ML17219A245

Proposed Tech Specs Re Reactor Protection Instrumentation & ESFAS & Associated Bases.Safety Evaluation & NSHC Determination Encl

ML17219A245
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/02/1986
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
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ML17219A244	List: ML17219A243 ML17219A245
References
NUDOCS 8612080622
Download: ML17219A245 (11)

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ATTACHMENTlMarked-upTechnicalSpecificationPages:2-43/43-l8B2-Sza02g6f@Q9062286Oo~gqpDR'DOCK0@DR,,JV/l/018/3 ICFNCTIONLNITIl..HanualReactorTripTRIPSETPOIHTHot,ApplicableHotApplicableTABLE2.2-1REACTORPROTECTIVEIHSTRNEHTATINTRIPSETPOIHTLIHITSJhLLOMABLKVALUES~~0~2.VariablePeerlevel-High(1)~FourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating3.PressurizerPressure-HighTheraalHargin/LmPressureIfourReactorCoolantPu<<psOperating5.Contain<<entPressure-High6.SteaiGeneratorPressure-Low7;SteaiGeneratorPressure(1)Dlfferencc-High(LogicinTH/LPTripUnit)<9.61KaboveTllERNLPOMER,Pitha<<inta'etpointof15KofRhTEDTUERNlLONER,'nda<<axi<<u<<of<107.NofQATEOTHERHALPNB.<2370psiaTripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesof~figures2.2-3and2.g-4.Hini<<mvalueof1900psia.<3.0Psig>626;9psia(2)<120.0psid.:IIc9.6lXaboveTilERNALPNER,'nda<<iniamsetpointof15KofRATEOTIIERNLPOMERanda<<axiomof<107.0X.ofRATEOTllERNLPOMER..<237Ipsia.Tripsetpointadjustedtonotexceedtheli<<itlinesoffigures2.2-3and2.2-4.Hiniaevalueof19Mpsia.<3.lpsigI>621.Opsia(2).<132.0psidOlO8.Stea<<GeneratorLevel-Los9.5X(3)->39.1X(3)

InMfllICMtQOhIlQFUNCTIONALUNIT.5.CONTAIHMEHTSUHP'RECIRCULATION(RAS)a.HanualRAS(TripButtons)b.RefuelingifaterStorageTank-Lowc.AutomaticActuationLogic6.LOSSOFPOMERa.(1)4.16kVEmergencyBusUndervoltage(LossofVoltage).(2)480VEmergencyBusUndervoltage(LossofVoltage)b.(1)4.16kVEmergencyBusUndervoltage(DegradedVoltage)TRIPVALUEHotApplicable5.67feetabovetankbottoaHotApplicable>3120volts>360volts>3848voltswitha10-second1timedelayALLOMABLfVALUESHotApplicable4.62feet'to6;24feetabove'tankbottomHotApplicable>3120volts~>360volts>3848voltswitha10-'secondtiaedelayiTABLE3.3-4ContinuedENGINEEREDSAFETYFEATURESACTUATIONSYSTEHIHSTRUNENTATIONTRIP.VALUES,(2)480VEmergencyBusUndervoltage(DegradedVoltage)AUXILIARYFEEOMATER(AFAS)a.Hanual(TripButtons)b.AutomaticActuationLogicc.StealsGeneratorhP-Highd.SG2wt28LevelLowe.FeedwaterHeaderHighAP>432voltsHotApplicable.HotApplicable<180.0Pseud'gg7.>20.6X<100.0psid>432voltsHotApplicableHotApplicable<187.5psid>20.(C<107.5psidigo%%uo SAFETYLIMITSANDLIMITINGSAFETYSYSTEMSETTINGSBASESContainmentPressure-HighTheContainmentPressure-Hightripprovidesassurancethatareactortripisinitiatedpriottooi'concurrentlywitha'afetyinjection(SIAS).Thisalsoprovidesassurancethatareactortripisinitiatedpriortoor.concurrentlywithanMSIS.SteamGeneratorPressure-LowTheSteamGeneratorPressure-Lowtripprovidesprotectionagainstanexcessiverateofheatextractionfromthesteamgeneratorsandsubsequentcooldownofthereactorcoolant.Thesetpointof620psiaissufficientlybelowthefullloadoperatingpointofapproximately885psiasoasnottointerferewithnormaloperation,but"stillhighenoughtoprovidetherequiredprotectionintheeventofexcessively'ighsteamflow.Thissettingwasusedwithanuncertaintyfactorof30psiinthesafetyanalyses.SteamGeneratorLevel-LowTheSteamGeneratorLevel-LowtripprovidesprotectionagainstalossoffeedwaterflowincidentandassuresthatthedesignpressureoftheReactorCoolantSystemwi11notbeexceededduetolossofthesteamgeneratorheatsink.Thisspecifiedsetpointprovidesallowancethattherewillbesufficientwaterinventoryinthesteamgeneratoratthetimeofthetriptoprovideamarginofatleast10minutesbefore'auxiliaryfeedwaterisrequired.AK'ocalPowerDensity-HihTheLocalPowerDensity-Hightrip,functioningfromAXIALSHAPEINDEXmonitoring,isprovidedtoensurethatthepeaklocalpowerdensityinthefuelwhichcorrespondstofuelcenterline"meltingwillnotoccurasaconsequenceofaxialpowermaldistributions.AreactortripisinitiatedwhenevertheAXIALSHAPEINDEXexceedstheallowablelimitsofFigure2.2-2.TheAXIALSHAPEINDEXiscalculatedfromtheupperandlowerexcoreneutrondetectorchannels.Thecalculated'setpointsaregeneratedasafunctionofTHERMALPOWERlevelwiththeallowedCEAgrouppositionbeinginferredfromtheTHERMALPOWERlevel.'hetripisautomaticallybypassedbelow15Kpower.ThemaximumAZIMUTHALPOWERTILTandmaximumCEAmisalignmentpermittedforcontinuousoperationareassumedingenerationofthesetpoints.Inaddition,CEAgroupsequencinginaccordancewiththeSpecifications3.1.3.5and3.1.3.6isassumed.Finally,themaximuminsertionofCEAbankswhichcanoccurduringanyanticipatedoperationaloccurrencepriortoaPowerLevel-H>c".tripisassumed.~~~~p~~~~"~~~~~~~~we>~mew~~iq~+we))~~blHGlos%oF5Quxtekal~~~~~~~~g~+~~~~~o~W>>~<+V,svetw~geeeR~sp~icUCIE-UNIT2hcepWC.

ATTACHMENT2SAFETYEVALUATIONIntroductionThisisarequesttoreviseTechnicalSpecification2.2.I,ReactorProtectiveInstrumentation(RPS),and3/4.3.2,EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystem(ESFAS)InstrumentationandtheirassociatedBasesoftheTechnicalSpecificationsforSt.LucieUnit2.DiscussionTheexistingTechnicalSpecificationsetpointscorrespondtoaCycleIanalysisassumptionofsteamgeneratorlowlevelRPSsetpointof30%narrowrange(NR)forthemostlimitingevent,LossofFeedwater,and5%NRsetpointforallaccidents.Thedifferencebetweentheanalysisassumptionandspecifiedsetpoint(9.5%)accountsforprocessequipmentuncertainties,equipmentresponsetimesandRPScabinetuncertainties.AuxiliaryfeedwaterwasmanuallyactuatedbytheReactorOperator,asreflectedinalltheanalysespresentedforCycleI.Thesafetygradeautomaticauxiliaryfeedwateractuationsystem(AFAS)wasinstalledbeforeCycleIoperationtosatisfyapost-TMIrequirement,NUREG-0737,ItemII.E.I.2.ThisproposedchangedoesnotimpacttheresultsoftheSafetyAnalysispresentedforCycles2or3butonlyreflectsachangeintheanalysisassumptionsmadeforCycleIversusCycles2or3.ThenewvaluestakeintoconsiderationtheassumedRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelanalysissetpointof<5%NRandtherelatedinstrumentuncertainties.Thecalculateduncertaintieswerederivedusingacceptedmethodologyforinstrumentuncertaintiescalculations(CEN-Il2(s)Rev.0,'PlantProtectionSystem-SelectionofTripSetpointValues,"Novemberl5,I979),whichtakesintoaccountinherentprocessinstrumentationerrors,equipmentresponsetime,instrumentdriftandenvironmentalconcernsforaccidentconditions,asappropriate.TheproposedsetpointnumbersareapplicableforoperationoftheRPSandESFASsystemsandareboundingforeithertheexistingBartonM764transmittersorRosemountII54transmitters(possiblereplacementtransmitters).TheproposedchangecontainsthoseTechnicalSpecificationsneededtosupportthereductionofthelowsteamgeneratorlevelsetpointforactuationofreactortripandinitiationoftheAFASintheRPSandESFAS.TheproposedchangerevisesTable2.2-IReactorProtectiveInstrumentationTripSetpointLimitsanditsassociatedBases,toreflectareductioninthesetpointandallowablevaluesforthereactortriponsteamgeneratorlevel-low.TheproposedchangealsorevisesTable3.3-4EngineeredSafetyFeaturesActuationSystemInstrumentationTripValues,toreflectareductionintheinitiationsetpointandallowablevaluefortheAFASonsteamgeneratorlevel-low.FJWI/0I8/4

'I4I4lIII4IIIII Attachment2(Cont'd)Table2.2-I,item8,presentlyspecifiesthatthetripsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelis>39.5%NR,withanallowablevalueof>39.I%.ThesevaluesarebasedontheCycleIFinalSafetyAnalysisReport(FSAR)analysis.TheproposedchangetoTable2.2.-l,item8decreasesthetripsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelto>20.5%NR,withanallowablevalueof>l9.5%.Thesevaluescorrespondwithananalyticalsetpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheBasesforTable2.2.I,item8,specifythatthetriponlowsteamgeneratorlevelprotectsagainstexceedingthereactorcoolantsystem(RCS)pressurelimitofII0%ofdesignpressureforaLossofFeedwaterevent.Theproposedchangeaddsthatthistripalsoprotectsagainstviolationofaspecifiedacceptablefueldesignlimit(SAFDL)andoffsitedoselimitsfortheanticipatedoperationaloccurrenceoftheinadvertentopeningofasteamgeneratoratmosphericdumpvalveoramainsteamsafetyvalve.Table3.3-4,item7.d,presentlyspecifiesthattheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelis>20.6%NRwithanallowablevalueof>20.0%.ThesearebasedontheCycleIFSARanalysis.TheproposedchangetoTable3.3-4,item7.d,revisestheAFASsetpointonlowsteamgeneratorlevelto>l9.0%NR,withanallowablevalueof>I8.0%.Thesevaluescorrespondwithananalyticalsetpointof5%usedintheaccidentanalysisforCycles2and3.TheproposedamendmenttothelowsteamgeneratorlevelsetpointsdoesnotimpacttheresultspresentedintheReloadSafetyEvaluationforCycles2and3butonlyreflectschangestothedeterminationoftheinstrumentsetpointconsistentwiththeCycles2and3RPSandESFASanalysisassumptions.TheeventswhichcanbeimpactedbychangesinRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelsetpointsaretheLossofFeedwaterevent,theFeedwaterLineBreak(FLB)event,theSteamLineBreakevent(SLB),andtheInadvertentOpeningofaSteamGeneratorSafetyValveorAtmosphericDumpValve.TheCycle2SafetyAnalysisassumeda<5%NRRPSandESFASsteamgeneratorlowlevelsetpoint.Theanalysissetpointwassetat5%NRtoensureactuationpriortoreaching0%,underaccidentconditions.TheresultsoftheanalysesfortheeventspresentedintheCycle2ReloadSafetyEvaluationdemonstratedthatallkeyparameterswerebelowtheacceptancecriteria.Basedonthisevaluation,itcanbeconcludedthattheproposedamendmenthasbeenaddressedbytheexistingAnalysesofRecordand,therefore,thereisnoimpactonthereportedresults.EJWI/0I8/5 IIU4ll5v4 ATTACHMENT3DETERMINATIONOFNOSIGNIFICANTHAZARDSCONSIDERATIONThestandardsusedtoarriveatadeterminationthatarequestforamendmentinvolvesnosignificanthazardsconsiderationareincludedintheCommission'sregulation,IOCFR50.92,whichstatesthatnosignificanthazardsconsiderationsareinvolvediftheoperationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnot(I)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated;or(2)createthepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluatedor(3)involveasignficantreductioninamarginofsafety.Eachstandardisdiscussedasfollows:(I)Operationofthefacilityinaccordancewiththeproposedamendmentwouldnotinvolveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.TheproposedchangelowerstheprobabilityofpreviouslyevaluatedeventsbydecreasingthelikelihoodofanunplannedreactortriporAuxiliaryFeedwaterActuationSystem(AFAS)initiationonlowsteamgeneratorlevel.(2)Useofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotcreatethepossibilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated.ThesetpointsfortheReactorProtectiveInstrumentation(RPS)tripandtheAFAShavebeenestablishedsuchthattheyensureactuationofthesefunctionsbeforetheinstrumentationgoesoffscale.Thisstartswithaminimumlevelof5%NRandincludesappropriateerrorsforan',insidecontainmentaccidentsuchasaSteamLineBre'ak.Thedifferencebetw'eenthesetpointandallowablevaluesaccountsfortheinstrumentationdriftoverthespecifiedsurveillanceinterval.(3)Useofthemodifiedspecificationwouldnotinvolveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety.AsdiscussedintheSafetyEvaluation,theresultsofallanalysesremainwithintheacceptancecriteriaoftheStandardReviewPlan.Basedontheabove,wehavedeterminedthattheamendmentrequestdoesnot(I)involveasignificantincreaseintheprobabilityorconsequencesofanaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,(2)createtheprobabilityofanewordifferentkindofaccidentfromanyaccidentpreviouslyevaluated,or(3)involveasignificantreductioninamarginofsafety;andthereforedoesnotinvolveasignificanthazardsconsideration.EJWI/0I8/6 ls'>>iMa'0'JvMS'MssHtuksusslf.StaH'"M'~ifss~IJIstJtlis~II,HIIIM~>>IHuf'~its4lis~HifsifMskl~IJVtl~ttgsIIM'NtI~JItl,il~>>I,'aJ,I*JMHtsfiI~I'MIS~Mg~MD~~..fls'~IitusMIsi.'sMsus,a'II~,tsvMI',IiiISItift'IJIIMSIISaIIlifIMJIHsIHHsita~'t~tttIIstfII'sa~IIMlilt,slil~IIIII~,M'"SIf,~~'flfI>>uII'I',f'I,I,IIItaI~I~"k'ISS~IJu...Mf,JSJilka~11flS,PifIIIMfltl,~.sIIuJM.IS.~I