT - mtil recirculaticn. fW EV1 Tyk 4M sistN - e All Ew Ta* and pising aN sanual start l FV-2 > of fl pur.ss at ocentN of i , iNection valves NN1(s) aM .t MT isolatim valves OD-Vits) i for WI tooling. Salve harNre f ailures not incl &$) ., EW EM Af ter 144 recovery GE 1) success l M Ett Af ter fE0 recoverr GE-2) secess , EW EW-l(F0.KC) Line EV-1, tut mentor trasv. stcss .! WIflow EW EV-lMa) Like 6W-1, tut cserator irwtv. stces W! flov af ter wrr 54411 break LOCA. -( CA/C8 3 EMS (M CEA CA-1.CS-! 6emration of an actution 519 41 on 4 psig ientor ; tuiltiN pressare - f roa EMS r (or samalir given EMS ! allure.) CES CB-lfCA, 6iven f ailure of CA. j (18,CSC (A-2,CS-2 Pa%al actution ontt, in (2) i 14 sinutes af ter Mrsi signal l m!d have occured. l CSD C3-2tCA) Ghen f allwre of CA C14 CA-16 6aranteel f ative ! Cli (5-1.0 Garanteed failwre < l 3 4.1-15 i
, ~ , < _ _ - . _ _ . . _ . _ _____ _ , ,_ . - , ,,__,.-_m.,, , _ . . . . - _ . , , . _ . - - ,
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 2 of 15 Lient free 5,stess ihree klit &ssort T* Event Analists $1stees Owatter Fraction ice Event at v.es Srstens
%t.e Section Invohes Cesiyutor kine ?uccess Criteria Availabtittr 0,E 12 (Ns, Cccliva aM desressurtration of ee K3, Fressar1:er (inc1Anns recoverr). atra Cs .N (3) krar, Cecar Fresut:er scrar given rf! is aia'laole.
h*at Fenoval Alw incl'Aes ccenes of t'e C4 etscharx Oischar9e salves (CH-WA 32 Crt in) aM t'e valve tardeare Valves CA CD-1 Af ter FI f allare e All CCS CJ-1((9) e 4 cffsite CC Ce' !UA) e 4 A!!. GC M-1(CA/T-)[like C-21 Af +er UR e M FGV cr 75V CED E-lGA)(lik e Q- G)] (4) e M ATA CEI G-lGF)(116 e (^rMf)1 e M offstte CEF G-1. 4 Garacte+d f 411 re Cf CC-1.6 Swa veed f ailure Ei E-1(1:1e CD-21 tif ter M~n e All od T-U 16 Fenctor Centaimt rett revval (in corQWLt;n B 11d19 with tcp ert (CSI) (ivitess wes CS Emergencr vrecessarr for t#at re<cval.1 C.;citr9 io of three reattor tulltr9 energency cxlig coils at f ai etts ccerat1N, tetN s.4slied cccitN veter free at least ore reactor river enter up (te of thre; exlers syk). CTA U-l e All 73 U-!G/CA/CEllC) e c.tr 1 train cf EP UC U-2 Cmator esta:119es reactor (17) tullhng (ccitrg ustN tr44 trial (:clets fell stN ICss of river water at f ailvre to recover it. UD CF-16 Gara, tees f allwre (? 15 Contwwnt pcte in Frwess at event initiation CFA W-1 11!) O 4.1-16
l \ 9 TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) Sheet 3 of 15 Evert Tree Srstess Thre) fellt em ort he irent Analysts Srstees (?e acter Fractice k9 Event aM Xtes 5, stets me Sectten Involved Cestrator 'tane eacess Criterta Availattlity CS/C2 17 Feactor Provides certatraent energy nes:real aM fissten (19) letletre prooxt scr@tr9 alts at least cre train of Strar Feactor D;113193 ff rar. Atuates aatcaatically. CM CS-1 e All CIS CS-It M/E) e All CSC CS-1( f a) Sue vale as CS-1(M/El e Celt I trun of cA CSi ($-1(56) caw vala as CS-1(M/E) 4tuat+1 wuillr: CSE CS-3 e All CSF CS-319/E) e All CQ C5-MM) saw vald as CS-hM/6E) 09: CS-3(58) stie vala as CS-3tM/E)
,s CSJ C5-1.4 brantes f ailwre
/ \ (#)' CV 6 Cetrol i~tidir 3 One train trovttes centrol tui'.dtng ve6ttlation for C4 hvs. untilatt:n CV4 CV-1 e All (W CV-1(7) e M effitte CVC CV-1(& 9) e EP train A om CZ CV-1M) CJ CV-it'a) C# Ch1W GB 10) CA CV-1(WE3 9) C,9 CV-1.9 Garave3 f all.re C1 15 Fenc tor 15:>latico of reactor Niletrn svge Sult at Eutl:ts) etad en ceeat at reatn is:latet etti Isolatico tre des 4M 15 rescves CIA (1-1 e All Cle Cl-1(M/E) e Cnh I train cf f4 CIC (1-1(CA) e 1 train of a 8 stral (10 (1-1(M E) e % AC cover CIE Cl-t(CA CB 7)=1.0 (16 (1-10 bracteed f ailu re COI 15 Feacter Isclati:n of MCT waste gas vent, lizard drain, Ectldtr9 m3 le'evn its IMlation CIA C-1 e All CS (2-1s M, b =Mi[C2 llM),C-1(2)) e (ely 1 train cf R CC C2 !ICA/Cl WIIG-1(CA1.C-!I CE O e I train of as itral CC C214 M Ei etK C3 (2-14 brante+1 f allere v' 4.1-17
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) Steet 4 of 15 7 vent Tree $rstees Tr.ree istit i m rt ice Evect Analtsts $3stees Character Frac tion Tc9 Event ns Mtes Erste haae Sectten inwlves Cesintor uw Success Critetta Avatletitti C1 Feacter lulatten of KP seal rett tn br M cr Euti:its 7a (lcitng (af ter cere cauw) Islation C'A CJ-l e All C6 C3-l@) e Only B train of AC CX C3-1. 4 Gaarante+1 f ailee CA.C6 2 CC Fe=er, One train of t4tteries avattele etit vital R trer are distrarges her C4 CA-1 Availattltty of train A C4 CA-1. 4 bra-te+1 f ail /e CM Ci-1 Avalletlity of train 6 given trat train A is
- 4. allele Cia C6-1(CA) Antletlitt of tratn B C4) given that train A tas iailed C(C C0-1.4 brarte+1 f ailvre N 14 Cec 47 h train cf 1* car r ent recal ens nj (21) eest test e> cran;4rs are casall, attatW aN seio.al ccerate for C4 to/s, incl Atri reccee'r
(*advare ceb) M C+l e All C4 e
" l@/2) e #1r 1 train of AC Cr0 C+MA) ?.ame vala as M ven tra;n SA is f ailed M C+1(!S) $re ola 45 CHE #en train 13 ts f ailes C4 C+l 4 bractees f ailee Ci 14 A> iliar y Oretat<r ut estelish &atltarr strar CC)
Scear flce or ccen Pxitre to prevert 1:N Lire + >:o tern toron comentratica of fects eithin Lire C4 tors of tre LC(A CIA CT-1 CTC CT-14 brantees f allet EA/EB EIAS h train of estreered safepari actutica (lWt R$ is a. allele w:n oeuN Premre 5tpli E:4 EA-1 Availeility of cce train e All st,en tr.at tre ctrer is availacle. E4 EA-14 b arte+1 f atlure EEA E!-l Availao111tr of m train e All girtn t*41 tre otrer is avallele EEE ElIEA) A ailattitt, of train 8 (C1) stver. t*4t tratt A tas f aile1 C4 EA-14 brantees f allare O 4.1-18
,rm I
v) TABLE 4.1-1 (continuea) Mt 5 of 15 Evert free Syst4e5 Diree iclit Sscor t I@ Event Aca trsts Srstees Character Fraction T@ Event anj N:tes Srstees hae Section involved Cestrator Name Sxcess Critria Availabilitt EF+ 11 Energiv r Both trains of ETW ce controlles to prevent (24) Feehaar overcmitr9 tre srinary in the first hwr follcstrq event initiation given sucess of U-ETA EF+1 e All ETB EF+1(SS) e Oelr ore train of AC EF- 11 Eaergeur At least cre eeer9encr feehater w Feewater autaaticallt startes, sultes suf f tcieet ft+34ter to reeM ce<av tent frce t'e primarr systes for 24 hNfs t4 che out of two stene 9evators. ETC EF-1 e All ET1 EF-1GP M) (5) e 4) cf f site mer, ro ron-tottlej inst. att EFE EF-1(7 AM M/68) e Crly 1 train cf AC
/^s EFF E~-ilG M GE) iO e %) t< r<me
( ) U6 (1-1(13 7 MJ Af ter SLB in !ct. El:1 01) e %) AC roer s/ ETH EF-It@ M Vara) EFl EF-1.4 Laracte+1 fatis re ETJ EF-1(18 7 M CAlts) ER EF-itSLS W M M/W EF1 EF-1(SLB VA/O EF% Ei-ln9 M %3) F3 13 Fractice of tre reactor trips for #ich tre R$ sust te cooleJ 0:in aN decreswr1:t1 to cels 5%thm trct3rr to te f1 ej. FIA FI-l FIB FI-2 Lite F1-1 NL T; ms f atles FIC FI-4 4 hever FC FI-1. 4 A!.ars ('x v 4.1-19
t TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) N t 4 of 15' beat free $rstees inree Sollt ~ ' S49ert T* Event k.altsis Srstens Character Frattion Top Eitnt asi s:tes srstees we tection Involved Cesignator be $xcess Criterta Availability M/Gil 2 Diesel Ava112tlitt of r<ver free cre train of Clus G5) 5erentors. IE settch 9 ear. All si N Sotct9 tar Frce ettter diesel or offsite; GM G-1 Availabilttr cf train A EA E-1 Avaticiltt, of trun B e All given trat train A is avail 21e MS GE-1(M) Availatilitr of train 9 e All glien ttat train A tas faile1 Frce one diesel generators for 6 hrs: r46 M-1(@) Availatilitr of trun A GC E-1(&) Avatleility of trun 3 e M of f stte given that train A is
- 4. allele GO i6-lim 0F) Avatleilitt from trun 6 e 'o of fitte snen train A wra atlele
%C %-1 6 Sareteed fstiste EE 6?-l 6 5arantes fule re 4/4 5 Cecar Feat N train of cccitag mater to tre secar teat t1: sed Al ver Vater, trtle c:cler 11 avulele for 24 rws Cecar etat, Cl:ses Cycle Cccling n:A XA re-1, +1 A uletitti of one trun e All enen eat t'e otter is a. allele.
n:6 4-16 Garanteed f allu i
$8 +1N) Availabilitr cf trun 8 give9 trat e All train A tas falle2 4C rE-1 6 6.arantees f allure *! 13 M e# migh pressure tajettlen val es (RM165) ht-:satttally csen on EMS at star ecen for :4 Nurs.
hA H A-1 CM cf to valves in t*4 A in;ection rata ('W164.El 6!B PIA-2 In cf to salves in tre A in;ection rath. MC n!!-l Cre of to valves in tre B injecticn rath IMMIK.0) MD W:8-2 In of to vahes in tre i Ifimiten rath P'!E d-l W cf to valves in tcta in;ectlen ratts (iMM19 ce !) 44 W-VlfC or Diltwen tutte KF H-2 kr cre of 4 MMlis Mi W-16 Saretees f ailw re NH k > l @> ) !are vaiw as G-1 in MM6 fr 120 renveer MJ al4-!t LR) i4.e .ala as H&-1 in k.:-14 f:e L4 reccverr O 4.1-20
I' ' TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) tat 7 cf is. Eient free $rstees Three Ssitt kuort ko Event Analtsis Srstas Craracter Fractice ko Event aM Mtes Srstees
%w !actica Involved Cesipator haw success Crtteria Availattlttr rt 14 Cecar Nat Oseratcr acticn to line w tre CeA sista E wval for various t)$es of operation.
H.A R-1 ftraal closed crcle (7) e All or IC ccoling - (ten tr.ree of faile1 tr.ree dropline valves free control r0:e ard Cre of tw) karbal valves locallr. Valves sat csen en &eams aN reenin cse9 for 24Wvs. including recevert. R It!C)=1.9 breta: f attare H.8 H.-2 Ftm-tack ucits - (A) e All (sei toth trates of pit;rtack valves @ '7Av ard CM7 Bland C+GA amd C*-W.Ef r.areva>e). M HA(SA) III sim-tack valves ccen HJ H.-:G) 1/1 pit;r-tatk valves esen rtC rL 1.9 bran 4e2 f ailure fa/49 13 ete Oseration of his crHsure inject.on nacsis) (;f) r Fress/e ass corresr4ndiN EG 54 tion valse a d l w) Injection centirtes cs+raticn fer 24 N:urs. Ore of te) pics ( A cr B) in train A and VV11A cre's 4A 4 A-1 e All di 4A-liCA/WI) Q) e (ely C(-6 40 VA-It49) fE 4A-1(41 EE) e 49 4A-l(48 CC e ;nly K-6 h VA-It!ES[saw brantes f ailee e. cast in !!$-;f vah.e as 401 vere is 40 for M6 rxo. err (aan acts in FE-li ass la !45-23 tere is 4M fv recoverr of cne train 41 4 A-1. 4 Cuarrteel f ailee 4K 4 A-lG /M) rft 4A-If GB) 49 4A-lO E/.) 4wal start of a pe4 en to astcoatic actation 44 4 A-l'EA G) Paral start of a pes seen to wtxatic actutten f0 fA-1(M CS) 8 esip conttrws to rA Fess A aM B teth r>rk at evi4A esens af ter C pm %s f alle$ rfi 4 A-2 e All 4 A-hCE/G/4) !4ae vals as 46 ! 49 4A- M ) Af tee LN ruoserr e All Em C eM PO-Vl48 i l 4t 49-1 e All l fj M-1 4 br;nue3 lallure j ! \ , i 4.1-21
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 8 of 15. Tent free Srstas inree Et SJocrt ko frent kalists itstets Character Fractt03 I@ Event aN Mtes Sntets Name Secita Involved Ctsirator Name Success Crtleria Availaollity 10 19 Ccetrol 104 10-1 (Nrator ikotifits a stena Rxe instru- se erator tle reture as sentation sah; otherwise, crerator is assee) u take it for a vert satil LCCA I:6 10-1;&) (32) e M cf fitte 1:6DI:C 10-1 4 branteed f ailure N 13 Faa ce RCP stil injectico wintaired thro # MW;4 aN M1-V32 to all fcur FU5- Incis:es all cc+rator actices (incia:tro ccentrg sH.as) (ecessary to taletatn seal injecti:n I?a N-1 Vith lates fl:4 f rie trati A e b) Of fsite l'E N-1(M) (puno A or BL (33) e b) air N N-2 Vith wes flov from train B IT N-2(M) Ippo () incleftr9 crentN e %) air MM11B au tre nyes crcss-cerect 'MM's A,B) valres aN startiM tre sw N N-3 htth eases flew free train A N N-F M) - ro cserator actts to xen e s) air W14A is retirec.
!?C N-4 With tales f cw f ry, train S, 1* N-4(M ) sestra cross- ce rect valves e 4) att tre celt csemer actici M taul actt:1 to cren Wil48 15 retire 2 hl N-1 4 Lardeed f atiste LP 14 Lcv Fressste ;re train of LPI actuates astcoatically G)
Ir:ectica aN injects fer 24 bNrs, inclu:es Cr8MMB UA LF-1 e Als UB LF-1(GA/E) e (ne train UC U-1. 4 6,4< anteed f ailwee LFO LP-It!A)[same valve as Ut] bo train B a<ailele UE LF-1(14)(s;.ne valw as LFil Suno train A a<4tlele Li 14 Men to Ccerator stovides a lor 9 teen water strce EWMJT fer injection tv eitter refillits tre Mi or takes tai within 6\ tours LTA LT-1 During a nc.rtal@cxtov e All LIB LT-2 Af ter stene generator L2e estare e All LiC Li-1 ( brantees f tilwre O 4.1-22
(, ,) TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) v Sreet i of 1$.
. bent Tree irstees Tr,ree icitt $,soort ko beet Wltsis $rstees Craracter Fraction Tc9 6ent ans %tes Systeas %w !4(tien involved Ces19Fator haae fuccess Criteria A,ailabilitt Pf+ 16 Patn ath tratrs of tain leeMter ramo cack to tre Fee.%ater cctrect rate to pre,ent over coaliN of the ccre for first Nu, TA T+1 e All Pf3 T+1(W66) e Cte train TC PF+1t M) e M ATA to 103 TD T+1@P)=03 e No of fstte TP PF+-4 4 e % of fsite T- it satn PalafeeMter ra:ts teck to to less tra, tre (27)
FwMter pr,:ser fla en at least ore steam sererator G4) to assure e#J;4te rett rewral free tre pritarr, or cserator attico to reestatitsh main fe+Mter flce af ter is:lation tr tre steam lite rwture detection sisten Pf6 T-1 e All T-1(Mint 0 e h> ATA T-IN#)st 6 e % of fsite T-It0Al=14 e % of fitte for f allve IC (Feedig cre steaa generator CS)
,, enlr with cne TW pp4) af ter tr;asstN
( j S00$ 15tlates tre otrer TJ T-2 e All T-FM)st 4 e % A?A T-2@=14 e o of f 51te T-37)s t . 6 e % of fstte FM T-3 s 16 Atter $LS 443 3LQi on tcta gevaters, xerator trpasses 5U0$ to fee 3156. TO T-14 brantees f allee rp g r$ TA 4-1 Frevia me.e tw rectrcwlaton br cretN WA 69137 (af ter ti sxtess ) 49 T-14 karanteed f ailee PRC T-l@E) locallt aruallt omtN cee valve E 4 9xlear Cre train of coolig to tuclear services c1m! Rt er crcle ccci N srstee Ic43 for 28 roes Vater, , hx! ear G E-1 e All ' Services G %-1( J ) e % ef f site (lzes kK Ki-l%fs) e I train of I4 Crcle G E-l' EA EE ) e I train of AC Ccolim G M-liEA EE) e M [$.13
%6 M-14 branteed f atIte l
l
% l t : ,v /
l 4.1-23
O TABLE 4.1-1 (continued)
'het it of 15 Event Tree irstees Three Selit S m it T* Eveet Analysis frstens Character Fraction T* Evert at notes Srstees Aue Se(tton lavched Destrator hae Success Crtterna Availabilitr & 2 Offsite WA &-1 Avalletlitr of of fstte e kn rN'd Fever Ever folla1N a turbine t r 10.
US & 1.4 0;aranteel f ailure FC 12 kev FGV cretates on Stard for RCS preswre relief or KS cooltrn, (rtles ccen until cesaN ti reeoved PM F0-1 Fasses stoa e All PX Fb2 Fasses mater e All NE Fe r li4/VA) Operatar latcres mn e w ATA FGV fer il coo!trq PJ F9-16(40-1(CA)) 6;arante+3 f allee FV 12 FSV5 F5"5 wen on cesaw, ocle, at reuin e 4n rN'd wen et11 c,esaN is rew;ved: M PJ-l One passes steam FW Fv-2 T,) pass sten EvC Fv-3 Ore passes enter. P0 FV-1 te) rass eater. FW Pain ite.a F4-1 A steaalnw troieiin tre tuttine tvil:tN r.trs aN (4Aes tre unatfe<te3 Cii3 to te af f ected, i e , toth are los1N steas K 12 PM, KKV EctX F1Ys cicss v'en detand ts rese,es; e Mne rN'd KA M-1 Af ter pass 1N steam o W e FN'd EQ K-2 Af ter pass 1N water RC K-) Af ter pass 1N vater aN Gl 15 thrcttled Kf7 ticses een cesa'd 15 reo>ve2; ECO K-4 Af ter passtN steaa e All KJ R-illC) ( 31) s 1 train Of AC EM K-5 Af ter rassly veter. O All Ky K-Sil(s e 1 train cf AC V/ K-4 Af ter passty veter ass o All Et, FM IC) 41 is tr.rcttles e i train of AC All K5V aN Fivs clcse v een desaN is retovel K6 K-7 Af ter passirs stena e All M K-hlO e I train of R KM M-? Af ter passtN =ater. e All M.4 R .. lC, e 1 train of R M! K-) Af ter rasstN .ater 4N 41 e All is trrettles RO K-FICs e 1 train of R D N*I 4 hA'arteti f alIWre O 4.1-24
l TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 94et 11 of 15 6ent free irstos three klit keert i:o Lent Aralvs;s $rstees 04racter Fra:tton is bent an1 Ws 5,s tas Anae fection 19volvH C+s t rator W bctess Craterta Availht111t r Fi Electric FIA FE-l tr+rator, d,rtN a station (14) Fever, blackwt, rece,ers 41 fla River kater af ter ECP seal f ailee er an!Clcse3 eeaAtton of tatterits CFCle (#1C*dver edsfe7 first) (0 lis At in itse to presert Vater (c*e catape. FG RE-2 Crerat:r, af ter 1:51 of ?!, (11) restares r ver sate tafere T0 sul f ailee FF RE-2t EF) L3 e EE-2, tot U- f allt3 FEC RE 1(EF) Lite FI-1, M EF- f aile2 (12) FD TE-1.0 bra-te+2 f ailee FEE FE-60 brant++: ss: cess 8!6 FE-3 F:#:cvery of cifstte cr strile /4 trate Tii F1-hi.F; L3e FE-3, ett%t EFd EP F03 FIA CJ-l All rats FU's stav rntN (13) FJS F#-l 6 barantet3 f allse Eft F1-l@) Enatrs tw:N fcr first It sin af ter C.$ FJO CP4 6 brantes sa: cess (~ f i Ei 7 Reac t.:e All (Ortrel ro asseglies e.cest ora (/ Protecton, trsert trto tre c:re on 0+=n3 . Cutrcl R>3 Crives RTA Ki-1 e 41 A *2 Ki-1@) e M OfIstte Fit ET-10 branta+1 f allee AfD AT4 0 Pt F?S ko rei.ctor vessel reture u ta: R(A FV 1 her(X1ir9 frc4 SL5 in 4N.rereos tar:gre Nil::N. P4 P/-2 Fatbre to c1 se sec:n:arv e A: 4 re-: : relief stic) P,t t<3 Fatise to tvettle trcreas+3 wesan1Finces AA P!-4 Failee to torottle ncreasei sees n2 FT/s cc+n (FJV 4:es st) F4 P/-5 Failee to tt-r:ttle txteises sees ns Ft/s cen iKP/ 0:es not). AW P/-3 Sall UXA syl Kv-9 ver, sull LMA R/J P!-10 Excessive sain fecater. RA F /-11 Ivetne tria f ail #e. l
,m Q,)
4.1-25
TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) Steet 12 of 15 isent free sistas inree iclit S m et T:o Ever.t Analrsis nstas Character Fraction Tco Event and %tes Srstas
%ae Sectta Inwliej Cest;*.ater he %ccess Critetta Availahlttr 'J/54 14 Fetctcr fullitN sw eM steers wrt M PutletN hrator w+ns A 3 tu twlation Sue valves af ter la level alare 4.J tefore sw cavitation. %) SA-1 Cap aN kWA vitt,tn I sin e All J 'S 9-l@):1.6 kn wtalle, lxallitin sit) e W AC S/4 9-2 cae aN MTA vitran 14 ein. e All !!i Ski 9 brrtees f atla re eiA 12 -1 C+Wa vitNn cv etN'.e fi8 15-1(!A)
ISC 'l-2 kWS witr.tn 14 stNtesispe as Sia) SEO !E-2i!A) EE 3E-1 4 baranteed f silee tif %-l@) Inclos inNal action e4 2 %-2$) 10 9 Gs kfficient of the ntre PS!Vs oc eacn e %n rera steaa 9e erator >At wei c1 ottaN at remain wen until t9 desat t 5 t e*Ne1 5"4 10-1 One ser stew weeratcr
.G 50-2 To ser steu g eratet '2 :li-3 Tw en one Oti4 (14) ?CO ?>l 4 brateed f allee 2 13 O !*als teal intevr ttr is natntaiv$
tv r.sns of ICCV IEA $E-1 e All iEE it-l@!%) e i train of 4
#iC IE-14 brantees f ailee iC $E-!K# ku Paul start of 1/2 ::S rws fiE iE-It7 M GE) Paul start cf 1/1 !T. rm !! ) Pain steas $D 5! 1 Curator clcses rim for a:wnstrean treas !!B SI-2 Crerator cl:ses nim at EFTS & MW2 f ar wstreas crents SIC !!-14 Lara-tees f a1lare it Pain Steae !!eanlire ret re oetection trates crit to isolate OT% on f44 rst9 ugral '1A ci-1 Cm Otis avst twlate e All id it-l@/C6) Pcter cwate1 velves nat twlate e 1 train of X RC 1-It M Call (VA N)) C4 sue f allej vith av val e o.t en otter Oi%
RL it-! M/',1) SLE 1-1M ',1) if it 14 bramee$ f ail.re O 4.1-26
! 'l %_ J TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 13 of 1$ litot free if stets Ihrte f#11% SMort is Event Analisit Srstees Craracter Fraction ice Event aN %:tes bstees une sectico involied Cesigator me Success Critetta Availe111tr 7/ l$ $# dratt, valve f ece $ Sn to na. tu le.N tt civuj inthally tt pas Mses tiA Phi A.t:44ticallr e All
?,5 SV-llCA/CS) e 1 train of E%3 to rhltCA CE) Cl: set initiallr 7,'. TV-2 Pnall! ?# SV-l . 4 brantee! Iallee 'B 19 Tuttire te efit ccoltr9 TEA ibi Af ter T & CD 6xcess IIS 76-1100 ) Af ter T sxcess, CO f allwre 'iC ibl . 4 brante+3 f allste 70 9 RsVs All $$vs O!s, 6M TTis wst c!cse w;n (15)
I65 recal of trattal des 4%1412 TWs KE7s sust star closeJ for C4 bNrs TCA TC-1 e 'll
,m Stena to EF4 pm turttre fres offecte: stan
( ) 9evrater mat also te is>lates N. _,/ TCS TC-2 a All ICC IC-1(%) ist TC-20.0 a 14 e M iMt att TCF TC C(9/CE914 e 148 stral Af ter loss of A'A :nitiattN eW event, f all close$ tal, ths never (sen, asi rGs clcu i testin 5) fcr C4 trf TCO TC-3 Af ter To f ail.re TC6 iC-4 e All i Af ter T+ f allste 4N stene to EFd emo Wrttre effectes sine 9ecentor met also de tulate1 af ter %it 70i TC-5 e all TC! TC-14 braatevi f ailwre k ( !
\m/
4.1-27
TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) 9eet 14 of 15 7.ent tree irstas ihree iflit 5Eort T:s E, tit kaltsis Systees &aracter Fraction im Event at kles $ > stas uw Section involve] Cestrator une Success Crtterla A'ill2 811tf Td 13 fl (terator throttles fl flow tefcre actrg csen MV/FSys with ater T4 T4-1 Throttle ustrg &V217- e All Tri T+1(2) is eet & f atisin:t LM) ES T&2 Throttle ust 4 W19, e All N 168, W 16C,&N M Ml(0. T4 T+;(6) e 1 trato of X Tr4 T+ 19) B >>e (cettw to run, Kwr to A-train PsMiss Icst (8 f rattt36 of time ccerator throttles tefort 9 f allee) T{ Tn-14 branteej f athre TrE TR ) brantees 5xcess 7 *
.4tn Stau $teaa gevrate.r tutes teenin intact: e 47e rN'd
- 31. I2-1 Dsta 1 e steaait e t, red 79 *R-2 Cnrits a wLa LEA TRC TF-1 4 barartet f ail /e ii 5 iw tiw All twrttre stc, valves er 5tco n1 all t-rtine ccattel ,alies Qtt a clese n f.eaaN
='ai e T*A II l e All I'r, II-li'.O e N) X-A i'C Ti-;s 14 Af ter lii, tr<!vM likelthco3 Ili) trat RT ts f aile$
T*l} Ti-14 bratteef Iaihre iTE TT-4 4 barrtees 5xcess JA1 Electrical vital amtvent tuses k!A aN 4i054) CtstriMion sti as1 f3=,t) k#. 'v A-1 63ren ettfer X c3 Z E3 trath avallsle W W1e brneteed f atlee AA 't. 1 itsen estrer N or AC ES train avattele
'48 it-1 4 brews f ative IC E3 Elect. G vclt m: tor control center IC-CW Ctstr atutten 101. 1C-1 108 1C-1 4 af tr las of X cr air, tm co-t4inty air c<erates 41,es vill vw w41 (with all snort siste=5 4<allelek 5:ht f rattt>M O
4.1-28
,m
( ) LJ TABLE 4.1-1 (continued) Nt 15 of 15
'a2cer Mtes (1) Success a toth suctica valres cceft.
(2) Ne3 celt if svrge valves are ces. O) Aske3 af ter f is asAe2, tot ret v ene ACFs are stcsc+3 or M f aites. (4) thes a4Nal ic43er. (i) W lA tottles reese$ af ter 2 tars. (6) Onlr twe t14 FW avaticie.
- 0) All crecitne valves at titter or tre t ) flce solittig valves.
(3) f-strairer, 415) bcth valves (9) Incl >3es M heat entr4Ws 4N CH CIC$ej valves. (14) Ns 9 ta.rs. (11) Fi-2 f ailsre a core suge (12, Ns 444 a:Ntes. (12) Fallste a n sws trtsets for AI. (14) Af ter SLQ. (15) Ltseteet DAlation of IENS in T- at of fins in CD. (16) Asaec t.) f all for certain for nce. (17) Vse3 in 52 tree E C. i (!$) N!e 11:1t, us+3 to ra.e reye Nst y in cae sgr vees ta creck sntcers till Nallr cely 49ej ci a failure of R.E. f an (Mitng C9) ~6 asies af ts. C4 C1) M te;tctich valves in this cm. fm C f+tue cf IW inws ava114:le for recair is asu.e3 u cn!r ir<luse ( ) to start in tre fint :4 tcurs CeceMs en It p:ver crir, if . (f 10 is /4vailable CT is f alle31 1 KTC). CD Ei ashes af ter EA. CA) itart LMlW3 in (F-1. C5) Of fitte Nwr avalla:llitr (m*.ere3 in (P. CO In:echon .al es not LNinj G7) T- f all:vs T* aN If T* fails CO TC wes tet.een T- 4 o (e. QD Cen't ne+2 9 f ailes case, tecue N-V14A vWt sen s.) tr.i, is see to te #4.alla:!e. CU ItM iTI43es Wltal bJses.
- 01) Cc+sn't satter if R is lat c+ rot, treat as AC Icis.
G2; Tre air ejetur a:ntters r:n't v)rk vitt/At ofIsite pcver elastratiN at twsttast cl* to urats ytr,9 on. (U) M failJre alTt te a dire (t C."Te3JefXe of tre stenaltre treak. G4i (An't Cl%e tio:k valve tut ran tr.rottle Ve W. 14t@i7 Elh [^'g () 4.1-29
O TABLE 4.1-2. GENERAL TRANSIENT TOP EVENT DEFINITIONS AND CONDITIONAL SPLIT FRACTIONS ti t ttt t m tu ts ti ttt t tun uuntut tuntuu tt utu ut t tuntunts tutuu tutsut ttt u ttt t tt tutu tutuu ttt t sut tis u t ta tun tunutuu t utu tt tun u ts u ts u ttut s titut ttt t ttitutt sti tt ttt t t tt*** u ut tt t ts a t tist it tu t s titt t t t tt tt tt tsutut ts u ts t ts uit TV ESTS: Cat!TI(vii RIT PXT!>ci: TOP RIT tiEA. VvE 1 T@ EOT EST FUCTICM C'XIIIM 6T COUA is/Vci!ENT 50 506 RT F Ri FIXTM TR Pil) TC TC6 T*F RP FfXiM C0tMT FW TK P(2) T- TJ TC F TT TJSIT TFIPin ti TTC si F 50 SECX#Y STUe FILIET(4) TH T4 iC F T+ W EICE55!4 M1% FEENTEMS) TH T4 T+F TC TU?!M'E SECX4V STEM SilIEF(6) TH T4 TT F 4- SJTICIST M 4 FEtuTE47) P0 K4 TH $ EF- SUFFICIST E'EEY. FEIMTEk81 F9 FM TH 8 EF
- NO EXCE3514 Ef4EMY FEEMiEh9) W ht TH B TH T4CTTLE fl FLM14) W 69 FT F M F N PJV (f96(!!) W P/J TH F M F FV Ft.S WE%(12) W P4 TW F F9 F W F W FIMICA di FA!u'E Fk.fi FIM13) W P4 ET+FM F R0 K5V/PivS CLOSE(14) W b1 EF* F M F W F M 69AT% ElitellMS P!*-Fl(4t!5) W RJ EF- F N F SE Ird.GA*E Mic Co1N d'EM16) W E% EF- F N F FV F Fi FECWf(17) W PE to F N F W Evii A.AILlit.I(13) W Pra 53 F M F N F 49 h!6H Fiia5E NECTi> PM U19) W Pd TC F 4A HIM UESME NECTIM FWs A 5 B(M) W WJ T+F N FECM Cami PM ilti N121) W P.y TT F
*1 M'M FiiMi NECil A VALVES (22) RC RCC NF F1 CXtDM TO Fit (23) Ed h6 T- F LF- F W E4 50 F 4A +6 EF- F N F 49 F $$ 41 EF+FN F49F 4A 44 50 F W F 49 F N N 4AF N INC TC F 4A 5 N I?O TC F 4 A F H! Plt 4A F H1 hlA 49 F HI HIE EF+ F FV F ml HIE EF- F FN F hl Hlf 50 F W F O
4.1-30
5 TABLE 4.1-3. GENERAL TRANSIENT B0UNDARY CONDITIONS RA W s 1 3 6 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 12 31 33 35 . 37 19 2 4 6 8 16 12 14 16 18 N 22 24 25 28 36 32 34 ;4 25 , SF \$35= 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 916111213141516171819 26 2122 23 24 25 26 2128 23 34 3132 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 '
- i RTET . .. . . . .
i . RK# . . . . , . . . ... . . . . ... .... TTATT . B B ,. B B BBBBBB BBBBBBBB. TTETT . . . . . SGMO . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . WW+ . .C
. C CC . . N . C N N N N C.C C , NNCNN TCATC .. ..... .. ... . . . . . . .. . . ..... . ....
WW- 00.00000 0000. . 0 0 0 . 0'0 0000000000.00000 EFCEF- HHD0HH E: E ,H NEHEN EFFEEE,EHH0EEEFE tFiGs .. .... . . . .. . . .. . . . . ...... T4TN FF. FFFF . .FF . F.F . FFFF . .FFFFFFFFFF N00 FF T F FFF .F FF F F F F F.F F FFF FFFFF Nfy . . . Rm USC , L ..L F L FLLLLF. . . LLLLL sta .. ..... BB. . .B . .BBBB B . B ... . B B B B B SEAIE DD DDDDD BED 000 0 ECDE B0000000000 . FEDF2 . Evu . . Woe 1 .J .....J. . . .JJCJJJJJJJJJ..JJ.JJCJJJJ ! WWA KK .KKKKBAlMll K IK0BB111IK lillKK!!IllK . 1WilWJ E EE . ......EE. . E.EEE....EE.EEEEEE l H:FH1 IG ACCCCAACAAAA6666ACC66 A60666A ;
$Mio . . .
TC6TC .. ..... .. .. . . . .... .. . . . .. . . . . .... WJT- 00 00000 0000 000 00.0000000000 000$ 0 TTCTT . T4TH 6 6666 6664666 00066600 6060006 ' T4TH 6 6666 6666666 00066600 6060006 T4TH 6. . . 6666 6666666 00066600.G060006 K#0 FF F F FFF F F F- F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF ' K#0 FF FF FFF F FF F. FFFFFF,FFF FFFFF ' PWfy . . . PM . . . . PM I , . . RG
' N . . . . . . . r Psv . . . .
) j tm rsy , I
- m ' ' ' '
- N6FV l
W . . . . WJW i y * *
- WK
, m . id(W .. ,.. .. . . . . 49fA i1 1I11I . ...... .. .. . . . .. .... ... ; i II1I IIII1II1!!Ii1I1111IIIII 49fA !! 11III.1III 49fA i1 .I1111 IIII IIIIIIIIIIIi 111111II111 ' IG F FF Ii!IIIi1II1I11II11IIIII FF FFF,. FF 16 64 F FFFFFF 6 . . 66 .6 666 66.666666 12!hJ H HH. ..HH. .k. HHH . .HH .HHHHHH 8 ) N14!6 6. .. 66C666646666. .66 6.. . .6666.4666. .66C6666 I hl4M1A .6666. 66666. kibi 466666666666666666666 } 4 6666666 i i HIEH1 k!D1 666666666666666666666 6.6 6 6 6 6 6 ' 466666666666666666666.6666666 i
, i v :
i } + i 4.1-31
O TABLE 4.1-4. SPLIT FRACTION TRANSLATION TABLE Sheet 1 of 5 SSS= 1 3 5 i 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 ?! 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 le 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 SF-TE BAABA EAEEA BEABB EEEEB EEGB EWasv EWBBW EWCEV EVDBW CAACA CABCA CACCA CE AC B CEBCB CECCB CEDCB CEECB .. .... ... . . . .. . .. ..... .... CCACD BB BBBB BBB B B D 8BBBBBBBBBBBBBBB CDBCD . CECCE EE EEEE FFE E F 0 FFFFEFEFEEEFFFFF CEDCE CEECE .. .... ... . . CEGCE EE EEEE FFE E F 0 FFFFEFEFEEEFFFFF CDF Q . . . . . .. .. .. . .. . ....... C FACF D DB BBBB BD BB DDDDBB B DDDDDDD CFC(F CFDCF CF ACP . CSACS B BBBBBBBBBBJJJEJJJBBBJJ BJBJJJB CSCC3 J . .
. .JJCJJJJDJJJJ .JJ JJCJJJJ CSGC3 .
J.JJJJ. .J JJJKJJJ.JJJJ .JJJJJ. CSECS F FFFFFFFFFFJJJ JJJFFFJJ FJFJJJF CEDCS J .J. . JJDJJJJ JJJJ..JJ JJDJJJJ CIACS J JJJJ J JJJ JJJ JJJJ JJJJJ CSJC5 .. . CI ACI BB B BDDB B B BDBDB C16C1 . DD. . . CICC1 GGGG CIDC1 G GG GG CIEC1 C1FC1 C1GC1 GG G GGG GG GGGG GAC2 6B BDDB B B GEC2 B BDBDB GCC2
.DD. .
EE E EEEE E E EEEEE C2002 GEC 2 GFC2 6G BB G 655. GG GGGGF B BCCB E B BCBCB C2CC3 . .. . . . CMH CM CH K KKBBK KkKBFHHKJJJBKBFJ KFJJJJJ EmDCH DHEC+t N A KHKKKCNNkJNNHNJJJJ# ANN NNKJNJJ N v. J J N K k. N K N H H A J J J K H J N J >NJJJJk DTADT C C CCCCCCCCC CC CCCCCC DTCDT O 4.1-32
g i i V TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) Sheet 2 of 5
$55= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 29 30 32 34 36 33 SS-TE EFAEF+
EFBEF+ . EFFEF+ ...... ... . ..... ...... . ....-. . EFCEF- HHDDHH EEE H NEHEN EFFEEE EHHDEEEFE EFDEF-EFEEF- . EFFEF .. .. .... . ............ . ...-.... EFGEF- MM MM GJJJ M KJMJKGII11JJ JMMGKKJlK EFMEF-EFIEF-EFJEF-EFkEF-EFLEF-EFr*EF-eft.EF-FX4#X F1ESX FICFI .... . .... .. . . .... H!AHIA GGGG G GGGG GGGG GGGGG HIEHIA .GGGG..G....GGGG.GGGG .GGGGG. HIChlB G GGC6GGGGGG6G GG GGC6GGG HIDHIB G....GGDGGGGGGGGG..GG GGDGGGG HIEH1 GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG6 GGGGGGG Os HIFHI ACCCCAACAAAAGGGGACCGG AGCGGGA H MHI HIJHI 5555G5G55655555555555555555'S55555GG5555 G666GGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGAGGGGG HLAHL . D . ..D . . .00D0 000D..DD .DDDDDD HLEA HLCHL E E EEE EEEEECC CCCEEEEC EEECCCE HLE4 .
. ... CCCCCCC CCCC..CC.CCCCCCC HLFHL hFAhFA KK C .C.CCC. .
CCC.CCC CCCCC.C.CCC . bFSHFA KKKKBA1M1I KIKDBB11IIK11!IKKIll1IK hFDHFA EL EEE FAIM!!AL1LFFFHI11LIIIIELIIIIIL hf EhF A HFFHFA HPIHF A 4WA HiLhFA .. ..... .... ....................... HF6HFA !! IIIII.IIII IIIIIIIIIIIIII1IIIIIIII HPFuPA .I1..I11.Ii111I.I.I!!IIIII11111IIM!!!!I HFhhPA IIIIII1IIi11IIIIIIIII!IMIHIII!!!IIIIIII HPO#B J J JJCJJJJJJJJJ JJ JJCJJJJ HPJHF B . . . ...... ........ ...... .... HF NHF A K1 KKK BB11II K KBB!!!IIKi!!!KKMKIIII IDAID ICelD IDCID .. .. . ... . . . . .. INAINJ E EE EE E EEE EE EEEEEE INEINJ . .. .. . ... . . . ... INBINJ F FF FF F FFF FF FFFFFF INFINJ - INCINJ 3 GG GG G GGG GG GGGGGG INGINJ . .. . . INDINJ H HH HH H HHH HH HHHHHH INHINJ INilNJ . LFALP B BBBeBBBBBBCCCCCCCBBBCC BCBCCCB
% ./
4.1-33
TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) Sheet 3 of 5
$$5= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 10 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 SI-TE LFELP CCCCCCCC CCC LMLP . . . ........ . .. .- &lP C .C....CCDCCCCCCCCC..CC CCDCCCC LPELP E CECCCC CECCCCCCCECCCC CCCCCE LTALT LTBLT LTCt' . . .. . .. . .. . . .
MAMF+ C C CC N CNNNNCC C NNCNN MFEMF+ MFCMF+ MFCnF+ MF3.MF+ YFFMF+ .. . . . , ... ..- . . .. ........ . MFGMF- 00 00000 0000 000 00 0000000000 00000 Yfe%- MFIrf- .. .. . . . . ... . .. .. . . .. . ... PfJMF- 00 00000 0000 000 00 0000000000 00000 M rf-MFRrf-MFLMF-MFrMF. FF%F- .. . . ... PAMR BB B BBBB B B BBBBB MFEmR PACPI< . . . ... .. . . . .... PC#0 FF F F FFF F FF F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF FOC50 FF F F FFF F FF F FFFFFF FFF FFFFF F0EPO FifF 0 FVMV PVEfv FV(PV FvDFv FunFJ . . . . .. . ..... FCMC 66 GGGGG G G G GG6GGGG GG FCEAC HH HHHHH H H H HHHHHHH HH FC(AC . . . . .. .. .. M DRC J J D J DJJJJD JJJJJ FCJRC FCEAC r K E r EKrrKE kAKKA FOFC . FCIRC L L F L FLLLLF LLLLL MLFC . . RCr/C M M GM GMMMMG MMMMM MMRC . MHRC N N H N HNNNNH NNNNN Mt#C . . . ... , . FCIFC 0 0 1 0 100001 00000 RC(AC RCFRC . . .. ..... . . . . ......... . . .. .. . AEM E DDDDDDDDDCDDDDDDDDDDDDDGD DDDDDDDDDDDDD FEEAE . .. . .... . . . . . . . ..... . FECFE DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDHD DDDDDDDDDDDDD E EC+ E FEECE . .. . . . .. . . . REGAE DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD DDDDD SEGAE Fik;E . . . . . FF4 P BC E B B C E. CC CBC B CCCC CCCCCCCCCC H EAP 4.1-34
TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) Sheet 4 of 5
$$$= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 33 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38 SF-TE FMRP , ,
RPORP RTART RTEAT . RTCRT RVARV T 55 55 5 CC C55 555555555C5555555B RVBRV . RVCRV , RVDRV RVERV RvFRV RVGRV RYHRV RVIRV , RVJRV , Rv> RV R'#AV .. ... . . $... SAA5A BB BBB B B BBBB
!KSA BB BBB B B BBBB iAESA . .. .. ..
9 SEAiB SEE!B iiC58 iEDiB GG E E E E EEEE EEEE EEEE EEEE G C A AEF
.E.EE CfCEE .BB SEE5B . ....
1E553 E EEEE SEGiB E EEEE ICAID SMSD SCC?O , 50010 .. ..... .. ... . .... ... ....... SEA!E DD DDDDD BED 000 D EDDE B000000D000 SEBSE SEC11 . . . ... . . ...
$!ASI C C C ,CCCC CCCCC $1BSI C C C CCCC CCCCC SIC 3! ... . .. ...... . .....
ftASL BBB BB BB BFFBBB B ?8BFB SLE5L itCSL < SLDSL l SLEi.L SLFSL SVASV
$VBSV I SVC$v SVDsV SVEiv SVF5V ... ..... .... ... .. ...............
TEATB CCC CCCCC CCCC CCC CC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC i l TEBTB CCC CCCCC CCCC CCC CC CCCCCCCCCCCCCCC l 1 4.1-35 l
r i TABLE 4.1-4 (continued) , Sheet 5 of 5
$55= 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 3) 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32 34 36 33 j l
TCATC . .. .. .. ......... ... ..... TCETC I II III I1 IIB 111!!I IIBIIII11 TCCTC i TCDTC ' TCETC T(FTC l TCGTC .. . .. ,. ......... ....... .. TChTC I II III II !!HII!!II IIHIi11II TCITC .. .... .. . . . ... .... . . ... THATH FF FFFF ..FF .F.F. . FFFF. .FFFFFFFFFF TH5TH G GGGG GGGGGGG DDD5GGDD GDGDDDG TMCTH ThDTH ibETH , TRATR TF5TR . . TTATT B B B B BBBBBB BBBBBBBB TTETT . TTCTT TTDTT TTETT O l 1 O 4.1-36 i
4
/m 4 V)
TABLE 4.1-5. SPLIT FRACTION TRANSLATION RULES FILE Shee_t_1 of __8 FRONTLINE M STEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO COND4T10NAL ' OESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFtlT FRACTIONS I STATES I Top Event CD,CE----- - - ------ -------------------------------------------- COS CDA COB CAA I I CDA CEC cdx t t
... ... ___ .._ i .._ ___
I 0 0 00 0 1 1,4,5,10,11,151 A C i l 16,10,00-23 1 1 0 00 0 1 2,3,6,7,8,14r I B E i 17,30,32-34 1 1 0 00 1 1 3,9,23 i B E 1 1 10 0 1 37 i B F 1 0 1 1 0 1 I B F 0 1 10 0 NONE I A C 0 0 1 1 0 1 NONF i A C 1 1 10 1 1 12,13,19,24,271 B F 1 29,31,35,39 1 1 0 1 1 1 ! i B F 0 1 21 0 ! NONE I B F 0 1 21 1 1 NONE 1 B F 1 1 21 0 i N0NE ! B F 1 1 21 1 : 25,26,36,38 ! B F 0 0 00 1 1 21,23 1 A 0 l i FR0NTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPP0RT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL
! CESCRIF TION SYSTEM i 1 SPLIT FRACTIONS sV i STATES !
T o o E v e n t C F --- - --- ----- -- -- - -- - - -- - --- - - -- - - - - - ---- ---- - =- ----------.- CFA CFB CFC RRA RRB ! ! CFA cfx crx 1 1
--- ... ... ... ... I ___
I 0 0 00 0 00 1 1,3-5,G-10, 1 A i 15-17,20,23, I I S0,32 ! 0 0 00 0 11 1 11,18,21,22,281 B 0 0 00 1 10 I " l B 1 0 10 1 10 i 12,13,29,31 1 B 1 0 10 0 11 ! " l B 0 6 1 1 1 10 t " l B 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 I l B 0 1 10 1 10 I
! B 0 1 10 0 11 I I B 1 0 10 0 o0 I 7,14, I 4 0 1 10 0 00 l l B 0 0 1 1 0 00 I 1 B 0 1 21 0 11 1 24,27,37 1 0 1 0 21 0 11 l "
l 0 1 1 20 0 11 I l D 0 1 21 1 10 1 i D 1 0 21 1 10 I l 0 1 1 20 1 10 1 I D 1 1 20 1 21 1 I O O 1 21 1 21 1 I O 1 0 21 1 21 I I o 1 1 31 1 21 1 2,3,19,25,26 I D I 33-36,33,33 I
..... ...---== = ==......_______________. ___ ...__,_______,,,,,,,,, __,,_,,
o 4.1-37 -
TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) Sheet 2 of 8 l i FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT i SUFFORT l CHANGE 3 TO C0N0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION l SYSTEM i SPLIT FFACT10NS I STATES I Top Event CS------------------------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - CSA CSB I I css CSE CSC CiO CSG CSK
- i ___ .__ ___ ___ .._ ___
0 0 1 1,2,4-9.32 i A E C D G K 1 0 1 10,12-15,18,281 8 F C D J J l 29,35 1 0 1 1 3,11,16,17,19,1 B F J J G K I 27,33,39 i 20-22,30,31, 1 J J J J J J j 1 1 24-26,34, l I j i 36-33 I ( 1 1 1 23 1 E E D 0 K K l i 1 FRONTLINE SYSTEM !!1 PACT I SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEM ! SFLIT FRACTION 5 l l STATES i TopEventC:-------------------------------------------------------------------- CIA CIB GA GB l ! CIA C1C C1F C2A (2F C2C C3A cix l 1
... ___ ___ .__ g ;__. ... ... .__ -._ -.. ___
0 00 - - t 1-11,14-18, i A C F A F C A 1 20-23,23,30, t
! 32-?4 1 1 1a 1 0 1 12,13,29,31,37: B C G B G E B 0 1 1 0 1 1 27,39 l & G F B F E 8 1 10 1 GR 1 24,35,19 i B G G B G E B 0 1 1 1 OR 1 I i 1 21 1 25,26,36,33 10 G G D G E C NOTE: In those support systera states that have some inpac t vectors with GA f a t ture and sorue with GB f ailure, a conservative assureot ton has t.een rance( suarant eed failure was used1for On-1(CA) and Cn-1(CB).
i i ! FRC4TLINE SYSTEM IMF ACT I SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CONDIT!0NAL DESCRIPTION i SYSTEM i iPLIT FRACTIONS I STATES I Top Event DH-------------------------------------------------------------------- i OHA Ch5 EA EB 1 1 DHA OHO OHE
- ; .._ ... ___ j 0 0 0 0 1 1,2,4-9,32 1 A 0 E l 1 0 0 0 1 3,10-14,28,29 i B D C {
1 0 1 0 1 15 l A D E 0 1 0 0 1 16-19,27,33,351 B C E 1 1 0 0 : 20-22,24-26, I C C C I
- 30,31,34,8 i 1 1 1 1 1 23 I A 0 E
.... ..____........._____....________..____....____ ___________________________. j i ! I FRONTLINE 5YSTEM IMPACT : SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL !
CE5CRIPT!0N ! SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACTIONS l STATES I Top Event OT-------------------------------------------------------------------- OTV l l DTA 0 : 1-6,6-13,15-18: A
- 23,29,32,33 1 1 l 7,14,19-27,20,t C I 31,34-39 i 4.1-3E
O) \ v TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued)
.._ __S.h.e.e.t..3._o.f. 8 I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT 1 ClPPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESC RIPT10t4 i SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS l STATES I Top Event EF- - =------ =- - ===------------- ------------ ==------
EPA EFB EVA EVB 2kR 1 EFC EFG ep< evx I 1 sb
; i ._ _..
0 00 0 00 0 i 1,2,7-10,15,17 C G 10,14.23,30 1 1 10 0 90 0 ! NONE I E J 0 1 1 0 00 0 i I E J 0 00 1 10 0 i 4,7,8,16,20,331 H M 0 00 0 1 1 0 1 I H H 0 00 0 00 1 1 6,5,34 i D G 1 21 0 00 0 i NONE i F 1 1 10 1 10 0 1 11-13,21,28,29: E J 0 11 1 10 0 t l E J 1 10 0 1 1 0 i 1 E J 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 t i E J 1 10 0 00 1 1 18,22 1 N K 0 1 1 0 00 1 I l N K rs 1 21 1 10 0 i NONE i F ! ( 1 10 1 10 1 i 19,28,31,37 I E J \s 0 1 1 1 10 1 :
- I E J 1 10 0 1 1 1 I 1 E J 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 I i E J 1 10 1 21 0 ! 24,27 I F !.
0 1 1 1 21 0 i " l F 1 1 10 1 21 1 1 35,36,39 1 E K 0 1 1 1 21 1 1 i E K 1 01 0 1 1 0 i NONE I F ! 1 21 1 10 0 1 NONE i F I 1 21 1 10 1 1 33 i F I 1 21 0 1 1 1 1 NONE I F i 1 21 1 21 0 N0NE I F ! 1 21 1 21 1 1 25,26 i F I 0 00 1 10 1 ! 3,3' ' H N 0 00 0 1 1 1- l l H M 0 00 1 21 0 I t F ! 0 00 1 21 1 i l F I I I FR0NTLINE SriTEM IMFACT I $UFFORT l CHAfYdi TO CON 0!TIONAL CESCRIPTION $YSTEM t $PLIT FRACTION $ 1 iTATES Top Event HI-------------------------------------------------------------------- HIA HIB [ t HIA HIS HIC HID HIF. HIF l
... ___ g 0 0 1 1-10,32 i A B C D E F 1 0 1 12-15,18,28,291 G G C D G C i
i I 35 1 0 1 : 11.16,17,19-221 A B G G G A I 27,33,33 i 1 1 : 23-26,20,31, i G G G G G G 34.36 33 1 (m) v 4,1-39 i
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued)
_-_-_----.--------- ------------------------------------------~~-----
Sheet 4 of 8 l t FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUFPORT I CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS i STATES l Top Event. HL------------------------------------------------ MLA HLB HL1 EA EB i ! HLA HLB H' E HL F hl< l 1 l 1 0 1/0 0 1 1-6,8-13, 1 A - - - 1 15,16,10,33 1 1 0 0 t 7,14,17,19-22,1 0 - - - l 24-32,34,35,81 1 1 1 : 23 1 A - - - 0 00 - 0 0 1 1,2,4-9,11,32 1 - B E F 1 10 - 0 0 l 3,10,12-14,28,t - E E C 1 29,32 i 1 10 - 1 0 1 15 i - B E F 0 1 1 - 0 0 1 16-19,27,33,351 - E C F 1 21 - 0 0 1 20-22,24-26, l - C C C 30,31,34.8 i 1 21 1 1 : 23 1 - B E F i FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT l SUFFORT I CHANGES TO CON 0lT10NAL CEICRIPTION : SYSTEtt : $ FLIT FR4CT10N5
- STATES :
Top Events HPA, rFE------------------------------------------------------------- HFA HF8 HPC i l HF A HFC HPO HPG HFH 0 0 0 l 1,4,5 i A C D G I 1 0 0 1 10 i B C F I I 0 1 0 l 2,6-3,32 1 K C E I 1 0 1 1 1 3,17,19,27,33,1 k J L 1 1 33 l 1 0 1 20-22 : B J F I 1 1 1 0 l 12-15,13,23,291 1 C 1 1 1
; 35 1 0 0 1 11,16 t A J A G 1 1 1 1 23-25,30,31,341 ! J I I !
56-38 1 1 1 1 : 26 : I J ! ! H
! I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT l SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION : SYSTEtt i $PLIT F6 ACTIONS
- STATES !
Tcp Event INJ------------------------------------------------------------------- INJ ; I INA INB INC INO 0 1,2,4,7-17,20,1 A B C D i 21.23,27-30, i I 33 : 1 : 3,5,6,18,19,22: E F G H I t 24-26,31,32, I l l 34-33 1 O 4.1-40
t'n\ \ ) TABLE 4.1-5 (Continued) Sh t5 f8 _._...._.._.......______..._...______........_....................___e__e___.o_... I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS 1 STATES I Top Event LP-------------------------------------------------------------------- LPA LPB l i LPA LPD LPE
~~~ --- I --- --- ---
1 0 0 1 1,2,4-9,32 i A D E 1 0 1 12-15,18,23,291 0 0 C 1 35 1 0 1 ! 3,11,16,17,19,1 B C E I 27,33,39 1 1 1 1 20-26,30,31, t C C C I 34,36-33 I
._ ...._...._..... .___ ___.=_ _
l i FRONTLINE SYSTEN IMPACT i SUPPORT 1 CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION SYSTEM 1 SPLIT FRACTIONS I STATES 1 Top Events MF+,MF- --..-==- =--- ..-------- ------------- --..---------------- MF+ FFT MF- LOP l l MFA MFG MFJ 0 0 - - 1 1-9,10,11,14, 1 A - - 1 15,17,20,21, I t 30,32-34 1 0 1
- - 1 18,21,22 i A - -
1 0 - - i 9.12,13.16,23,I C - - N 1 26,28,29,31, t 35,8 1 y- - - l 19,24-25,27 i N - - 1 1 0 - l 1,2,4,7,10,15,i - G J l 20,34 1 1
- i 3,5,6,8,9, 1 - 0 0 1 11-14,16-19, 1 I 21-33,35,8 1 1 1 1 0 Q Q 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUFFORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS t STATES 1 Top Event MR- =-- ------- ------ ----------------------------------------
fM i i NRA O I 1-11,14-18, 1 A I 20-23,28,30, 1 i 32-34 i 1 112,13,19,24-27,1 B i 29,31,35-39 i
- ! I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL ;
CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTICNS i STATES I l Top Event RC----------------------------------------------- ----------------- RC l I RCD RCE RCF RCG RC H RCI 0 11-6,8-13,15-13,1 0 E F G H I I 20-23,23-34 1 1 :7,14.19,24-27, 1 J K L M N 0 1 I 24-27.35-39 t
=______ ......_
l
...._________ ....__.._____.. ..._______ ........______.....- l s I 1
i 1 1 1 l l 4,1-41
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) Sheet 6 of 8 I ! FRONTL!t4E SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION i SYSTEM i $PLIT FRACTIONS l STATES i Tcp Event P0-------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 I Pol PDA LDA 1 1 P0A P0C
--- --_ ___ g --- ---
0 0 0 1-3,5-8,14,15,1 A C 1 17,18,20,22, !
; 30,33-35 1 1 0 0 : 4,9,10,12,13, ! F F
- 16,19,23,27, !
! 32 l 0 1 o i 26 1 F F 1 1 0 11,21,24,0$.
i 28,29,31,B 1 i ! F F 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL DESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACT[0NS i STATE 5 t T:p EventRP-------------------------------------------------------------------- RP LOP OP t i RFA
--- --- --- l l ---
0 - 0 1 1,4,7,9-12,15,1 A i 16,00,21 : 1 0 2,5,6,18, ! B 1 22-25,27-29, i 33-35 B : 1 - 1 1 3,8,13,14,17, i C 1 19,26,30-32 1 1 - I B i ! 1 1 FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT I SUFFORT CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL CEiCRIPT]QN 1 SYSTEM l SPLIT FRACTIONS l STATES 1 Tcp Ev+nt SE--------- ---------------------------------------------------------- SEA SEB kP : ! ?EA se< 1 I t --- 0 00 0 1,4,7,9,10.15,1 A I 16.00 t 1 10 0 1 NONE t B 0 1 1 0 : NONE I B 1 21 0 1 5,6,11,12,21 1 C 0 00 1 1 S,14.17,10 1 0 1 10 1 i NONE : C 0 1 1 1 i NONE : C 1 21 1 ! 2,3,5,6,13,18,1 0
- 19,20-29, ;
; 31-35.8 I O
4.1-42
d R U/ TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) Sheet 7 of 8 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT ! SUPPORT i CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL i STATES I
- = = = - = = = - ==------ == --------
Tcp Event S!-- ----------------== ==
$1 1 I SIA SIB ... i 0 1 1-6,6-13,15, 1 A B 1 16,18,20-22, 1 I 29-34 1 1 1 7,14,17,19, I C C i 23-28,35,8 i . . . . --- ......_________ ....=--
I I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACTIONS I STATES i Top Event FL-- - =- ==-- ------------------------------ -- =------------------ SA 16A SB 168 i i SLA sia slb I I ___ ... ... ___ i ; ... 0 00 0 00 1 1,3-10,14-17, 1 A I 20,23,30,32-34 1 10 0 00 1 12,13,18,22 1 8 0 1 1 0 00 I l B 0 06 1 10 1 11,21,27,23, I B 0 00 0 1 1 1 31,35 i B 1 10 1 10 1 2,19,24,25,29.1 B ,C' 0 1 1 1 10 i B i B ! 1 10 0 1 1 i i B
\-
- 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 I B 1 21 0 00 i NONE I F 0 00 1 21 i NONE I F 1 21 1 10 1 NONE I F 1 21 0 1 1 1 i F 1 10 1 21 i NONE 1 F 0 11 1 21 i 1 F 1 21 1 21 1 26 1 F 1 I ,
FRvNTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT I CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL i CEICRIPTION i SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTIONS l i STATES I j Top Event SA,SB--= ---- - -------------------------------------------------- < SA $8 EA EB i 1 SAA SAC SBA SBB SEC $80
--- --- --- --- t I --- --- --- --- --- ---
0 0 0 0 1 1-2,4-9,32 i A C A B C 0 1 0 0 0 1 3,10-14,28,29 ! B B A F C G 1 v 1 0 1 15 i B C A B C D 0 1 0 0 1 16-19,27,33,35! A C E E E E , 1 1 0 0 1 20-22.24-26, i B B E E E E !
! 30,31,34,8 1 1 1 1 1 1 23 i B C E B C D
() V 4.1-43
O TABLE 4.1-5 (continued) Sheet 8 of 8 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT 1 SUFPORT 1 CHANGES TO CONDITIONAL CESCRIPTION I SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTION 3 i STATES I Top Event TC-------------------------------------------------------------------- TC2 I I TCO TCH 0 1 1,2,4,7-10, I B H I 14-17,20,30 I l 33,34 I t i 3,5,6,11-13, I I I i 18,19,21-29. I I 31,32,35,0 1 .------------------------------------------------_--_------~~---------------~~~- 1 I FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMFACT I SUFPORT l CHANGES TO CON 0!TIONAL DESCRIPTION 1 SYSTEM i SFLIT FRACT10NS I STATES I Top Event TH-------------------------------------------------------------------- TH1 THA THB LOP EA EB i i THA THB thx I I
... --. --. ___ --- ---g g .-- -.-
0 00 - 0 0 1 1,2,4-11.32 l B 1 10 - 0 01 3,12-14,16-21,1 - G t 27-29,33,35 1 0 1 1 - 0 0 l I - C 1 10 - 1 0 1 15 1 - B 1 21 - 0 0 1 22,24-26,20, 1 - 0 I 31, 34.8 i 1 21 - 1 1 1 23 1 - B 0 - -- 0 - - 1 ;,2,4,5,7, 1 A -
! 9-12,15,16, I i 18,20-23,34,B1 1
0 -
- 1 3,6,3,13,14, 1 F -
1 17,19,24-33,35 0 - -- 1 -
- 1 I A -
1 t -
- 1 A _
i l FRONTLINE SYSTEM IMPACT I SUPPORT l CHANGES TO CONDIT!nNAL DESCRIPTION 1 SYSTEM i SPLIT FRACTION 3 i STATES I Top Event TT-------------------------------------------------------------------- TT I I TTA 1 i --- 0 ! 1-10.12-20,22,1 A I 23,27,30,32-B 1 1 1 11,21.24-26, I B I 20-29,31 1 O 4.1-44
rm S ( ) TABLE 4.1-6. SAFETY FUNCTION SUCCESS CRITERIA Sheet 1 of 3 Inventory Control Injection
- 1. During LOCAs.
2 Large: 0.5 ft -1 LPI. Medium: 0.12-0.5 f t 2-1 HPI and either LPI . Smail: 0.02-0.12 ft 2-1 HPI. , 2 Very Smail: 0.02 ft .7 gp;,
- 2. SCTR - one HPI.
- 3. One PSV or PORY fails to reclose - one HPI.
- 4. HPI cooling - one HPI with 1 PSV.
HPI cooling - two HPIs with no PSV. pl 5. RCP seal failure - one HP!. g
- 6. Inadvertent DHR valve opening (IDHRVO) - one HPI and one LPI.
Recirculation
- 1. Large, medium LOCA, IDHRY0 - one LPI and one DHR heat exchanger.
- 2. All other situations - one HPI and one LPI and one DHR heat exchanger.
Reactivity Control
- 1. Large, medium, small LOCAs - one LPI/one HPI pumping from BWST (large LOCA has assist from voids).
- 2. All others - at least 59 out of 61 control rods insert or one HPI started within 10 minutes of turbine trip, i
(a)> 1 0584G101387PMR 4.1-45 l
TABLE 4.1-6 (continued) Sheet 2 of 3 RCS Heat Removal Insufficient Decay Heat Removal
- 1. Large, medium, small LOCAs, IDHRVO - through the break.
- 2. All others, with RT- (main feedwater at least 87, or one EFW to one steam generator and one MSSV/0TSG or one ADV/0TSG or two T8Vs) or (PORV/PSV opens auto and HPI cooling inventory control).
- 3. All others, without RT - (MFW 8% or one EFW to one steam generator) and (two MSSVs/0TSG or four TBVs/ADV).
Insufficient Decay and Latent Heat Removal All cases - (MFW or one EFW to one steam generator) and (four TBVs/ADVs) or one PORY and PSV.
RCS Pressure Cont
- \SH.7A E
SIGNAL
/
[SD] y Apy3 l
IISHI SH, NSSYS XeePPressureBelow SH.
l 2A NFNPShutoffHead i 1/19/85 2B J
FIGURE 4.1-2. EVENT SEQ flCE DIAG OR GENERALIZED TRANSIENT l
SH.
IA SH.\
IB
/
s too little MFW [M-] ,
MFW (Flow ( 5% will open FORY/PSUT RAMPBACE includes toontichMFW[M+] _ _ will not isolate ICSfailures MANUAL MFW\
CONIROL y (SLRDS )-""
/~~ _ _
C $--" .
(1600PSiG)1 S 4 SIGNAL E
AgH \[EF- , oP EF+],/HPI,\
C99L includes
_ CONIR0L j IX.7.A M - - _I ! a _
EF+ exc CD* will fail I.D.
hi-level MANUALLY 3 \c gygp PitnP hy Water caPPyover if INI'R'PI /->
ctttoff MfN / notalreadyfailedbyMF+'
.ASGS
&op,willendEFWflow SH k eventitally fails both pttnps (seeATP-1210-3) 1/25/85 {* excessive cooldown May restilt in RU failure fran PIS FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 2 of 15) e -_ - -
O O
O O O SH.
2 t
REDUCERCS H0
[IC]
HEAT/ REN. \Exc/
/
\ _ t_
\CD/
ALREADY?
(gigggt1699PSIG)
YES g
7-
? 1699psig SIGNAL
\
YES U [ OpenMU-U217 StartsecondM/UPuMP INCREASE \ StartDCandDRsystans IHP-81 M/UFLOW
/ (assunedtoalvagsoccur)
UProvidecontinuouslytoseals i F
! kH.
) IISH3 4 i 5/24/85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 3 of 15) i
1600psig '~s.YES signal y y HPI SIARIS\
[HP]
+ RUNS i
/
CLOSE
\ j gysI \ [BW-4] BWSI
\ >
m
?
[IH-1] C0 /0/ } AVAILABLE)[BW-2]
AVAILABLE
/ "
asstinesnin. EI refill rate P flowline insttfficient SIARI 3RD \ , /PR_OVIDEi/SH. __ \
normally for2HPIPs $'hgfE/IBW-3 \ /
available fIHPIP h
" PORU/PSYSor SH. P SH.
! IISH4 SH. 50 Sealsis
/SH.\ 5B 5/24/85 5A \5D/ Sttfficient FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 4 of 15)
O O O
O O O
/SH. SH. 'SH. IISH5
\ 4A 4C 4B 2/26/P5
\
m p
REDUCE M/UFLOW
\ /
>4
/' REDUCE sHPIPFLOW
/ o IIH-21 l
4 YES;Ircs)500F,
/WATERTHRU\
t [P0,PU]
\ RELIEFS m
/ s i /,
y 7?)P-SHUI 0FFh FPPpts:0 i N0; FLOWSTOPS t- 'SIOPHPIPs CLOSEYALYs HPIPs( ) ,
RECRC ,
FaH r H. FSUBq
[RC]
! 4 '4 2 /SH.\
l "
- Min-flonornally availablehere
- ( 200F ) [SE-1] tj FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 5 of 15)
- U I NEAL HPI
- 1 2HPIPsifless .-~_ _
- 2/26/85 FIGURE 4.1-2 (Sheet 7 of 15) i
- HXsnotreallyneeded OPENSUMP\pps4x J,
- CB]
- I IRIPPD /
- [MF]\_MPBACX ,
- IISH11 SH. Does lack of MFW change HPIP or PSY or EFW sitecess criteria?
- , t E PORU+FSYs \ >/'OCA L
- [RC] / \_
- o o o
- 1 1 l ! ! 1 1 I W 3 N
- 1 ! ! I l i I I 4 3 37
- 7) V% ici I !
- 1. Large LOCA (LL) Has Its Own (LL) LLA from MLA directly.
- 2. Medium LOCA (ML) Has Its Own (ML) MLA something like A, but with LP and DT and BA/BB instead of HL and DH.
- 3. Small LOCA (SL) Has Its Own (SB) A,B,C (same as used in RT).
- 4. Very Small LOCA Has its own (VSB) A,B C.BFA,BFB,R/2,RY3 (same (VL) as RV2,RY3 used in GT).
- 5. Inadvertent No Event Tree Opening of OHR (just a scenario Oropline Valves into PDS 1H at IE (VS) frequency)
- 6. Steam and Feed- Has Its Own (SLI) A,B,C,RV2,RV3,BFA,BFB,BFC, water Line RT4,RT2,RT3 (same as RTs).
- 7. Steam Genera'.or Has Its Own (TR) C,RV2,BFA,BFB,BFC (same as Tube Rupture 'TR) RTs).
- 8. Excessive Main Uses GT with Same as GT.
- 9. Total Loss of Uses GT with Same as GT. !
- 10. Reactor Trip (RT) Uses Cri with Same as GT, which means:
- 11. Turbine Trip (TT) Uses GT with A,B,C,RV2,BFA,BFB,BFC (same TT = 1.0 as used for GT). 1 RT4 from HPI parts of the main tree and from A I (currently uses A subtree I runs). '
- 12. Loss of Air Uses GT with Same as TT.
- 13. Loss of Control Uses Its Own (LC) CB, which asks CP, C1, and SV Building Ventila- Which has only since they might be closed tion (LC) BW Top Event initially or fail closed (similar to subtree C).
- 14. Loss of ATA Uses GT with Same as turbine trip.
- 15. Loss of Train A Uses GT and SSSs of DC Power (LD) Set Its Own
- 16. Loss of Offsite Has Its Own with Same as turbine trip Power (AC) Changes from GT except for:
- 17. Loss of Nuclear Uses GT but with Same as turbine trip, Services Closed Correct SSS Set Cooling Water (LN)
- 18. Loss of River Uses Its Own (LR) C,RT2,RT3,RT4,RV2,RY3.
- 19. 0.15g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip.
- 20. 0.259 Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip.
- 21. 0.40g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip.
- 22. 0.60g Earthquake Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip.
- 23. Fire in IE Uses GT Evaluated Same as turbine trip.
- c. U.
- 1 234 5 6 7 8 910111213 ;415 L6171419 20 0122 :3 :4 ;5 26 ;7 29 ;P )) 3172 23 34 25 % 37 36 ??
- Q 1 2
- E
- S
- E
- T
- A
- T _
- S
- AC m
- Q 1 2 _
- E
- S -
- E
- E
- R
- T
- T
- N E
- E
- A
- C O
- L
- E G
- 1
- 1
- 2 W l 4
- E
- R
- U
- G
- I
- F
- O
- N
- O
- I T
- C
- A
- R
- F
- T
- I
- L
- P
- S
- L
- G A * :
- G I FFF O
- t T AEB
- 0 I PFP I
- I D HHH T
- C N I
- T O
- A C D
- P N
- F O *
- T C
- I
- L D
- P
- S N
- A
- L A
- N N
- O O N
- I I CAD O
- T TT - - -
- I I C II P I
- D LA HHH T
- N PP I
- O SF
- C N
- I F
- T N *
- N )
- E 3 V
- V (
- E B E *
- G ) &)
- N 2 4 I ( A(
- T C S T
- A SE I
- NNN L
- E OOO
- E I I I
- R) TTT M
- T1 (CCC U
- I *
- TYIEE NTNt N D D
- EII I I E
- VL M
- T N
- E OI SSS 1
- E I THHH 2
- 1 M DWI E
- E
- L
- T
- N B
- E 8A A
- V
- E 1 .WPPI 1 BHHH T
- O PN""
- EB/ EAb d l . ' YES
- C
- & [BW] /
- Nttst he nantial sprag valve
- q Nttsthe2/2ifRIfails.
- 4 3/8/85 8UNP N\ PDS2H ,_,Cpx ' onotgoto l ngLUE
- [SU) CLOSED T
- [31] IN CORE / n
- e. B (see Section 4.3.2) when it is not, o C (see Section 4.3.3) when the BWST is not available.
- D 00 4 n_ $
- cp -
- 555 N c=
- nWWE a w d sss ,
- E 5 $EEE i
- I K !t 0 3 8 I I I I
- 1 1 1 I r *. 1 I I I Ia .
- HEAT RP BEFORE o,/
- / BVPASS LO- \
- S.S. STEAM \ '
- /
- [MF] \ _MPBACX _/ y increasingRCStenp. ?WR in26nins, i /
- 94 2
- s. PDS 3x . U~-
- -~.~
- Q 12345678
- E
- S
- E
- T
- A
- T
- S
- O D ABA8A880
- Q 1 2345678
- E
- S
- E
- E
- R
- T
- T
- I N
- H : : : E
- V
- E
- A
- C
- O .
- L
- K -
- A
- A E
- F R
- : l : :
- B
- L
- L
- A
- M
- S
- B 3
- Pi f : l : : -
- 3
- 2
- 4 E _
- R
- U
- G
- I
- V E : l : : : : : F -
- E -
- 5 t
- ( 1s arctate eef wlt wist fractiors which are rot A O
- s. ..r t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ;
- 2. r > . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- \2A l FIGURE 4.2.4-2. EVENT SEQUENCE DIAGRAM FOR VERY SMALL LOCA (Sheet 1 of 13)
- /
- nc) _ /
- [BW] /
- \RECRC RCSwillrapidly depressurizeatter T- coredanageduetoRY
- i 6 'CinDEPR
- O O O
- FORU+PSUs\
- 2___ '
- [CS] BUILDING [\
- : : 1 I : i l- 13 ers a I I I t- N IFl4 41 i . . . . l_. 21 c 47 I I I I l 22 in5 43 f f' I l -.- -
- ' ! ! ! I I A A12 tit
- i ' f
- 0587G102087PMR
- tt t* * ** * **t s ** ** tit *** tit tt turant s tut s tit t t t ts TCP EiBTS: C00!T101 SPLli RKTIONS:
- W- -=DD~~ . Ei l . n . % i 4 i N . iF F Eii. En n DLEEF i . .
- C : . i . F F E . F i - . C , .
- F F F F F . F F C . F F - F F . ;
- 3. 89 '
- 9a 1 m I 1 . a i
- 0B B I I i 1 ( ! ! ! !: ( l I 4 1 1 k .
- 'JN . I i
- s
- p. A8 / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- .c4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- '[jg))R OperahnwithaMs..) in the l TRIP \ (
- : interneciatebuilding y
- 'LUS ISOLMES FWIOBOTH\
- SH i 2 FIGURE 4.2.6-2. EVENT S EEE D AG FOR STEAM LINE BREAK I
- MSLBSH3 '
- EHid)0fineyyg/
- 2/2/87 i
- 6- u
- HIGHERPOWERLEYEL MSLBSH8 'SH -
- \ PDS3X ,.. / CORE ' ~
- a. Pqr r.
- I ,. -
- ,5 i FIGURE 4.2.6-2 (Sheet 11 of 13) i
- 1 r l,'
- \ SUMP YLYS/ i.
- I : I ! l ! 1 i i i 19 A 36 I I l 1 l l ! I I I i 1 29 0 31 I i 1 : I I I I i l 1 21 A 32 I I l l l 1 1 I i 1 l 1 22 B 33 1 ! l l 8 ! l I I I : 23 8 34 1 i ! 1 I I I I I l 24 C 35 I I i l l l l 1 l- 25 Rv2 36 1 I l 1 1 : I i 5; 26 Av3 37 I l : l l i l l 27 IFR3 38 I I I I ! ! I 23 IFR12 64 l l 1 i : i i 29 IFRS 75
- I l l l t t 3) TR1 77 1 l ! ! 14; I I : l : 31 IR2 73 I I i 1 I I I I I I 22 'Al 73 l 1 l l ! ! I I I I 33 TR2 86 I l l l 1 I t 1 I I 34 TRI 81 l : : : : 1 : : i_ 25 TR2 82 I I i 1 ! l 1 1 ! ! 36 TR2 83
- I : : I I 45 al 92 I I l l ! ! ! ! : I I : 46 TRI 93 l l l l 1 I l l 1 l l : 47 TR2 94 t I : : l t 1 : : I I o ni 95 3 : I l l 3 i ! : I. 49 TRI 96 i l 1 1 1 I I I i 1 54 TR2 97 l l I i I I 1 51 TR1 93 3 l l I ! l l l l l l 52 TRI t) l l l 1 I ; i ! l ; 53 TR2 100 I ! I I : 1 1 I i !_ $4 TR2 101 l l l l l 1 1 : MC 192 i
- I ! l l l I 53 C IM
- ! : l 5) IFils 197 i l : : : I : 64 Ini: it) '
- : : i : : : : : : i. 64 erb m i
- : : : : I 1 : 65 ETA 221 I ! I I ! ! ! l 1 i : M EfB 222 i ! l l l 1 ' l l l 67 E/B 223 l l 1 l l :
- : : : : : ; i :. 74 EfB 226
- : : l l l ! I i __. 71 ifB 227 l l l l l 1 : I 72 EFA 223
- : : : : I : : : :. n En m 1 1 : . 1 : I ! 74 EfB 23 FIGURE 4.2.6-3. STEAM LINE BREAK IN THE INTERMEDIATE BUILDING EVENT TREE (Sheet 1 of 2) 4.2.6-20
- t t in tttt itus nititt ttt tt t tt t t t t t t tistit * **tuti n t s tti t u tt
- IRIP isoccurring.
- [ffA, _ /
- [0P] [M/GB] \ '
- excessive cooldown nag result in RU failure fran PIS FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 2 of 14)
- [IR] INIACI/
- MSSYs KeepPressureBelow N0
- INI.RCP
- P SEAL INTEG' C.D.
- FIGURE 4.2.7-2 (Sheet 5 of 14)
- 9 O
- STOP3/4 (i
- H
- O O O SH.
- \_w/
- [sp]
- [MF] \ /
- g ggg7 \.PDS3x
- [Mg] HPIP FLOW MIN. / ~ - '_ spike ) their shtttoff head C t
- [RC] / \ /
- y SBSX14 I PDS 1 l I PDS 1 /
- "J:; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- F E i . F . D . . F F 6 F E F iF ( ( EF 8 F F F .
- C CC C 4 4 C 4 A e4 3 00 04 : C } G e FiC G G } a .
- 4: ; r ,
- i::i .ii . Ii( E . F F i i i ; . F F F i( F iF ( ( ( i F F F F .
- O ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- excessive cooldown Mag restilt in RY failttre fron PIS i
- t
- [SH.\ ~
- f2]
- U .,
- CB] / 'I {.D)>
- IRSH12 /SH, 3/8/85 \ 13
- C2] IS0IAIION/ [CS:\ SPRAYS / ( nF )
- 1 1 1 1 59 IGli 165
- 69 143 &?4 FIGURE 4.2.8-3. STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE EVENT TREE 4.2.8-20
- Table 4.2.9-1 defines the top event codes and conditional split fractions j i . used in the event tree. Table 4.2.9-2 is the boundary condition table t i for this event tree. !
- excessive main feedwater initiating event are the same as those shcwn on j the general transient. ESD. All of these actions are important to ,
- o BFB (see B described in Section 4.3.2) when HPI cooling is required
- alleviating systems have operated correctly. !
- tits tu TJ D OTS: CC41 TIM. RIT FTACTIN:
- U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- v. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i t-i T * . G . . . GGG G GGGGGGG . DD000G3D . "s DGD0DG. I 13?C F ' . C C , C C i .
- 8C . P . . . . a . 3 . 9 . . GM M 9 M 6 . . . . . 9 9 9 1 3 .
- M . . . . . . I' I . . . . B . . . . B B Bi . & 5 . . . I68 i 8 t
- 5 s . . . . . s . . . a C > J JJ a J s a J . a J J a i J J J J .
- . 21 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- . P/ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- a. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- / H00 PSIG\ sll' l
- ECSH2 /g .ISOLATESFEEDilhTER 1/27/87 Qll\,I L FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 2 of 14)
- O O O
- r?)P-SHUI 0FF)
- Min-flonorMally p \4D i o availablehere liAINI.RCP -
- AITTOC/bg -
- 1/27/87 $ ~~ -/
- FIGURE 4.2.9-2 (Sheet 11 of 14) l 1
- [Hg) FLOW / ~_'
- 4_____
- 5) IFR7 84 4 64 RT4 913 1 1 1 1 ! 8l 61 RT3 919 I I I I I 62 RT2 929 I I I I 91 63 RT3 921 I I I I I
- IMi ; ; ? . D DD. IEL t00 . O i LDi . 8DDDDDL0DCD f
- v::n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- i*-
- n.:-) . F , F . F . F + F , F GF . F . . F F F F F F . F : F F F F F : .
- s.J4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- .G: t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s
- e. es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '
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- 2 : F : : . , : : : . : ,
- G . , J .J l
- 1 4 2 19 il 2 'J 4 .) ) J J .J J 2 .
- (nainfdwtr/
- r. /v -RI cattsed hg anticapatory IRIl ( REACIOR \ " tri?.if FilP's trip off i T IRIP
- throttle \ /roide.
- ::]
- J jAci: ions th)
- e ; -> \g(ettP i
- }'[
- ]
- ?eaHor all1,c,Ing \j i.:
- [HP-1] )piin2 mins i T ~
- sea 0p
- 1 I i ! ! I I I i 14 0 14 i ! 1 ! l 1 i i ! 11 5 11 1 ! ! I I I I I I l 12 C2 12 1 1 1 1 I i l i I 13 4 13 I t i i 1 1 1 I I i 14 8 14 I i i : I 1 1 1 15 8 ..
- I I I t ! l ! I 22 4 37
- 1 i l t i 1 i 27 INC 42
- ! ! : I i 2) 1A1 69
- : : 1 I ! 31 IFR2 $7 i l l ! I i 32 VA 173 i 1 i 4 i I 6 ! 4; . : . 33 FB 174
- i ! ! : 8 I I i l : 34 F4 175 i ! i l 1 !
- 1 : I i I I i i '6 J SFA 1 77
- 1 I I I l : i 1 37 FB 174 I l ! ! ! l ! ! 38 EQ 17)
- i ! l t I ! ! l 39 ffC IM t 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 44 IFA 131
- 1 I I : I I I i l 42 60 133 1 1 i i ! ! I i . 43 F4 14
- 1 ! I i 52 196 N2 i t i .
- : 1 i i . 1 I i 59 8 252 i l I ! ( !
- I . ! : I I 66 IFR5 259 1 i 1 1- 67 afR7
- t tut tuun tu t tut tttutttttu ttu t tttt t ttu tt u t tt ttt tit t t t ttt tta tuttutt T7 Emis: C00li!M. SFtli FMCTICMi; TOP Sit!T AEst. VM MTOPEDT EDT FMCTIM CUClilWS ET FfACTM TRIP IE 50 508 RT F RT FfXi% TR:F(l) TC TCd T+F F# FIACTM C0Q1.47 P# TRIPt2) T- TJ TC F TT TW514 TAIF(3) TT TTC RT F SO SECCW STEM E!ET(4) TH T4 TC F PF + 4) E123514 M14 FEENTUts) TH T4 T+F TC TU3NTE SECOC4f STEM Ellr(6) TH T4 TT F T- SJFICIEhT $!N FEEMTUt7) P0 PGA TH $
- 7 8 910111; 1314 d 161718 t' ;0 21 :2 23 :4 25 :6 27 28 D 30 3122 33 :4 M 16 37 34 M J
- uN . i. 5L . . . . . . . . . tE. . E.EEi . . . EE . ( IEffE.
- a. - . . . . . . . 4 CC C *A aCA 4 4 4 00G6 4 CC00. A 0C54G4
- C , F .
- u. . . . . . . . .
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- i . -;) . . . . . . 4 . . ) } ( 550 40 05 GG . . GG, GGCGGGG . I
- 1 i
- 1 I : : : 1 I 11 $ 11 I i l 1 1 1 1 I I l 12 Q2 12 1 1 1 i t I i 1 : 13 A 13 I I I I i i l I I i 14 9 14
- 1 1 1 : I : 1 1 15 B 15 I i ! I t i 1 ; 16 C 16 1 1 ! ! 1 1 '
- I t t : ! ! : I t 22 4 37 l 1 I i i t i 1 i D B 2 t i i i ! i t I ! 24 6 39 I l i : I I t ! ! 25 C 44 1 1 1 1 1 I I 2% 3% 41 1 ! ! ! ! 1 1 . 27 INC 42 I I i 1 1 1 1 28 H3 43 1 1 1 : i 29 Inl 69 I I I I I I A
- i t i I ! 6: 1 4: . . I 33 IFR 174 1 1 . ! ! I : 1 I : I 14 FA 175 I I i 1 1 ! I i . . + 35 EfB 176 i i i I 1 i 1 i % FA 177
- i ! i 1 8 . 1 i ; i 37 FB !?S t i l I I i t i l l_ 38 El 179 t i I I I i ! ! ! 29 FC IM 1 I i t I I i 44 FA 181 I i i t i I ! 1 I . . 41 EFI 1C
- I i ! t ! 47 UT4 15 i i : 1 I : s 4 43 10 5 1%
- 1 i ! I i 1 l l i 5) 8 25 2 i i l l I I t : 64 C 253 1 i 1 1 ! I 1 61 5 34 1 : 1 I : 1 ! I I I l 62 Q2 255
- I 1 i . I 1 1 63 8 N I . t I t t t I 64 8 37
- I I i 1 i 1 l 65 C N I l I 1 1 I 1.. . M 145 3)
- ! ! . 79 1All 94 1 1 : I W 1411 in i !! Ulti lau I I 82 1911 law 2 1
- E. . .. .c + . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- F F t 5 c,
- CCN . F F .i . F F F F , . F , t F . F . . FF F F F F . F FF F F F F F .
- . s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
- e.*. v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....
- F r 3 i.
- a . . a n a a n . I j -;C.;) . . . . . G . . . 54C G0 0 4 6030 6. . G6. 0 6 ( 0 S 4.
- : t I t ! I t t 13 C2 !!
- ! ! ! 1 1 17 131 17 1 i t ! I I 71 3; i 19 A 23 I I I I I I I i i I i 6 19 8 34 I i 1 I I i 1 1 1 M 4 5
- I 1 l i ! 30 Inl (6 I l l l l l 31 FR 41
- i i ! ! ! I 1 14 VA 175
- i l I I I : 1 1 i 35 EF) 176 I i ! l : ! I ! % (fA 177 l l 1 1 ! '
- . l 1 : : 1 : at IFA til 1 1 l 1 1 ! ! 6 . . 41 fft !?2 i I 1 1 I I I 42 F) 133
- I . ! : : 47 Ina IM i i l i 1 i i I L3 tR5 1%
- I l . I 8: I 6 54 5 247 I I I ! I l I i & i i M C2 !s8 1 1 1 I l l t I ! ! % $ 249 i : : i I i ! I i 1 1 57 i N I I ! l t I i ! i M $ 31 i : I : : 1 1 : I 59 8 252 I i I : ! I I 64 C 29
- . iw 1n11 9M il 1411 Ime I2 af til IW2 83 tull Iwo FIGURE 4.2.12-1. TURBINE TRIP EVENT TREE 4.2.12-4
- tree; therefore, the general transient event tree (Figure 4.1-2), default j
- i i
- I J- y H ?
- 2 U
- p m >--
- n :51 ti; til til t-il :(1 til til 644 Hi 416 bil di tsi ill 631 til MI til 1
- Q 1 2
- E
- S t
- E
- T
- A
- T
- S t O D CG B
- E
- E
- Q 1 2 R
- E
- S T
- T
- N
- E
- V
- E
- N
- 0
- 1
- T A
- L
- I
- T
- 4 f
- E
- V t
- L
- I U
- F t V O t E l
- S
- S
- O
- L t 1 t -
- 1
- 2
- 4
- E
- R
- U
- G
- I
- F t
- L .
- 2. Main Feedwater Pumps 4100 RPM
- 3. Pressurizer Heaters Off 4 Reactor Trips
- 5. Turbine Trips
- 6. Atmospheric Dump Valves Closed 3 Will Be Controlled fADVD By Manual Leader e- - -
- ....3, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- m. . . .
- t-i . . . . . . a- c,a . c.A e4 >S a C C ; a.4 C0 S S .
- E t F F F F . F . 9 I F , F 5 5 F F F , F F F F F F F .
- 49. . . . . . . . . . .
- ,54, , . . . . . . . .
- t: . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- .; , . , . : C .
- 2 2 ) ) 4. .) 4 1 D 2 1 ) .t l
- 3/3/87 /SH./
- excessive cooldown nag result in RU failttre fron PIS FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 2 of 14)
- j1HPIP Flowthru t
- ~ CFTs k u control roon, but the IBY's will fail
- AIASH6 /SH.u FIx
- /4HI (RECRC)
- [ggj U
- [CA/
- 3/3/87 \l3 FIGURE 4.2.15-2 (Sheet 12 of 14) i l
- 1 I I I 74 trE6 464 1 1 1 1 71 ITF) 4?)
- 1. For all support system states except 26, the split fraction used for RE in the AC tree is RED (failure frequency = 1.0). For SSS-26, split fraction REA was used for top event RE. (REA represents the likelihood that the operator successfully recovers at least one train of electric power. ) The split fractions used for RE in each SSS can be seen in the boundary condition Table 4.2.17-2. This means that the (reduced) tree scenarios 2 through 9, those that end in RIA, R18, and RIC, can only be reached in SSS-26 when RE succeeds. In all other cases, when EF+ or EF- fails, RE automatically fails and the tree always goes to scenarios 10 through 20
- 2. The subtrees R1A, R18, and R1C are evaluated only as if one train of electric power is available since recovery (REA) has been successful. One run of these subtrees was made for SSS-13. In 4.2.17-1 l 0587G102087PMR
- 3. The split fractions for the HPA, HPB, and HI top events that follow successful recovery of one train of electric power must also be modified from the values that would normally be used in SSS-26. This is done by inserting entries in the conditional split fraction list that choose split fractions to be used after RE success.
- E EE , Ea LEEEF E ,
- F F F . , . F F , . F . F . . F F F F .. F F F t F F F F F t .
- s. . .
- L0
- 3. D D D D; LL C D DLL D I & O =D . ; D* DL DDDL0L ,
- C0 .
- r. :a i i . ! ! 6 I I i ! I i 11 . I i wa . I 1 6 I . ! ; I i 1 . , i d 'da 1 . I i I I i
- i
- 4N . . , . . . . . . , . , . . . . ,
- 9, g, . ) . -'
- t,.h.
- s, h
- 4 ')
- b ** 9 . . 3 .J .
- INm 11 I
- O O O l /SH\
- 1/28/87 5A 5D Sufficient j FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 4 of 15)
- 4AIT TO C/fA ..
- I . ~s~
- 1/28/87 9 FIGURE 4.2.17-2 (Sheet 8 cf 15) i i
- /SH.\ ACSH10 6 or/ '
- s III/ \i 'NANUAL RB[CS] (Nanual if i F2]s COOLERS
- u. .
- St it W 4% WA 14 til $tt DC Statt . SE41 til (0) (0) . @ (C) (C) (( sC) tF) (Op. LC) - (F) 1 5- 'l I i . 1 8 1 1. 11 2 A14 2 I I i 18; 136 L 1 f 3 alt 3
- 10111: 131411161718 9 M t 22 :3 :4:53 7 :1 9 to 313: n ;4 35 h it M it i 4*MT ....................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . !
- 4. . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,
- 8 f( E. (
- n D( EEF i . ;
- A 4 G004A CC00. A0C0004 .
- F ccce i ,
- .
- ( ! . . . . . . . GG6 300 } 0 06 06G +G'GS 40 . GGv GSG .
- l l l 1 1 1 17 IFR1 17 I I I i l 1 Ti 3; i 13 W 33 I I 1 1 1 1 1 I i i i ! 19 8 34 i 1 i ! ! I 1 I I I N N 35 1 1 ! ! l l t 1 1 1 1 21 B 36 i ! ! i i I i I I l_ 22 W 37 I l 1 i I i t i I : 23 8 33 I I i l I 1 i l 1 24 8 7) 1 ! l 1 I I 25 C 46 I l l I I I ! I 26 Ev2 41 1 I 1 1 1 1 51 27 W3 42 1 ! I i i i 28 IFR3 43
- I 1 1 I i 29 KFR1 6) i I i ! ! ! N IFFS 65 I t ! I I i ?! IFR2 87 I I I 1 1 1 32 ETA 173 i 1 i : 6: I 41 i 1 33 EIB 174 i i I I i : 1 : 1 I 34 ETA 175 I i t ! I I t i I i 1 35 EIB 176
- 1 I I i 1 1 I I . M ETA 177 1 I ! I I I I I i ! 37 EfB 178 l l l 1 l 1 i I i 33 EI6 179
- 1 i l i i i 43 XFR5 1%
- i ! l 1 1 ; I 56 EFC IH 1 i l i l i 51 IFF5 M
- 1 I I I . 52 IFF6 N2
- l l l t 53 IFR1 231 1 i ! I i 8I I i 54 S 247 1 : ! I t i I I 55 B 243 I i i ! i i i 54 B 24)
- : : I !. . 53 IFR7 253
- : : : 1 id ITi3 323
- : i 91 1 61 *FF6 415 l l ! ! 1 62 IFE6 444 i i 63 IFE) 473 i ! i ! (4 IFE) 623 I i ! (5 IFF6 773 1 1 64 1FR) 542 1 67 Ef4 952 l . : : 10: _ f4 RT) %)
- Fill N4 1 ; . 74 1 Fill %2 l -=
- U4 PV F k! J F1 $ EF4 W F Hl-J RE S 50 F N F N-4 TH 8 PH EF4 PH TH $
- 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- win . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- 'l . 4 . . . . . . . J . J J C J J J J J J J - ) . J J . 2 ) C J J J ) .
- I I . A ! . C i 9 I i i !a ! ! ! I e ( ! ! ! ! ! <
- .4 N . E i i . . . . . . . . . E ! .. E i Ef . . EE i i!EiE .
- f D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- ' 31 I . I I I i i i ! . I I I I 1 ! ! 1 ! i ! ! ! ! ! 1 I ! ! ! ! I i W4 ! l . I I I I ! ! 1 ! ! I i 1 ! ! 1 i 1 1 1 I i ! I i i i ! ! .
- 7
- I t 1 I l . .
- :4 . i 1 . I i ! ! . I i i ! ! ! 1 I i i ! I i 1 I a i I 1 I .
- ;4 1 1 1 1 1 i I 1 1 1 1 ! ! 1 ! ! I i ! t 1 9 i 1 1 1 I l
- /HANUAL \'
- p i j ttto efw pulpt, ,
- 4) /
- i O O O l SH ,
- Min-flonorMally y
- e e e
- LORWSH5a l 1/23/87
- a rea/ "f A
- y N ffAL '\ PDS 3x "g i [HP] SIARI / 2/3 HPIPs available if MS
- 8 ~-
- FIGURE 4.2.19-2 (Sheet 7 of 14) i
- wecaneherefran5.
- 4 'CD+DEPR ppg g g
- u E -
- [C1/ REACIOR\
- F2] FAN C'L'RS/ [gg) ,
- 1. 4 2 60E-04 CV-1(OP)
- 3. 62 50E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINE W/0NE TRAIN DOWNS NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NS-1(CP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(GA\GB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DORN$
- 1. 0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$
- RCDRC 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAM $ [
- VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DB AND GB FAILED $ '
- RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSYS$ i RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???O RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROM HPI COOLING & No PORV$ !
---------- --------- -------------------------~~-------------------
DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.8320E-04 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUPES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEKS AVAILABLE$ EBBE3 3.7390E-01 EB-1(FA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FAILED $ EBCIB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFAIF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ IFBEF+ 1.29 50E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ EFCEF- 2.5600E-05 EF-1 1 or 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ EFCEF- 1.7790E-03 EF-1(OP.AH) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUHENT AIR $ EFEEF- 2.4560E-03 EF-1(GA/GB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LCIAS EFFEF- 5. 54 4 0E-02 EF-i(CA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ EFGEF- 4.0310E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAH LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDGc LOSPS ETHEF- 2.2660E-03 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ EFIEF- 1.0000E+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.0220E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKIF- 4.2200E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS ETHFF- 2.8510E-03 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAINS EFNEF- 1.9710E-03 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOS P, LOIAS FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ FXCFX 0.0000E-01 FX-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES GAAGA 3.1320E-04 GA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ GABGA 7.2 590E-02 GA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILED $ CACGA 1.0000E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ GBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN B$ GB BGB 2.51303-04 GB-1(CA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAILS GBCGB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ GBDGB 7.8460E-02 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN * *TH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ GBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ HAAHA 3.7820E-02 HA-1 1 0F . J'AIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAIL $ KABHA 1.0000E+00 MA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ 1 HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAIL $ ' HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS l HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ HIBMI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ . HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ l HICHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HIEHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 1 0F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ HIFHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HIHHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATEh$ 0 4.2.20-4
-_ . . .. . --- -. . - . - . . . - . - - -~ . - . .. - .
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) SHEET 4 0F 8-SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLYS AND 1/2 MANUAL ~ VLV CPEN$. MLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 OR 10F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPEN$ HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(IC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HPAMPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B)$ HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/MA)10F 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/MA HAS FAILED $ HPCMPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C) $ HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HP3.OP) 1 OF 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ ' HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS CIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILID$ HPGMPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUTS HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF CP OR NS$ HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ HPMHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(OP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND CA(MAN START HUP-B)$ HPNMPA 1.9970E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN$
""N HPCHPA 1.34 30E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB) B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATES (d' \ HPPHPA HPCHPA IAAIA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 1.4980E-03 HPA-1(LR) 2.000CE-03 LOIA 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $
DIFFEP1NT SFT FOR LRW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENT $ IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 CPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCHS
-IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $
IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUHP C AVAIL $ INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-1 WITH IA FAILED $ INFINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL'SS AVAILS LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(GA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWNS LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS LPELP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWN$ LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 OPERATOR PROVIDES I4NG TERM MAKEUP-NORMALS LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES
\
l 1 4.2.20-5
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMT+ 1.3980E-03 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF KFW RAMP BACK$ MF BMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM MFW PUMPS $ { MFDMF+ 0.0000E-01 MT+1(LCSP) OFFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ MFEMT+ 1.0270E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVENTED $ MFFMF+ 6. 4340E-02 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LCSS OF MS PRESS CONTROLS MFGMF- 1.4030E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFIMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(CP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SG$ MTKMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFLMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (OP) MF-2 BUT NO OP (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYPASSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED)$ MFNMF+ 1.1650E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS MFW WITHOUT FW PUMP TRIPS MTOMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MT-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISOLATION OF 1 SGS MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MREMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ MRCMR
NSDNS NSENS
l NSTNS 1.0660E-04 1.4750E-02 NS-1(EA.EB) LO;;S LIFE NSA EXCEPT BOTM TRAINS OF ESAS DOWN$ LO3S OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENT $ NSGNS 1.0000E+00 NS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ OPAOP 6.2200E-02 CP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ OPSOP 1.0000E+00 CP-1 0 GIVEN LCSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES POAPO 7.5200E-02 PO-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAM $ POBPO 1.4100E-01 Po-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, NO AUTO CONTROL $ POCPO 7.5200E-02 PC-2 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ PCFPO 1.0000E+00 PC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE, DA FAILS $ PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 CF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING STEAMS PVB PV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING STEAM $ PVCPV 1.5860E-05 PV-3 1 CF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING WATER $ PVDPV 5.8880E-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATER $ PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STEAM LINE WHIPS, BREAKS OTHER$ RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 RECOVERY OF IA AFTER LCSPC 1 4.2.20-6 l
i i /~ \ $- V TABLE 4.2.20-1(continued). ;
~
SHEET 6 0F 8 - i SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION i RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH PSV'S CLOST AFTER ' PASSING STEAM $ I RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 B01H PSV'S CICSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ RCCRC 2.8520E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MfST MANUALLY BE THROTS
RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ ; RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS RCGRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER STEAMS RCHRC 2.0430E-01 RC BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORY CLOSE AFTER WATER $ ' RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-9 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROT$ RCJRC 2.0930E-03 RC-4(lC) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ l RCKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(lC) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ' RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(lC) LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILID$ 2.4340E-02 RC-7(IC) LIKE RC-7, BUT 1C-To BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS RCMRC RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC) LIKE RC-8, BUT IC To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ i RCCRC 3.854 0E-01 RC-9(lC) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILEDS ! RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ! RCQRC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTL3 LOOPS r REARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER L'PI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FATLURES REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLE$ i
/"'% RECRE 1.5520E-01 RI-1(E-) LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $
('% f/ REDRE REERP 1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $' GUARANTEED SUCCESS $- REFRE 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILIDS e REGRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 kESTORE OP OR 1 DGS - REHRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3(E-) RESTORE OP OR 1 DG W/0 EFW$ REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ RPARP RPBRP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS . GUARANTEED FAILURES ! RPCRP 6.94 3 0E-03 RP-1(OP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ , RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RP-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RTART 1.7830E-04 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ . RTBRT 3.5760E-06 RT-1(OP) 0FFSITE POWER LOST $ ! RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ' RTDRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM SLB IN TBS RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TC FAILURES , RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORV$ . RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSVS$ f RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???$ ' RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROH HPI COOLING & No PORV$ PVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND No PORV/PSV$ RVHRV 4.95905-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ 1.7500E-10 RV-10 RVJRV VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ ' RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURE $ . RVLRV 4.!300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, DA/DB$ RVhRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS VA/VB$ RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ r b fb a t i 4.2.20-7
O TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) SHEET 7 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTICN SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL OPENING OF DH-V6 W/IN 1 MINS SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SAISA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISCL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, SHORTS SBBSB 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS CIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ SBCSP 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONGS SBDSB 1. 3 600E-01 SB-2 (S A) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, LCNGS SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBFSB 5.1220E-02 SB-1(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES SBGSB 3.9230E-03 SB-2(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SDASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMAND $ SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-2 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMAND $ SCCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs CN ONE OTSGS SDDSD 1. 0 0 0 0 E+ 0 0 S D-1. 0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 CNE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$ SEBSE 1. 0190E-02 SE-1(CA/CB) LIKE SE-1 BUT ONLY CNE TRAIN OF AC AVAIL $ SECSE 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEDSE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 0F 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(CP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 OF 1 PUMP MANU/L RESTARTS SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-l OPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 OPER ISOL SLB UFSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ S LASL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1 ISOLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ SLBSL 7.8070E-03 SL-1(DA/DB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWN$ S LCSL 7. 8 07 0E-0 3 SL-1(VB. DA/VA. DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL BUS DOWN$ S LDSL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1(VA/VB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWNS S LESL 7. 59 50E-04 SL-1(VA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWN$ SLFSL 1.0000E+00 SL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAILS SVBSV 1. 618 0E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) SUMP DAAINS, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ SVDSV 5. 9 52 0E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP DRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLOSED $ SVESV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, KANUALLY$ SVFSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE CCOLING,MF & CD SUCCESS $ TBBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TURBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ TBCTB 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, GUARANTEED FAILURI$ TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDEDS TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG GIVEN STEAM FLCW ISOL FAIL $ TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLGsE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ 1 TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY 1 TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ j TCGTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER MF+ FAILURES l TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER HF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ l TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES l l l till l l l 1 4.2.20-8 i
s , TABLE 4.2.20-1 (continued) i SHEET 8 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION TRATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLCW USING HU-V217$ , THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI USING HU-V16A/B/C/D$ ; THCTH 4.5910E-02 TH-2(GB) OPER THROT HPI W/HU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ i THDTH 1.0000t+00 TM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES THETH 0.0000E-01 TH-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ THFTH 4.1800E-02 TH-1(OP) OPER THROTTLIS GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IES TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TH-2(CA) OPER THROTTLES W/HUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ THHTH 5.2890E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE FOR LOOP IN S-26$ , TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SLB$ TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR-2 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - HLOCAS TRCTR 1.0000Z+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSES TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ No DCA$ ; TTCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, No SIGNAL GENERATED $ TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ , VAAVA 1.5600E-02 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLE$ ' VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILED $ VBAVB 1.4540E-02 VB-1 GIVEN (DA OR GA) AND (DB CR GB) AVAILS [ VBBVB 1.5600E-CJ VB-1(DA.GA) GIVEN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB CR GB AVAILS
1CA1C 5.1700E-05 1C-1 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B AVAILS 1CBIC 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B FAILIDS
+
1 a h I i I
\ '
6 4.2.20-9
r 1 4.2.21 0.25g EARTHQUAXE MAIN TREE-The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented in Figure 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a 0.25g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process was described in some detail in Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix B.4.4 of the technical summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.25g earthquake case is presented in Table 4.2.21-1. O O ! 4.2.21-1 0587G102687PMR
TABLE 4.2.21-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR 0.25g EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAILABL2 (VA)$ AABAA 8.4960E-04 AA-1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ AMAAM 4.8800E-04 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAILS AMBAM 5.2470E-02 AM-1(CP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES AMDAM 5.9590E-02 AM-1(CP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN AS BADBA 1.0000E+00 BA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN B$ BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ BBCBB 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BWABW 6.3900E-02 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ BWBBW 9.9580E-02 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW l.3010E-01 BW-3 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-1 SUCC) $ BWDBW 6.5030E-02 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBC RECOV (RE-2 SUCC) $ BWEBW 6.7410E-02 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 6.7410E-02 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND NO INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLING $ CIACl 2.8230E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES ClBC1 2.74 30E-03 Cl-1(GA/GB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWN$ CICCl 6.2560E-03 Cl-1(CA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ ClDCl 5. 3200E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC POWER AVAILABLE$ ClEC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1(CA.CB.CP) LARGE HOLE, NO ESAS, PURGE GOINGS ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C2AC2 3.1910E-05 C2-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWNS C2BC2 4. 4 58 0E-03 C2-1(GA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7. 6910E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ C2DC2 4.5770E-03 C2-1(GA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C3AC3 1.3840E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ C3BC3 3.5620E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN ISOLATION,EP TRAIN A DOWN$ C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.8400E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ CABCA 2.7870E-01 CA-2 KANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.8400E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ CBBCB 8.0930E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLES CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT GIVEN CA FAILED $ CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CDACD 2.9730E-04 CD-1 C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ COBCD 6.6180E-03 CD-1(OP) SLOW C00LDOWN ONLY, 36 HOURS $ CDDCD 3.0650E-04 CD-1(AA) SLCW C00LDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ C0FCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CECCE 2.7640E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORV NOT AVAILS WA CEDCE 2.8310E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1. 0650E-01 CE-1(CP) RAPID C00LDOWN WITHOUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ , CEGCE 5.0140E-03 CE-1 RAPID C00LDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS ! 1 l l l 4.2.21-2 j
,& v .
I ) V TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) SHEET 2 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION CFACF 6.3360E-02 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(GA/GB) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS AFTER LORW$ CFDCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES 1 CMNCS 5.6710E-05 ECHO OF CCHMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILE $ CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ CSACS 1.0360E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAILS CSBCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 1 OF 2 TRAINS REQD, ONE DG DOWNS CSCCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SA) 10F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWN$ CS DCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A DOWNS CSECS 4.5560E-01 CS-3 HANUAL ACT OF 1 OF 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAIL $ CSFCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(GA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS CSGCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ CSKCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUHP TkAIN B IS FAILIDS CVACV 4.1590E-06 CV-1 COOLING To ALL VITAL EQPHT, ALL SS AVAILS CVBCV 1. 4 2 6 0E-04 CV-1 (OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPHT, NO CP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPHT, EP TRAIN A DOWN$ CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $ CVECV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) LOSS OF VITAL INST BUS VBB OR VBDS /~'g CVFCV 1. 612 0E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.1C) TRAIN B AND OP LOST $ t CVGCV 2.3290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $ V) CVHCV 1.0000E+00 CV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ CVPCV 2.0710E-04 LOCV CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ CAADA 1.5020E-01 DA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ DABDA 1.0000E+00 DA-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILIDS DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ DBBDB 9.8730E-01 DB-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A FAILED $ DBCDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILID$ DHACH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAIL $ DHBDH 2. 4100E-02 DH-1(CA/GB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ DHCCH 1.0000E+00 DH-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES DHDDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ CHECH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS CHFDH 9.9060E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF HA CR HB, ALL SS AVAILS , DHHDH 5.9030E-02 DH-1(HA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 DHR TRAIN,1 DC TRAIN DOWN$ DHJCH 1.0000E+00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILL'RES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS i DHLDH 8.8720E-03 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHMDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHODH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHPDH 1.7770E-02 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS ] DHQDH 1.4620E-04 DH-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER CHR TRN, AIL SS AVAILS DHRCH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN,A.'1 SS AVAIL $ DHSDH 1.0600E-04 DH-1 24 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DMR TRN, AIL SS AVAIL $ , DHTCH 6.9450E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS ! CHUDH 6.3240E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAIL $ , 1 1 l l l i 0 p r%
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l 4.2.21-3 1
5 TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FPEQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION EfrADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.8320E-04 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EBBEB 3.7390E-01 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FA* 'D$ EBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFAEF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EFBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLE$ ETCEF- 2.5600E-05 EF-1 1 0F 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES ETDEF- 1.7790E-03 EF-1(OP.AH) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ EFEEF- 2. 4 560E-03 EF-1(CA/CB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LOIAS EFFET- 5. 54 40E-02 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ EFGEF- 4.0310E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAM LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDG, LOSP$ ETHEF- 2.2660E-03 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ EFIEF- 1.0000E+00 ZF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.02 20E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAIN $ EFKEF- 4.2200E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS EFHEF- 2.8510E-03 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAINS ETNE - 1.9710E-03 EF-1(DA/DB) IASS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOSP, 14IAS FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ FXCFX 0.00J0E-01 FX-0.0 CUARANTEED SUCCESS $ FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES GAAGA 7.8610E-04 GA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ GABGA 1.1320E-01 GA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILED $ GACGA 1.0000E+0C GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ GBAGB 2.513CE-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN BS GBBGB 6.0180E-01 GB-1(GA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ GBCGB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ GBDGB 4.3630E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ CBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITI ALLY FAILED $ HAARA 3.7820E-02 MA-1 1 OF 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HABHA 1.0000E+00 KA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWN$ HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SU? PORT SYSTEMS YAILED$ HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES I:: INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ HIBHI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'O$ HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HIDHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HIEHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 10F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ HITHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 1 0F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ HIGHI 1.000CE+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ HIHHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 10F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 10F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATER $ 1 l 1 4.2.21-4
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) SHEET 4 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 KANUAL VLV OPEN$ HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 CR 10F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPEN$ HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL 1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(lC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HPAHPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1 10F 2 PUMPS (A CR B)$ HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)1 OF 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILID$ HPCHPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C)$ HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 10F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILID$ HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 10F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 OF 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ HPGHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAI120$ HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUT $ HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURI 0F HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(CP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP OR NS$ HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ HPMHPA HPNHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(CP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND GA(MAN START MUP-B) $ 1.9970E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORI % VAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN$ \ HPCMPA 1.3430E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB)B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATE $ HPPHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ HPQHPA 1.4980E-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LRW (SAME ECNS AS HPA)$ IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LOIA LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCHS IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR-IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $' IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE $ INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A OR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAILS INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-l WITH IA FAILIDS INTINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(CA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWNS LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ LPELP 1.9170E-C2 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS RIQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWN$ LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 OPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NOPRALS LTBLT 6.5570E-C2 LT-2 OPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ( 4.2.21-5
TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) O SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 1.3980E-03 MF+1 BOTH TRAINS OF MFW RAMP BACKS MFBMT+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(GA/CB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS MFCMF+ 1.1250T-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTH MFW PUMPS $ MFDMF+ 0.0000E-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ MTEMF+ 1.0270E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERCOOLING PRIVINTED$ MFFMF+ 6.4340E-02 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LOSS OF MS PRESS CCNTROLS MFGMF- 1.4030E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MFHMF- 1.0000E+00 MF.1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFIMF- 1.000CE+00 MF-1(OP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SGS MFEMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFLMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (CP) MF-2 BUT NO OP (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYPASSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED) $ MFNMT+ 1.1650E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS MFW WITHOUT FW PUMP TRIP $ MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISOLATION OF 1 SG$ hFQMF- 1.0000E+00 MF.1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MRBMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ MRCMR 3.6250E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINE W/CNE TRAIN DOWN$ NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NE-1(OP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(CA\GB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DOWN$ NSDNS 1.0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ NSENS 1.0660E-04 NS-1(EA.EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT BOTH TRAINS CF ESAS DOWN$ NSFNS 1.4750E-02 LONS LCSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENT $ NSGNS 1.0000E+00 US-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES OPAOP 3.4930E-01 OP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ OPBOP 1.0000E+00 OP-1.0 GIVEN LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES PCAPO 7.5200E-02 PC-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAMS PCBPO 1.4100E-01 PC-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, NO AUTO CONTROL $ PCCPC 7.5200E-02 PO-2 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ PCFPC 1.0000E'00 PO-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE, DA FAILS $ PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 OF 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING STEAM $ PVBPV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING STEAMS PVCPV 1.5860E-05 PV-3 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, PASSING WATER $ PVDPV 5.8880E-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATERS PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STF3M LINE WHIPS, BREAKS OTHER$ RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 RECOVERY CV IA AFTER LOSPS i tilll 4.2.21-6
l 1 i
)
i Q(% TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued)- SHEET 6 0F ' 8 ; SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING STEAMS RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ RCCRC 2.8520E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MUST KANUALLY BE THROTS RCCRC 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORV CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAMS RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORV CLCSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST KANUALLY BE THROT$ RCGRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV's AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER STEAMS RCHRC 2.0430E-01 RC-8 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PCRV CLOSE AFTER WATER $ RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-9 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS RCJRC 2.0930E-02 RC-4(lC) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS ! RCKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(1C) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(1C) LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILIDS RCMRC 2.4340E-02 RC-7(IC) LIKE RC-7, BUT IC TO BLOCK VALVE FAILID$ RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC) LIKE RC-8, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ RCCRC 3.8540E-01 RC-9(IC) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RCORC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTER LOOPS l RIARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER HPI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FAILURES REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLIS l O t / RECRE REDRE 1.5520E-01 RE-1(E-) 1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $ GUARANTEED FAILURES l U REERE 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RETRE 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILED $ RECRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 RISTORE OP OR 1 DGS RIHRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3(E-) RESTORE OP OR 1 DG W/0 EFWS REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ l RPARP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS RPERP 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ RPCRP 6.9430E-03 RP-1(CP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RP-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RTART 1.1180E-02 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ RTBRT 3. 5760E-06 RT-1(OP) CFFSITE POWER LOST $ RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RTCRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM SLB IN TBS RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TC FAILURES RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORV$ RVDRV 7.8990E-17 RV-4 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PSYS$ RVERV 7.8990E-17 RV-5 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM ???$ RVFRV 7.8990E-17 RV-6 VESS RUPT FROM HPI COOLING & NO PORV$ RVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND NO PORV/PSV$ RVMRV 4.9590E-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ l RVJRV 1.75002-10 RV-10 VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURE $ i RVLRV 4.5300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, DA/DBS I RVMRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, VA/VBS I RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ 4.2.21-7 4
, - , , , - - , - , - - - ,, ,- , . - - - --, .- -~, - -
e
O TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) SHEET 7 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTE $ (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL CPENING OF DE-V6 W/IN 1 MIN $ SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SAESA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, SHORTS SBBSD 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ SBCSB 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONG$ SBDSB 1.3600E-01 SB-2(SA) TRAIN D WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, LONG$ SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ SBFSB 5.1220E-02 SB-1(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTE $ S BCS B 3.9230E-03 SB-2(GA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SDASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACM SG OPEN CN DEMAND $ SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-L 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG CPEN ON DEMAND $ S DCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs CN ONE OTSGS SDDSD 1.0000E+00 SD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES S EASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 ONE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$ SEBSE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(GA/GB) LIKE SE-1 BUF CNLY ONE TRAIN OF AC AVAILS SECSE 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SEDSE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 0F 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 0F 1 PUMP MANUAL RESTART $ SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-1 OPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 OPER ISOL SLB UPSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES S LASL 7.5950E-04 SL-1 ISOLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPORT AVAILABlIS SLBSL 7.8070E-03 SL-1(DA/DB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWN$ S LCS L 7. 7 3 4 0E-0 3 SL-1(VB. DA/VA. DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL BUS DOWNS SLDS L 7.5950E-04 S L-1 (VA/VB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWNS S LESL 7.5950E-04 SL-1(VA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWNS SLFSL 1. 0 0 0 0 E+ 0 0 S L-1. 0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISCLATION, ALL SS AVAILS SVBSV 1.6180E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) SUMP DRAINS, 1 TRAIN OF LSAS IS DOWNS SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ SVDSV 5.9520E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP DRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLCSEDS SVISV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, MANUALLY $ SVFSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURI$ TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE C00 LING,MP & CD SUCCESS $ TBBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TURBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ TBCTS 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, GUARANTEED FAILURES TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDED$ TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG GIVEN STEAM FLOW ISOL FAILS TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLOSE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY l TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ TCCTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER HF+ FAILURES TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER MF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O 4.2.21-8
/'~5g q (s / ' TABLE 4.2.21-1 (continued) SHEET 8 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION , THATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLOW USING MU-V217$ l THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2 OPERATOR THROTTLIS HPI USING MU-V16A/B/C/D$ THCTH 4.5910E-02 TH-2(GB) OPER THROT HPI W/MU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ THDTH 1.0000E+00 TH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ ' THETH 0.0000E-01 TH-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ '
-TEFTH 4.1800E-02 TH-1(OP) OPER THROTTLES GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IE$
TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TH-2(GA) OPER THROTTLIS W/MUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ THHTH 5.2890E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE FOR LOOP IN $=26$ TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SL3$ i TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR-2 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - HLOCAS TRCTR 1.0000E+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES , TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSES TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV's OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ NO DCA$
'ITCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, No SIGNAL GENERATED $ 7 TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $- '
TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ VAAVA 1.4200E-01 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLES VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILED $ I VBAVB 1.4100E-01 VB-2 GIVEN (DA OR CA) AND (DB OR GB) AVAILS ! VBBVB ' 1.4200E-01 VB-1(DA.GA) GIVIN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB OR GB AVAILS VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DB AND GB FAILIDS
) 1CAIC 5.1700E-05 1C-1 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B AVAILS I / ICB1C 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN AC EL TRAIN B FAILED $ ,
i t I i F b o ) \s / , 4.2.21-9
7
?
4.2.22 0.4g EARTHQUAKE MAIN TREE The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented ; in Figure 4.1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and ; quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a-0.4g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process.was described in some detail in i Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix 8.4.4 of the technical l summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.4g earthquake
. case is presented in Table 4.2.22-1 i i
l 6 l I O ! t I O ~ 4.2.22-1 0587G102687PMR
- - - _ _ , _ . _ . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , _ , , _____,__,_,_.,,_._,,,,,,1
TABLE 4.2.22-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS O FOR 0.49 EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAILABLE (VA)$ AABAA 4.2360E-02 AA.1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ AMAAM 4.7900E-02 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAILS AMBAM 9. 74 2 0E-02 AM-1(OP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES AMDAM 1. 04 2 0E-01 AM-1(OP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN AS BABBA 1.0000E+00 BA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN B$ BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ BBCBB 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURE$ BWABW 2.3300E-01 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ BWBBW 2.6220E-01 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW 2.8720E-01 BW-3 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBO RECOV (RE-1 SUCC) $ BWDBW 2.3390E-01 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-2 SUCC) $ BWESW 2.3590E-01 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 2.3590E-01 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND No INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLING $ CIACl 2.8290E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES ClBC1 2.74 3 0E-03 Cl-1(GA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWNS CICC1 6. 2 560E-03 Cl-1(CA/CB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWNS C1DCl 5.3200E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC PCWER AVAILABLIS CIEC1 1. 000 0E+0 0 Cl-1 (CA. CB. CP) LARGE HOLE, NO ESAS, PURGE GOING $ ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES C2AC2 3.1910E-05 C2-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWN $ C2BC2 4.4580E-03 C2-1(CA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7.6910E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWNS C2DC2 4.5770E-03 C2-1(GA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 CUARANTEED FAIUURES C3AC3 1.3840E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ C3BC3 3.5620E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN ISOLATION,EP TRAIN A DOWN$ C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.8400E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ CABCA 2.7870E-01 CA-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.8400E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ CBBCB 8.0930E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT CIVEN CA FAILED $ CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CDACD 2.9730E-04 CD-1 C00LDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ CDBCD 6.6180E-03 CD-1(OP) SLOW COOLDOWN ONLY, 3 6 HOURS $ CDDCD 3.0650E-04 CD-1(AA) SLOW C00LDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ CDFCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ CECCE 2.7640E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORV NOT AVAILS WA CEDCE 2.8310E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1. 0 6 5 0 E-01 CE-1 (OP) RAPID COOLDOWN WITHOUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ CEGCE 5.0140E-03 CE-1 RAPID C00LDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS O 4.2.22-2
G TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) SHEET 2 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION CFACF 2.3490E-01 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(GA/GB) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS ATTER I4RWS CFDCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CMNCS 5.6710E-05 ECHO OF COMMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILES CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ CSACS 1.0360E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAILS CSBCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, CNE DC DOWNS CSCCS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SA) CSDCS 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWNS 4.7690E-01 CS-3 (SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A DOWNS CSECS 4.6560E-01 CS-3 MANUAL ACT OF 10F 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAILS CSTCS CSGCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3 (GA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS 2.2490E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 0F 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUFES CSKCS 4.7690E-01 CS-3(SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUMP TRAIN B IS FAILED $ CVACV 4.1590E-06 CV-1 COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, ALL SS AVAIL $ CVBCV 1.4260E-04 CV-1(OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, NO CP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, EP TRAIN A DCWN$ CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $ CVICV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) CVFCV I4SS OF. VITAL INST BUS VBB CR VBD$ 1.6120E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.lC) TRAIN B AND OP LOST $ CVGCV 2.3 290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $
, CVHCV 1.0000E+00 CV-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CVPCV 2.0710E-04 I4CV CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $
DAADA 3.6740E-01 DA-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ DABDA 1.0000E+00 DA-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ DBBDB S.9610E-01 DB-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A FAILED $ D3CDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ DHADH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 i DHBDH 1 0" 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS l 1.4100E-02 DH-1(GA/GB) 1 0'.' ? TRAINS REQ ' D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ DHCDH 1.0000E+00 DM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ l DHDDH 1. 4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF CHR REC'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS ) DHEDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS t DHFDH 9.9060E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB, ALL SS AVAILS ) DHHDH 5.903 0E-02 DH-1(HA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 DHR TPAIN,1 DC TRAIN DOWN$ CHJDH 1.0000E+00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILURES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DER TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHLDH 8.8720E-03 DH-1(CA) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 CHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHMDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(GA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HS TRN,2 SS TRN DOWN$ DHODH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/9B TRN,1 SS TRN DOWNS ! DHPDH 1.7770E-C2 DM-1(GA) 24 HR. RC7RY OF 1 HA/HW TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHQDH 1.4620E-04 DH-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER CHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS ; DHRDH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS DHSDH 1.0600E-04 DM-1 24 HR. itCVRY DF E77MR DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS l DHTDH DHUDH 6.94 50E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB ALL SS AVAILS 6.324 0E-01 CH-1(HA.HB) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF HA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS O 4.2.22-3 4
O TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS IANG TERM BORON EFFECTS $ DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 1.3760E-01 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EBAEB 1.8320E-04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EBBEB 9.9930E-01 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE CIVEN EA FAILED $ EBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ETAEF+ 3.9250E-05 ET+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ EFBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAX AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABL2$ EFCEF- 3.5120E-02 EF-1 1 0F 3 PUHPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLI$ EFCEF- 3.6820E-02 EF-1(OP.AM) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ EFEEF- 3.7470E-02 EF-1(GA/CB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LOIA$ EFFEF- 8.8590E-02 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ EFGEF- 4. 2 4 00E-01 EF-1(SB.CP) STEAH LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDC, 14SP$ ETHEF- 3.7290E-02 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ EFIEF- 1.00CCE+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 4.2320E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKEF- 4.4230E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS ETMEF-EFNET-3.7850E-02 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND 14SS OF 1 INST TRAINS 3.7000E-02 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF ONE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOSP, LOIA$ FXAFX 9.9990E-03 FX-1 FFACTION OF RLJ FAILL* REG REQ'G COLD S/D$ TXCFX 0.0000E-Ol FX-0.0 GU..RANTEED SUCCESS $ FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ GAAGA 1.4390E-01 GA-1 CIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ GABGA 3.8690E-01 CA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILEDS CACCA 1.0000E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILIDS GBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN B$ CBBGB 9.9810E-01 GB-1(GA) GBCGB GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ 7.2 530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILED $ CBDG B 8.9930E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ GBEGB 1.0000E+00 GB-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ RAAHA 3.7820E-02 RA-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS KABRA 1.0000E+00 HA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HBAHB 3.7820E-02 HB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4.3020E-02 HB-1(HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HIAHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1 1 or 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ HIBHI 7.2950E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ HICHI 1.4410E-04 HIB-1 1 OF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HICHI 7.2950E-03 HIB-2 2 CF 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HIIHI 2.3150E-04 HI-l 1 CF 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ HIFHI 5.6790E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HIMMI HIJHI 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 10F 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ 1.4410E-04 HIA-1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATERS I 1 tilli l l 4.2.22-4 l
i l 1
, i lv ;I 5
TABLE 4.2.22-1(continued) SHEET 4 OF 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HLAHL 4.1230E-04 HL-1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 MANUAL VLV OPEN$ HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 10F 2 OR 1 OF 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPENS HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4.6020E-03 HL-1(IC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HLFML 3.5710E-03 HL-2(SB) B TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HPAMPA 1.4983E-03 HPA-1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A CR B)$ HPBHPA 4.8570E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)10F 1 PUMP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILED $ HPCMPB 8.0870E-03 HPB-1 1 PUMP (C)$ HPDHPA 1.1300E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 OF 2 PUMPS (A Ch B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPEHPA 5.2070E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILED $ HPFHPA 1.2240E-02 HPA(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ HPGHPA 1.3690E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACK 0UTS HPIMPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP Ok NS$ HPLHPA 8.0870E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF AC POWER $ HPMHPA 2.3300E-02 HPA-1(OP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF OP AND GA(MAN START MUP-B) $ HPNHPA 1.9970E-02 HPA-L(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWN $ (A)\s - HPOMPA HPPHPA 1.3430E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB) B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATE $ 1.3690E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 OF 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ HPQHPA 1.49POE-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LAW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LOIA LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2910E-04 ID-1 OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCH$ IDBID 1.5370E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILID$ IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUAPANTEED FAILURE $ INAINJ 3.2910E-03 INJ-l RCP LEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.1670E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAIL $ INCINJ 3.2260E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-1 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUCED$ INDINJ 1.2510E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT NO OPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INEINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-1 WITH IA FAILED $ INFINJ 9.7000E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILED $ INGINJ 9.1510E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAILED $ INHINJ 1.0100E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILED $ INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(GA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1. 9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ LPELP 1. 9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NORMAL $ LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-SGTR$ LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES 1 ('~~\, rl l
\
l 4.2.22-5 l l
O TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 3.6450E-02 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF HFW RAMP BACKS MTBMF+ 1.12 50E-01 MT+1(GA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM MFW PUMPS $ MFDMF+ 0.000nE-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILLRE (GUARANI 2ED SUCCESS)$ MTEMF+ 4.1220E-02 MFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVENTED $ MFFMF+ 9.654 0E-01 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LCSS OF MS PRESS CONTROLS MFGMF- 4.7720E-02 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK TO SUFFICIENT FLOWS MTEMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFIMF- 1. 0000E+00 MF-1(OP) No CFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SG$ MFFMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARAPTEED FAILURE)$ MFLMF - 1.0000E+00 MF-2 (OP) MF-2 BUT NO 'P (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFMMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-3 OPERATOR BYP.JSES SLRDS (ASSUMED FAILED) $ MTNMT+ 4. 6340E-02 MF+1(DB) EXCESS HFW WITMOUT FW PUMP TRIP $ MFOMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, LOSS OF CONDENSER $ MFPMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-2(DA) INSUFFICIENT MFW, AFTER ISCLATION OF 1 SGS MFCMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1 0 GUARANTEED FAILURES MRAMR 3.4240E-01 MR-1 OPERATOR OPENS MU PUMP RECIRC LINES MRBMR 1.0000E+00 MR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES MRCMR 3. 62 50E-01 MR-1(GA/GB) OPENS MU PUMP RECIPC LINE W/0NE TRAIN DOWN$ NSANS 1.0710E-04 NS-1 SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS AVAILS NSBNS 7.9910E-04 NS-1(OP) SUFFICIENT COOLING, ALL SS A'/ AIL EXCEPT OPS NSCNS 1.8960E-02 NS-1(GA\CB) LIKE NSB EXCEPT ONE DG DOWN$ NSDNS 1.0710E-04 NS-1(EA\EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT ONE TRAIN OF ESAS DCWNS NSENS 1.066CE-04 NS-1(EA.EB) LIKE NSA EXCEPT BOTM TRAINS OF ESAS DOWN$ NSTNS 1.4750E-02 LONS LOSS OF NUCLEAR SERVICE INITIATING EVENTS NSGNS 1.0000E+00 NS-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURES OPACP 6.2820E-01 OP-1 GIVEN A PLANT TRIP (ALL IE EXCEPT LOSP) $ OPBOP 1.0000E+00 CP-1.0 GIVEN LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER IES PCAPO 7.5200E-02 PO-1 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING STEAMS PCBPO 1.4100E-01 PC-1(AA/VA) MANUAL PORV, No AUTO CONTROLS PCCPO 7.5200E-02 50-4 AUTO PORV OPENING, PASSING WATER $ PCFPO 1.0000E+00 PC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE, DA IAILS$ PVAPV 1.5860E-05 PV-1 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, l'A5 SING STEAMS PVBPV 5.8880E-04 PV-2 2 0F 2 rSI S OPEN, PASSING STEAM $ PVCPV 1.586CE-05 PV-3 1 0F 2 PSV'S OPENS, ?ASSING WATER $ PVDPV 5.888CE-04 PV-4 2 0F 2 PSV'S OPEN, PASSING WATER $ PWAPW 0.0000E-01 PW-1 BROKEN STEAM LINE WMIPS, BREAKS OTMEk$ RAARA 6.1660E-02 RA-1 REcov?TY OF IA AFTER LCSP$ 0 4.2.22-6
r r
/N (s_sl' r
TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) . i 4 SHEET 6 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION f r RCARC 3.0690E-03 RC-1 BOTH FSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING STEAM $ , RCBRC 2.0200E-01 RC-2 BOTH PSV'S CLOSE AFTER PASSING WATER $ RCCRC 2.85202-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-2 BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS I RCDRC. 2.7260E-04 RC-4 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING STEAM $ RCERC 1.3330E-03 RC-5 PORY CLOSES AFTER PASSING WATER $ j RCFRC 8.2770E-02 RC-6 LIKE RC-5, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROTS ! RCCRC 3.3230E-03 RC-7 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORY CLOSE AFTER STEAHS .g RCERC 2.0430E-01 RC-8 BOTH PSV'S AND THE PORV CLOSE AFTER WATER $ ; RCIRC 2.8940E-01 RC-3 LIKE RC-8, BUT HPI MUST MANUALLY BE THROT$ > RCJRC 2. 09 3 0E-02 RC-4 (1C) LIKE RC-4, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ - ROKRC 1.0140E-01 RC-5(1C) LIKE RC-5, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ! RCLRC 1.8370E-01 RC-6(1C) _LIKE RC-6, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ i RCMRC 2.4340E-02 RC-7(1C) LIKE RC-7, BUT 1C TO BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ LIKE RC-8, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ [ RCNRC 3.1270E-01 RC-8(lC)' RCORC 3. 8 5 4 0E-01 RC-9 (1C) LIKE RC-9, BUT 1C To BLOCK VALVE FAILED $ ! RCPRC 1.0000E+00 RC-1.0 ' GUARANTEED FAILURES ! RCCRC 2.0390E-01 RC-2(AC) LIKE RCB, DIFFERENT SFT LINE AFTER LOOP $ ! REARE 9.1000E-03 RE-1 RECOVER HPI AFTER SEAL / BATTERY FAILURES i REBRE 9.2930E-04 RE-2 RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW AVAILABLI$ ' O RECRE 1. 5 52 0E-01 12-1(E-) LIKE RE-1 BUT EF- FAILED $ ;
& REDRE 1.0000E+00 RE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES t REERE 0.0000E-01 RE-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ i REFRZ 3.9700E-01 RE-2(E-) RESTORE RIVER WATER, EFW FAILED $ ;
RIGRE 5.2500E-02 RE-3 RESTORE OP CR 1 DGS l RINRE 3.8990E-01 RE-3 (E-) RESTORE OP CR 1 DG W/0 EFW$ REIRE 4.5650E-01 RE-2(CV) RECOVER RIVER WATER, CV FAILED, EF OK$ i RPARP 4.9990E-03 RP-1 ALL RUNNING RCPS STAY RUNNINGS i RPBRP 1.0000E+00 RP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES RPCRP l 6.9430E-03 RP-1(CP) OP NOT LOST AS INITIATOR $ j RPDRP 0.0000E-01 RF-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ RTART 1.0500E-01 RT-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS RTBRT 3.5760E-06 RT-1(OP) 0FFSITE POWER LOST $ RTCRT 1.0000E+00 RT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUREW RTDRT 0.0000E-01 RT-0.0 GUARANTEED FICCESS$ l RVARV 2.7600E-06 RV-1 VESCEL RUPTC d TROM SU IN TB$ ' RVBRV 4.6130E-07 RV-2 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM 'IC FAILURES RVCRV 7.8990E-17 RV-3 VESSEL RUPTURE FROM TH AND PORVS
RVGRV 7.8990E-17 RV-7 VESS RUPT, HPI COOL AND NO PORV/PSV$ ! RVERV 4.9590E-08 RV-8 VESS RUPT, VSB AND HPI THROTTLED $ ; RVIRV 7.8990E-17 RV-9 VESS RUPT, VSB AND No HPI THROTTLED $ ! RVJRV 1.7500E-10 RV-10 VESS RUPT, EXCESSIVE MAIN FEEDWATER$ l RVKRV 2.7600E-06 RV-11 VESS RUPT, TURBINE TRIP FAILURES } RVLRV 4.5300E-06 RV-12 VESS RUPI, TC FAILS, DA/DB$
. RVMRV 4.6130E-07 RV-13 VESS RUPT, TC FAILS, VA/VB$ f f RVNRV 5.8020E-04 RV-14 VESS RUPT, TC AND SLRDS FAILED $ i t \ r i
i e 4.2.22-7
9 TABLE 4.2.22-1 (continued) SHEET 7 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION SAASA 5.1220E-02 SA-1 SUMP AND LH-V6A WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES (ALSO SABSA 1.0000E+00 SA-1(GA) LOCAL, MANUAL OPENING OF DH-V6 W/IN 1 MINS SACSA 3.9230E-03 SA-2 SUMP AND DH-V6A WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SAESA 1.0000E+00 SA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES SBASB 3.6840E-03 SB-1 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V0B OPENS, SHORT$ SBBSB 9.3430E-01 SB-1(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN, SHORT$ SBCSB 3.6840E-03 SB-2 RB SUMP ISOL VALVE DH-V6B OPENS, LONGS SBDSB 1.3600E-01 SB-2(SA) TRAIN B WORKS GIVEN TRAIN A DOWN. LONG$ SBESB 1.0000E+00 SB-1.0 GUARAFIEED FAILURES SBTLB 5.1200E-02 SB-1(CA) SUMP Abb DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 1 MINUTES S BOS B 3.9230E-03 SB-2(CA) SUMP AND DH-V6B WORK WITHIN 10 MINUTES $ SCASD 7.1190E-06 SD-1 1/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG OPEN ON DEMANDS SDBSD 7.1190E-06 SD-2 2/9 MSSVs ON EACH SG CPEN ON DEMANDS SCCSD 7.1190E-06 SD-3 2/9 MSSVs ON ONE OTSGS SDDSO 2.0000E+00 SD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES ' RASE 3.5370E-04 SE-1 ONE ICCW PUMP & HEAT EXCHANGER REQ'D$
?SE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(GA/GB) LIKE JE-1 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF AC AVAILS ;;E 1.0000E+00 SE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES
_:SE 5.8420E-04 SE-1(OP.AM SUCCESS) 1 OF 2 PUMPS MANUAL RESTARTS SEESE 1.0190E-02 SE-1(CP.AM SUCCESS.GB) 1 0F 1 PUMP MANUAL RESTART $ SIASI 8.8600E-02 SI-l CPERATOR ISOL SLB DOWNSTREAM OF MSIV'S$ SIBSI 1.0960E-01 SI-2 CPER ISOL SLB UPSTREAM OF MSIV'S(+EF&MS) $ SICSI 1.0000E+00 SI-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURE $ S LAS L 3.5830E-02 SL l ISCLATE OTSG, ALL SUPPCRT AVAILABLE$ S LBS L 4.2910E-02 SL-1(DA/DB) ISCLATE OTSG, ONE DC TRAIN DOWNS S LCSL 4.2270E-02 SL-l f VB.DA/VA.DB) ONE DC/0PP VITAL EUS DOWN$ SLOS L 3.5830E-02 SL-1(VA/VB) ISOLATE OTSG, ONE VITAL BUS DOWN$ S LESL 3.58 3 0E-02 SL-1(iA.VB) ISOLATE OTSG, BOTH VITAL BUSES DOWN$ S LFS L 1.0000E+00 SL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ SVASV 3.8950E-07 SV-1 SUMP DRAIN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAIL $ SVBSV 1.6180E-05 SV-1(CA/CB) 6 UMP DRAINS, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWNS SVCSV 0.0000E-01 SV-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ SVDSV 5. 9520E-03 SV-1(CA.CB) SUMP CRAINS, NO ESAS, INITIALLY CLOSED $ SVESV 5.3370E-05 SV-2 SUMP DRAINS, MANUALLY $ SVTSV 1.0000E+00 SV-1.0 CUARANTEED FAILURES TBATB 5.9410E-02 TB-1 TURBINE COOLING,MF & CD SUCCESS $ TDBTB 2.0600E-01 TB-1(CD) TUPBINE COOLING, MF SUCCESS, CD FAILED $ TBCTB 1.0000E+00 TB-1.0 TURBINE COOLING, CUARANTEED FAILURES TCATC 4.5350E-02 TC-1 ALL MSSVs, ADVs AND TBVs CLOSE AFTER DEMANDS TCBTC 5.0530E-02 TC-2 LIKE TC-1 BUT EF PUMP TURB STEAM ISO ADDED$ TCCTC 9.8520E-01 TCISG ISO OF ONE SG CIVEN STEAM FLOW ISOL FAILS TCDTC 2.8070E-02 TC-3 MSSVs CLOSE AFTER LOSS OF ATA INIT EVENTS TCETC 1.00001+00 TC-2(AM) TC-2 WITH NO INSTRUMENT AIR $ TCFTC 1.0000E+00 TC-2(CA/CB) TC-2 WITH ONLY l TRAIN OF 4 PSIG SIGNAL $ TCGTC 1.0850E-01 TC-4 AFTER MF+ FAILURES TCHTC 1.1430E-01 TC-5 AFTER MF+ FAILURE AND SGTR$ TCITC 1.0000E+00 TC-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILUPIS O 4.2.22-8
h i p i TABLE 4.2.22-1(continued) ; I v t SHEET 8 CF 8 [ i SF TE TREQUENut SF NAME DESCRIPTION ,
..... .......... ......... .............................................. j THATH 3.6270E-03 TH-1 OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI FLOW USING HU-V217$ i THBTH 5.2890E-02 TM-2. OPERATOR THROTTLES HPI USING HU-V16A/B/C/D$ -!
THCTH 4.5910E-02 TM-2 (GB) OPER THROT HPI W/HU-V16'S BUT B POWER FAILS $ THDTH 1.0000E+00 TH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES THETH 0.0000E-01 TM-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $' THFTH 4.1800E-02 TM-1(CP) OPER THROTTLES GIVEN OP FAILS BUT NOT AS IES I TNGTH 4.9740E-02 TM-2(GA) OPER THROTTIES W/NUV16S BUT A POWER FAILS $ 1 THHTH 5.2390E-02 TH-2(AC) THB, BUT DIFF SFT LINE TOR LOOP IN S-26$ ! TRATR 9.9990E-03 TR-1 OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT - SLB$ TRBTR 4.9990E-03 TR OTSG TUBES STAY INTACT + MLOCAS i TRCTR 1.0000E+00 TR-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES i TTATT 3.6400E-05 TT-1 ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE$ '+ TTBTT 1.7770E-03 TT-1(DA) ALL 4 TSV'S OR ALL 4 TCV'S CLOSE,W/ No DCAS -r TTCTT 1.0000E+00 TT-2 AFTER RT FAILS, NC SIGNAL GENERATED $ TTDTT 1.0000E+00 TT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES { TTETT 0.0000E-01 TT-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ + VAAVA 3.4950E-01 VA-1 GIVEN EITHER DC OR AC ES TRAIN A AVAILABLE$ ! VABVA 1.0000E+00 VA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH DC AND AC ES TRAIN A FAILEDS i VBAVB 3.4880E-01 VB-1 GIVIN (DA CR GA) AND (DB OR GB) AVAILS t VBBVB 3.4950E-01 VB-1(DA.GA) GIVEN DA & GA FAILED W/ DB CR GB AVAIL $ : VBCVB 1.0000E+00 VB-1.0 O 1CA1C 1CBIC 5.1700E-05 1C-1 1.0000E+00 1C-1.0 GIVEN BOT!* DB AND GB FAILED $ GIVEN AC FS TRAIN B AVAILS GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B FAILED $ f
? ?
< r i j 4 1 l t I l' 1 > I t f i i l I ! r d a 6 e 4.2.22-9 f
- - - -- -. --_ . - . -.-t
4.2.23 0.6g EARTHQUAKE MAIN TREE The general transient event tree and boundary condition table presented in Figure 4,1-2 and Table 4.1-3, respectively, were used for defining and quantifying the scenarios postulated to be initiated by a 0.6g earthquake. The quantification process used for this earthquake was unlike that used for any of the other nonseismic initiating events considered in this report. The process was described in some detail in Section 4.2.20 of this report and in Appendix B.4.4 of the technical summary report. The master frequency file used for the 0.69 earthquake case is presented in Table 4.2.23-1. t [ d O l. O 4.2.23-1 0587G102687PMR
s G TABLE 4.2.23-1. MEAN VALUES OF SPLIT FRACTIONS FOR 0.69 EARTHQUAKE SHEET 1 0F 8 SF TE FRIQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION AAAAA 4.9610E-05 AA-1 GIVEN VBA AND VBC ARE BOTH AVAIIABLE (VA)$ AABAA 2.6930E-01 AA-1(VA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH VA FAILED $ AACAA 1.0000E+00 AA-1.0 GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND VA FAILED $ AMAAM 3.1900E-01 AM-1 GIVEN OP, DB, AND GB ARE AVAIL $ AMBAM 3.5440E-01 AM-1(OP) GIVEN OP FAILED WITH DB AND GB AVAILS AMCAM 1.0000E+00 AM-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURIS AMDAM 3. 5930E-01 AM-1(OP.GA/GB) OP AND ONE AC POWER TRAIN FAILED $ BAABA 3.1510E-04 BA-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN A$ BAB BA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ BBABB 3.1510E-04 BB-1 BWST DISCHARGE VALVES OPEN, TRAIN BS BBBBB 3.1510E-04 BB-1(BA) TRAIN B OPENS GIVEN TRAIN A FAILS $ BBCBS 1.0000E+00 BB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES BWABW 5.6000E-01 BW-1 FLOW FROM BWST AVAILABLE$ BWBBW 5.7680E-01 BW-2 BWST, MAN START OF HPI PUMPS AND NOT THROTS BWCBW 5.9110E-01 BW-3 BWST FL.W AVAIL AFTER SB0 RECOV (RE-1 SUCC)$ BWDBW 5.6050E-01 BW-4 BWST FLOW AVAIL AFTER SBC RECOV (RE-2 SUCC)$ BWEBW 5. 6160E-01 BW-1(PO.RC) BWST FLOW AVAIL AND HPI NOT WRONGLY THROTS BWFBW 5.6160E-01 BW-1(VSB) BWST AND NO INAPPROPRIATE THROTTLINGS CIAC1 2.8290E-04 Cl-1 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION, LARGE HOLES C1BC1 2.7130E-03 Cl-1(GA/GB) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF EP IS DOWNS CICC1 6.2250E-03 Cl-1(CA/CL) LARGE HOLE, 1 TRAIN OF ESAS IS DOWN$ ClDCl 5.4080E-03 Cl-1(GA.GB) LARGE HOLE, NO AC POWER AVAILABLE$ ClEC1 1. 0000E+00 Cl-1( CA.CB.CP) LARGE HOLE, No ESAS, PURGE GOINGS ClGC1 1.0000E+00 Cl-1.0 GUARANTEED rAILURES C2AC2 3.1890E-05 C2-1 CONTAIUMENT ISCLATION FOR RCDT, LETDOWN $ C2BC2 4.4 590E-03 C2-1(GA/GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWNS C2CC2 7. 6870E-03 C2-1(CA/CB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- 1 TRAIN OF ESAS DOWN$ C2DC2 4.58 60E-03 C2-1(CA.GB) RCDT, LETDOWN -- NO AC POWER $ C2EC2 1.0000E+00 C2-1.0 GUARANTIED FAILURES C3AC3 1.3910E-05 C3-1 SEAL RETURN ISOLATION, ALL SS AVAILS C3BC3 3.5730E-03 C3-1(GA) SEAL RETURN IS01ATION,EP TRAIN A DOWNS C3CC3 1.0000E+00 C3-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CAACA 8.3380E-04 CA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS CABCA 2.9470E-01 CA-2 KANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLE$ CACCA 1.0000E+00 CA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CBACB 8.3380E-04 CB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLIS CBBCB 9.ll40E-01 CB-1(CA) TRAIN B AV?.ILABLE GIVEN CA FAILED $ CBCCB 0.0000E-01 CB-2 MANUAL ACTUATION, ALL SUP SYS AVAILABLIS CBDCB 1.0000E+00 CB-2(CA) MAN ACT GIVEN CA FAILED $ CBECB 1.0000E+00 CB-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURES CDACD 2.9930E-04 CD-1 COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION OF RCS$ COBCS 6.4670E-03 CD-1(CP) SLOW COOLDOWN ONLY, 36 HOURS $ CDDCD 3.0250E-04 CD-1(AA) SLOW COOLDOWN WITHOUT ADVS OR TBVS$ C0FCD 1.0000E+00 CD-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES CECCE 2.7690E-02 CE-1(DA/M-) RAPID C00LDOWN, TBV'S AND PORY NOT AVAIL $ WA CEDCE 2.8200E-02 CE-1(AA) LIKE CE-1, BUT BUS ATA NOT AVAILABLE$ WAS CD CEECE 1.0670E-01 CE-1(CP) RAPID C00LDOWN WITIZUT RCPS$ WAS CDE CEFCE 1.0000E+00 CE-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILED $ CEGCE 5.0120E-03 CE-1 RAPID COOLDOWN ONLY, ALL SUP AND M- AVAILS i O 4.2.23-2
O) TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) , SHEET 2 0F 8 , t SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION q ..... .......... ......... ....-......................................... . CTACF 5.8530E-01 CF-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ i CFBCF 1.0000E+00 CF-1(CA/G3) ONE TRAIN OF SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ CFCCF 1.0000E+00 CF-2 USING INDUSTRIAL COOLERS AFTER LORWS CFDCT 1.0000E+00 CF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES l CMNCS 5.7000E-05 ECHO OF CCHMON EQUATIONS IN RBSS EQUATION FILES i CPACP 1.3890E-01 CP-1 CONTAINHENT PURGE IN PROGRESS $ CSACS 1.0353E-03 CS-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQD, ALL SS AVAIL $ CSBCS 2.2460E-02 CS-1(GA/GB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQD, ONE DG DOWN$ CSCCS 2. 2 4 60E-02 CS-1(SA) 1 CF 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH A DOWNS CSDCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3(SA) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUCTION PATH A.DOWN$ CSECS 4.6470E-01 CS-3 MANUAL ACT OF 10F 2 TRAINS, ALL SS AVAILS CSTCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3(CA/GB) LIKE CS-3 BUT ONLY ONE TRAIN OF EP AVAILS CSGCS 2.2460E-02 CS-1(SB) 1 or 2 TRAINS WITH SUCT PATH B FAILED $ CSJCS 1.0000E+00 CS-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $' CSKCS 4.7610E-01 CS-3 (SB) LIKE CS-3 BUT SUMP TRAIN B IS FAILED $ CVACV 4.1590E=06 CV-1 COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPNT, ALL SS AVAIL $ CVBCV 1.4 2 60E-04 CV-1(OP) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, NO OP AVAILS CVCCV 2.3830E-04 CV-1(OP.GA) COOLING TO ALL VITAL EQPMT, EP TRAIN A DOWNS CVDCV 2.1840E-03 CV-1(NS) NUCLEAR SERVICES FAILED $- CVECV 1.2760E-03 CV-1(VB) LOSS OF VITAL INST BUS VBB CR VBD$ CVFCV 1.6120E-03 CV-1(GB.0P.1C) TRAIN B AND CP LCST$ CVCCV 2.3290E-03 CV-1(NS.GA.0P) NUCLEAR SERVICES & TRAIN A EP FAILED $ CVHCV 1.0000E+0L V-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O CVPCV DAADA DABDA 2.0710E-04 uCCV 6.7880E-01 DA-1 1.0000E+00 DA-1 0 CBV FAILS AS INITIATING EVENT $ GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN A POWER $ GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ DBADB 2.2510E-03 DB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR DC TRAIN B POWER $ l DBBDB 9.98905-01 D8-1(DA) GIVEN DC TRAIN A TAILED $ 1 DBCDB 1.0000E+00 DB-1.0 GIVEN DC TRAIN A INITIALLY TAILED $ . CHADH 4.3040E-04 DH-1 1 0F 2 TRAINS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAILS DMBDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(CA/CB) 10F 2 TRAINS REQ'D, CNE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ DHCDH 1.0000E+00 DH-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES d DHDDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF DHR REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWN$ DMEDH 1.4100E-02 DH-1(SB) 1 T?AIN OF DMR REQ'D, O 6 LOTION PATH DOWNS CHFDH 9.9 060E-02 DH-1(RA.HB) 6 RR. RECOVERY OF HA CR HB, ALL SS AVAILS DRHDH 5.9 030E-02 DH-1(RA.DB) LOCAL START OF 1 CHR TRAIN,1 DC TRAIN DCWN$ DHJDH 1.0000E*00 DH-1(FAIL) GUARANTEED FAILURES CHKDH 1.0160E-02 DH-1(GA) 6 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DNR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHLDH 8.0720E-03 DH-1(GA) 12 KR. RECOVERY OF 1 DHR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DKNDH 8.2950E-03 DH-1(CA) 24 HR. RECOVERY OF 1 DMR TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DHNDH 2.5880E-02 DH-1(CA) 6 HR. RCVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ DH0DH 2.0750E-02 DH-1(GA) 12 HR. RCVRY OF 1 RA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ - DHPDH 1.7770E-02 CH-1(GA) 24 HR. ACVRY OF 1 HA/HB TRN,1 SS TRN DOWN$ I CHQDH 1.4620E-04 DM-1 6 HR. RCVRY OF EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS . DMRDH 1.0890E-04 DH-1 12 KR. RCVRY . EITHER DHR TRN, ALL SS AVAILS l DMSDH 1.0600E-04 DH-1 24 KR. RCVRY of EITHER DHh TRN, ALL SS AVAILS , DHTDH 6.9450E-02 DH-1(HA.HB) 12 KR.RECuYERY OF MA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS ' DKUDH 6.3240E-02 DH-1(RA.hB) 24 MR.RIC0VERY OF RA OR HB,ALL SS AVAILS l l l i 1 N l 1 l l l i 4.2.23-3
O TABLE 4 2.23-1 (continued) SHEET 3 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION ..... .. ...--.- ..-- .... ..........-------..........------ -~.-------. DTADT 1.0630E-03 DT-1 OPERATOR PREVENTS LONG TERM BORON EFFECT9$ DTCDT 1.0000E+00 DT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EAAEA 6.1230E-01 EA-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EABEA 1.0000E+00 EA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ EBAEB 2.3110E=04 EB-1 ALL SUPPORT SYSitMS AVAILABL2$ EBBEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1(EA) TRAIN B AVAILABLE GIVEN EA FAILED $ IBCEB 1.0000E+00 EB-1.0 t.,UARANTIED FAILURES EFAEF+ 3.9250E-05 EF+1 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLE$ ETBEF+ 1.2950E-03 EF+1(SB) STEAM LINE BREAK AND ALL SUPPORT AVAILABLES ETCEF- 1.8670E-01 EF-1 1 0F 3 PCMPS, ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS AVAILABLES EFDEF- 1.8800E-01 EF-1(OP.AM) LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER AND INSTRUMENT AIR $ EFEEF- 1.8860E-01 EF-1(GA/GB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF AC POWER, LOSP, LCIA$ EFFEF- 2.3170E-01 EF-1(GA.GB) LOSS OF ALL AC POWER $ EFGEF- 5.1460E-01 EF-1(SB.0P) STEAM LINE BREAK IN INTERMED. BLDG, LOSP$ EFHEF- 1.8840E-01 EF-1(VA/VB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF VITAL INST POWER $ EFIEF= 1.0000E+00 EF-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES EFJEF- 5.1410E-01 EF-1(SB.DA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 DC TRAINS EFKIF- 5.3030E-01 EF-1(SB.GA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 AC TRAINS EFMEF- 1.8910E-01 EF-1(SB.VA) STEAM LINE BREAK AND LOSS OF 1 INST TRAIN $ EFNEF- 1.8820E-01 EF-1(DA/DB) LOSS OF CNE TRAIN OF DC POWER, LOS P, LCIAS TXAFX 1.0000E-02 TX-1 FRACTION OF RCS FAILURES REQ'G COLD S/D$ FXCFX 0.0000E-01 FX-0.0 GUARANTEED SUCCESS $ FXDFX 1.0000E+00 FX-1.0 GUARANTEED TAILURE$ CAAGA 6.5190E-01 CA-1 GIVIN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN A POWER $ GABGA 8.7860E-01 CA-1(OP) GIVEN OFFSITE POWER FAILEDS GACGA 1.0C00E+00 GA-1.0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A INITIALLY FAILED $ CBAGB 2.5130E-04 GB-1 GIVEN A DEMAND FOR AC ES TRAIN BS GBBGB 9.9980E-01 GB-1(GA) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A FAILED WITH OP AVAIL $ CBCOB 7.2530E-02 GB-1(OP) GIVEN AC ES TRAIN A AVAIL WITH OP FAILIDS GBDGB 9.9 410E-01 GB-1(OP.GA) GIVEN BOTH AC ES TRAIN A AND OP FAILED $ CBEGB 1. 0t 00E+00 GB-1. 0 GIVEN AC ES TRAIN B INITIALLY FAILED $ KAAHA 3.7 40E-02 KA-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS MABRA 1.0000E+00 RA-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HBAHB 3.7750E-02 MB-1 1 0F 1 TRAIN REQ'D, ALL SS AVAILS HBBHB 4 . 314 0 E-O ' * '. ( HA) 1 TRAIN REQ'D GIVEN THE OTHER TRAIN'S DOWNS HBCHB 1.0000E+00 HB-1.0 ALL SUPPORT SYSTEMS FAILED $ HIAHI 1.4440E-C4 HIA-1 10F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'D$ HIBMI 7.3010E-03 HIA-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH A REQ'DS HICHI 1.4440E-04 HIB-1 1 or 2 VALVES IN INJECTION PATH B REQ'D$ HICHI 7.3010E-03 HIB-2 2 0F 2 VALVES IF INJECTION PATH B REQ'DS HIEHI 2.318CE-04 HI-1 10F 2 VALVES IN BOTH INJECT PATHS REQ'D$ HIFHI 5.7020E-05 HI-2 10F 4 VALVES OF ALL INJECTION PATHS $ HIGHI 1.0000E+00 HI-1.0 GUARANTEID TAILURES HIKHI 1.4440E-04 HIA-1(SBO) 1 or 2 VALVES IN PATH WITH POWER RESTORED $ HIJHI 1.4440E-04 HIA 1(LR) 1 0F 2 VALVES IN TRAIN WITH RIVER WATER $ 9 4.2.23-4
TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) SHEET 4 0F 0 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION HIAHL 4.1230E-04 HL.1 3/3 DROPLINE VLVS AND 1/2 MANUAL VLV CPEN$ HLBHL 3.8610E-04 HL-2 1 0F 2 OR 1 0F 1 PIGGY-BACK VALVES OPENS HLCHL 1.0000E+00 HL-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES HLDHL 4. 6020E-03 HL-1(lC) MANUAL 3/3 DROPLINE VALVES AND 1/2 MAN VLV$ HLEHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SA) A TRAIN OF PIGGY-BACK VALVES $ HLFHL 3.5710E-03 HL-2 (SB) B TRAIN OF PIGCY-BACK VALVES $ HPAHPA 1.5200E-03 HPA.1 1 0F 2 PUMPS (A OR B) $ HPBHPA 4.8360E-03 HPA-1(DA/HA)10F 1 PUHP (B) GIVEN DA/HA HAS FAILIDS HPCHPS 8.0960E-03 HPB.1 1 PUHP(C)$ HPDHPA 1.3060E-02 HPA-1(HPB) 1 0F 2 PCHPS (A CR B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPEMPA 5.27 60E-02 HPA(HPB.0P) 1 0F 2 PUHPS GIVEN HPB-1 & OP FAILID$ HPFHPA 1.4640E-0J HP)(HPB.DA) 1 0F 2 PUMPS GIVEN HPB-1 & DA FAILED $ HPGHPA 1.3490E-01 HPA-2 2 0F 2 PUMPS (A & B) GIVEN HPB-1 FAILED $ HPHHPA 1.1440E-02 HPA-1(SBO) FOR STATION BLACKOUTS HPIHPA 1.0000E+00 HPA-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPA$ HPJHPB 1.0000E+00 HPB-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE OF HPBS HPKHPA 8.096CE-03 HPA(OP/NS) HPA WITH LOSS OF OP OR NS$ HPLEPA 8.0960E-03 HPA-1(GB) HPA WITH LOSS OF B TRAIN OF'AC POWER $ HPHHPA 2.3980E-02 HPA-1(CP.GA)HPA WITH LOSS OF CP AND CA(HAN START MVP-B)$ HPNMPA 1.9130E-02 HPA-1(EA.EB) ALL SUPPORT AVAIL BUT EA.EB DOWNS HP0HPA 1.3480E-03 HPA-1(HA.DB)B PUMP CONTINUES TO OPERATES s_,/ HPPHPA 1.3490E-01 HPA-2(LR) 2 0F 2 PUMPS AFTER RW RECOVERY $ HPQHPA 1.5200E-03 HPA-1(LR) DIFFERENT SFT FOR LRW (SAME EQNS AS HPA)$ IAAIA 2.0000E-03 LCIA LOSS OF I"STRUHENT AIR INITIATING EVENTS IDAID 1.2680E-04 ID-1 CPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR AS SUCH$ IDBID 1.5100E-04 ID-1(OP) OPERATOR IDENTIFIES SGTR, OP FAILED $ IDCID 1.0000E+00 ID-1.0 GUARANTEED FAIL 7RES INAINJ 3.3560E-03 INJ-1 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP A CR B AVAILS INBINJ 8.2470E-03 INJ-2 RCP SEAL INJ REQ'D GIVEN PUMP C AVAILS INCINJ 3.2290E-03 INJ-3 LIKE INJ-l BUT No CPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INDINJ 1.2660E-02 INJ-4 LIKE INJ-2 BUT No CPERATOR ACTION INCLUDED $ INEINJ 9.2000E-02 INJ-1(AM) LIKE INJ-l WITH IA FAILIDS INFINJ 9.6890E-02 INJ-2(AM) LIKE INJ-2 WITH IA FAILIDS INGINJ 9.1870E-02 INJ-3(AM) LIKE INJ-3 WITH IA FAIL 2DS INHINJ 1.0130E-01 INJ-4(AM) LIKE INJ-4 WITH IA FAILIDS INIINJ 1.0000E+00 INJ-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURE $ LPALP 8.3310E-04 LP-1 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D WITH ALL SS AVAIL $ LPBLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, ONE TRAIN OF AC DOWN$ LPCLP 1.0000E+00 LP-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES LPDLP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SA) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, A SUCTION PATH DOWNS LPELP 1.9170E-02 LP-1(SB) 1 TRAIN OF LPIS REQ'D, B SUCTION PATH DOWNS LTALT 6.9600E-02 LT-1 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKEUP-NORMAL $ LTBLT 6.5570E-02 LT-2 CPERATOR PROVIDES LONG TERM MAKIUP-SGTR$ LTCLT 1.0000E+00 LT-1.0 GUARANTEED FAILURES O t
%.)
4.2.23-5
TABLE 4.2.23-1 (continued) SMEET 5 0F 8 SF TE FREQUENCY SF NAME DESCRIPTION MFAMF+ 1.8710E-01 MF+1 BOTM TRAINS OF MFW RAMP BACK$ MTBMT+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(CA/GB) 1 TRAIN OF EP DOWN$ MFCMF+ 1.1250E-01 MF+1(AA) OPERATOR TRIPS BOTM HFW PUMPS $ MFDMF+ 0.0000E-01 MF+1(LOSP) 0FFSITE POWER FAILURE (GUARANTEED SUCCESS)$ MFEMT+ 1.7710E-01 XFPT MFW PUMPS TRIP AFTER OVERC00 LING PREVINTEDS MFFMF+ 9.9430E-01 MFTBV/ADV EXCESS MFW AFTER LOSS OF MS PRESS CONTROL $ MFCMF- 1.9570E-01 MF-1 MFW SYSTEM RAMPS BACK To SUFFICIENT FLOW $ MFHMF- 1.0000E+00 MF-1(AA) NO ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MFIMF- 1. 0000E+00 MF-1(OP) NO OFFSITE POWER (GUARANTEED FAILURE) $ MFJMF- 3.8660E-02 MF-2 SUFFICIENT MFW AFTER ISOLATION OF ONE SGS MTKMF. 1.0000E+00 MF-2(AA) MF-2 BUT No ATA (GUARANTEED FAILURE)$ MF LMF- 1.00}}