IR 05000228/2023001: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML23219A188
| number = ML24025A167
| issue date = 08/24/2023
| issue date = 02/05/2024
| title = NRC Inspection Report 05000228/2023001, and Notice of Violation
| title = NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001, Disputed Cited Violation and Minor Violation Revised, EA-23-118
| author name = Warnick G
| author name = Bloomer T
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS/DIOR
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS
| addressee name = Slaughter D
| addressee name = Slaughter D
| addressee affiliation = Aerotest Operations, Inc
| addressee affiliation = Aerotest Operations, Inc
| docket = 05000228
| docket = 05000228
| license number = R-098
| license number = R-098
| contact person = Anderson S
| contact person =  
| case reference number = EA-23-118
| document report number = IR 2023001
| document report number = IR 2023001
| document type = Inspection Report, Letter, Notice of Violation
| document type = Letter, Notice of Violation
| page count = 9
| page count = 9
}}
}}
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:August 24, 2023
{{#Wiki_filter:February 5, 2024


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00228/2023-001, AND NOTICE OF VIOLATION
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00228/2023-001, DISPUTED CITED VIOLATION AND MINOR VIOLATION REVISED


==Dear David Slaughter:==
==Dear David Slaughter:==
This letter refers to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, at Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) in San Ramon, California. The NRC inspectors discussed the preliminary results of this inspection with you and members of your staff on June 27, 2023. A final exit meeting was conducted via Microsoft Teams on July 13, 2023, to inform you of the final inspection results. The inspection results are documented in the enclosure to this letter.
This letter responds to your letters dated September 9, 2023 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML23255A034 and ML23255A036). In your letters you provided written responses to the August 24, 2023, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 (ML23219A188) disputing one of the violations and the minor violation. The inspection report documented a violation associated with the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program. The inspection report also described a minor violation that involved the failure of the Reactor Safeguards Committee to meet at least annually. On October 13, 2023 (ML23285A171), the NRC acknowledged receipt of your letters.


During this inspection, the NRC inspectors examined activities conducted under your licenses as they relate to public health and safety, the environment, and to confirm compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, as well as with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of the examination of selected procedures and representative records, tour of the reactor and supporting equipment, independent radiation surveys, and interviews with personnel.
The NRC conducted a detailed review of your responses and the applicable regulatory requirements consistent with Part I, Section 2.8 of the NRC Enforcement Manual. The review included staff who were not involved in the original inspection effort. The details of the NRCs evaluation are contained in the enclosure.


Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC has determined that two Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at https://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
After consideration of the basis for your dispute of the subject report violations, the NRC concluded that the original violations remained valid. However, the staff revised the cited violation to enhance its clarity and modified the dates of noncompliance. The NRC also revised the minor violation to correct the reference to the technical specification requirement in place during the period of the noncompliance. The modified language for the violations is provided in the enclosure. The NRC will reissue Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 to document the revised violations.


The violations are cited in Enclosure 1, Notice of Violation (Notice), and the circumstances surrounding them are described in detail in the subject inspection report, Enclosure 2. The violations are being cited in the Notice because they were identified by the NRC and corrective actions had not been fully articulated on the docket at the time of the final exit meeting.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and from the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.


Therefore, you are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the enclosed Notice when preparing your response. If you have additional information that you believe the NRC should consider, you may provide it in your response to the Notice. The NRC review of your response to the Notice will also determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary, information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Greg Warnick of my staff at 817-200-1249 or at Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov.


If you have any questions concerning this inspection report, please contact Stephanie Anderson at 817-200-1213, or the undersigned at 817-200-1249.
Sincerely, Signed by Bloomer, Tamara on 02/05/24 Tamara Bloomer, Director Division of Radiological Safety and Security Docket No. 050-00228 License No. R-98 Enclosure:
NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response to a Notice of Violation


Sincerely, Signed by Warnick, Gregory on 08/24/23 Gregory G. Warnick, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Docket No. 050-00228 License No: R-98
ML24025A167 SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:
By: ACR  Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SHP:DIOR TL:ACES C:DIOR RC NMSS NAME TJohnson JGroom GWarnick DCylkowski MBurgess SIGNATURE /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E DATE 01/23/24 01/29/24 01/25/24 01/29/24 01/31/24 OFFICE OE D:DRSS NAME DJones TBloomer SIGNATURE /RA/ E /RA/ E DATE 02/05/24 02/05/24


===Enclosures:===
NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response to a Notice of Violation Restatement of Violation A and Minor Violation:
1. Notice of Violation 2. Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001
On August 24, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 and Notice of Violation (Notice) to Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO, Aerotest, or licensee) Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)
Accession No. ML23219A188. Violation A and the minor violation documented in the inspection report, are restated below:
Violation A NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.


ML23219A188 SUNSI Review ADAMS: Sensitive Non-Publicly Available Keyword By: SGA Yes No Non-Sensitive Publicly Available NRC-002 OFFICE DRSS/DIOR DRSS/DIOR NMSS/RDB DRSS/DD NAME SAnderson MLaFranzo JParrott GMiller SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/  /RA/  /RA/
Contrary to the above, from December 6, 2021, to June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to have a qualified Certified Fuel Handler and a qualified Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor and implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR [Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor] CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies.
DATE 08/17/23 08/10/23 08/17/23 08/14/23 OFFICE C:DIOR NAME GWarnick SIGNATURE /RA/
DATE 08/24/23


NOTICE OF VIOLATION Aerotest Operations, Inc. Docket No: 050-00228 Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor  License No: R-98 During an NRC inspection conducted on June 27, 2023, two violations of NRC requirements of greater than minor significance were identified. In a
Minor Violation Technical Specification 12.1.6 requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually. Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually.


REGION IV==
Violation A: Licensee Contentions and NRC Evaluation In a letter dated September 9, 2023 (ML23255A034), Aerotest disputed Violation A in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001. The Aerotest letter included 10 specific contentions which are documented and addressed below:
Docket No: 050-00228 License No: R-98 Report No: 050-00228/2023-001 Licensee: Aerotest Operations, Inc.
Licensee Contention 1:
There is no need to move fuel. There is not an "emergency situation" that would have AO move fuel from its current location; the safest and secure location for the fuel is the subterranean subcritical storage racks in the lower portion of the tank (wet or dry.)


Facility: Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
Enclosure
Location: 3455 Fostoria Way San Ramon, California Dates: June 27, 2023 Inspectors: Stephanie G. Anderson Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Michael M. LaFranzo Senior Health Physicist Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Jack D. Parrott Senior Project Manager Reactor Decommissioning Branch Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Accompanied By: Nathan A. Fuguet Health Physicist Reactor Decommissioning Branch Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Approved By: Gregory G. Warnick, Chief Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Operating Reactor Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security Enclosure 2


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Aerotest Operations, Inc.
NRC Contention 1 Evaluation:
The applicable license condition applies to more than just the need to move fuel. As cited in license condition 2.C.(4), Aerotest is required to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) Training and Requalification Program whenever in possession of TRIGA fuel elements.


NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 This U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspection was a routine, announced inspection of licensed activities being conducted at the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR)
Licensee Contention 2:
of Aerotest Operations, Inc. (licensee). The inspectors identified two Severity Level IV violations, one minor violation, and opened one unresolved item. Other than the identified violations and the one unresolved item, the licensee was conducting site activities in accordance with site procedures, license requirements, and applicable NRC regulations.
Since October 2019, AO has employed employees that meet the experience/qualifications as outlined in "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, 2. Experience/Qualifications.


Staffing and Audits The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with its technical specifications and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor Certified Fuel Handler training and requalification program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the technical specification requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually. (Section 1.2)
NRC Contention 2 Evaluation:
Radiological Surveys The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings.
Information reviewed showed there were Aerotest personnel with the experience and qualifications specified in Section 2 of ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. However, section 4 of the program requires individuals to complete an initial training program and pass a comprehensive final examination, and section 8 requires that associated training records be maintained until all fuel is shipped out of the facility and a CFH and CFH Supervisor are no longer needed. Information and records provided did not demonstrate that the referenced employees had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination.


One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration program. (Section 2.2)
Licensee Contention 3:
Emergency Preparedness The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercise and drills as required by the emergency plan and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with their emergency plan commitments. (Section 3.2)
AO was not aware of the "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, was approved or acceptable by the NRC until we received the NRC letter dated December 6, 2021. It would be impossible to have implemented and completed the training program on the December 6, 2021, date.


Report Details Summary of Plant Status On October 15, 2010, Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO or licensee), notified the NRC that they will voluntarily not operate the Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor (ARRR) reactor until further decisions were made concerning the ownership issue (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML103140289). By letter dated December 6, 2021, (ML21242A463), license amendment number 6 was issued, which revised Facility Operating License No. 98 and the associated technical specifications to remove the authority to operate ARRR, to authorize possession-only of the reactor and fuel, and removed all operational requirements not needed for possession-only status.
NRC Contention 3 Evaluation:
NRC agrees partially with this statement. Specifically, License Amendment No. 6 issued by letter dated December 6, 2021 (ML21242A463), stated, This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance. Therefore, the requirements outlined in Amendment 6 should have been implemented by January 5, 2022.


By letter dated July 20, 2021 (ML21230A304), and supplemented by letter dated January 20, 2022 (ML22025A200), the licensee submitted a license amendment to the NRC for approval of the Decommissioning Plan (DP) for ARRR. These submittals were made pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.82, Termination of license, paragraph (b)(1),
The NRC determined there was some level of awareness by Aerotest as License Amendment 6 was issued in response to the licensees license amendment request (LAR) dated March 21, 2019 (ML19084A051), as supplemented by letters dated: June 28, 2019 (ML19184A112);
which requires AO to apply for license termination within 2 years of permanently ceasing operations and that each application for termination of a license be accompanied or preceded by a proposed DP.
August 14, 2019 (ML19231A127); March 26, 2020 (three letters; ML20098D415, ML20097D279, and ML20134H946); June 8, 2020 (ML20175A676); July 28, 2020 (ML20220A422); August 28, 2020 (ML20248H460); September 28, 2020 (ML20276A247);
March 31, 2021 (ML21098A157); April 28, 2021 (ML21126A150); May 19, 2021 (ML21147A060); and June 22, 2021 (ML21181A123).


By letter dated April 11, 2022 (ML22098A092), the NRC accepted the amendment request application to perform the technical review to approve the proposed DP.
The NRC also communicated to Aerotest by e-mail dated November 23, 2021 (ML21328A197)
and informed the licensee of its plans for the approval in part and denial in part of the LAR; provided a draft of the approved revised ARRR license and technical specifications; and offered the opportunity for a teleconference to discuss the approval in part and denial in part of the LAR,


1 Staffing and Audits (IP 69002)
prior to the NRC staffs issuance of the approved license amendment. By e-mail dated December 2, 2021 (ML21337A330), the licensee indicated that a teleconference would not be necessary.
1.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed that the staffing was maintained and that required audits were conducted in accordance with the technical specification requirements.


1.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the licensees administrative requirements for staffing and audits as required by the site license and technical specifications (TSs) 12.0. The licensee organization was fully staffed except for a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and a CFH Supervisor.
Therefore, the NRC and the licensee have been in communication and the notice to implement the training/requalification program within the 30 days of issuance of the approved license amendment was not unreasonable or unforeseeable.


License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the CFH and CFH Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies. During review of the licensees organization chart and interviews with licensee personnel, the inspectors determined the licensee failed to implement the requirements of the ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program to have a qualified CFH and CFH Supervisor, this is considered a violation of Licensee Condition 2.C.(4) (VIO 050-00228/2023001-01).
During this review, the NRC identified the need to change the beginning date of the noncompliance from December 6, 2021, to January 5, 2022.


The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor safeguards committee requirements and verified the licensee maintained at least five members, of whom no more than three are members of AO. The licensees records indicated that the reactor safeguards committee consisted of five members, of which two were outside of AO. The requirements further state that the committee shall meet on the call of the chairman and they shall meet at least annually. The inspectors reviewed the committee meeting records and determined that the committee did meet annually in 2018, 2019, 2020, and January and December of 2022. The committee was not able to meet annually in 2021, but the committee did meet in January 2022 to review the 2021 activities. Technical Specification 12.1.6 requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually.
Licensee Contention 4:
The ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, "4. Initial Training Program" does not express a specific time for the initial training program to be completed. After initial CFH training, the requalification program would be biennial.


Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a minor violation of TS 12.1.6.
NRC Contention 4 Evaluation:
License Amendment 6 replaced the requirements for senior reactor operator/reactor operators with the requirement to have a CFH Supervisor and CFH in accordance with the approved training/requalification program. Therefore, as the licensee is in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, the program required by license condition 2.C.(4) was to be implemented by January 5, 2021, with the qualified CHF Supervisor and CHF in place as required by Technical Specifications 12.1.3 and 12.1.5, respectively.


1.3 Conclusions The licensee maintained staffing requirements in accordance with the TSs and completed the required audits, with two exceptions. The inspectors identified a violation of license requirements associated with the requirements to implement the ARRR CFH Training and Requalification Program. The inspectors also identified a minor violation of the TS requirement for the reactor safeguards committee to meet annually.
Licensee Contention 5:
In an October 1, 2019, letter to the NRC, AO informed the NRC that Christopher E. Bauman was no longer employed by AO and requested that his Senior Operator License be terminated.


2 Radiological Surveys (IP 69002)
It also stated that under David M. Slaughters supervision, Fuel handling after the adaptation of the new license and tech spec would be handled by Mitch Wilkerson; He has over 20 years of experience using AO fuel handling tools.
2.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed if required radiological surveys were performed in accordance with approved licensee procedures.


2.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the licensees radiological survey program as required by the site license and TS 12.2. The licensee had procedures associated with the radiological survey program.
NRC Contention 5 Evaluation:
While Mitch Wilkerson had the experience and qualifications to be placed within the training/qualification program, there was no evidence provided that demonstrate that he had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination per ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021.


During the inspection, the inspectors reviewed the licensees survey meter calibration program associated with portable gamma and neutron detectors. The licensee demonstrated the calibration program with a portable neutron survey instrument used by the licensee detected approximately 150 mrem/hr on the surface of a neutron source and the expected reading was 102 mrem/hr. Technical Specification 12.2.1.2 states, in part, detailed written procedures shall be provided and followed for normal operation of all systems and components involving nuclear safety at ARRR facility. Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures, dated January 5, 2021, section 3.c.II.4 titled Neutron Monitor states, in part, that if a meter is more than 20 percent off expected readings, route the survey meter to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair. Technical specification in Table 1 defines a Portable Neutron Survey Instrument as a system. A review of calibration records for 2022 and 2023 showed that the neutron meter had detected approximately 150 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102 mrem, a difference of approximately 47 percent. The licensee stated that the neutron survey meter was appropriately calibrated as the radiation readings were consistent with past measurements. However, the calibration records for
Licensee Contention 6:
AOs April 27, 2023, organizational chart shows that Malcolm McCarthy is listed as the Fuel Handling Supervisor. The organizational chart was shown to the NRC lead inspector.


January 5, 2021, were approximately 125 mrem/hr while the expected reading was 102, a difference of approximately 22.5 percent.
NRC Contention 6 Evaluation:
Records reviewed failed to demonstrate that Malcolm McCarthy had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination per ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021.


Although the values read were more than 20 percent of the expected reading, the neutron survey instrument was not adjusted and/or sent for repair. Failure of the licensee to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings is a violation of TS 12.2.1.2 (VIO 050-00228/2023001-02). The licensee committed to send the neutron meter for repairs to an appropriate contractor that could adjust and/or repair the instrument.
Licensee Contention 7:
Technical Specification 11.6 CFH or CFH Supervisor does not need to be at the facility on a daily basis. They are only required when there is a transfer/movement of fuel.


In addition, the inspectors identified an unresolved item (URI 050-00228/2023001-003)
NRC Contention 7 Evaluation:
regarding the licensees calibration program. Procedure Instrument Calibration Instruction - Safety Procedures references the use of NIST-traceable source for the calibration of radiation detection instrumentation. A selected review of the NIST-traceable source records indicated that the sources have Certificate of Calibration dates for Thorium-230, Cesium-137, and Strontium/Yttrium-90 of December 15, 1989, January 3, 1990, and December 19, 1989, respectively. Within the Thorium-230 and Strontium/Yttrium-90 Certificate of Calibration record is a statement that it is recommended that the source be recertified on an annual basis. Industry standards regarding the certification of accuracy for NIST-traceable sources is typically one year.
The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, rather than the schedule for when the CFH or CFH Supervisor need to be at the facility.


However, the sources referenced above have calibration dates that exceed 30 years and, in discussions with the licensee, these sources had not been recertified pursuant to the recommendations on the Certificate of Calibration. The NRC has questioned the accuracy of the NIST-traceable sources, barring radioactive decay, over such a long period of time beyond recommended recertification. This unresolved item remains under NRC review.
Licensee Contention 8:
Technical Specification 11.4 "The transfer of irradiated fuel in the reactor tank, storage pits and facility shall be conducted by a minimum staff of two; a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and an additional person trained in radiation safety."


2.3 Conclusions The licensee performed the required radiological surveys in accordance with approved licensee procedures, with one exception. The inspectors identified a violation of the licensees failure to send the neutron survey instrument to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repairs when the meter was more than 20 percent off expected readings. One unresolved item was identified by the inspectors related to the licensees calibration program.
NRC Contention 8 Evaluation:
The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, rather than the minimum staff required to conduct irradiated fuel transfer operations.


3 Emergency Preparedness (IP 69002)
Licensee Contention 9:
3.1 Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed if the licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the emergency plan and if the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with the emergency plan commitments.
The "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021. "3.1. CFH Supervisor - The CFH Supervisor is a non-licensed operator who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the NRC. They will supervise other CFHs and perform CFH duties." Since the CFH Supervisor can perform CFH duties, and 1 CFH is required per technical 11.4, we dont necessarily need an additional employee as a CFH.


3.2 Observations and Findings The inspectors reviewed the requirements of Section III of the licensees procedures entitled General Emergency and Emergency Plan, dated as last reviewed by the licensee on April 27, 2023, and the Emergency Plan for Possession Only dated June 30, 2021. Specifically evaluated were completion of emergency preparedness exercises and drills and emergency preparedness training and interaction with offsite agencies that may be needed to assist in a radiological emergency.
NRC Contention 9 Evaluation:
The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements. Technical Specifications 12.1.3 and 12.1.5, respectively, discuss the roles and responsibilities of the CHF Supervisor and CHF.


The licensee had established emergency action levels in both the General Emergency and Emergency Plan procedure and the Emergency Plan (EP). The inspectors verified that, per the EP, unannounced emergency drills were held on a twice-yearly basis and that there is a monthly test of the various automatic alarms associated with an emergency (fire, earthquake resulting in damage to the fuel storage pool, bomb threat, and reactor tank rupture). The inspectors verified that the emergency alarm system is continuously monitored and that the alarm company monitors unauthorized entry, fire, and radiation. The alarm company has instructions to notify pre-designated ARRR personnel, the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and local law enforcement. The inspectors also verified that annual refresher training of personnel with emergency response responsibilities had been conducted within the last year, that drills, as required by the EP, had been conducted twice yearly, and that a company vehicle was available to transport contaminated personnel to the designated medical facility.
Licensee Contention 10:
AO has not moved any fuel since October 1, 2019; AO will complete the initial training before any fuel is moved.


Two outside agencies are required by the EP to be notified in event of an emergency requiring offsite assistance: the San Ramon Valley Fire Protection District and the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center in Pleasanton, CA. The inspectors verified that the fire protection district personnel had visited the facility in the last year as part of an annual inspection and interacted with the Radiation Safety Officer who is the alternate Emergency Coordinator in the case of a radiological emergency. The inspectors verified that the licensee had contacted the Stanford Health Care Tri-Valley Medical Center and had a signed agreement with them to admit radiation-exposed or contaminated individuals requiring medical treatment. That agreement had been renewed on May 23, 2023. In addition, the inspectors verified that the licensee had identified the NRC on the notification list of agencies to be contacted in the event of a facility emergency.
NRC Contention 10 Evaluation:
License condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and


3.3 Conclusions The licensee completed emergency preparedness exercises and drills as required by the EP and the licensee completed emergency preparedness training in accordance with its EP commitments.
Requalification Program. The training/requalification program was required to be implemented by January 5, 2022, as Aerotest was in possession of TRIGA fuel elements.


4 Exit Meeting Summary On July 13, 2023, the NRC inspectors presented the final inspection results to the Dr.
NRC Conclusion and Revised Violation A As a result of the evaluation above, the NRC will be revising Violation A in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 as follows:
NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to License Condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.


David M. Slaughter, President. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary information. No proprietary information was identified.
Contrary to the above, from January 5, 2022, through June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies.


SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee D. Slaughter, President and Reactor Administrator T. Richey, Radiological Safety Officer T. Holt, Radiation Safety Analyst M. McCarthy, Nuclear Analyst K. Reichert, Office Manager INSPECTION PROCEDURE IP 69002 Class III Research and Test Reactors ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000228/2023001-001 VIO Failure to implement the ARRR CFH Training and Requalification Program. (Section 1.2)
Minor Violation: Licensee Contention and NRC Evaluation In a letter dated September 9, 2023 (ML23255A036), Aerotest disputed the minor violation in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001.
05000228/2023001-002 VIO Failure to route a neutron monitor to the electronics shop for adjustment and/or repair if meter is more than 20% off expected readings. (Section 2.2)
05000228/2023001-003 URI NIST-Traceable sources recertification. (Section 2.2)
Closed None Discussed None LIST OF ACRONYMS ADAMS Agency Documents Access and Management Systems AO Aerotest Operations, Inc.


ARRR Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor CFH Certified Fuel Handler CFR Code of Federal Regulations DP Decommissioning Plan EP Emergency Plan NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NOV Notice of Violation POL Possession-Only License TRIGA Training, Research, Isotopes, General Atomic TS Technical Specification URI Unresolved Item VIO Violation 7
Licensee Contention:
Aerotest Operations followed the annual meeting requirement. 10 CFR 36.2 defines Annually to mean either (1) at intervals not to exceed 1 year or (2) once per year, at about the same time each year (plus or minus 1 month). The language "about the same time each year" suggests that there is some leeway in the meeting timing. The definition also suggests a time variation as shown in parenthesis of "plus or minus one month." Given this definition, it is possible to have a meeting in 2022 covering the activities of 2021. The NRC lead inspector and inspector's supervisor (as reported in the 8/13/2023 exit meeting) were unaware of the second part of the definition which contributed to their erroneous conclusion.
 
NRC Contention Evaluation:
Aerotest is not a 10 CFR Part 36 license holder; the NRC understands that the licensee was using this as an example of periodicity language in the CFR to demonstrate potential leeway.
 
The NRC determined it was 409 days between meetings, as Reactor Safeguards Meetings were held December 8, 2020, and January 21, 2022, such that the time between meetings exceeded an annual timeframe and no meeting was held in calendar year 2021. There is no additional precedent or language to grant further leeway in this situation. There is no documented evidence to show that the required meeting was held within the annual time period as required under Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5.
 
During the NRC review, it was identified that the administrative requirements section of technical specification numbering changed from Amendment 5 to Amendment 6, which became effective December 6, 2021, and had to be implemented by January 5, 2022. Specifically, the annual meeting requirement was Technical Specification 12.1.3 during the period of noncompliance, January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021. The annual meeting requirement changed to Technical Specification 12.1.6 with full implementation of Amendment 6 on January 5, 2022.
 
NRC Conclusion and Revised Minor Violation As a result of the evaluation above, the NRC will be revising the minor violation in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 as follows:
Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5 required, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually. Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a minor violation of Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5.
 
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Latest revision as of 15:48, 15 February 2024

NRC Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001, Disputed Cited Violation and Minor Violation Revised, EA-23-118
ML24025A167
Person / Time
Site: Aerotest
Issue date: 02/05/2024
From: Tamara Bloomer
NRC/RGN-IV/DRSS
To: Slaughter D
Aerotest
References
EA-23-118 IR 2023001
Download: ML24025A167 (9)


Text

February 5, 2024

SUBJECT:

AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC. - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00228/2023-001, DISPUTED CITED VIOLATION AND MINOR VIOLATION REVISED

Dear David Slaughter:

This letter responds to your letters dated September 9, 2023 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession Nos. ML23255A034 and ML23255A036). In your letters you provided written responses to the August 24, 2023, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 (ML23219A188) disputing one of the violations and the minor violation. The inspection report documented a violation associated with the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program. The inspection report also described a minor violation that involved the failure of the Reactor Safeguards Committee to meet at least annually. On October 13, 2023 (ML23285A171), the NRC acknowledged receipt of your letters.

The NRC conducted a detailed review of your responses and the applicable regulatory requirements consistent with Part I, Section 2.8 of the NRC Enforcement Manual. The review included staff who were not involved in the original inspection effort. The details of the NRCs evaluation are contained in the enclosure.

After consideration of the basis for your dispute of the subject report violations, the NRC concluded that the original violations remained valid. However, the staff revised the cited violation to enhance its clarity and modified the dates of noncompliance. The NRC also revised the minor violation to correct the reference to the technical specification requirement in place during the period of the noncompliance. The modified language for the violations is provided in the enclosure. The NRC will reissue Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 to document the revised violations.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Agency Rules of Practice and Procedure, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room and from the NRCs ADAMS, accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy or proprietary information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact Greg Warnick of my staff at 817-200-1249 or at Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Signed by Bloomer, Tamara on 02/05/24 Tamara Bloomer, Director Division of Radiological Safety and Security Docket No. 050-00228 License No. R-98 Enclosure:

NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response to a Notice of Violation

ML24025A167 SUNSI Review: ADAMS: Non-Publicly Available Non-Sensitive Keyword:

By: ACR Yes No Publicly Available Sensitive NRC-002 OFFICE SHP:DIOR TL:ACES C:DIOR RC NMSS NAME TJohnson JGroom GWarnick DCylkowski MBurgess SIGNATURE /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E /RA/ E DATE 01/23/24 01/29/24 01/25/24 01/29/24 01/31/24 OFFICE OE D:DRSS NAME DJones TBloomer SIGNATURE /RA/ E /RA/ E DATE 02/05/24 02/05/24

NRC Evaluation of Licensee Response to a Notice of Violation Restatement of Violation A and Minor Violation:

On August 24, 2023, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 and Notice of Violation (Notice) to Aerotest Operations, Inc., (AO, Aerotest, or licensee) Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS)

Accession No. ML23219A188. Violation A and the minor violation documented in the inspection report, are restated below:

Violation A NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.

Contrary to the above, from December 6, 2021, to June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to have a qualified Certified Fuel Handler and a qualified Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor and implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR [Aerotest Radiography and Research Reactor] CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies.

Minor Violation Technical Specification 12.1.6 requires, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually. Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually.

Violation A: Licensee Contentions and NRC Evaluation In a letter dated September 9, 2023 (ML23255A034), Aerotest disputed Violation A in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001. The Aerotest letter included 10 specific contentions which are documented and addressed below:

Licensee Contention 1:

There is no need to move fuel. There is not an "emergency situation" that would have AO move fuel from its current location; the safest and secure location for the fuel is the subterranean subcritical storage racks in the lower portion of the tank (wet or dry.)

Enclosure

NRC Contention 1 Evaluation:

The applicable license condition applies to more than just the need to move fuel. As cited in license condition 2.C.(4), Aerotest is required to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) Training and Requalification Program whenever in possession of TRIGA fuel elements.

Licensee Contention 2:

Since October 2019, AO has employed employees that meet the experience/qualifications as outlined in "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, 2. Experience/Qualifications.

NRC Contention 2 Evaluation:

Information reviewed showed there were Aerotest personnel with the experience and qualifications specified in Section 2 of ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. However, section 4 of the program requires individuals to complete an initial training program and pass a comprehensive final examination, and section 8 requires that associated training records be maintained until all fuel is shipped out of the facility and a CFH and CFH Supervisor are no longer needed. Information and records provided did not demonstrate that the referenced employees had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination.

Licensee Contention 3:

AO was not aware of the "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, was approved or acceptable by the NRC until we received the NRC letter dated December 6, 2021. It would be impossible to have implemented and completed the training program on the December 6, 2021, date.

NRC Contention 3 Evaluation:

NRC agrees partially with this statement. Specifically, License Amendment No. 6 issued by letter dated December 6, 2021 (ML21242A463), stated, This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance. Therefore, the requirements outlined in Amendment 6 should have been implemented by January 5, 2022.

The NRC determined there was some level of awareness by Aerotest as License Amendment 6 was issued in response to the licensees license amendment request (LAR) dated March 21, 2019 (ML19084A051), as supplemented by letters dated: June 28, 2019 (ML19184A112);

August 14, 2019 (ML19231A127); March 26, 2020 (three letters; ML20098D415, ML20097D279, and ML20134H946); June 8, 2020 (ML20175A676); July 28, 2020 (ML20220A422); August 28, 2020 (ML20248H460); September 28, 2020 (ML20276A247);

March 31, 2021 (ML21098A157); April 28, 2021 (ML21126A150); May 19, 2021 (ML21147A060); and June 22, 2021 (ML21181A123).

The NRC also communicated to Aerotest by e-mail dated November 23, 2021 (ML21328A197)

and informed the licensee of its plans for the approval in part and denial in part of the LAR; provided a draft of the approved revised ARRR license and technical specifications; and offered the opportunity for a teleconference to discuss the approval in part and denial in part of the LAR,

prior to the NRC staffs issuance of the approved license amendment. By e-mail dated December 2, 2021 (ML21337A330), the licensee indicated that a teleconference would not be necessary.

Therefore, the NRC and the licensee have been in communication and the notice to implement the training/requalification program within the 30 days of issuance of the approved license amendment was not unreasonable or unforeseeable.

During this review, the NRC identified the need to change the beginning date of the noncompliance from December 6, 2021, to January 5, 2022.

Licensee Contention 4:

The ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021, "4. Initial Training Program" does not express a specific time for the initial training program to be completed. After initial CFH training, the requalification program would be biennial.

NRC Contention 4 Evaluation:

License Amendment 6 replaced the requirements for senior reactor operator/reactor operators with the requirement to have a CFH Supervisor and CFH in accordance with the approved training/requalification program. Therefore, as the licensee is in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, the program required by license condition 2.C.(4) was to be implemented by January 5, 2021, with the qualified CHF Supervisor and CHF in place as required by Technical Specifications 12.1.3 and 12.1.5, respectively.

Licensee Contention 5:

In an October 1, 2019, letter to the NRC, AO informed the NRC that Christopher E. Bauman was no longer employed by AO and requested that his Senior Operator License be terminated.

It also stated that under David M. Slaughters supervision, Fuel handling after the adaptation of the new license and tech spec would be handled by Mitch Wilkerson; He has over 20 years of experience using AO fuel handling tools.

NRC Contention 5 Evaluation:

While Mitch Wilkerson had the experience and qualifications to be placed within the training/qualification program, there was no evidence provided that demonstrate that he had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination per ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021.

Licensee Contention 6:

AOs April 27, 2023, organizational chart shows that Malcolm McCarthy is listed as the Fuel Handling Supervisor. The organizational chart was shown to the NRC lead inspector.

NRC Contention 6 Evaluation:

Records reviewed failed to demonstrate that Malcolm McCarthy had completed the initial training program and passed a comprehensive final examination per ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021.

Licensee Contention 7:

Technical Specification 11.6 CFH or CFH Supervisor does not need to be at the facility on a daily basis. They are only required when there is a transfer/movement of fuel.

NRC Contention 7 Evaluation:

The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, rather than the schedule for when the CFH or CFH Supervisor need to be at the facility.

Licensee Contention 8:

Technical Specification 11.4 "The transfer of irradiated fuel in the reactor tank, storage pits and facility shall be conducted by a minimum staff of two; a Certified Fuel Handler (CFH) and an additional person trained in radiation safety."

NRC Contention 8 Evaluation:

The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements, rather than the minimum staff required to conduct irradiated fuel transfer operations.

Licensee Contention 9:

The "ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program," dated March 30, 2021. "3.1. CFH Supervisor - The CFH Supervisor is a non-licensed operator who has qualified in accordance with a fuel handler training program approved by the NRC. They will supervise other CFHs and perform CFH duties." Since the CFH Supervisor can perform CFH duties, and 1 CFH is required per technical 11.4, we dont necessarily need an additional employee as a CFH.

NRC Contention 9 Evaluation:

The violation is in regard to the failure to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements. Technical Specifications 12.1.3 and 12.1.5, respectively, discuss the roles and responsibilities of the CHF Supervisor and CHF.

Licensee Contention 10:

AO has not moved any fuel since October 1, 2019; AO will complete the initial training before any fuel is moved.

NRC Contention 10 Evaluation:

License condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and

Requalification Program. The training/requalification program was required to be implemented by January 5, 2022, as Aerotest was in possession of TRIGA fuel elements.

NRC Conclusion and Revised Violation A As a result of the evaluation above, the NRC will be revising Violation A in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 as follows:

NRC License R-98, Amendment 6, License Condition 2.C.(4), states, in part, that whenever the licensee possesses TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to License Condition 2.B.(2), the licensee shall maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program.

Contrary to the above, from January 5, 2022, through June 27, 2023, the licensee failed to maintain in effect and fully implement all provisions of the NRC-approved Certified Fuel Handler Training and Requalification Program when in possession of TRIGA fuel elements pursuant to license condition 2.B.(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to implement the approved program consistent with the document entitled ARRR CFH Training/Requalification Program, dated March 30, 2021. The document states the qualification, training, and retraining of the Certified Fuel Handler and Certified Fuel Handler Supervisor provides an appropriate level of oversight commensurate with the reduced risks and relative simplicity of the facility systems needed for safe storage of spent fuel, including the safe handling and storage of spent fuel, and response to plant emergencies.

Minor Violation: Licensee Contention and NRC Evaluation In a letter dated September 9, 2023 (ML23255A036), Aerotest disputed the minor violation in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001.

Licensee Contention:

Aerotest Operations followed the annual meeting requirement. 10 CFR 36.2 defines Annually to mean either (1) at intervals not to exceed 1 year or (2) once per year, at about the same time each year (plus or minus 1 month). The language "about the same time each year" suggests that there is some leeway in the meeting timing. The definition also suggests a time variation as shown in parenthesis of "plus or minus one month." Given this definition, it is possible to have a meeting in 2022 covering the activities of 2021. The NRC lead inspector and inspector's supervisor (as reported in the 8/13/2023 exit meeting) were unaware of the second part of the definition which contributed to their erroneous conclusion.

NRC Contention Evaluation:

Aerotest is not a 10 CFR Part 36 license holder; the NRC understands that the licensee was using this as an example of periodicity language in the CFR to demonstrate potential leeway.

The NRC determined it was 409 days between meetings, as Reactor Safeguards Meetings were held December 8, 2020, and January 21, 2022, such that the time between meetings exceeded an annual timeframe and no meeting was held in calendar year 2021. There is no additional precedent or language to grant further leeway in this situation. There is no documented evidence to show that the required meeting was held within the annual time period as required under Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5.

During the NRC review, it was identified that the administrative requirements section of technical specification numbering changed from Amendment 5 to Amendment 6, which became effective December 6, 2021, and had to be implemented by January 5, 2022. Specifically, the annual meeting requirement was Technical Specification 12.1.3 during the period of noncompliance, January 1, 2021, through December 31, 2021. The annual meeting requirement changed to Technical Specification 12.1.6 with full implementation of Amendment 6 on January 5, 2022.

NRC Conclusion and Revised Minor Violation As a result of the evaluation above, the NRC will be revising the minor violation in Inspection Report 050-00228/2023-001 as follows:

Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5 required, in part, that the Reactor Safeguards Committee shall meet at least annually. Contrary to the above, in 2021, the Reactor Safeguards Committee failed to meet at least annually. Since the committee met in January 2022, the NRC considered this a minor violation of Technical Specification 12.1.3, Amendment 5.

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