ML17209A294

Tech Spec 3/4.4 for Reactor Coolant Sys

ML17209A294
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/30/1980
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17209A293	List: ML17209A292 ML17209A294
References
NUDOCS 8011030561
Download: ML17209A294 (18)

Text

3/4-4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMREACTORCOOLANTLOOPSLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.1Fourreactorcoolantpumpsshallbeinoperation-APPLICABILITY:Modes1and2.ACTION:Withlessthanfourreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation,beinatleastHOTSTANDBYwithin6hours.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.4.1TheFlowDependentSelectorSwitchshallbedeterminedtobeinthe4pumppositionwithin15minutespriortomakingthereactorcriticalandatleastonceper12hoursthereafter.ST.LUCIE-UNITI'">>0S0$4)3/44-110;30'=80 I4 REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMHOTSTANDBYLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.2a.AtleasttwoofthereactorcoolantloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE.b.c~1~ReactorCoolantLoop(A)andatleastoneassociatedreactorcoolantpump.2.ReactorCoolantLoop(B)andatleastoneassociatedreactorcoolantpump.3.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)(Mode4only).4-ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)(Mode4only).AtleastoneoftheaboveReactorCoolantLoopsshallbeinoperation*.Whenoperatingwithlessthan4reactorcoolingpumpsinMode3,theSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementofSpecification3.1.1.1.shallbeincreasedtoandmaintainedat>4.1$.wk/K.TheprovisionsofSpecifications3.0.3and3.0.4arenotapplicable.APPLICABILITY:MODES3and4ACTION:a.Withlessthantheaboverequiredreactorcoolantloopsoperable,restoretherequiredloopstoOPERABLEstatuswith72hoursorbeinCOLDSHUTDOWNwithinthenext30hours.b.Withnoreactorcoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredlooptooperation.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.4.1.2.1Atleasttheaboverequiredreactorcoolantpumps,ifnotinoperation,shallbedeterminedtobeOPERABLEonceper7daysbyverifyingcorrectbreakeralignmentsandindicatedpoweravailability.4.4.1.2.2Atleastonecoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantatleastonceper12hours.~eA1reactorcoolantpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided(1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/44-la10-30-80 IItt REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMSHUTDOWNLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.4.1.3a.ThetwoShutdownCoolingloopslistedbelowshallbeOPERABLE:l.ShutdownCoolingLoop(A)¹2.ShutdownCoolingLoop(B)¹b.Atleastoneoftheabovecoolantloopsshallbeinoperation*.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withoutRCSintegrityACTION:a.With1essthantheaboverequiredcoolant1oopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequriedcoolantloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.IfrequiredloopsarenotrestoredtoOPERABLEwithin8hours,immediatelyinitiateactiontorestoreRCSintegrity.b.Withnocoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE5withRCSintegrityACTION:Withnocoolantloopinoperation,suspendalloperationsinvolvingareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystemandimmediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturntherequiredcoolantlooptooperation.SURVEILLANCEREURIEMENTS4.4.1.3.1Therequiredshutdowncoolingloop(s)shallbedeterminedOPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnitInserviceInspectionProgram,Pump,TestProgram,andValveTestProgram.KllreactorcooTantpumpsanddecayheatremovalpumpsmaybede-energizedforupto1hourprovided(1)nooperationsarepermittedthatwouldcausedilutionofthereactorcoolantsystemboronconcentration,and(2)coreoutlettemperatureismaintainedatleast10'Fbelowsaturationtemperature.¹ThenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableinMODE5-ST.LUCIE-UNIT13.44-lb10,:30,-;80 II'5IIIIIaiI'llIIII,b REFUELINGOPERATIONS3/49.8SHUTDOWNCOOLINGANDCOOLANTCIRCULATIONALLWATERLEVELSLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION3.98.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeinoperation.APPLICABILITY:MODE6ACTION:a~Withlessthanoneshutdowncoolingloopinoperation,exceptasprovidedinb.below,suspendalloperationsinvolvinganincreaseinthereactordecayheatloadorareductioninboronconcentrationoftheReactorCoolantSystem.Closeallcontainmentpenetrationsprovidingdirectaccessfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheoutsideatmospherewithin4hours.b.Theshutdowncoolingloopmayberemovedfromoperationforupto1hourper8hourperiodduringtheperformanceofCOREALTERATIONSinthevicinityofreactorpressurevesselhotlegs.c.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIREMENTS4.9.8.1Atleastoneshutdowncoolingloopshallbeverifiedtobeinoperationandcirculatingreactorcoolantataflowrateofgreaterthanorequalto3000gpmatleastonceper4hours.ST.LUCIE-UNIT13/49-8,10-30-80;=

REFUELINGOPERATIONLOWMATERLEVELLIMITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION'3.9.8.2TwoindependentshutdowncoolingloopsshallbeOPERABLE.*APPLICABILITY:MODE6whenthewaterlevelabovethetopoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesseatedwithinthereactorpressurevesselislessthan23feet.ACTION:a.WithlessthantherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLE,immediatelyinitiatecorrectiveactiontoreturnloopstoOPERABLEstatusassoonaspossible.b.TheprovisionsofSpecification3.0.3arenotapplicable.SURVEILLANCEREUIRENENTS4.9.8.2TherequiredshutdowncoolingloopsshallbedeterminedOPERABLEpertheSt.LucieUnit1InserviceInspectionProgram,PumpTestProgram,andValveTestProgram.*Thenormaloremergencypowersourcemaybeinoperableforeachshutdowncoolingloop.ST.LUCIE-UNITI3/49.8a10'-3040 4I'h4Ii'j 3/4.4.1REACTORCOOLANTLOOPSTheplantisdesignedtooperatewithbothreactorcoolantloopsandassociatedreactorcoolantpumpsinoperation,andmaintainDNBRabove1.30duringallnormaloperationsandanticipatedtransients.ByoriginaldesignSTARTUPandPOWEROPERATIONmaybeinitiatedandmayproceedwithoneortworeactorcoolantpumpsnotinoperationafterthesetpointsforthePowerLevel-High,ReactorCoolantFlow-Low,andThermalMargin/LowPressuretripshavebeenreducedtotheirspecifiedvalues.ReducingthesetripsetpointsensuresthattheDNBRwillbemaintainedabove1.30duringthreepumpoperationsandthatduringtwopumpoperationthecorevoidfractionwillbelimitedtoensureparallelchannelflowstabilitywithinthecoreandthereby,preventprematureDNB.However,lessthan4pumpoperationinModes1and2iscurrentlynotauthorizedfortheunit.Asingleshutdowncoolinglooporasinglereactorcoolantloopwith.itssteamgeneratorfilledabovethelowleveltripsetpointprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforcorecoolingwhileinMODES3and4,however,,singlefailureconsiderationsrequireplantcooldownifcomponentrepairsand/orcorrectiveactioncannotbemadewithintheallowableout-of-servicetimeifatleast2redundentloopsarenotOPERABLE.TheadditionalSHUTDOWNMARGINrequirementforMode3providesassuranceofacceptableresultsshouldtherebeaMSLBwithlessthan4RCPsoperating.ForMode5withoutRCSintegrity(i.e.SGmanwaysopen)andMode6whenthewaterlevelabovefuelassembliesseatedinthevesselislessthan23'eet,asingleshutdowncoolingloopprovidessufficientheatremovalcapabilityforcorecooling;however,singlefailureconsiderationsrequirethat2loopsbeOPERABLE.ForMode5withRCSintegrity,intheeventofafailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,othermethodsofheatremova)areviableandavailable,(i.e.injectionviatherequiredOPERABLEchargingorHPSIpump).Theseprovide,as'-aminimum,adequate,timetoinitiateemergencymeasurestocoolthecore.ST.LUCIE-UNITIB3/4.4-1f~.n,10-,,30-80 3/4.4REACTORCOOLANTSYSTEMBASES3/4.4.2and3/4.4.3SAFETYVALVESThepressurizercodesafetyvalvesoperatetopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitsSafet~Limitof2750psia.Eachsafetyvalveisdesignedtorelieve2X10~lbsperhourofsaturatedsteamatthevalvesetpoint.Thereliefcapacityofasinglesafetyvalveisadequatetorelieveanyoverpressureconditionwhichcouldoccurduringshutdown.IntheeventthatnosafetyvalvesareOPERABLE,anoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,connectedtotheRCS,providesoverpressurereliefcapabilityandwillpreventRCSoverpressurization.Duringoperation,allpressurizercodesafetyvalvesmustbeOPERABLEtopreventtheRCSfrombeingpressurizedaboveitssafetylimitof2750psia.ThecombinedreliefcapacityofthesevalvesissufficienttolimittheReactorCoolantSystempressuretowithinitsSafetyLimitof2750psiafollowingacompletelossofturbinegeneratorloadwhileoperatingatRATEDTHERMALPOWERandassumingnoreactortripuntilthefirstReactorProtectiveSystemtripsetpoint(PressurizerPressure-High)isreached(i.e..nocreditistakenforadirectreactortriponthelossofturbine)andalsoassumingnooperationofthepressurizerpoweroperatedreliefvalveorsteamdumpvalves.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/4.4-1a10'-,30.-80 i'1II'II REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.6MANIPULATORCRANEOPERABILITYTheOPERABILITYrequirementsofthecranesusedformovementoffuelassembliesensurethat:1)eachcranehassufficientloadcapacitytoliftafuelelement,and2)thecoreinternalsandpressurevesselareprotectedfromexcessiveliftingforceintheeventtheyareinadvertentlyengagedduringliftingoperations.3/4.9.7CRANETRAVEL-SPENTFUELSTORAGEBUILDINGTherestrictiononmovementofloadsinexcessofthenominalweightofafuelasemblyandCEAoverirradiatedfuelassembliesensuresthatnomorethanthecontentsofonefuelassemblywillberupturedintheeventofafuelhandlingaccident.Thisassumptionisconsistentwiththeactivityreleaseassumedintheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.8COOLANTCIRCULATIONTherequirementthatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperationensuresthat(1)sufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE,and(2)sufficientcoolantcirculationismaintainedthroughthereactorcoretominimizetheeffectsofaborondilutionincidentandpreventboronstratification.TherequirementtohavetwoshutdowncoolingloopsOPERABLEwhenthereislessthan23feetofwaterabovethecore,ensuresthatasinglefailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloopwillnotresultinacompletelossofdecayheatremovalcapability.Withthereactorvesselheadremovedand23feetofwaterabovethecore,alargeheatsinkisavailableforcorecooling,thusintheeventofafailureoftheoperatingshutdowncoolingloop,adequatetimeisprovidedtorinitiate'mergency,'proceduresto=cool~thecore~Therequirementthatatleastoneshutdowncoolingloopbeinoperationisconsistentwiththeassumptionsinthesafetyanalysisoftheborondilutionaccidentandpreventslocalvariationsinboronconcentrations,thusminimizingtheeffectsofinadvertentborondilution.Italsoassuresthatsufficientcoolingcapacityisavailabletoremovedecayheatandmaintainthewaterinthereactorpressurevesselbelow140'FasrequiredduringtheREFUELINGMODE.3/4.9.9CONTAINMENTISOLATIONSYSTEMTheOPERABILITYofthissystemensuresthatthecontainmentisolationvalveswillbeautomaticallyisolatedupondetectionofhighradiationlevelswithinthecontainment.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemisrequiredtorestrictthereleaseofradioactivematerialfromthecontainmentatmospheretotheenvironment.ST.LUGIE-UNIT1B3/49-2<10-30~80) c>C REFUELINGOPERATIONSBASES3/4.9.10and3/4.9.11WATERLEVEL-REACTORVESSELANDSTORAGEPOOLWATERLEVELTherestrictionsonminimumwaterlevelensurethatsufficientwaterdepthisavailabletoremove99Koftheassumed10$iodinegapactivityreleasedfromtheruptureofanirradiatedfuelassembly.Theminimumwaterdepthisconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalysis.3/4.9.12FUELPOOLVENTILATIONSYSTEM-FUELSTORAGEThelimitationsonthefuelhandlingbuildingventilationsystemensuresthatallradioactivematerialreleasedfromanirradiatedfuelassemblywillbefilteredthroughtheHEPAfiltersandcharcoaladsorberpriortodischargetotheatmosphere.TheOPERABILITYofthissystemandtheresultingiodineremovalcapacityareconsistentwiththeassumptionsoftheaccidentanalyses.3/4.9.13SPENTFUELCASKCRANEThemaximumloadwhichmaybehandledbythespentfuelcaskcraneislimitedtoaloadedsingleelementcaskwhichisequivalenttoapproximately25tons.Thisrestrictionisprovidedtoensurethestructuralintegrityofthespentfuelpoolintheeventofadroppedcaskaccident.Structuraldamagecausedbydroppingaloadinexcessofaloadedsingleelementcaskcouldcauseleakagefromthespentfuelpoolinexcessofthemaximummakeupcapability.3/4.9.14DECAYTIME-STORAGEPOOLTheminimumrequirementfordecayoftheirradiatedfuelassembliesinthethree7X7modulesandtheone7X10modulenearestthefuelcaskcompartmentpriortomovementofthespentfuelcaskintothefuelcaskcompartmentensuresthatsufficienttimehasclaspedtoallowradioactivedecayofthefissionproducts.Thisdecaytimeisconsistentwiththeassumptionsusedinthecaskdropaccidentanalysis.ST.LUGIE-UNITIB3/49-31D.30-,:80 NCWf~PQ SAFETYEVALUATIONRE:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Proposed;TechSecAmendmentI.IntroductionThisevaluationsupportsaproposal-torevisespecifications3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3'andtoaddspecifications3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2toensurethattheLimitingConditionsforOperationprovideforredundancyinavailabledecayheatremovalsystems.II.DiscussionTheproposedrevisionstoTechnicalSpecifications3.4.1,3.4.1.2and3.4.1.3andtheadditionofTechnicalSpecification3.9.8.1and3.9.8.2arenecessarytocomplywithaNRCletterdatedJunell,1980.ThepurposeofthesechangesistoprovideforredundancyintheShutdownCoolingandReactorCoolantSystemstoensureadequatedecayheatremovalcapabilityinallmodesofreactoroperation.III.ConclusionWehaveconcluded,basedontheconsiderationsdiscussedabove,that:(1)theamendmentdoesnotincreasetheprobabilityorconsequencesofaccidentspreviouslyconsideredanddoesnotreducethemarginofsafety,(2)thereisreasonableassurancethatthehealthandsafetyofthepublicwillnotbeendangeredbyoperationintheproposedmanner,and(3)suchactivitieswillbeconductedincompliancewiththeCommission'sregulationsandtheissuanceofthisamendmentwillnotbeinimicaltothecommondefenseandsecurityortothehealthandsafetyofthepublic.10;;30.:80 tY'()IIIb