ML092090773: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Z 0:: (l)" en -c (l) (l)-c ESc en (l)--0:: CO RI
{{#Wiki_filter:Cf)~
Z 0::     (l)
"   ~  en Cf)~
-c (l)
(l)-c E
,--0 0
S c c      0
.:::t::.-C en     (l)
-- en 0:: co CO
 
RI lSI
 
===Background===
* RBS Submittal dated June 16, 2009
* RBS Submittal dated June 16, 2009
* Requested approval date -December 2010
* Requested approval date - December 2010
* RF-16 begins early 2011
* RF-16 begins early 2011
* RI lSI Relief Requests based upon Case N-716 have a common
* RI lSI Relief Requests based upon Code Case N-716 have a common template
* Submittal template based upon Grand pilot submittal dated September 22, RI
* Submittal template based upon Grand Gulf pilot submittal dated September 22, 2006
 
RI lSI
 
===Background===
* Used prior submittals as guidance in development of RBS submittal
* Used prior submittals as guidance in development of RBS submittal
* Followed Regulatory Guide 1.200 1  
* Followed Regulatory Guide 1.200 Revision 1 guidance
-GAPs  
  - GAPs identified
-Applicable GAPs RI
  - Applicable GAPs addressed
* Submittal consists of the following  
 
-Risk Methodology based on Code Case -Risk information  
RI lSI
-PRA Model Capability
 
* Performed Internal Flooding Analysis in support of submittal RI Reviewed Risk Model for this use in accordance with current guidance Determined Risk Model acceptable for use in RI lSI Applications
===Background===
* Assisted by industry-recognized subject -experience with many RI lSI Implemented latest industry guidance
* Submittal consists of the following sections
* Compared with other RI lSI submittals Incorporated lessons learned from RAls River Bend Station
  - Risk Methodology based on Code Case N 716
* Developed in response to GL 88-20 (I
  - Risk information included
  - PRA Model Capability addressed
* Performed Internal Flooding Analysis in support of submittal
 
RI lSI
 
===Background===
* Reviewed Risk Model for this use in accordance with current guidance
* Determined Risk Model acceptable for use in RI lSI Applications
* Assisted by industry-recognized subject matter experts
  - experience with many RI lSI submittals
* Implemented latest industry guidance
* Compared with other RI lSI submittals
* Incorporated lessons learned from RAls
 
River Bend Station PRA
 
===Background===
* Developed in response to GL 88-20 (I PE)
* IPE approved via Oct. '97 NRC Staff Evaluation
* IPE approved via Oct. '97 NRC Staff Evaluation
* Used in support of various risk-informed License Amendment Requests River Bend Station
* Used in support of various risk-informed License Amendment Requests
* Last Full RBS PRA Revision 4 Sept. 2005
 
* Revision 5 update: Scheduled completion  
River Bend Station PRA
-Dec. 2010 PRA Gap
 
===Background===
* Last Full RBS PRA Revision: Revision 4 Sept. 2005
* Revision 5 update: Scheduled completion
  - Dec. 2010
 
PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis
* Performed Self-Assessment cons*istent with RG 1.200 R.1 Section 4.1 in late 2008
* Performed Self-Assessment cons*istent with RG 1.200 R.1 Section 4.1 in late 2008
* Assessed against RG 1.200 Rev.1 and ASME PRA Standard PRA Gap
* Assessed against RG 1.200 Rev.1 and ASME PRA Standard
* Used industry expertise in Gap
 
* Entergy lead for Internal Flooding and Maintenance/Update elements Internal Flooding PRA performed to meet ASME Cat. II PRA Gap
PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis
* Gap: All items where any work required meet RG 1.200 characterized as
* Used industry expertise in Gap analysis
* Self-assessment grading consistent with RG 1.200 Section 2.1 expectations PRA Gap Analysis
* Entergy lead for Internal Flooding and Maintenance/Update elements
* Gaps to RG 1.200 identified in submittal  
  - Internal Flooding PRA performed to meet ASME Cat. II
-Consistent with RG 1.174 -Consistent with Vogtle Per RG 1.174 section 2.2.6: "There are, however, some applications that, because of the nature of the proposed change, have a limited impact on risk, and this is reflected in the impact on the elements of the risk model. An example is risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI).
 
In this application, risk significance was used as one criterion for selecting pipe segments to be periodically examined for cracking.
PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis
During the staff review it became clear that a high level of emphasis on PRA technical acceptability was not necessary.
* Gap: All items where any work required to meet RG 1.200 characterized as "gaps"
* Self-assessment grading consistent with RG 1.200 Section 2.1 expectations
 
PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis
* Gaps to RG 1.200 identified in submittal
  - Consistent with RG 1.174
  - Consistent with Vogtle
 
PRA Quality Per RG 1.174 section 2.2.6:
  "There are, however, some applications that, because of the nature of the proposed change, have a limited impact on risk, and this is reflected in the impact on the elements of the risk model.
An example is risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI). In this application, risk significance was used as one criterion for selecting pipe segments to be periodically examined for cracking. During the staff review it became clear that a high level of emphasis on PRA technical acceptability was not necessary.
Therefore, the staff review of plant-specific RI-ISI typically will include only a limited scope review of PRA technical acceptability. "
Therefore, the staff review of plant-specific RI-ISI typically will include only a limited scope review of PRA technical acceptability. "
Quality
 
* N-716 RI lSI less reliant on PRA other RI lSI approaches -Binning before  
PRA Quality
-PRA one of 5  
* N-716 RI lSI less reliant on PRA than other RI lSI approaches  
-Absolute risk
  - Binning before selection
* N-716 criteria -CDF of 1 E-06, LERF of 1 E-07 -Degradation Mechanisms
  - PRA one of 5 elements
  - Absolute risk ranking
* N-716 criteria
  - CDF of 1E-06, LERF of 1E-07
  - Degradation Mechanisms
 
PRA Self-Assessment
* Self-Assessment performed to identify all work to meet RG 1.200, including Cat. II, for other future risk-informed applications
* Self-Assessment performed to identify all work to meet RG 1.200, including Cat. II, for other future risk-informed applications
* For RBS RG 1.200 Gap Analysis:  
* For RBS RG 1.200 Gap Analysis:
-Of the 72 Supporting Requirements (SR) with identified gaps, 7 SR's have different requirements for Cat. I vs. Cat. II.
  - Of the 72 Supporting Requirements (SR) with identified gaps, 7 SR's have different requirements for Cat. I vs. Cat. II.
Gap
 
* Breakdown of gaps: -40 gaps: Documentation Issues -13 gaps: Need not be met (per EPRI) mostly uncertainty issues, would not Impact RI lSI. -10 gaps: Model refinements potentially needed but not significant for RI lSI
PRA Gap Analysis
* Breakdown of gaps:
  - 40 gaps: Documentation Issues
  - 13 gaps: Need not be met (per EPRI) mostly uncertainty issues, would not Impact RI lSI.
  - 10 gaps: Model refinements potentially needed but not significant for RI lSI
* 6 gaps (9 items): Model refinements or sensitivity studies. Addressed in Table 2 of submittal.
* 6 gaps (9 items): Model refinements or sensitivity studies. Addressed in Table 2 of submittal.
* Internal Flooding PRA completed June 2009 --meets Cat. II requirements
 
PRA Inputs
* Internal Flooding PRA completed June 2009
  --meets Cat. II requirements
* Two cases quantified:
* Two cases quantified:
* Base: EPRI pipe break frequencies
* Base: EPRI pipe break frequencies
* Sensitivity (Conservative, used for N-716 screening)
* Sensitivity (Conservative, used for N-716 screening)
* Used IFPRA to assess CDF E-06) and LERF E-07) for segments considered conservative due to assumptions  
 
& conservative simplifications due to scope
PRA Inputs
* Used PRA to confirm and provide upper limit CCDP/CLERP values in N-716 risk impact assessment Compared risk impact results to guidance of RG1.174
* Used IFPRA to assess CDF (~1 E-06) and LERF (~1 E-07) for segments considered conservative due to assumptions &
* Addressed potentially applicable gaps in Table 2 of June 16 submittal  
conservative simplifications due to scope
--includes sensitivity studies
* Used PRA to confirm and provide upper limit CCDP/CLERP values in N-716 risk impact assessment
* Entered all gaps into Model Change Request (MCR) database to address in Revision 5 to RBS model Controlled procedurally by common Entergy process
  - Compared risk impact results to guidance of RG1.174
 
PRA Inputs
* Addressed potentially applicable gaps in Table 2 of June 16 submittal
  --includes sensitivity studies
* Entered all gaps into Model Change Request (MCR) database to address in Revision 5 to RBS model
  - Controlled procedurally by common Entergy process
 
PRA Conclusion
* Followed established process
* Followed established process
* Determined RBS PRA providing acceptable support / sufficient rigor for N-716 RIISI -Cat. II Internal Flooding PRA -Gaps to ASME Std. addressed, do not impact use for RI lSI
* Determined RBS PRA providing acceptable support / sufficient rigor for N-716 RIISI
------Q) () c co +-' c.. Q) << co co s.... ><Q) -c Z +-' c s.... Q)0 () c.+-' c.. 0 ..... en ->Q)co 0::: c.. 0)C) I--I
  -Cat. II Internal Flooding PRA
--I Q) <<+-' 0 I +-' (]) +-' -Cf)"'0 c \t---CJ) (]) +-'
  - Gaps to ASME Std. addressed, do not impact use for RI lSI
lSI I nterval
 
Q)
()
c co
+-'
c..
Q)
()
()
<<             co
()      co 0::    s....
Q)     --c><
Z     +-'
      --        c s.... Q) 0 ()             c.
+-'             c..
0 c            <<      .....
en
              ~
s....          >
co              Q) 0:::
c..           0)
E            C) 0            ~
I
()            ()
              -I
 
Q)
  >    -co co      L.
(])
C      +-'
C I.
Q)   --
+-'     Cf)
<< l.
        "'0 N
c I
0I    \t-O
+-'      C en    --0 Q)      CJ)
::J    c
(])
0    +-'
Q)    w 0:::
 
lSI Interval Extension
 
===Background===
* Previously extended lSI Interval to RF-15 for examination of 123 welds.
* Previously extended lSI Interval to RF-15 for examination of 123 welds.
* Projected exposure for these examinations  
* Projected exposure for these examinations
-17.83 Rem
  - 17.83 Rem
* RBS proposed to perform 73 examinations by startup from RF-15
* RBS proposed to perform 73 examinations by startup from RF-15
* Requested extension of lSI interval from RF-15 until RF-16 for remaining 50 examinations lSI Interval Exposure Projections
* Requested extension of lSI interval from RF-15 until RF-16 for remaining 50 examinations
 
lSI Interval Extension Exposure Projections
* Include weld prep time, RP, scaffolding, insulation support and NDE
* Include weld prep time, RP, scaffolding, insulation support and NDE
* Based upon current plant conditions, and crediting previous chemical cleaning, use of shielding and system flushing
* Based upon current plant conditions, and crediting previous chemical cleaning, use of shielding and system flushing
* Validated during RWP challenge process for RF-15 lSI Interval Result of Approval
* Validated during RWP challenge process for RF-15
* Extension results in completion of subject Examination Categories for Second lSI Interval by end of RF-15
 
* NOTE: Subject examinations greatly reduced under RI lSI requirements  
lSI Interval Extension Result of Approval
-123 examinations under conventional lSI program -14 examinations under RI lSI program lSI Interval Extension Examinations Result
* Extension results in ~90% completion of subject Examination Categories for Second lSI Interval by end of RF-15
* NOTE: Subject examinations greatly reduced under RI lSI requirements
  - 123 examinations under conventional lSI program
  - 14 examinations under RI lSI program
 
lSI Interval Extension Examinations Result
* 43 examinations deferred to RF-16 pending RI lSI approval (not required under RI lSI)
* 43 examinations deferred to RF-16 pending RI lSI approval (not required under RI lSI)
* 80 examinations performed during
* 80 examinations performed during RF-15
* No additional actions required when RI lSI submittal approved lSI Interval
* No additional actions required when RI lSI submittal approved
* Low significance for extension based on: -acceptable previous examination history -industry experience for failure probabilities  
 
-proposed RI lSI program indicates 43 welds would not require future examination
lSI Interval Extension Conclusions
* Excessive radiation exposure without a compensating increase in quality or safety
* Low significance for extension based on:
----0) u c co +-J U << o 0:: s....c o E o o Q) I 0') ()-I}}
  - acceptable previous examination history
  - industry experience for failure probabilities
  - proposed RI lSI program indicates 43 welds would not require future examination
* Excessive radiation exposure without a compensating increase in quality or safety
 
0) u c
co
+-J 0
0)
U U
o     .~
0::   Ci3 z~
co
.so c
s....
            \J C
o CJ)
Q) 0..
s....        0..
CO        <<
0          I 0')
E          o o          ~
o          ()
I
            --J}}

Latest revision as of 11:35, 12 March 2020

July 28, 2009 Meeting Slides from Entergy Operations(River Bend Station) to Discuss Ri ISI
ML092090773
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 07/28/2009
From:
Entergy Operations
To:
Plant Licensing Branch IV
References
TAC ME1507, TAC ME1508
Download: ML092090773 (27)


Text

Cf)~

Z 0:: (l)

" ~ en Cf)~

-c (l)

(l)-c E

,--0 0

S c c 0

.:::t::.-C en (l)

-- en 0:: co CO

RI lSI

Background

  • RBS Submittal dated June 16, 2009
  • Requested approval date - December 2010
  • RF-16 begins early 2011
  • Submittal template based upon Grand Gulf pilot submittal dated September 22, 2006

RI lSI

Background

  • Used prior submittals as guidance in development of RBS submittal

- GAPs identified

- Applicable GAPs addressed

RI lSI

Background

  • Submittal consists of the following sections

- Risk Methodology based on Code Case N 716

- Risk information included

- PRA Model Capability addressed

RI lSI

Background

  • Reviewed Risk Model for this use in accordance with current guidance
  • Determined Risk Model acceptable for use in RI lSI Applications
  • Assisted by industry-recognized subject matter experts

- experience with many RI lSI submittals

  • Implemented latest industry guidance
  • Compared with other RI lSI submittals
  • Incorporated lessons learned from RAls

River Bend Station PRA

Background

  • IPE approved via Oct. '97 NRC Staff Evaluation
  • Used in support of various risk-informed License Amendment Requests

River Bend Station PRA

Background

  • Last Full RBS PRA Revision: Revision 4 Sept. 2005
  • Revision 5 update: Scheduled completion

- Dec. 2010

PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis

  • Performed Self-Assessment cons*istent with RG 1.200 R.1 Section 4.1 in late 2008

PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis

  • Used industry expertise in Gap analysis

- Internal Flooding PRA performed to meet ASME Cat. II

PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis

  • Gap: All items where any work required to meet RG 1.200 characterized as "gaps"
  • Self-assessment grading consistent with RG 1.200 Section 2.1 expectations

PRA Self-Assessment Gap Analysis

  • Gaps to RG 1.200 identified in submittal

- Consistent with RG 1.174

- Consistent with Vogtle

PRA Quality Per RG 1.174 section 2.2.6:

"There are, however, some applications that, because of the nature of the proposed change, have a limited impact on risk, and this is reflected in the impact on the elements of the risk model.

An example is risk-informed in-service inspection (RI-ISI). In this application, risk significance was used as one criterion for selecting pipe segments to be periodically examined for cracking. During the staff review it became clear that a high level of emphasis on PRA technical acceptability was not necessary.

Therefore, the staff review of plant-specific RI-ISI typically will include only a limited scope review of PRA technical acceptability. "

PRA Quality

  • N-716 RI lSI less reliant on PRA than other RI lSI approaches

- Binning before selection

- PRA one of 5 elements

- Absolute risk ranking

  • N-716 criteria

- CDF of 1E-06, LERF of 1E-07

- Degradation Mechanisms

PRA Self-Assessment

  • Self-Assessment performed to identify all work to meet RG 1.200, including Cat. II, for other future risk-informed applications

- Of the 72 Supporting Requirements (SR) with identified gaps, 7 SR's have different requirements for Cat. I vs. Cat. II.

PRA Gap Analysis

  • Breakdown of gaps:

- 40 gaps: Documentation Issues

- 13 gaps: Need not be met (per EPRI) mostly uncertainty issues, would not Impact RI lSI.

- 10 gaps: Model refinements potentially needed but not significant for RI lSI

  • 6 gaps (9 items): Model refinements or sensitivity studies. Addressed in Table 2 of submittal.

PRA Inputs

--meets Cat. II requirements

  • Two cases quantified:
  • Base: EPRI pipe break frequencies
  • Sensitivity (Conservative, used for N-716 screening)

PRA Inputs

  • Used IFPRA to assess CDF (~1 E-06) and LERF (~1 E-07) for segments considered conservative due to assumptions &

conservative simplifications due to scope

  • Used PRA to confirm and provide upper limit CCDP/CLERP values in N-716 risk impact assessment

- Compared risk impact results to guidance of RG1.174

PRA Inputs

  • Addressed potentially applicable gaps in Table 2 of June 16 submittal

--includes sensitivity studies

  • Entered all gaps into Model Change Request (MCR) database to address in Revision 5 to RBS model

- Controlled procedurally by common Entergy process

PRA Conclusion

  • Followed established process
  • Determined RBS PRA providing acceptable support / sufficient rigor for N-716 RIISI

-Cat. II Internal Flooding PRA

- Gaps to ASME Std. addressed, do not impact use for RI lSI

Q)

()

c co

+-'

c..

Q)

()

()

<< co

() co 0:: s....

Q) --c><

Z +-'

-- c s.... Q) 0 () c.

+-' c..

0 c << .....

en

~

s.... >

co Q) 0:::

c.. 0)

E C) 0 ~

I

() ()

-I

Q)

> -co co L.

(])

C +-'

C I.

Q) --

+-' Cf)

<< l.

"'0 N

c I

0I \t-O

+-' C en --0 Q) CJ)

J c

(])

0 +-'

Q) w 0:::

lSI Interval Extension

Background

  • Previously extended lSI Interval to RF-15 for examination of 123 welds.
  • Projected exposure for these examinations

- 17.83 Rem

  • RBS proposed to perform 73 examinations by startup from RF-15
  • Requested extension of lSI interval from RF-15 until RF-16 for remaining 50 examinations

lSI Interval Extension Exposure Projections

  • Based upon current plant conditions, and crediting previous chemical cleaning, use of shielding and system flushing
  • Validated during RWP challenge process for RF-15

lSI Interval Extension Result of Approval

  • Extension results in ~90% completion of subject Examination Categories for Second lSI Interval by end of RF-15
  • NOTE: Subject examinations greatly reduced under RI lSI requirements

- 123 examinations under conventional lSI program

- 14 examinations under RI lSI program

lSI Interval Extension Examinations Result

  • 43 examinations deferred to RF-16 pending RI lSI approval (not required under RI lSI)
  • 80 examinations performed during RF-15
  • No additional actions required when RI lSI submittal approved

lSI Interval Extension Conclusions

  • Low significance for extension based on:

- acceptable previous examination history

- industry experience for failure probabilities

- proposed RI lSI program indicates 43 welds would not require future examination

  • Excessive radiation exposure without a compensating increase in quality or safety

0) u c

co

+-J 0

0)

U U

o .~

0:: Ci3 z~

co

.so c

s....

\J C

o CJ)

Q) 0..

s.... 0..

CO <<

0 I 0')

E o o ~

o ()

I

--J