Information Notice 1993-67, Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:U -AU UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:U                             -AU


COMMISSION
UNITED STATES


===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION


NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT PERSONNEL
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-67:     BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION
 
STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT
 
PERSONNEL


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating
nuclear power


licenses or construction
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for


permits for nuclear power reactors.
reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
information


Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing thissteam driven


notice to remind addressees
notice to remind addressees   of  the hazards  associated      with


of the hazards associated
injection (HPCI)
coolant injection systems such as the high pressure coolant at BWRs and the


with steam driven coolant injection
system and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system                        will


systems such as the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI)system and the reactor core isolation
auxiliary feedwater system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients        and   consider


cooling (RCIC) system at BWRs and the auxiliary
review the information for applicability to their facilities                                  X


feedwater
actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions    therefore, no


system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients
contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;
specific action or written response is required.


will review the information
Background


for applicability
the HPCI turbine


to their facilities
The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect        event    if the normal


and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
casing and associated exhaust piping from an overpressure Quad Cities Station, exhaust path to the suppression pool becomes blocked.             At


However, suggestions
in series with a


X contained
two 40.6-cm [16-inch] stainless steel discs are installed                  sensor


in this information
6.4-cm [2.5-inch] spacer between them to allow      for  a  pressure


notice are not NRC requirements;
while  serving    no  control    function, instrumentation line. The pressure sensor,                              to  alert  the
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background


The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect the HPCI turbine casing and associated
actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9      kPa  [10    psig]
                                                                          of the HPCI


exhaust piping from an overpressure
operators that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range The HPCI high


event if the normal exhaust path to the suppression
exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25      to  30  psig].-
                                                                            and is sensed by


pool becomes blocked. At Quad Cities Station, two 40.6-cm [16-inch]  
exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] piping
stainless


steel discs are installed
the  section      of


in series with a 6.4-cm [2.5-inch]
pressure sensors located downstream from where                        piping. The
spacer between them to allow for a pressure sensor instrumentation


line. The pressure sensor, while serving no control function, actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig] to alert the operators
containing the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust vertically over the


that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range of the HPCI exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].- The HPCI high exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] and is sensed by pressure sensors located downstream
section of piping containing the rupture discs      is mounted


from where the section of piping containing
greater than


the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust piping. The section of piping containing
turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure    inner  disc  to rupture


the rupture discs is mounted vertically
1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line    will  cause  the


over the turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure greater than 1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the inner disc to rupture and impact the outer disc, releasing
steam  into  the   HPCI   room.


steam into the HPCI room.Description
and impact the outer disc, releasing


of Circumstances
==Description of Circumstances==
Edison


During a quarterly
During a quarterly inservice test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth        line  rupture


inservice
9, 1993,  the  exhaust      steam


test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth
Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June


Edison Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June 9, 1993, the exhaust steam line rupture 9308100248 F QrRi
9308100248 F                                                                     QrRi


IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly


steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double doors that are part of the secondary
contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after


containment
the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms


boundary were also blown open. The floor latch on the inner containment
were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double


door was bent; the outer doors were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately
doors that are part of the secondary containment boundary were also blown


35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated
open. The floor latch on the inner containment door was bent; the outer doors


by automatic isolation
were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately


of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature
35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated by automatic


about 20 seconds into the event.Discussion
isolation of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature about


Upon investigating
20 seconds into the event.


the event, the licensee determined
Discussion


that water had accumulated
Upon investigating the event, the licensee determined that water had


in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed
accumulated in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for


a reliability-centered
the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed a


maintenance
reliability-centered maintenance study which recommended the level switches be


study which recommended
included in the preventive maintenance program but the recommendation had not


the level switches be included in the preventive
been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level


maintenance
switches were also found to be inoperable.


program but the recommendation
The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine


had not been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level switches were also found to be inoperable.
casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed the air in the 40.6 cm


The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed
[16 inch] line containing the rupture discs. The resulting pressure pulse


the air in the 40.6 cm[16 inch] line containing
caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as


the rupture discs. The resulting
designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal 61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the


pressure pulse caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal
vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure


61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure (see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance
(see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance and should have


and should have immediately
immediately isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure


isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure was not detected indicates
before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure


two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design
was not detected indicates two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either


pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the disc to burst, relieving
the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the


the exhaust line pressure before the downstream
disc to burst, relieving the exhaust line pressure before the downstream


pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.
pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.


While inspection
While inspection of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation from
 
corrosion or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the
 
discs are warranted for one year of service under normal conditions. The HPCI
 
and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years
 
and were not part of any scheduled inspection or preventive maintenance
 
program. When consulted about the event, the vendor advised against using the
 
spare discs in the plant storeroom because they were purchased at the same
 
time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with


of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation
new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture


from corrosion
disc during a refueling outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad


or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the discs are warranted
Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection. The rupture


for one year of service under normal conditions.
discs were inspected at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement to the


The HPCI and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years and were not part of any scheduled
preventive maintenance program that was recommended by a reliability-centered


inspection
analysis.


or preventive
I  I


maintenance
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating in the HPCI


program. When consulted
pump surveillance test. The fifth, and m6st severely. injured worker was a


about the event, the vendor advised against using the spare discs in the plant storeroom
health physics technician in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of


because they were purchased
the danger posed by the surveillance test. The test procedure contained no


at the same time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture disc during a refueling
specific guidance on room occupancy. Interviews with the workers revealed


outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection.
that they had performed the surveillance in the past and were familiar with


The rupture discs were inspected
the process. This familiarity may have led to a relaxed attitude toward


at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement
personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances they


to the preventive
sometimes evacuated the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the


maintenance
doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement over


program that was recommended
the plant paging system to alert plant personnel before the HPCI-turbine


by a reliability-centered
start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.


analysis.
A lack of constant communication between the workersand the control room may
 
have contributed to the personnel injuries. If a control room operator had
 
been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the
 
workers would have been aware of the impending turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated or the turbine manually
 
tripped before the automatic isolation caused by the high area temperatureoin
 
the HPCI room.
 
When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown
 
off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a
 
pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters [2 inches]. If the steam
 
release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the
 
HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI
 
system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been
 
analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing high
 
energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis. For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered that while the HPCI and
 
RCIC rooms were qualified for pressures of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors
 
between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].


I I IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating
The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement a preventive


in the HPCI pump surveillance
maintenance schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level


test. The fifth, and m6st severely.
switches. The licensee will review the surveillance test procedure and


injured worker was a health physics technician
evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced


in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of the danger posed by the surveillance
the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the


test. The test procedure
event at Unit 1 and is considering burst testing the removed discs to


contained
determine if they are degraded.


no specific guidance on room occupancy.
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action


Interviews
you have any questions about the information in this or written response. If


with the workers revealed that they had performed
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate notice, please contact


the surveillance
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.              Office of Nuclear


in the past and were familiar with the process. This familiarity
Brian K. Grim s, Director


may have led to a relaxed attitude toward personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances
Division of Operating Reactor Support


they sometimes
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


evacuated
Technical contacts:  Clark Vanderniet, RIII


the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR


over the plant paging system to alert plant personnel
(301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad Cities


before the HPCI-turbine
Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.A lack of constant communication
Cq~
        0cr                                                                                                                  1 cO


between the workersand
Cd)h  r-
          4
              0                                                                      OUTER RUPTURE DISC  _____
    \TO                                                                                                                                    VENT TO


the control room may have contributed
HPCI ROOM


to the personnel
INNER RUPTURE DISC


injuries.
[1 In]
                                                                              2                                  40.6 cm


If a control room operator had been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the workers would have been aware of the impending
[16 in]
                            CLOSABLE            CHECK


turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated
CHECK VALVE          VALVE        I


or the turbine manually tripped before the automatic
SUPPRESSION


isolation
50.8 cm


caused by the high area temperatureoin
LOCKED                        I                                                    [20 In]          STEAM INLET LINE


the HPCI room.When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters
OPEN                        I                                                                        FROM "B" MAIN


[2 inches]. If the steam release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing
I                        61 cm                                            STEAM LINE


high energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis.
I                        [24 In]
                                                              I


For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered
25 cm


that while the HPCI and RCIC rooms were qualified
RX BLDG          HPCI ROOM                                                    [10 In]
                                                              I


for pressures
I


of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement
POOL                                          I


a preventive
I


maintenance
D    NOTES:
            1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER


schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level switches.
RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.


The licensee will review the surveillance
2. REDUNDANT PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].


test procedure
3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].


and evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the event at Unit 1 and is considering
Figure 1 - Simplified Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line


burst testing the removed discs to determine
Attachment 2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED


if they are degraded.
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES


IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
Information                                    Date of


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Notice No.             Subject                Issuance    Issued to


If you have any questions
93-66          Switchover to Hot-Leg          08/16/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


about the information
Injection Following                        for pressurized water


in this notice, please contact the technical
A Loss-of-Coolant                          reactors.


contact listed below or the appropriate
Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grim s, Director Division of Operating
93-65          Reactor Trips Caused            08/13/93-  All holders of OLs or CPs


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
by Breaker Testing                          for nuclear power reactors.
Technical


contacts:
with Fault Protection
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified


Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
Bypassed


Notices
93-64            Periodic Testing and            08/12/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


Cq~0cr cO Cd) h r-4 0\TO SUPPRESSION
Preventive Maintenance                      for nuclear power reactors.


POOL 1 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____CLOSABLE CHECK CHECK VALVE VALVE I INNER RUPTURE DISC[1 In]2 40.6 cm[16 in]VENT TO HPCI ROOM STEAM INLET LINE FROM "B" MAIN STEAM LINE LOCKED OPEN I I I I I RX BLDG I I I I 50.8 cm[20 In]61 cm[24 In]HPCI ROOM 25 cm[10 In]D NOTES: 1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.
of Molded Case Circuit


2. REDUNDANT
Breakers


PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].Figure 1 -Simplified
93-63          Improper Use of Soluble        08/11/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line
Weld Purge Dam Material                    for nuclear power reactors.


Attachment
93-62          Thermal Stratification          08/10/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
of Water in BWR Reactor                    for boiling water reactors.


NOTICES Information
Vessels


Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 93-66 93-65 93-64 93-63 93-62 93-61 93-60 93-59 93-58 Switchover
93-61           Excessive Reactor Coolant      08/09/93   All holders of OLs or CPs


to Hot-Leg Injection
Leakage Following A Seal                    for nuclear power reactors.


Following A Loss-of-Coolant
Failure in A Reactor


Accident in Pres-surized Water Reactors Reactor Trips Caused by Breaker Testing with Fault Protection
Coolant Pump or Reactor


Bypassed Periodic Testing and Preventive
Recirculation Pump


Maintenance
93-60          Reporting Fuel Cycle and        08/04/93  All fuel cycle and materials


of Molded Case Circuit Breakers Improper Use of Soluble Weld Purge Dam Material Thermal Stratification
Materials Events to the                    licensees.


of Water in BWR Reactor Vessels Excessive
NRC Operations Center


Reactor Coolant Leakage Following
93-59          Unexpected Opening of            07/26/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


A Seal Failure in A Reactor Coolant Pump or Reactor Recirculation
Both Doors in An                          for nuclear power reactors.


Pump Reporting
Airlock


Fuel Cycle and Materials
93-58          Nonconservatism in Low-        07/26/93  All holders of OLs or CPs


Events to the NRC Operations
Temperature Overpressure                  for pressurized-water


Center Unexpected
Protection for Pressurized-                reactors.


Opening of Both Doors in An Airlock Nonconservatism
Water Reactors


in Low-Temperature
OL = Operating License


===Overpressure===
CP = Construction Permit
Protection


for Pressurized- Water Reactors 08/16/93 08/13/93-08/12/93 08/11/93 08/10/93 08/09/93 08/04/93 07/26/93 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
l


water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All fuel cycle and materials licensees.
IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


reactors.OL = Operating
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


License CP = Construction
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


Permit
orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for


l--IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information
Brian K. Grimes, Director


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Division of Operating Reactor Support


If you have any questions
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


about the information
Technical contacts:    Clark Vanderniet, RIII


in this notice, please contact the technical
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR


contact listed below or the appropriate
(301) 504-1174 Attachments:
1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad Cities


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for
Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"
2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
OFC      *OEAB:DORS      *TECH:ED          *OGCB:DORS    *DRS:R-III
Technical


contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachments:
NAME    DSkeen          JMain              PWen          CVanderniet
1. Figure 1, "Simplified


Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line" 2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information
DATE    07/08/93      , 07/08/93          07/14/93      07/14/93 OFC


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
NAME


OFC *OEAB:DORS
DATE


*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
*C:DRS:R-III


*DRS:R-III
GWright


===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
[ 07/14/93 I *SC:OEAB:DORS
DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III


*SC:OEAB:DORS
RDennig


*C/OEAB/DORS
107/15/93
                                              *C/OEAB/DORS


*C:SPLB:DSSA
AEChaffee


NAME GWright I RDennig AEChaffee
07/15/93
                                                              *C:SPLB:DSSA


CEMcCracken
CEMcCracken


DATE [ 07/14/93 1 07/15/93 07/15/93 ]07/16/93 I__ _ i OFC*D:DSSA*C/OGCB:DORS
]07/16/93
                _                        I__             i


D/DORS A^r NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V[OFFICIAL
OFC      *D:DSSA          *C/OGCB:DORS      D/DORS A^r


RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN
NAME     AThadani        GMarcus            BGrimes  t


\-IN 93-XX July XX, 1993 This information
DATE    07/24/93        07/29/93          0,S/\o/93 V


notice requires no specific action or written response.
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN


If you have any questions
\-                                          IN 93-XX


about the information
July XX, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


in this notice, please contact the technical
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


contact listed below or the appropriate
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Technical


contacts:
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Clark Vanderniet, RIII (708) 790-5594 David (301)Skeen, NRR 504-1174 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


*D:DSSA AThadani 07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS
Technical contacts:     Clark Vanderniet, RIII


*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR


*DRS:R-III
(301) 504-1174 Attachment:


===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
===List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices===
DATE J 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.


*SC:OEAB:DORS
*D:DSSA


*C/OEAB/DORS
AThadani


*C:SPLB:DSSA
07/24/93 OFC      *OEAB:DORS        *TECH:ED        *OGCB:DORS      *DRS:R-III


NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee
NAME     DSkeen          JMain          PWen            CVanderniet


CEMcCracken
DATE  J07/08/93            07/08/93        07/14/93        07/14/93 OFC      *C:DRS:R-III      *SC:OEAB:DORS  *C/OEAB/DORS    *C:SPLB:DSSA
 
NAME      GWright          RDennig        AEChaffee      CEMcCracken
 
DATE  J07/14/93
        .Y.
 
07/15/93      107/15/93      J07/16/93 OFC        C/OGCB:DORS      D/DORS
 
NAME      GMarcus  ifM    BGrimes T
 
DATE      07/.9/93        07/  /93
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1
 
IN 93-XX
 
July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
 
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
 
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of
 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
 
Brian K. Grimes, Director
 
Division of Operating Reactor Support
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
 
Technical contacts:        Clark Vanderniet, R-III
 
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR
 
(301) 504-1174 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
 
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
 
OFFICE  *OEAB:DORS      *TECH:ED        *OGCB:DORS          *DRS:R-III
 
NAME    DSkeen          JMain          l PWen                CVanderniet
 
1'I
 
DATE    07/08/93          07/08/93        07/14/93            07/14/93
  *C:DRS:RIII  *SC:OEAB:DORS    *C:OEAB:DORS      C:SPLBAS*          D: DSS 3q  %
  GWright      RDenning          AChaffee          CEMcCracken        ACThadani
 
07/14/93    [07/15/93          07/15/93        -07/2/f93              07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS    D: DORS
 
GHMarcus      BKGrimes
 
07/  /93      07/  /93 DOCUMENT NAME:    QCHPCIIN.WEN    C 5 G-4J -z--l            - 2'J 43--
                                                                    - k k- 9 CJ-
 
IN 93-XX


DATE J 07/14/93 07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93.Y.OFC C/OGCB:DORS
July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


D/DORS NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93[OFFICIAL
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information
one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


If you have any questions
Brian K. Grimes, Director


about the information
Division of Operating Reactor Support


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Technical contacts:      Clark Vanderniet, R-III


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
(301) 504-1174 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Technical


contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III (708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFFICE  *OEAB:DORS        *TECH:ED                *OGCB:DORS            *DRS:R-III


OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
NAME    DSkeen            JMain                  PWen                  CVanderniet


*TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS
DATE    07/08/93      L, 07/08/93 I_,__. . _,
                                                    07 114/93
                                                      .  . . _I_ __
                                                                  ,      I


*DRS:R-III
07/14/93
                                                                            -
  *C:DRS:RIII    S    ODORS                EAB:DORS          C:SPLB:DSSA      D:DSSA


===NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet===
GWright        R enn                      afee
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 1'I*C:DRS:RIII


*SC:OEAB:DORS
afaf'              CEMcCracken      ACThadani


*C:OEAB:DORS
07/14/93    [        3                07/j</93              07/  /93          07/  /93 C:OGCB:DORS    D:DORS


C:SPLBAS*
GHMarcus      BKGrimes
D: DSS 3q %GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken


ACThadani 07/14/93 [07/15/93
0
07/15/93 -07/2/f93
  07/ /93       07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS


D: DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
-  E7/14/93                     12:53                787905538417463837
                                                          ?03                                                                            P. 0',
                                                                                                                            IN 93-XX


C 5 G-4J -z--l -2'J 4 3-- -k k- 9 C J-
July xx. 1993 This infiIrmation notice requires no specific action noticet please contact
IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information


notice requires no specific action or written response.
or written response. It


If you have any questions
you have any questions about the information                                            inthis


about the information
the tech lcal contmct listed                              below        or  the    appropriate      Office of Nuclear


in this notice, please contact one of the technical
Roactor r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.


contacts listed below or the appropriate
Brian K. Grimes, Director


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
Division of sOrating RGOM Support


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical


contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
Technic~l contacts                                 Clark Vanderniet, R-II1
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
                                                                    (708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
(301) 604-1174 Attach            4  nt:        List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices


OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
._
                ,,1
                          *       _
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===NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet===
:ISS
DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07 114/93 07/14/93 L, _, I_,__ _ .., __ ...I_ I -*C:DRS:RIII


S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA
--            I


D:DSSA GWright R enn afaf' afee CEMcCracken
I                      nF&-flIA            I C:PBDS


ACThadani 07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS
- -.    n  J  T TV        cr


D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 0 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
P.   rAn


-E7/14/93 12:53 ?03 787905538417463837 P. 0', This infi you have the tech Roactor IN 93-XX July xx. 1993 Irmation notice requires no specific action or written response.
* Motw        rn nAsr        WDgR      I C.SPLB*DSSA          D :DSSA            _I


It any questions
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--    - -            T                    II


in this noticet please contact lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate
11 A                      tn"^"4^"                ji 1%V, fam


Office of Nuclear r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of sOrating RGOM Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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-..  ..-     _            L4Y.IIuL


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* Motw rn r nAs WDgR I C.SPLB*DSSA
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D :DSSA_I Ch ouf I 1NNI I I I;rn n I= -- 1 --.-. -T II 1 A tn"^"4^" I ji 1%V, fam rEIaCracken
July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If


ACThadani
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact


_1 OI-lqn 0, 7/ R/9M3..~07~11 9 93 07/ /93 -- 107/ /193 -IQl l 193 107/ /93--:_ _r _r.nnr 'f lRS D:DORS us BK rimes-.. ..- _ L4Y.IIuL)OCUME NA ML: QUMrLun.w~J'
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
14 JUL 93 B: 5u LETd lN11 211HM DUN 411 b0S T ,z ES:90 t 5os->X-L0 LM1 b0S IQ&#xa3;
J\1 IN 93-XX July xx, 1993 This information


notice requires no specific action or written response.
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.


If you have any questions
Brian K. Grimes, Director


about the information
Division of Operating Reactor Support


in this notice, please contact the technical
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


contact listed below or the appropriate
Technical contacts:        Clark Vanderniet, R-III


Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR


===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
(301) 504-1174 Attachment:    List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
Technical


contacts: Clark (708)Vanderniet, R-III 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR (301) 504-1174 Attachment:
*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE                                I
List of Recently Issued NRC Information


Notices*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE
OFFICE  *OEAB:DORS        *TECH:ED        _    i'O


I OFFICE *OEAB:DORS
_GC W        DRS:R-III


*TECH:ED _ _GC i'O W DRS:R-III NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet
NAME     DSkeen           JMain             PWen             CVanderniet


DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII
DATE     07/08/93         07/08/93         07/ W/93         07/   /93 C:DRS:RIII   SC:OEAB:DORS    C:OEAB:DORS        C:SPLB:DSSA      D:DSSA


SC:OEAB:DORS
GWright      RDenning        AChaffee          CEMcCracken      ACThadani


C:OEAB:DORS
07/  /93    J07/  .


C:SPLB:DSSA
/93
                              .I


D:DSSA GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken
07/  /93          07/  /93        07/  /93 C:OGCB:DORS    D:DORS


ACThadani 07/ /93 J07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93..I C:OGCB:DORS
GHMarcus        BKGrimes


D:DORS GHMarcus BKGrimes 07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN
07/ /93         07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN


I' >OFC OEAB:DORS
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SC/OEAB:DORS
' >
  OFC      OEAB:DORS      SC/OEAB:DORS  PUB:ADM          C/OEAB:DORS


PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORS
NAME    DSkeen o      RDennig      Tech Ed T7avLY AChaffee


NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7av LY AChaffee[DATE 1 7/g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS
[DATE   17 /g/93           / /93       7/P /93           / /93 OFC     OGCB:DORS     C/DRS/R-III  DRS/R-III


C/DRS/R-III
NAME    PWen          GWright      CVanderniet


DRS/R-III NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet
DATE        / /93          / /93        /  /93 OFC      TECH BRANCH    CHF TECH BR    C/OGCB:DORS      D/DORS


DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS
NAME                                l GMarcus        l BGrimes


D/DORS NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l[OFFICIAL
DATE       / /93         / /93         / /93         1   / /93     l


RECORD COPY]DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1}}
[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]
  DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
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Latest revision as of 04:24, 24 November 2019

Bursting of High Pressure Coolant Injection Steam Line Rupture Discs Injures Plant Personnel
ML031070135
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000349, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/16/1993
From: Grimes B
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-067, NUDOCS 9308100248
Download: ML031070135 (14)
v • d • e


U -AU

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 16, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-67: BURSTING OF HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION

STEAM LINE RUPTURE DISCS INJURES PLANT

PERSONNEL

Addressees

nuclear power

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for

reactors.

Purpose

information

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing thissteam driven

notice to remind addressees of the hazards associated with

injection (HPCI)

coolant injection systems such as the high pressure coolant at BWRs and the

system and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system will

auxiliary feedwater system at PWRs. It is expected that recipients and consider

review the information for applicability to their facilities X

actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions therefore, no

contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

specific action or written response is required.

Background

the HPCI turbine

The purpose of HPCI steam exhaust rupture discs is to protect event if the normal

casing and associated exhaust piping from an overpressure Quad Cities Station, exhaust path to the suppression pool becomes blocked. At

in series with a

two 40.6-cm [16-inch] stainless steel discs are installed sensor

6.4-cm [2.5-inch] spacer between them to allow for a pressure

while serving no control function, instrumentation line. The pressure sensor, to alert the

actuates an alarm in the control room at 68.9 kPa [10 psig]

of the HPCI

operators that the inner disc is leaking. The normal range The HPCI high

exhaust steam pressure is 172 to 207 kPa [25 to 30 psig].-

and is sensed by

exhaust pressure turbine trip setpoint is 689 kPa [100 psig] piping

the section of

pressure sensors located downstream from where piping. The

containing the rupture discs branches off from the exhaust vertically over the

section of piping containing the rupture discs is mounted

greater than

turbine exhaust and vents directly to the HPCI room. Pressure inner disc to rupture

1034 kPa [150 psig] in the exhaust line will cause the

steam into the HPCI room.

and impact the outer disc, releasing

Description of Circumstances

Edison

During a quarterly inservice test of the HPCI pump at the Commonwealth line rupture

9, 1993, the exhaust steam

Quad Cities Station, Unit 1, on June

9308100248 F QrRi

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 discs burst, releasing steam into the HPCI room, burning, and slightly

contaminating, five workers. The rupture discs burst within one second after

the turbine was started. Fire doors between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 HPCI rooms

were blown off their hinges into the Unit 2 HPCI room. Both sets of double

doors that are part of the secondary containment boundary were also blown

open. The floor latch on the inner containment door was bent; the outer doors

were also slightly damaged, but were repaired, closed and sealed approximately

35 minutes after the event. The steam release was terminated by automatic

isolation of the steam supply line on high HPCI turbine area temperature about

20 seconds into the event.

Discussion

Upon investigating the event, the licensee determined that water had

accumulated in the turbine casing because the drain system level switches for

the Unit 1 HPCI system had failed. In April 1992, the licensee performed a

reliability-centered maintenance study which recommended the level switches be

included in the preventive maintenance program but the recommendation had not

been acted on at the time of the event. The Unit 2 HPCI drain system level

switches were also found to be inoperable.

The slug of water created during the HPCI turbine roll passed from the turbine

casing to the vertical exhaust line and compressed the air in the 40.6 cm

[16 inch] line containing the rupture discs. The resulting pressure pulse

caused the inner rupture disc to burst, which impacted the outer disc as

designed and caused it to burst as well. The exhaust line pressure sensors, located in the horizontal 61 cm [24 inch] exhaust line that tees off from the

vertical 40.6 cm [16 inch] rupture disc line, did not detect a high pressure

(see Figure 1). The pressure switches were within tolerance and should have

immediately isolated the steam supply upon sensing a high exhaust pressure

before the rupture discs burst. The fact that a high exhaust line pressure

was not detected indicates two possible causes for the disc rupture. Either

the inner rupture disc was degraded and burst at lower-than-design pressure, or the pressure pulse actually exceeded the design pressure and caused the

disc to burst, relieving the exhaust line pressure before the downstream

pressure sensors detected a high pressure condition.

While inspection of the rupture discs did not reveal any degradation from

corrosion or aging, the vendor, Black Sivalls & Bryson, Inc, stated that the

discs are warranted for one year of service under normal conditions. The HPCI

and RCIC rupture discs at Quad Cities Station had been in service for 20 years

and were not part of any scheduled inspection or preventive maintenance

program. When consulted about the event, the vendor advised against using the

spare discs in the plant storeroom because they were purchased at the same

time as the failed discs. The licensee later replaced the failed discs with

new units. Before this event, the licensee recently replaced a HPCI rupture

disc during a refueling outage at the Dresden Station, a plant similar to Quad

Cities, after finding a crack in the disc during an inspection. The rupture

discs were inspected at the Dresden station as part of an enhancement to the

preventive maintenance program that was recommended by a reliability-centered

analysis.

I I

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 The steam injured five workers, four of whom were participating in the HPCI

pump surveillance test. The fifth, and m6st severely. injured worker was a

health physics technician in the room on routine rounds, who was not aware of

the danger posed by the surveillance test. The test procedure contained no

specific guidance on room occupancy. Interviews with the workers revealed

that they had performed the surveillance in the past and were familiar with

the process. This familiarity may have led to a relaxed attitude toward

personal safety. The workers stated that during previous surveillances they

sometimes evacuated the room before rolling the turbine, or stood near the

doors to be ready to escape. The licensee made no routine announcement over

the plant paging system to alert plant personnel before the HPCI-turbine

start, and the workers were not prepared for the turbine to start.

A lack of constant communication between the workersand the control room may

have contributed to the personnel injuries. If a control room operator had

been in contact with the workers in the HPCI room during the turbine roll, the

workers would have been aware of the impending turbine start and, after start, the steam supply might have been manually-isolated or the turbine manually

tripped before the automatic isolation caused by the high area temperatureoin

the HPCI room.

When the Unit 1 HPCI rupture disc failure caused the fire doors to be blown

off their hinges and into the Unit 2 HPCI room, one of the doors impacted a

pipe hanger in the room and moved it 5.1 centimeters [2 inches]. If the steam

release had resulted from a high energy line break from the inlet side of the

HPCI steam line instead of the exhaust line, the damage to the Unit 2 HPCI

system could have been more severe. While high energy line breaks have been

analyzed for safety systems at all plants, the doors to rooms containing high

energy steam lines may not have been included in the analysis. For example, at Duane Arnold Energy Center, the licensee discovered that while the HPCI and

RCIC rooms were qualified for pressures of 26.2 kPa [3.8 psig], the doors

between these rooms and the reactor building would yield at 6.9 kPa [1 psig].

The licensee for the Quad Cities Station will implement a preventive

maintenance schedule for both the HPCI and RCIC rupture discs and the level

switches. The licensee will review the surveillance test procedure and

evaluate the missile hazard created by the fire doors. The licensee replaced

the rupture discs for the Unit 2 HPCI and RCIC systems with new ones after the

event at Unit 1 and is considering burst testing the removed discs to

determine if they are degraded.

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action

you have any questions about the information in this or written response. If

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate notice, please contact

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. Office of Nuclear

Brian K. Grim s, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad Cities

Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Cq~

0cr 1 cO

Cd)h r-

4

0 OUTER RUPTURE DISC _____

\TO VENT TO

HPCI ROOM

INNER RUPTURE DISC

[1 In]

2 40.6 cm

[16 in]

CLOSABLE CHECK

CHECK VALVE VALVE I

SUPPRESSION

50.8 cm

LOCKED I [20 In] STEAM INLET LINE

OPEN I FROM "B" MAIN

I 61 cm STEAM LINE

I [24 In]

I

25 cm

RX BLDG HPCI ROOM [10 In]

I

I

POOL I

I

D NOTES:

1. PRESSURE SWITCH ACTUATES ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM WHEN PRESSURE BETWEEN THE INNER RUPTURE DISC AND OUTER

RUPTURE DISC IS GREATER THAN 68.9 kPa [10 psig]. ALARM IS FOR INNER RUPTURE DISC LEAK DETECTION.

2. REDUNDANT PRESSURE SWITCHES IN EXHAUST STEAM LINE TRIP THE HPCI TURBINE IF PRESSURE IS GREATER THAN 689 kPa [100 psig].

3. RUPTURE DISC MAXIMUM DESIGN BURST PRESSURE IS 1034 kPa [150 psig].

Figure 1 - Simplified Layout of Quad Cities Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line

Attachment 2 IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

93-66 Switchover to Hot-Leg 08/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Injection Following for pressurized water

A Loss-of-Coolant reactors.

Accident in Pres- surized Water Reactors

93-65 Reactor Trips Caused 08/13/93- All holders of OLs or CPs

by Breaker Testing for nuclear power reactors.

with Fault Protection

Bypassed

93-64 Periodic Testing and 08/12/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Preventive Maintenance for nuclear power reactors.

of Molded Case Circuit

Breakers

93-63 Improper Use of Soluble 08/11/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Weld Purge Dam Material for nuclear power reactors.

93-62 Thermal Stratification 08/10/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

of Water in BWR Reactor for boiling water reactors.

Vessels

93-61 Excessive Reactor Coolant 08/09/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Leakage Following A Seal for nuclear power reactors.

Failure in A Reactor

Coolant Pump or Reactor

Recirculation Pump

93-60 Reporting Fuel Cycle and 08/04/93 All fuel cycle and materials

Materials Events to the licensees.

NRC Operations Center

93-59 Unexpected Opening of 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Both Doors in An for nuclear power reactors.

Airlock

93-58 Nonconservatism in Low- 07/26/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Temperature Overpressure for pressurized-water

Protection for Pressurized- reactors.

Water Reactors

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

l

IN 93-67 August 16, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

orig /s/'d by CIGrimes/for

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachments:

1. Figure 1, "Simplified Layout of Quad Cities

Station HPCI Turbine Exhaust Steam Line"

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.

OFC *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 , 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC

NAME

DATE

  • C:DRS:R-III

GWright

[ 07/14/93 I *SC:OEAB:DORS

RDennig

107/15/93

  • C/OEAB/DORS

AEChaffee

07/15/93

  • C:SPLB:DSSA

CEMcCracken

]07/16/93

_ I__ i

OFC *D:DSSA *C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS A^r

NAME AThadani GMarcus BGrimes t

DATE 07/24/93 07/29/93 0,S/\o/93 V

[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]

DOCUMENT NAME: 93-67.IN

\- IN 93-XX

July XX, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, RIII

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
  • D:DSSA

AThadani

07/24/93 OFC *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE J07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93 OFC *C:DRS:R-III *SC:OEAB:DORS *C/OEAB/DORS *C:SPLB:DSSA

NAME GWright RDennig AEChaffee CEMcCracken

DATE J07/14/93

.Y.

07/15/93 107/15/93 J07/16/93 OFC C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS

NAME GMarcus ifM BGrimes T

DATE 07/.9/93 07/ /93

[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]

DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1

IN 93-XX

July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain l PWen CVanderniet

1'I

DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/14/93 07/14/93

  • C:DRS:RIII *SC:OEAB:DORS *C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLBAS* D: DSS 3q  %

GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani

07/14/93 [07/15/93 07/15/93 -07/2/f93 07/2A/93 C:OGCB:DORS D: DORS

GHMarcus BKGrimes

07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN C 5 G-4J -z--l - 2'J 43--

- k k- 9 CJ-

IN 93-XX

July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED *OGCB:DORS *DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 L, 07/08/93 I_,__. . _,

07 114/93

. . . _I_ __

, I

07/14/93

-

  • C:DRS:RIII S ODORS EAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSA

GWright R enn afee

afaf' CEMcCracken ACThadani

07/14/93 [ 3 07/j</93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS D:DORS

GHMarcus BKGrimes

0

07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN

- E7/14/93 12:53 787905538417463837

?03 P. 0',

IN 93-XX

July xx. 1993 This infiIrmation notice requires no specific action noticet please contact

or written response. It

you have any questions about the information inthis

the tech lcal contmct listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Roactor r.gulmtion (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of sOrating RGOM Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technic~l contacts Clark Vanderniet, R-II1

(708) 790-5594 Oavid Skeen NRR

(301) 604-1174 Attach 4 nt: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

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J \1 IN 93-XX

July xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear

Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Clark Vanderniet, R-III

(708) 790-5594 David Skeen, NRR

(301) 504-1174 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

  • SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE I

OFFICE *OEAB:DORS *TECH:ED _ i'O

_GC W DRS:R-III

NAME DSkeen JMain PWen CVanderniet

DATE 07/08/93 07/08/93 07/ W/93 07/ /93 C:DRS:RIII SC:OEAB:DORS C:OEAB:DORS C:SPLB:DSSA D:DSSA

GWright RDenning AChaffee CEMcCracken ACThadani

07/ /93 J07/ .

/93

.I

07/ /93 07/ /93 07/ /93 C:OGCB:DORS D:DORS

GHMarcus BKGrimes

07/ /93 07/ /93 DOCUMENT NAME: QCHPCIIN.WEN

I

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OFC OEAB:DORS SC/OEAB:DORS PUB:ADM C/OEAB:DORS

NAME DSkeen o RDennig Tech Ed T7avLY AChaffee

[DATE 17 /g/93 / /93 7/P /93 / /93 OFC OGCB:DORS C/DRS/R-III DRS/R-III

NAME PWen GWright CVanderniet

DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 OFC TECH BRANCH CHF TECH BR C/OGCB:DORS D/DORS

NAME l GMarcus l BGrimes

DATE / /93 / /93 / /93 1 / /93 l

[OFFICIAL RECORD COPY]

DOCUMENT NAME: IN93 XX.QC1


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