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| * Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 | | * Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 27, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 |
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| ==Dear Sir:== | | ==Dear Sir:== |
| Salem Generating Station License No. DPR-75 Docket No. 50-311 Unit No. 2 Special Report 90-3 April 27, 1990 This Special Report addresses pressurizer overpressure protection system (POPS) actuations on. April 1, 1990. It is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3c pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery. | | |
| MJP:pc Distribution 9005080124 900427 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDC The .. Energy People . .,t i-,*ibl:l*te* . Sincerely yours, L.K. Miller General Manager Salem Operations 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 1 SPECIAL REPORT NUMBi990-3 PLANT IDENTIFICATION: | | Salem Generating Station License No. DPR-75 Docket No. 50-311 Unit No. 2 Special Report 90-3 This Special Report addresses pressurizer overpressure protection system (POPS) actuations on. April 1, 1990. It is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3c pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2. |
| Salem Generating Station -Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: | | This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery. |
| * Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Channel I Actuation Due To An Equipment Problem Event Date{s): 4/01/90 Report Date: 4/27/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 90-218 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
| | Sincerely yours, L.K. Miller General Manager Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 9005080124 900427 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDC The . Energy People . .,t i-,*ibl:l*te*. |
| | 95-2189 (10M) 12-89 |
| | |
| | 1 SPECIAL REPORT NUMBi990-3 PLANT IDENTIFICATION: |
| | Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| | Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Channel I Actuation Due To An Equipment Problem Event Date{s): 4/01/90 Report Date: 4/27/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report No. 90-218 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE: |
| Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown) | | Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown) |
| Unit had been brought to Mode 5 at 1349 hours on April 1, 1990 in .support of the initiation of the 5th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: | | Unit had been brought to Mode 5 at 1349 hours on April 1, 1990 in |
| This Special Report addresses a Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System {POPS) actuation. | | .support of the initiation of the 5th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: |
| The actuation occurred on April 01, 1990 at 1855 hours. This report is submitted for information in *accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c. | | This Special Report addresses a Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System {POPS) actuation. The actuation occurred on April 01, 1990 at 1855 hours. This report is submitted for information in *accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c. which states: |
| which states: In the event that either the POPS's or the RCS vents are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be* prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within thirty (30) days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the POPS's or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. | | In the event that either the POPS's or the RCS vents are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be* |
| On April 1, 1990 at 1855 hours, with the Unit in Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown), the 2PR1 valve (Power Operated Relief Valve) lifted (POPS actuation) af.ter removing No. 23 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) from service an4Sp;J;acing Ho. 21 RCP in service. The RCPs were swapped in support burst" operations. | | prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within thirty (30) days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the POPS's or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence. |
| Reactor Coolant System (RCS) indicated. | | On April 1, 1990 at 1855 hours, with the Unit in Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown), the 2PR1 valve (Power Operated Relief Valve) lifted (POPS actuation) af.ter removing No. 23 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) from service an4Sp;J;acing Ho. 21 RCP in service. The RCPs were swapped in support of:'/l~~~ud burst" operations. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) indicated. pj:es*sure was 320 psig at the time of swapping the RCPs. |
| pj:es*sure was 320 psig at the time of swapping the RCPs. The indicated RCS._ pressure during the POPS actuation was 360 psig. After the first POPS actuation, three (3) additional actuations (same channel) occurred until pressure control was regained by removing No. 21 RCP from service and placing No. 23 RCP back in service at 1921 hours the same day (26 minutes later). The maximum RCS pressure observed, during any of the POPS actuations, was 365 psig. RCS pressure was reduced to approximately 310 psig upon regaining pressure control. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: :, --Ll. ::.-* .£ ** *::. . ,:_. ' r:J.::i Th1: The "root of this event has beeri=attrf.lid*ed to inadequate SPECIAL REPORT 90-3. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) procedural direction for identification of RCP requirements during Mode 5 operation. | | The indicated RCS._ pressure during the POPS actuation was 360 psig. |
| Procedure IOP-6, "Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown" does not clearly address the phenomenon (see Analysis section} that Pressurizer spray is not adequate to maintain RCS pressure control with No. 21 RCP. The procedure states: "When RCS is less than 250°F, Reduce the number of Reactor Coolant Pumps to one. (If possible, maintain 23 RCP in service to provide spray flow)". Contributing to this event has been inconsistent training in addressing Pressurizer Spray operations and the phenomenon identified in this Special Report. The Salem simulator treats RCS loops 21 and 23 as having equal capability for providing Pressurizer Spray.* The simulator training sessions are conducted in accordance with the procedural preference, however, the Operations Training lesson plans do not require discussion of the ha.sis for the pump preference. | | After the first POPS actuation, three (3) additional actuations (same channel) occurred until pressure control was regained by removing No. |
| | 21 RCP from service and placing No. 23 RCP back in service at 1921 hours the same day (26 minutes later). The maximum RCS pressure observed, during any of the POPS actuations, was 365 psig. RCS pressure was reduced to approximately 310 psig upon regaining pressure control. |
| | APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: ~ :, -- ~- Ll. ::.-* |
| | .£***::. . ,:_. ~ ' r:J.::i Th1: |
| | The "root '~cause of this event has beeri=attrf.lided to inadequate |
| | |
| | SPECIAL REPORT 90-3. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) procedural direction for identification of RCP requirements during Mode 5 operation. |
| | Procedure IOP-6, "Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown" does not clearly address the phenomenon (see Analysis section} that Pressurizer spray is not adequate to maintain RCS pressure control with No. 21 RCP. |
| | The procedure states: |
| | "When RCS is less than 250°F, Reduce the number of Reactor Coolant Pumps to one. (If possible, maintain 23 RCP in service to provide spray flow)". |
| | Contributing to this event has been inconsistent training in addressing Pressurizer Spray operations and the phenomenon identified in this Special Report. The Salem simulator treats RCS loops 21 and 23 as having equal capability for providing Pressurizer Spray.* The simulator training sessions are conducted in accordance with the procedural preference, however, the Operations Training lesson plans do not require discussion of the ha.sis for the pump preference. |
| ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: | | ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: |
| POPS is designed to protect the RCS from overpressurization by providing adequate relieving capability from the start of either one (1) Centrifugal Charging Pump or one (1) Safety Injection Pump during low temperature operation. | | POPS is designed to protect the RCS from overpressurization by providing adequate relieving capability from the start of either one (1) Centrifugal Charging Pump or one (1) Safety Injection Pump during low temperature operation. However, since No. 21 Centrifugal Charging Pump and both Safety Injection Pumps were cleared and tagged, only No. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump was available thereby satisfying the design of POPS. |
| However, since No. 21 Centrifugal Charging Pump and both Safety Injection Pumps were cleared and tagged, only No. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump was available thereby satisfying the design of POPS. As discussed in Westinghouse letter (PSE-86-639), "Pressurizer Spray Operation" dated December 11, 1986, RCPs may not provide Pressurizer Spray as required. | | As discussed in Westinghouse letter (PSE-86-639), "Pressurizer Spray Operation" dated December 11, 1986, RCPs may not provide Pressurizer Spray as required. Apparently, the Pressurizer surge line causes a pressure head loss (approximately 15 psi) due to the net elevation difference in raising the spray flow to the top of the Pressurizer. |
| Apparently, the Pressurizer surge line causes a pressure head loss (approximately 15 psi) due to the net elevation difference in raising the spray flow to the top of the Pressurizer. | | This loss is apparently compensated for when No. 23 RCP is used to supply Pressurizer Spray due to the Pressurizer surge line being connected to the No. 23 RCS loop. When any of the other pumps are individually in service (including No. 21 RCP), insufficient Pressurizer Spray driving head is provided. Therefore, when No. 21 RCP |
| This loss is apparently compensated for when No. 23 RCP is used to supply Pressurizer Spray due to the Pressurizer surge line being connected to the No. 23 RCS loop. When any of the other pumps are individually in service (including No. 21 RCP), insufficient Pressurizer Spray driving head is provided. | | * was put .,$~ service, insufficient Pressurizer Spray was provided resulting :j;:* ""-:he POPS actuations. These actuations were not terminated., ,.:l. No. 23 RCP was put back in service. |
| Therefore, when No. 21 RCP | | In Mode 5, Pr~ssurizer*spray can be provided by an alternate means (other than directly from the RCS 21 or 23 loops). This other source is the charging line from the Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS). This source is not affected by the pressure head loss caused by the surge line location. However, this source cannot be used if a differential temperature between the Pressurizer Spray line and charging return line is ~ 320°F. During this event, the differential temperature was 323°F. |
| * was put service, insufficient Pressurizer Spray was provided resulting | | The POPS functioned as designed to mitigate pressure transients caused by the lack of sufficient Pressurizer Spray. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, |
| :j;:* ""-:he POPS actuations. | | |
| These actuations were not terminated., ,.:l. No. 23 RCP was put back in service. In Mode 5, can be provided by an alternate means (other than directly from the RCS 21 or 23 loops). This other source is the charging line from the Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS). This source is not affected by the pressure head loss caused by the surge line location. | | SPECIAL R~PORT 90-3. |
| However, this source cannot be used if a differential temperature between the Pressurizer Spray line and charging return line is 320°F. During this event, the differential temperature was 323°F. The POPS functioned as designed to mitigate pressure transients caused by the lack of sufficient Pressurizer Spray. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, SPECIAL 90-3. | | ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) due to the actuation of POPS, this Special Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c, pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2. . |
| * ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) due to the actuation of POPS, this Special Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c, pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2. . CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operations Department procedure(s) will be reviewed and revised to ensure that operations personnel are aware of the constraints for providing sufficient Pressurizer Spray such that mitigating actions can be taken to prevent a future POPS actuation.
| | CORRECTIVE ACTION: |
| This event will be reviewed by the PSE&G Nuclear Training Department to ensure existing training programs are revised to include the detail for the RCP preference when employing Pressurizer Spray. A Simulator Deficiency Report has been approved. | | Operations Department procedure(s) will be reviewed and revised to ensure that operations personnel are aware of the constraints for providing sufficient Pressurizer Spray such that mitigating actions can be taken to prevent a future POPS actuation. |
| Plans are in place to model the Pressurizer Spray function as per the actual plant response. | | This event will be reviewed by the PSE&G Nuclear Training Department to ensure existing training programs are revised to include the detail for the RCP preference when employing Pressurizer Spray. A Simulator Deficiency Report has been approved. Plans are in place to model the Pressurizer Spray function as per the actual plant response. '- |
| MJP:pc SO.RC Mtg. 90-043 '-General Manager Salem Operations | | General Manager ~ |
| * .. !*}} | | Salem Operations MJP:pc SO.RC Mtg. 90-043 |
| | *.. !*}} |
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[Table view] Category:LER)
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Caused by Moisture Build Up in Starting Air headers.2A EDG Equipment Inspected Just Subsequent to Aborted Start ML18102B6001997-09-30030 September 1997 Special Rept 97-02:on 970909,isolation of Fire Protection Water to Plant Auxiliary Bldgs & Containments Occurred Due to Closure of Valves 1PF186 & 1PF187.Valves Opened on 970916 & Locally Verified Open by Loss Prevention Personnel ML18102B4241997-06-30030 June 1997 Special Rept 97-01:on 970615,radiation Monitoring Sys Channel 1R15 Was Inoperable for More than Seven Days.Caused by Configuration of Plant.Required Operational Surveillances Will Be Completed on 2R15 & Channel Restored ML18101B3051996-03-25025 March 1996 Special Rept:On 960224,valid Failure of 1B EDG Was Identified During Surveillance Testing.Caused by Fatigue Due to Normal Machine Vibration.Replaced Threaded Nipple ML18101B1581995-12-29029 December 1995 Special Rept 95-02:on 951207,valid Failure of 1A EDG Identified Approx 23 & 1/2 H Into 24 H Endurance Surveillance Test.Caused by Lubricating Oil Leak at Threaded Piping Nipple.Threaded Nipple Replaced ML18101B1541995-12-27027 December 1995 Special Rept 95-001:on 951129,valid Failure of 1B EDG Identified During Routine Monthly Surveillance Test.Caused by Malfunction of Woodward Electronic Governor Control Unit. Unit Replaced & 1B EDG Tested Satisfactorily on 951214 ML18101A8061995-07-0303 July 1995 Special Rept:On 950607,identified That 950601 Failure of EDG 1B Potential Common Mode Failure.Util Unable to Determine Cause at Present Time.Ler Will Be Submitted to NRC ML18101A7341995-05-19019 May 1995 Special Rept:On 950506,RMS Declared Inoperable Due to Problems Encountered W/Operation of Victoreen Met Package. Caused by Met Package Inconsistencies.Appropriate Computer Software Corrections Being Researched & Will Be Implemented ML18101A5601995-02-15015 February 1995 Special Rept 95-01:on 950125,shortly After RCP Turned Off to Remove RCP from Svc,Momentary RCS Pressure Transient Occurred & Pressure Peaked 365.5 Psig Due to Pressure Equalization Through 21 RCS Loop.Procedures Will Be Changed ML18100B0421994-04-27027 April 1994 Special Rept 94-2:on 940329,valid Failure of 1A Diesel Generator Occurred.Caused by Buildup on Contacts of Breaker Position Switch 52HL,resulting in Excessive Electrical Resistance.Breaker Position Switch Replaced ML18100A8271994-01-20020 January 1994 Special Rept 94-01:on 940106,radiation Monitoring Channels 1R45B & 1R45C Declared Inoperable & Exceeded 7-day Time Frame for Restoring Inoperable Channels to Operable Status on 940113.Monitors Returned to Svc on 940118 ML18100A6211993-09-17017 September 1993 Special Rept 93-4:on 930910,radiation Monitoring Channels 2R45B & 2R45C Inoperable Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Design Deficiency.Corrected by Separating Monitors Reference & Chassis Grounds ML18100A4941993-07-21021 July 1993 Special Rept:On 930707,process Monitor - Noble Gas effluent- Condenser Exhaust Sys Was Removed from Svc Due to Observed Water in Its Sample Line.Sample Line 2R15 Drained & Dried. W/930721 Ltr ML18096B3511993-03-23023 March 1993 Special Rept 93-2:on 930310,RMS Channels 2R45B & 2R45C Removed from Svc to Functionally Test Low Flow Differential Pressure.Test Results Showed That Switch Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Design Mod Being Prepared ML18096B2571993-02-0404 February 1993 Special Rept 93-1:on 930104,fire Barrier Penetration Seal Impaired to Support Welding of RHR Sys Drain Piping.Barrier Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Cables Removed & Access Hatch Closed to Restore Penetration to Operability ML18096B2331993-01-28028 January 1993 Special Rept 93-1:on 930114,RMS Channels 1R45B & 1R45C Declared Inoperable Upon Annuciation of External Fail Alarm.Cause Not Determined.Upon Completion,Corrective Actions Will Be Taken & Channels Will Return to Svc ML18096B1701992-12-21021 December 1992 Special Rept 92-9:on 921208,chilled Water Supply Could Not Be Restored Following Completion of Rms Channel Functional Surveillance.Caused by Blow Indication Panel Circuit Fuse. New Solenoid Valve Operator Ordered ML18096B1601992-12-18018 December 1992 Special Rept 92-9:on 921112,fire Barrier Impairment Initiated to Support Svc Water Sys Design Changes & Penetration Inoperable for More than 7 Days Through 921119. Penetrations Will Be Sealed Upon Completion of Work ML18096B1171992-11-23023 November 1992 Special Rept 92-8:on 921116,RMS Channels Declared Inoperable & Removed from Svc for More than 7 Days.Caused by Bad Ground Wire Connection on Three Wire Power Cable.Connector Repaired & post-maint Testing Successfully Completed ML18096B0861992-11-0505 November 1992 Special Rept 92-7:on 921008,discovered Door Misaligned & Would Not Close & Latch.Caused by Equipment Failure.Fire Door Declared Functional Upon Completion of Repairs & Testing ML18096B0731992-10-30030 October 1992 Special Rept 92-8:on 920924,fire Barrier Penetrations Impaired to Support Design Change Work.On 921001, Penetrations Exceeded seven-day Limit,Per TS 3.7.11.a. Impaired Penetrations Resealed & Inspected ML18096B0591992-10-23023 October 1992 Special Rept 92-6:on 920924,valid Failure,Involving DG 2B, Occurred During Monthly Surveillance Testing & Exhaust Smoke Observed Rising from Around Turbocharger.Caused by Loose Pipe Fasteners.Fasteners Torqued Appropriately ML18096B0021992-09-24024 September 1992 Special Rept 92-7:on 920826,auxiliary Bldg 100-ft Elevation Corridor Fire Door Found Impaired & Not Returned to Operability within 7 Days.Caused by Broken Internal Hinge Plate Welds.Damaged Door Will Be Replaced ML18096A9151992-08-21021 August 1992 Special Rept 92-6:on 920814,radiation Monitoring Channels 1R45B & 1R45C Declared Inoperable for More than 7 Days. Caused by Degradation on Impellers of Two Sample Pumps. Preventive Maint Applicability Review Will Be Performed ML18096A8841992-08-0707 August 1992 Special Rept 92-4-1:on 920430,fire Pump 1 Started Knocking 10 Minutes Into half-hour Run.Caused by sheared-off Follower Guide Pin.On 920514,fire Pump Developed Severe Oil Leak.Caused by Piston Failing to Contact Cylinder Head ML18096A8261992-07-0909 July 1992 Special Rept 92-5:on 920623,actuation Capability of 78-ft Lower Electrical Penetration CO2 Fire Protection Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Required Maint Work.Sys Returned to Svc on 920702 ML18096A7431992-05-22022 May 1992 Special Rept 92-4:on 920430 & 0514,fire Pumps 1 & 2, Respectively,Inoperable for More than 7 Days.Caused by Sheared Cam Follower Pin & Severe Oil Leak.Fire Protection Sys cross-tie Valve Opened to Provide Backup Protection ML18096A7281992-05-22022 May 1992 Special Rept 92-3,on 920422,discovered That CO2 Sys Was Inoperable.Caused by Maint Work Activities.Upon Completion of Maint Diesel Generator Area CO2 Sys Will Be Returned to Svc ML18096A7351992-05-15015 May 1992 Ro:On 920423,fire Pump 1 Declared Inoperable & Remains Inoperable Due to Broken Crankshaft.Both Fire Suppression Sys Inoperable.On 920515,fire Pump 2 Declared Inoperable Due to Severe Oil Leak.Written Rept to Be Provided in 14 Days ML18096A7021992-05-11011 May 1992 Special Rept 92-2-1:on 920324,0414,15 & 25,fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days to Support Planned Work in SW Sys,Sw Project Support & SW Pipe Replacement.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Concerns Resolved ML18096A6501992-04-23023 April 1992 Special Rept 92-2:on 920324,0414 & 15,fire Barriers Impaired for Greater than Seven Days in Support of Planned Work. Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until Fire Protection Concerns Associated W/Areas Resolved ML18096A6491992-04-23023 April 1992 Special Rept 92-4:on 920318,two Fire Barrier Penetrations Were Impaired to Support Turbine/Generator Design Change Work for Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Outage Related Activities.Penetrations Were Resealed on 920326 ML18096A6051992-03-26026 March 1992 Special Rept 92-3:on 920302,jacket Water Leakage Developed After Loading DG 2A.On 920305,DG 2A Tripped on Low Lube Oil Pressure.Both Events Caused by Equipment Failure.Tube Connector Compression Fitting Replaced & Diesel Retested ML18096A5891992-03-23023 March 1992 Special Rept 92-2:on 920302 & 21,fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days to Support Design Changes & outage-related Activities.Hourly Fire Watch Established & Fire Penetrations Will Be Sealed ML18096A5671992-03-12012 March 1992 Special Rept 92-1:on 920223,fire Barriers Found Impaired for Greater than Seven Days.Caused by Equipment Failure.Fire Door Will Be Replaced Upon Receipt of New Door ML18096A5101992-02-0606 February 1992 Special Rept 92-1 on 920104,06 & 25,fire Barriers Impaired for Greater than Seven Days in Support of Outage Related Activities Due to Time Required to Complete Work.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until Concerns Re Areas Are Resolved ML18096A4231992-01-0909 January 1992 Special Rept 91-3,on 911210,26 & 27:fire Barriers Found Impaired for Greater than 7 Days.Cause of Occurrence Due to Support Outage Related Activities.Penetrations Will Be Sealed ML18096A4001991-12-23023 December 1991 Special Rept 91-4 Re Valid Failure of Diesel Generator 2B on 911122.Cause Unknown.Surveillance Procedure SP(O)4.8.1.1.2 Performed Satisfactorily ML18096A2301991-08-22022 August 1991 Special Rept 91-02:on 910725,reactor Trip Breaker Failure Occurred Duing Surveillance Testing of Reactor Trip Bypass Breaker.Detailed Investigation Rept Being Prepared & Breaker Being Replaced ML18096A0841991-06-20020 June 1991 Special Rept:On 910523 & 910525,valid Failure Re 2B Diesel Generator Occurred When pre-lube Pump Heater Circuit de-energized & non-valid Failure Occurred on 910525 Re Jacket Water Leak ML18095A8901991-04-17017 April 1991 Special Rept 91-1-1:on 910218,910220,910224 & 910322 Fire Barrier Penetration Seals Impaired for Greater than Seven Days.Cause of Impairment Was to Support Outage Activities. Hourly Fire Watch Will continue.W/910417 Ltr ML18095A8111991-03-20020 March 1991 Special Rept:On 910211,910213 & 910217 Fire Barrier Impairments Greater than Seven Days in Support of Planned Work.Cause of Impairment of Fire Barrier Penetrations Was to Support Outage Related Activities ML18095A7831991-03-0707 March 1991 Special Rept 91-1:on 910211,Elevation 64 & 84 Ft Switchgear Rooms & Elevation 78 Ft Electrical Penetration Area CO2 Fire Protection Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days.Caused by Required Design Work.Continuous Fire Watch Established ML18095A7521991-02-20020 February 1991 Special Rept 88-3-28:from 880720-910122,listed Fire Barrier Penetration Seal Impairments Occurred.Cause Not Positively Determined.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Fire Protection Concerns Resolved ML18095A6751990-12-26026 December 1990 Special Rept 90-7:on 901210,switchgear Rooms & Electrical Penetration Area CO2 Fire Protection Sys Inoperable for More than 14 Days to Support Design Change Work on 901126. Adequate Precautions Taken to Ensure Design Capability ML18095A7511990-12-0505 December 1990 Revised Special Rept 90-10-1:on 900707,TS Action Statement 3.7.10.3c.a Entered When 64 Ft & 84 Ft Elevation Switchgear Room CO2 Fire Protection Sys Declared Inoperable.Caused by Equipment Failure.Sys Design Drawing Revised ML18095A6141990-11-14014 November 1990 Special Rept 90-06:on 901022 & 24,fire Barriers Penetration Seals Impaired for More than Seven Days.Caused by Support Design Change Work.Hourly Fire Watch Will Continue Until All Fire Protection Concerns Resolved ML18095A5801990-11-0707 November 1990 Supplemental Special Rept 88-3-27:on 880720-901010,listed Fire Barriers Impaired for More than 7 Days.Cause of Degraded Fire Barrier Penetrations Could Not Be Positively Determined 1998-08-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
OPS~G *
- Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 27, 1990 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commision Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sir:
Salem Generating Station License No. DPR-75 Docket No. 50-311 Unit No. 2 Special Report 90-3 This Special Report addresses pressurizer overpressure protection system (POPS) actuations on. April 1, 1990. It is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3c pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.2.
This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.
Sincerely yours, L.K. Miller General Manager Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 9005080124 900427 PDR ADOCK 05000311 S PDC The . Energy People . .,t i-,*ibl:l*te*.
95-2189 (10M) 12-89
1 SPECIAL REPORT NUMBi990-3 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:
Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:
Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System Channel I Actuation Due To An Equipment Problem Event Date{s): 4/01/90 Report Date: 4/27/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.90-218 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:
Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown)
Unit had been brought to Mode 5 at 1349 hours0.0156 days <br />0.375 hours <br />0.00223 weeks <br />5.132945e-4 months <br /> on April 1, 1990 in
.support of the initiation of the 5th refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:
This Special Report addresses a Pressurizer Overpressure Protection System {POPS) actuation. The actuation occurred on April 01, 1990 at 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />. This report is submitted for information in *accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c. which states:
In the event that either the POPS's or the RCS vents are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be*
prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within thirty (30) days. The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the POPS's or vents on the transient and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.
On April 1, 1990 at 1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />, with the Unit in Mode 5 {Cold Shutdown), the 2PR1 valve (Power Operated Relief Valve) lifted (POPS actuation) af.ter removing No. 23 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) from service an4Sp;J;acing Ho. 21 RCP in service. The RCPs were swapped in support of:'/l~~~ud burst" operations. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) indicated. pj:es*sure was 320 psig at the time of swapping the RCPs.
The indicated RCS._ pressure during the POPS actuation was 360 psig.
After the first POPS actuation, three (3) additional actuations (same channel) occurred until pressure control was regained by removing No.
21 RCP from service and placing No. 23 RCP back in service at 1921 hours0.0222 days <br />0.534 hours <br />0.00318 weeks <br />7.309405e-4 months <br /> the same day (26 minutes later). The maximum RCS pressure observed, during any of the POPS actuations, was 365 psig. RCS pressure was reduced to approximately 310 psig upon regaining pressure control.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: ~ :, -- ~- Ll. ::.-*
.£***::. . ,:_. ~ ' r:J.::i Th1:
The "root '~cause of this event has beeri=attrf.lided to inadequate
SPECIAL REPORT 90-3. APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) procedural direction for identification of RCP requirements during Mode 5 operation.
Procedure IOP-6, "Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown" does not clearly address the phenomenon (see Analysis section} that Pressurizer spray is not adequate to maintain RCS pressure control with No. 21 RCP.
The procedure states:
"When RCS is less than 250°F, Reduce the number of Reactor Coolant Pumps to one. (If possible, maintain 23 RCP in service to provide spray flow)".
Contributing to this event has been inconsistent training in addressing Pressurizer Spray operations and the phenomenon identified in this Special Report. The Salem simulator treats RCS loops 21 and 23 as having equal capability for providing Pressurizer Spray.* The simulator training sessions are conducted in accordance with the procedural preference, however, the Operations Training lesson plans do not require discussion of the ha.sis for the pump preference.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:
POPS is designed to protect the RCS from overpressurization by providing adequate relieving capability from the start of either one (1) Centrifugal Charging Pump or one (1) Safety Injection Pump during low temperature operation. However, since No. 21 Centrifugal Charging Pump and both Safety Injection Pumps were cleared and tagged, only No. 22 Centrifugal Charging Pump was available thereby satisfying the design of POPS.
As discussed in Westinghouse letter (PSE-86-639), "Pressurizer Spray Operation" dated December 11, 1986, RCPs may not provide Pressurizer Spray as required. Apparently, the Pressurizer surge line causes a pressure head loss (approximately 15 psi) due to the net elevation difference in raising the spray flow to the top of the Pressurizer.
This loss is apparently compensated for when No. 23 RCP is used to supply Pressurizer Spray due to the Pressurizer surge line being connected to the No. 23 RCS loop. When any of the other pumps are individually in service (including No. 21 RCP), insufficient Pressurizer Spray driving head is provided. Therefore, when No. 21 RCP
- was put .,$~ service, insufficient Pressurizer Spray was provided resulting :j;:* ""-:he POPS actuations. These actuations were not terminated., ,.:l. No. 23 RCP was put back in service.
In Mode 5, Pr~ssurizer*spray can be provided by an alternate means (other than directly from the RCS 21 or 23 loops). This other source is the charging line from the Chemical & Volume Control System (CVCS). This source is not affected by the pressure head loss caused by the surge line location. However, this source cannot be used if a differential temperature between the Pressurizer Spray line and charging return line is ~ 320°F. During this event, the differential temperature was 323°F.
The POPS functioned as designed to mitigate pressure transients caused by the lack of sufficient Pressurizer Spray. Therefore, this event did not affect the health or safety of the public. However,
SPECIAL R~PORT 90-3.
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) due to the actuation of POPS, this Special Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specification Action Statement 3.4.10.3.c, pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification 6.9.2. .
CORRECTIVE ACTION:
Operations Department procedure(s) will be reviewed and revised to ensure that operations personnel are aware of the constraints for providing sufficient Pressurizer Spray such that mitigating actions can be taken to prevent a future POPS actuation.
This event will be reviewed by the PSE&G Nuclear Training Department to ensure existing training programs are revised to include the detail for the RCP preference when employing Pressurizer Spray. A Simulator Deficiency Report has been approved. Plans are in place to model the Pressurizer Spray function as per the actual plant response. '-
General Manager ~
Salem Operations MJP:pc SO.RC Mtg.90-043