ML18052A190

Proposed Tech Specs,Deleting out-of-date Footnotes & Incorrect Refs to Motor Control Ctr

ML18052A190
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	12/19/1985
From:	CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:
Shared Package
ML18052A188	List: ML18052A187 ML18052A189 ML18052A190
References
NUDOCS 8512260103
Download: ML18052A190 (5)

Text

ATTACHMENT Consumers Power Company Palisades Plant Docket 50-255 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE CHANGES December 19, 1985 4 Pages 851-2260103 8512-19----~

PDR' *A DOCK 05'00025"5 *1 P PDR .. j - ,I I

IC1285-0354-NL04

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM Applicability Applies. to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from the core in either emergency or normal.shutdown situations.

Specifications Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling Systems 3.3.1 The reactor shall not be made critical, except fo~ low-temperature physics tests, unless all.of the following conditions are met:

a. The SIRW tank contains not less than 250,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of at_ least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm at a temperature not less than 40°F.

b. *All four Safety Injection tanks are operable and pressurized to at least 200 psig_with a tank liquid level of at-least 186 inches (55.5%) and a maximum level of 198 inches (59%) with a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm.

c. One low-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

d. Orie high-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

e. Both shutdown heat exchangers and both component cooling heat exchangers are operable.

f.

• Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the primary cooling system.

g. All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above

. components and required to function during accident conditions are operable.

h. The Low-Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 shall be opened and disabl~d (by isolating the air supply) to prevent spurious closure.

i. The Safety Injection bottle motor-operated isolation valves shall be opened with the electric power supply to the valve motor disconn_ec ted.

j. The Safety Injection miniflow valves CV-3027 and 3056 shall be opened with HS-3027 *nd 3056 positions to maintain them open.

3-29 Proposed TSP1285-0~54-NL04

3.3

.e EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Contd)

g. A maximum of one high-pressure safety injection pump shall be

. OPERABLE whenever the temperature of qne-or more of the PCS.cold legs is :S 250°F.

3.3.3 Prior to returning to the Power Operation Condition after every time the plant has been placed in the Refueling Shutdown Condition, or the Cold Shutdown Condition for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and testing of Specification 4.3.h has not been accomplished in the previous 9 months, or prior to returning the check valves in Table 4.3.1 to service after maintenance, repair or replacement, the following conditions shali be met:

a. All pressure isolation valves listed .. in Table 4. 3 .1 shall be functional as a pressure isolation device, except as specified in

b. Valve leakage shall not exceed the amounts-indicated.

• b. In the event that integrity of any pressure isolation*valve specified in Table 4.3.1 cannot be demonstrated, at least two valves in each high pressure line hav_ing a non-functional valve must be in and remain in, the mode correspond_ing to the isolated

. (1) condition.

c. If Specification a. and b. cannot be met, an order~y shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

1 .

Motor-operated valves shall be placed in the closed position and power supplies deenergized.

3-30 Proposed TSP1285-0354-NL04

3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (cont) that 25%*of their combined discharge rate. is lost from the primary coolant system out the break. The transient hot spot fuel clad temperatures for the break sizes considered are shown on FSAR Figures 14.17.9 to 14.17.13. These demonstrate that the maximum fuel c*lad temperatures that could occur over the break size spectrum are well below the melting temperature of zirconium (3300°F).

Malfunction of the Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow control valve could defeat the Low Pressure Injection feature of the ECCS; therefore, it is disabled in the 'open' fuode (by isolating the air

• supply) during plant operation. This action assures that it will not block flow during Safety Injection.

The inadvertent closing of any one of the Safety Injection bottle isolation valves in conjunction with a LOCA has not been analyzed. To provide assurance that this will not occur, these valv.es are electrically locked open by a key switch in the control room. In a~dition, prior to critical the valves ar~ checked open, and then the 480 volt breakers are opened. Thus, a failure of a breaker and a switch are required for any of the valves to close.

I The limitation for a maximum*of one high-pressure safety injection pump to be operable, and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all high-pressure safety injection pumps except the required operable pump to be inoperable below 250°F, provides assurance that a mass ~ddition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

References (1) FSAR, Section 9.10.3.' (2) FSAR, Section 6.1.

3-33 Proposed TSP1285-0354-NL04

TABLE 4.1.2 Min:fmum Fre~ies for Cllecks, Calibrations and Testing of*

Fng:ineered ety Feature InstrunEntation Controls (Contd)

• Suzveillance Channel Description F\mction *Frequency SUIVeillance *~t:hod

13. Safety Injection Tank level a. Oieck s a. Verify that level and pressure indic;:a._

and Pressure InstrunEr1ts tion is between independent high high/

low a1armg for level and pressure.

b. Calibrate R 'b.' Known pressure and differential

~ssure applied to pressure and el sensors. *

14. Boric Acid Tank. level Switches a. Test R a. Pump tank below low-level alarm point to verify &Witch operation.

15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing System a. Oieck D a. Cl>serve.temperature recorders for proper readings. .

16. M:iin Steam Isolation Valve a. Oieck s a. ilinpare four independent pressure Circuits indications.

b. Test(3) R b. Signal to reter rel~ adjusted with test device to verify ffi circuit logic.

17. SIRW Tank Temperature a. Oieck M a. Canpare independent temperature readouts.

Indication anQ. AlaI'IJ5

b. Cal:ihrate R b. Known resistance applied to indicating loop.

18. Low-Pressure Safety Injection a. Oieck p a. Cl>serve valve is open with air supply Flow Control Valve 01-3006 isolated.

19. Safety Injection Bottle a. Oieck p a. Fnsure each valve open by obse~valve 9,

Isolation Valves * ~tion indication and valve itse

• lock open breakers and control power key &WitcheS. '

20. Safety Injection Miniflow a. Clleck P* a. Verify valves open and HS-3027 and 3056 Valves 01-3027, 3056 positioned to neintain them open.

NJ!Es:

llCalibration of the sensors is perfomEd during calibration of Item 5(b), Table 4.1.1.

2 All m:mthly tests will be done on only one charmel at a. tire to prevent protection system actuation.

3 Calibration of the sensors is performad durln,g calibration of Item 7 (b) , Table 4 .1.1.

4 The 1981 surveillance :ftmction may be deferre<I until the end of the 1981 refueling outage.

4-8 Proposed TSP1285-0354-NL04 1*