ML16007A443

Surry 2015-301 Draft SRO Written Examination

ML16007A443
Person / Time
Site:	Surry
Issue date:	01/07/2016
From:	Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
Download: ML16007A443 (74)

Text

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 34K/A Number:

002G2.2.25 , Reactor Coolant / 2, Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.2 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!76 Given the following:

Unit 1 is cooling down for refueling outage.

RCS Tave is 349 o F. RCS Pressure is 360 psig. Which ONE of the following correctly states:

1) The maximum number of charging pumps that are allowed per Tech Specs 3.1.G, RCS Overpressure Mitigation for sustained operation

. 2) The basis for that requirement?

A. 1. one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent

. B. 1. one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of both PORVs, or equivalent

. C. 1. two charging pump s capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of both PORVs, or equivalent

. D. 1. two charging pump s capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV, or equivalent.

Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

Part 1) Technical Specifications 3.1.G.c.(1) states: "

Whenever the RCS average temperature is less than or equal to 350 oF and the reactor vessel head is bolted: A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS. Two charging pumps may be in operation momentarily during transfer of operation from one charging pump to another." The question asks for the requirement for sustained operation therefore a maximum of one charging pump is the only correct answer.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Part 2) The basis for a maximum of one charging pump allowed OPERABLE below 350 oF provi de assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV, or equivalent.

Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications 3.1.G Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-88.1-LP-9H, Apply the RCS Tech Specs, including for the SRO candidate, the basis behind each specification.

Question Source:

Bank (TS00164) Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

The K/A requires knowledge of the bases in Technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations, and the question (part 2) clearly tests for that knowledge.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct Answer.

B. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis clearly states that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent. Plausible if candidate confuses the fact that while two PORVs will provide sufficient protection from pressure transients below 350 oF, the basis for a single charging pump is one PORV providing adequate protection, not two

. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because above 350 oF two charging pumps may be OPERABLE, but at or below 350 oF a maximum of one charging pump is allowed. Because question asks for sustained operation momentary operation of two charging pumps is incorrect as a reason for 2 charging pumps. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis clearly states that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent. Plausible if candidate confuses the fact that while two PORVs will provide sufficient protection from pressure transients below 350 oF, the basis for a single charging pump is one PORV providing adequate protection, not two.

D. 1) Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because above 350 oF two charging pumps may be OPERABLE, but at or below 350 oF a maximum of one charging pump is allowed. Because question asks for sustained operation momentary operation of two charging pumps is incorrect as a reason for 2 charging pumps. 2) Part 2 is correct for one charging pump, but is not correct for two charging pumps.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

004A2.35 , Chemical and Volume Control / 2 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Reactor trip

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 3.8 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!77 Unit 1 initially operating at 100% power when a reactor trip occurs due to "A" reactor trip breaker spuriously opening.

On transition to ES

-0.1, The RO reports the following:

Annunciator 1D

-E5, CHG PP TO RE GEN HX HI/LO FLOW, has alarmed.

Charging flow indicates 2 5 gpm. Letdown flow is 0 gpm. RO identified 1

-CH-TV-1204A, Inside Letdown Trip Valve, is closed and cannot be re

-opened. Which ONE of the following states

1) The operating Team used ________ to close and de-activate 1-CH-TV-1204B , Outside Letdown Trip Valve

. 2) The Letdown penetration is

________? A. 1) 1-OPT-CT-306, Containment Integrity Verification

2) Inoperable (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock in effect)

B. 1) 1-OPT-CT-306, Containment Integrity Verification

2) Operable (Exit the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock)

C. 1) 0-OP-CT-001, Containment Isolation Barriers

2) Inoperable(4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock in effect)

D. 1) 0-OP-CT-001, Containment Isolation Barriers

2) Operable (Exit the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock) Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

0-OP-CT-001 provides the guidance for responding to an INOPERABLE containment Trip Valve. TS

-3.8 states: restore an INOPERABLE TV to an OPERABLE status OR isolate the penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

. Once this action has been completed, the penetration would be considered Operable. Technical

Reference:

0-OP-CT-001, Rev. 3

. TS-3.8.C ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No. Learning Objective:

ND-88.4-LP-2, CTMT Vessel, Objective E, Employ the technical specifications associated with the containment structure, including for the SRO candidates, the basis behind these specifications

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.5 / 43/5 / 45/3 / 45/5)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess post trip abnormal condition and select the appropriate procedure and Tech Spec Reference to address the condition.

Distractor Analysi s: A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 1

-OPT-CT-306 is a monthly surveillance used to verify penetration status

. Part 2) is incorrect, the penetration has been isolated, thus meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 1

-O PT-CT-306 is a monthly surveillance used to verify penetration status. Part 2) is correct and meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. C. Incorrect

-Part 1) is correct, this OP provides the guidance necessary for ensuring CTMT integrity for a TV failure. Part 2) is incorrect, the penetration has been isolated, thus meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. D. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

007EA2.06 , Reactor Trip

- Stabilization

- Recovery /1 , Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip:

Occurrence of a reactor trip

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.3 IR-SRO: 4.5 Proposed Question:

!78 Initial Conditions

The reactor is operating at 100% power.

An RCS Leak Rate is in progress in accordance with 1

-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Coolant Leakage

- Computer Calculated

. Current Conditions:

The Reactor Trips due to a loose wire in the "A" reactor trip breaker

. The Team is stabilizing the Unit in accordance with ES

-0.1, Reactor Trip Response

. Which of the following identifies

1) In accordance with OP

-AP-105, Post Trip Review, ______ must authorize Reactor Restart following completion of recovery actions?

2) The RCS Leakrate is required to be completed ______

in accordance with TS

-4.13 Basis?

A. 1) Manager - Nuclear Operations

. 2) Shiftly. B. 1) Manager - Nuclear Operations

. 2) Daily. C. 1) Site Vice President

. 2) Shiftly. D. 1) Site Vice President.

2) Daily. Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

IAW OP-AP-105, the Site Vice President must approve reactor restart following completion of recovery actions

. IAW TS-4.13 Basis, the RCS leakrate must be completed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of establishing steady state operations.

Technical

Reference:

OP-AP-104, Post Trip Review

. TS-4.13 Basis.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No o Learning Objective: SROU

-02, Admin Procs, Objective C Tier 3 Procedures, For a Tier 3 procedure, discuss the following: Purpose, What conditions would result in use of the procedure, Overall knowledge of what the procedure accomplishes.

Question Source:

New Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

The question matches the K/A. In Part 1) of the question the Candidate must recall specific knowledge from an Administrative Procedure

. In Part 2) of the question, the Candidate must assess condition and recall information from the Basis section of Tech Specs.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect - Part 1) is incorrect, authorization for reactor restart must be obtained from the Site Vice President

. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since 1

-OPT-RC-10.0 is performed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after steady state operation is established

. B. Incorrect

- Part 1 is incorrect, authorization for reactor restart must be obtained from the Site Vice President

. Part 2) is correct. C. Incorrect - Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since 1

-OPT-RC-10.0 is performed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after steady state operation is establishe

d. D. Incorrect, Both Part 1) and Part 2) is correct

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

012G2.4.1 , Reactor Protection / 7, Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.6 IR-SRO: 4.8 Proposed Question:

!79 Initial Conditions Unit 1 is operating at 100% power

. Annunciator 1E

-B8, Loss of Coolant flow >P

-8, FIRST OUT is received.

"A" RCS Loop flow indicates 0% flow.

Manual reactor trip from the control room is unsuccessful and the Team transitions to 1

-FR-S.1 , Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS

. Current Conditions Offsite power is lost on swapover to RSSTs.

1. 1 EDG trips on overspeed.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) T he Procedure Flowpath

. 2) The EAL Classification and category

. REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1) Immediately transition to ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

2) SAE, SS2.1

.

B. 1) Continue with FR-S.1 until an exit point is reached, Transition to E

-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and Transition to ECA

-0.0 at Step 3

. 2) SAE, SS2.1

. C. 1) Immediately transition to ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

2) Alert SA1.1

. D. 1) Continue with FR-S.1 until an exit point is reached, Transition to E

-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and and Transition to ECA

-0.0 at Step 3

. 2) Alert, SA1.1.

Proposed Answer:

A.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

Classification for an ATWS event with the failure of the reactor to trip is a SAE, SS2.1

. When Offsite is lost and #1 EDG trips on overspeed, Unit 1 will be in a Loss of All AC condition; #3 EDG is designed to preferentially load to Unit 2. Function Restoration procedures require at least 1 Emergency bus to be energized in order to be applicable. This leaves ECA

-0.0 as the only applicable procedure in effect; an immediate transition to this procedure is required.

Technical

Reference:

WOG Background Document, ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, HP

-Rev 2, Page

2. Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-17, ECA-0.0, Objective A, Given the major action categories associated with ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, determine the purpose of ECA

-0.0, the transition criteria for entering and exiting ECA

-0.0, and the types of operator actions that will occur within each category. ND-95.5-LP-2, SEM, Objective C, Using EPIP

-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, analyze plant situations and determine the appropriate classification utilizing the EAL charts (both HOT and COLD conditions).

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A at SRO level, Candidate must assess Plant conditions, determine correct procedural flowpath, and classify an event.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct - Parts 1) and 2) are correct. Due to sequence of events, Unit 1 will have no emergency buses; this procedure becomes highe st priority.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, FR-S.1 will no longer be the highest priority procedure in effect. ECA-0.0 along with E

-0 are the only two direct entry procedures of EOPs. Plausible if Candidate assumes FR

-S.1, highest priority FR, must be continued until an exit point is reached. Part 2) classification is correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct.

Part 2) is incorrect, Plausible if Candidate assumes FR

-S.1, highest priority FR, must be continued until an exit point is reached, and does not identify both emergency buses on Unit 1 have been de

-energized.

Classification is plausible if ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Candidate fails to account for ability to supply Unit 1 "J" bus from Either #3 EDG or the AAC DG. D. Incorrect

- part 1) incorrect, ECA-0.0 becomes the only applicable EOP when a Loss of All AC occurs. Part 2) incorrect. Plausible if Candidate fails to account for ECA

-0.0 is a direct entry procedure/ misapplies guidance for procedure applicability; Classification plausible if Candidate does not account for supplying Unit 1 "J" bus from #3 EDG or the AAC DG.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

015G2.4.47 , Nuclear Instrumentation / 7, Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 4.2 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!80 Initial Conditions for Unit 1:

Unit 1 at 100% power.

Delta Flux is at

-2.7% with a target of

-1%. Spurious Instrument failure causes rods to insert

. Current Conditions:

Reactor Power is 89% and stable.

Delta Flux is at

-15%. Tave is 571.5 oF, Tref is 571.0 o F. Annunciator 1E

-E3, Delta Flux Deviation is lit.

Annunciator 1G-G8, Rod Bank D Lo Limit Based on the current conditions, which ONE of the following states:

1) The next action required to be taken to comply with Technical Specifications. 2) The most restrictive Tech. Spec basis for this CONDITION

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED

) A. 1) Restore Delta flux to target band within 1-hour or reduce power to <

50% in 1-hour. 2) Minimize the effects of Xenon redistribution during load

-follow maneuvers

. B. 1) Restore Delta flux to target band within 1

-hour or reduce power to < 50% in 1

-hour. 2) Provide a limit on rod worth in the event of a rod ejection accident

. C. 1) Reduce reactor power to < 50% within 30 minutes

. 2) Minimize the effects of Xenon redistribution during load

-follow maneuvers.

D. 1) Reduce reactor power to < 50% within 30 minutes

. 2) Provide a limit on rod worth in the event of a rod ejection accident

.

Proposed Answer:

C Explanation:

1) A Delta flux of

-15% not only deviates from target but also deviates from maximum allowable deviation of TS Figure 3.12

-3. At power levels < 90% the indicated delta flux deviation may deviate from its target band for a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (cumulative) in any 24

-hour period provided the flux difference is within the limits of TS Figure 3.12

-3. One minute penalty is accumulated for each minute of operation outside the target band. Because TS Figure 3.12

-3 is violated (-10.8 is max) Tech ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Specs require power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes. 2) The Delta Flux LCO is not met with Delta flux at -12.0. The basis for the Delta Flux LCO is to minimize the effects of xenon redistribution on the axial power distribution during load

-follow maneuvers

. Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications 3.12.B.4, Rev. 44.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

YES Learning Objective:

ND-93.2-LP-4, Power Range Nuclear Instruments, Objective D, Explain the meaning of the "Delta Flux" indication, including the limitations imposed upon it by Technical Specifications

Question Source:

New Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

This question matches the K/A because the SRO must use the Delta flux information provided by Nuclear instrumentation to determine that an adverse trend in Delta flux is occurring. The Delta flux figure provide (Axial Flux Difference Limits which is also TS Figure 3.12-3) is a control room reference from 1E-E3, Delta Flux Deviation that would be provided to the Control Room Operator. This is an SRO level question because it requires detailed knowledge of Tech Spec actions, and power levels for which penalty minutes will accrue. Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is incorrect because Delta flux is outside TS Figure 3.12

-3 band which requires power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes

. Also time to reduce power to < 50% is 30 minutes, and not 1-hour. Plausible if candidate confuses max time for penalty minutes (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) with max allowable delta flux deviation.

Tech Specs do es allow Delta Flux to be outside target band for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period provided that Delta flux does not exceed max deviation allowed by TS Figure 3.12

-3. 2) Part 2 is correct.

B. 1) Part 1 is incorrect because Delta flux is outside TS Figure 3.12

-3 band which requires power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes. Also time to reduce power to < 50% is 30 minutes, and not 1-hour. Plausible if candidate confuses max time for penalty minutes (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) with max allowable delta flux deviation. Tech Specs does allow Delta Flux to be outside target band for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period provided that Delta flux does not exceed max deviation allowed by TS Figure 3.12

-3. 2). 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis given is for rod insertion limits

. Rod insertion limits are met as the annunciator 1G

-G8 ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 only indicates that the rod insertion limit is getting close. This choice is plausible because rod insertion given has come close to the rod insertion limit.

C. Correct answer.

D. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis given is for rod insertion limits. Rod insertion limits are met as the annunciator 1G-G8 only indicates that the rod insertion limit is getting close. This choice is plausible because rod insertion given has come close to the rod insertion limit

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

022A2.04 , Containment Cooling / 5 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Loss of service water

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 2.9 IR-SRO: 3.2 Proposed Question:

!81 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power

. Unit 2 is performing 2

-PT-41.1, CC Pump Performance.

CC is split out in the Turbine Building

. 1-CC-E-1A, "A" CC HX, has been isolated due to a through wall SW leak.

Current Conditions

Annunciators 1B

-A7 and 1B-B7, Channel 1 and Channel 2

, CTMT PART +.1 PSI are received.

CTMT pressure is 1 0.6 PSIA and rising slowly.

The operating Team is performing ARP 1B

-A7 , and has raised SW flow to the "C" CC Heat Exchanger.

Which ONE of the following describes

1) The effect on Unit 1 Containment Temperature

. 2) The basis of the sloped line from 70 °F to 100 °F on the Containment Allowable Air Partial Pressure VS. Service Water Temperature Curve (Figure TS

-3.8-1) is __________

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) No change. 2) MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure

. B. 1) Lower. 2) LOCA depressurization

. C. 1) No change. 2) LOCA depressurization

.

D. 1) Lower. 2) MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure

. Proposed Answer:

C ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation: When CC flow is reduced by isolating the "A" CCHX, CC temperature will rise causing CTMT Air partial pressure to rise

. With CC split out, the adjustment in SW flow to the "C" CC HX will have no effect on Unit 1 CTMT pressure/temperature. Per Basis of TS

-3.8, the sloping section of Figure 3.8

-1 is based upon LOCA depressurization.

Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8 basis and Figure 3.8-1, Rev. 44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

Yes Learning Objective:

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13

) Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question Matches K/A. Candidate must assess the reduction of SW to the CC system and the effect on CTMT cooling. Candidate must also recall basis of TS Figure 3.8

-1. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) correct, adjusting SW flow to split section of CC system will have no effect on Unit 1 containment temperature

. Part 2) is incorrect, the horizontal upper line on TS Figure 3.8

-1 is based on MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure. Plausible since Candidate must assess effect of SW adjustments on Unit 1 CTMT temperature and recall basis for CTMT partial pressure curve.

B. Incorrect

- Pa rt 1) is incorrect, SW has been throttled to a split out section of CC system; temperature of CC on Un it 2 is affected

- not Unit 1

. Part 2) Part 2 is correct. Plausible since Candidate must assess the changes in SW flow and correctly apply the expected effect to the correct Unit.

C. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

D. Incorrect - Part 1) is incorrect, SW has been throttled to a split out section of CC system; temperature of CC on Unit 2 is affected

- not Unit 1

. Part 2) is incorrect, the horizontal upper line on TS Figure 3.8

-1 is based on MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure. Plausible since Candidate must assess effect of SW adjustments on Unit 1 CTMT temperature and recall basis for CTMT partial pressure curve.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

024AA2.01 , Emergency Boration / 1 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:

Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning from plant conditions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.1 Proposed Question:

!82 Given the following:

Unit 1 is ramping down in accordance with 0-AP-23.00, Rapid Load Reduction, to 71%. 30 second Emergency boration has just been initiated

. Emrg Borate Flow from 1-CH-FI-1110 indicates 60 gpm. Which ONE of the following states:

1) Cause for lower than expected Boric Acid Flow on 1

-CH-FI-1110. 2) The Tech Spec Basis for the minimum Boric Acid Storage Tank concentration of 7.0 weight percent. A. 1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Recirc Valve full open

. 2) Ensure Cold Shutdown Boron concentration can be achieved. B. 1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Recirc Valve full open

. 2) Ensure solubility of Boric Acid at 112 °F

. C. 1) Boric Acid Transfer pump thermalled in fast speed

. 2) Ensure Cold Shutdown Boron concentration can be achieved

. D. 1) Boric Acid Transfer pump thermalled in fast speed

. 2) Ensure solubility of Boric Acid at 112 °F

. Proposed Answer:

A. Explanation: The identified Boration flow of 60 GPM is significantly less than expected flow with the Boric Acid Pump in fa st speed (usually ~110 gpm)

. With the recirc valve full open, the pump discharge pressure would be affected, resulting in the lower than normal flow rate. Part 2) of the question determines the SRO level of knowledge on TS 3.2 Basis.

Technical

Reference:

TS 3.2 Basis, Rev. 44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-88.3-LP-2, Charging and Letdown, Objective D, Describe the Technical Specifications associated with the CVCS System, including for SRO candidates, the basis behind these specifications.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis. Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is correct and 2) Part 2 is correct. B. 1) Part 1 is correct. Part 2) is incorrect, the minimum solution temperature of 112 °F is based on tank concentration of 8.5 weight percent. Plausible in that Candidate misapplying Basis for minimum and/or maximum tank concentration with the Basis for the other limit

. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect

, BA transfer pump thermal would result in 0 indicated flow. Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction. 2) Part 2 is incorrect.

D. 1) Part 1 is incorrec t, BA transfer pump thermal would result in 0 indicated flow. Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction. 2) Part 2 is incorrect, Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction and candidate misapplying Basis for minimum and/or maximum tank concentration with the Basis for the other limit

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

026A2.04 , Containment Spray / 5 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Failure of spray pump

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.9 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!83 The reactor has been tripped and SI initiated due to a Large Break LOCA inside Containment

. "A" Containment Spray pump tripped on startup.

"A" Outside Recirc Spray pump (ORS) discharge pressure and amp indications are fluctuating.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) Operator action required for the "A" ORS pump

. 2) The required procedural flow path is 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or SI

1-E-1 , Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; and ________

. A. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL.

2) 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

.

B. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL.

2) 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

. C. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL and locally open the supply breaker.

2) 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

. D. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL and locally open the supply breaker.

2) 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

. Proposed Answer:

B. Explanation:

Candidate must assess status of ORS pump, with conditions given the ORS pump is cavitating

- since the CS pump has tripped and not supplying NPSH to the ORS pump. IAW 1

-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attachment 1, Step 9; if the ORS pump is cavitating, the pump control switch placed in PTL. Correct EOP flowpath for this event is E

-0, E-1, ES-1.3, E-1. ES-1.2 transition would be appropriate for a SBLOCA; not a Design Basis LOC A.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, attachment 1, Rev 71, Step 9. 1

-E-1, Rev. 43, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; steps 20, and 21.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-3, E-0, Objective B, Given a copy of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition.

ND-95.3-LP-7, E-1, Objective B, Given a copy of E

-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and identify procedural requirements for ORS pump operation with indications of cavitation, and procedural flowpath for the event. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since the Candidate can apply expected procedure sequence for a S BLOCA with the sequence for a LBLOCA

. B. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect

- Placing control switch in PTL is required, locally opening breaker is not required. Plausible since Candidate can misapply which of the Spray pumps cannot be secured, in PTL, without reset of the H

-Hi CLC signal. Part 2) incorrect sequence for a LBLOCA. Plausible since the Candidate could apply the sequence for a SBLOCA with that of a LBLOCA. D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, ORS pump will secure in PTL with Hi

-Hi CLS signal active. Part 2) is correct.

Plausible since Candidate can misapply which of the Spray pumps cannot be secured, in PTL, without reset of the H

-Hi CLC signal.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

026AG2.2.44 , Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8, Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.2 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!84 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100%.

1-CC-TV-105B, RCP "B" CLR CC RTN TV

, fails closed.

Annunciator 1C

-B1, RCP 1B CC RETURN LO FLOW alarms.

The crew enters 1

-AP-9.00, RCP Abnormal Conditions.

Current Conditions:

The following additional annunciators are Lit.

o 1 C-G4, RCP FRAME ALERT. RCP 'B' parameter changes over the last 5 minutes Parameter Initial reading Current reading Frame Vibration 1.6 mils 2.9 mils and stable Shaft Vibration 5.5 mils 10.8 mils and stable

Which ONE of the following answers the questions below: 1) Is it required at this time to remove the unit from service and secure the 'B' RCP in accordance with 1-AP-9.00, RCP Abnormal Conditions

? 2) What is the Tech Spec Bases for the most limiting LCO that is entered?

A. 1) N o. 2) Provide cooling water for the removal of residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant system, cool the containment recirculation air coolers, and the reactor coolant pump motor coolers.

B. 1) N o. 2) Ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

C. 1) Y es. 2) Provide cooling water for the removal of residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant system, cool the containment recirculation air coolers, and the reactor coolant pump motor coolers.

D. 1) Y es.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 2) Ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment

. Proposed Answer:

B. Explanation:

1) There is no immediate requirement to remove the unit from operation and secure the 'B' RCP. All parameters are below their action level per 1

-AP-9.00, Attachment 1. Action levels are as follows: Frame Vibration

- Frame Danger annunciator lit. 2) LCO 3.8.C.1 for one containment isolation valve inoperable is entered, and that requires a 4

-hour clock to restore 1-CC-TV105B to operable status or isolate/deactivate that line. The Basis for LCO 3.8.C.1 is to ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct.

Technical

Reference:

1-AP-9.00, Rev. 35, RCP Abnormal Conditions, Surry Technical Specifications , Rev. 44. ARP 1C-H4, Rev. 3, RCP Frame Danger; 1C

-H5, Rev. 2, RCP Shaft Danger.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-88.1-LP-6, RX Coolant Pumps, Objective G; Summarize the content of Abnormal Procedures 9 and 16, and Annunciator Procedures for RCP CC Return Low Flow, RCP Vibrations, and RCS Low Flow, and the EP Continuous Actions Page which require stopping the RCPs

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires detailed knowledge of control room indications associated with CC supply to the RCP, and their normal and alert levels per 1

-AP-9.00. Part 2 question ensures question is at the SRO level.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect; LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct. Plausible because CC is affected and if candidate does not understand the requirements for CC operability then this choice becomes viable.

B. Correct answer C. Part 1 is incorrect because Frame vibration level is below the action level per AP

-9.00. Plausible if candidate confuses alarm levels with action levels because alarm for vibration put this parameters closer but not at the action level. Part 2 is incorrect; LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct. Plausible because CC is affected and if candidate does not understand the requirements for CC operability then this choice becomes viable.

D. Part 1 is incorrect because Frame vibration level is below the action level per AP

-9.00. Plausible if candidate confuses alarm levels with action levels because alarm for vibration put this parameters closer but not at the action level. Part 2 is correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

036AG2.2.37 , Fuel Handling Accident / 8, Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.6 IR-SRO: 4.6 Proposed Question:

!85 Unit 1 is operating at 100% power; Unit 2 is in Refueling shutdown.

The eighth fuel assembly has just been lifted into the Manipulator Crane when it is dropped, and bubbles begin issuing from the assembly.

Containment is open. Which ONE of the following identifies

1) In accordance with 0

-AP-22.00, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions, Containment Closure is required to be set within

________ minutes. 2) In accordance with TS 3.21 Basis, the Minimum number of OPERABLE trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System is _______

. A. 1) 45 2) 4 B. 1) 60 3) 4 C. 1) 45 2) 2 D. 1) 60 2) 2 Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

IAW 0-AP-22.00, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions, Note prior to Step 18, CTMT closure must be established within 45 minutes

. IAW TS 3.21 basis, 2 MCR Emergency Ventilation Trains are required to be Operable whenever either Unit is above 200°F (CSD). This is to ensure that, due to power supply alignments, at least one (1) train will be available to supply the MCR.

Technical

Reference:

TS-3.21, MCR and ESGR Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) and Bases, Rev. 44; 0-AP-22.00, Rev. 24, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

ND-92.3-LP-2, Serv Bldg Vent, Objective B, Describe the components, controls, and power supplies for the Main Control Room Ventilation system, including:

MCR/ESGR supply and exhaust systems and controls, and MCR/ESGR emergency ventilation supply and controls.

ND-92.3-LP-2, Serv Bldg Vent, Objective D, Determine the Technical Specifications associated with the Ventilation system, including for SRO candidates, the basis for these requirements, for the following: Tech Spec 3.21, Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)

. ND-92.5-LP-7, Refueling Aps, Objective C, Respond to a plant event in accordance with AP

-22.00, "Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions," AP

-22.01, "Loss of Refueling Cavity Level," and A P-22.02, "Malfunction of Spent Fuel Pit Systems," while demonstrating knowledge of the purpose, indications, and applicable immediate operator actions.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. The Candidate must recall specific knowledge item from 0

-AP-22.00 concerning CTMT closure times during an abnormal condition during Fuel Handling , and must recall s p ecific requirements for Operable Trains of MCR Emergency Ventilation from TS

-3.21 Bases under conditions established in the question

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, per Note prior to Step 18 of 0

-AP-22.00, CTMT closure must be set within 45 minutes

- a CTMT closure Team is designated to perform this function. Part 2) is incorrect, 2 Trains must be Operable. Plausible since Candidate can confuse the minimum number of Operable Trains required with the total number of trains installed. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 60 minutes is the allowed time to start MCR Emergency Ventilation following isolation of the Ventilation system per 0

-D RP-049, Time Critical Operator Actions, E01.1; for a SGTR/MSLB/LBLOCA (1(2)

-E-0) or 0-AP-22.00. Part 2) is incorrect, 2 Trains must be Operable. Plausible since Candidate can confuse the minimum number of Operable Trains required with the total number of trains installed

. C. Correct - Both Part s 1) and 2 are correct.

D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 60 minutes is the allowed time to start MCR Emergency Ventilation following isolation of the Ventilation system per 0

-DRP-049, Time Critical Operator Actions, E01.1; for a SGTR/MSLB/LBLOCA (1(2)

-E-0) or 0-AP-22.00.. Plausible since Candidate can confuse establishment of MCR Emergency Ventilation with CTMT Closure time. Part 2) is correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

054AG2.4.18 , Loss of Main Feedwater/4, Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 4.0 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!86 With the plant at 100% power, a loss of all feedwater occurs.

Current Conditions:

The crew is NOT successful at tripping the reactor manually.

The reactor fails to trip automatically.

The crew enters FR

-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

- ATWS. In accordance with the FR-S.1 background document which ONE of the following states:

1) The maximum amount of time for tripping the turbine to prevent unacceptable consequences

. 2) The basis for tripping the main turbine shortly after the onset of the event.

A. 1) 30 seconds

. 2) Shut down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up. B. 1) 60 seconds

. 2) Shut down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up

. C. 1) 60 seconds

. 2) Prevent the RCS from exceeding its RCS pressure limit

. D. 1) 30 seconds

. 2) Prevent the RCS from exceeding its RCS pressure limit

. Answer: D Proposed Answer:

D Explanation:

For an ATWS event where a loss of normal FW has occurred, analyses have shown that turbine trip is necessary (within 30 seconds) to maintain SG inventory. This type of event will result in the rapid heatup and pressurization of the Reactor Coolant system.

Technical

Reference:

1-FR-S.1 background document Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.1-LP-11, ATWT, Assess the expected sequence of events and the operator actions associated with an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT)

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 ND-95.3-LP-36, FR-S.1, Objective B Given the Major Action Categories associated with FR

-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, explain the purpose of FR

-S.1, the transition criteria for entering and exiting FR

-S.1, and the types of operator actions that will occur within each category. Question Source:

TAA0118 Significantly Modified Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question tests operators' knowledge of the EOP basis for Loss of Feedwater accident. 1

-FR-S.1 satisfies this because it is in the EOP network and actions in this procedure are governed by accident analysis for loss of feedwater with failure to trip. This K/A is satisfied by specifically asking reason for Turbine trip.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect. Other operator actions such as; locally tripping Rx Trip breakers and continuing to insert rods will shutdown the reactor. This is plausible because Shutting down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up is a strategy in FR

-S.1 to aid in reactor shutdown

. B. 1) Part 1 is Incorrect. 60 seconds is the time specified for Aux Feedwater restoration

. 2) Part 2 is incorrect. Other operator actions such as; locally tripping Rx Trip breakers and continuing to insert rods will shutdown the reactor. This is plausible because Shutting down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up is a strategy in FR

-S.1 to aid in reactor shutdown. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect

. 60 seconds is the time specified for Aux Feedwater restoration. 2) Part 2 is correct.

D. Correct answer.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

056AA2.75 , Loss of Off

-site Power /6 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

CVCS makeup

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.0 IR-SRO: 3.2 Proposed Question:

!87 Initial Conditions:

Both Units operating at 100% power.

"A" charging pump running on both Units.

Off-Site power is lost. Current Conditions:

The Team has load ed the AAC DG on the 1J Bus

. Which ONE of the following identifies

1) The _______ and "B" Charging Pump s are running on Unit 1. 2) The EAL classification

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED) A. 1) "A" 2) Alert, SA1.1.

B. 1) "A" 2) NOUE, SU1.1.

C. 1) "C" 2) Alert, SA1.1.

D. 1) "C" 2) NOUE, SU1.1.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

When off-site power is lost, both Units will automatically trip, and EDGs receive an auto start signal.

When "J" bus is lost and auto start signal will be generated that will close the "C" CH breaker - this will result in a lock

-out of the "A" CH pump on both Units

. When the AAC DG is loaded, the "B" CH pump will start.

Technical

Reference:

EAL Chart, SU1.1, SA1.1

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

YES EAL Chart Learning Objective:

ND-88.3-LP-5, Charging Pumps, Objective D, Outline the normal and abnormal conditions relating to charging pump control.

ND-95.5-LP-2, SEM, Objective C, Using EPIP

-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, analyze plant situations and determine the appropriate classification utilizing the EAL charts (both HOT and COLD conditions

). . Question Source:

New (EAL Chart is the Required Reference) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must determine which CH pump will be running when power restored (RCS makeup

.) Loss of Offsite power is classified as a NOUE, SU1.1, for loss of offsite AC power to both "H" and "J" emergency buses > 15 minutes.

Alert Classification plausible if Candidate confuses available power sources for Emergency buses and determines only 1 power source available.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, "A" CH pump will trip and lock

-out as soon as "C" CH pump breaker closes. Plausible, since Candidate must analyze Plant Status and determine CH pump that will be running. Since "A" CH pump initially running, Candidate may incorrectly determine that "A" CH pump will "ride the bus".

Part 2) is incorrect, power sources for emergency buses =3, requirement for Alert requires a single source remaining. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, "A" CH pump will trip and lock

-out as soon as "C" CH pump breaker closes. Plausible, Candidate must analyze Plant Status and determine CH pump that will be running.

Part 2) is correct.

. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is in correct, classification should be NOUE

. Plausible if Candidate confuses available power sources for Emergency buses and determines only 1 power source available.

D. Correct -Part 1) is correct.

Part 2) is correct ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

061AA2.03 , ARM System Alarms /7 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms:

Setpoints for alert and high alarms

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.0 IR-SRO: 3.3 Proposed Question:

!88 Initial Conditions:

Refueling operations in progress for Unit 1.

Annunciator 1

-RMA-A1, Unit 1 CTMT HI RAD ALERT/TRBL alarms.

Recorder traces for 1-RM-RR-127, and 1

-RM-128 are shown below.

Current Conditions:

The operator depresses the SAFE/RESET pushbutton to attempt to reset the alarm. There is no change from the initial conditions.

Which ONE of the following describes:

1) Th e actions that must be performed in accordance with 1

-RMA-A1? 2) The Technical specification basis for this Radiation Monitor?

A. 1) Stop refueling, notify HP, and evacuate Unit 1 containment

. 2) Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release.

B. 1) Review Technical Specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor

. 2) Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release.

C. 1) Stop refueling, notify HP, and evacuate Unit 1 containment

. 2) Provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage.

D. 1) Review Technical Specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor

. 2) Provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer:

B Explanation:

The situation posed by the question is indicative of an electronic check source failure.

The actions taken are from ARP 1

-RMA-A1 and indicate a failure of 1

-RM-127. Rad monitor readings are normal for both Containment Hi Range Rad monitors therefore per ARP 1

-RMA-A1 the actions are to review technical specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor. There is no need to evacuate containment as there are no indications of a breach of radioactivity. The Tech Spec basis is to provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release. It is the containment particulate and gas detectors that provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage.

Technical

Reference:

ARP 1-RMA-A1, Rev. 4, Unit 1 CTMT HI RAD ALERT/TRBL.

Tech Specs, Rev.

44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-93.5-LP-3, Post-TMI Rad Monitor, objective C; Determine the operation of the CHRRMS. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires an understanding of the setpoint for the Alert/Trbl alarm FOR 1

-RM-127 which is a containment area radiation monitor, therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis: A. Incorrect. Part 1 are actions to be taken if there is an indication of high radiation in containment. Plausible because these are actions taken from the ARP, and if candidate doesn't understand causes for the Alert/Trbl alarm, then this choice is likely. Part 2 is correct.

B. Correct. C. Incorrect. Part 1 are actions to be taken if there is an indication of high radiation in containment. Plausible because these are actions taken from the ARP, and if candidate doesn't understand causes for the Alert/Trbl alarm, then this choice is likely. Part 2 is incorrect. The CHHRMS do not have the same degree of sensitivity to leakage as the Containment particulate/gaseous detectors therefore this is false. Plausible because the Containment High Range Rad monitors can also deflect on primary system leakage, but the leakage would have to be fairly large or have fission products to cause significant deflection.

D. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. The CHHRMS do not have the same degree of sensitivity to leakage as the Containment particulate/gaseous detectors therefore this is false. Plausible because the Containment High Range Rad monitors can also deflect on primary system leakage, but the leakage would have to be fairly large or have fission products to cause significant deflection.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

064G2.1.32 , Emergency Diesel Generator / 6, Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.0 Proposed Question:

!89 Tech Specs Section 4.6, Emergency Power System Periodic Testing, states that a minimum fuel oil storage of 35,000 gallons shall be maintained on

-site. Concerning the basis for this capacity, which ONE of the following states: 1) The number of EDG(s) running at full power assumed? 2) The time elapsed before the fuel supply is exhausted?

A. 1) Two (2). 2) 1 Day. B. 1) Two (2). 2) 7 Days. C. 1) One (1). 2) 1 Day.

D. 1) One (1). 2) 7 Days. Proposed Answer:

D Explanation:

Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec Section 4.6.B.1, Emergency Power System Periodic Testing. 1

-OPT-EG-001, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test, Rev. 63, Initial Condition 3.6, Page 8. UFSAR, Section 8.5, Emergency Power System.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-90.3-LP-1, EDG, Objective M, Describe the Tech Spec requirements for the EDG and support systems, including for SRO candidates, the basis for these requirements.

Question Source:

Bank (TS00028) modified.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must recall the basis of the TS requirement for a minimum volume of fuel available.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, minimum level per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load. Plausible should Candidate assume on Loss of off

-site power, EDG #1 and #2 load to specific Unit; and #3 EDG fails to load which is assumed in many UFSAR Chapter 14 analyses.

Part 2) is incorrect, 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is derived from T S-3.16 requirement for length of time allowed for 1 EDG fuel oil flowpath to be inoperable before EDG is considered inoperable.

Plausible since Candidate can conflate TS

-3.16 fuel oil flowpath and justify 1 day for full power operation of 2 EDGs on available capacity required. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, minimum level per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load. Plausible if Candidate assumes on Loss of off

-site power, EDG #1 and #2 load to specific Unit; and #3 EDG fails to load which is assumed in many UFSAR Chapter 14 analyses

. Part 2) is correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load.

Part 2) is incorrect, 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is derived from TS

-3.16 requirement for length of time allowed for 1 EDG fuel oil flowpath to be inoperable before EDG is considered inoperable. Plausible since Candidate can conflate TS

-3.16 fuel oil flowpath and justify 1 day for full power operation of 2 EDGs on available capacity required.

D. Parts 1) and 2) are correct IAW TS 4.6.B.1 basis for minimum tank level.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

065AG2.4.9 , Loss of Instrument Air /8, Knowledge of low power / shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!90 Given the following

Team is responding to a SGTR on Unit 2 "B" S/G following a sustained loss of off-site power.

Team has transitioned to 2-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Annunciator 2 B-E6, IA LO HDR PRESS

/ IA COMPR1 TRBL has alarmed.

Instrument air pressure on PI

-IA-100 is 50 psig and lowering rapidly.

Temporary Diesel Air compressor will not start. Annunciator 2 D-C6, PRZR PWR RELIEF VV LO AIR PRESSURE is not LIT.

Team is ready to perform RCS cooldown.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes:

1) The initial actions for RCS cooldown in accordance with 2-E-3. 2) The post-SGTR procedure to use following initial cooldown.

A. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the S/G PORVs

. 2) 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL. B. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the steam dumps

. 2) 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL

. C. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the S/G PORVs

. 2) 2-ES-3.2, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN

. D. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the steam dumps

. 2) 2-ES-3.2, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN

. Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

1) With indications of a Total Loss of Air, the RCS cooldown will have to be via local operation of the S/G PORVs as there are local air bottles to allow this. Use of Steam Dumps are not possible because of the loss of air and the loss of offsite power which will diminish condenser vacuum. 2) ES-3.1 is the preferred method for final cooldown.

2-ES-3.2 (cannot be used because the BD Tri p valves will not be able to be opened.

Technical

Reference:

2-E-3, Rev. 53 , SGTR. 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-13, E-3 SGTR, objective B; Given a copy of E

-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture , apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition ND. ND-95.3-LP-14, ES-3.1 Post-SGTR Cooldown using backfill.

Question Source:

Mod Bank (LORP LEOP0708), Modified stem and distractors.

Question History: Last NRC Exam:

Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires an understanding as to how a loss of instrument air will impact a SGTR with respect to cooldown and depressurization which is how the SGTR is mitigated. Therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct answer.

B. Part 1 is incorrect because with a LOOP and loss of air there will be motive force to operate the Steam dumps. Also with no instrument air Main Steam Trip valves will close. Plausible because local operation of steam dumps possible if MSTVs are bypassed.

Part 2 is correct.

C. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect because blowdown trip valves will not be open due to loss of air. Plausible because this is one of the possible Post SGTR procedures.

D. Part 1 is incorrect because with a LOOP and loss of air there will be motive force to operate the Steam dumps. Also with no instrument air Main Steam Trip valves will close. Plausible because local operation of steam dumps possible if MSTVs are bypassed. Part 2 is incorrect because blowdown trip valves will not be open due to loss of air. Plausible because this is one of the possible Post SGTR procedures.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

069AG2.4.21 , Loss of CTMT Integrity /5, Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 4.0 IR-SRO: 4.6 Proposed Question:

!91 Unit 1 has experienced a LBLOCA coincident with a loss of off

-site power. The following conditions exist: 4160 V Emergency bus 1H is de

-energized due to a faul

t. CTMT pressure is 55 psia and slowly rising. 1-CS-P-1B, "B" CS pump tripped on start.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) The procedure and Path Color in effect 2) EAL Classification and category

? (REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; RED Path.

2) Alert, FA1.1

. B. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; RED Path.

2) SAE, FS1.1

. C. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; ORANGE Path.

2) Alert, FA1.1

.

D. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; ORANGE Path.

2) SAE, FS1.1

.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

With only 1 RS train in service due to the loss of the "H" emergency bus and the loss of ""B" CS pump, an Orange Path will exist on the C on ta inment Status Tree

. EAL chart, RCS barrier LOST, CTMT barrier Potential Loss, Item 7, FS1.1. Technical

Reference:

0-F-5, Rev. 2,Containment; Surry EAL Table, Rev. 4.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and determine that CTMT pressure is >23 psia. Select the appropriate procedure and path color from memory. EAL also must be determined

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect - a RED entry condition for FR

-. Plausible since Candidate could incorrectly recall RED path setpoint for CTMT pressure. Part 2) is incorrect, the RCS barrier has been lost and CTMT barrier is a potential loss, item 7; making the classification a SAE. Plausible in that the Candidate could miss identification of the Potential Loss of CTMT integrity

. B. Incorrect -Part 1) incorrect, - a RED entry condition for FR

-. Plausible since Candidate could incorrectly recall RED path setpoint for CTMT pressure. Part 2) is correct for the Unit condition.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, CTMT pressure > 23 psia AND CS is not flowing is an ORANGE Path. Part 2) is incorrect, the RCS barrier has been lost and CTMT barrier is a potential loss, item 7; making the classification a SAE. Plausible in that the Candidate could

miss identification of the Potential Loss of CTMT integrity.

D. Correct - Part 1) is correct and Part 2) is correct

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

086A2.04 , Fire Protection /, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 3.9 Proposed Question:

!92 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power when a fire occurs in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room.

The emergency switchgear Fire Suppression system could NOT be manually actuated. The team entered 1

-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire.

The team has placed the MS PRESS CONT VLV FIRE EMERG CLOSE switch es to EMERG CLOSE position for the SG PORVs. The fire has resulted in a loss of all three transfer busses.

Condenser Waterbox Vacuum breakers have been opened.

Which one of the following states:

1) The correct method available for controlling the RCS cooldown in accordance with 0

-FCA-17.00. 2) The maximum amount of time for restoring the Fire Suppression system to a FUNCTIONAL status per the TRM.

(REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) Operate the SG PORVs from the MCR.

2) 14 days. B. 1) Operate the SG PORVs from the MCR

. 2) 7 days. C. 1) Locally operate the SG PORVs using the air bottles

. 2) 14 days. D. 1) Locally operate the SG PORVs using the air bottles

. 2) 7 days. Proposed Answer:

C. 1) Locally open SG PORVs using the Appendix

-R air bottles. 2) 14 days.

Explanation:

1) 0-FCA-17.00 directs using SG PORVs because with the transfer busses de

-energized the condenser water boxes vacuum breakers are opened to slow intake canal draw down. SG PORVs are operated using the Appendix

-R air bottles to cool down.

2) TRM allows 14 days as a maximum amount of time (TRM 3.7.5)

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

0-FCA-17.00, Rev. 32, Limiting Fire Cooldown. 1-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Fire, Rev. 23. TRM Section 3.7.5, 3.7.2, Rev. 35

. Reference Provided to Applicant:

Learning Objective:

ND-95.6-LP-3, Fire Area FCAs, Objective E; Examine the operations involved in achieving stable HSD conditions following implementation of FCA 4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire Question Source:

Modified Bank (EOP0412) Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question stem includes failure of Halon system which meets intent of K/A, "failure to actuate FPS when required". Question requires the student to predict the effects of the fire and actions taken for the operation of SG PORVs, and based on those actions the student must determine how to perform cooldown operation in FCA

-17.00. Part 2 supports the knowledge required of SRO candidates to determine maximum amount of time for restoration of halon system.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Incorrect because Condenser is not available because loss of power will require opening condenser waterbox vacuum breakers. Plausible if the Candidate does not account for the SG Appendix

-R key switches being placed in EMER CLOSE, this would be a viable option. 2) Correct.

B. 1) Incorrect because Condenser is not available because loss of power will require opening condenser waterbox vacuum breakers. Plausible the Candidate does not account for the SG Appendix

-R key switches being placed in EMER CLOSE, this would be a viable option.

2) Incorrect because TRM 3.7.5 states 14 days as a completion time. Plausible because 7 days is completion time allowed for a spray or sprinkler sytem. C. Correct answer.

D. 1) Correct. 2) Incorrect because TRM 3.7.5 states 14 days as a completion time. Plausible because 7 days is completion time allowed for a spray or sprinkler sytem.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.1.14 , Conduct of operations, Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant

-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.1 IR-SRO: 3.1 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!93 The Unit is operating at 100% when the following events occur:

1236 #2 EDG is started for Monthly Performance Test.

1330 Heavy black smoke is reported coming from #2 EDG Engine Control Cabinet.

1333 #2 EDG tripped.

1340 An alert is declared based on Tab HA2.1, Fire or explosion affecting the operability of structures, systems, or components required to establish or maintain Safe Shutdown.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) T he First method used to notif y Plant personnel to report to their Emergency Assembly Area(s) in accordance with EPIP

-1.01. 2) T he maximum time allowed for Security to report initial results of Accountability of Plant personnel.

A. 1) Contact Station Personnel with Beepers

. 2) 15 minutes.

B. 1) Contact Station Personnel with Beepers

. 2) 30 minutes.

C. 1) Station Emergency Manager announcement using Gai

-tronics. 2) 15 minutes.

D. 1) Station Emergency Manager announcement using Gai

-tronics. 2) 30 minutes.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

The SEM will announce the event classification, reason for classification, and direct personnel to report to their Emergency Assembly Area on Step 5 of EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling procedure. Accountability initial report is required to be complete within 30 minutes

. Technical

Reference:

EPIP-1.01, Rev. 57, Emergency Manager; 0-AP-48.00, Rev. 33, Fire Protection; Emergency Plan, Rev. 59, - page 65; EP

-AA-400, Drill and Exercise Program, Rev. 6.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective: ND-95.5-SP-1, EPIP I, Objective E, Given entry conditions to the Station Emergency Plan, perform the actions specified in the appropriate EPIP's.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must recall from memory the correct method used to personnel notification to direct plant personnel to Emergency Assembly Areas; and the time limit allowed for accountability to be completed when required.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect. Part 2) is incorrect, the time allowed is 30 minutes. Plausible since Step 4 of EPIP

-1.01 has the SEM assess whether implementation of normal emergency response actions could present a danger to Station personnel; in this case, the SEM could direct Security to notify personnel in unaffected areas of the event/accountability by a selective method; and 15 minutes is the time allowed for the SEM to classify an event when conditions are evident.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect

, the Gai-tronics is used for the announcement of the Event. Part 2) is correct. Plausible since Step 4 of EPIP

-1.01 has the SEM assess whether implementation of normal emergency response actions could present a danger to Station personnel; in this case, the SEM could direct Security to notify personnel in unaffected areas of the event/accountability by a selective met hod. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible if Candidate confuses allotted time to classify event with time allowed to complete accountability.

D. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.1 .38 , Conduct of operations, Knowledge of the stations requirements for verbal communication when implementing procedures

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.7 IR-SRO: 3.8 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!94 Preparations are in progress to conduct a Reactor startup following a refueling outage for Unit 2. The operations and support personnel have assembled to conduct a Pre

-job briefing for 2

-NPT-RX-008, Startup Physics Testing (ICCE II).

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the requirements per O P-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions, Attachment 3

- Management Expectations Briefing checklist, for covering the expectations regarding "the need for open communication

"? 1) The individual must have a position of ________ or above.

2) The individual must be qualified at a minimum as __________.

A. 1) Test Coordinator

. 2) Current Reactor Engineer.

B. 1) Test Coordinator

. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present.

C. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present.

D. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. 2) Current Reactor Engineer.

Proposed Answer:

C Explanation:

Per OP-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions the individual who must cover managements' expectations for "the need for open communications" is the Senior Operations Manager who is designated to provide oversight. This is a specific requirement as stated in OP

-AA-106, Attachment 3, Management Expectations Pre

-Job Briefing Checklist for an ICCE. That individual must have a site position of Second Line Supervisor or above for an ICCE II test. The qualifications of that individual must be a Senior Reactor Operator past or present.

Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-106, Rev. 9, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 B. Learning Objective:

SROUTP-SDS-02, Administrative Procedures, objective A; For a Tier 1 procedure, discuss the following:

o Purpose of the procedure o Responsibilities, as it applies to operations personnel (Operations Personnel, Shift Operators, Reactor Operators, etc.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.

13) Comments: K/A Match Analysis: The K/A requires knowledge of station requirements for verbal communications- An ICCE requires a brief which entails verbal communications with specific requirements therefore this question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis: A. 1) Test Coordinator

. Incorrect, management expectations for the need for open communications must be covered by the Senior Operations Manager. While it is possible for 2 nd line Supervisor to perform as Test Coordinator, it is not allowable for a 2 nd line Sup to hold both positions. This is plausible because the Test coordinator will cover other communication items specific to the test.

2) Current Reactor Engineer. Incorrect because for an ICCE II test the Senior Operations Manager must be a Second Line Supervisor or above. Plausible because this is the required qualification level for Test coordinator.

B. 1) Test Coordinator

. Incorrect, management expectations for the need for open communications must be covered by the Senior Operations Manager. While it is possible for 2 nd line Supervisor to perform as Test Coordinator, it is not allowable for a 2 nd line Sup to hold both positions. This is plausible because the Test coordinator will cover other communication items specific to the test.

2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present. Correct.

C. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. Correct. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present. Correct.

D. 1) Second Line Supervisor. Correct.

2) Current Reactor Engineer. Incorrect because for an ICCE II test the Senior Operations

Manager must be a Second Line Supervisor or above. Plausible because this is the required qualification level for Test coordinator.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.2.1 , Equipment Control, Ability to perform pre

-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 4.5 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!95 Initial Conditions: A reactor startup is in progress per 1

-GOP-1.8, Unit Startup, HSD to Max Allowable Power

. The RO is withdrawing control rods.

Intermediate

-Range channels both indicate 6 X 10

-11 amps and slowly rising. Startup rate is +0.1 dpm and slowly rising. Current Conditions:

Source-Range channel N

-31 fails LOW.

The Team has entered 1

-AP-4.00, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction.

Which ONE of the following identifies

(1) When is PG to the blender valves ADMINISTRATIVELY required to be Caution Tagged closed?

(2) What is required in accordance with TS

-3.7, Table 3.7

-1, concerning the failed detector?

(REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. (1) Less than 98 steps on "C" control bank

. (2) Reactor startup may continue

. B. (1) RCS Temperature < 200 °F

. (2) Immediately suspend reactivity changes

. C. (1) Less than 98 steps on "C" control bank.

(2) Immediately suspend reactivity changes

. D. (1) RCS Temperature < 200 °F

. (2) Reactor startup may continue

. Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

To prevent an undetected dilution due to Source Range detector shadowing, PG to the blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 200°F and Control Bank C is withdrawn less than 98 steps. For the conditions as listed, TS 3.7, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4, OA 4, reactor power must be maintained below P

-6, and positive reactivity changes are immediately suspended.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

TS-3.7, Rev. 44, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4. A., Nuclear Flux Source Range, Operator Action 4.

Reference Provided to Applicant: Yes Learning Objective:

ND-93.2-LP-2, Source Range Nis, Objective C, Analyze the operation of the source range detection system during both normal and abnormal operating conditions.

Question Source:

Modified (TS00186), Significantly Modified Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 43.6 / 45.1)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and apply Administrative and TS requirements.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, Withdrawal of Control Banks to Critical Conditions, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS Temperature

- reactor power is less than P

-6 and IR is low in its' range, SR would be required for monitoring core power, power level is not high enough to block the SR. Plausible

- Candidate must recall TS requirements for SR; Candidate may confuse IR requirements with SR requirements.

Candidate must recall functions and interlocks with SR channels.

B. Incorrect

- part 1) is incorrect, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be bank "C. Plausible since the Candidate can confuse the Administrative requirements with the TS 3.2.E requirements for the PG to Blender Valves in CSD and RSD conditions. Par t 2) is correct, reactivity changes must be suspended IAW TS 3.7, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4, OA 4 requirements when < P

-6. C. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, Withdrawal of Control Banks to Critical Conditions, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS can confuse the Administrative requirements with the TS 3.2.E requirements for the PG to Blender Valves in CSD and RSD conditions. Part 2) is incorrect". Part 2) is incorrect

- reactor power is less than P

-6 and IR is low in its' range, SR would be required for monitoring core power, power level is not high enough to block the SR. Plausible

- Candidate must recall TS requirements for SR; Candidate may confuse IR requirements with SR requirements. Candidate must recall functions and interlocks with SR channels.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.2.21 , Equipment Control, Knowledge of pre

- and pos t-maintenance operability requirements.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 2.9 IR-SRO: 4.1 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!96 Given the following:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at 100%.

Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) is in progress following Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Battery replacement.

1-EPT-0106-03, Emergency Diesel No. 1 Battery Service Test has just been turned in for review as UNSAT.

All other PMT items have been completed as Sat.

Which ONE of the following correctly answers the questions regarding returning Emergency Diesel No. 1 to service per VPAP 2003, Post Maintenance Testing:

1) Can Emergency Diesel No. 1 be returned to service without performing rework

, with an Engineering justification that the test failure does not affect operability?

2) Which department is responsible for making the final determination of operability?

A. 1) Yes. 2) Engineering.

B. 1) Yes. 2) Operations.

C. 1) N o. 2) Engineering

. D. 1) N o. 2) Operations

. Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

Per VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required.

Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2003, Rev. 14, Post Maintenance Testing Program. WM

-AA-100, Rev. 22, Work Management.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 C. Learning Objective:

SROU-SDS-2, Admin Procedures, objective B, For a Tier 2 procedure, discuss the following:

o Purpose of the procedure o Requirements for operations personnel Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question requires SRO knowledge of Post maintenance operability requirements therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Correct. 2) Incorrect. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required. Plausible if candidate confuses roles of operations and engineering department.

B. Correct. C. 1) Incorrect. Per VPAP

-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. 2) Incorrect. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required. Plausible if candidate confuses roles of operations and engineering department.

D. 1) Incorrect. Per VPAP

-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. 2) Correct

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.3.11 , Radiation Control, Ability to control radiation releases

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.3 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!97 A licensed operator commences the release of a waste gas decay tank in accordance with OP

-23.2.4, Release of Waste Gas Decay Tank 1B. Initial Hydrogen concentration in WGDT 1B is 67.3%. A spike results in the process vent radiation monitor , 1-GW-RI-130, entering into ACCIDENT mode. The release is subsequently isolated in accordance with 0

-RMA-C7, Process Vent Normal Range Gas Alert/HI, and activity returns to pre

-event levels.

Which ONE of the following states: 1) The maximum release rate from a WGDT 1B is based on ________. 2) The procedu r e used to return the radiation monitor to Normal Mode

. A. 1) the release permit

2) I&C resets the RM using an Instrument Maintenance Procedure. B. 1) the Hydrogen concentration

2) I&C resets the RM using an Instrument Maintenance Procedure

. C. 1) release permit

2) Operations resets the RM using 0-RMA-C7. D. 1) the Hydrogen concentration

2) Operations resets the RM using 0

-RMA-C7.

Proposed Answer: A. Explanation:

WGDT release flow rate is limited by hydrogen concentration to ensure a conservative indicated flow rate when H2 concentration is >80%. When Accident mode is entered, I&C must reset the monitor to Normal Mode using an IMP (Instrument Maintenance Procedure

.) Technical

Reference:

ARP 0-RMA-C7, Rev. 3, Process Vent Normal Range Gas Alert/HI.

OP-23.2.4, Rev. 19, Release of Waste Gas Decay Tank 1B.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-93.5-LP-3, Post-TMI Rad Monitor, Objective B, Determine the operation of the MGPI Radiation Monitoring System.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source:

Modified (RM00039) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must consider the limiting factor in setting release rate. Candidate determine the appropriate procedural reference used to restore the RM to Normal Mode

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, hydrogen concentration is used to set the maximum release rate only when H2 concentration is >80%, by initial condition H2 concentration is 67.3%. Part 2) is correct, per ARP 0-RMA-C7, I&C must be contacted to restore the RM to Normal Mode. Plausible if Candidate does not take account of current H2 concentration in the tank for determining limiting factor for setting release rate

. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, tank release rate is limited by the release permit if H2 concentration is less than 80%. Part 2) is incorrect, return to Normal Mode requires I&C involvement pe r 0-RMA-C6. Plausible if Candidate incorrectly assumes ARP is used by Operations to restore the RM to Normal Mode

. D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, hydrogen concentration is used to set the maximum release rate if H2 concentration is above 80%. Part 2) is incorrect

, return to Normal Mode requires I&C involvement per 0

-RMA-C6. Plausible if Candidate does not take account of current H2 concentration in the tank, and assumes ARP is used by Operations to restore the RM to Normal Mode.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.4.12 , Emergency Procedures/Plans, Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 4.0 IR-SRO: 4.3 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!98 Given the following conditions:

A General Emergency has been declared.

An individual has been injured in the Auxiliary Building penetration area.

Dose rates in the area are 140 R em/hr. It will take a maximum of 10 minutes to remove the individual from the area.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the EPIP 4.04 requirements for:

1) Solicitation of a volunteer to rescue the individual.

2) Use of an RWP.

A. 1) Anticipated dose rates do NOT require the SEM to solicit volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) An RWP is NOT required provided the SEM authorizes the activity.

B. 1) Due to anticipated dose for rescue workers, the SEM can assign ONLY volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) An RWP is NOT required provided the SEM authorizes the activity.

C. 1) Anticipated dose rates do NOT require the SEM to solicit volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) The SEM may NOT waive the requirement for an RWP.

D. 1) Due to anticipated dose for rescue workers, the SEM can assign ONLY volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) The SEM may NOT waive the requirement for an RWP.

Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

The individual used for rescue will receive a minimum dose of approximately 23.3 Rem based on current dose rates (140 R/HR 10/60 = 23.34 Rem). Per EPIP 4.04 only volunteers can be used if individual will receive > 25 Rem, therefore the SEM does not have to solicit a volunteer. The RWP may be waived if authorized by the SEM. Technical

Reference:

EPIP-4.04, Rev. 9, Emergency Personnel Radiation Exposure.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.5-LP-2, Objective B; List the responsibilities of the Station Emergency Manager during an emergency according to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan

. Question Source:

Modified EPIP062 Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question requires knowledge of crew responsibilities with focus on SEM responsibilities. Knowledge of RWP requirements specific to SEM.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct Answer.

B. Incorrect answer. 1) Incorrect. Per EPIP

-4.04 volunteers do NOT have to be used. If TEDE would be > 25 Rem that the SEM would need a volunteer to perform rescue. This is plausible if student confuses requirement or miscalculates dose. 2) Part 2 is correct. C. Incorrect answer. 1) Part 1 is correct.

2) Incorrect, EPIP

-4.04 DOES authorize the SEM to waive the requirement for an RWP

. Plausible if student misunderstands duties and responsibilities of an SEM.

D. Incorrect answer. 1) Incorrect. Per EPIP

-4.04 volunteers do NOT have to be used. If TEDE would be > 25 Rem that the SEM would need a volunteer to perform rescue. This is plausible if student confuses requirement or miscalculates dose. 2) Incorrect, EPIP

-4.04 does authorize the SEM to waive the requirement for an RWP

. Plausible if student misunderstands duties and responsibilities of an SEM

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.4.23 , Emergency Procedures/Plans, Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.4 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!99 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

"A" Train ICCM plasma display is INOPERABLE

. Current Conditions:

A severe thunderstorm has caused a Loss of Off

-Site Power (LOOP)

. Storm generated missiles have destroyed the following tanks

. 1 & 2-CN-TK-2 (Normal CN Storage T anks) 1-CN-TK-1 (Emergency CN Storage T an k) 1-FP-TK-1A & 1B (Fire Protection T anks) At the completion of 1

-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the operating team determines that a Natural Circulation Cooldown must be performed at a rate that will cause Reactor Vessel Head void formation

. Which ONE of the following states the required procedural transition for Unit 1

? A. Go to 1-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel

. B. Go to 1-ES-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel Without RVLIS C. Go to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown. Initiate RCS cooldown, then transition to 1

-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel

. D. Go to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown. Initiate RCS cooldown, then transition to 1

-ES-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel Without RVLIS

.

Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

Correct procedural flowpath for this scenario is to transition to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, after the first 14 Steps have been completed, the Team can then transition to ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in the Vessel.

Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.2, Rev.2 5, Natural Circulation Cooldown. 1

-E S-0.3, Rev. 18, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx. Vessel. 1

-ES-0.4, Rev. 13, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx. Vessel (w/o RVLIS)

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-5, ES-0.2, Objective B, Given a copy of ES

-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition.

ND-95.3-LP-6, ES-0.3, Objective B, Given a copy of ES

-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Rx Vessel, explain the basis of each procedural step.

Question Source:

Modified Bank (LEOP0135 Significantly modified

) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess conditions given and select the appropriate procedure flow path for the scenario presented

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect - ES-0.3 is not entered from ES

-0.1; the first 14 Steps of ES-0.2 should be completed before transitioning to ES

-0.3; actions taken in first 14 steps are not repeated

. Plausible should Candidate consider only the need to Cooldown at a rapid rate.

B. Incorrect

-ES-0.4 is not entered from ES-0.1; the first 14 Steps of ES

-0.2 should be completed before transitioning to ES

-0.3; actions taken in first 14 steps are not repeated. Plausible if candidate accounts for need to Cooldown rapidly, and does not account for one train of RVLIS still OPEABLE.

C. Correct - Correct procedural flowpath

. D. Incorrect

-Transition to ES

-0.4 no t required; one train of RVLIS still OPERABLE Plausible in that Candidate does not take into account one train of RVLIS OPERABLE.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

WE05EA2.1 , Inadequate Heat Transfer

- Loss of Secondary Heat Sink /4 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink):

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.4 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!100 Given the following sequence of events

Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to "A" SG fault in Unit 1 Safeguards. A Main Steam Safety Valve has stuck open on "B" and "C" S/G on the reactor trip

. The TDAFW pump, 1

-FW-P-2, tripped on startup.

The crew is performing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip Or SI, Diagnostic Steps

. SG narrow-range levels are off

-scale low. "A" and "B" MDAFW pump trip and lock

-out. The SRO announces, "Transitioning to 1

-E-2." The STA reports a red

-path exists on Heat Sink CSF status tree.

Which ONE of the following describes:

1) The first source of AFW directed to be restored in accordance with 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink

. 2) Sequence of procedure transitions for this event

. A. 1) AFW from Unit 2 via the cross

-tie. 2) 1-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1

-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs; 1

-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink. B. 1) Unit 1 Main Feed Water.

2) 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink; 1

-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs

. C. 1) Unit 1 Main Feed Water.

2) 1-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1

-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs; 1

-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink

. D. 1) AFW from Unit 2 via the cross

-tie. 2) 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink; 1

-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs

. Proposed Answer:

D ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

The sequence of AFW restoration in order of priority is:

Affected Unit AFW system, opposite Unit AFW via the cross

-tie, Affected Unit Main Feed system, feed SGs using Main Condensate system, and depressurize one (1) SG and feed using Fire protection or AFW booster pumps. On diagnostic Steps, E

-2 would be selected on a steam break to Exit E

-0. On exit from E

-0, FR-H.1 is expected to be implemented to restore an AFW feed source. On exit from FR

-H.1, the Team would go to E

-2, then transition to ECA

-2.1. Technical

Reference:

1-E-2, Rev. 20; 0-F-3, Rev. 5, Heat Sink.

1-FR-H.1, Rev. 37, Response to Loss of Heat Sink.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-41, Objective C; Given a copy of FR

-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam: NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

K/A requires ability to select appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency situations related to Inadequate Heat Xfer, and determine the optimum sequence pursued to re-establish AFW flow to the SGs. Question poses inadequate heat sink scenario whereby student must determine the correct FR-H.1 flowpath and sequence of procedure flowpath for the given scenario. Distractor Analysis:

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 A. Incorrect - Part 1) is correct

. As given in the scenario, affected Unit AFW is unavailable; success path is establish AFW flow using AFW from opposite Unit. Part 2) is incorrect, STA report of Red Path on Heat sink would require transition to FR

-H.1, then E

-2, and finally to ECA

-2.1. Plausible since Candidate could assess conditions as requiring transition to E

-2 before implementing FR

-H.1. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, proper sequence for attempt to restore AFW flow is Affected Unit AFW, opposite Unit AFW, then attempt Main Feed. Part 2) is correct, proper sequence of procedure transition for scenario. Plausible since Candidate could assess condition as requiring MFW since SG NR levels are off

-scale low and MFW has the ability to feed the SGs at a higher rate.

C. Incorrect

-- Part 1) is incorrect, proper sequence for attempt to restore AFW flow is Affected Unit AFW, opposite Unit AFW, then attempt Main

Feed. Part 2) is incorrect, STA report of Red Path on Heat sink would require transition to FR

-H.1, then E

-2, and finally to ECA-2.1. Plausible since Candidate could assess conditions as requiring transition to E

-2 before implementing FR

-H.1 D. Correct. Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

SRO EXAM LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment #

Attachment Description 1 TS Figure 3.12-3 2 TS Figure 3.8

-1 3 TRM, section 3.7, Plant Systems (3.7.1

- 3.7.6) 4 TS Table 3.7

-1, Page 1 EAL EAL Charts

ATTACHMENT 1

ATTACHMENT 2

Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Less than required equipment FUNCTIONAL.

A.1 Restore equipment to FUNCTIONAL status.

OR A.2 Provide an alternate means to accomplish the nonfunctional function. 7 days 7 days B. One fire pump nonfunctional AND Piping from the remaining fire pump to 1-FP-92 (shortest route to U1 Turb Bldg) nonfunctional.

B.1 Declare Unit 1 Turbine Building sprinkler system nonfunctional and take actions as specified in TR 3.7.15.A. As specified in TR 3.7.15.A. 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Fire Suppression Water System TR 3.7.1 The Fire Suppression Water System equipment listed below shall be FUNCTIONAL:

a. Two 2,500 gpm fire pumps (1

-FP-P-1, 1-FP-P-2), b. Automatic initiation logic for each fire pump, c. Two fire water tanks (1

-FP-TK-1A, 1-FP-TK-1B), each containing 250,000 gallons of water reserved for fire protection, and

d. Necessary piping and valves to insure that fire water is available, upon demand, to the spray and sprinkler systems, fire hose stations, and yard fire hydrant and hydrant hose houses. APPLICABILITY:

At all times.

ACTIONS SPS TRM 3.7.1-2 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 ACTIONS C. One fire pump nonfunctional AND Piping from the remaining fire pump to 1-FP-49 (shortest route to U2 Turb Bldg) nonfunctional.

C.1 Declare Unit 2 Turbine Building sprinkler system nonfunctional and take actions as specified in TR 3.7.15.A. As specified in TR 3.7.15.A. D. No Fire Suppression Water System

FUNCTIONAL.

D.1 Establish a backup Fire Suppression Water System.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.1.1 Verify each fire water tank volume 250,000 gallons. 7 days TSR 3.7.1.2 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery electrolyte level is above the plates.

7 days TSR 3.7.1.3 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery voltage is 24V. 7 days TSR 3.7.1.4 Verify each pump starts and operates for 15 minutes on recirculation flow. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS TSR 3.7.1.5 Verify each manual, power

-operated, and automatic valve in the Fire Suppression Water System flow path is in its correct position. 31 days TSR 3.7.1.6 Verify the fire pump diesel fuel storage tank (1-FP-TK-4) contains 220 gallons of fuel. 31 days SPS TRM 3.7.1-3 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.7.1.7 Verify the fire pump diesel engine starts from ambient conditions and operates for 30 minutes on recirculation flow. 31 days TSR 3.7.1.8 Verify the fire pump diesel fuel oil storage tank sample parameters are within limits. The parameters shall be within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-74 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment.

92 days TSR 3.7.1.9 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery specific gravity is within limits.

92 days TSR 3.7.1.10 Perform a system flush.

6 months TSR 3.7.1.11 Verify functionality of each testable valve in the Fire Suppression Water System flow path by cycling it through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

12 months TSR 3.7.1.12 Perform a system functional test on the Fire Suppression Water System. The system functional test shall include simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. 18 months TSR 3.7.1.13 Verify each pump develops a flow 2,500 gpm at a Total Dynamic Head of 231 feet. 18 months TSR 3.7.1.14 Verify each pump starts sequentially and maintains Fire Suppression Water System pressure 80 psig. 18 months SPS TRM 3.7.1-4 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.1.15 Perform an inspection of the fire pump diesel engine. The inspection shall be in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service. per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.16 Verify fire pump diesel starting batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.17 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti

-corrosion material. per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.18 Perform a system flow test on the Fire Suppression Water System. The system flow test shall be in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of Fire Protection National Fire Protection Association.

3 years Spray and Sprinkler System 3.7.2 SPS TRM 3.7.2-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Sprinkler or Spray System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system(s) to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 7 days 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Spray and Sprinkler System TR 3.7.2 The Spray and Sprinkler System that provides protection for the Cable Tunnel shall be FUNCTIONAL (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

At all times.

ACTIONS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.2.1 Verify each manual, power

-operated, and automatic valve in the Sprinkler or Spray System flow path is in its correct position. 31 days TSR 3.7.2.2 Verify functionality of each testable valve in the Sprinkler or Spray System flow path by cycling it through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

12 months Spray and Sprinkler System 3.7.2 SPS TRM 3.7.2-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.2.3 Verify by visual inspection the integrity of the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers. 18 months TSR 3.7.2.4 Verify by visual inspection that each nozzle's spray pattern is not obstructed.

18 months TSR 3.7.2.5 Verify by performance of an air flow test that each open head spray and sprinkler nozzle is not obstructed.

3 years Low Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.3 SPS TRM 3.7.3-1 Revision 34, 03/26/14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Low Pressure CO 2 System TR 3.7.3 The Low Pressure CO 2 System shall be FUNCTIONAL for: Cable tray rooms (Appendix R - Yes), Cable vaults and tunnels (Appendix R - Yes), Safety related charcoal filter banks 3A and 3B (Appendix R - Yes), Emergency diesel generator rooms (Appendix R - No), and Normal switchgear rooms (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the Low Pressure CO 2 protected areas is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the Low Pressure CO 2 System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for Low Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctionality in each area listed in TR 3.7.3. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Low Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Low Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.3 SPS TRM 3.7.3-2 Revision 34, 03/26/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.3.1 Verify low pressure CO 2 storage tank 7 days TSR 3.7.3.2 Verify low pressure CO 2 storage tank 7 days TSR 3.7.3.3 Verify system valves and associated ventilation dampers and fire doors actuate manually and/or automatically as designed upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. 18 months TSR 3.7.3.4 Verify flow from each nozzle during a "Puff Test." 18 months High Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.4 SPS TRM 3.7.4-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 High Pressure CO 2 System TR 3.7.4 The High Pressure CO 2 System shall be FUNCTIONAL for:

Emergency Service Water pumps fuel oil storage tank room (Appendix R - No) and Emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump rooms (Appendix R - No). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the High Pressure CO 2 protected areas is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the High Pressure CO 2 System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for High Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctionality in each area listed in TR 3.7.4. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. High Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days High Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.4 SPS TRM 3.7.4-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.4.1 Verify individual high pressure CO 2 6 months TSR 3.7.4.2 Verify system valves and associated ventilation dampers and fire doors actuate manually and/or automatically as designed upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. 18 months TSR 3.7.4.3 Verify no blockage through headers and nozzles during a flow test. 18 months Halon System 3.7.5 SPS TRM 3.7.5-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Halon System TR 3.7.5 The Halon System shall be FUNCTIONAL for the Emergency Switchgear Room (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the Halon protected area is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the Halon System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Halon System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the Emergency Switchgear Room. AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.5.1 Verify each manual, power-operated, and automatic valve in the Halon System flow path is in its correct position.

31 days Halon System 3.7.5 SPS TRM 3.7.5-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.5.2 Verify individual Halon storage tanks 95% of full charge weight. 6 months TSR 3.7.5.3 Verify individual Halon storage tanks 90% of full charge pressure. 6 months TSR 3.7.5.4 Verify system actuates automatically upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal.

18 months TSR 3.7.5.5 Verify no blockage through headers and nozzles during a flow test. 18 months TSR 3.7.5.6 Verify functionality of manual initiating system. 18 months Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-1 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations TR 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations listed in Table 3.7.6

-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in areas protected by the hose stations is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each hose station listed in Table 3.7.6-1. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required primary fire hose stations outside containment nonfunctional.

A.1.1 Route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from a FUNCTIONAL hose station.

OR A.1.2.1 Establish an hourly fire watch in the affected area. AND A.1.2.2 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-2 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more required secondary fire hose stations outside containment nonfunctional.

B.1.1 Route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from a FUNCTIONAL hose station.

OR B.1.2.1 Establish an hourly fire watch in the affected area. AND B.1.2.2 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND B.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 14 days C. One or more required primary fire hose stations inside containment nonfunctional.

C.1 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND C.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-3 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.6.1 Verify by visual inspection that all required equipment is available at each Fire Hose Station located outside Containment.

31 days TSR 3.7.6.2 Perform hydrostatic testing of hose house fire hose at a pressure of 200 psig. 12 months TSR 3.7.6.3 Inspect hoses and gaskets located outside Containment. Hoses shall be removed, degraded gaskets in the couplings shall be replaced, and the hoses shall be re

- racked. 18 months TSR 3.7.6.4 Verify by visual inspection that each Fire Hose Station located inside Containment is FUNCTIONAL.

Each outage of duration greater than 7 days TSR 3.7.6.5 Inspect hoses and gaskets located inside Containment or intended for inside Containment use. Hoses shall be removed, degraded gaskets in the couplings shall be replaced, and the hoses shall be returned to the storage location.

18 Months TSR 3.7.6.6 Verify valve functionality and no flow blockage by partial opening of each Fire Hose Station.

3 years TSR 3.7.6.7 Perform hydrostatic testing of interior hose at a pressure of 200 psig. 3 years Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-4 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations Station Number Note Location Size a. 1-FP-HR-01-37, 1-FP-HR-01-39, 1-FP-HR-01-41, 1-FP-HR-01-42, 1-FP-HR-01-44, 1-FP-HR-01-46, 1-FP-HR-01-48, 1-FP-HR-01-50, 1-FP-HR-01-38, 1-FP-HR-01-40, 1-FP-HR-01-41A, 1-FP-HR-01-43, 1-FP-HR-01-45, 1-FP-HR-01-47, 1-FP-HR-01-49, 1-FP-HR-01-51 f Auxiliary Building 1-1/2" b. 1-FP-HR-01-52, 1-FP-HR-01-53 f Fuel Building 1-1/2" c. 1-FP-HR-01-12, 1-FP-HR-01-20, 1-FP-HR-01-23, 1-FP-HR-01-55, 1-FP-HR-01-57 1-FP-HR-01-16, 1-FP-HR-01-21A, 1-FP-HR-01-54, 1-FP-HR-01-56, a, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" d. 1-FP-HR-01-22 b, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" e. 1-FP-HR-01-33 c, f Turbine Building 1-1/2" f. 1-FP-HR-01-34 d, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" g. 1-FP-HR-01-73, 1-FP-HR-01-74, 1-FP-HR-01-75, 1-FP-HR-01-76, 1-FP-HR-01-77, 1-FP-HR-01-78, 1-FP-HR-01-79, 1-FP-HR-01-80, 1-FP-HR-01-81, 1-FP-HR-01-82, 1-FP-HR-01-83, 1-FP-HR-01-84, 1-FP-HR-01-85 e, f Unit 1 Containment 1-1/2" These hose stations to be used as backup to control room, emergency switchgear room and emergency diesel generator rooms. (a) This hose station to be used as backup to emergency switchgear rooms. (b) This hose station to be used as primary support for control room. (c) This hose station to be used as backup to emergency diesel generator rooms. (d) These hose stations are designed to be dry and shall be FUNCTIONAL when the main shutoff valves in the auxiliary building are opened. (e) Primary means of fire suppression.

(f) Secondary means of fire suppression

. (g) Secondary means of fire suppression.

SPS TRM 3.7.6-5 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Fire Hose Stations Station Number Note Location Size h. 2-FP-HR-02-60, 2-FP-HR-02-61, e, f Unit 2 Containment 1-1/2" 2-FP-HR-02-62, 2-FP-HR-02-63, 2-FP-HR-02-64, 2-FP-HR-02-65, 2-FP-HR-02-66, 2-FP-HR-02-67, 2-FP-HR-02-68, 2-FP-HR-02-69, 2-FP-HR-02-70, 2-FP-HR-02-71, 2-FP-HR-02-72 (e) These hose stations are designed to be dry and shall be FUNCTIONAL when the main shutoff valves in the auxiliary building are opened. (f) Primary means of fire suppression.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 34K/A Number:

002G2.2.25 , Reactor Coolant / 2, Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.2 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!76 Given the following:

Unit 1 is cooling down for refueling outage.

RCS Tave is 349 o F. RCS Pressure is 360 psig. Which ONE of the following correctly states:

1) The maximum number of charging pumps that are allowed per Tech Specs 3.1.G, RCS Overpressure Mitigation for sustained operation

. 2) The basis for that requirement?

A. 1. one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent

. B. 1. one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of both PORVs, or equivalent

. C. 1. two charging pump s capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient , can be relieved by the operation of both PORVs, or equivalent

. D. 1. two charging pump s capable of injecting into the RCS.

2. To ensure that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV, or equivalent.

Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

Part 1) Technical Specifications 3.1.G.c.(1) states: "

Whenever the RCS average temperature is less than or equal to 350 oF and the reactor vessel head is bolted: A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of injecting into the RCS. Two charging pumps may be in operation momentarily during transfer of operation from one charging pump to another." The question asks for the requirement for sustained operation therefore a maximum of one charging pump is the only correct answer.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Part 2) The basis for a maximum of one charging pump allowed OPERABLE below 350 oF provi de assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV, or equivalent.

Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications 3.1.G Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-88.1-LP-9H, Apply the RCS Tech Specs, including for the SRO candidate, the basis behind each specification.

Question Source:

Bank (TS00164) Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 43.2) Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

The K/A requires knowledge of the bases in Technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations, and the question (part 2) clearly tests for that knowledge.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct Answer.

B. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis clearly states that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent. Plausible if candidate confuses the fact that while two PORVs will provide sufficient protection from pressure transients below 350 oF, the basis for a single charging pump is one PORV providing adequate protection, not two

. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because above 350 oF two charging pumps may be OPERABLE, but at or below 350 oF a maximum of one charging pump is allowed. Because question asks for sustained operation momentary operation of two charging pumps is incorrect as a reason for 2 charging pumps. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis clearly states that the mass addition transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV or equivalent. Plausible if candidate confuses the fact that while two PORVs will provide sufficient protection from pressure transients below 350 oF, the basis for a single charging pump is one PORV providing adequate protection, not two.

D. 1) Part 1 is incorrect. Plausible because above 350 oF two charging pumps may be OPERABLE, but at or below 350 oF a maximum of one charging pump is allowed. Because question asks for sustained operation momentary operation of two charging pumps is incorrect as a reason for 2 charging pumps. 2) Part 2 is correct for one charging pump, but is not correct for two charging pumps.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

004A2.35 , Chemical and Volume Control / 2 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CVCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Reactor trip

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 3.8 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!77 Unit 1 initially operating at 100% power when a reactor trip occurs due to "A" reactor trip breaker spuriously opening.

On transition to ES

-0.1, The RO reports the following:

Annunciator 1D

-E5, CHG PP TO RE GEN HX HI/LO FLOW, has alarmed.

Charging flow indicates 2 5 gpm. Letdown flow is 0 gpm. RO identified 1

-CH-TV-1204A, Inside Letdown Trip Valve, is closed and cannot be re

-opened. Which ONE of the following states

1) The operating Team used ________ to close and de-activate 1-CH-TV-1204B , Outside Letdown Trip Valve

. 2) The Letdown penetration is

________? A. 1) 1-OPT-CT-306, Containment Integrity Verification

2) Inoperable (4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock in effect)

B. 1) 1-OPT-CT-306, Containment Integrity Verification

2) Operable (Exit the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock)

C. 1) 0-OP-CT-001, Containment Isolation Barriers

2) Inoperable(4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock in effect)

D. 1) 0-OP-CT-001, Containment Isolation Barriers

2) Operable (Exit the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> clock) Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

0-OP-CT-001 provides the guidance for responding to an INOPERABLE containment Trip Valve. TS

-3.8 states: restore an INOPERABLE TV to an OPERABLE status OR isolate the penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />

. Once this action has been completed, the penetration would be considered Operable. Technical

Reference:

0-OP-CT-001, Rev. 3

. TS-3.8.C ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No. Learning Objective:

ND-88.4-LP-2, CTMT Vessel, Objective E, Employ the technical specifications associated with the containment structure, including for the SRO candidates, the basis behind these specifications

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.5 / 43/5 / 45/3 / 45/5)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess post trip abnormal condition and select the appropriate procedure and Tech Spec Reference to address the condition.

Distractor Analysi s: A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 1

-OPT-CT-306 is a monthly surveillance used to verify penetration status

. Part 2) is incorrect, the penetration has been isolated, thus meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 1

-O PT-CT-306 is a monthly surveillance used to verify penetration status. Part 2) is correct and meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. C. Incorrect

-Part 1) is correct, this OP provides the guidance necessary for ensuring CTMT integrity for a TV failure. Part 2) is incorrect, the penetration has been isolated, thus meets the requirements of TS

-3.8.C. D. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

007EA2.06 , Reactor Trip

- Stabilization

- Recovery /1 , Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a reactor trip:

Occurrence of a reactor trip

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.3 IR-SRO: 4.5 Proposed Question:

!78 Initial Conditions

The reactor is operating at 100% power.

An RCS Leak Rate is in progress in accordance with 1

-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Coolant Leakage

- Computer Calculated

. Current Conditions:

The Reactor Trips due to a loose wire in the "A" reactor trip breaker

. The Team is stabilizing the Unit in accordance with ES

-0.1, Reactor Trip Response

. Which of the following identifies

1) In accordance with OP

-AP-105, Post Trip Review, ______ must authorize Reactor Restart following completion of recovery actions?

2) The RCS Leakrate is required to be completed ______

in accordance with TS

-4.13 Basis?

A. 1) Manager - Nuclear Operations

. 2) Shiftly. B. 1) Manager - Nuclear Operations

. 2) Daily. C. 1) Site Vice President

. 2) Shiftly. D. 1) Site Vice President.

2) Daily. Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

IAW OP-AP-105, the Site Vice President must approve reactor restart following completion of recovery actions

. IAW TS-4.13 Basis, the RCS leakrate must be completed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> of establishing steady state operations.

Technical

Reference:

OP-AP-104, Post Trip Review

. TS-4.13 Basis.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No o Learning Objective: SROU

-02, Admin Procs, Objective C Tier 3 Procedures, For a Tier 3 procedure, discuss the following: Purpose, What conditions would result in use of the procedure, Overall knowledge of what the procedure accomplishes.

Question Source:

New Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level: Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

The question matches the K/A. In Part 1) of the question the Candidate must recall specific knowledge from an Administrative Procedure

. In Part 2) of the question, the Candidate must assess condition and recall information from the Basis section of Tech Specs.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect - Part 1) is incorrect, authorization for reactor restart must be obtained from the Site Vice President

. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since 1

-OPT-RC-10.0 is performed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after steady state operation is established

. B. Incorrect

- Part 1 is incorrect, authorization for reactor restart must be obtained from the Site Vice President

. Part 2) is correct. C. Incorrect - Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since 1

-OPT-RC-10.0 is performed 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> after steady state operation is establishe

d. D. Incorrect, Both Part 1) and Part 2) is correct

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

012G2.4.1 , Reactor Protection / 7, Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.6 IR-SRO: 4.8 Proposed Question:

!79 Initial Conditions Unit 1 is operating at 100% power

. Annunciator 1E

-B8, Loss of Coolant flow >P

-8, FIRST OUT is received.

"A" RCS Loop flow indicates 0% flow.

Manual reactor trip from the control room is unsuccessful and the Team transitions to 1

-FR-S.1 , Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS

. Current Conditions Offsite power is lost on swapover to RSSTs.

1. 1 EDG trips on overspeed.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) T he Procedure Flowpath

. 2) The EAL Classification and category

. REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1) Immediately transition to ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

2) SAE, SS2.1

.

B. 1) Continue with FR-S.1 until an exit point is reached, Transition to E

-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and Transition to ECA

-0.0 at Step 3

. 2) SAE, SS2.1

. C. 1) Immediately transition to ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power.

2) Alert SA1.1

. D. 1) Continue with FR-S.1 until an exit point is reached, Transition to E

-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and and Transition to ECA

-0.0 at Step 3

. 2) Alert, SA1.1.

Proposed Answer:

A.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

Classification for an ATWS event with the failure of the reactor to trip is a SAE, SS2.1

. When Offsite is lost and #1 EDG trips on overspeed, Unit 1 will be in a Loss of All AC condition; #3 EDG is designed to preferentially load to Unit 2. Function Restoration procedures require at least 1 Emergency bus to be energized in order to be applicable. This leaves ECA

-0.0 as the only applicable procedure in effect; an immediate transition to this procedure is required.

Technical

Reference:

WOG Background Document, ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, HP

-Rev 2, Page

2. Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-17, ECA-0.0, Objective A, Given the major action categories associated with ECA

-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, determine the purpose of ECA

-0.0, the transition criteria for entering and exiting ECA

-0.0, and the types of operator actions that will occur within each category. ND-95.5-LP-2, SEM, Objective C, Using EPIP

-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, analyze plant situations and determine the appropriate classification utilizing the EAL charts (both HOT and COLD conditions).

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A at SRO level, Candidate must assess Plant conditions, determine correct procedural flowpath, and classify an event.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct - Parts 1) and 2) are correct. Due to sequence of events, Unit 1 will have no emergency buses; this procedure becomes highe st priority.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, FR-S.1 will no longer be the highest priority procedure in effect. ECA-0.0 along with E

-0 are the only two direct entry procedures of EOPs. Plausible if Candidate assumes FR

-S.1, highest priority FR, must be continued until an exit point is reached. Part 2) classification is correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct.

Part 2) is incorrect, Plausible if Candidate assumes FR

-S.1, highest priority FR, must be continued until an exit point is reached, and does not identify both emergency buses on Unit 1 have been de

-energized.

Classification is plausible if ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Candidate fails to account for ability to supply Unit 1 "J" bus from Either #3 EDG or the AAC DG. D. Incorrect

- part 1) incorrect, ECA-0.0 becomes the only applicable EOP when a Loss of All AC occurs. Part 2) incorrect. Plausible if Candidate fails to account for ECA

-0.0 is a direct entry procedure/ misapplies guidance for procedure applicability; Classification plausible if Candidate does not account for supplying Unit 1 "J" bus from #3 EDG or the AAC DG.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

015G2.4.47 , Nuclear Instrumentation / 7, Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 4.2 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!80 Initial Conditions for Unit 1:

Unit 1 at 100% power.

Delta Flux is at

-2.7% with a target of

-1%. Spurious Instrument failure causes rods to insert

. Current Conditions:

Reactor Power is 89% and stable.

Delta Flux is at

-15%. Tave is 571.5 oF, Tref is 571.0 o F. Annunciator 1E

-E3, Delta Flux Deviation is lit.

Annunciator 1G-G8, Rod Bank D Lo Limit Based on the current conditions, which ONE of the following states:

1) The next action required to be taken to comply with Technical Specifications. 2) The most restrictive Tech. Spec basis for this CONDITION

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED

) A. 1) Restore Delta flux to target band within 1-hour or reduce power to <

50% in 1-hour. 2) Minimize the effects of Xenon redistribution during load

-follow maneuvers

. B. 1) Restore Delta flux to target band within 1

-hour or reduce power to < 50% in 1

-hour. 2) Provide a limit on rod worth in the event of a rod ejection accident

. C. 1) Reduce reactor power to < 50% within 30 minutes

. 2) Minimize the effects of Xenon redistribution during load

-follow maneuvers.

D. 1) Reduce reactor power to < 50% within 30 minutes

. 2) Provide a limit on rod worth in the event of a rod ejection accident

.

Proposed Answer:

C Explanation:

1) A Delta flux of

-15% not only deviates from target but also deviates from maximum allowable deviation of TS Figure 3.12

-3. At power levels < 90% the indicated delta flux deviation may deviate from its target band for a maximum of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (cumulative) in any 24

-hour period provided the flux difference is within the limits of TS Figure 3.12

-3. One minute penalty is accumulated for each minute of operation outside the target band. Because TS Figure 3.12

-3 is violated (-10.8 is max) Tech ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Specs require power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes. 2) The Delta Flux LCO is not met with Delta flux at -12.0. The basis for the Delta Flux LCO is to minimize the effects of xenon redistribution on the axial power distribution during load

-follow maneuvers

. Technical

Reference:

Technical Specifications 3.12.B.4, Rev. 44.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

YES Learning Objective:

ND-93.2-LP-4, Power Range Nuclear Instruments, Objective D, Explain the meaning of the "Delta Flux" indication, including the limitations imposed upon it by Technical Specifications

Question Source:

New Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

This question matches the K/A because the SRO must use the Delta flux information provided by Nuclear instrumentation to determine that an adverse trend in Delta flux is occurring. The Delta flux figure provide (Axial Flux Difference Limits which is also TS Figure 3.12-3) is a control room reference from 1E-E3, Delta Flux Deviation that would be provided to the Control Room Operator. This is an SRO level question because it requires detailed knowledge of Tech Spec actions, and power levels for which penalty minutes will accrue. Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is incorrect because Delta flux is outside TS Figure 3.12

-3 band which requires power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes

. Also time to reduce power to < 50% is 30 minutes, and not 1-hour. Plausible if candidate confuses max time for penalty minutes (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) with max allowable delta flux deviation.

Tech Specs do es allow Delta Flux to be outside target band for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period provided that Delta flux does not exceed max deviation allowed by TS Figure 3.12

-3. 2) Part 2 is correct.

B. 1) Part 1 is incorrect because Delta flux is outside TS Figure 3.12

-3 band which requires power reduction to < 50% in 30 minutes. Also time to reduce power to < 50% is 30 minutes, and not 1-hour. Plausible if candidate confuses max time for penalty minutes (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) with max allowable delta flux deviation. Tech Specs does allow Delta Flux to be outside target band for 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period provided that Delta flux does not exceed max deviation allowed by TS Figure 3.12

-3. 2). 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis given is for rod insertion limits

. Rod insertion limits are met as the annunciator 1G

-G8 ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 only indicates that the rod insertion limit is getting close. This choice is plausible because rod insertion given has come close to the rod insertion limit.

C. Correct answer.

D. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect because the basis given is for rod insertion limits. Rod insertion limits are met as the annunciator 1G-G8 only indicates that the rod insertion limit is getting close. This choice is plausible because rod insertion given has come close to the rod insertion limit

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

022A2.04 , Containment Cooling / 5 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Loss of service water

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 2.9 IR-SRO: 3.2 Proposed Question:

!81 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 operating at 100% power

. Unit 2 is performing 2

-PT-41.1, CC Pump Performance.

CC is split out in the Turbine Building

. 1-CC-E-1A, "A" CC HX, has been isolated due to a through wall SW leak.

Current Conditions

Annunciators 1B

-A7 and 1B-B7, Channel 1 and Channel 2

, CTMT PART +.1 PSI are received.

CTMT pressure is 1 0.6 PSIA and rising slowly.

The operating Team is performing ARP 1B

-A7 , and has raised SW flow to the "C" CC Heat Exchanger.

Which ONE of the following describes

1) The effect on Unit 1 Containment Temperature

. 2) The basis of the sloped line from 70 °F to 100 °F on the Containment Allowable Air Partial Pressure VS. Service Water Temperature Curve (Figure TS

-3.8-1) is __________

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) No change. 2) MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure

. B. 1) Lower. 2) LOCA depressurization

. C. 1) No change. 2) LOCA depressurization

.

D. 1) Lower. 2) MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure

. Proposed Answer:

C ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation: When CC flow is reduced by isolating the "A" CCHX, CC temperature will rise causing CTMT Air partial pressure to rise

. With CC split out, the adjustment in SW flow to the "C" CC HX will have no effect on Unit 1 CTMT pressure/temperature. Per Basis of TS

-3.8, the sloping section of Figure 3.8

-1 is based upon LOCA depressurization.

Technical

Reference:

TS 3.8 basis and Figure 3.8-1, Rev. 44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

Yes Learning Objective:

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13

) Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question Matches K/A. Candidate must assess the reduction of SW to the CC system and the effect on CTMT cooling. Candidate must also recall basis of TS Figure 3.8

-1. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) correct, adjusting SW flow to split section of CC system will have no effect on Unit 1 containment temperature

. Part 2) is incorrect, the horizontal upper line on TS Figure 3.8

-1 is based on MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure. Plausible since Candidate must assess effect of SW adjustments on Unit 1 CTMT temperature and recall basis for CTMT partial pressure curve.

B. Incorrect

- Pa rt 1) is incorrect, SW has been throttled to a split out section of CC system; temperature of CC on Un it 2 is affected

- not Unit 1

. Part 2) Part 2 is correct. Plausible since Candidate must assess the changes in SW flow and correctly apply the expected effect to the correct Unit.

C. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

D. Incorrect - Part 1) is incorrect, SW has been throttled to a split out section of CC system; temperature of CC on Unit 2 is affected

- not Unit 1

. Part 2) is incorrect, the horizontal upper line on TS Figure 3.8

-1 is based on MSLB Peak Calculated Pressure. Plausible since Candidate must assess effect of SW adjustments on Unit 1 CTMT temperature and recall basis for CTMT partial pressure curve.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

024AA2.01 , Emergency Boration / 1 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:

Whether boron flow and/or MOVs are malfunctioning from plant conditions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.1 Proposed Question:

!82 Given the following:

Unit 1 is ramping down in accordance with 0-AP-23.00, Rapid Load Reduction, to 71%. 30 second Emergency boration has just been initiated

. Emrg Borate Flow from 1-CH-FI-1110 indicates 60 gpm. Which ONE of the following states:

1) Cause for lower than expected Boric Acid Flow on 1

-CH-FI-1110. 2) The Tech Spec Basis for the minimum Boric Acid Storage Tank concentration of 7.0 weight percent. A. 1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Recirc Valve full open

. 2) Ensure Cold Shutdown Boron concentration can be achieved. B. 1) Boric Acid Transfer Pump Recirc Valve full open

. 2) Ensure solubility of Boric Acid at 112 °F

. C. 1) Boric Acid Transfer pump thermalled in fast speed

. 2) Ensure Cold Shutdown Boron concentration can be achieved

. D. 1) Boric Acid Transfer pump thermalled in fast speed

. 2) Ensure solubility of Boric Acid at 112 °F

. Proposed Answer:

A. Explanation: The identified Boration flow of 60 GPM is significantly less than expected flow with the Boric Acid Pump in fa st speed (usually ~110 gpm)

. With the recirc valve full open, the pump discharge pressure would be affected, resulting in the lower than normal flow rate. Part 2) of the question determines the SRO level of knowledge on TS 3.2 Basis.

Technical

Reference:

TS 3.2 Basis, Rev. 44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-88.3-LP-2, Charging and Letdown, Objective D, Describe the Technical Specifications associated with the CVCS System, including for SRO candidates, the basis behind these specifications.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis. Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is correct and 2) Part 2 is correct. B. 1) Part 1 is correct. Part 2) is incorrect, the minimum solution temperature of 112 °F is based on tank concentration of 8.5 weight percent. Plausible in that Candidate misapplying Basis for minimum and/or maximum tank concentration with the Basis for the other limit

. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect

, BA transfer pump thermal would result in 0 indicated flow. Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction. 2) Part 2 is incorrect.

D. 1) Part 1 is incorrec t, BA transfer pump thermal would result in 0 indicated flow. Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction. 2) Part 2 is incorrect, Plausible if candidate assumes head of the tank would provide some flow to the CH pump suction and candidate misapplying Basis for minimum and/or maximum tank concentration with the Basis for the other limit

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

026A2.04 , Containment Spray / 5 , Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CSS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Failure of spray pump

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.9 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!83 The reactor has been tripped and SI initiated due to a Large Break LOCA inside Containment

. "A" Containment Spray pump tripped on startup.

"A" Outside Recirc Spray pump (ORS) discharge pressure and amp indications are fluctuating.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) Operator action required for the "A" ORS pump

. 2) The required procedural flow path is 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or SI

1-E-1 , Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; and ________

. A. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL.

2) 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

.

B. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL.

2) 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

. C. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL and locally open the supply breaker.

2) 1-ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization

. D. 1) Place "A" ORS pump in PTL and locally open the supply breaker.

2) 1-ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation

. Proposed Answer:

B. Explanation:

Candidate must assess status of ORS pump, with conditions given the ORS pump is cavitating

- since the CS pump has tripped and not supplying NPSH to the ORS pump. IAW 1

-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Attachment 1, Step 9; if the ORS pump is cavitating, the pump control switch placed in PTL. Correct EOP flowpath for this event is E

-0, E-1, ES-1.3, E-1. ES-1.2 transition would be appropriate for a SBLOCA; not a Design Basis LOC A.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

1-E-0, attachment 1, Rev 71, Step 9. 1

-E-1, Rev. 43, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant; steps 20, and 21.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-3, E-0, Objective B, Given a copy of E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition.

ND-95.3-LP-7, E-1, Objective B, Given a copy of E

-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and identify procedural requirements for ORS pump operation with indications of cavitation, and procedural flowpath for the event. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible since the Candidate can apply expected procedure sequence for a S BLOCA with the sequence for a LBLOCA

. B. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect

- Placing control switch in PTL is required, locally opening breaker is not required. Plausible since Candidate can misapply which of the Spray pumps cannot be secured, in PTL, without reset of the H

-Hi CLC signal. Part 2) incorrect sequence for a LBLOCA. Plausible since the Candidate could apply the sequence for a SBLOCA with that of a LBLOCA. D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, ORS pump will secure in PTL with Hi

-Hi CLS signal active. Part 2) is correct.

Plausible since Candidate can misapply which of the Spray pumps cannot be secured, in PTL, without reset of the H

-Hi CLC signal.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

026AG2.2.44 , Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8, Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 4.2 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!84 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 is operating at 100%.

1-CC-TV-105B, RCP "B" CLR CC RTN TV

, fails closed.

Annunciator 1C

-B1, RCP 1B CC RETURN LO FLOW alarms.

The crew enters 1

-AP-9.00, RCP Abnormal Conditions.

Current Conditions:

The following additional annunciators are Lit.

o 1 C-G4, RCP FRAME ALERT. RCP 'B' parameter changes over the last 5 minutes Parameter Initial reading Current reading Frame Vibration 1.6 mils 2.9 mils and stable Shaft Vibration 5.5 mils 10.8 mils and stable

Which ONE of the following answers the questions below: 1) Is it required at this time to remove the unit from service and secure the 'B' RCP in accordance with 1-AP-9.00, RCP Abnormal Conditions

? 2) What is the Tech Spec Bases for the most limiting LCO that is entered?

A. 1) N o. 2) Provide cooling water for the removal of residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant system, cool the containment recirculation air coolers, and the reactor coolant pump motor coolers.

B. 1) N o. 2) Ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment.

C. 1) Y es. 2) Provide cooling water for the removal of residual and sensible heat from the Reactor Coolant system, cool the containment recirculation air coolers, and the reactor coolant pump motor coolers.

D. 1) Y es.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 2) Ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment

. Proposed Answer:

B. Explanation:

1) There is no immediate requirement to remove the unit from operation and secure the 'B' RCP. All parameters are below their action level per 1

-AP-9.00, Attachment 1. Action levels are as follows: Frame Vibration

- Frame Danger annunciator lit. 2) LCO 3.8.C.1 for one containment isolation valve inoperable is entered, and that requires a 4

-hour clock to restore 1-CC-TV105B to operable status or isolate/deactivate that line. The Basis for LCO 3.8.C.1 is to ensures the containment atmosphere will be isolated from the outside environment in the event of a release of radioactive material to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct.

Technical

Reference:

1-AP-9.00, Rev. 35, RCP Abnormal Conditions, Surry Technical Specifications , Rev. 44. ARP 1C-H4, Rev. 3, RCP Frame Danger; 1C

-H5, Rev. 2, RCP Shaft Danger.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-88.1-LP-6, RX Coolant Pumps, Objective G; Summarize the content of Abnormal Procedures 9 and 16, and Annunciator Procedures for RCP CC Return Low Flow, RCP Vibrations, and RCS Low Flow, and the EP Continuous Actions Page which require stopping the RCPs

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires detailed knowledge of control room indications associated with CC supply to the RCP, and their normal and alert levels per 1

-AP-9.00. Part 2 question ensures question is at the SRO level.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect; LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct. Plausible because CC is affected and if candidate does not understand the requirements for CC operability then this choice becomes viable.

B. Correct answer C. Part 1 is incorrect because Frame vibration level is below the action level per AP

-9.00. Plausible if candidate confuses alarm levels with action levels because alarm for vibration put this parameters closer but not at the action level. Part 2 is incorrect; LCO 3.13, Component Cooling is met because CC flow to the RHR system is not affected; therefore, the bases for LCO 3.13 is not correct. Plausible because CC is affected and if candidate does not understand the requirements for CC operability then this choice becomes viable.

D. Part 1 is incorrect because Frame vibration level is below the action level per AP

-9.00. Plausible if candidate confuses alarm levels with action levels because alarm for vibration put this parameters closer but not at the action level. Part 2 is correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

036AG2.2.37 , Fuel Handling Accident / 8, Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.6 IR-SRO: 4.6 Proposed Question:

!85 Unit 1 is operating at 100% power; Unit 2 is in Refueling shutdown.

The eighth fuel assembly has just been lifted into the Manipulator Crane when it is dropped, and bubbles begin issuing from the assembly.

Containment is open. Which ONE of the following identifies

1) In accordance with 0

-AP-22.00, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions, Containment Closure is required to be set within

________ minutes. 2) In accordance with TS 3.21 Basis, the Minimum number of OPERABLE trains of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System is _______

. A. 1) 45 2) 4 B. 1) 60 3) 4 C. 1) 45 2) 2 D. 1) 60 2) 2 Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

IAW 0-AP-22.00, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions, Note prior to Step 18, CTMT closure must be established within 45 minutes

. IAW TS 3.21 basis, 2 MCR Emergency Ventilation Trains are required to be Operable whenever either Unit is above 200°F (CSD). This is to ensure that, due to power supply alignments, at least one (1) train will be available to supply the MCR.

Technical

Reference:

TS-3.21, MCR and ESGR Emergency Ventilation System (EVS) and Bases, Rev. 44; 0-AP-22.00, Rev. 24, Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

ND-92.3-LP-2, Serv Bldg Vent, Objective B, Describe the components, controls, and power supplies for the Main Control Room Ventilation system, including:

MCR/ESGR supply and exhaust systems and controls, and MCR/ESGR emergency ventilation supply and controls.

ND-92.3-LP-2, Serv Bldg Vent, Objective D, Determine the Technical Specifications associated with the Ventilation system, including for SRO candidates, the basis for these requirements, for the following: Tech Spec 3.21, Main Control Room/Emergency Switchgear Room (MCR/ESGR) Emergency Ventilation System (EVS)

. ND-92.5-LP-7, Refueling Aps, Objective C, Respond to a plant event in accordance with AP

-22.00, "Fuel Handling Abnormal Conditions," AP

-22.01, "Loss of Refueling Cavity Level," and A P-22.02, "Malfunction of Spent Fuel Pit Systems," while demonstrating knowledge of the purpose, indications, and applicable immediate operator actions.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. The Candidate must recall specific knowledge item from 0

-AP-22.00 concerning CTMT closure times during an abnormal condition during Fuel Handling , and must recall s p ecific requirements for Operable Trains of MCR Emergency Ventilation from TS

-3.21 Bases under conditions established in the question

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, per Note prior to Step 18 of 0

-AP-22.00, CTMT closure must be set within 45 minutes

- a CTMT closure Team is designated to perform this function. Part 2) is incorrect, 2 Trains must be Operable. Plausible since Candidate can confuse the minimum number of Operable Trains required with the total number of trains installed. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 60 minutes is the allowed time to start MCR Emergency Ventilation following isolation of the Ventilation system per 0

-D RP-049, Time Critical Operator Actions, E01.1; for a SGTR/MSLB/LBLOCA (1(2)

-E-0) or 0-AP-22.00. Part 2) is incorrect, 2 Trains must be Operable. Plausible since Candidate can confuse the minimum number of Operable Trains required with the total number of trains installed

. C. Correct - Both Part s 1) and 2 are correct.

D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, 60 minutes is the allowed time to start MCR Emergency Ventilation following isolation of the Ventilation system per 0

-DRP-049, Time Critical Operator Actions, E01.1; for a SGTR/MSLB/LBLOCA (1(2)

-E-0) or 0-AP-22.00.. Plausible since Candidate can confuse establishment of MCR Emergency Ventilation with CTMT Closure time. Part 2) is correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

054AG2.4.18 , Loss of Main Feedwater/4, Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 4.0 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!86 With the plant at 100% power, a loss of all feedwater occurs.

Current Conditions:

The crew is NOT successful at tripping the reactor manually.

The reactor fails to trip automatically.

The crew enters FR

-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION

- ATWS. In accordance with the FR-S.1 background document which ONE of the following states:

1) The maximum amount of time for tripping the turbine to prevent unacceptable consequences

. 2) The basis for tripping the main turbine shortly after the onset of the event.

A. 1) 30 seconds

. 2) Shut down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up. B. 1) 60 seconds

. 2) Shut down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up

. C. 1) 60 seconds

. 2) Prevent the RCS from exceeding its RCS pressure limit

. D. 1) 30 seconds

. 2) Prevent the RCS from exceeding its RCS pressure limit

. Answer: D Proposed Answer:

D Explanation:

For an ATWS event where a loss of normal FW has occurred, analyses have shown that turbine trip is necessary (within 30 seconds) to maintain SG inventory. This type of event will result in the rapid heatup and pressurization of the Reactor Coolant system.

Technical

Reference:

1-FR-S.1 background document Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.1-LP-11, ATWT, Assess the expected sequence of events and the operator actions associated with an Anticipated Transient Without Trip (ATWT)

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 ND-95.3-LP-36, FR-S.1, Objective B Given the Major Action Categories associated with FR

-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS, explain the purpose of FR

-S.1, the transition criteria for entering and exiting FR

-S.1, and the types of operator actions that will occur within each category. Question Source:

TAA0118 Significantly Modified Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question tests operators' knowledge of the EOP basis for Loss of Feedwater accident. 1

-FR-S.1 satisfies this because it is in the EOP network and actions in this procedure are governed by accident analysis for loss of feedwater with failure to trip. This K/A is satisfied by specifically asking reason for Turbine trip.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Part 1 is correct. 2) Part 2 is incorrect. Other operator actions such as; locally tripping Rx Trip breakers and continuing to insert rods will shutdown the reactor. This is plausible because Shutting down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up is a strategy in FR

-S.1 to aid in reactor shutdown

. B. 1) Part 1 is Incorrect. 60 seconds is the time specified for Aux Feedwater restoration

. 2) Part 2 is incorrect. Other operator actions such as; locally tripping Rx Trip breakers and continuing to insert rods will shutdown the reactor. This is plausible because Shutting down the reactor by allowing the RCS to heat up is a strategy in FR

-S.1 to aid in reactor shutdown. C. 1) Part 1 is incorrect

. 60 seconds is the time specified for Aux Feedwater restoration. 2) Part 2 is correct.

D. Correct answer.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

056AA2.75 , Loss of Off

-site Power /6 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Offsite Power:

CVCS makeup

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.0 IR-SRO: 3.2 Proposed Question:

!87 Initial Conditions:

Both Units operating at 100% power.

"A" charging pump running on both Units.

Off-Site power is lost. Current Conditions:

The Team has load ed the AAC DG on the 1J Bus

. Which ONE of the following identifies

1) The _______ and "B" Charging Pump s are running on Unit 1. 2) The EAL classification

. (REFERENCE PROVIDED) A. 1) "A" 2) Alert, SA1.1.

B. 1) "A" 2) NOUE, SU1.1.

C. 1) "C" 2) Alert, SA1.1.

D. 1) "C" 2) NOUE, SU1.1.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

When off-site power is lost, both Units will automatically trip, and EDGs receive an auto start signal.

When "J" bus is lost and auto start signal will be generated that will close the "C" CH breaker - this will result in a lock

-out of the "A" CH pump on both Units

. When the AAC DG is loaded, the "B" CH pump will start.

Technical

Reference:

EAL Chart, SU1.1, SA1.1

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

YES EAL Chart Learning Objective:

ND-88.3-LP-5, Charging Pumps, Objective D, Outline the normal and abnormal conditions relating to charging pump control.

ND-95.5-LP-2, SEM, Objective C, Using EPIP

-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling Procedure, analyze plant situations and determine the appropriate classification utilizing the EAL charts (both HOT and COLD conditions

). . Question Source:

New (EAL Chart is the Required Reference) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must determine which CH pump will be running when power restored (RCS makeup

.) Loss of Offsite power is classified as a NOUE, SU1.1, for loss of offsite AC power to both "H" and "J" emergency buses > 15 minutes.

Alert Classification plausible if Candidate confuses available power sources for Emergency buses and determines only 1 power source available.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, "A" CH pump will trip and lock

-out as soon as "C" CH pump breaker closes. Plausible, since Candidate must analyze Plant Status and determine CH pump that will be running. Since "A" CH pump initially running, Candidate may incorrectly determine that "A" CH pump will "ride the bus".

Part 2) is incorrect, power sources for emergency buses =3, requirement for Alert requires a single source remaining. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) incorrect, "A" CH pump will trip and lock

-out as soon as "C" CH pump breaker closes. Plausible, Candidate must analyze Plant Status and determine CH pump that will be running.

Part 2) is correct.

. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is in correct, classification should be NOUE

. Plausible if Candidate confuses available power sources for Emergency buses and determines only 1 power source available.

D. Correct -Part 1) is correct.

Part 2) is correct ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

061AA2.03 , ARM System Alarms /7 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Area Radiation Monitoring (ARM) System Alarms:

Setpoints for alert and high alarms

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.0 IR-SRO: 3.3 Proposed Question:

!88 Initial Conditions:

Refueling operations in progress for Unit 1.

Annunciator 1

-RMA-A1, Unit 1 CTMT HI RAD ALERT/TRBL alarms.

Recorder traces for 1-RM-RR-127, and 1

-RM-128 are shown below.

Current Conditions:

The operator depresses the SAFE/RESET pushbutton to attempt to reset the alarm. There is no change from the initial conditions.

Which ONE of the following describes:

1) Th e actions that must be performed in accordance with 1

-RMA-A1? 2) The Technical specification basis for this Radiation Monitor?

A. 1) Stop refueling, notify HP, and evacuate Unit 1 containment

. 2) Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release.

B. 1) Review Technical Specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor

. 2) Provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release.

C. 1) Stop refueling, notify HP, and evacuate Unit 1 containment

. 2) Provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage.

D. 1) Review Technical Specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor

. 2) Provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Proposed Answer:

B Explanation:

The situation posed by the question is indicative of an electronic check source failure.

The actions taken are from ARP 1

-RMA-A1 and indicate a failure of 1

-RM-127. Rad monitor readings are normal for both Containment Hi Range Rad monitors therefore per ARP 1

-RMA-A1 the actions are to review technical specifications and monitor activity using the redundant monitor. There is no need to evacuate containment as there are no indications of a breach of radioactivity. The Tech Spec basis is to provide information to the operators that will enable them to determine the likelihood of a gross breach of barriers to radioactive release. It is the containment particulate and gas detectors that provide a sensitive indication of primary system leakage.

Technical

Reference:

ARP 1-RMA-A1, Rev. 4, Unit 1 CTMT HI RAD ALERT/TRBL.

Tech Specs, Rev.

44. Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-93.5-LP-3, Post-TMI Rad Monitor, objective C; Determine the operation of the CHRRMS. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires an understanding of the setpoint for the Alert/Trbl alarm FOR 1

-RM-127 which is a containment area radiation monitor, therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis: A. Incorrect. Part 1 are actions to be taken if there is an indication of high radiation in containment. Plausible because these are actions taken from the ARP, and if candidate doesn't understand causes for the Alert/Trbl alarm, then this choice is likely. Part 2 is correct.

B. Correct. C. Incorrect. Part 1 are actions to be taken if there is an indication of high radiation in containment. Plausible because these are actions taken from the ARP, and if candidate doesn't understand causes for the Alert/Trbl alarm, then this choice is likely. Part 2 is incorrect. The CHHRMS do not have the same degree of sensitivity to leakage as the Containment particulate/gaseous detectors therefore this is false. Plausible because the Containment High Range Rad monitors can also deflect on primary system leakage, but the leakage would have to be fairly large or have fission products to cause significant deflection.

D. Incorrect. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect. The CHHRMS do not have the same degree of sensitivity to leakage as the Containment particulate/gaseous detectors therefore this is false. Plausible because the Containment High Range Rad monitors can also deflect on primary system leakage, but the leakage would have to be fairly large or have fission products to cause significant deflection.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

064G2.1.32 , Emergency Diesel Generator / 6, Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.0 Proposed Question:

!89 Tech Specs Section 4.6, Emergency Power System Periodic Testing, states that a minimum fuel oil storage of 35,000 gallons shall be maintained on

-site. Concerning the basis for this capacity, which ONE of the following states: 1) The number of EDG(s) running at full power assumed? 2) The time elapsed before the fuel supply is exhausted?

A. 1) Two (2). 2) 1 Day. B. 1) Two (2). 2) 7 Days. C. 1) One (1). 2) 1 Day.

D. 1) One (1). 2) 7 Days. Proposed Answer:

D Explanation:

Technical

Reference:

Tech Spec Section 4.6.B.1, Emergency Power System Periodic Testing. 1

-OPT-EG-001, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise Test, Rev. 63, Initial Condition 3.6, Page 8. UFSAR, Section 8.5, Emergency Power System.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-90.3-LP-1, EDG, Objective M, Describe the Tech Spec requirements for the EDG and support systems, including for SRO candidates, the basis for these requirements.

Question Source:

Bank (TS00028) modified.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must recall the basis of the TS requirement for a minimum volume of fuel available.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, minimum level per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load. Plausible should Candidate assume on Loss of off

-site power, EDG #1 and #2 load to specific Unit; and #3 EDG fails to load which is assumed in many UFSAR Chapter 14 analyses.

Part 2) is incorrect, 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is derived from T S-3.16 requirement for length of time allowed for 1 EDG fuel oil flowpath to be inoperable before EDG is considered inoperable.

Plausible since Candidate can conflate TS

-3.16 fuel oil flowpath and justify 1 day for full power operation of 2 EDGs on available capacity required. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, minimum level per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load. Plausible if Candidate assumes on Loss of off

-site power, EDG #1 and #2 load to specific Unit; and #3 EDG fails to load which is assumed in many UFSAR Chapter 14 analyses

. Part 2) is correct.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, per TS 4.6 is 35,000 gallons to allow a single EDG operation for 7 days at full load.

Part 2) is incorrect, 1 day (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) is derived from TS

-3.16 requirement for length of time allowed for 1 EDG fuel oil flowpath to be inoperable before EDG is considered inoperable. Plausible since Candidate can conflate TS

-3.16 fuel oil flowpath and justify 1 day for full power operation of 2 EDGs on available capacity required.

D. Parts 1) and 2) are correct IAW TS 4.6.B.1 basis for minimum tank level.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

065AG2.4.9 , Loss of Instrument Air /8, Knowledge of low power / shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.2 Proposed Question:

!90 Given the following

Team is responding to a SGTR on Unit 2 "B" S/G following a sustained loss of off-site power.

Team has transitioned to 2-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture.

Annunciator 2 B-E6, IA LO HDR PRESS

/ IA COMPR1 TRBL has alarmed.

Instrument air pressure on PI

-IA-100 is 50 psig and lowering rapidly.

Temporary Diesel Air compressor will not start. Annunciator 2 D-C6, PRZR PWR RELIEF VV LO AIR PRESSURE is not LIT.

Team is ready to perform RCS cooldown.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes:

1) The initial actions for RCS cooldown in accordance with 2-E-3. 2) The post-SGTR procedure to use following initial cooldown.

A. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the S/G PORVs

. 2) 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL. B. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the steam dumps

. 2) 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL

. C. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the S/G PORVs

. 2) 2-ES-3.2, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN

. D. 1) Cooldown by dumping steam from intact S/Gs via local operation of the steam dumps

. 2) 2-ES-3.2, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BLOWDOWN

. Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

1) With indications of a Total Loss of Air, the RCS cooldown will have to be via local operation of the S/G PORVs as there are local air bottles to allow this. Use of Steam Dumps are not possible because of the loss of air and the loss of offsite power which will diminish condenser vacuum. 2) ES-3.1 is the preferred method for final cooldown.

2-ES-3.2 (cannot be used because the BD Tri p valves will not be able to be opened.

Technical

Reference:

2-E-3, Rev. 53 , SGTR. 2-ES-3.1, POST SGTR COOLDOWN USING BACKFILL.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-13, E-3 SGTR, objective B; Given a copy of E

-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture , apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition ND. ND-95.3-LP-14, ES-3.1 Post-SGTR Cooldown using backfill.

Question Source:

Mod Bank (LORP LEOP0708), Modified stem and distractors.

Question History: Last NRC Exam:

Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question requires an understanding as to how a loss of instrument air will impact a SGTR with respect to cooldown and depressurization which is how the SGTR is mitigated. Therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct answer.

B. Part 1 is incorrect because with a LOOP and loss of air there will be motive force to operate the Steam dumps. Also with no instrument air Main Steam Trip valves will close. Plausible because local operation of steam dumps possible if MSTVs are bypassed.

Part 2 is correct.

C. Part 1 is correct. Part 2 is incorrect because blowdown trip valves will not be open due to loss of air. Plausible because this is one of the possible Post SGTR procedures.

D. Part 1 is incorrect because with a LOOP and loss of air there will be motive force to operate the Steam dumps. Also with no instrument air Main Steam Trip valves will close. Plausible because local operation of steam dumps possible if MSTVs are bypassed. Part 2 is incorrect because blowdown trip valves will not be open due to loss of air. Plausible because this is one of the possible Post SGTR procedures.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

069AG2.4.21 , Loss of CTMT Integrity /5, Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 4.0 IR-SRO: 4.6 Proposed Question:

!91 Unit 1 has experienced a LBLOCA coincident with a loss of off

-site power. The following conditions exist: 4160 V Emergency bus 1H is de

-energized due to a faul

t. CTMT pressure is 55 psia and slowly rising. 1-CS-P-1B, "B" CS pump tripped on start.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) The procedure and Path Color in effect 2) EAL Classification and category

? (REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; RED Path.

2) Alert, FA1.1

. B. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; RED Path.

2) SAE, FS1.1

. C. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; ORANGE Path.

2) Alert, FA1.1

.

D. 1) FR-Z.1, Response to Containment High Pressure; ORANGE Path.

2) SAE, FS1.1

.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

With only 1 RS train in service due to the loss of the "H" emergency bus and the loss of ""B" CS pump, an Orange Path will exist on the C on ta inment Status Tree

. EAL chart, RCS barrier LOST, CTMT barrier Potential Loss, Item 7, FS1.1. Technical

Reference:

0-F-5, Rev. 2,Containment; Surry EAL Table, Rev. 4.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective:

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and determine that CTMT pressure is >23 psia. Select the appropriate procedure and path color from memory. EAL also must be determined

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect - a RED entry condition for FR

-. Plausible since Candidate could incorrectly recall RED path setpoint for CTMT pressure. Part 2) is incorrect, the RCS barrier has been lost and CTMT barrier is a potential loss, item 7; making the classification a SAE. Plausible in that the Candidate could miss identification of the Potential Loss of CTMT integrity

. B. Incorrect -Part 1) incorrect, - a RED entry condition for FR

-. Plausible since Candidate could incorrectly recall RED path setpoint for CTMT pressure. Part 2) is correct for the Unit condition.

C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, CTMT pressure > 23 psia AND CS is not flowing is an ORANGE Path. Part 2) is incorrect, the RCS barrier has been lost and CTMT barrier is a potential loss, item 7; making the classification a SAE. Plausible in that the Candidate could

miss identification of the Potential Loss of CTMT integrity.

D. Correct - Part 1) is correct and Part 2) is correct

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

086A2.04 , Fire Protection /, Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Fire Protection System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Failure to actuate the FPS when required, resulting in fire damage

. Level: S RO Tier #: 2 Group #: 2 IR - RO: 3.3 IR-SRO: 3.9 Proposed Question:

!92 Given the following conditions:

Unit 1 is at 100% power when a fire occurs in the Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear Room.

The emergency switchgear Fire Suppression system could NOT be manually actuated. The team entered 1

-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire.

The team has placed the MS PRESS CONT VLV FIRE EMERG CLOSE switch es to EMERG CLOSE position for the SG PORVs. The fire has resulted in a loss of all three transfer busses.

Condenser Waterbox Vacuum breakers have been opened.

Which one of the following states:

1) The correct method available for controlling the RCS cooldown in accordance with 0

-FCA-17.00. 2) The maximum amount of time for restoring the Fire Suppression system to a FUNCTIONAL status per the TRM.

(REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. 1) Operate the SG PORVs from the MCR.

2) 14 days. B. 1) Operate the SG PORVs from the MCR

. 2) 7 days. C. 1) Locally operate the SG PORVs using the air bottles

. 2) 14 days. D. 1) Locally operate the SG PORVs using the air bottles

. 2) 7 days. Proposed Answer:

C. 1) Locally open SG PORVs using the Appendix

-R air bottles. 2) 14 days.

Explanation:

1) 0-FCA-17.00 directs using SG PORVs because with the transfer busses de

-energized the condenser water boxes vacuum breakers are opened to slow intake canal draw down. SG PORVs are operated using the Appendix

-R air bottles to cool down.

2) TRM allows 14 days as a maximum amount of time (TRM 3.7.5)

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

0-FCA-17.00, Rev. 32, Limiting Fire Cooldown. 1-FCA-4.00, Limiting ESGR Fire, Rev. 23. TRM Section 3.7.5, 3.7.2, Rev. 35

. Reference Provided to Applicant:

Learning Objective:

ND-95.6-LP-3, Fire Area FCAs, Objective E; Examine the operations involved in achieving stable HSD conditions following implementation of FCA 4.00, Limiting ESGR Number 1 Fire Question Source:

Modified Bank (EOP0412) Question History: Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

Question stem includes failure of Halon system which meets intent of K/A, "failure to actuate FPS when required". Question requires the student to predict the effects of the fire and actions taken for the operation of SG PORVs, and based on those actions the student must determine how to perform cooldown operation in FCA

-17.00. Part 2 supports the knowledge required of SRO candidates to determine maximum amount of time for restoration of halon system.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Incorrect because Condenser is not available because loss of power will require opening condenser waterbox vacuum breakers. Plausible if the Candidate does not account for the SG Appendix

-R key switches being placed in EMER CLOSE, this would be a viable option. 2) Correct.

B. 1) Incorrect because Condenser is not available because loss of power will require opening condenser waterbox vacuum breakers. Plausible the Candidate does not account for the SG Appendix

-R key switches being placed in EMER CLOSE, this would be a viable option.

2) Incorrect because TRM 3.7.5 states 14 days as a completion time. Plausible because 7 days is completion time allowed for a spray or sprinkler sytem. C. Correct answer.

D. 1) Correct. 2) Incorrect because TRM 3.7.5 states 14 days as a completion time. Plausible because 7 days is completion time allowed for a spray or sprinkler sytem.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.1.14 , Conduct of operations, Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant

-wide announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode changes, etc.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.1 IR-SRO: 3.1 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!93 The Unit is operating at 100% when the following events occur:

1236 #2 EDG is started for Monthly Performance Test.

1330 Heavy black smoke is reported coming from #2 EDG Engine Control Cabinet.

1333 #2 EDG tripped.

1340 An alert is declared based on Tab HA2.1, Fire or explosion affecting the operability of structures, systems, or components required to establish or maintain Safe Shutdown.

Which ONE of the following identifies

1) T he First method used to notif y Plant personnel to report to their Emergency Assembly Area(s) in accordance with EPIP

-1.01. 2) T he maximum time allowed for Security to report initial results of Accountability of Plant personnel.

A. 1) Contact Station Personnel with Beepers

. 2) 15 minutes.

B. 1) Contact Station Personnel with Beepers

. 2) 30 minutes.

C. 1) Station Emergency Manager announcement using Gai

-tronics. 2) 15 minutes.

D. 1) Station Emergency Manager announcement using Gai

-tronics. 2) 30 minutes.

Proposed Answer:

D. Explanation:

The SEM will announce the event classification, reason for classification, and direct personnel to report to their Emergency Assembly Area on Step 5 of EPIP-1.01, Emergency Manager Controlling procedure. Accountability initial report is required to be complete within 30 minutes

. Technical

Reference:

EPIP-1.01, Rev. 57, Emergency Manager; 0-AP-48.00, Rev. 33, Fire Protection; Emergency Plan, Rev. 59, - page 65; EP

-AA-400, Drill and Exercise Program, Rev. 6.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Learning Objective: ND-95.5-SP-1, EPIP I, Objective E, Given entry conditions to the Station Emergency Plan, perform the actions specified in the appropriate EPIP's.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must recall from memory the correct method used to personnel notification to direct plant personnel to Emergency Assembly Areas; and the time limit allowed for accountability to be completed when required.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect. Part 2) is incorrect, the time allowed is 30 minutes. Plausible since Step 4 of EPIP

-1.01 has the SEM assess whether implementation of normal emergency response actions could present a danger to Station personnel; in this case, the SEM could direct Security to notify personnel in unaffected areas of the event/accountability by a selective method; and 15 minutes is the time allowed for the SEM to classify an event when conditions are evident.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect

, the Gai-tronics is used for the announcement of the Event. Part 2) is correct. Plausible since Step 4 of EPIP

-1.01 has the SEM assess whether implementation of normal emergency response actions could present a danger to Station personnel; in this case, the SEM could direct Security to notify personnel in unaffected areas of the event/accountability by a selective met hod. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct. Part 2) is incorrect. Plausible if Candidate confuses allotted time to classify event with time allowed to complete accountability.

D. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.1 .38 , Conduct of operations, Knowledge of the stations requirements for verbal communication when implementing procedures

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.7 IR-SRO: 3.8 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!94 Preparations are in progress to conduct a Reactor startup following a refueling outage for Unit 2. The operations and support personnel have assembled to conduct a Pre

-job briefing for 2

-NPT-RX-008, Startup Physics Testing (ICCE II).

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the requirements per O P-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions, Attachment 3

- Management Expectations Briefing checklist, for covering the expectations regarding "the need for open communication

"? 1) The individual must have a position of ________ or above.

2) The individual must be qualified at a minimum as __________.

A. 1) Test Coordinator

. 2) Current Reactor Engineer.

B. 1) Test Coordinator

. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present.

C. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present.

D. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. 2) Current Reactor Engineer.

Proposed Answer:

C Explanation:

Per OP-AA-106, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions the individual who must cover managements' expectations for "the need for open communications" is the Senior Operations Manager who is designated to provide oversight. This is a specific requirement as stated in OP

-AA-106, Attachment 3, Management Expectations Pre

-Job Briefing Checklist for an ICCE. That individual must have a site position of Second Line Supervisor or above for an ICCE II test. The qualifications of that individual must be a Senior Reactor Operator past or present.

Technical

Reference:

OP-AA-106, Rev. 9, Infrequently Conducted or Complex Evolutions.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 B. Learning Objective:

SROUTP-SDS-02, Administrative Procedures, objective A; For a Tier 1 procedure, discuss the following:

o Purpose of the procedure o Responsibilities, as it applies to operations personnel (Operations Personnel, Shift Operators, Reactor Operators, etc.

Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.

13) Comments: K/A Match Analysis: The K/A requires knowledge of station requirements for verbal communications- An ICCE requires a brief which entails verbal communications with specific requirements therefore this question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis: A. 1) Test Coordinator

. Incorrect, management expectations for the need for open communications must be covered by the Senior Operations Manager. While it is possible for 2 nd line Supervisor to perform as Test Coordinator, it is not allowable for a 2 nd line Sup to hold both positions. This is plausible because the Test coordinator will cover other communication items specific to the test.

2) Current Reactor Engineer. Incorrect because for an ICCE II test the Senior Operations Manager must be a Second Line Supervisor or above. Plausible because this is the required qualification level for Test coordinator.

B. 1) Test Coordinator

. Incorrect, management expectations for the need for open communications must be covered by the Senior Operations Manager. While it is possible for 2 nd line Supervisor to perform as Test Coordinator, it is not allowable for a 2 nd line Sup to hold both positions. This is plausible because the Test coordinator will cover other communication items specific to the test.

2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present. Correct.

C. 1) Second Line Supervisor

. Correct. 2) Senior Reactor Operator, past or present. Correct.

D. 1) Second Line Supervisor. Correct.

2) Current Reactor Engineer. Incorrect because for an ICCE II test the Senior Operations

Manager must be a Second Line Supervisor or above. Plausible because this is the required qualification level for Test coordinator.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.2.1 , Equipment Control, Ability to perform pre

-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 4.5 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!95 Initial Conditions: A reactor startup is in progress per 1

-GOP-1.8, Unit Startup, HSD to Max Allowable Power

. The RO is withdrawing control rods.

Intermediate

-Range channels both indicate 6 X 10

-11 amps and slowly rising. Startup rate is +0.1 dpm and slowly rising. Current Conditions:

Source-Range channel N

-31 fails LOW.

The Team has entered 1

-AP-4.00, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction.

Which ONE of the following identifies

(1) When is PG to the blender valves ADMINISTRATIVELY required to be Caution Tagged closed?

(2) What is required in accordance with TS

-3.7, Table 3.7

-1, concerning the failed detector?

(REFERENCE PROVIDED)

A. (1) Less than 98 steps on "C" control bank

. (2) Reactor startup may continue

. B. (1) RCS Temperature < 200 °F

. (2) Immediately suspend reactivity changes

. C. (1) Less than 98 steps on "C" control bank.

(2) Immediately suspend reactivity changes

. D. (1) RCS Temperature < 200 °F

. (2) Reactor startup may continue

. Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

To prevent an undetected dilution due to Source Range detector shadowing, PG to the blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 200°F and Control Bank C is withdrawn less than 98 steps. For the conditions as listed, TS 3.7, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4, OA 4, reactor power must be maintained below P

-6, and positive reactivity changes are immediately suspended.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Technical

Reference:

TS-3.7, Rev. 44, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4. A., Nuclear Flux Source Range, Operator Action 4.

Reference Provided to Applicant: Yes Learning Objective:

ND-93.2-LP-2, Source Range Nis, Objective C, Analyze the operation of the source range detection system during both normal and abnormal operating conditions.

Question Source:

Modified (TS00186), Significantly Modified Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 43.6 / 45.1)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess Unit condition and apply Administrative and TS requirements.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, Withdrawal of Control Banks to Critical Conditions, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS Temperature

- reactor power is less than P

-6 and IR is low in its' range, SR would be required for monitoring core power, power level is not high enough to block the SR. Plausible

- Candidate must recall TS requirements for SR; Candidate may confuse IR requirements with SR requirements.

Candidate must recall functions and interlocks with SR channels.

B. Incorrect

- part 1) is incorrect, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be bank "C. Plausible since the Candidate can confuse the Administrative requirements with the TS 3.2.E requirements for the PG to Blender Valves in CSD and RSD conditions. Par t 2) is correct, reactivity changes must be suspended IAW TS 3.7, Table 3.7

-1, Item 4, OA 4 requirements when < P

-6. C. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, IAW 1

-OP-RX-006, Withdrawal of Control Banks to Critical Conditions, P&L 4.15, PG to the Blender valves must be caution tagged closed when RCS can confuse the Administrative requirements with the TS 3.2.E requirements for the PG to Blender Valves in CSD and RSD conditions. Part 2) is incorrect". Part 2) is incorrect

- reactor power is less than P

-6 and IR is low in its' range, SR would be required for monitoring core power, power level is not high enough to block the SR. Plausible

- Candidate must recall TS requirements for SR; Candidate may confuse IR requirements with SR requirements. Candidate must recall functions and interlocks with SR channels.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.2.21 , Equipment Control, Knowledge of pre

- and pos t-maintenance operability requirements.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 2.9 IR-SRO: 4.1 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!96 Given the following:

Unit 1 and Unit 2 are at 100%.

Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) is in progress following Emergency Diesel Generator No. 1 Battery replacement.

1-EPT-0106-03, Emergency Diesel No. 1 Battery Service Test has just been turned in for review as UNSAT.

All other PMT items have been completed as Sat.

Which ONE of the following correctly answers the questions regarding returning Emergency Diesel No. 1 to service per VPAP 2003, Post Maintenance Testing:

1) Can Emergency Diesel No. 1 be returned to service without performing rework

, with an Engineering justification that the test failure does not affect operability?

2) Which department is responsible for making the final determination of operability?

A. 1) Yes. 2) Engineering.

B. 1) Yes. 2) Operations.

C. 1) N o. 2) Engineering

. D. 1) N o. 2) Operations

. Proposed Answer: B Explanation:

Per VPAP-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required.

Technical

Reference:

VPAP-2003, Rev. 14, Post Maintenance Testing Program. WM

-AA-100, Rev. 22, Work Management.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 C. Learning Objective:

SROU-SDS-2, Admin Procedures, objective B, For a Tier 2 procedure, discuss the following:

o Purpose of the procedure o Requirements for operations personnel Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question requires SRO knowledge of Post maintenance operability requirements therefore the question matches the K/A.

Distractor Analysis:

A. 1) Correct. 2) Incorrect. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required. Plausible if candidate confuses roles of operations and engineering department.

B. Correct. C. 1) Incorrect. Per VPAP

-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. 2) Incorrect. Per WM

-AA-100, Work management it is the operations department that is responsible for returning equipment to service. Engineering is responsible for supporting post maintenance testing as required. Plausible if candidate confuses roles of operations and engineering department.

D. 1) Incorrect. Per VPAP

-2003, Post Maintenance Testing, when a test fails there are two possibilities for resolution; either perform rework and retest, or if Engineering provides justification that the failure does not affect operability then the equipment can be returned to service. 2) Correct

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.3.11 , Radiation Control, Ability to control radiation releases

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.8 IR-SRO: 4.3 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!97 A licensed operator commences the release of a waste gas decay tank in accordance with OP

-23.2.4, Release of Waste Gas Decay Tank 1B. Initial Hydrogen concentration in WGDT 1B is 67.3%. A spike results in the process vent radiation monitor , 1-GW-RI-130, entering into ACCIDENT mode. The release is subsequently isolated in accordance with 0

-RMA-C7, Process Vent Normal Range Gas Alert/HI, and activity returns to pre

-event levels.

Which ONE of the following states: 1) The maximum release rate from a WGDT 1B is based on ________. 2) The procedu r e used to return the radiation monitor to Normal Mode

. A. 1) the release permit

2) I&C resets the RM using an Instrument Maintenance Procedure. B. 1) the Hydrogen concentration

2) I&C resets the RM using an Instrument Maintenance Procedure

. C. 1) release permit

2) Operations resets the RM using 0-RMA-C7. D. 1) the Hydrogen concentration

2) Operations resets the RM using 0

-RMA-C7.

Proposed Answer: A. Explanation:

WGDT release flow rate is limited by hydrogen concentration to ensure a conservative indicated flow rate when H2 concentration is >80%. When Accident mode is entered, I&C must reset the monitor to Normal Mode using an IMP (Instrument Maintenance Procedure

.) Technical

Reference:

ARP 0-RMA-C7, Rev. 3, Process Vent Normal Range Gas Alert/HI.

OP-23.2.4, Rev. 19, Release of Waste Gas Decay Tank 1B.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-93.5-LP-3, Post-TMI Rad Monitor, Objective B, Determine the operation of the MGPI Radiation Monitoring System.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Question Source:

Modified (RM00039) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Memory or Fundamental Knowledge 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must consider the limiting factor in setting release rate. Candidate determine the appropriate procedural reference used to restore the RM to Normal Mode

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct - Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, hydrogen concentration is used to set the maximum release rate only when H2 concentration is >80%, by initial condition H2 concentration is 67.3%. Part 2) is correct, per ARP 0-RMA-C7, I&C must be contacted to restore the RM to Normal Mode. Plausible if Candidate does not take account of current H2 concentration in the tank for determining limiting factor for setting release rate

. C. Incorrect

- Part 1) is correct, tank release rate is limited by the release permit if H2 concentration is less than 80%. Part 2) is incorrect, return to Normal Mode requires I&C involvement pe r 0-RMA-C6. Plausible if Candidate incorrectly assumes ARP is used by Operations to restore the RM to Normal Mode

. D. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, hydrogen concentration is used to set the maximum release rate if H2 concentration is above 80%. Part 2) is incorrect

, return to Normal Mode requires I&C involvement per 0

-RMA-C6. Plausible if Candidate does not take account of current H2 concentration in the tank, and assumes ARP is used by Operations to restore the RM to Normal Mode.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.4.12 , Emergency Procedures/Plans, Knowledge of general operating crew responsibilities during emergency operations.

Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 4.0 IR-SRO: 4.3 NRC APPROVED.

Proposed Question:

!98 Given the following conditions:

A General Emergency has been declared.

An individual has been injured in the Auxiliary Building penetration area.

Dose rates in the area are 140 R em/hr. It will take a maximum of 10 minutes to remove the individual from the area.

Which ONE of the following correctly describes the EPIP 4.04 requirements for:

1) Solicitation of a volunteer to rescue the individual.

2) Use of an RWP.

A. 1) Anticipated dose rates do NOT require the SEM to solicit volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) An RWP is NOT required provided the SEM authorizes the activity.

B. 1) Due to anticipated dose for rescue workers, the SEM can assign ONLY volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) An RWP is NOT required provided the SEM authorizes the activity.

C. 1) Anticipated dose rates do NOT require the SEM to solicit volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) The SEM may NOT waive the requirement for an RWP.

D. 1) Due to anticipated dose for rescue workers, the SEM can assign ONLY volunteers to remove the injured worker;

2) The SEM may NOT waive the requirement for an RWP.

Proposed Answer:

A Explanation:

The individual used for rescue will receive a minimum dose of approximately 23.3 Rem based on current dose rates (140 R/HR 10/60 = 23.34 Rem). Per EPIP 4.04 only volunteers can be used if individual will receive > 25 Rem, therefore the SEM does not have to solicit a volunteer. The RWP may be waived if authorized by the SEM. Technical

Reference:

EPIP-4.04, Rev. 9, Emergency Personnel Radiation Exposure.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.5-LP-2, Objective B; List the responsibilities of the Station Emergency Manager during an emergency according to the Surry Power Station Emergency Plan

. Question Source:

Modified EPIP062 Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question requires knowledge of crew responsibilities with focus on SEM responsibilities. Knowledge of RWP requirements specific to SEM.

Distractor Analysis:

A. Correct Answer.

B. Incorrect answer. 1) Incorrect. Per EPIP

-4.04 volunteers do NOT have to be used. If TEDE would be > 25 Rem that the SEM would need a volunteer to perform rescue. This is plausible if student confuses requirement or miscalculates dose. 2) Part 2 is correct. C. Incorrect answer. 1) Part 1 is correct.

2) Incorrect, EPIP

-4.04 DOES authorize the SEM to waive the requirement for an RWP

. Plausible if student misunderstands duties and responsibilities of an SEM.

D. Incorrect answer. 1) Incorrect. Per EPIP

-4.04 volunteers do NOT have to be used. If TEDE would be > 25 Rem that the SEM would need a volunteer to perform rescue. This is plausible if student confuses requirement or miscalculates dose. 2) Incorrect, EPIP

-4.04 does authorize the SEM to waive the requirement for an RWP

. Plausible if student misunderstands duties and responsibilities of an SEM

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

G2.4.23 , Emergency Procedures/Plans, Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations

. Level: S RO Tier #: 3 Group #: IR - RO: 3.4 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!99 Initial Conditions:

Unit 1 was initially at 100% power.

"A" Train ICCM plasma display is INOPERABLE

. Current Conditions:

A severe thunderstorm has caused a Loss of Off

-Site Power (LOOP)

. Storm generated missiles have destroyed the following tanks

. 1 & 2-CN-TK-2 (Normal CN Storage T anks) 1-CN-TK-1 (Emergency CN Storage T an k) 1-FP-TK-1A & 1B (Fire Protection T anks) At the completion of 1

-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, the operating team determines that a Natural Circulation Cooldown must be performed at a rate that will cause Reactor Vessel Head void formation

. Which ONE of the following states the required procedural transition for Unit 1

? A. Go to 1-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel

. B. Go to 1-ES-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel Without RVLIS C. Go to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown. Initiate RCS cooldown, then transition to 1

-ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel

. D. Go to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown. Initiate RCS cooldown, then transition to 1

-ES-0.4, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx Vessel Without RVLIS

.

Proposed Answer:

C. Explanation:

Correct procedural flowpath for this scenario is to transition to 1-ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, after the first 14 Steps have been completed, the Team can then transition to ES-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in the Vessel.

Technical

Reference:

1-ES-0.2, Rev.2 5, Natural Circulation Cooldown. 1

-E S-0.3, Rev. 18, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx. Vessel. 1

-ES-0.4, Rev. 13, Natural Circulation Cooldown with Steam Void in Rx. Vessel (w/o RVLIS)

.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Reference Provided to Applicant:

No Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-5, ES-0.2, Objective B, Given a copy of ES

-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition.

ND-95.3-LP-6, ES-0.3, Objective B, Given a copy of ES

-0.3, Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in Rx Vessel, explain the basis of each procedural step.

Question Source:

Modified Bank (LEOP0135 Significantly modified

) Question History:

Last NRC Exam:

NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis: Question matches K/A. Candidate must assess conditions given and select the appropriate procedure flow path for the scenario presented

. Distractor Analysis:

A. Incorrect - ES-0.3 is not entered from ES

-0.1; the first 14 Steps of ES-0.2 should be completed before transitioning to ES

-0.3; actions taken in first 14 steps are not repeated

. Plausible should Candidate consider only the need to Cooldown at a rapid rate.

B. Incorrect

-ES-0.4 is not entered from ES-0.1; the first 14 Steps of ES

-0.2 should be completed before transitioning to ES

-0.3; actions taken in first 14 steps are not repeated. Plausible if candidate accounts for need to Cooldown rapidly, and does not account for one train of RVLIS still OPEABLE.

C. Correct - Correct procedural flowpath

. D. Incorrect

-Transition to ES

-0.4 no t required; one train of RVLIS still OPERABLE Plausible in that Candidate does not take into account one train of RVLIS OPERABLE.

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 K/A Number:

WE05EA2.1 , Inadequate Heat Transfer

- Loss of Secondary Heat Sink /4 , Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink):

Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

. Level: S RO Tier #: 1 Group #: 1 IR - RO: 3.4 IR-SRO: 4.4 Proposed Question:

!100 Given the following sequence of events

Unit 1 tripped from 100% power due to "A" SG fault in Unit 1 Safeguards. A Main Steam Safety Valve has stuck open on "B" and "C" S/G on the reactor trip

. The TDAFW pump, 1

-FW-P-2, tripped on startup.

The crew is performing 1-E-0, Reactor Trip Or SI, Diagnostic Steps

. SG narrow-range levels are off

-scale low. "A" and "B" MDAFW pump trip and lock

-out. The SRO announces, "Transitioning to 1

-E-2." The STA reports a red

-path exists on Heat Sink CSF status tree.

Which ONE of the following describes:

1) The first source of AFW directed to be restored in accordance with 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink

. 2) Sequence of procedure transitions for this event

. A. 1) AFW from Unit 2 via the cross

-tie. 2) 1-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1

-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs; 1

-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink. B. 1) Unit 1 Main Feed Water.

2) 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink; 1

-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs

. C. 1) Unit 1 Main Feed Water.

2) 1-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1

-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs; 1

-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink

. D. 1) AFW from Unit 2 via the cross

-tie. 2) 1-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Heat Sink; 1

-E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation; 1-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All S/Gs

. Proposed Answer:

D ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 Explanation:

The sequence of AFW restoration in order of priority is:

Affected Unit AFW system, opposite Unit AFW via the cross

-tie, Affected Unit Main Feed system, feed SGs using Main Condensate system, and depressurize one (1) SG and feed using Fire protection or AFW booster pumps. On diagnostic Steps, E

-2 would be selected on a steam break to Exit E

-0. On exit from E

-0, FR-H.1 is expected to be implemented to restore an AFW feed source. On exit from FR

-H.1, the Team would go to E

-2, then transition to ECA

-2.1. Technical

Reference:

1-E-2, Rev. 20; 0-F-3, Rev. 5, Heat Sink.

1-FR-H.1, Rev. 37, Response to Loss of Heat Sink.

Reference Provided to Applicant:

NO Learning Objective:

ND-95.3-LP-41, Objective C; Given a copy of FR

-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, apply the basis of each procedural step to be able to determine the appropriate response for a given plant condition

. Question Source:

New Question History:

Last NRC Exam: NO Question Cognitive Level:

Comprehension or Analysis 10 CFR Part 55 Content:

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Comments: K/A Match Analysis:

K/A requires ability to select appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency situations related to Inadequate Heat Xfer, and determine the optimum sequence pursued to re-establish AFW flow to the SGs. Question poses inadequate heat sink scenario whereby student must determine the correct FR-H.1 flowpath and sequence of procedure flowpath for the given scenario. Distractor Analysis:

ES-401 Sample Written Examination Question Worksheet Form ES-401-5 A. Incorrect - Part 1) is correct

. As given in the scenario, affected Unit AFW is unavailable; success path is establish AFW flow using AFW from opposite Unit. Part 2) is incorrect, STA report of Red Path on Heat sink would require transition to FR

-H.1, then E

-2, and finally to ECA

-2.1. Plausible since Candidate could assess conditions as requiring transition to E

-2 before implementing FR

-H.1. B. Incorrect

- Part 1) is incorrect, proper sequence for attempt to restore AFW flow is Affected Unit AFW, opposite Unit AFW, then attempt Main Feed. Part 2) is correct, proper sequence of procedure transition for scenario. Plausible since Candidate could assess condition as requiring MFW since SG NR levels are off

-scale low and MFW has the ability to feed the SGs at a higher rate.

C. Incorrect

-- Part 1) is incorrect, proper sequence for attempt to restore AFW flow is Affected Unit AFW, opposite Unit AFW, then attempt Main

Feed. Part 2) is incorrect, STA report of Red Path on Heat sink would require transition to FR

-H.1, then E

-2, and finally to ECA-2.1. Plausible since Candidate could assess conditions as requiring transition to E

-2 before implementing FR

-H.1 D. Correct. Both Parts 1) and 2) are correct.

SRO EXAM LIST OF ATTACHMENTS Attachment #

Attachment Description 1 TS Figure 3.12-3 2 TS Figure 3.8

-1 3 TRM, section 3.7, Plant Systems (3.7.1

- 3.7.6) 4 TS Table 3.7

-1, Page 1 EAL EAL Charts

ATTACHMENT 1

ATTACHMENT 2

Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Less than required equipment FUNCTIONAL.

A.1 Restore equipment to FUNCTIONAL status.

OR A.2 Provide an alternate means to accomplish the nonfunctional function. 7 days 7 days B. One fire pump nonfunctional AND Piping from the remaining fire pump to 1-FP-92 (shortest route to U1 Turb Bldg) nonfunctional.

B.1 Declare Unit 1 Turbine Building sprinkler system nonfunctional and take actions as specified in TR 3.7.15.A. As specified in TR 3.7.15.A. 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Fire Suppression Water System TR 3.7.1 The Fire Suppression Water System equipment listed below shall be FUNCTIONAL:

a. Two 2,500 gpm fire pumps (1

-FP-P-1, 1-FP-P-2), b. Automatic initiation logic for each fire pump, c. Two fire water tanks (1

-FP-TK-1A, 1-FP-TK-1B), each containing 250,000 gallons of water reserved for fire protection, and

d. Necessary piping and valves to insure that fire water is available, upon demand, to the spray and sprinkler systems, fire hose stations, and yard fire hydrant and hydrant hose houses. APPLICABILITY:

At all times.

ACTIONS SPS TRM 3.7.1-2 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 ACTIONS C. One fire pump nonfunctional AND Piping from the remaining fire pump to 1-FP-49 (shortest route to U2 Turb Bldg) nonfunctional.

C.1 Declare Unit 2 Turbine Building sprinkler system nonfunctional and take actions as specified in TR 3.7.15.A. As specified in TR 3.7.15.A. D. No Fire Suppression Water System

FUNCTIONAL.

D.1 Establish a backup Fire Suppression Water System.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.1.1 Verify each fire water tank volume 250,000 gallons. 7 days TSR 3.7.1.2 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery electrolyte level is above the plates.

7 days TSR 3.7.1.3 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery voltage is 24V. 7 days TSR 3.7.1.4 Verify each pump starts and operates for 15 minutes on recirculation flow. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS TSR 3.7.1.5 Verify each manual, power

-operated, and automatic valve in the Fire Suppression Water System flow path is in its correct position. 31 days TSR 3.7.1.6 Verify the fire pump diesel fuel storage tank (1-FP-TK-4) contains 220 gallons of fuel. 31 days SPS TRM 3.7.1-3 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS TSR 3.7.1.7 Verify the fire pump diesel engine starts from ambient conditions and operates for 30 minutes on recirculation flow. 31 days TSR 3.7.1.8 Verify the fire pump diesel fuel oil storage tank sample parameters are within limits. The parameters shall be within the acceptable limits specified in Table 1 of ASTM-D975-74 when checked for viscosity, water, and sediment.

92 days TSR 3.7.1.9 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery specific gravity is within limits.

92 days TSR 3.7.1.10 Perform a system flush.

6 months TSR 3.7.1.11 Verify functionality of each testable valve in the Fire Suppression Water System flow path by cycling it through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

12 months TSR 3.7.1.12 Perform a system functional test on the Fire Suppression Water System. The system functional test shall include simulated automatic actuation of the system throughout its operating sequence and verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position. 18 months TSR 3.7.1.13 Verify each pump develops a flow 2,500 gpm at a Total Dynamic Head of 231 feet. 18 months TSR 3.7.1.14 Verify each pump starts sequentially and maintains Fire Suppression Water System pressure 80 psig. 18 months SPS TRM 3.7.1-4 Revision 34, 03/26/14 Attachment 3 Fire Suppression Water System 3.7.1 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.1.15 Perform an inspection of the fire pump diesel engine. The inspection shall be in accordance with procedures prepared in conjunction with its manufacturer's recommendations for the class of service. per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.16 Verify fire pump diesel starting batteries, cell plates, and battery racks show no visual indication of physical damage or abnormal deterioration.

per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.17 Verify fire pump diesel starting battery battery-to-battery and terminal connections are clean, tight, free of corrosion, and coated with anti

-corrosion material. per the PM Program TSR 3.7.1.18 Perform a system flow test on the Fire Suppression Water System. The system flow test shall be in accordance with Chapter 5, Section 11 of Fire Protection National Fire Protection Association.

3 years Spray and Sprinkler System 3.7.2 SPS TRM 3.7.2-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Sprinkler or Spray System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system(s) to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 7 days 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Spray and Sprinkler System TR 3.7.2 The Spray and Sprinkler System that provides protection for the Cable Tunnel shall be FUNCTIONAL (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

At all times.

ACTIONS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.2.1 Verify each manual, power

-operated, and automatic valve in the Sprinkler or Spray System flow path is in its correct position. 31 days TSR 3.7.2.2 Verify functionality of each testable valve in the Sprinkler or Spray System flow path by cycling it through at least one complete cycle of full travel.

12 months Spray and Sprinkler System 3.7.2 SPS TRM 3.7.2-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.2.3 Verify by visual inspection the integrity of the dry pipe spray and sprinkler headers. 18 months TSR 3.7.2.4 Verify by visual inspection that each nozzle's spray pattern is not obstructed.

18 months TSR 3.7.2.5 Verify by performance of an air flow test that each open head spray and sprinkler nozzle is not obstructed.

3 years Low Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.3 SPS TRM 3.7.3-1 Revision 34, 03/26/14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Low Pressure CO 2 System TR 3.7.3 The Low Pressure CO 2 System shall be FUNCTIONAL for: Cable tray rooms (Appendix R - Yes), Cable vaults and tunnels (Appendix R - Yes), Safety related charcoal filter banks 3A and 3B (Appendix R - Yes), Emergency diesel generator rooms (Appendix R - No), and Normal switchgear rooms (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the Low Pressure CO 2 protected areas is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the Low Pressure CO 2 System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for Low Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctionality in each area listed in TR 3.7.3. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Low Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Low Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.3 SPS TRM 3.7.3-2 Revision 34, 03/26/14 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.3.1 Verify low pressure CO 2 storage tank 7 days TSR 3.7.3.2 Verify low pressure CO 2 storage tank 7 days TSR 3.7.3.3 Verify system valves and associated ventilation dampers and fire doors actuate manually and/or automatically as designed upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. 18 months TSR 3.7.3.4 Verify flow from each nozzle during a "Puff Test." 18 months High Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.4 SPS TRM 3.7.4-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 High Pressure CO 2 System TR 3.7.4 The High Pressure CO 2 System shall be FUNCTIONAL for:

Emergency Service Water pumps fuel oil storage tank room (Appendix R - No) and Emergency diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump rooms (Appendix R - No). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the High Pressure CO 2 protected areas is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the High Pressure CO 2 System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for High Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctionality in each area listed in TR 3.7.4. CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. High Pressure CO 2 System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the unprotected area(s). AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days High Pressure CO 2 System 3.7.4 SPS TRM 3.7.4-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.4.1 Verify individual high pressure CO 2 6 months TSR 3.7.4.2 Verify system valves and associated ventilation dampers and fire doors actuate manually and/or automatically as designed upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal. 18 months TSR 3.7.4.3 Verify no blockage through headers and nozzles during a flow test. 18 months Halon System 3.7.5 SPS TRM 3.7.5-1 Revision 19, 04/12/07 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Halon System TR 3.7.5 The Halon System shall be FUNCTIONAL for the Emergency Switchgear Room (Appendix R - Yes). APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in the Halon protected area is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

NOTE Functionality of the Halon System may be impacted by nonfunctionality of gas boundary barriers addressed in Section 3.7.8. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Halon System nonfunctional.

A.1 Establish a fire watch in accordance with TRM Section 5.2 with backup fire suppression equipment for the Emergency Switchgear Room. AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional system to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.5.1 Verify each manual, power-operated, and automatic valve in the Halon System flow path is in its correct position.

31 days Halon System 3.7.5 SPS TRM 3.7.5-2 Revision 19, 04/12/07 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.5.2 Verify individual Halon storage tanks 95% of full charge weight. 6 months TSR 3.7.5.3 Verify individual Halon storage tanks 90% of full charge pressure. 6 months TSR 3.7.5.4 Verify system actuates automatically upon receipt of a simulated actuation signal.

18 months TSR 3.7.5.5 Verify no blockage through headers and nozzles during a flow test. 18 months TSR 3.7.5.6 Verify functionality of manual initiating system. 18 months Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-1 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations TR 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations listed in Table 3.7.6

-1 shall be FUNCTIONAL.

APPLICABILITY:

Whenever equipment in areas protected by the hose stations is required to be OPERABLE/FUNCTIONAL.

ACTIONS NOTE Separate Condition entry is allowed for each hose station listed in Table 3.7.6-1. ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more required primary fire hose stations outside containment nonfunctional.

A.1.1 Route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from a FUNCTIONAL hose station.

OR A.1.2.1 Establish an hourly fire watch in the affected area. AND A.1.2.2 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND A.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-2 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more required secondary fire hose stations outside containment nonfunctional.

B.1.1 Route an additional equivalent capacity fire hose to the unprotected area(s) from a FUNCTIONAL hose station.

OR B.1.2.1 Establish an hourly fire watch in the affected area. AND B.1.2.2 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND B.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status.

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> 14 days C. One or more required primary fire hose stations inside containment nonfunctional.

C.1 Stage additional protection as directed by Safety and Loss Prevention.

AND C.2 Restore the nonfunctional fire hose station to FUNCTIONAL status.

1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> 14 days Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-3 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY TSR 3.7.6.1 Verify by visual inspection that all required equipment is available at each Fire Hose Station located outside Containment.

31 days TSR 3.7.6.2 Perform hydrostatic testing of hose house fire hose at a pressure of 200 psig. 12 months TSR 3.7.6.3 Inspect hoses and gaskets located outside Containment. Hoses shall be removed, degraded gaskets in the couplings shall be replaced, and the hoses shall be re

- racked. 18 months TSR 3.7.6.4 Verify by visual inspection that each Fire Hose Station located inside Containment is FUNCTIONAL.

Each outage of duration greater than 7 days TSR 3.7.6.5 Inspect hoses and gaskets located inside Containment or intended for inside Containment use. Hoses shall be removed, degraded gaskets in the couplings shall be replaced, and the hoses shall be returned to the storage location.

18 Months TSR 3.7.6.6 Verify valve functionality and no flow blockage by partial opening of each Fire Hose Station.

3 years TSR 3.7.6.7 Perform hydrostatic testing of interior hose at a pressure of 200 psig. 3 years Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 SPS TRM 3.7.6-4 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 1 of 2) Fire Hose Stations Station Number Note Location Size a. 1-FP-HR-01-37, 1-FP-HR-01-39, 1-FP-HR-01-41, 1-FP-HR-01-42, 1-FP-HR-01-44, 1-FP-HR-01-46, 1-FP-HR-01-48, 1-FP-HR-01-50, 1-FP-HR-01-38, 1-FP-HR-01-40, 1-FP-HR-01-41A, 1-FP-HR-01-43, 1-FP-HR-01-45, 1-FP-HR-01-47, 1-FP-HR-01-49, 1-FP-HR-01-51 f Auxiliary Building 1-1/2" b. 1-FP-HR-01-52, 1-FP-HR-01-53 f Fuel Building 1-1/2" c. 1-FP-HR-01-12, 1-FP-HR-01-20, 1-FP-HR-01-23, 1-FP-HR-01-55, 1-FP-HR-01-57 1-FP-HR-01-16, 1-FP-HR-01-21A, 1-FP-HR-01-54, 1-FP-HR-01-56, a, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" d. 1-FP-HR-01-22 b, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" e. 1-FP-HR-01-33 c, f Turbine Building 1-1/2" f. 1-FP-HR-01-34 d, g Turbine Building 1-1/2" g. 1-FP-HR-01-73, 1-FP-HR-01-74, 1-FP-HR-01-75, 1-FP-HR-01-76, 1-FP-HR-01-77, 1-FP-HR-01-78, 1-FP-HR-01-79, 1-FP-HR-01-80, 1-FP-HR-01-81, 1-FP-HR-01-82, 1-FP-HR-01-83, 1-FP-HR-01-84, 1-FP-HR-01-85 e, f Unit 1 Containment 1-1/2" These hose stations to be used as backup to control room, emergency switchgear room and emergency diesel generator rooms. (a) This hose station to be used as backup to emergency switchgear rooms. (b) This hose station to be used as primary support for control room. (c) This hose station to be used as backup to emergency diesel generator rooms. (d) These hose stations are designed to be dry and shall be FUNCTIONAL when the main shutoff valves in the auxiliary building are opened. (e) Primary means of fire suppression.

(f) Secondary means of fire suppression

. (g) Secondary means of fire suppression.

SPS TRM 3.7.6-5 Revision 32, 03/26/13 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Fire Hose Stations 3.7.6 Table 3.7.6-1 (Sheet 2 of 2) Fire Hose Stations Station Number Note Location Size h. 2-FP-HR-02-60, 2-FP-HR-02-61, e, f Unit 2 Containment 1-1/2" 2-FP-HR-02-62, 2-FP-HR-02-63, 2-FP-HR-02-64, 2-FP-HR-02-65, 2-FP-HR-02-66, 2-FP-HR-02-67, 2-FP-HR-02-68, 2-FP-HR-02-69, 2-FP-HR-02-70, 2-FP-HR-02-71, 2-FP-HR-02-72 (e) These hose stations are designed to be dry and shall be FUNCTIONAL when the main shutoff valves in the auxiliary building are opened. (f) Primary means of fire suppression.