05000346/FIN-2011005-03: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = A Wilson, D Kimble, J Cameron, J Neurauter, J Steffes, L Jones, M Holmberg, M Mitchell, P Cardona, | | Inspector = A Wilson, D Kimble, J Cameron, J Neurauter, J Steffes, L Jones, M Holmberg, M Mitchell, P Cardona Morales, P Smagacz, T Briley, T Go | ||
| CCA = H.7 | | CCA = H.7 | ||
| INPO aspect = WP.3 | | INPO aspect = WP.3 | ||
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1(a) were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain technically adequate procedures to cover the restoration (i.e., filling and venting) of the component cooling water (CCW) system following maintenance activities. Specifically, a complex series of fill and venting evolutions to restore the system had been required following extensive maintenance activities; these evolutions did not ensure that all the air was vented from the system, such that later ultrasonic testing performed by the licensee identified a significant air void, approximately 19 cubic feet, in a CCW pump 3 horizontal suction piping segment. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as CRs 2011-05542 and 2011-05831. The finding was determined to be of more than minor safety significance because the issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality, and had adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, CCW, a mitigating system, had its reliability adversely impacted by the lack of appropriate fill and venting procedural guidance. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Because the finding involved reactor shutdown operations and conditions, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process - Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs. Since the finding was associated with an issue that occurred during the time the licensee was conducting RCS fill and venting activities and plant conditions were in transition, the inspectors consulted both Checklist 2, PWR Cold Shutdown Operation: RCS Closed and Steam Generators Available for Decay Heat Removal (Loops Filled and Inventory in the Pressurizer); Time to Boiling Less Than 2 Hours, and Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation: RCS Open and Refueling Cavity Level Less Than 23 Feet or RCS Closed and No Inventory in the Pressurizer; Time to Boiling Less Than 2 Hours. The inspectors determined that the finding did not adversely impact any shutdown defense-in-depth or mitigation attributes on either checklist, nor did it meet any of the checklist specific requirements for a Phase 2 or Phase 3 SDP analysis. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensees procedures and guidance for the restoration of the CCW system following outage maintenance activities did not ensure that the system was fully filled and properly vented prior to operation. | | description = A finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1(a) were identified by the inspectors for the licensees failure to establish, implement, and maintain technically adequate procedures to cover the restoration (i.e., filling and venting) of the component cooling water (CCW) system following maintenance activities. Specifically, a complex series of fill and venting evolutions to restore the system had been required following extensive maintenance activities; these evolutions did not ensure that all the air was vented from the system, such that later ultrasonic testing performed by the licensee identified a significant air void, approximately 19 cubic feet, in a CCW pump 3 horizontal suction piping segment. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP as CRs 2011-05542 and 2011-05831. The finding was determined to be of more than minor safety significance because the issue was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality, and had adversely affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, CCW, a mitigating system, had its reliability adversely impacted by the lack of appropriate fill and venting procedural guidance. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Because the finding involved reactor shutdown operations and conditions, the inspectors transitioned to IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process - Phase 1 Operational Checklists for Both PWRs and BWRs. Since the finding was associated with an issue that occurred during the time the licensee was conducting RCS fill and venting activities and plant conditions were in transition, the inspectors consulted both Checklist 2, PWR Cold Shutdown Operation: RCS Closed and Steam Generators Available for Decay Heat Removal (Loops Filled and Inventory in the Pressurizer); Time to Boiling Less Than 2 Hours, and Checklist 3, PWR Cold Shutdown and Refueling Operation: RCS Open and Refueling Cavity Level Less Than 23 Feet or RCS Closed and No Inventory in the Pressurizer; Time to Boiling Less Than 2 Hours. The inspectors determined that the finding did not adversely impact any shutdown defense-in-depth or mitigation attributes on either checklist, nor did it meet any of the checklist specific requirements for a Phase 2 or Phase 3 SDP analysis. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Resources component, because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the licensees procedures and guidance for the restoration of the CCW system following outage maintenance activities did not ensure that the system was fully filled and properly vented prior to operation. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:43, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Davis Besse  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000346/2011005 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Wilson D Kimble J Cameron J Neurauter J Steffes L Jones M Holmberg M Mitchell P Cardona Morales P Smagacz T Briley T Go |
| CCA | H.7, Documentation |
| INPO aspect | WP.3 |
| ' | |