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| {{#Wiki_filter:From: Burnell, Scott Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2014 11:51 AM To: colldm@gmail.com | | {{#Wiki_filter:From: Burnell, Scott Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2014 11:51 AM To: colldm@gmail.com |
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| ==Subject:== | | ==Subject:== |
| RE: your e-mail to the NRC Hello Mr. Collins: | | RE: your e-mail to the NRC Hello Mr. Collins: |
| The NRC understands your May 7 e-mail (available in the NRC's electronic document database, ADAMS, under accession No. ML14128A432) questions the NRC's ability to independently oversee the U.S. civilian use of nuclear materials. Specifically, you cited the Wikipedia entry on "regulatory capture" referring to the regulation of nuclear power. | | The NRC understands your May 7 e-mail (available in the NRCs electronic document database, ADAMS, under accession No. ML14128A432) questions the NRCs ability to independently oversee the U.S. civilian use of nuclear materials. Specifically, you cited the Wikipedia entry on regulatory capture referring to the regulation of nuclear power. |
| As an independent regulatory agency, our robust and comprehensive approach holds U.S. | | As an independent regulatory agency, our robust and comprehensive approach holds U.S. |
| nuclear power plants to strict safety standards. | | nuclear power plants to strict safety standards. The NRC never wavers from its primary mission of ensuring the publics health and safety during any civilian use of radioactive material. The NRC carries out that mission by requiring every U.S. reactor to meet safety requirements. In many cases those requirements are based on standards created and maintained by national professional organizations. For instance, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers codes have been incorporated into requirements for reactor vessels and reactor coolant piping, while the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers codes apply to computer systems. The NRC only approves (by regulation) changes to those standards if the changes continue to reasonably assure the agency the public will remain adequately protected. In some cases the NRC has required that the new codes be used only in conjunction with additional NRC-approved safety conditions. |
| The NRC never wavers from its primary mission of ensuring the public's health and safety during any civilian use of radioactive material. The NRC carries out that mission by requiring every U.S. reactor to meet safety requirements. In many cases those requirements are based on standards created and maintained by national professional organizations. For instance, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' codes have been incorporated into requirements for reactor vessels and reactor coolant piping, while the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers' codes apply to computer systems. The NRC only approves (by regulation) changes to those standards if the changes continue to reasonably assure the agency the public will remain adequately protected. In some cases the NRC has required that the new codes be used only in conjunction with additional NRC-approved safety conditions. | | The NRC has addressed the issue of safety culture mentioned in your e-mail. The agency issued its policy on safety culture in June 2011, and the policy statement included input from Commissioner George Apostolakis (quoted in your e-mail), who was confirmed as a Commissioner in 2010. More information on the NRCs approach to safety culture is available on the agency website at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/safety-culture.html The NRC also inspects each nuclear power plant, and takes regulatory action (including enforcement action) where necessary, if the NRC identifies a potential safety or security concern. One example is the sequence of events following the severe corrosion incident at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant - a case where the licensee, FirstEnergy, was fined $5.5 million for lying to the NRC and failing to follow critical agency requirements. The NRC kept Davis-Besse shut down for several years until the plants damaged reactor vessel head was replaced and other required repairs were done. When later inspections revealed that the replacement head was also showing degradation, the NRC then ensured FirstEnergy accelerated its plans to install a brand-new reactor vessel head that utilizes a more corrosion-resistant alloy. The NRC also recently kept the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant shut down for more than a year to ensure the plant addressed several operational issues. When the Tennessee Valley Authority sought permission to restart the long-dormant Browns Ferry Unit 1 reactor, the NRC required years of analysis and maintenance before the agency was satisfied the reactor was suitable for operation. |
| | The agency operates in an open and transparent manner, reaching decisions based on the best available information and analysis. The general public, interest groups, Congress and nuclear utilities all provide input and information for the agencys deliberations. We make safety-significant decisions without regard for potential economic impacts on plant operators. The NRC |
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| The NRC has addressed the issue of safety culture mentioned in your e-mail. The agency issued its policy on safety culture in June 2011, and the policy statement included input from Commissioner George Apostolakis (quoted in your e-mail), who was confirmed as a Commissioner in 2010. More information on the NRC's approach to safety culture is available on the agency website at:
| | sets appropriate technical requirements using impartial professional standards, expertise and analysis. We have inspectors working daily at every nuclear power plant in the country and we enforce our requirements to ensure the public remains safe. |
| http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/safety-culture.html
| |
| | |
| The NRC also inspects each nuclear power plant, and takes regulatory action (including enforcement action) where necessary, if the NRC identifies a potential safety or security concern. One example is the sequence of events following the severe corrosion incident at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant - a case where the licensee, FirstEnergy, was fined $5.5
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| million for lying to the NRC and failing to follow critical agency requirements. The NRC kept Davis-Besse shut down for several years until the plant's damaged reactor vessel head was replaced and other required repairs were done. When later inspections revealed that the replacement head was also showing degradation, the NRC then ensured FirstEnergy accelerated its plans to install a brand-new reactor vessel head that utilizes a more corrosion-resistant alloy. The NRC also recently kept the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant shut down for more than a year to ensure the plant addressed several operational issues. When the Tennessee Valley Authority sought permission to restart the long-dormant Browns Ferry Unit 1 reactor, the NRC required years of analysis and maintenance before the agency was satisfied the reactor was suitable for operation.
| |
| | |
| The agency operates in an open and transparent manner, reaching decisions based on the best available information and analysis. The general public, interest groups, Congress and nuclear utilities all provide input and information for the agency's deliberations. We make safety-significant decisions without regard for potential economic impacts on plant operators.
| |
| The NRC sets appropriate technical requirements using impartial professional standards, expertise and analysis. We have inspectors working daily at every nuclear power plant in the country and we enforce our requirements to ensure the public remains safe.
| |
| Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission}} | | Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission}} |
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24274A1482024-09-30030 September 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse - RAI Re Relief Request L-23-214 ML24221A0082024-08-0707 August 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Remove the Table of Contents from the Technical Specifications ML24204A0012024-07-17017 July 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Vistraops Fleet Exemption for the Requirements in 10 CFR 50.71 Pertaining to the Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports ML24170B0562024-06-18018 June 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Results for Davis-Besse, Unit No. 1 - RR-A1 ISI Impracticality ML24061A1002024-03-29029 March 2024 Energy Harbor Fleet- Closing of Transaction Between Vistra Operations Company LLC and Energy Harbor Nuclear Corporation (Email) ML24080A3922024-03-20020 March 2024 NRR E-mail Capture - Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Davis-Besse Power Station Unit No. 1, and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Exemption for Final Safety Analysis Report Update ML23128A1612023-05-0808 May 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of Requested Licensing ML23086B9862023-03-27027 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance Review Results for Davis-Besse, Unit No. 1 - Proposed Alternative Request RP-5 ML23033A0322023-02-0101 February 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information for Davis-Besses 2022 Steam Generator Inspection Report (L-2022-LRO-0115) ML22266A1102022-09-23023 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding July 21, 2022, Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure ML22164A8572022-06-13013 June 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan ML22118A6862022-04-28028 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative to Extend the Steam Generator Weld Inspection Interval ML22112A1092022-04-22022 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise the Design Basis for the Shield Building ML22090A1692022-03-30030 March 2022 Re_ Action Tracking Item 2022 SST - 335 - Tom Gurdziel, E-mail Re_ Event Number 55734 at Davis Besse, a Matter of Interpretation ML22080A2512022-03-18018 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) ASME OM Code Case OMN-27, Alternative Requirements for Testing Category a Valves (Non- Piv/Civ) ML22055B0382022-02-24024 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Upcoming Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection ML22055A0872022-02-23023 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request RP-3 ML22045A4962022-02-14014 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Revise the Emergency Plan ML22040A1832022-02-0707 February 2022 LTR-22-0033 Tom Gurdziel, E-mail Event Number 55734 at Davis Besse, a Matter of Interpretation ML22034A9472022-02-0303 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Revised Review Estimates for Proposed Alternative to Extend the Steam Generator Weld Inspection Interval ML22033A0632022-02-0101 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Revise the Design Basis for the Shield Building Containment Structure ML21321A3792021-11-16016 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Alternative to Extend the Steam Generator Weld Inspection Interval ML21321A3782021-11-16016 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Energy Harbor Fleet, Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 and DAVIS-BESSEL Unit 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Adoption of TSTF-554 EPID-L-2021-LLA-0193 ML21287A0382021-10-14014 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of Requests for Relief from Certain Inservice Testing Requirements ML21271A1332021-09-28028 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of Proposed Alternative RR-A2 for Certain Steam Generator Weld Inspections ML21119A2152021-04-28028 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Energy Harbor Fleet, Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 and DAVIS-BESSE Unit 1 - Acceptance of Relief Request Proposed Alternative to Use ASME OM Code Case OMN-27 ML21041A5452021-02-10010 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports ML21007A3732021-01-0707 January 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) (External) Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Incorporate the Applicable Standard Technical Specification 5.2.2, Unit Staff, ML21004A1442020-12-30030 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Incorporate the Applicable Standard Technical Specification 5.2.2, Unit Staff ML20329A3832020-11-24024 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for an Exemption from the 2020 Force-on-Force Exercises ML20304A2842020-10-29029 October 2020 50.59 Inspection 2nd Request for Information ML20289A0992020-10-0505 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Energy Harbor Fleet, Results of Acceptance Review Request to Use Provision in Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, EPID-l-2020-LLR-0132 ML20281A3692020-10-0505 October 2020 Energy Harbor Fleet, Results of Acceptance Review Request to Use Provision in Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI, EPID-l-2020-LLR-0132 ML20239A7942020-08-25025 August 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Energy Harbor Fleet, Beaver Valley Units 1 and 2 and DAVIS-BESSEL Unit 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Incorporation of Applicable Standard in TS 5.2.2.e ML20203M3722020-07-21021 July 2020 Ultimate Heat Sink Request for Information Part 1 and Part 2 ML20203M3712020-07-21021 July 2020 Ultimate Heat Sink Request for Information Part 1 L-20-183, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force2020-06-23023 June 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Adoption of TSTF-425, Revision 3, Relocate Surveillance Frequencies to Licensee Control - Risk Informed Technical Specification Task Force ML20154K7642020-06-0202 June 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425 ML20127H8672020-05-0606 May 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Beaver Valley, Davis-Besse, and Perry - Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exemptions from Part 73 Security Requalification Requirements ML20058D3152020-02-27027 February 2020 Completion of License Transfer for the Beaver Valley, Davis-Besse and Perry Nuclear Units ML20024E0092020-01-23023 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - FENOC License Transfer - January 23, 2020 Call Summary ML20021A3162020-01-21021 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Containment Leakage Rate Testing ML19346B3972019-12-11011 December 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-425 ML19273A1132019-09-27027 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Extend Containment Leakage Rate Test Interval ML19179A1382019-06-28028 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse - Request for Additional Information Regarding the Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program ML19164A1532019-06-13013 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Post-Shutdown Emergency Plan ML19162A3922019-06-11011 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications ML19161A2132019-06-0606 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Results of Acceptance Review - FENOC Fleet - Request for Approval of Request for Approval of Lrradiated Fuel Management Plans, EPID L-2019-LRO-0016 ML19149A6202019-05-29029 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1 - Request for Approval of the Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program ML19130A2082019-05-0808 May 2019 Email - NRC Email to FEMA Dated May 8, 2019: NRC Response to Comment on FEMA Review of Proposed Changes to DBNPS Emergency Plan for Permanently Defueled Condition 2024-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
From: Burnell, Scott Sent: Thursday, May 22, 2014 11:51 AM To: colldm@gmail.com
Subject:
RE: your e-mail to the NRC Hello Mr. Collins:
The NRC understands your May 7 e-mail (available in the NRCs electronic document database, ADAMS, under accession No. ML14128A432) questions the NRCs ability to independently oversee the U.S. civilian use of nuclear materials. Specifically, you cited the Wikipedia entry on regulatory capture referring to the regulation of nuclear power.
As an independent regulatory agency, our robust and comprehensive approach holds U.S.
nuclear power plants to strict safety standards. The NRC never wavers from its primary mission of ensuring the publics health and safety during any civilian use of radioactive material. The NRC carries out that mission by requiring every U.S. reactor to meet safety requirements. In many cases those requirements are based on standards created and maintained by national professional organizations. For instance, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers codes have been incorporated into requirements for reactor vessels and reactor coolant piping, while the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers codes apply to computer systems. The NRC only approves (by regulation) changes to those standards if the changes continue to reasonably assure the agency the public will remain adequately protected. In some cases the NRC has required that the new codes be used only in conjunction with additional NRC-approved safety conditions.
The NRC has addressed the issue of safety culture mentioned in your e-mail. The agency issued its policy on safety culture in June 2011, and the policy statement included input from Commissioner George Apostolakis (quoted in your e-mail), who was confirmed as a Commissioner in 2010. More information on the NRCs approach to safety culture is available on the agency website at: http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/safety-culture.html The NRC also inspects each nuclear power plant, and takes regulatory action (including enforcement action) where necessary, if the NRC identifies a potential safety or security concern. One example is the sequence of events following the severe corrosion incident at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant - a case where the licensee, FirstEnergy, was fined $5.5 million for lying to the NRC and failing to follow critical agency requirements. The NRC kept Davis-Besse shut down for several years until the plants damaged reactor vessel head was replaced and other required repairs were done. When later inspections revealed that the replacement head was also showing degradation, the NRC then ensured FirstEnergy accelerated its plans to install a brand-new reactor vessel head that utilizes a more corrosion-resistant alloy. The NRC also recently kept the Fort Calhoun nuclear power plant shut down for more than a year to ensure the plant addressed several operational issues. When the Tennessee Valley Authority sought permission to restart the long-dormant Browns Ferry Unit 1 reactor, the NRC required years of analysis and maintenance before the agency was satisfied the reactor was suitable for operation.
The agency operates in an open and transparent manner, reaching decisions based on the best available information and analysis. The general public, interest groups, Congress and nuclear utilities all provide input and information for the agencys deliberations. We make safety-significant decisions without regard for potential economic impacts on plant operators. The NRC
sets appropriate technical requirements using impartial professional standards, expertise and analysis. We have inspectors working daily at every nuclear power plant in the country and we enforce our requirements to ensure the public remains safe.
Scott Burnell Public Affairs Officer Nuclear Regulatory Commission