IR 05000338/2000301

North Anna SEPT/2000 Exam, 50-338/2000-301 Final Outlines, Simulator Scenarios

ML003765727
Person / Time
Site:	North Anna
Issue date:	09/14/2000
From:	Christensen H Operator Licensing and Human Performance Branch
To:	Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
-RFPFR, 50-388/00301
Download: ML003765727 (108)

Text

FINAL SUBMITTAL NORTH ANNA EXAM 50-338/2000-301 SEPTEMBER 14 - 21, 2000 NUREG-1021 - ES-501 ES-301-1 - ADMIN TOPICS OUTLINE

& ADMIN JPMS

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I WW--Z *..JLILIII Crsrm FUiIIII Co 2nd1-4 Facility: North Anna Power Station Date of Examination: 9/18 - 21/00 Exam Level: RO / SRO Operating Test Number: 1 Administrative Describe method of evaluation:

Topic/Subject 1. ONE Administrative JPM, OR Description 2. TWO Administrative Questions Shift staffing A.1 A1 requirements (Both) JPM: Evaluate overtime eligibility (NEW)

Plant parameters verification JPM: Determine shutdown margin by hand calculation (Both)

(BANK)

Tagging and clearances JPM: Determine if tagging boundaries are adequate (Both)

(NEW)

Radiation exposure limits JPM: Assess personnel exposure to determine if/how RHR inlet

. (Both) valve can be opened (NEW)

Emergency communications JPM: Meteorological and stability class determination A4 (RO Only)

(NEW)

Emergency protective action recommendation JPM: Determine protective action recommendations (PAR)

s (SRO Only)

(BANK)

NRC Developed Admin JPM on Overtime Eligibility (NRC ADMIN Al)

LESSON TITLE: Evaluate Overtime Eligibilit Validation time: 15 mi REVISION NO: 0 Developed by: R. Aiello Page 1 of 8

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS:

None.

EVALUATOR NOTES: (Do not read to trainee)

1_ The applicable procedure section WILL NOT be provided to the traine _ If this is the first JPM of the JPM set, read the JPM briefing contained NUREG-1021, Appendix E, or similar to the traine Read the following to trainee.

TASK CONDITIONS:

1_ A startup is planned for the following shift. One Reactor Operator must be held over two hours for startup 2_ The following is the work history (excluding shift turnover time) of the available reactor operators on shift. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> occurred between all work periods. All operators began their shift schedule at the same time each day and none stood watch as the OATC on day 8 (today).

Page 2 of 8

Evaluate Overtime Eligibilit DAY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (Today)

Operator

1. 1 0 0 12 12 12 8 14 10 Operator

1. 2 0 0 12 12 12 12 8 14 Operator

1. 3 0 0 12 12 12 8 8 15 Operator

1. 4 0 8 12 10 10 8 10 12 Operator

1. 5 0 4 12 10 10 14 10 12 INITIATING CUE:

Evaluate the work history for all 5 operators. Determine which operator(s), if any, can be held over for two hours without prior overtime approval, and determine which operators CANNOT be held over for two hours without prior overtime approva Page 3 of 8 REV. 1

Evaluate Overtime Eligibilit PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST NOTE: Sequence is assumed unless denoted in the Comments.

Step 1 - Obtain a current revision of VPAP-0103 Current Revision of VPAP-0103 obtained and verifie SAT/UNSAT*

Step 2 - Determine Operator #1 would exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48-hour perio Determined that Operator #1 would exceed 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> in a 48-hour perio ** CRITICAL STEP ** SAT/UNSAT*

Step 3 - Determine Operator #2 would not exceed any overtime restriction Determined that Operator #2 would not exceed any overtime restriction SAT/UNSAT*

Step 4 - Determine Operator #3 would exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> straigh Determined that Operator #3 would exceed 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> straigh ** CRITICAL STEP ** SAT/UNSAT*

Page 4 of 8 REV. 1

Evaluate Overtime Eligibility.

Step 5 - Determine Operator #4 would not exceed any overtime restriction Determined that Operator #4 would not exceed any overtime restriction SAT/UNSAT*

Step 6 - Determine Operator #5 would exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7-day perio Determined that Operator #5 would exceed 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> in a 7 day period SAT/UNSAT*

CoveriIme _TEMINATIN restrictionsthis JPM'is

~ complete.Y

• Comments required for any step evaluated as UNSA Page 5 of 8 REV. 1

Evaluate Overtime Eligibilit RELATED TASKS:

Conduct shift turnover and relief K/A REFERENCE AND IMPORTANCE RATING:

GEN 2.1.4, 2.1.5 REFERENCES:

VPAP-0 103 TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT:

None.

SAFETY FUNCTION (from NUREG 1123, Rev 2.):

A.1 - Conduct Of Operations REASON FOR REVISION:

New JPM for NRC exa Page 6 of 8 REV. 1

Evaluate Overtime Eligibility.

Time Required for Completion: 10 Minutes (approximate).

APPLICABLE METHOD OF TESTING Performance: Simula ite Actual Unit:

Setting: Control Roc Im Simulator ( Not apj plicable to In-Plant JPMs )

Time Critical: Yees No Time Limit N/A Alternate Path: Yeas No EVALUATION Trainee: SSN:

JPM: Pass Fail Remedial Training Required: Yes No Did Trainee Obtain Procedure using PROMIS/MIND?: Yes No ( Each Student should obtain one procedure per evaluation set using PROMFIS/MIND. )

Comments:

Page 7 of 8 REV. 1

TASK CONDITIONS:

1_ A startup is planned for the following shift. One Reactor Operator must be held over two hours for startup 2_ The following is the work history (excluding shift turnover time) of the available reactor operators on shift. A break of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> occurred between all work periods. All operators began their shift schedule at the same time each day and none stood watch as the OATC on day 8 (today).

DAY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 (Today)

Operator

1. 1 0 0 12 12 12 8 14 10 Operator

1. 2 0 0 12 12 12 12 8 14 Operator

1. 3 0 0 12 12 12 8 8 15 Operator

1. 4 0 8 12 10 10 8 10 12 Operator

1. 5 0 4 12 10 10 14 10 12 INITIATING CUE:

Evaluate the work history for all 5 operators. Determine which operator(s), if any, can be held over for two hours without prior overtime approval, and determine which operators CANNOT be held over for two hours without prior overtime approva Page 8 of 8 REV. 1

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Determine shutdown margin by hand calculation CANDIDATE EXAMINER

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:

Determine shutdown margin by hand calculation (1-PT-1OA)

References:

1-PT-1 OA Validation Time: 25 mi Time Critical: No Candidate:

NAME Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Examiner:I NAME SIGNATURE DATE COMMENTS

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station REACTOR OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (Admin Al)

R97 TASK Determine the shutdown margin by hand calculation (1-PT-1i A).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedur PREREQUISITES The trainee has completed the applicable course knowledge training at the reactor operator level.

INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor has been shut down for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a reactor tri Shift supervisor has been notified of this test There are no equivalent stuck rods Reactor power was 100% for > 100days prior to the trip with all rods fully withdrawn and a Reactor Coolant System boron concentration of 750 ppm Core burnup is 9000 MWD/MTU Reactor Coolant System boron concentration was determined 15 minutes ago to be 1200 PPM Reactor Coolant System projected temperature is 200OF No dilutions have occurred since the last Reactor Coolant System boron concentration was determined Test is being performed to determine if an RCS boration is required prior to cooling down to 2000 F There are no control rods stuck INITIATING CUE You are requested to determine the shutdown margin by hand calculation using 1-PT-lO STANDARDS Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the underlined procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

• Emergency communication

• Face-to-face communication

• Giving and acknowledging orders

• Phonetic alphabet

• Telephone communication systems TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT Calculator PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD Demonstration VALIDATION TIME: 25 min.

K/A: 001A411 (3.5/4.1)

START TIME:

PERFORMANCE STEPS (HAND APPLICANT THE PARTIALLY FILLED OUT SDM SHEET, 1-PT-10A)

1 Review the initial conditions, precautions, and limitation Standards Procedure initial conditions, precautions and limitations are reviewed ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

2 Check the reason for doing the procedur Standards The "calculation of shutdown margin for projected conditions" blank is checked ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

3 Determine the worth of rods that are stuck, untrippable, and not fully inserte Standards Attachment 1 is completed ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

4 Record the current or projected shutdown condition Standards Data is obtained from the initial conditions page and the station curve book; calculations are performed and data is entered in column 1 of attachment 2 ISAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

5 Record the previous critical condition Standards Data is obtained from the initial conditions page and the station curve book; calculations are performed and data is entered in column 2 of attachment 2 ISAT[ I UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

Calculate the sum of the current or projected shutdown condition Critical Standards Sum is determined to be -10417 +/- 100 pcm ISAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

Calculate the sum of the previous critical condition Critical Standards Sum is determined to be -10175 +/- 100 pcm ISAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

Calculate the difference between the current or projected shutdown conditions and the previous critical condition Critical Standards Difference is calculated to be -242 pcm + 25 pcm ISAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

If necessary, calculate the boron concentration required to achieve a shutdown margin of at least 1.77% AK/ Critical Standards Determines that RCS must be borated 221.5 PPM + 11 ppm JSAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

10 Verify that the acceptance criteria cited in the procedure have been me Evaluator's Cue Assume another operator will complete the procedure SAT [ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE: I FINISH TIME:

>>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station REACTOR OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE R97 INITIAL CONDITIONS Reactor has been shut down for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a reactor tri Shift supervisor has been notified of this test There are no equivalent stuck rods Reactor power was 100% for > 100days prior to the trip with all rods fully withdrawn and a Reactor Coolant System boron concentration of 750 ppm Core burnup is 9000 MWD/MTU Reactor Coolant System boron concentration was determined 15 minutes ago to be 1200 PPM Reactor Coolant System projected temperature is 200OF No dilutions have occurred since the last Reactor Coolant System boron concentration was determined Test is being performed to determine if an RCS boration is required prior to cooling down to 2000 F There are no control rods stuck INITIATING CUE You are requested to determine the shutdown margin by hand calculation using 1-PT-10 NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Determine if tagging boundaries are adequate CANDIDATE EXAMINER Rev. 0

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:

Determine if tagging boundaries are adequate (1-OPAP-0010)

References:

1-OPAP-001 0 Validation Time: 30 mi Time Critical: No Candidate:

NAME Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Examiner: /

NAME SIGNATURE DATE COMMENTS Rev. 0

Tools/EquipmentlProcedures Needed:

1-OPAP-001 0 Station Load List Mind computer or FM prints READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTION TO TRAINEE:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps shall be performed for this JPM. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

High-pressure heater drain pump 1-SD-P-1A has been shutdown due to excessive packing leakage and must be isolated and tagged for maintenance.

A draft tagging record has been generated by shift personnel.

INITIATING CUES:

You are requested to determine if the tagging boundaries identified by the shift will adequately isolate high-pressure heater drain pump 1-SD-P-1A. You may any plant reference except the computerized tagging system and the maintenance operating procedure for l-SD-P-lA. Continue until the entire tagging record has been reviewe Rev. 0

NOTE TO EXAMINER: JPM steps need NOT be performed in sequence.

STEP 1: Review the appropriate electrical reference SAT STANDARD: Operator reviews station load list or electrical diagrams.

COMMENTS: UNSAT STEP 2: Determine if electrical boundary is adequat CRITICAL STEP STANDARD: Operator determines that the breaker listed on the tagging record will not de-energize 1-SD-P-1 SAT COMMENTS:

UNSAT STEP 3: Review the appropriate mechanical drawing SAT STANDARD: Operator reviews 11715-FM -75A, sheet 1.

COMMENTS: UNSAT STEP 4: Determine if mechanical boundaries are adequat CRITICAL STEP STANDARD: Operator determines that the following errors exist in the mechanical section:

• 1-SD-12, check valve on the pump discharge, is tagged closed instead of the discharge isolation valve SAT

. The vents and drains are opened before the discharge/suction isolations are close * The suction is isolated before the discharge is isolate UNSAT COMMENTS:

END OF TASK Rev. 0

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET (TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS:

High-pressure heater drain pump 1-SD-P-1A has been shutdown due to excessive packing leakage and must be isolated and tagged for maintenance.

A draft tagging record has been generated by shift personnel.

INITIATING CUES:

You are requested to determine if the tagging boundaries identified by the shift will adequately isolate high-pressure heater drain pump 1-SD-P-1A. You may any plant reference except the computerized tagging system and the maintenance operating procedure for 1-SD-P-1A. Continue until the entire tagging record has been reviewe Rev. 0

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Assess personnel exposure to determine if/how RHR inlet valve can be opened CANDIDATE EXAMINER Page 1 of 9

-

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:

Assess personnel exposure to determine if/how RHR inlet valve can be opened References:

Survey maps Validation Time: 30 mi Time Critical: No

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = -_

= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = __- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Candidate:

NAME Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Examiner: -

l NAME SIGNATURE DATE COMMENTS Page 2 of 7

JPM TITLE: Assess personnel exposure to determine if/how RHR inlet valve can be opened JPM NUMBER:NRC Admin A3 JPM REV. DATE:8/17/00 TIME VALIDATION:15 MINUTES AN 'X' BELOW INDICATES THE APPLICABLE METHOD(S) OF TESTING WHICH MAY BE USED:

PERFORM: X SIMULATE: DISCUSS:_

INSTRUCTOR's INFORMATION TASK STANDARDS:

Determined there is no success path for opening valve without exceeding dose margin limit REQUIRED MATERIALS:

1. Unit 1 containment survey maps with estimated transit times 2. Calculator REFERENCES:

None VALIDATION TIME: 25 mi K/A: 2.3.4 (2.5/3.1)

2.3.10 (2.9/3.3)

TERMINATING CUES:

Determined there is no success path for opening valv Page 3 of 9

READ TO THE TRAINEE If you have any questions, ask them now and I will answer them. During the test, I cannot answer questions. When you complete all the steps correctly, you will pass this Job Performance Measur I will describe the general conditions for the task you will perform and provide the initiating cue INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 has experienced a valid safety injection signal. The crew is attempting to place the residual heat removal system in service, but they are unable to open 1-RH-MOV-1 701 from the Main Control Room. You have been tasked with entering containment and locally opening 1-RH-MOV-1701. Your allowable dose margin limit is 1850 mr. Survey maps of the unit 1 containment are available, showing dose rates and one way travel time to reach the valve for each of 2 possible routes. Health physics personnel are currently unavailable to provide assistanc INITIATING CUES:

You have been directed to determine:

1) Which roundtrip path would result in the lowest radiation exposur ) If you can locally open 1-RH-MOV-1701 without exceeding your dose margin limi Page 4 of 7

()ELEMENT: 1 Calculate exposure at valve.

STANDARDS:

_ (6 R/HR)(1000 MR/R)(1 HR/60 MIN)(5 MIN)= 500 MR EVALUATOR'S NOTES:

NOTE: The operator may perform the calculations in any order.

(ELEMENT: 2 Calculate exposure from using stairway.

STANDARDS:

_ Personnel hatch to top of stairway:

(4 R/HR)(1000 MR/R)(1 HR/60 MIN)(0.5 MIN)(2 TRIPS) = 66 2/3 MR.

_ On stairway and walk to valve:

(12 R/HR)(1000 MR/R)(1 HR/60 MIN)(5 MIN)(2 TRIPS) = 2000 MR

_ Total dose received:

(66 2/3 MR)+(2000 MR)+(500 MR)= 2566 2/3 MR TOTAL DOS Page 5 of 9

()ELEMENT: 3 Calculate exposure from using spiral staircas STANDARDS:

_ Personnel hatch to top of spiral staircase:

(1 R/HR)(1000 MR/R)(1 HR/60 MIN)(1 MIN)(2 TRIPS) = 33 1/3 M _2. On spiral staircase and walk to valve:

(16 R/HR)(1000 MR/R)(1 HR/60 MIN)(4 MIN)(2 TRIPS) = 2133 1/3 M _3. Total dose received:

(33 1/3 MR)+(2133 1/3 MR)+(500 MR) = 2666 2/3 MR.

(C) ELEMENT: 4 Determine lowest exposure pat STANDARDS:

_ Compared results of the calculations and determined the path using the stairway to be the lowest exposure.

EVALUATOR'S NOTES:

None Page 6 of 7

(C) ELEMENT: 5 Compare exposure to margin.

STANDARDS:

_1 Compared exposure to margin and determined alignment could not be made within allowable margin of 1850 mr.

EVALUATOR'S NOTES:

TERMINA TE JPM AT THIS POINT Page 7 of 9

JPM STUDENT IC SHEET INITIAL CONDITIONS: Unit 1 has experienced a valid safety injection signal. The crew is attempting to place the residual heat removal system in service, but they are unable to open 1-RH-MOV-1 701 from the Main Control Room. You have been tasked with entering containment and locally opening 1-RH-MOV-1701. Your allowable dose margin limit is 1850 mr. Survey maps of the unit 1 containment are available, showing dose rates and one way travel time to reach the valve for each of 2 possible routes. Health physics personnel are currently unavailable to provide assistanc INITIATING CUES:

You have been directed to determine:

1) Which roundtrip path would result in the lowest radiation exposur ) If you can locally open 1-RH-MOV-1 701 without exceeding your dose margin limi Page 8 of 7

SURVEY DATA:

Location of 1-RH-MOV-1 701 is designated on Survey Ma Estimated time at the valve: 5 minute Dose rate at the valve: 6 R/h Survey Map Area One Way Travel Time (min.) Average Dose Rate (R/hr)

B (from personnel hatch 1 1 to top of spiral staircase)

C (spiral staircase to 241' 4 16

& walk to valve)

D (from personnel hatch to top of stairway)

E (stairway to 241' & walk 5 12 to valve)

RESULTS:

Identify the Lowest Exposure Path:

STAIRWAY:

SPIRAL STAIRCASE:

Can the Alignment be completed within your Dose Margin Limit?

YES NO Page 9 of 9

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

A-4 ADMINISTRATIVE SECTION RO NRC-JPM-04/R Title:

Meteorological and Stability Class Determination IAW EPIP-2.01 Notification of State and Local Governments

Time Required forCompletion: 10 Minutes (approximate).

APPLICABLE METHOD OF TESTING Performance: Simulate Actual Unit:

Setting: Control Room Simulator ( Not applicable to In-Plant JPMs )

Time Critical: Yes No _ Time Limit N/A Alternate Path: Yes No EVALUATION Trainee: SSN:

JPM: Pass Fail Remedial Training Required: Yes No Did Trainee Obtain Procedure using PROMIS/MIND?: Yes No ( Each Student should obtain one procedure per evaluation set using PROMI1S/MIND. )

Comments:

• Indicates a critical step

Read to the Operator DIRECTION TO APPLICANT:

I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All steps shall be performed/simulated for this JPM. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided yo INITIAL CONDITIONS:

An ALERT was declared 30 minutes ago due to a unit 1 SGTR with safety injection required based on EAL tab B- An initial notification to state and local governments was completed 15 minutes ago with an update schedule of 30 minute The SG PORV has just lifted on the ruptured SG and will not resea A release of radioactive material is presently occurrin A follow-up message is being prepared to the state and local governments IAW attachment 2 of EPIP-2.01 The main tower lower-level wind direction recorder is OO The main tower Delta T recorder is OO The main tower lower-level wind speed recorder is OOS.

INITIATING CUES:

The Unit 1 SRO has requested that you to perform steps 7- 12 of EPIP 2.01, "Notification of State and Local Governments," to obtain meteorological data from the Met Pane Meteorological and Stability Class Determination STEP1 Observes Note prior to Step STANDARD:

SAT Wind direction is always given as the compass point the wind blows from. Example: Wind direction is from East North East (ENE).

UNSAT COMMENTS:

STEP 2: Get meteorological information. (Step 7)

STANDARD:

__SAT Determines the Main Tower Lower Level Wind Direction recorder is not in service lAW the Initial Conditions and uses an alternate:

Backup Tower, Main Tower Upper Level. (Step 7. a)

UNSAT COMMENTS:

• STEP 3: Obtains approximate average wind direction. (Step 7.b)

STANDARD:

SAT Locates and observes the average wind direction for previous 15 minutes (appx. 3080).

Evaluators Cue: Provide the wind direction once applicant has UNSAT located the appropriate indication. The wind direction has been bouncing between 306° to 316°.

COMMENTS:

I ____________________________

• Indicates a critical step

• STEP 4: Determine compass point wind blowing from. (Step 7.c)

STANDARD:

_SAT Uses the table in step 7 to determine the compass point based on the average wind direction is N COMMENTS: UNSAT STEP 5: Determine wind speed. (Step 7.d)

STANDARD:

SAT Determines the Main Tower Lower Level Wind Speed recorder is not in service lAW the Initial Conditions and uses an alternate:

Backup Tower, Main Tower Upper Leve UNSAT COMMENTS:

• STEP 6: Obtains wind speed. (Step 7 e)

STANDARD:

__SAT Obtains wind speed from either the Backup Tower or Main Tower Upper Level Wind Speed recorde Evaluator Cue: Provide the wind speed once applicant has located UNSAT the appropriate indication. The wind speed is 10 MP COMMENTS:

• Indicates a critical step

-

STEP 7: Record the following in Item 7 (Step Source of meteorological date (on-site/regional)

0 Compass point SAT 0 Wind speed STANDARD:

UNSAT Records the following on Item 7 of Attachment * Source of meteorological data is from on-sit * Compass point is N * Wind speed is 10 MP COMMENTS:

r STEP 8: Check any of the following information needed: (Step 8)

0 Downwind sectors 0 Stability Class SAT 0 Temperature STANDARD:

UNSAT Determines all above are necessar Evaluators Cue: The SEM desires this informatio COMMENTS:

• STEP 9: Determine Downwind Sectors: (Step 9)

STANDARD:

-SAT Uses table in step 9 and determines downwind sectors are F,G COMMENTS:

UNSAT

• Indicates a critical step

STEP 10: Observes Note Prior to step 1 STANDARD:

SAT NOTE: Numerical ranges presented below for Delta T and Sigma Theta are less than the range of the chart recorder and indicator in the Control Room. Indications are not expected to read outside the ranges found on these UNSAT table COMMENTS:

I STEP 11: Determines Stability Class: (Step 10.a)

STANDARD:

__SAT Determines that the Main Tower Delta T recorder is not in service IAW the Initial Conditions and uses the alternate: Backup Tower Sigma Theta Recorde UNSAT COMMENTS:

• STEP 12: Determines Stability Class (Step 1Ob)

STANDARD:

__SAT Locates the Backup Tower Sigma Theta recorder. Reads recorder and determines Stability class is UNSAT Evaluators Cue: Provide Sigma Theta once applicant has located the appropriate indication. Sigma Theta is degree COMMENTS:

I.___________________________________________

• Indicates a critical step

STEP 13: Use value closer to "G" (if unable to distinguish Delta T or Sigma Theta Value) (Step 1O.c)

STANDARD: SAT Determines that this step is not applicabl COMMENTS: UNSAT

• STEP 14: Determine Temperature (Step 11)

STANDARD:

SAT Determines Temperature from the Main Tower Temperature Recorder (Step 11.a)

Evaluators Cue: Provide the temperature once applicant has UNSAT located the appropriate indication. The temperature is 740 COMMENTS:

• STEP 15: Give Meteorological information to the requesto STANDARD:

SAT Provides the filled out Attachment 2 to the evaluato COMMENTS:

UNSAT END OF TASK

• Indicates a critical step

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station REACTOR OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE INITIAL CONDITIONS:

An ALERT was declared 30 minutes ago due to a unit 1 SGTR with safety injection required based on EAL tab B- An initial notification to state and local governments was completed 15 minutes ago with an update schedule of 30 minute The SG PORV has just lifted on the ruptured SG and will not resea A release of radioactive material is presently occurrin A follow-up message is being prepared to the state and local governments IAW attachment 2 of EPIP-2.01 The main tower lower-level wind direction recorder is OO The main tower Delta T recorder is OO The main tower lower-level wind speed recorder is OOS.

INITIATING CUES:

The Unit 1 SRO has requested that you to perform steps 7- 12 of EPIP 2.01, "Notification of State and Local Governments," to obtain meteorological data from the Met Pane NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Determine protective action recommendations CANDIDATE EXAMINER Page 1 of 9

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION ADMINISTRATIVE JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE Task:

Determine protective action recommendations (EPIP-1.01)

References:

EPIP-1 .01 Validation Time: 15 mi Time Critical: No Candidate:

NAME Performance Rating: SAT UNSAT Examiner: /

NAME SIGNATURE DATE COMMENTS Page 2 of 9

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE (Admin A4)

S93 TASK Determine protective action recommendations (EPIP-1.06).

NOTE TO THE TRAINER AND THE EVALUATOR Unless a specific evaluator's cue is provided, you should provide a cue indicating that the component or parameter is in the condition specified by the procedure.

PREREQUISITES The trainee has completed the applicable course knowledge training at the senior reactor operator level.

INITIAL CONDITIONS A reactor trip and safety injection has occurre A large tube rupture has occurred in the "A" steam generato "A" main steam line is faulted in the main steam valve house upstream of the main steam trip valv RCS specific activity is 500 pCi/gm dose equivalent lodine-13 A general emergency has been declared due to a fuel failure with a steam generator tube rupture.

INITIATING CUE You are requested to determine protective action recommendations (PARs).

Continue until off-site authorities have been notifie Page 3 of 9

STANDARDS Task was performed as directed by the procedure referenced in the task statement within parentheses (one of the underlined procedures if several are cited)

Self-checking practices were used throughout task performance Verbal communication related to any of the following modes was conducted in accordance with VPAP-1407

• Emergency communication

• Face-to-face communication

• Giving and acknowledging orders

• Phonetic alphabet

• Telephone communication systems TOOLS AND EQUIPMENT None PREFERRED EVALUATION METHOD Verbal-visual VALIDATION TIME: 15 min.

K/A: 038EK306 (4.2/4.5); 038EA207 (4.4/4.8)

Page 4 of 9

START TIME:

PERFORMANCE STEPS 1 Initiate EPIP-1.0 Standards EPIP-1.01 is initiated ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

2 Determine the emergency action level used to classify the general emergenc Standards Tab B-2 is noted as the applicable EAL ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

3 Determine the wind speed and three downwind sector Standards Meteorological monitoring instrumentation is observed Evaluator's Cue Wind speed is 10 mph, and wind direction is 220 degrees ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ I NOTE:

4 Determine the protective action recommendatio Standards PAR-1 is noted as the applicable PAR SAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

Page 5 of 9

5 Record the wind speed and downwind sector Critical Standards

"10" is entered into the "wind speed" block, and "B, C, D" is entered into the "downwind sectors" block of the meteorological data section of the protective action recommendation form LSAT [ ] UNSAT [ I NOTE: l 6 Mark the appropriate protective action recommendation bo Critical Standards

"PAR" 1 box is marked on the protective action recommendation form ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

7 Enter the downwind sectors to be evacuate Critical Standards

"B, C, D" is entered into the "evacuate downwind sectors" blanks of the "protective action recommendation 1" (PAR 1) section ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

8 Sign and date the protective action recommendation for Standards Protective action recommendation form is signed and dated ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

Page 6 of 9

9 Request the emergency communicators to notify off-site authoritie Critical Standards Operator performs both of the following actions:

• Request the state and local communicator to notify the state emergency operations center of the protective action recommendation in accordance with EPIP-2.01

• Request the NRC communicator to notify the Nuclear Regulatory Commission of the protective action recommendation in accordance with EPIP-2.02 ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ I NOTE:

10 Request the radiological assessment director to implement EPIP-4.0 Standards Radiological assessment director is requested to implement EPIP-4.07 ISAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

11 Check if a radiological-based protective action recommendation is recommende Evaluator's Cue Radiological-based protective action recommendation is not recommended ISAT[ ] UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

12 Check if the emergency is terminate Evaluator's Cue Emergency has not been terminated SAT[ ] UNSAT [ ] NOTE:

Page 7 of 9

13 Determine the appropriate procedure step to perfor Evaluator's Cue Assume that another operator will perform this step SAT[ I UNSAT[ ] NOTE:

FINISH TIME:

>>>>> END OF EVALUATION <<<<<

Page 8 of 9

Virginia Power North Anna Power Station SENIOR REACTOR OPERATOR JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE S93 INITIAL CONDITIONS A reactor trip and safety injection has occurre A large tube rupture has occurred in the "A" steam generato "A' main steam line is faulted in the main steam valve house upstream of the main steam trip valv RCS specific activity is 500 pCi/gm dose equivalent lodine-13 A general emergency has been declared due to a fuel failure with a steam generator tube rupture.

INITIATING CUE You are requested to determine protective action recommendations (PARs).

Continue until off-site authorities have been notifie Page 9 of 9

FINAL SUBMITTAL NORTH ANNA EXAM 50-338, 50-339/00-301 SEPTEMBER 14 - 21, 2000 FINAL SUBMITTAL SCENARIO

Anniondix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Annndiy fl Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: (RO) -

(BOP) -

(SRO)

Initial Conditions: EOL. Condenser steam dumps are in steam pressure control due to a problem with the Tavg input, which is under l&C investigation. A AFW pump is OOS for corrective maintenance. No other equipment is OO Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area with winds clocking at 60 mph. Large golf ball size hail has also been reported. Unit 2 SRO is coordinating AP-41, Severe Weather. Slight tremors on the order of 2.1 on the Richter scale have been detecte POD: Maintain 100% power. Complete 1-PT-17.1 rod operability test, which was commenced by the offgoing shift. Continue corrective maintenance on the A AFW pum Event Malf. N Event Event l_N Type* Description 1 N/A N (R) Conduct rod movement test 2 MRC0702 I (R) PT-1445 failure high (with failure of turbine to runback in event fail to react timely to PT445 failure)

3 MRC32 C (R) Unisolable PZR PORV leak 4 N/A I (B) Power reduction due to excessive RCS leakage 5 MFW0103 C (B) A SIG level channel Ill (LT-1476) failure low 6 MS_286 C (R) Steam-driven AFW pump failure 7 MMS0901 C->M (A) Main steam line break 7a N/A M (A) Reactor trip with MS isolation failure 7b MFW2302 C (B) Loss of all auxiliary feed 7c N/A C (A) Loss of secondary heat sink with RCS bleed & feed

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (R)O (B)OP (A)LL

NORTH ANA POWER STATION ROISRO NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAM SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO NRC-1 PROGRAM: RO/SRO Initial License Training DESCRIPTION: Main Steam Line Break / Loss of All Feedwater LENGTH: 90 minutes AUTHOR: R. Aiello (Chief Examiner North Anna)

REVISION DATE: 8/15/00 REVIEWED BY:

NRC Senior License Examiner Date APPROVED BY: Date NRC Chief Examiner (Surry)

Chief Examiner (Surry) Date

EVALUATION SCENARIO OBJECTIVES TERMINAL OBJECTIVE: During normal and abnormal plant conditions, the Shift Operating Crew will perform control room operations in accordance with (IAVV) approved plant procedures ensuring that the health and safety of the public is protected and the integrity of the plant maintained.

ENABLING OBJECTIVES: Conduct control rod movement test Given specific plant conditions, plant procedures, and a shift turnover, respond to the following events IAW approved plant procedures: PT-1445 failure high Unisolable PRZR PORV leak LT-1476 failure low Steam-driven AFW pump failure Power reduction due to inoperable AFW pumps Main steam line break on MS manifold Reactor trip with MS isolation failure Loss of all auxiliary feed Loss of secondary heat sink with RCS bleed & feed Given abnormal plant conditions, mitigate the adverse consequences of thefollowing events lAW approved plant procedures: Identify abnormalities while assessing actual system response with respect to predicted system respons Investigate the cause and effect of abnormalities in system performanc Implement applicable procedure Perform immediate actions from memory. Given abnormal plant conditions, implement the applicable on-site and off-site reports and notifications lAW approved plant procedures. Given normal and abnormal plant conditions, using the following principles for operational effectiveness as they apply to all operators, conduct plant operations IAW approved plant procedures: Plant and control room communicatio Plant/Control Board monitorin Plant/Control Board manipulatio Operational problem solvin Use of OPs/APs and Technical Specification Use of EOPs lAW EOP Rules of Usag . Annunciator recognition and respons Written communications/log ALARA awarenes EVALUATION SCENARIO OBJECTIVES (cont'd)

6. Given normal and abnormal plant conditions, using the following principles for operational effectiveness as they apply to the Unit Supervisor (US), conduct plant operations lAW approved plant procedures: Team performance managemen Problem solvin Decision analysi Action plannin Self-checking.

7. During abnormal and emergency events, the shift operating crew shall apply techniques of teamwork and self-checking lAW established work practices and operating guideline EVALUATION SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 581 degrees F Turnover: Maintain 100% power steady state operation. Condenser steam dumps are in steam pressure control due to a problem with the Tavg input, which is under I&C investigation. A AFW pump is OOS for corrective maintenance. Control rod movement surveillance test is in progress.

Synopsis: Shortly after completion of the control rod movement test, PT-1445 fails high causing PRZR PORV PCV-1456 to automatically open. Operators respond per 1-AP-44 by manually closing the opened PORV. Following PORV closure, the PORV (PCV-1456) develops a leak. Operators respond by attempting to close MOV-1535, which trips on breaker overload leaving the leak unisolated. The crew evaluates Tech Specs and determines a shutdown is required due to excessive RCS leakage. After a 5% power reduction (or as determined by the evaluator),

the A SIG level channel IlIl (LT-1476) fails low. The resulting transient requires the BOP to take A S/G level control to manual per 1-AP-3. Once Technical Specifications have been consulted and the crew briefed on the effects of the failure, the steam-driven AFW pump spuriously auto-starts. When the crew identifies the failure and stops the AFW pump, the overspeed trip mechanism fails, rendering the pump inoperable. After the crew evaluates Technical Specifications, the next event occurs. A steam break occurs on the main steam manifold in the turbine building. The crew responds per E-0 and addresses a failure of main steamline isolation and a trip of the B AFW pump after auto-start causing a loss of all auxiliary feed water (A AFW pump OOS, B AFW pump failed, steam-driven AFW pump previously failed). Transition to FR-H.1 is made in response to low steam generator levels with a loss of all AFW. Steam generator levels are sufficiently low to require RCS bleed and feed initiation. The exercise is concluded upon establishment of adequate RCS heat removal by bleed & feed (FR-H.1 step 26) or at the evaluator's discretion. The event is classified after scenario completion as a notification of unusual event per EPIP-1.01, tabs A-10, B-8 and G-3 (note that SRO may elect to classify the event as an Alert per tab M-3 based on SEM judgment.)

Event Summary:

EVENT # DESCRIPTION 1 Conduct rod movement test K/A: 001A 106 (4.1/4.4)

2 PT-1445 fails high K/A: APE027; AA215 (3.7/4.0)

3 PRZR PORV-1456 leak / MOV-1 535 overload trip K/A: 010A203 (4.2/4.2)

4 Power reduction due to excessive RCS leakage K/A: GEN-2.1.12 (2.9/4.0)

5 LT-1476 fails low K/A: 016A201 (3.0/3.1)

6 Steam-driven AFW spurious auto-start/failure K/A: 061A204 (3.4/3.8)

7a/b Main steam line break/reactor trip with B AFW pump and MS isolation failures K/A: APE040; AA104 (4.3/4.3)

7c Loss of secondary heat sink (bleed & feed required)

K/A: E05; EK12 (3.9/4.5); EK22 (3.9/4.2)

Crew Critical Steps:

EVENT # DESCRIPTION 7 Manually actuate steam line isolation (MSTV pushbuttons) prior to orange path on subcriticality or integrity or transition to ECA-2.1 (whichever occurs first) (applicable only after main steam line isolation step is read).

7 When required, initiate RCS bleed and feed so that the RCS depressurizes sufficiently for HHSI injection flow to occur.

Individual Critical Steps:

The bolded individual actions listed under the respective positions (RO, US, etc.) are for use during evaluations to identify steps that are critical to the individual positio EVALUATION SCENARIO PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING 1. Review the following with students: Primary responsibility of the student is to operate the simulator as if it were the actual plan The evaluators will observe teamwork skills, communication, and the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during the simulator examination. This includes individual

& crew performanc If you recognize an incorrect decision, response, answer, analysis, action, or interpretation by another crew member but fail to correct it, then the evaluator may assume that you agree with the incorrect ite The crew should keep a rough log during each scenario sufficient to complete necessary formal log entrie The simulator instructor facility operator will perform all of the functions of personnel needed outside the control room are Before the examination begins, crew members may perform a control board walkdown for up to 10 minutes.

2. The following are initial conditions for this exam (in shift turnover package, but may be covered verbally if needed): Time in core life - 18,000 MWD/MTU Reactor power and power history - 100% steady state Turbine status - online RCS boron concentration - 26 ppm A BAST boron concentration is 14,100 ppm Temperature - 581 degrees F Pressure - 2235 psig Xenon - Equilibrium for 100% powe Core cooling - forced Tech. Spec. LCO(s) in effect

- 3.7.1.2 Action 3 (30 days); A AFW pump bearing failure (entered action 12 hrs ago) Tagouts in effect - A AFW pump Significant problems/abnormalities - Condenser steam dumps in steam pressure (manual) control due to Tavg input problem. I&C investigatin Evolutions/maintenance for the coming shift - Complete rod operability surveillance and maintain 100% power steady state operatio Unit 2 - mode 5 on RHR 3. Ensure students understand examination schedule and that a break will be necessary between scenarios to allow simulator initial condition setup. Cover exam security rules to be observed by students both during and after the exam IAW the latest revision of AG-017 or NUREG-1021 as applicable.

4. Before the examination begins, make crew position assignments and allow students to ask any questions concerning the administration of the tes Page 6

Page 7

-

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Conduct rod movement tes INDICATIONS: Shift orders direct completion of 1-PT-17.1, Rod Operabilit POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by US RO Verifies shutdown bank A step counter reading . Selects SBA on bank selector switc . Records initial position for shutdown bank A in PT data shee . Inserts shutdown bank A 18 steps and observes plant respons . Records final position for shutdown bank A in PT data shee . Withdraws shutdown bank A 18 steps and observes plant respons . Calculates rod travel and record in PT data shee . Places bank selector switch in MANUA . Verifies "D" bank positio . Ensures Tavg and Tref are within 1O . Requests watchstander to observe bank overlap counter readin . Records bank overlap counter reading and "D" bank position in P . Calculates difference between bank overlap counter and "D" bank position and records in P . Places bank selector switch in AUT . Performs follow-on tasks and informs US that PT is complet US 1. Coordinates/directs performance of PT-1 . Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 8

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Pressure transmitter PT-1445 fails high opening PORV PCV-1456 and decreasing pressure. The problem is diagnosed and the PORV closed stopping the pressure decrease. The plant is stabilized and PT-1445 is declared OOS.

INDICATION S: PT-1445 failed high Pressurizer pressure decreases rapidl Overtemperature Delta-T runback occurs in event of failure to react timely to PT-1445 failure (FAIL THE RUNBACK). All pressurizer heaters energiz . When pressure returns above 2000 psig, PCV-1456 open . Pressure oscillates with PCV-1456 cycling around 2000 psig as appropriat . PRESSURIZER HIGH PRESSURE and PRZR SAFETY VALVE OR PORV OPEN alarms are actuated.

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by US Recognize failure of turbine to runback Manually run back the turbine (if auto runback called for)

RO Recognizes & reports PRZR pressure control problem Checks PRZR PORVs closed - NO Closes PRZR PORV PCV-1456 Checks master pressure controller controlling properly Verifies PRZR spray valves closed Verifies all PRZR heaters energized Checks auxiliary spray valve closed Verifies PRZR safety valves closed Verifies RCS pressure stable or increasing Verifies RCS pressure normal Page 9

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 2 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS RO 1 Verifies' PRZR heaters operable (cont'd)

1 Checks if PRZR PORV is leaking - NO 1 Checks if leaking PRZR safety is reducing pressure - NO 1 Determines if RCS leak is reducing pressure - NO 1 Checks if PRZR pressure decreasing - NO 1 Checks RCS pressure stable 1 Checks if auto pressure control can be established 1 Establishes auto pressure control 1 Keeps US informed of plant status US Coordinates/directs performance of AP-44 Reviews Technical Specifications Ensures l&C notified Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 10

- -

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 3 BRIEF DESCRIPTIO N: A pressurizer PORV begins to leak. Tech Specs are consulted and the decision is made to attempt to isolate the leaking PORV, but the associated block MOV trips on overload before the leak is isolate Tech Specs are referenced and the determination is made that unit shutdown is required due to excessive RCS leakage.

INDICATIONS: Increased charging flow compared to initial conditions PORV tailpipe temperature increased Spray valves closed and additional PRZR heaters required to maintain RCS pressure compared to initial conditions PRT level increase POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by the US RO RO identifies elevated PRZR tailpipe temperature, spray valves closed with additional heaters required to maintain RCS pressure, and increased charging flo . Recognizes PRZR PORV leaking and notifies U . Attempts to close PORV block MOV at US directio . Recognizes PORV block MOV breaker thermal OIL actuated and notifies U Page 11

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 3 (cont'd.)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Directs PRZR PORV leak response per Tech Spec Directs MOV-1535 closure & response to ensuing overload trip including direction to locally reset MOV-1535 breaker overload (will not reset) Ensures PRZR htrs on to keep pressure > 2205 psig Directs STA to perform RCS leak rate Concludes excessive RCS leakage due to unisolable leaking PRZR PORV 2. Reviews T.S. 3.4.3.2 and determines leaking PORV must be locally isolate . Informs SS of plant status & requests electrical maintenance support with block MOV bkr NOTE TO EVALUATOR: Provide STA-calculated RCS leak rate (12 gpm) to U Page 12

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 4 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: With reactor power initially at 100% power, a power reduction to Hot Standby is commenced in response to excessive RCS leakage.

INDICATIONS: US review of TS-3.4.3.2/3.4.6.2, SS/Ops Management direction POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Reduces turbine load IAW AP-2.2 or OP- . Performs secondary plant s/d generator-load-dependent activities lAW AP-2.2 or OP- . Performs activities as directed by US Notifies Chemistry of need to sample RCS if reactor power reduced > 15% Keeps US informed of plant status RO Reduces Rx power lAW AP-2.2 or OP- Calculates change req'd to reduce power and borates at rate directed by US Energizes PRZR backup heaters Coordinates w/BOP to keep Tref w/in 30F of Tavg w/rods in manual (1OF w/rods in auto) (if using AP-2.2, maintains Tave and Tref within 50F) Observes AFD limitations Keeps US informed of plant status Page 13

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 4 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Coordinates power reduction activities of RO & BOP Performs other activities lAW AP-2.2 or OP- Evaluates Xe changes and directs boration rate changes as necessary Notifies System Dispatcher of load reduction Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 14

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 5 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: A S/G level transmitter LT-1476 fails low. The crew recognizes the failure, takes manual control of A S/G FRV, and regains control of S/G level. The channel is declared OOS and compensatory actions taken per 1-AP-3.

INDICATIONS: Failure low of LI-1476 A S/G level decreases Annunciator F-B1, SG A LO-LO LEVEL Annunciator F-D1, SG A FF<SF Annunciator F-Fl, SG A LEVEL ERROR POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Recognizes failure of LT-1476 and responds as directed by US Compares to other SG level channels Verifies no off-normal conditions on related indications Notifies US of failure Takes manual control of A SIG level RO Assists BOP as directed by US Informs US of plant status US Directs stabilization of plant conditions. May suspend load reduction to perform actions of AP-3 or may continue load reduction and trip bistables late . Directs compensatory action per AP-3 Verifies related instrument status Determines which bistables to trip and effects on plant of tripping bistables. Provides this info to RO/BOP for guidanc . Notifies SS of plant status Ensures Tech. Spec. 3.3.1.1/2 requirements met Ensures l&C notification of LT-1476 failure and directs initiation of Page 15

Pwo.

Page 16

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 6 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Steam-driven AFW pump spuriously auto-starts. The crew recognizes the failure and stops the pump. When the pump is stopped,the overspeed trip mechanism fails, which renders the pump inoperable.

INDICATIONS: Steam-driven AFW pump steam supply valves open indication A S/G MFW flow must be manually decreased to maintain SG level A S/G AFW flow indicated RCS Tave decreasing Reactor power increasing Annunciator F-D8, TDAFWP TROUBLE POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Recognizes steam-driven AFW pump auto-start and notifies US Observes steam supply valves indicating open Observes AFW flow indicated to A S/G Observes A S/G level increasing Notifies US of failure Stops steam-driven AFW pump when directed by US Notes TDAFW pump trouble alarm and informs US Dispatches watchstander to locally check AFW pump RO Observes RCS Tave decreasing and reactor power increasing Notifies US of RCS parameter changes US Directs BOP to stop steam-driven AFW pump Directs BOP to dispatch watchstander to check AFW pump Reviews TS-3.7.1.2 and determines plant shutdown is required Notifies SS of plant status Ensures Maintenance Dept notified of failure and directs initiation of Page 17

a PWO.

Page 18

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 7a/b BRIEF DESCRIPTION: In response to a steam break on the main steam manifold in the turbine building, reactor trip and SI occur. Operators perform actions of E- When MSTVs are verified closed, all MSTVs fail to auto-close. No AFW flow exists (no pumps available: A OOS, B trip on auto-start, steam-driven AFW pump previously failed). Transition to FR-H.1 is made.

INDICATIONS: Reactor trip & SI actuates MSTVs remain open All S/G Pressures dropping No AFW flow CREW CRITICAL STEPS: Manually actuate steam line isolation (MSTV pushbuttons)

prior to orange path on subcriticality or integrity, or transition to ECA-2.1 (whichever occurs first) (applicable only after main steam line isolation step is read).

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Performs IOAs in response to reactor trip with SI per E-0: Verifies all turbine stop valves closed Resets MSR steam supply FCVs Verifies open generator output breaker Performs other E-0 immediate actions: Manually initiates S Page 19

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7a/b (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Performs subsequent E-0 actions at US direction:

(cont'd) Verifies feedwater isolation Manually initiates containment isolation phase A Verifies AFW pumps running - NO Manually starts AFW pumps - NO Determines NO AFW pumps available (A OOS, B start fail & steam-driven AFW pump overspeed trip). Dispatches local operators to check B AFW pum Verifies LHSI pumps running Verifies SW pumps running Checks if main steamlines should be isolated Verifies MSTVs and bypass valves closed - NO Manually closes MSTVs Checks if CDA or QS is required - NO Verifies SI flow indicated Verifies AFW flow - NO Checks S/G NR level >11%[22%1 - NO Verifies AFW flow > 340 gpm - NO Manually starts pumps/directs local valve realignment as directed by US to get AFW > 340 gpm - NO Keeps US informed of plant status Page 20

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7a/b (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS RO Performs lOAs in response to reactor trip with Si per E-0 Verifies reactor tripped Verifies AC emergency busses energized Manually initiates SI Performs subsequent actions of E-0 as directed by US Manually initiates containment isolation phase A Verifies HHSI pumps running Keeps US informed of plant status US Directs response to reactor trip and failure of main steam isolation per E-0 Obtains verification of reactor and turbine trip Determines electric plant status Directs manual SI/phase A Monitors foldout page including direction to RO to stoD all RCPs if subcooling lost Directs subsequent actions Ensures manual closure of MSTVs Transitions to FR- . Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 21

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 7c BRIEF DESCRIPTION: Loss of secondary heat sink with RCS bleed and feed INDICATIONS: No AFW flow indicated All SGs wide-range levels <12% RCS pressure > SG pressures Hot-leg temperatures >3500 F POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Observes all SG wide-range levels <12% Verifies HHSI flow indicated Verifies instrument air aligned to containment Opens all reactor head vents and PRZR vents Verifies applicable E-0 actions per FR-H.1 attachment 5 Keeps US informed of plant status RO Checks RCS pressure > SG pressures Checks hot-leg temperatures >3500 F Stops all RCPs Places all PRZR heaters in PULL-TO-LOCK Checks Si actuated Checks at least one charging pump running Checks Si valve alignment Resets both trains of SI and containment isolation phase A Checks PRZR block MOVs energized and open 1 Opens both PRZR PORVs - NO 1 Verifies adequate RCS bleed path - NO 1 Closes charging pump recirc valves Page 22

13. Keeps US informed of plant status Page 23

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7c (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Determines secondary heat sink is required Determines bleed and feed is immediately required Directs response to loss of secondary heat sink per FR-H. 1 Directs RCPs stopped and PRZR heaters in PTL Directs bleed and feed alignment Transitions to ES-1.3 if RWST level decreases to <23% Classifies event as a Notification of Unusual Event per EPIP-1.01, tabs A-1 0, B-8 and G-3 (may elect to classify as an Alert per tab M-3 based on SEM judgment) Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 24

SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR FACILITY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS SETUP Recall IC # 31 Ensure EOL curve book in place Verify auxiliary steam isolated from unit 2 (U2_AS_54) Verify 1-FW-P-3A tagged out per MOP-31.01 (red sticker on CIS) Verify steam dumps in steam pressure mode Verify analog trend pens set up for Tave, Tref, PDTT level & VCT level Verify the following malfunctions are preloaded: MMS0501/02/03 (MSTV fails to close when rq'd); TD = 0 sec; trigger = N/A MFW2302 (B AFW pump trips on overcurrent); TD = 5 sec; trigger = Si1 CONDUCTING THE EXAMINATION: Unfreeze the simulator and begin the exam. Perform 1-PT-17.1, Control Rod Operability Test Initiation: Shift orders Response: Respond as safeguards watchstander when requested to obtain bank overlap counter reading (counter reads 613) PT-1445 fails high (event 2). Initiation: MRC0702: TD = 10 sec; ramp = 10 sec; start deg = 50; stop deg =

100; trigger = N/A NOTE: Allow timer to run until the next malfunction (MRC32) is implemented. Response: As SS, state that a work request will be generated and l&C will be notified of the failure. As I&C, reply that a planner will initiate a work package for troubleshooting & repair. PORV-1456 leak (event 3). Initiation: MRC32: TD = 20 sec; ramp = 10 sec; start deg = 0; stop deg = 3; trigger = N/A. When crew attempts to close block MOV, takesimloch variable RCMOV535_RACKIN = F; monitor valve position using Page 25

RCMOV535.

Page 26

NOTE: Ensure PORV leak does NOT result in pressure decrease (preclude entry into AP-44, which requires a unit trip if the block MOV cannot be closed) Response: As SS state that, due to a history of the block MOV stem binding, station management does not desire to attempt to close the block MOV until cold shutdown is reached. When notified by US of excessive RCS leakage, direct US to commence unit shutdown without delay. As safeguards watchstander, report that breaker thermal OIL has actuated. If directed to reset, report that the reset button was pushed but didn't feel like it reset the O/L. Power reduction due to excessive RCS leakage (event 4). Initiation: US review of TS-3.7.1.2 and decision to remove unit from service to comply with the action statement. Response: As SS, concur with US decision to remove unit from service. LT-1476 fails low (event 5) Initiation: MFW0103; TD = 30 sec; ramp = 10 sec; start deg = 50; stop deg =

0; trigger = N/A Response: As SS, state that a work request will be generated and l&C will be notified of the failure. As l&C, reply that a planner will initiate a work package for troubleshooting & repair. Steam-driven AFW pump spuriously starts/fails (event 6). Initiation: Start pump: Simloch variables MSTV1 11A(B)_RATE=0, then take simloch variables MSTV11 1A(B) = 0.1 to give mid-position, then =

1.0 to fully open; When BOP places switches to CLOSE, take rate to 300. Immediately after valves begin to close, trip pump by taking simloch variable MS_286 = 0 Response: As outsides watchstander, report steam exhausting from the TDAFW pump. Respond as safeguards watchstander when requested to locally check steam-driven AFW pump that the overspeed trip latch is broken. As SS, state that a work request will be generated and mechanical maintenance will be notified of the failure. As mechanical maintenance, reply that the trip latch repair will require approximately one hour to accomplish. Steam break with failure of MS isolation (event 7a/b) Initiation: MMS0901: TD = 50 sec; ramp = 5 sec; start deg = 0; sbp deg = 100; trigger = N/A. When at least two S/G wide-range levels decrease to Page 27

<12%, remove malfunctions MMS0501/02/03 (MSTV fails to close when required)

NOTE: Allow timer to run until B AFW pump trip . Response: Respond as turbine building watchstander that the turbine building is engulfed in stea . Loss of secondary heat sink with RCS bleed and feed (event 7c) Initiation: Previous events cause loss of AFW and SI causes loss of MFW. SG levels decrease below bleed and feed setpoint due to failure of MSTVs to auto-clos . Response: Respond as electrical maintenance that B AFW pump breaker has overcurrent trips.

IIl. TERMINATION CRITERIA: Upon completion of RCS bleed and feed alignment %yclosing charging pump recirc valves (step 26 of FR-H. 1),

OR At the discretion of the evaluato Page 28

EVALUATION SCENARIO CONTENT SUMMARY Total Number of Malfunctions: 8 Malfunctions Occurring During EOP Performance: 2 B AFW pump start failure MS isolation failure Abnormal Events: 4 PT-1445 fails high PCV-1456 block MOV fails to close LT-1476 fails low Steam-driven AFW pump spurious start/failure Major Transients: 2 MS line break in turbine bldg RCS bleed and feed EOPs Used: 2 EOP Contingencies Entered: 0 Simulator Run Time: 90 minutes EOP Run Time: 45 minutes Crew Critical Tasks: 2 Page 29

Appendix D Scenario Outline Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Form ES-fl-I Facility: North Anna Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: Operators: (RO)

(BOP)

(SRO)

Initial Conditions: BOL. Mode 1, 564 degrees. J EDG is OOS for corrective governor maintenance. No other equipment is OOS. No surveillance tests are in progres Turnover: There are thunderstorms in the area with winds clocking at 60 mph. Large golf ball size hail has also been reported. Unit 2 SRO is coordinating AP-41, Severe Weathe Slight tremors on the order of 2.1 on the Richter scale have been detecte POD: Perform 1-PT-60.2 Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature, with annulus temperature element 1-LM-TE-100-15 inoperable. Conduct a power increase from 50% to 100%. The system dispatcher has asked that this power increase be expedited to deal with an expected high peak demand towards the end of day shif Ev Malf. N Event Event ent Type* Description N a N/A N (R) Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature 1 N/A R (R) Power increase from 50%

2 MMS0102 I (B) FT-475 failure low (controlling channel)

3 MRD07 R,l (R) TM-408F failure low 3a MEL1304 C (B) Loss of Vital bus 1-IV 4 MCC0502 C (R) RCP thermal barrier failure CC-TV-1 16B 5 MRC0302 M (A) Large break LOCA 6 MEL01 C (A) LOOP 7 MSI1501 C (A) A LHSI pump trip (Loss of emergency coolant recirc)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor (R)O, (B)OP, (A)LL

NORTH ANNA POWER STATION RO/SRO NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAM SIMULATOR EVALUATION SCENARIO NRC-2 PROGRAM: RO/SRO Initial License Training DESCRIPTION: Large Break Loss of Coolant Accident /

Loss of Offsite Power LENGTH: 90 minutes AUTHOR: R. F. Aiello REVISION DATE: 8/15/00 REVIEWED BY:

Senior Operations Engineer Date APPROVED BY:

NRC Chief Examiner (Surry) Date Page 1 of 26

EVALUATION SCENARIO OBJECTIVES TERMINAL OBJECTIVE: During normal and abnormal plant conditions, the Shift Operating Crew will perform control room operations in accordance with (lAW) approved plant procedures ensuring that the health and safety of the public is protected and the integrity of the plant maintaine ENABLING OBJECTIVES: Given specific plant conditions, plant procedures, and a shift turnover, respond to the following events IAW approved plant procedures: Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature Power increase from 50% FT-475 failure low (controlling channel)

d TM-408F failure low Loss of Vital bus 1-IV RCP thermal barrier failure / CC-TV-1 16B auto close failure Large break LOCA Loss of offsite power A LHSI pump trip (loss of emergency coolant recirculation) Given abnormal plant conditions, mitigate the adverse consequences of the following events IAW approved plant procedures: Identify abnormalities while assessing actual system response with respect to predicted system respons Investigate the cause and effect of abnormalities in system performanc Implement applicable procedure Perform immediate actions from memory. Given abnormal plant conditions, implement the applicable on-site and off-site reports and notifications IAW approved plant procedures. Given normal and abnormal plant conditions, using the following principles for operational effectiveness as they apply to all operators, conduct plant operations IAW approved plant procedures: Plant and control room communicatio Plant/Control Board monitorin Plant/Control Board manipulatio Operational problem solvin Use of OPs/APs and Technical Specification Use of EOPs lAW EOP Rules of Usag Annunciator recognition and respons Written communications/log ALARA awarenes Page 2 of 26

EVALUATION SCENARIO OBJECTIVES (cont'd)

5. Given normal and abnormal plant conditions, using the following principles for operational effectiveness as they apply to the Unit Supervisor (US), conduct plant operations lAW approved plant procedures: Team performance managemen Problem solvin Decision analysi Action plannin Self-checking.

6. During abnormal and emergency events, the shift operating crew shall apply techniques of teamwork and self-checking lAW established work practices and operating guideline Page 3 of 26

EVALUATION SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Initial Conditions: Mode 1, 50% power Turnover: Power increase from 50% to 100% power is in progress following main feed pump breaker repair. The system dispatcher has asked that this power increase be expedited to deal with an expected high peak demand towards the end of day shif J EDG is OOS for corrective governor maintenance. Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature PT with annulus temperature element 1-LM-TE-100-15 inoperable. Use the provided printout of group review #1.

Synopsis: Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature. After a 5%

power increase (or at lead examiner direction) the controlling steam flow channel on A S/G (FT-475) fails low causing FCV-478 to automatically close. Operator action is required to manually control A S/G level and select the other steam flow channel for level control input. The crew responds per 1-AP-3. Once the plant is stabilized, Technical Specifications are consulted and the crew briefed on the effects of the failure. Next, TM-408F fails low generating erroneous Tref input to rod control. If rods are in AUTO, inward rod movement occurs and operators respond per 1-AP-1.1 taking rod control to MANUAL. Next, the Vital Bus Inverter for Vital Bus 1-IV will fail resulting in a loss of vital bus 1-IV. The crew should identify the bus failure and enter 0-AP-10, "Loss of Electrical Power". The crew will be informed that the Inverter has failed and they will need to re-energize the vital bus via the SOLA transformer. The Unit Supervisor (US) should refer to technical specifications and declare the vital bus inoperable since it is being supplied by the SOLA transforme Once the bus is re-energized the next event will occur. Following plant stabilization, the B RCP thermal barrier HX experiences a large leak and CC-TV-1 16B fails to automatically close on high flow. The operators respond per AR-C-C4. After thermal barrier return isolation, RCP shaft vibration begins to increase enough to eventually require a reactor and B RCP trip per AR-A-E6. When B RCP is tripped, the leak becomes a large break loss of coolant accident on the B RCS loop. The crew responds per E-0. While verifying FW isolation, a loss of offsite power occurs. Since the J EDG is OOS, only the H 4kV bus re-energizes on the H EDG. Train A safeguards loads fail to restart and must be manually restarted. An RWST rupture occurs, which results in rapidly decreasing RWST level. The crew transitions to FR-P.1 momentarily, then to E-1. Due to low RWST level, the crew transitions to 1-ES-1.3. Then, the A LHSI pump trips causing a loss of all LHSI. With no LHSI pumps running, transition is made to ECA-1.1. The exercise is concluded upon restoration of LHSI flow (return of J bus from SBO EDG) or at the evaluator's discretion. The event is classified after scenario completion as a Site Area Emergency per EPIP-1.01, Tab B- Page 4 of 26

Event summary:

EVENT # DESCRIPTION 1a Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature K/A: 2.1.23 (3.9/ Power increase from 50%

K/A: 2.2.2 (4.0/3.5)

2 FT-475 fails low (A S/G FRV closes)

K/A: 035K401 (3.6/3.8)

3 TM-408F fails low K/A: 001K602 (2.8/3.3)

3a Loss of Vital bus 1-IV K/A: 062K301 (3.5/3.9)

4 B RCP TBHX failure / CC-TV-1 16B auto close failure K/A: 008K 104 (3.3/3.8); 003K1 12 (3.0/3.3)

5 Large break loss of coolant accident K/A: EPE 011; EK309 (4.2/4.5); EK312 (4.4/4.6)

6 Loss of offsite power (loss of J 4kV bus)

K/A: EPE055; EA106 (4.1/4.5)

7 A LHSI pump trip (loss of emergency coolant recirc)

K/A: EO1; EA I (3.7/3.7); EK22 (3.5/3.8)

Crew Critical Steps:

EVENT # DESCRIPTION 6 Ensure one train of safeguards is actuated and running prior to transitioning from E-0 7 Stop SI and QS pumps upon reaching 3% in the RWST Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow per ECA-1.1 Individual Critical Steps:

The bolded individual actions listed under the respective positions (RO, US, etc.) are for use during evaluations to identify steps that are critical to the individual positio Page S of 26

EVALUATION SCENARIO PRE-EXERCISE BRIEFING Review the following with students: Primary responsibility of the student is to operate the simulator as if it were the actual plan The evaluators will observe teamwork skills, communication, and the crew's ability to safely operate the plant during the simulator examination. This includes individual

& crew performanc If you recognize an incorrect decision, response, answer, analysis, action, or interpretation by another crew member but fail to correct it, then the evaluator may assume that you agree with the incorrect ite The crew should keep a rough log during each scenario sufficient to complete necessary formal log entrie The simulator instructor facility operator will perform all of the functions of personnel needed outside the control room are Before the examination begins, crew members may perform a control board walkdown for up to 10 minute . The following are initial conditions for this exam (in shift turnover package, but may be covered verbally if needed): Time in core life - 4000 MWD/MTU Reactor power and power history - 100%-50% 4 hr ago Turbine status - online RCS boron concentration - 1332 ppm A BAST boron concentration is 14,100 ppm Temperature - 5640 F Pressure - 2235 psig Xenon - Increasing following 100%-50% downpower 4 hr ag Core cooling - forced Tech. Spec. LCO(s) in effect

- 3.8.1.1 Action b (1 hrs); J EDG OOS (governor) Tagouts in effect - J EDG Significant problems/abnormalities - None Evolutions/maintenance for the coming shift - Return to 100% power this shif Expedite to meet system pea Unit 2 status - Mode 5 on RHR Ensure students understand examination schedule and that a break will be necessary between scenarios to allow simulator initial condition setup. Cover exam security rules to be observed by students both during and after the exam lAW the latest revision of AG-017 or NUREG-1021 as applicable. Before the examination begins, make crew position assignments and allow students to ask any questions concerning the administration of the tes Page 6 of 26

-

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: la BRIEF DESCRIPTIO N: Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature Test (1-PT-60.2) with Annulus Temperature Element (1-LM-TE-100-15) inoperable.

INDICATIONS: Shift orders POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by US RO Reviews containment temperature elements group review (provided). Determines average temperature of the operable elements at annulus elevation 329 f . Enters the average value for the inoperable element into the compute . Waits at least one minute for the computer to updat . Prints the containment weighted average temperatur . Records data in the P . Performs follow-on tasks and informs US that PT is complete.

US Coordinates/directs performance of PT-6 . Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 7 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 1 BRIEF DESC ;RIPTION: Unit is at reduced power (50%) and is directed to return to 100%

power.

INDICATION S: Notification by System Shift turnover POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Increases turbine load at the rate determined by the U . Keeps US informed of plant status RO Maintains TreflTavg approx equal during uppower At steady state power with Tavg within 1°F of Tref, places rods in AUTO Keeps US informed of plant status US Coordinates and directs uppower evolution Keeps SS informed of plant status Page 8 of 26

-

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 2 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: A S/G controlling steam flow FT-475 fails low. The A S/G FRV requires manual operation. The channel is called OOS and compensatory actions are initiated per AP-3.

INDICATIONS: Annunciator F-El, SG A FEED > STEAM Annunciator F-Fl, SG A LEVEL ERROR FI-475 off scale low FCV-478 closing in AUTO Decreasing level in A S/G POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Recognizes failure of FT-475 and responds as directed by US Compares to other SG FT's and verifies no off-normal conditions on other SG FT's Notifies US of failure Takes manual control of FCV-478, restores steam/feed flow balance and stabilizes SG level Selects alternate SG steam FT channel for control and returns FCV-478 to automatic RO Assists BOP as directed by US US Directs stabilization of plant conditions Directs compensatory action per AP-3 Verifies BOP determination of SG FT status Determines which b/s to trip and effects on plant of tripping b/s. Provides this info to RO/BOP for guidanc . Notifies SS of plant status Page 9 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 2 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Ensures Tech Spec requirements are met (cont'd) Notifies I&C of FT-475 failure and directs initiation of PWO Page 10 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 3 BRIEF DESC *RIPTION: TM-408F loses power. Rod control Tref fails low. Rods step in if in AUTO. The crew responds per AP-1.1.

INDICATION S: Annunciator B-A7, Tavg-Tref DEVIATION Tref input on Tavg-Tref recorder failed low Control rods stepping in if in AUTO POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by US.

RO Responds to TM-408F failure per AP-1.11: Determines rods should NOT be moving, places rods in MANUAL & verifies rod motion stopped Verifies rod low-low insertion limits not exceeded Increases Tave to match Tref using rods or dilution as directed by US Checks PRZR pressure and level stable Checks rods above low insertion limit and restores if necessary as directed by US Informs US of plant status US Directs response per AP- . Informs SS/I&C of TM-408F failure Directs PWO initiation Page 11 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 3a BRIEF DESCRIPTION: A loss of vital bus 1-IV occurs. The crew responds per Q-AP-10.

INDICATIONS: Numerous status lights due to de-energized ch IV instruments Vital bus 1-IV voltmeter decreases to zero 3. Annunciator H-A4, VITAL BUS 1-IV INVERTER TROUBLE POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Identifies annunciator 1H-A4, VITAL BUS 1-IV INVERTER TROUBLE Identifies loss of vital bus 1-I . Notifies US of vital bus los . Directs safeguards operator to investigate loss of vital bus 1-I . Enters 0-AP-10 and performs electrical system diagnosti . Restores vital bus from SOLA transformer per MOP-26.63 RO Assists BOP as directed by US.

US Directs BOP to enter 0-AP-1 . Directs electrical department to investigate 1-IV vital bus and inverte . Directs BOP to energize the vital bus via the SOLA transforme . Refers to TS 3.8.2.1 and MOP-26.63 and declares the vital bus inoperabl Page 12 of 26

-

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 4 BRIEF DESCRIPTION: B RCP thermal barrier HX (TBHX) fails. CC-TV-116B fails to auto-close on high flow requiring manual closure. AR-C-C4 is performe After CC-TV-1 16B closure, B RCP shaft vibration increases requiring a reactor and B RCP trip.

INDICATIONS: Annunciator C-C4, RCP A-B-C THERMAL BARR CC HI-LO FLOW, alarms (CC-TV-1 16B fails) Annunciator C-D4, RCP A-B-C THERM BARR CC HI TEMP, alarm . Annunciator A-E6, RCP 1B VIBRATION ALERT/DANGER POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Assists RO as directed by US Reports shaft high vibration condition (RCP vibration monitor panel) Performs E-0 immediate actions when directed by US RO Recognizes RCP TBHX failure & informs US Performs actions as directed by AR-C-C4 Manually closes CC-TV-116B NOTE TO EVALUATOR: After operator has depressed the CLOSE pushbutton, inform the booth operato Verifies seal injection flow to B RCP Monitors B RCP temperatures Performs actions as directed by AR-A-E6 Trips reactor & B RCP when directed by US Page 13 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 4 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Directs mitigative actions IAW AR-C-C4 and A-E6 Directs CC-TV-116B closure Directs reactor trip followed by B RCP trip due to high shaft vibration Informs SS of plant status Page 14 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 5 &6 BRIEF DESCRIPTIO1N: In response to a large-break LOCA, a reactor trip & SI has occurre Operators perform actions of E-0. While verifying FW isolation per E-0, a loss of offsite power occurs and train A ESF loads fail to restart requiring manual restart. E-0 is completed and transition is then made to E-1.

INDICATIONS: Reactor trip directed or actuates Rod bottom lights on and RTBs/BYBs open SI alarms & ESF equipment auto starts Switchyard deenergizes & only H emergency bus reenergizes (J EDG OOS)

CREW CRITICAL STEPS: Ensure one train of safeguards is actuated and running prior to transitioning from E-0 POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Responds to reactor trip and SI per E-0 Verifies turbine trip Manually initiates SI Verifies feedwater isolation Manually initiates containment isolation phase A Verifies AFW pumps running - NO Manually starts the A AFW pump Verifies LHSI pumps running Verifies SW pumps running - NO Manually starts the A SW pump Checks if main steam lines should be isolated Manually initiates CDA Page 15 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 5 & 6 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP(cont) Responds to reactor trip and SI per E-0 (cont'd) Verifies CC pumps stopped Verifies QS pumps running Verifies HHSI and LHSI flow Verifies proper AFW alignment and flow Performs MSLB & SGTR diagnostics Responds to loss of J bus as directed by US Informs US of plant status RO Responds to reactor trip and SI per E-0 Verifies reactor tripped Verifies both AC emergency busses energized Manually initiates SI Performs continuous action page items as directed by US Checks RCS subcooling and HHSI flow, then trips all RCPs Closes all charging pump recirc valves Manually actuates CDA Page 16 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 5 & 6 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS RO Performs subsequent actions of E-0 as directed by US Manually initiates containment isolation phase A Verifies charging pumps running Checks RCS Tave Checks PRZR PORVs/spray valves closed Checks RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria Performs LOCA diagnostics US Directs response to reactor trip per E-0 Obtains verification of reactor trip Directs entry into AP-1 0 for loss of emergency bus Directs manual SI/phase A if required Monitors continuous action page items: Direction to RO to close charging pump recirc valves if required by subcoolinglPhase B actuation/RCS pressure Directs manual initiation of CDA Directs manual start of train A SW pump Transitions to appropriate plant procedure (E-1 or appropriate FRP) Informs SS as to status of plant Page 17 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT: 7 BRIEF DESCRIPTIO N: With a large break LOCA/LOOP, only train A ESF is running (J EDG OOS). From E-0, FR-P.1 is briefly entered followed by transition to either FR-Z.1 if needed or E-1. When RWST level decreases below 23%, transition to ES-1.3 is made, after which A LHSI pump trip From ES-1.3, with no LHSI pumps, ECA-1.1 is entered.

INDICATIONS: Cntmt radiation & sump level indications abnormal Safety injection actuated and injecting RWST level dropping RCS cold leg temperature (<285 0 F for FR-P.1) Annunciator J-A5, LHSI PP A LO OR OL TRIP CREW CRITICAL ST'EPS: Stop charging/QS pumps upon reaching 3% in the RWST Make up to the RWST and minimize RWST outflow per ECA-1 .1 POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Performs actions of E-1 as directed: Checks for faulted S/Gs Checks S/G levels and secondary radiation Checks QS/casing cooling/RS pump status Checks if EDGs should be stopped - NO Identifies rapidly decreasing RWST level and informs US Performs actions of ES-1.3 as directed: Verifies proper SW system operation Verifies recirc spray pumps aligned and running Identifies A LHSI pump tripped and informs US Verifies LHSI pumps running - NO Aligns SI system for cold-leg recirc - NO Page 18 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS BOP Performs actions of ECA-1.1 as directed (cont'd) Checks for cold leg recirc capability - NO Resets Si recirc mode Maintains intact S/G levels 11 - 50% Initiates RCS cooldown using SIG PORVs Restores J bus from SBO EDG, then aligns and starts B LHSI Informs US of plant status RO Performs actions of FR-P.1 as directed: Checks RCS press > 225 [450] psig - NO Checks LHSI flow > 650 gpm Performs actions of E-1 as directed: Check RCP trip and charging pump recirc criteria Verifies Si, phase A and AMSAC reset Checks PRZR PORVs and block valves Checks if Si should be terminated - NO Performs actions of ES-1.3 as directed: Resets both trains of SI Checks charging pump status Aligns Si system for cold-leg recirc - NO Page 19 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS RO Performs actions of ECA-1.1 as directed:

(cont'd) Checks cold-leg recirc capability available - NO Verifies Si reset Aligns makeup to the RWST If RWST level <3%, stops charging/QS pumps Checks containment air recirc fans Verifies only one charging pump running Checks if an RCP should be started - NO Establishes minimum Si as directed Informs US of plant status Page 20 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US Determines FR-P. 1 N/A for LBLOCA Directs response to LBLOCA per E-1: Determines Si cannot be terminated Transitions to appropriate procedure or FRP if required by red/orange path CSFST:

1) FR-Z.1 if CNMT pressure > 28 psia 2) ES-1.3 if RWST level < 23% Directs response to decreasing RWST level per ES-1.3: Determines flow path from containment sump to RCS cannot be establishe Transitions to ECA-1.1 for loss of both LHSI pumps Page 21 of 26

EXPECTED OPERATOR ACTIONS (cont'd)

EVENT: 7 (cont'd)

POSITION TIME EXPECTED ACTIONS US (cont'd) Directs response to LBLOCA per ECA-1.1: Directs addition of makeup to the RWST Directs RCS cooldown If RWST level >3%:

1) Reduces containment spray to minimum 2) Verifies no backflow from RWST to sump & determines RCP could not be started 3) Determines minimum SI flow (figure 1) & directs action accordingly If RWST level < 3%, directs all charging and QS pumps to be stopped Classifies event as a Site Area Emergency per EPIP-1.01, Tab B-3 Informs SS of status of unit Page 22 of 26

SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR FACILITY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS SETUP Recall IC # 32 Ensure BOL curve book in place Verify auxiliary steam isolated from unit 2 (U2.AS_54) Verify channel IV SF/FF/1st stage pressure selected for SGWLC Verify analog trend pens set up for Tave, Tref, PDTT level & VCT level Verify 1J EDG T.O. (red sticker on breaker) Verify the following malfunctions are preloaded: Switch OIR SWP1AASTART; TD = 0 sec; O/R = OFF Switch O/R FWP3AASTART; TD = 0 sec; O/R = OFF Switch O/R FWP3AASTOP; TD = 0 sec; O/R = OFF 11. CONDUCTING THE EXAMINATION: Unfreeze the simulator and begin the exa Perform 1-PT-60.2, Reactor Containment Average Air Temperature Initiation: Crew should begin in response to shift turnove . Response: As SS, acknowledge completion of surveillanc Power increase from 50% (event 1). Initiation: Crew should begin in response to shift turnover. If slow to begin, call as System Dispatcher and prompt commencement of load increas . Response: Acknowledge load dispatcher/plant management notifications of the load increase. Respond as field operator in response to notification of starting/stopping plant equipmen FT-475 fails low (A SIG FRV closes) (event 2). Initiation: MMS01 02; TD = 10 sec; ramp = 60 sec; start deg = 50; stop deg =

0; trigger = N/A Response: As SS state that a work request wil be generated and l&C will be notified of the failure. As I&C, reply that a planner will initiate a work package for troubleshooting & repai Page 23 of 26

SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR FACILITY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd) TM-408F fails low (event 3). Initiation: After channel IlIl is selected and rod control is returned to AUTO, implement MRD07 (continuous rod insertion in AUTO); TD = 20 sec; trigger = N/A. Meter override: TI-408B (Tref); TD = 19 sec; ramp = 1 sec; 100% negative deviatio . Response: Respond as SS/I&C to notification of TM-408B failure. As SS state that a work request will be generated and I&C will be notified. As l&C, reply that a planner will initiate a work package for troubleshooting/repai Loss of Vital bus I -IV (event 3a) Initiation: MEL1304; TD = 30 sec; trigger = N/A Response: About 2 minutes after requested, report as safeguards watchstander that the 1-IV inverter appears to have smoked, the outside is charred. Report as the electricians that the inverter is damaged and cannot be re-energized. Also report that the 1-IV vital bus has been checked and has been given the "OK" to re-energize. B RCP TBHX failure I CC-TV-116B auto close failure / RCP vibration (event 4). Initiation: MCCO502; TD = 40 sec; ramp = 5 sec; deg = 100; trigger = N/ Prevent auto-closure of CC-TV-1 16B using CCTV1 16_RATE(2) = 0;-,

monitor valve position using CCTV1 16(2). When RO pushes CLOSE button, take CCTV1 16_RATE(2) = 1200. MRC3902; TD = 50 sec; ramp = 5 sec; start deg = 0; stop deg = 12; trigger = N/A.

NOTE: Allow timer to run after TBHX failure until the RCP vibration malfunction is implemented (requires time for the vibrations to build in after the malfunction is implemented.) Response: Acknowledge direction to auxiliary building watchstander for verification of RCP seal injection flows. Large break loss of coolant accident (event 5) Initiation: When the B RCP is tripped, implement malfunction MRC0302; TD =

60 sec; trigger = N/A. Response: Respond as HP if directed to survey the main steam lines and outside containment. After 10-15 minutes, report elevated general area radiation in all areas near containmen Page 24 of 26

SIMULATOR INSTRUCTOR FACILITY OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS (cont'd) Loss of offsite power (loss of B 4kV bus) (event 6) Initiation: After B MFW pump is placed in PTL, implement malfunction MEL01; TD = 70 sec; trigger = N/A. After unit-2 EDGs reenergize the emergency busses, implement malfunctions MSWO104 and 0105 (unit-2 SW pumps trip); TD = 0 sec; trigger = N/ . Response: If requested, respond as safeguards watchstander to align alternate power supply to the J emergency bus. If requested, swap common RM power supply using RMSALTSUPPLY=T. If requested to throttle AFW flow to A SG, take FWMOV100DRATE=0, then FWMOV100D=0.9, 0.8, et A LHSI pump trip/RWST rupture (loss of emergency coolant recirc) (event 7). Initiation: Immediately after LOOP, implement MQS07 (RWST rupture). After transition from FR-P.1 to either FR-Z.1 or back to E-1, implement malfunction MSI1501; TD = 80 sec; trigger = N/ . Response: Report as Health Physics that water is issuing from the side of the RWST about three feet above the bottom edge. When directed as safeguards watchstander to check out the A LHSI pump, wait 1-3 minutes and report as follows:

- If the pump is still running, state that the pump is much noisier than usual and getting wors If the pump has tripped, state that top of the motor casing is very hot with burnt insulation smell in the room. The pump shaft will not rotate (seized) by han If asked as mechanical maintenance about J EDG, state that the governor is disassembled and awaiting parts arriving tomorro Respond as HP as in event 5. Surveys may now include areas around containment. Acknowledge requests as Chemistry to take periodic S/G activity samples (no activity).

When requested to restore J bus from SBO EDG, delay completion of the alignment until ECA-1.1 has been entered. Then, use PEDS to align the SBO EDG to supply D transfer bus per 0-OP-6.4.

Ill. TERMINATION CRITERIA: Upon reduction of SI flow to minimum or trip of all pumps with RWST suction (step 17 or 30 of ECA-1.1),

OR At the discretion of the evaluato Page 25 of 26

EVALUATION SCENARIO CONTENT SUMMARY 1. Total Number of Malfunctions: 8 2. Malfunctions Occurring During EOP Performance: 1 A LHSI pump trip / loss of emergency coolant recirc 3. Abnormal Events: 5 FT-475 fails low TM-408 fails low Loss of Vital bus 1-IV RCP thermal barrier failure CC-TV-1 16B auto close failure 4. Major Transients: 2 Large break loss of coolant accident Loss of offsite power 5. EOPs Used: 2 6. EOP Contingencies Entered: 1 7. Simulator Run Time: 90 minutes 8. EOP Run Time: 45 minutes 9. Crew Critical Tasks: 3 Page 26 of 26