ML18094B282

Special Rept 90-1:on 900109,diesel Generator 2C Failed Due to Loss of Ability to Adjust Speed During Surveillance. Defective Governor Replaced & Surveillance Procedure Successfully Performed

ML18094B282
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	01/31/1990
From:	Miller L Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
90-1, NUDOCS 9002090298
Download: ML18094B282 (3)

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• Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station January 31, 1990 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 SPECIAL REPORT 90-1 This Special Report addresses the circumstances surrounding the No.

2C Diesel Generator valid failure occurr~ng on January 9, 1990.

This report is being submitted in accordance with the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance 4.8.1.1.4. It is being submitted within 30 days of the event as per the Surveillance.

Sincerely yours, L. K. Miller General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution onn?n90298 900131 95-2189 (5MJ 12-88

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UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 9c9 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

2C Diesel Generator; Failure due to the loss of ability to adjust speed during surveillance Event Date(s): 1/09/90 Report Date: 1/31/90 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.90-021 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 - Reactor Power 100% - Unit Load 1160 MWe DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

This special report describes a valid test failure involving 2C Diesel Generator (D/G) occurring on January 9, 1990. This report is submitted for informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4 and contains the information required by Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, Regulatory Position C.3.b.

Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4 states:

"Reports - All diesel generator failures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1 .**** "

On January 9, 1990, the required monthly one hour surveillance run of 2C D/G was initiated in accordance with Surveillance Ptocedure SP(O) 4.8.1.1.2., "Electrical Power Systems - Emergency Diesels". The D/G speed could not be adequately adjusted to allow synchronization to the grid as specified in the procedure. Therefore, the D/G output breaker was never closed and the D/G was never loaded on the grid.

Therefore, the D/G was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.8.1.lb Action Statement "a" was entered.

Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 states:

"As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall.be OPERABLE:

a. Two physically independent circuits between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class lE distribution system (vital bus system) and

b. Three separate and independent diesel generators with:

Technical Specification 3.8.1.1 Action Statement a states:

• ~ ... UNIT 2 SPECIAL REPORT 9 .

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd)

"With either an offsite circuit or diesel generator of the above required A.C. electrical power sources inoperable, demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the remaining A.C. sources by performing Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.1.a and 4.8.1.1.2.a.2 within one hour and at least once per 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> thereafter; restore at least two offsite circuits and three diesel generators to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The cause of this DIG valid test failure was an equipment failure.

Troubleshooting revealed the cause of not being able to adjust DIG speed to the grid speed was due to a failure of the Woodward Governor (model No. EG-BlOC).

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The failure of the governor to allow full loading of the D/G constitutes a valid test failure as described in Regulatory Guide 1.108. This was the second D/G failure in the last 100 starts for all three (3) DIG's. The last 100 valid tests performed date back to November 15, 1988. Since then, the only other valid test failure occurred on September 9, 1989 (reference Special Report 311/89-3) due to a 2B DIG jacket water leak. Additionally, a non-valid test failure had occurred on December 15, 1988 (reference Special Report 311188-9) due to the failure of the 2C DIG speed relay.

With one diesel inoperable, the remaining diesels are capable of providing power to the minimum safeguards equipment required for analyzed accident and transient conditions. Therefore, this event did not impact the health and safety of the general public.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The defective governor was replaced and Surveillance Procedure SP(0)4.8.l.1.2 was successfully performed. 2C D/G was declared operable on January 10, 1990 at 0630 hours0.00729 days <br />0.175 hours <br />0.00104 weeks <br />2.39715e-4 months <br /> at which time Technical Specification Action Statement 3.8.1.lb.a was exited.

The surveillance test interval was decreased to every fourteen (14) days in compliance with Regulatory Position C.2.d of Regulatory Guide 1.108.

The defective governor has been shipped to the manufacturer for inspection and refurbishment.

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.90-008