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{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENTlMarked-upTechnicalSpecificationPages:2-43/43-l8B2-Sza02g6f@Q9062286Oo~gqpDR'DOCK0@DR,,''JV/l/018/3 ICFNCTIONLNITIl..HanualReactorTripTRIPSETPOIHTHot,ApplicableHotApplicableTABLE2.2-1REACTORPROTECTIVEIHSTRNEHTATINTRIPSETPOIHTLIHITSJhLLOMABLKVALUES~~0~2.VariablePeerlevel-High(1)~FourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating3.PressurizerPressure-HighTheraalHargin/LmPressureIfourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating5.Contain<<entPressure-High6.SteaiGeneratorPressure-Low7;SteaiGeneratorPressure(1)Dlfferencc-High(LogicinTH/LPTripUnit)<9.61KaboveTllERNLPOMER,Pitha<<inta'etpointof15KofRhTEDTUERNlLONER,'nda<<axi<<u<<of<107.NofQATEOTHERHALPNB.<2370psiaTripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesof~figures2.2-3and2.g-4.Hini<<mvalueof1900psia.<3.0Psig>626;9psia(2)<120.0psid.:IIc9.6lXaboveTilERNALPNER,'nda<<iniamsetpointof15KofRATEOTIIERNLPOMERanda<<axiomof<107.0X.ofRATEOTllERNLPOMER..<237Ipsia.Tripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesoffigures2.2-3and2.2-4.Hiniaevalueof19Mpsia.<3.lpsigI>621.Opsia(2).<132.0psidOlO8.Stea<<GeneratorLevel-Los9.5X(3)->39.1X(3)  
{{#Wiki_filter:ATTACHMENT lMarked-up Technical Specification Pages:2-43/43-l8B2-Sza02g6f@Q90622 86Oo~gqpDR'DOCK0@DR,,''JV/l/018/3 ICFNCTIONLNITIl..HanualReactorTripTRIPSETPOIHTHot,Applicable HotApplicable TABLE2.2-1REACTORPROTECTIVE IHSTRNEHTATIN TRIPSETPOIHTLIHITSJhLLOMABLK VALUES~~0~2.VariablePeerlevel-High(1)~FourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating 3.Pressurizer Pressure-HighTheraalHargin/Lm PressureIfourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating 5.Contain<<ent Pressure-High6.SteaiGenerator Pressure-Low7;SteaiGenerator Pressure(1)Dlfferencc-High(LogicinTH/LPTripUnit)<9.61KaboveTllERNLPOMER,Pitha<<inta'etpoint of15KofRhTEDTUERNlLONER,'nda<<axi<<u<<of<107.NofQATEOTHERHALPNB.<2370psiaTripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesof~figures2.2-3and2.g-4.Hini<<mvalueof1900psia.<3.0Psig>626;9psia(2)<120.0psid.:IIc9.6lXaboveTilERNALPNER,'nda<<iniamsetpointof15KofRATEOTIIERNLPOMERanda<<axiomof<107.0X.ofRATEOTllERNLPOMER..<237Ipsia.Tripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesoffigures2.2-3and2.2-4.Hiniaevalueof19Mpsia.<3.lpsigI>621.Opsia(2).<132.0psidOlO8.Stea<<Generator Level-Los9.5X(3)->39.1X(3)  


InMfllICMtQOhIlQFUNCTIONALUNIT.5.CONTAIHMEHTSUHP'RECIRCULATION(RAS)a.HanualRAS(TripButtons)b.RefuelingifaterStorageTank-Lowc.AutomaticActuationLogic6.LOSSOFPOMERa.(1)4.16kVEmergencyBusUndervoltage(LossofVoltage).(2)480VEmergencyBusUndervoltage(LossofVoltage)b.(1)4.16kVEmergencyBusUndervoltage(DegradedVoltage)TRIPVALUEHotApplicable5.67feetabovetankbottoaHotApplicable>3120volts>360volts>3848voltswitha10-second1timedelayALLOMABLfVALUESHotApplicable4.62feet'to6;24feetabove'tankbottomHotApplicable>3120volts~>360volts>3848voltswitha10-'secondtiaedelayiTABLE3.3-4ContinuedENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATURESACTUATIONSYSTEHIHSTRUNENTATIONTRIP.VALUES,(2)480VEmergencyBusUndervoltage(DegradedVoltage)AUXILIARYFEEOMATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TripButtons)b.AutomaticActuationLogicc.StealsGeneratorhP-Highd.SG2wt28LevelLowe.FeedwaterHeaderHighAP>432voltsHotApplicable.HotApplicable<180.0Pseud'gg7.>20.6X<100.0psid>432voltsHotApplicableHotApplicable<187.5psid>20.(C<107.5psidigo%%uo SAFETYLIMITSANDLIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGSBASESContainmentPressure-HighTheContainmentPressure-Hightripprovidesassurancethatareactortripisinitiatedpriottooi'concurrentlywitha'afetyinjection(SIAS).Thisalsoprovidesassurancethatareactortripisinitiatedpriortoor.concurrentlywithanMSIS.SteamGeneratorPressure-LowTheSteamGeneratorPressure-Lowtripprovidesprotectionagainstanexcessiverateofheatextractionfromthesteamgeneratorsandsubsequentcooldownofthereactorcoolant.Thesetpointof620psiaissufficientlybelowthefullloadoperatingpointofapproximately885psiasoasnottointerferewithnormaloperation,but"stillhighenoughtoprovidetherequiredprotectionintheeventofexcessively'ighsteamflow.Thissettingwasusedwithanuncertaintyfactorof30psiinthesafetyanalyses.SteamGeneratorLevel-LowTheSteamGeneratorLevel-LowtripprovidesprotectionagainstalossoffeedwaterflowincidentandassuresthatthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystemwi11notbeexceededduetolossofthesteamgeneratorheatsink.Thisspecifiedsetpointprovidesallowancethattherewillbesufficientwaterinventoryinthesteamgeneratoratthetimeofthetriptoprovideamarginofatleast10minutesbefore'auxiliaryfeedwaterisrequired.AK'ocalPowerDensity-HihTheLocalPowerDensity-Hightrip,functioningfromAXIALSHAPEINDEXmonitoring,isprovidedtoensurethatthepeaklocalpowerdensityinthefuelwhichcorrespondstofuelcenterline"meltingwillnotoccurasaconsequenceofaxialpowermaldistributions.AreactortripisinitiatedwhenevertheAXIALSHAPEINDEXexceedstheallowablelimitsofFigure2.2-2.TheAXIALSHAPEINDEXiscalculatedfromtheupperandlowerexcoreneutrondetectorchannels.Thecalculated'setpointsaregeneratedasafunctionofTHERMALPOWERlevelwiththeallowedCEAgrouppositionbeinginferredfromtheTHERMALPOWERlevel.'hetripisautomaticallybypassedbelow15Kpower.ThemaximumAZIMUTHALPOWERTILTandmaximumCEAmisalignmentpermittedforcontinuousoperationareassumedingenerationofthesetpoints.Inaddition,CEAgroupsequencinginaccordancewiththeSpecifications3.1.3.5and3.1.3.6isassumed.Finally,themaximuminsertionofCEAbankswhichcanoccurduringanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrencepriortoaPowerLevel-H>c".tripisassumed.~~''~~p~~~~"~~~~~~~~we>~mew~~iq~+we))~~blHGlos%oF5Quxtekal~~~~~~~~g~+~~~~~o~W>>~<+V,svetw~geeeR~sp~icUCIE-UNIT2hcepWC.
InMfllICMtQOhIlQFUNCTIONAL UNIT.5.CONTAIHMEHT SUHP'RECIRCULATION (RAS)a.HanualRAS(TripButtons)b.Refueling ifaterStorageTank-Lowc.Automatic Actuation Logic6.LOSSOFPOMERa.(1)4.16kVEmergency BusUndervoltage (LossofVoltage).(2)480VEmergency BusUndervoltage (LossofVoltage)b.(1)4.16kVEmergency BusUndervoltage (Degraded Voltage)TRIPVALUEHotApplicable 5.67feetabovetankbottoaHotApplicable
ATTACHMENT2SAFETYEVALUATIONIntroductionThisisarequesttoreviseTechnicalSpecification2.2.I,ReactorProtectiveInstrumentation(RPS),and3/4.3.2,EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationandtheirassociatedBasesoftheTechnicalSpecificationsforSt.LucieUnit2.DiscussionTheexistingTechnicalSpecificationsetpointscorrespondtoaCycleIanalysisassumptionofsteamgeneratorlowlevelRPSsetpointof30%narrowrange(NR)forthemostlimitingevent,LossofFeedwater,and5%NRsetpointforallaccidents.Thedifferencebetweentheanalysisassumptionandspecifiedsetpoint(9.5%)accountsforprocessequipmentuncertainties,equipmentresponsetimesandRPScabinetuncertainties.AuxiliaryfeedwaterwasmanuallyactuatedbytheReactorOperator,asreflectedinalltheanalysespresentedforCycleI.Thesafetygradeautomaticauxiliaryfeedwateractuationsystem(AFAS)wasinstalledbeforeCycleIoperationtosatisfyapost-TMIrequirement,NUREG-0737,ItemII.E.I.2.ThisproposedchangedoesnotimpacttheresultsoftheSafetyAnalysispresentedforCycles2or3butonlyreflectsachangeintheanalysisassumptionsmadeforCycleIversusCycles2or3.ThenewvaluestakeintoconsiderationtheassumedRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelanalysissetpointof<5%NRandtherelatedinstrumentuncertainties.Thecalculateduncertaintieswerederivedusingacceptedmethodologyforinstrumentuncertaintiescalculations(CEN-Il2(s)Rev.0,'PlantProtectionSystem-SelectionofTripSetpointValues,"Novemberl5,I979),whichtakesintoaccountinherentprocessinstrumentationerrors,equipmentresponsetime,instrumentdriftandenvironmentalconcernsforaccidentconditions,asappropriate.TheproposedsetpointnumbersareapplicableforoperationoftheRPSandESFASsystemsandareboundingforeithertheexistingBartonM764transmittersorRosemountII54transmitters(possiblereplacementtransmitters).TheproposedchangecontainsthoseTechnicalSpecificationsneededtosupportthereductionofthelowsteamgeneratorlevelsetpointforactuationofreactortripandinitiationoftheAFASintheRPSandESFAS.TheproposedchangerevisesTable2.2-IReactorProtectiveInstrumentationTripSetpointLimitsanditsassociatedBases,toreflectareductioninthesetpointandallowablevaluesforthereactortriponsteamgeneratorlevel-low.TheproposedchangealsorevisesTable3.3-4EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystemInstrumentationTripValues,toreflectareductionintheinitiationsetpointandallowablevaluefortheAFASonsteamgeneratorlevel-low.FJWI/0I8/4  
>3120volts>360volts>3848voltswitha10-second 1timedelayALLOMABLf VALUESHotApplicable 4.62feet'to6;24feetabove'tank bottomHotApplicable
'I4I4lIII4IIIII Attachment2(Cont'd)Table2.2-I,item8,presentlyspecifiesthatthetripsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelis>39.5%NR,withanallowablevalueof>39.I%.ThesevaluesarebasedontheCycleIFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)analysis.TheproposedchangetoTable2.2.-l,item8decreasesthetripsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelto>20.5%NR,withanallowablevalueof>l9.5%.Thesevaluescorrespondwithananalyticalsetpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheBasesforTable2.2.I,item8,specifythatthetriponlowsteamgeneratorlevelprotectsagainstexceedingthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)pressurelimitofII0%ofdesignpressureforaLossofFeedwaterevent.Theproposedchangeaddsthatthistripalsoprotectsagainstviolationofaspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimit(SAFDL)andoffsitedoselimitsfortheanticipatedoperationaloccurrenceoftheinadvertentopeningofasteamgeneratoratmosphericdumpvalveoramainsteamsafetyvalve.Table3.3-4,item7.d,presentlyspecifiesthattheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelis>20.6%NRwithanallowablevalueof>20.0%.ThesearebasedontheCycleIFSARanalysis.TheproposedchangetoTable3.3-4,item7.d,revisestheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelto>l9.0%NR,withanallowablevalueof>I8.0%.Thesevaluescorrespondwithananalyticalsetpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheproposedamendmenttothelowsteamgeneratorlevelsetpointsdoesnotimpacttheresultspresentedintheReloadSafetyEvaluationforCycles2and3butonlyreflectschangestothedeterminationoftheinstrumentsetpointconsistentwiththeCycles2and3RPSandESFASanalysisassumptions.TheeventswhichcanbeimpactedbychangesinRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelsetpointsaretheLossofFeedwaterevent,theFeedwaterLineBreak(FLB)event,theSteamLineBreakevent(SLB),andtheInadvertentOpeningofaSteamGeneratorSafetyValveorAtmosphericDumpValve.TheCycle2SafetyAnalysisassumeda<5%NRRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelsetpoint.Theanalysissetpointwassetat5%NRtoensureactuationpriortoreaching0%,underaccidentconditions.TheresultsoftheanalysesfortheeventspresentedintheCycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluationdemonstratedthatallkeyparameterswerebelowtheacceptancecriteria.Basedonthisevaluation,itcanbeconcludedthattheproposedamendmenthasbeenaddressedbytheexistingAnalysesofRecordand,therefore,thereisnoimpactonthereportedresults.EJWI/0I8/5 IIU4ll5v4 ATTACHMENT3DETERMINATIONOFNOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONThestandardsusedtoarriveatadeterminationthatarequestforamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationareincludedintheCommission'sregulation,IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificanthazardsconsiderationsareinvolvediftheoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot(I)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedor(3)involveasignficantreductioninamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussedasfollows:(I)Operationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheproposedchangelowerstheprobabilityofpreviouslyevaluatedeventsbydecreasingthelikelihoodofanunplannedreactortriporAuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem(AFAS)initiationonlowsteamgeneratorlevel.(2)Useofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThesetpointsfortheReactorProtectiveInstrumentation(RPS)tripandtheAFAShavebeenestablishedsuchthattheyensureactuationofthesefunctionsbeforetheinstrumentationgoesoffscale.Thisstartswithaminimumlevelof5%NRandincludesappropriateerrorsforan',insidecontainmentaccidentsuchasaSteamLineBre'ak.Thedifferencebetw'eenthesetpointandallowablevaluesaccountsfortheinstrumentationdriftoverthespecifiedsurveillanceinterval.(3)Useofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.AsdiscussedintheSafetyEvaluation,theresultsofallanalysesremainwithintheacceptancecriteriaoftheStandardReviewPlan.Basedontheabove,wehavedeterminedthattheamendmentrequestdoesnot(I)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,(2)createtheprobabilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety;andthereforedoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.EJWI/0I8/6 ls'>>iMa'0'JvMS'MssHtuksusslf.StaH'"M'~ifss~IJIstJtlis~II,HIIIM~>>IHuf'~its4lis~HifsifMskl~IJVtl~ttgsIIM'NtI~JItl,il~>>I,'aJ,I*JMHtsfiI~I'MIS~Mg~MD~~..fls'~IitusMIsi.'sMsus,a'II~,tsvMI',IiiISItift'IJIIMSIISaIIlifIMJIHsIHHsita~'t~tttIIstfII'sa~IIMlilt,s''lil~IIIII~,M'"SIf,~~'flfI>>uII'I',f'I,I,IIItaI~I~"k'ISS~IJu...Mf,JSJilka~11flS,PifIIIMfltl,~.sIIuJM.IS.~I}}
>3120volts~>360volts>3848voltswitha10-'second tiaedelayiTABLE3.3-4Continued ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESACTUATION SYSTEHIHSTRUNENTATION TRIP.VALUES,(2)480VEmergency BusUndervoltage (Degraded Voltage)AUXILIARY FEEOMATER (AFAS)a.Hanual(TripButtons)b.Automatic Actuation Logicc.StealsGenerator hP-Highd.SG2wt28LevelLowe.Feedwater HeaderHighAP>432voltsHotApplicable
.HotApplicable
<180.0Pseud'gg7.>20.6X<100.0psid>432voltsHotApplicable HotApplicable
<187.5psid>20.(C<107.5psidigo%%uo SAFETYLIMITSANDLIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGSBASESContainment Pressure-High TheContainment Pressure-High tripprovidesassurance thatareactortripisinitiated priottooi'concurrently witha'afetyinjection (SIAS).Thisalsoprovidesassurance thatareactortripisinitiated priortoor.concurrently withanMSIS.SteamGenerator Pressure-Low TheSteamGenerator Pressure-Low tripprovidesprotection againstanexcessive rateofheatextraction fromthesteamgenerators andsubsequent cooldownofthereactorcoolant.Thesetpointof620psiaissufficiently belowthefullloadoperating pointofapproximately 885psiasoasnottointerfere withnormaloperation, but"stillhighenoughtoprovidetherequiredprotection intheeventofexcessively'igh steamflow.Thissettingwasusedwithanuncertainty factorof30psiinthesafetyanalyses.
SteamGenerator Level-Low TheSteamGenerator Level-Low tripprovidesprotection againstalossoffeedwater flowincidentandassuresthatthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystemwi11notbeexceededduetolossofthesteamgenerator heatsink.Thisspecified setpointprovidesallowance thattherewillbesufficient waterinventory inthesteamgenerator atthetimeofthetriptoprovideamarginofatleast10minutesbefore'auxiliary feedwater isrequired.
AK'ocalPowerDensity-Hi hTheLocalPowerDensity-High trip,functioning fromAXIALSHAPEINDEXmonitoring, isprovidedtoensurethatthepeaklocalpowerdensityinthefuelwhichcorresponds tofuelcenterline" meltingwillnotoccurasaconsequence ofaxialpowermaldistributions.
AreactortripisinitiatedwhenevertheAXIALSHAPEINDEXexceedstheallowable limitsofFigure2.2-2.TheAXIALSHAPEINDEXiscalculated fromtheupperandlowerexcoreneutrondetectorchannels.
Thecalculated
'setpoints aregenerated asafunctionofTHERMALPOWERlevelwiththeallowedCEAgrouppositionbeinginferredfromtheTHERMALPOWERlevel.'he tripisautomatically bypassedbelow15Kpower.ThemaximumAZIMUTHAL POWERTILTandmaximumCEAmisalignment permitted forcontinuous operation areassumedingeneration ofthesetpoints.
Inaddition, CEAgroupsequencing inaccordance withtheSpecifications 3.1.3.5and3.1.3.6isassumed.Finally,themaximuminsertion ofCEAbankswhichcanoccurduringanyanticipated operational occurrence priortoaPowerLevel-H>c".
tripisassumed.~~''~~p~~~~"~~~~~~~~we>~mew~~iq~+we))~~blHGlos%oF5Quxtekal
~~~~~~~~g~+~~~~~o~W>>~<+V,svetw~
geeeR~sp~icUCIE-UNIT2hcepWC.
ATTACHMENT 2SAFETYEVALUATION Introduction ThisisarequesttoreviseTechnical Specification 2.2.I,ReactorProtective Instrumentation (RPS),and3/4.3.2,Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System(ESFAS)Instrumentation andtheirassociated BasesoftheTechnical Specifications forSt.LucieUnit2.Discussion TheexistingTechnical Specification setpoints correspond toaCycleIanalysisassumption ofsteamgenerator lowlevelRPSsetpointof30%narrowrange(NR)forthemostlimitingevent,LossofFeedwater, and5%NRsetpointforallaccidents.
Thedifference betweentheanalysisassumption andspecified setpoint(9.5%)accountsforprocessequipment uncertainties, equipment responsetimesandRPScabinetuncertainties.
Auxiliary feedwater wasmanuallyactuatedbytheReactorOperator, asreflected inalltheanalysespresented forCycleI.Thesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)wasinstalled beforeCycleIoperation tosatisfyapost-TMIrequirement, NUREG-0737, ItemII.E.I.2.ThisproposedchangedoesnotimpacttheresultsoftheSafetyAnalysispresented forCycles2or3butonlyreflectsachangeintheanalysisassumptions madeforCycleIversusCycles2or3.Thenewvaluestakeintoconsideration theassumedRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelanalysissetpointof<5%NRandtherelatedinstrument uncertainties.
Thecalculated uncertainties werederivedusingacceptedmethodology forinstrument uncertainties calculations (CEN-Il2(s)Rev.0,'PlantProtection System-Selection ofTripSetpointValues,"Novemberl5,I979),whichtakesintoaccountinherentprocessinstrumentation errors,equipment responsetime,instrument driftandenvironmental concernsforaccidentconditions, asappropriate.
Theproposedsetpointnumbersareapplicable foroperation oftheRPSandESFASsystemsandareboundingforeithertheexistingBartonM764transmitters orRosemount II54transmitters (possible replacement transmitters).
TheproposedchangecontainsthoseTechnical Specifications neededtosupportthereduction ofthelowsteamgenerator levelsetpointforactuation ofreactortripandinitiation oftheAFASintheRPSandESFAS.TheproposedchangerevisesTable2.2-IReactorProtective Instrumentation TripSetpointLimitsanditsassociated Bases,toreflectareduction inthesetpointandallowable valuesforthereactortriponsteamgenerator level-low.TheproposedchangealsorevisesTable3.3-4Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation SystemInstrumentation TripValues,toreflectareduction intheinitiation setpointandallowable valuefortheAFASonsteamgenerator level-low.FJWI/0I8/4  
'I4I4lIII4IIIII Attachment 2(Cont'd)Table2.2-I,item8,presently specifies thatthetripsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelis>39.5%NR,withanallowable valueof>39.I%.ThesevaluesarebasedontheCycleIFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)analysis.
TheproposedchangetoTable2.2.-l,item8decreases thetripsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelto>20.5%NR,withanallowable valueof>l9.5%.Thesevaluescorrespond withananalytical setpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheBasesforTable2.2.I,item8,specifythatthetriponlowsteamgenerator levelprotectsagainstexceeding thereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)pressurelimitofII0%ofdesignpressureforaLossofFeedwater event.Theproposedchangeaddsthatthistripalsoprotectsagainstviolation ofaspecified acceptable fueldesignlimit(SAFDL)andoffsitedoselimitsfortheanticipated operational occurrence oftheinadvertent openingofasteamgenerator atmospheric dumpvalveoramainsteamsafetyvalve.Table3.3-4,item7.d,presently specifies thattheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelis>20.6%NRwithanallowable valueof>20.0%.ThesearebasedontheCycleIFSARanalysis.
TheproposedchangetoTable3.3-4,item7.d,revisestheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelto>l9.0%NR,withanallowable valueof>I8.0%.Thesevaluescorrespond withananalytical setpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.Theproposedamendment tothelowsteamgenerator levelsetpoints doesnotimpacttheresultspresented intheReloadSafetyEvaluation forCycles2and3butonlyreflectschangestothedetermination oftheinstrument setpointconsistent withtheCycles2and3RPSandESFASanalysisassumptions.
TheeventswhichcanbeimpactedbychangesinRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpoints aretheLossofFeedwater event,theFeedwater LineBreak(FLB)event,theSteamLineBreakevent(SLB),andtheInadvertent OpeningofaSteamGenerator SafetyValveorAtmospheric DumpValve.TheCycle2SafetyAnalysisassumeda<5%NRRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpoint.
Theanalysissetpointwassetat5%NRtoensureactuation priortoreaching0%,underaccidentconditions.
Theresultsoftheanalysesfortheeventspresented intheCycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluation demonstrated thatallkeyparameters werebelowtheacceptance criteria.
Basedonthisevaluation, itcanbeconcluded thattheproposedamendment hasbeenaddressed bytheexistingAnalysesofRecordand,therefore, thereisnoimpactonthereportedresults.EJWI/0I8/5 IIU4ll5v4 ATTACHMENT 3DETERMINATION OFNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Thestandards usedtoarriveatadetermination thatarequestforamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration areincludedintheCommission's regulation, IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificant hazardsconsiderations areinvolvediftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated or(3)involveasignficant reduction inamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussed asfollows:(I)Operation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Theproposedchangelowerstheprobability ofpreviously evaluated eventsbydecreasing thelikelihood ofanunplanned reactortriporAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation System(AFAS)initiation onlowsteamgenerator level.(2)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotcreatethepossibilityof anewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.
Thesetpoints fortheReactorProtective Instrumentation (RPS)tripandtheAFAShavebeenestablished suchthattheyensureactuation ofthesefunctions beforetheinstrumentation goesoffscale.Thisstartswithaminimumlevelof5%NRandincludesappropriate errorsforan',inside containment accidentsuchasaSteamLineBre'ak.Thedifference betw'eenthesetpointandallowable valuesaccountsfortheinstrumentation driftoverthespecified surveillance interval.
(3)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Asdiscussed intheSafetyEvaluation, theresultsofallanalysesremainwithintheacceptance criteriaoftheStandardReviewPlan.Basedontheabove,wehavedetermined thattheamendment requestdoesnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety;andtherefore doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.
EJWI/0I8/6 ls'>>iMa'0'JvMS'MssHtuksusslf.StaH'"M'~ifss~IJIstJtlis~II,HIIIM~>>IHuf'~its4lis~HifsifMskl~IJVtl~ttgsIIM'NtI~JItl,il~>>I,'aJ,I*JMHtsfiI~I'MIS~Mg~MD~~..fls'~IitusMIsi.'sMsus,a'II~,tsvMI',IiiISItift'IJIIMSIISaIIlifIMJIHsIHHsita~'t~tttIIstfII'sa~IIMlilt,s''lil~IIIII~,M'"SIf,~~'flfI>>uII'I',f'I, I,IIItaI~I~"k'ISS~IJu...Mf,JSJilka~11flS,PifIIIMfltl,~.sIIuJM.IS.~I}}

Revision as of 16:01, 29 June 2018

Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Instrumentation & ESFAS & Associated Bases.Safety Evaluation & NSHC Determination Encl
ML17219A245
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/02/1986
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17219A244 List:
References
NUDOCS 8612080622
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ATTACHMENT lMarked-up Technical Specification Pages:2-43/43-l8B2-Sza02g6f@Q90622 86Oo~gqpDR'DOCK0@DR,,JV/l/018/3 ICFNCTIONLNITIl..HanualReactorTripTRIPSETPOIHTHot,Applicable HotApplicable TABLE2.2-1REACTORPROTECTIVE IHSTRNEHTATIN TRIPSETPOIHTLIHITSJhLLOMABLK VALUES~~0~2.VariablePeerlevel-High(1)~FourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating 3.Pressurizer Pressure-HighTheraalHargin/Lm PressureIfourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating 5.Contain<<ent Pressure-High6.SteaiGenerator Pressure-Low7;SteaiGenerator Pressure(1)Dlfferencc-High(LogicinTH/LPTripUnit)<9.61KaboveTllERNLPOMER,Pitha<<inta'etpoint of15KofRhTEDTUERNlLONER,'nda<<axi<<u<<of<107.NofQATEOTHERHALPNB.<2370psiaTripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesof~figures2.2-3and2.g-4.Hini<<mvalueof1900psia.<3.0Psig>626;9psia(2)<120.0psid.:IIc9.6lXaboveTilERNALPNER,'nda<<iniamsetpointof15KofRATEOTIIERNLPOMERanda<<axiomof<107.0X.ofRATEOTllERNLPOMER..<237Ipsia.Tripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesoffigures2.2-3and2.2-4.Hiniaevalueof19Mpsia.<3.lpsigI>621.Opsia(2).<132.0psidOlO8.Stea<<Generator Level-Los9.5X(3)->39.1X(3)

InMfllICMtQOhIlQFUNCTIONAL UNIT.5.CONTAIHMEHT SUHP'RECIRCULATION (RAS)a.HanualRAS(TripButtons)b.Refueling ifaterStorageTank-Lowc.Automatic Actuation Logic6.LOSSOFPOMERa.(1)4.16kVEmergency BusUndervoltage (LossofVoltage).(2)480VEmergency BusUndervoltage (LossofVoltage)b.(1)4.16kVEmergency BusUndervoltage (Degraded Voltage)TRIPVALUEHotApplicable 5.67feetabovetankbottoaHotApplicable

>3120volts>360volts>3848voltswitha10-second 1timedelayALLOMABLf VALUESHotApplicable 4.62feet'to6;24feetabove'tank bottomHotApplicable

>3120volts~>360volts>3848voltswitha10-'second tiaedelayiTABLE3.3-4Continued ENGINEERED SAFETYFEATURESACTUATION SYSTEHIHSTRUNENTATION TRIP.VALUES,(2)480VEmergency BusUndervoltage (Degraded Voltage)AUXILIARY FEEOMATER (AFAS)a.Hanual(TripButtons)b.Automatic Actuation Logicc.StealsGenerator hP-Highd.SG2wt28LevelLowe.Feedwater HeaderHighAP>432voltsHotApplicable

.HotApplicable

<180.0Pseud'gg7.>20.6X<100.0psid>432voltsHotApplicable HotApplicable

<187.5psid>20.(C<107.5psidigo%%uo SAFETYLIMITSANDLIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGSBASESContainment Pressure-High TheContainment Pressure-High tripprovidesassurance thatareactortripisinitiated priottooi'concurrently witha'afetyinjection (SIAS).Thisalsoprovidesassurance thatareactortripisinitiated priortoor.concurrently withanMSIS.SteamGenerator Pressure-Low TheSteamGenerator Pressure-Low tripprovidesprotection againstanexcessive rateofheatextraction fromthesteamgenerators andsubsequent cooldownofthereactorcoolant.Thesetpointof620psiaissufficiently belowthefullloadoperating pointofapproximately 885psiasoasnottointerfere withnormaloperation, but"stillhighenoughtoprovidetherequiredprotection intheeventofexcessively'igh steamflow.Thissettingwasusedwithanuncertainty factorof30psiinthesafetyanalyses.

SteamGenerator Level-Low TheSteamGenerator Level-Low tripprovidesprotection againstalossoffeedwater flowincidentandassuresthatthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystemwi11notbeexceededduetolossofthesteamgenerator heatsink.Thisspecified setpointprovidesallowance thattherewillbesufficient waterinventory inthesteamgenerator atthetimeofthetriptoprovideamarginofatleast10minutesbefore'auxiliary feedwater isrequired.

AK'ocalPowerDensity-Hi hTheLocalPowerDensity-High trip,functioning fromAXIALSHAPEINDEXmonitoring, isprovidedtoensurethatthepeaklocalpowerdensityinthefuelwhichcorresponds tofuelcenterline" meltingwillnotoccurasaconsequence ofaxialpowermaldistributions.

AreactortripisinitiatedwhenevertheAXIALSHAPEINDEXexceedstheallowable limitsofFigure2.2-2.TheAXIALSHAPEINDEXiscalculated fromtheupperandlowerexcoreneutrondetectorchannels.

Thecalculated

'setpoints aregenerated asafunctionofTHERMALPOWERlevelwiththeallowedCEAgrouppositionbeinginferredfromtheTHERMALPOWERlevel.'he tripisautomatically bypassedbelow15Kpower.ThemaximumAZIMUTHAL POWERTILTandmaximumCEAmisalignment permitted forcontinuous operation areassumedingeneration ofthesetpoints.

Inaddition, CEAgroupsequencing inaccordance withtheSpecifications 3.1.3.5and3.1.3.6isassumed.Finally,themaximuminsertion ofCEAbankswhichcanoccurduringanyanticipated operational occurrence priortoaPowerLevel-H>c".

tripisassumed.~~~~p~~~~"~~~~~~~~we>~mew~~iq~+we))~~blHGlos%oF5Quxtekal

~~~~~~~~g~+~~~~~o~W>>~<+V,svetw~

geeeR~sp~icUCIE-UNIT2hcepWC.

ATTACHMENT 2SAFETYEVALUATION Introduction ThisisarequesttoreviseTechnical Specification 2.2.I,ReactorProtective Instrumentation (RPS),and3/4.3.2,Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation System(ESFAS)Instrumentation andtheirassociated BasesoftheTechnical Specifications forSt.LucieUnit2.Discussion TheexistingTechnical Specification setpoints correspond toaCycleIanalysisassumption ofsteamgenerator lowlevelRPSsetpointof30%narrowrange(NR)forthemostlimitingevent,LossofFeedwater, and5%NRsetpointforallaccidents.

Thedifference betweentheanalysisassumption andspecified setpoint(9.5%)accountsforprocessequipment uncertainties, equipment responsetimesandRPScabinetuncertainties.

Auxiliary feedwater wasmanuallyactuatedbytheReactorOperator, asreflected inalltheanalysespresented forCycleI.Thesafetygradeautomatic auxiliary feedwater actuation system(AFAS)wasinstalled beforeCycleIoperation tosatisfyapost-TMIrequirement, NUREG-0737, ItemII.E.I.2.ThisproposedchangedoesnotimpacttheresultsoftheSafetyAnalysispresented forCycles2or3butonlyreflectsachangeintheanalysisassumptions madeforCycleIversusCycles2or3.Thenewvaluestakeintoconsideration theassumedRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelanalysissetpointof<5%NRandtherelatedinstrument uncertainties.

Thecalculated uncertainties werederivedusingacceptedmethodology forinstrument uncertainties calculations (CEN-Il2(s)Rev.0,'PlantProtection System-Selection ofTripSetpointValues,"Novemberl5,I979),whichtakesintoaccountinherentprocessinstrumentation errors,equipment responsetime,instrument driftandenvironmental concernsforaccidentconditions, asappropriate.

Theproposedsetpointnumbersareapplicable foroperation oftheRPSandESFASsystemsandareboundingforeithertheexistingBartonM764transmitters orRosemount II54transmitters (possible replacement transmitters).

TheproposedchangecontainsthoseTechnical Specifications neededtosupportthereduction ofthelowsteamgenerator levelsetpointforactuation ofreactortripandinitiation oftheAFASintheRPSandESFAS.TheproposedchangerevisesTable2.2-IReactorProtective Instrumentation TripSetpointLimitsanditsassociated Bases,toreflectareduction inthesetpointandallowable valuesforthereactortriponsteamgenerator level-low.TheproposedchangealsorevisesTable3.3-4Engineered SafetyFeaturesActuation SystemInstrumentation TripValues,toreflectareduction intheinitiation setpointandallowable valuefortheAFASonsteamgenerator level-low.FJWI/0I8/4

'I4I4lIII4IIIII Attachment 2(Cont'd)Table2.2-I,item8,presently specifies thatthetripsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelis>39.5%NR,withanallowable valueof>39.I%.ThesevaluesarebasedontheCycleIFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)analysis.

TheproposedchangetoTable2.2.-l,item8decreases thetripsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelto>20.5%NR,withanallowable valueof>l9.5%.Thesevaluescorrespond withananalytical setpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheBasesforTable2.2.I,item8,specifythatthetriponlowsteamgenerator levelprotectsagainstexceeding thereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)pressurelimitofII0%ofdesignpressureforaLossofFeedwater event.Theproposedchangeaddsthatthistripalsoprotectsagainstviolation ofaspecified acceptable fueldesignlimit(SAFDL)andoffsitedoselimitsfortheanticipated operational occurrence oftheinadvertent openingofasteamgenerator atmospheric dumpvalveoramainsteamsafetyvalve.Table3.3-4,item7.d,presently specifies thattheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelis>20.6%NRwithanallowable valueof>20.0%.ThesearebasedontheCycleIFSARanalysis.

TheproposedchangetoTable3.3-4,item7.d,revisestheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgenerator levelto>l9.0%NR,withanallowable valueof>I8.0%.Thesevaluescorrespond withananalytical setpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.Theproposedamendment tothelowsteamgenerator levelsetpoints doesnotimpacttheresultspresented intheReloadSafetyEvaluation forCycles2and3butonlyreflectschangestothedetermination oftheinstrument setpointconsistent withtheCycles2and3RPSandESFASanalysisassumptions.

TheeventswhichcanbeimpactedbychangesinRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpoints aretheLossofFeedwater event,theFeedwater LineBreak(FLB)event,theSteamLineBreakevent(SLB),andtheInadvertent OpeningofaSteamGenerator SafetyValveorAtmospheric DumpValve.TheCycle2SafetyAnalysisassumeda<5%NRRPSandESFASsteamgenerator lowlevelsetpoint.

Theanalysissetpointwassetat5%NRtoensureactuation priortoreaching0%,underaccidentconditions.

Theresultsoftheanalysesfortheeventspresented intheCycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluation demonstrated thatallkeyparameters werebelowtheacceptance criteria.

Basedonthisevaluation, itcanbeconcluded thattheproposedamendment hasbeenaddressed bytheexistingAnalysesofRecordand,therefore, thereisnoimpactonthereportedresults.EJWI/0I8/5 IIU4ll5v4 ATTACHMENT 3DETERMINATION OFNOSIGNIFICANT HAZARDSCONSIDERATION Thestandards usedtoarriveatadetermination thatarequestforamendment involvesnosignificant hazardsconsideration areincludedintheCommission's regulation, IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificant hazardsconsiderations areinvolvediftheoperation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated; or(2)createthepossibility ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated or(3)involveasignficant reduction inamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussed asfollows:(I)Operation ofthefacilityinaccordance withtheproposedamendment wouldnotinvolveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Theproposedchangelowerstheprobability ofpreviously evaluated eventsbydecreasing thelikelihood ofanunplanned reactortriporAuxiliary Feedwater Actuation System(AFAS)initiation onlowsteamgenerator level.(2)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotcreatethepossibilityof anewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated.

Thesetpoints fortheReactorProtective Instrumentation (RPS)tripandtheAFAShavebeenestablished suchthattheyensureactuation ofthesefunctions beforetheinstrumentation goesoffscale.Thisstartswithaminimumlevelof5%NRandincludesappropriate errorsforan',inside containment accidentsuchasaSteamLineBre'ak.Thedifference betw'eenthesetpointandallowable valuesaccountsfortheinstrumentation driftoverthespecified surveillance interval.

(3)Useofthemodifiedspecification wouldnotinvolveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety.Asdiscussed intheSafetyEvaluation, theresultsofallanalysesremainwithintheacceptance criteriaoftheStandardReviewPlan.Basedontheabove,wehavedetermined thattheamendment requestdoesnot(I)involveasignificant increaseintheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentpreviously evaluated, (2)createtheprobability ofanewordifferent kindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviously evaluated, or(3)involveasignificant reduction inamarginofsafety;andtherefore doesnotinvolveasignificant hazardsconsideration.

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