Information Notice 1992-13, Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites: Difference between revisions
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| issue date = 02/18/1992 | | issue date = 02/18/1992 | ||
| title = Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites | | title = Inadequate Control Over Vehicular Traffic at Nuclear Power Plant Sites | ||
| author name = Rossi C | | author name = Rossi C | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | ||
| addressee name = | | addressee name = | ||
Line 14: | Line 14: | ||
| page count = 9 | | page count = 9 | ||
}} | }} | ||
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
COMMISSION | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | ||
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION | |||
NOTICE 92-13: INADEQUATE | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 18, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-13: INADEQUATE CONTROL OVER VEHICULAR TRAFFIC | ||
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES | |||
==Addressees== | ==Addressees== | ||
All holders of operating | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power | ||
reactors. | |||
==Purpose== | ==Purpose== | ||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice | ||
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information | |||
notice | |||
to alert addressees to continuing problems resulting from the failure of some | |||
licensees to maintain adequate control over vehicular traffic at their plants. | |||
These licensees failed to follow established administrative procedures related | |||
to the use of self-propelled cranes. Their failures resulted in unnecessary | |||
challenges to safety systems and threatened the health and safety of plant | |||
personnel. It is expected that recipients will review the information for | |||
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to | |||
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information | |||
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written | |||
response is required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
Diablo Canyon Unit 1: On March 7, 1991, during a refueling outage, the Diablo | |||
of | Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, experienced a total loss of offsite power | ||
(LOOP). The event was caused when an electrical flashover occurred between a | |||
500 kV transmission line and the boom of a mobile crane. The boom was positioned | |||
approximately three feet from the transmission line. At the time of the event, power to plant loads was being supplied from offsite by back-feeding through | |||
the main output transformer from the 500 kV switchyard. Two standby startup | |||
transformers, the normal sources of offsite power to the plant, had been | |||
removed from service for scheduled maintenance. The flashover caused protective | |||
relaying to actuate to isolate the faulted line and, as a result, offsite power | |||
to plant loads was interrupted. | |||
and | All three emergency diesel generators started and loaded successfully. Operation | ||
of the residual heat removal system was restored within about 1 minute. The | |||
temperature of the core did not increase. No radiological release resulted. | |||
The fault did not affect Diablo Canyon, Unit 2, which was operating at full | |||
power. | |||
Palo Verde Unit 3: On November 15, 1991, while the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating | |||
a ion , was shutdown in hot standby, the boom of a 35-ton truck-mounted | |||
CL- | |||
AAClec on 2/1 9 lJ-I | |||
..... IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 crane made contact with one of two 13.8 kV offsite power feeder lines located | |||
in the plant's protected area. The crane was being used to replace the "A" phase | |||
bushing on the main output transformer. The original bushing had been damaged | |||
by lightning a day earlier. Prior to final installation and after high voltage | |||
testing had been completed, the bushing was returned to its shipping cask. The | |||
and | crane operator shut down the crane motor and engaged one of several braking | ||
devices on the crane boom. The crane operator then exited the crane cab to | |||
discuss replacement procedures with other maintenance personnel. | |||
A wind gust caused the boom of the crane to rotate and contact one of the phases | |||
of the 13.8 kY feeder. The feeder was transmitting power from the startup trans- former to various vital and non-vital loads in the "A" train. The electrical | |||
fault current which was generated was not of sufficient magnitude to cause | |||
protective devices to actuate because the crane had not been grounded as | |||
required by plant procedure. Therefore, the feeder remained energized and the | |||
the | fault current initiated small asphalt fires in the areas where the crane's | ||
front outrigger pads made ground contact. The rear outrigger pads were not | |||
extended. | |||
The maintenance foreman (the foreman) contacted the shift supervisor and | |||
incorrectly identified the "B" train feeder as being faulted. The shift | |||
supervisor opened the supply circuit breaker for the "B" train feeder before | |||
the foreman could correct his misstatement. Electrical power was interrupted | |||
to non-vital loads, including two of four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). Power | |||
but was reestablished | to vital train "B" loads was momentarily interrupted but was reestablished | ||
following-the | following-the successful start and Toa-din-g of the train "B" emergency diesel | ||
generator (EDG). | |||
start | The correct "A" feeder was subsequently deenergized, resulting in the start | ||
of the | and loading of the "A" EDG and causing the loss of power to the remaining two | ||
operating RCPs. The reactor was cooled by natural circulation for about 28 minutes until a reactor coolant pump was started. A notification of an unusual | |||
event was made by the licensee based on a fire located in the protected area | |||
in | lasting longer than 10 minutes. The event resulted in no personnel injuries | ||
and no release of radioactive material. | |||
Fermi Unit 2: On December 12, 1991, an event involving a self-propelled crane | |||
occurred at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2. The Fermi Unit was in | |||
cold shutdown in preparation for replacing a main output transformer. The | |||
crane, with its boom extended, attempted to turn onto a roadway that is outside | |||
the protected area but inside the owner controlled area at the plant. While | |||
the crane spotter was directing traffic, the crane operator proceeded to turn | |||
onto the roadway. A lifting strap, which was dangling from the end of the | |||
crane | crane boom made momentary contact with one phase of a 120 kV transmission line | ||
for | which was providing offsite power to the plant. The circuit breaker for the | ||
line immediately opened and reclosed, interrupting and reestablishing the power | |||
supply in a matter of cycles. No LOOP resulted. | |||
to | When the operator stopped the crane, the crane came to rest with the end of | ||
the boom extended above the transmission line and with the transmission line | |||
passing between the boom and lifting strap. The operator then backed up the | |||
crane. A second contact occurred between the transmission line and the lifting | |||
IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual | |||
LOOP occurred. The crane operator then informed his supervisor of the event. | |||
No personnel injuries or equipment damage resulted. No challenge to plant | |||
safety systems occurred. | |||
Discussion | |||
Information Notice 90-25, Supplement 1, "Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent | |||
Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees of problems that can occur | |||
when vehicular traffic is not properly controlled near safety systems or | |||
systems important to safety. A significant operating event occurred at the | |||
Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident | |||
investigation team described the circumstances of the event in detail in | |||
NUREG-1410 titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal | |||
System During Mid-Loop Operations at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The | |||
Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated when a fuel and lubricants truck, conducting | |||
routine operations in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV | |||
feeder which was supplying offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to | |||
to | the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation in natural circu- lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop. | ||
One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees | |||
to develop appropriate programs for controlling vehicular traffic at their | |||
sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants | |||
were of less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate that | |||
of | problems associated with inadequate control of vehicles continue to occur. | ||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Charles E. Rossi, Direc | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
2 C | |||
I- | |||
m | |||
Attachment | |||
IN 92-13 February 18. 1992 | |||
:n~ Page I of I | |||
r Q C)Z LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED | |||
0z NRC INFORMATION NOTICES | |||
I | |||
la 1- | |||
<C Zoj IInformation Date of | |||
tNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to | |||
I , | |||
toW | |||
m 00 92-12 Effects of Cable Leakage 02/10/92 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
c e 6 Currents on Instrument for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Settings and Indications | |||
92-11 Soil and Water Contamina- 02/05/92 All uranium fuel fabrica- (n tion at Fuel Cycle Facil- tion and conversion facil- ities ities.' | |||
2 | |||
92-10 Brachytherapy Incidents 01/31/92 All Nuclear Regulatory Com- Involvihg Iridium-192 Wire mission (NRC) licensees | |||
Used In Endobronchial authorized to use | |||
Treatments iridiwu-192 for brachy- therapy; manufacturers and | |||
of | distributors of iridium-192 wire for use In brachy- therapy. | ||
92-09 Overloading and Subsequent 01/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Lock Out of Electrical for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Buses During Accident | |||
Conditions | |||
92-08 Revised Protective Action 01/23/92 All fuel cycle and materi- Guidance for Nuclear Inci- als licensees authorized | |||
dents to possess large quanti- ties of radioactive materi- | |||
1al. | |||
92-07 Rapid Flow-Induced Erosion/ 01/09/92 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Corrosion of Feedwater Piping for pressurized water | |||
reactors. | |||
of | 92-06 Reliability of ATHS Mitiga- 01/15/92 All holders of OLs or CPs | ||
tion System and Other NRC for nuclear power reactors. | |||
Required Equipment Not | |||
Controlled by Plant Tech- nical Specifications | |||
92-05 Potential Coil Insulation 01/08/92 All holders of OLs or CPs | |||
Breakdown in ABB RXHH2 Relays for nuclear power reactors. | |||
OL - Operating License | |||
0 | |||
CP I Construction Permit | |||
a | |||
t 6a; | |||
IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual | |||
LOOP occurred. The crane operator then informed his supervisor of the event. | |||
No challenge | No personnel injuries or equipment damage resulted. No challenge to plant | ||
safety systems occurred. | |||
Discussion | |||
Notice 90-25, Supplement | Information Notice 90-25, Supplement 1, *Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent | ||
Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees of problems that can occur | |||
when vehicular traffic is not properly controlled near safety systems or | |||
systems important to safety. A significant operating event occurred at the | |||
Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident | |||
investigation team described the circumstances of the event in detail in | |||
NUREG-1410 titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal | |||
System During Mid-Loop Operations at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The | |||
event | Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated when a fuel and lubricants truck, conducting | ||
routine operations in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV | |||
feeder which was supplying offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to | |||
the | the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation in natural circu- lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop. | ||
of the | One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees | ||
at | to develop appropriate programs for controlling vehicular traffic at their | ||
sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants | |||
were of less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate that | |||
problems associated with inadequate control of vehicles continue to occur. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager., A | |||
harles E. Rossi, Directo | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
OFC : DOEA:OEAB | OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB: | ||
___ ___ ___--_ __ ____ _ | |||
------------ ___ __ _____ --------- | |||
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn* :DFischer* : | |||
_ ___ ________ ___ ________ _ --------- | |||
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :01/30/92 : | |||
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOE : | |||
NAME :AChaffee* :CBerlinger* :CRossi : | |||
DATE :01/31/92 :02/10/92 :02////9 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-13 | |||
IN 92-XX | |||
January xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Charles E. Rossi, Director | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
OFC : DOEA:OEAB | OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB: | ||
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn* :DFischer* : | |||
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :01/30/92 : | |||
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C: 0 B :D:DOEA | |||
: | __--- _ _----- :--. ,-- ------------ :.------------:------------:------------:--------- | ||
NAME :AChaffee* :CBe in er :CRossi : | |||
NAME : | DATE :01/31/92 : V/0/92 : / /92 : : : | ||
: | OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | ||
: | |||
: | |||
Document Name: IN/HF | |||
IN 92-XX | IN 92-XX | ||
notice requires no specific action or written response. | January xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | ||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Charles E. Rossi, Director | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
OFC : DOEA:OEAB | OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOE :OEAB: | ||
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn* | |||
. | |||
:DF cher | |||
:DF cher | |||
. | |||
: | : | ||
NAM N.els J*ain | |||
:CRossi : : : DATE : L/31/92 : / /92 : / /92 : : : OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :1/3q/92 : | ||
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : : | |||
----- :-6Z&'--------:------------:------------ ---------- ------- -------- | |||
NAME :ACha fee :CBerlinger :CRossi : : : | |||
DATE : L/31/92 : / /92 : / /92 : : : | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
Document Name: IN/NF | |||
notice requires no specific action or written response. | This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | ||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office Of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Charles E. Rossi, Director | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information | |||
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE | |||
OFC : DOEA:OEAB | OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB: | ||
_ _ ------ _ ____ _ ------------ _-__-___-____ | |||
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood iTz : CTrammell* :TColburn :DFischer | |||
: | ___ _ _ _ _ _____ _ ------------- | ||
: | DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : \ /25/92 : 01/22/92 :' /ze/92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : : | ||
____- _ ____ _____ ___ __ ------------ | |||
NAME :AChaffee :CBerlinger :CRossi : : | |||
NAME : | DATE : / /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 : | ||
: | OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | ||
: | Document Name: IN/NF | ||
IN 92-XX | |||
January xx, 1992 One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees | |||
to develop appropriate procedures governing vehicular traffic in protected | |||
areas. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde plants were of | |||
less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they nevertheless call into | |||
question the adequacy of the affected licensees' programs for controlling | |||
vehicular traffic at their sites. The Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde events may | |||
prompt licensees to reevaluate the adequacy of their followup actions regarding | |||
the lessons learned from the Vogtle event. | |||
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If | |||
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the | |||
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office Of Nuclear Reactor | |||
Regulation (NRR) project manager. | |||
Charles E. Rossi, Director | |||
Division of Operational Events Assessment | |||
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | ||
Technical | Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR | ||
contact: N. Fields, NRR | |||
: | (301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | ||
OFC : DOEA:PEAB :JAM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPSJD5 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:C:DOEA:OEAB | |||
: | NAME : NFields HRood | ||
:D:DOEA : : : : NAME :CBerlinger | HM1' C ammell DFischer :AChaffee : | ||
-- ------- A , f ------------ | |||
O :------------ ___ ------------ ___--------- _ _ _ __ _ | |||
DATE: / /2.2/92 : /1,9/92 : / /92 : /y4P92 : / /92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : : : : | |||
NAME :CBerlinger :CRossi : : | |||
DATE: / /92 : / /92 : : : : | |||
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY | |||
Document Name: IN/NF}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Latest revision as of 03:19, 24 November 2019
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 February 18, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-13: INADEQUATE CONTROL OVER VEHICULAR TRAFFIC
AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITES
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice
to alert addressees to continuing problems resulting from the failure of some
licensees to maintain adequate control over vehicular traffic at their plants.
These licensees failed to follow established administrative procedures related
to the use of self-propelled cranes. Their failures resulted in unnecessary
challenges to safety systems and threatened the health and safety of plant
personnel. It is expected that recipients will review the information for
applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to
avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information
notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
response is required.
Description of Circumstances
Diablo Canyon Unit 1: On March 7, 1991, during a refueling outage, the Diablo
Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, experienced a total loss of offsite power
(LOOP). The event was caused when an electrical flashover occurred between a
500 kV transmission line and the boom of a mobile crane. The boom was positioned
approximately three feet from the transmission line. At the time of the event, power to plant loads was being supplied from offsite by back-feeding through
the main output transformer from the 500 kV switchyard. Two standby startup
transformers, the normal sources of offsite power to the plant, had been
removed from service for scheduled maintenance. The flashover caused protective
relaying to actuate to isolate the faulted line and, as a result, offsite power
to plant loads was interrupted.
All three emergency diesel generators started and loaded successfully. Operation
of the residual heat removal system was restored within about 1 minute. The
temperature of the core did not increase. No radiological release resulted.
The fault did not affect Diablo Canyon, Unit 2, which was operating at full
power.
Palo Verde Unit 3: On November 15, 1991, while the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
a ion , was shutdown in hot standby, the boom of a 35-ton truck-mounted
CL-
AAClec on 2/1 9 lJ-I
..... IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 crane made contact with one of two 13.8 kV offsite power feeder lines located
in the plant's protected area. The crane was being used to replace the "A" phase
bushing on the main output transformer. The original bushing had been damaged
by lightning a day earlier. Prior to final installation and after high voltage
testing had been completed, the bushing was returned to its shipping cask. The
crane operator shut down the crane motor and engaged one of several braking
devices on the crane boom. The crane operator then exited the crane cab to
discuss replacement procedures with other maintenance personnel.
A wind gust caused the boom of the crane to rotate and contact one of the phases
of the 13.8 kY feeder. The feeder was transmitting power from the startup trans- former to various vital and non-vital loads in the "A" train. The electrical
fault current which was generated was not of sufficient magnitude to cause
protective devices to actuate because the crane had not been grounded as
required by plant procedure. Therefore, the feeder remained energized and the
fault current initiated small asphalt fires in the areas where the crane's
front outrigger pads made ground contact. The rear outrigger pads were not
extended.
The maintenance foreman (the foreman) contacted the shift supervisor and
incorrectly identified the "B" train feeder as being faulted. The shift
supervisor opened the supply circuit breaker for the "B" train feeder before
the foreman could correct his misstatement. Electrical power was interrupted
to non-vital loads, including two of four reactor coolant pumps (RCPs). Power
to vital train "B" loads was momentarily interrupted but was reestablished
following-the successful start and Toa-din-g of the train "B" emergency diesel
generator (EDG).
The correct "A" feeder was subsequently deenergized, resulting in the start
and loading of the "A" EDG and causing the loss of power to the remaining two
operating RCPs. The reactor was cooled by natural circulation for about 28 minutes until a reactor coolant pump was started. A notification of an unusual
event was made by the licensee based on a fire located in the protected area
lasting longer than 10 minutes. The event resulted in no personnel injuries
and no release of radioactive material.
Fermi Unit 2: On December 12, 1991, an event involving a self-propelled crane
occurred at the Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 2. The Fermi Unit was in
cold shutdown in preparation for replacing a main output transformer. The
crane, with its boom extended, attempted to turn onto a roadway that is outside
the protected area but inside the owner controlled area at the plant. While
the crane spotter was directing traffic, the crane operator proceeded to turn
onto the roadway. A lifting strap, which was dangling from the end of the
crane boom made momentary contact with one phase of a 120 kV transmission line
which was providing offsite power to the plant. The circuit breaker for the
line immediately opened and reclosed, interrupting and reestablishing the power
supply in a matter of cycles. No LOOP resulted.
When the operator stopped the crane, the crane came to rest with the end of
the boom extended above the transmission line and with the transmission line
passing between the boom and lifting strap. The operator then backed up the
crane. A second contact occurred between the transmission line and the lifting
IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual
LOOP occurred. The crane operator then informed his supervisor of the event.
No personnel injuries or equipment damage resulted. No challenge to plant
safety systems occurred.
Discussion
Information Notice 90-25, Supplement 1, "Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent
Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees of problems that can occur
when vehicular traffic is not properly controlled near safety systems or
systems important to safety. A significant operating event occurred at the
Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident
investigation team described the circumstances of the event in detail in
NUREG-1410 titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal
System During Mid-Loop Operations at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The
Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated when a fuel and lubricants truck, conducting
routine operations in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV
feeder which was supplying offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to
the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation in natural circu- lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop.
One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees
to develop appropriate programs for controlling vehicular traffic at their
sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants
were of less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate that
problems associated with inadequate control of vehicles continue to occur.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Direc
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
2 C
I-
m
Attachment
IN 92-13 February 18. 1992
- n~ Page I of I
r Q C)Z LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
0z NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
I
la 1-
<C Zoj IInformation Date of
tNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
I ,
toW
m 00 92-12 Effects of Cable Leakage 02/10/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
c e 6 Currents on Instrument for nuclear power reactors.
Settings and Indications
92-11 Soil and Water Contamina- 02/05/92 All uranium fuel fabrica- (n tion at Fuel Cycle Facil- tion and conversion facil- ities ities.'
2
92-10 Brachytherapy Incidents 01/31/92 All Nuclear Regulatory Com- Involvihg Iridium-192 Wire mission (NRC) licensees
Used In Endobronchial authorized to use
Treatments iridiwu-192 for brachy- therapy; manufacturers and
distributors of iridium-192 wire for use In brachy- therapy.
92-09 Overloading and Subsequent 01/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Lock Out of Electrical for nuclear power reactors.
Buses During Accident
Conditions
92-08 Revised Protective Action 01/23/92 All fuel cycle and materi- Guidance for Nuclear Inci- als licensees authorized
dents to possess large quanti- ties of radioactive materi-
1al.
92-07 Rapid Flow-Induced Erosion/ 01/09/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Corrosion of Feedwater Piping for pressurized water
reactors.
92-06 Reliability of ATHS Mitiga- 01/15/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
tion System and Other NRC for nuclear power reactors.
Required Equipment Not
Controlled by Plant Tech- nical Specifications
92-05 Potential Coil Insulation 01/08/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Breakdown in ABB RXHH2 Relays for nuclear power reactors.
OL - Operating License
0
CP I Construction Permit
a
t 6a;
IN 92-13 February 18, 1992 strap. The circuit breaker again opened and reclosed rapidly so that no actual
LOOP occurred. The crane operator then informed his supervisor of the event.
No personnel injuries or equipment damage resulted. No challenge to plant
safety systems occurred.
Discussion
Information Notice 90-25, Supplement 1, *Loss of Vital AC Power with Subsequent
Reactor Coolant System Heat-up," informed licensees of problems that can occur
when vehicular traffic is not properly controlled near safety systems or
systems important to safety. A significant operating event occurred at the
Alvin W. Vogtle Generating Plant (Vogtle) on March 20, 1990. An NRC incident
investigation team described the circumstances of the event in detail in
NUREG-1410 titled, "Loss of Offsite AC Power and the Residual Heat Removal
System During Mid-Loop Operations at Vogtle Unit 1 on March 20, 1990." The
Vogtle Unit 1 event was initiated when a fuel and lubricants truck, conducting
routine operations in the switchyard, backed into a support column for a 230 kV
feeder which was supplying offsite power to the Unit. Ensuing events led to
the total loss of vital ac power at the plant and operation in natural circu- lation while the reactor coolant system was drained down to mid-loop.
One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees
to develop appropriate programs for controlling vehicular traffic at their
sites. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon, Palo Verde, and Fermi plants
were of less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they demonstrate that
problems associated with inadequate control of vehicles continue to occur.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager., A
harles E. Rossi, Directo
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:
___ ___ ___--_ __ ____ _
___ __ _____ ---------
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn* :DFischer* :
_ ___ ________ ___ ________ _ ---------
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :01/30/92 :
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOE :
NAME :AChaffee* :CBerlinger* :CRossi :
DATE :01/31/92 :02/10/92 :02////9 DOCUMENT NAME: IN 92-13
IN 92-XX
January xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn* :DFischer* :
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :01/30/92 :
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C: 0 B :D:DOEA
__--- _ _----- :--. ,-- ------------ :.------------:------------:------------:---------
NAME :AChaffee* :CBe in er :CRossi :
DATE :01/31/92 : V/0/92 : / /92 : : :
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN/HF
IN 92-XX
January xx, 1992 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOE :OEAB:
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood* : CTrammell* :TColburn*
.
- DF cher
.
NAM N.els J*ain
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : 01/23/92 : 01/22/92 :01/28/92 :1/3q/92 :
OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : :
:-6Z&'--------:------------:------------ ---------- ------- --------
NAME :ACha fee :CBerlinger :CRossi : : :
DATE : L/31/92 : / /92 : / /92 : : :
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN/NF
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office Of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFC : DOEA:OEAB : ADM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPW:PD5 :DRPW:PD3-1 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:
_ _ ------ _ ____ _ ------------ _-__-___-____
NAME : NFields* : JMain* : HRood iTz : CTrammell* :TColburn :DFischer
___ _ _ _ _ _____ _ -------------
DATE : 01/22/92 : 01/14/92 : \ /25/92 : 01/22/92 :' /ze/92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OEAB :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : :
____- _ ____ _____ ___ __ ------------
NAME :AChaffee :CBerlinger :CRossi : :
DATE : / /92 :/ /92 :/ /92 :
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN/NF
IN 92-XX
January xx, 1992 One of the lessons learned from the Vogtle incident was the need for licensees
to develop appropriate procedures governing vehicular traffic in protected
areas. Although the events at the Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde plants were of
less safety significance than the Vogtle event, they nevertheless call into
question the adequacy of the affected licensees' programs for controlling
vehicular traffic at their sites. The Diablo Canyon and Palo Verde events may
prompt licensees to reevaluate the adequacy of their followup actions regarding
the lessons learned from the Vogtle event.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact the
technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office Of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact: N. Fields, NRR
(301) 504-1173 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
OFC : DOEA:PEAB :JAM:RPB : DRPW:PD5 : DRPSJD5 :SC:DOEA:OEAB:C:DOEA:OEAB
NAME : NFields HRood
HM1' C ammell DFischer :AChaffee :
-- ------- A , f ------------
O :------------ ___ ------------ ___--------- _ _ _ __ _
DATE: / /2.2/92 : /1,9/92 : / /92 : /y4P92 : / /92 : / /92 OFC :C:DOEA:OGCB :D:DOEA : : : :
NAME :CBerlinger :CRossi : :
DATE: / /92 : / /92 : : : :
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Document Name: IN/NF