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| | issue date = 11/25/1991 | | | issue date = 11/25/1991 |
| | title = Changes in Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Before Installation | | | title = Changes in Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Before Installation |
| | author name = Rossi C E | | | author name = Rossi C |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| | page count = 11 | | | page count = 11 |
| }} | | }} |
| {{#Wiki_filter:IUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555August 6, 1991NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-47: FAILURE OF THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER MATERIALTO PASS FIRE ENDURANCE TEST | | {{#Wiki_filter:I |
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| | UNITED STATES |
| | |
| | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
| | |
| | OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION |
| | |
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 6, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-47: FAILURE OF THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL |
| | |
| | TO PASS FIRE ENDURANCE TEST |
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| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| :All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors. | | : |
| | All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power |
| | |
| | reactors. |
|
| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| :This information notice is intended to alert addressees to problems that couldresult from the use of or improper installation of THERMO-LAG material tosatisfy the electrical raceway fire protection requirements for safe shutdowncomponents specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to Part 50 of Title 10of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50). It is expected thatrecipients will review the information for applicability to their facilitiesand consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However,suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute any newNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements; therefore, no specificaction or written response is required. | | : |
| | This information notice is intended to alert addressees to problems that could |
| | |
| | result from the use of or improper installation of THERMO-LAG material to |
| | |
| | satisfy the electrical raceway fire protection requirements for safe shutdown |
| | |
| | components specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to Part 50 of Title 10 |
| | of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50). It is expected that |
| | |
| | recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities |
| | |
| | and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute any new |
| | |
| | Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements; therefore, no specific |
| | |
| | action or written response is required. |
|
| |
|
| ==Description of Circumstances== | | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| :The Gulf States Utilities Company, the licensee for the River Bend Station(RBS), submitted Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 87-005, 89-009, 90-003, and anInformational Report to the NRC concerning deficiencies identified in firebarriers. The NRC staff reviewed test report information and associateddocuments regarding the RBS electrical raceway fire barriers to determine ifthe problems identified in the LERs and Informational Report could affectother NRC licensees. The electrical raceway fire barrier material used at RBSis THERMO-LAG, a product manufactured and supplied by Thermal Science,Incorporated, (TSI), of St. Louis, Missouri. TSI provides THERMO-LAG for1-hour and 3-hour rated fire barriers.A 3-hour fire endurance test of a 30-inch aluminum electrical cable tray wasperformed in October 1989 at the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) for GulfStates Utilities Company. In this test, a THERMO-LAG envelope system failedresulting in high temperatures inside the cable tray envelope and loss ofcircuit integrity within approximately 60 minutes. Catastrophic failure andcollapse of the tray occurred within 1 1/2 hours. The failure of this testraised concerns regarding the adequacy of THERMO-LAG cable tray enclosuresprotecting 30-inch wide cable trays.9108020180 -PY- Xat r q 9 &je Go 4oi IN 91-47August 6, 1991 Discussion:NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barriers are contained in variousdocuments, including Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Generic Letter 86-10,"Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements", and NUREG-0800, "StandardReview Plan." The extent to which these requirements or guidelines are applic-able to a specific plant depends on plant age, commitments established by thelicensee in developing the fire protection plan, the staff safety evaluationreports (SERs) and supplements, and the license conditions pertaining to fireprotection. Fire barrier wrap material is designed to provide reasonableassurance that the effects of a fire are limited to one division of a safeshutdown related system while another division will remain free of fire damage.The Gulf States Utilities Company uses THERMO-LAG to protect raceways andcomponents throughout RBS that are related to safe shutdown. In addition, atleast 40 NRC licensed facilities use THERMO-LAG to construct fire barrierassemblies with 3-hour and 1-hour ratings to enclose electrical raceway andother safe shutdown components.During routine walkdown inspections in early 1987, RBS fire protection personnelidentified degradation of the THERMO-LAG 1-hour and 3-hour rated barriers.During repairs to correct the deficiencies discovered during the walkdowns, thelicensee found that the fire barriers had not been installed in accordance withthe manufacturer's specifications. The large number of observed deficienciesprompted the licensee to expand these walkdown inspections to include allTHERMO-LAG fire barriers. Hourly fire watches were posted in all affectedsafety-related areas pending completion of all inspections and correction ofany deficiencies found. The licensee attributed the deficiencies to failure ofthe subcontractor installation and quality control inspection program.During maintenance activities in early 1989, the licensee found-additionaldeficiencies indicating an apparent deficiency in the installation and qualitycontrol inspection program. The subcontractor who installed the THERMO-LAGfire barriers at RBS was approved by TSI as a qualified installer. However,during the installation at RBS, the subcontractor removed the factory-installedcomponents of the THERMO-LAG called "stress skin" and structural ribbing. Thestress skin component, a wire mesh, is critical to the structural integrity ofthe fire product during fire exposure. The RBS fire protection personnelconsidered that all barriers were degraded because of the many sections of theinside Layer of the stress skin that had been removed during initial installa-tion at RBS.The discrepancies identified between the manufacturer's installation manual,actual site installation manual and qualification fire tests resulted in thelicensee conducting additional fire endurance testing. In October 1989, SwRItested a U-shaped 30-inch wide aluminum ladder back cable tray enclosed in a3-hour fire-rated barrier constructed of THERMO-LAG material. RBS personnelconstructed the cable tray protective envelope in accordance with themanufacturer's published installation instruction IN 91-47August 6, 1991 During the 3-hour fire endurance test, all thermocouples inside the THERMO-LAGprotected tray reached failure temperatures (>3251F) in times ranging fromapproximately 45 minutes to 80 minutes. Conductor-to-ground failure occurredin the power cable at 60 minutes. The THERMO-LAG enclosure disintegrated at77 minutes, and the cable tray collapsed at 82 minutes. The SwRI test resultson the as-designed THERMO-LAG configuration prompted RBS to institute a firewatch patrol in all areas that depend on THERMO-LAG barriers for protection ofsafe shutdown capability.Additional deficiencies, such as small holes, cracks and unfilled seams, werefound in the THERMO-LAG material during walkdowns conducted in early 1990.The licensee conducted additional testing of as-installed barriers in Novemberand December 1990. Certain 1-hour and 3-hour cable tray and conduit envelopetests failed. The envelopes were upgraded and tests of the upgraded barrierspassed with the exception of the 3-hour cable tray envelope. Final resolutionof the 3-hour envelope may include replacing existing fire wrap materials withfully qualified fire wrap, repairing and then qualifying in-plant fire wrapassemblies by supplemental fire tests, or rerouting the cables into acceptableenclosures.Additionally, other fire barrier wrap design and installation concerns havebeen reported by RBS that indicate the possibility that NRC requirements forfire protection were not being met in all aspects. The type of concernsidentified to date include the following:1. Lack of documentation of qualification tests which demonstrate thataluminum conduits penetrating the THERMO-LAG protective envelope havebeen tested.2. Lack of documentation of qualification tests for different jointinstallations that demonstrate that varying fitup methods (i.e., dryfitting) are qualified.3. Lack of documentation of qualification tests of THERMO-LAG installationsapplicable to large cable trays. The licensee questioned the validity ofextrapolating results from small cable tray tests to its 30-inch widetrays.The NRC is particularly interested in obtaining information on fire barriersthat have been found with deficiencies similar to those described in thisnotice. Documentation, in as much detail as practicable, of any suchdeficiencies discovered, especially in cases where a fire barrier may havebeen improperly installed or tested is important. Licensees may communicatethe availability of information of this type by telephone to the NRC technicalcontact listed below. Information Notice No. 88-04, "Inadequate Qualificationand Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," provides additionaldiscussion and considerations regarding qualification of installed firebarrier IN 91-47August 6, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Charles E. o S, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | | : |
| | The Gulf States Utilities Company, the licensee for the River Bend Station |
| | |
| | (RBS), submitted Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 87-005, 89-009, 90-003, and an |
| | |
| | Informational Report to the NRC concerning deficiencies identified in fire |
| | |
| | barriers. The NRC staff reviewed test report information and associated |
| | |
| | documents regarding the RBS electrical raceway fire barriers to determine if |
| | |
| | the problems identified in the LERs and Informational Report could affect |
| | |
| | other NRC licensees. The electrical raceway fire barrier material used at RBS |
| | |
| | is THERMO-LAG, a product manufactured and supplied by Thermal Science, Incorporated, (TSI), of St. Louis, Missouri. TSI provides THERMO-LAG for |
| | |
| | 1-hour and 3-hour rated fire barriers. |
| | |
| | A 3-hour fire endurance test of a 30-inch aluminum electrical cable tray was |
| | |
| | performed in October 1989 at the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) for Gulf |
| | |
| | States Utilities Company. In this test, a THERMO-LAG envelope system failed |
| | |
| | resulting in high temperatures inside the cable tray envelope and loss of |
| | |
| | circuit integrity within approximately 60 minutes. Catastrophic failure and |
| | |
| | collapse of the tray occurred within 1 1/2 hours. The failure of this test |
| | |
| | raised concerns regarding the adequacy of THERMO-LAG cable tray enclosures |
| | |
| | protecting 30-inch wide cable trays. |
| | |
| | 9108020180-PY- rXat q9 &je Go 4oi |
| | |
| | IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 Discussion: |
| | NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barriers |
| | |
| | documents, including Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Generic are contained in various |
| | |
| | "Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements", Letter 86-10, |
| | Review Plan." The extent to which these requirements and NUREG-0800, "Standard |
| | |
| | able to a specific plant depends on plant age, or guidelines are applic- licensee in developing the fire protection plan, commitments established by the |
| | |
| | reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license the staff safety evaluation |
| | |
| | protection. Fire barrier wrap material is designed conditions pertaining to fire |
| | |
| | assurance that the effects of a fire are limited to provide reasonable |
| | |
| | shutdown related system while another division to one division of a safe |
| | |
| | will remain free of fire damage. |
| | |
| | The Gulf States Utilities Company uses THERMO-LAG |
| | |
| | components throughout RBS that are related to to protect raceways and |
| | |
| | least 40 NRC licensed facilities use THERMO-LAG safe shutdown. In addition, at |
| | |
| | to |
| | |
| | assemblies with 3-hour and 1-hour ratings to encloseconstruct fire barrier |
| | |
| | other safe shutdown components. electrical raceway and |
| | |
| | During routine walkdown inspections in early 1987, identified degradation of the THERMO-LAG 1-hour RBS fire protection personnel |
| | |
| | and |
| | |
| | During repairs to correct the deficiencies discovered3-hour rated barriers. |
| | |
| | licensee found that the fire barriers had not been during the walkdowns, the |
| | |
| | the manufacturer's specifications. The large number installed in accordance with |
| | |
| | prompted the licensee to expand these walkdown of observed deficiencies |
| | |
| | THERMO-LAG fire barriers. Hourly fire watches inspections to include all |
| | |
| | safety-related areas pending completion of all were posted in all affected |
| | |
| | any deficiencies found. The licensee attributedinspections and correction of |
| | |
| | the subcontractor installation and quality controlthe deficiencies to failure of |
| | |
| | inspection program. |
| | |
| | During maintenance activities in early 1989, the |
| | |
| | deficiencies indicating an apparent deficiency licensee found-additional |
| | |
| | control inspection program. The subcontractor in the installation and quality |
| | |
| | who |
| | |
| | fire barriers at RBS was approved by TSI as a qualified installed the THERMO-LAG |
| | |
| | during the installation at RBS, the subcontractor installer. However, components of the THERMO-LAG called "stress skin" removed the factory-installed |
| | |
| | stress skin component, a wire mesh, is critical and structural ribbing. The |
| | |
| | the fire product during fire exposure. The RBS to the structural integrity of |
| | |
| | considered that all barriers were degraded because fire protection personnel |
| | |
| | inside Layer of the stress skin that had been of the many sections of the |
| | |
| | tion at RBS. removed during initial installa- The discrepancies identified between the manufacturer's |
| | |
| | actual site installation manual and qualification installation manual, licensee conducting additional fire endurance fire tests resulted in the |
| | |
| | tested a U-shaped 30-inch wide aluminum ladder testing. In October 1989, SwRI |
| | |
| | back cable tray enclosed in a |
| | |
| | 3-hour fire-rated barrier constructed of THERMO-LAG |
| | |
| | constructed the cable tray protective envelope material. RBS personnel |
| | |
| | in accordance with the |
| | |
| | manufacturer's published installation instructions. |
| | |
| | IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 During the 3-hour fire endurance test, all thermocouples inside the THERMO-LAG |
| | |
| | protected tray reached failure temperatures (>3251F) in times ranging from |
| | |
| | approximately 45 minutes to 80 minutes. Conductor-to-ground failure occurred |
| | |
| | in the power cable at 60 minutes. The THERMO-LAG enclosure disintegrated at |
| | |
| | 77 minutes, and the cable tray collapsed at 82 minutes. The SwRI test results |
| | |
| | on the as-designed THERMO-LAG configuration prompted RBS to institute a fire |
| | |
| | watch patrol in all areas that depend on THERMO-LAG barriers for protection of |
| | |
| | safe shutdown capability. |
| | |
| | Additional deficiencies, such as small holes, cracks and unfilled seams, were |
| | |
| | found in the THERMO-LAG material during walkdowns conducted in early 1990. |
| | |
| | The licensee conducted additional testing of as-installed barriers in November |
| | |
| | and December 1990. Certain 1-hour and 3-hour cable tray and conduit envelope |
| | |
| | tests failed. The envelopes were upgraded and tests of the upgraded barriers |
| | |
| | passed with the exception of the 3-hour cable tray envelope. Final resolution |
| | |
| | of the 3-hour envelope may include replacing existing fire wrap materials with |
| | |
| | fully qualified fire wrap, repairing and then qualifying in-plant fire wrap |
| | |
| | assemblies by supplemental fire tests, or rerouting the cables into acceptable |
| | |
| | enclosures. |
| | |
| | Additionally, other fire barrier wrap design and installation concerns have |
| | |
| | been reported by RBS that indicate the possibility that NRC requirements for |
| | |
| | fire protection were not being met in all aspects. The type of concerns |
| | |
| | identified to date include the following: |
| | 1. Lack of documentation of qualification tests which demonstrate that |
| | |
| | aluminum conduits penetrating the THERMO-LAG protective envelope have |
| | |
| | been tested. |
| | |
| | 2. Lack of documentation of qualification tests for different joint |
| | |
| | installations that demonstrate that varying fitup methods (i.e., dry |
| | |
| | fitting) are qualified. |
| | |
| | 3. Lack of documentation of qualification tests of THERMO-LAG installations |
| | |
| | applicable to large cable trays. The licensee questioned the validity of |
| | |
| | extrapolating results from small cable tray tests to its 30-inch wide |
| | |
| | trays. |
| | |
| | The NRC is particularly interested in obtaining information on fire barriers |
| | |
| | that have been found with deficiencies similar to those described in this |
| | |
| | notice. Documentation, in as much detail as practicable, of any such |
| | |
| | deficiencies discovered, especially in cases where a fire barrier may have |
| | |
| | been improperly installed or tested is important. Licensees may communicate |
| | |
| | the availability of information of this type by telephone to the NRC technical |
| | |
| | contact listed below. Information Notice No. 88-04, "Inadequate Qualification |
| | |
| | and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," provides additional |
| | |
| | discussion and considerations regarding qualification of installed fire |
| | |
| | barriers. |
| | |
| | IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If |
| | |
| | you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact |
| | |
| | the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear |
| | |
| | Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. |
| | |
| | Charles E. o S,Director |
| | |
| | Division of Operational Events Assessment |
| | |
| | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
|
| |
|
| ===Technical Contact:=== | | ===Technical Contact:=== |
| Ralph Architzel, NRR301-492-0804
| |
|
| |
|
| ===Attachment:=== | | ===Ralph Architzel, NRR=== |
| List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices | | 301-492-0804 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices |
| | |
| | . I |
| | |
| | Attachment |
| | |
| | IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
| | |
| | NRC INFORMATION NOTICES |
| | |
| | Information Date of |
| | |
| | Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to |
| | |
| | 89-56, Questionable Certification 07/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Supp. 2 of Material Supplied to for nuclear power reactors. |
| | |
| | the Defense Department by |
| | |
| | Nuclear Suppliers |
| | |
| | 91-46 Degradation of Emergency 07/18/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Diesel Generator Fuel Oil for nuclear power reactors. |
| | |
| | Delivery Systems |
| | |
| | 91-45 Possible Malfunction of 07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Westinghouse ARD, BFD, and for nuclear power reactors. |
| | |
| | NBFD Relays, and A200 DC |
| | |
| | and DPC 250 Magnetic Con- tactors |
| | |
| | 91-44 Improper Control of 07/08/91 All nuclear fuel facilities. |
| | |
| | Chemicals in Nuclear Fuel |
| | |
| | Fabrication |
| | |
| | 91-43 Recent Incidents Involving 07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Rapid Increases in Primary- for pressurized-water |
| | |
| | to-Secondary Leak Rate reactors (PWRs). |
| | |
| | 91-42 Plant Outage Events 06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Involving Poor Coordina- for nuclear power reactors. |
| | |
| | tion Between Operations |
| | |
| | and Maintenance Personnel |
| | |
| | During Valve Testing and |
| | |
| | Manipulations |
| | |
| | 91-41 Potential Problems with 06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | The Use of Freeze Seals for nuclear power reactors. |
| | |
| | 88-63, High Radiation Hazards 06/25/91 All holders of OLs or CPs |
| | |
| | Supp. 2 from Irradiated Incore for nuclear power reactors, Detectors and Cables research reactors, and |
| | |
| | test reactors. |
| | |
| | OL = Operating License |
|
| |
|
| .IAttachmentIN 91-47August 6, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to89-56,Supp. 291-4691-4591-4491-4391-4291-4188-63,Supp. 2Questionable Certificationof Material Supplied tothe Defense Department byNuclear SuppliersDegradation of EmergencyDiesel Generator Fuel OilDelivery SystemsPossible Malfunction ofWestinghouse ARD, BFD, andNBFD Relays, and A200 DCand DPC 250 Magnetic Con-tactorsImproper Control ofChemicals in Nuclear FuelFabricationRecent Incidents InvolvingRapid Increases in Primary-to-Secondary Leak RatePlant Outage EventsInvolving Poor Coordina-tion Between Operationsand Maintenance PersonnelDuring Valve Testing andManipulationsPotential Problems withThe Use of Freeze SealsHigh Radiation Hazardsfrom Irradiated IncoreDetectors and Cables07/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.07/18/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.07/08/91 All nuclear fuel facilities.07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized-waterreactors (PWRs).06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.06/25/91 All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors,research reactors, andtest reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit}}
| | CP = Construction Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Changes in Pressurizer Safety Valve Setpoints Before InstallationML031190453 |
Person / Time |
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Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Issue date: |
11/25/1991 |
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From: |
Rossi C Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
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To: |
|
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References |
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IN-91-074, NUDOCS 9111180310 |
Download: ML031190453 (11) |
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Similar Documents at Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. 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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs and Corrective Actions in the Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-13, Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool2012-08-10010 August 2012 Boraflex Degradation Surveillance Programs And Corrective Actions In The Spent Fuel Pool Information Notice 2012-11, Age Related Capacitor Degradation2012-07-23023 July 2012 Age Related Capacitor Degradation ML12031A0132012-02-0606 February 2012 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Investigation Report No. 2-2010-058, Cpn International, Inc Information Notice 2011-19, Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components2011-09-26026 September 2011 Licensee Event Reports Containing Information Pertaining to Defects to Basic Components Information Notice 2011-15, Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues2011-08-0101 August 2011 Steel Containment Degradation and Associated License Renewal Aging Management Issues Information Notice 2011-17, Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping2011-07-26026 July 2011 Calculation Methodologies for Operability Determinations of Gas Voids in Nuclear Power Plant Piping Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 Official Exhibit - Nys000329-00-Bd01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (Nrc in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-13, OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13)2011-06-29029 June 2011 OFFICIAL EXHIBIT - NYS000329-00-BD01 - NRC Information Notice 2011-13, Control Rod Blade Cracking Resulting in Reduced Design Lifetime (Jun 29, 2011) (NRC in 2011-13) Information Notice 2011-04, IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 IN: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 In: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2011-04, in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors2011-02-23023 February 2011 in: Contaminants and Stagnant Conditions Affecting Stress Corrosion Cracking in Stainless Steel Piping in Pressurized Water Reactors Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review2010-12-30030 December 2010 New England Coalition'S Motion for Leave to Reply to NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 and Entergy'S Response to the Supplement to Nec'S Petition for Commission Review of LBP-10-19 Information Notice 2010-26, 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-262010-12-21021 December 2010 2010/12/21-NRC Staff'S Objection to Nec'S Notification of Information Notice 2010-26 ML13066A1872009-12-16016 December 2009 Draft NRC Information Notice 2009-xx - Underestimate of Dam Failure Frequency Used in Probabilistic Risk Assessments ML1007804482009-11-23023 November 2009 Email from Peter Bamford, NRR to Pamela Cowan, Exelon on TMI Contamination Control Event Information Notice 2009-11, NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-112009-07-0707 July 2009 NSP000059-Revised Prefiled Testimony of Northard/Petersen/Peterson-NRC Information Notice 2009-11 Information Notice 2009-10, Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10)2009-07-0707 July 2009 Official Exhibit - NYS000019-00-BD01- NRC Information Notice 2009-10, Transformers Failures - Recent Operating Experience (Jul. 7, 2009) (NRC in 2009-10) Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify2009-06-19019 June 2009 Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify Information Notice 2008-12, Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation2008-07-0707 July 2008 Reactor Trip Due to Off-Site Power Fluctuation Information Notice 2008-11, Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 12008-06-18018 June 2008 Service Water System Degradation at Brunswicksteam Electric Plant Unit 1 Information Notice 2008-04, Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants2008-04-0707 April 2008 Counterfeit Parts Supplied to Nuclear Power Plants Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves2007-09-25025 September 2007 Counterfeiting of Crane Valves Information Notice 2007-28, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls2007-09-19019 September 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Due to Inadequate Chemistry Controls Information Notice 2007-29, Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment2007-09-17017 September 2007 Temporary Scaffolding Affects Operability of Safety-Related Equipment Information Notice 2007-14, Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station2007-03-30030 March 2007 Loss of Offsite Power and Dual-Unit Trip at Catawba Nuclear Generating Station Information Notice 2007-06, Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems2007-02-0909 February 2007 Potential Common Cause Vulnerabilities in Essential Service Water Systems Information Notice 2007-05, Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures2007-02-0909 February 2007 Vertical Deep Draft Pump Shaft and Coupling Failures Information Notice 2006-31, Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers2006-12-26026 December 2006 Inadequate Fault Interrupting Rating of Breakers Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves as a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-29, Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear2006-12-14014 December 2006 Potential Common Cause Failure of Motor-operated Valves As a Result of Stem Nut Wear Information Notice 2006-13, E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Mcguire]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] </code>. |
I
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 6, 1991 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 91-47: FAILURE OF THERMO-LAG FIRE BARRIER MATERIAL
TO PASS FIRE ENDURANCE TEST
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
This information notice is intended to alert addressees to problems that could
result from the use of or improper installation of THERMO-LAG material to
satisfy the electrical raceway fire protection requirements for safe shutdown
components specified in Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to Part 50 of Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50). It is expected that
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute any new
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements; therefore, no specific
action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
The Gulf States Utilities Company, the licensee for the River Bend Station
(RBS), submitted Licensee Event Reports (LERs)87-005, 89-009,90-003, and an
Informational Report to the NRC concerning deficiencies identified in fire
barriers. The NRC staff reviewed test report information and associated
documents regarding the RBS electrical raceway fire barriers to determine if
the problems identified in the LERs and Informational Report could affect
other NRC licensees. The electrical raceway fire barrier material used at RBS
is THERMO-LAG, a product manufactured and supplied by Thermal Science, Incorporated, (TSI), of St. Louis, Missouri. TSI provides THERMO-LAG for
1-hour and 3-hour rated fire barriers.
A 3-hour fire endurance test of a 30-inch aluminum electrical cable tray was
performed in October 1989 at the Southwest Research Institute (SwRI) for Gulf
States Utilities Company. In this test, a THERMO-LAG envelope system failed
resulting in high temperatures inside the cable tray envelope and loss of
circuit integrity within approximately 60 minutes. Catastrophic failure and
collapse of the tray occurred within 1 1/2 hours. The failure of this test
raised concerns regarding the adequacy of THERMO-LAG cable tray enclosures
protecting 30-inch wide cable trays.
9108020180-PY- rXat q9 &je Go 4oi
IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 Discussion:
NRC requirements and guidelines for fire barriers
documents, including Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Generic are contained in various
"Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements", Letter 86-10,
Review Plan." The extent to which these requirements and NUREG-0800, "Standard
able to a specific plant depends on plant age, or guidelines are applic- licensee in developing the fire protection plan, commitments established by the
reports (SERs) and supplements, and the license the staff safety evaluation
protection. Fire barrier wrap material is designed conditions pertaining to fire
assurance that the effects of a fire are limited to provide reasonable
shutdown related system while another division to one division of a safe
will remain free of fire damage.
The Gulf States Utilities Company uses THERMO-LAG
components throughout RBS that are related to to protect raceways and
least 40 NRC licensed facilities use THERMO-LAG safe shutdown. In addition, at
to
assemblies with 3-hour and 1-hour ratings to encloseconstruct fire barrier
other safe shutdown components. electrical raceway and
During routine walkdown inspections in early 1987, identified degradation of the THERMO-LAG 1-hour RBS fire protection personnel
and
During repairs to correct the deficiencies discovered3-hour rated barriers.
licensee found that the fire barriers had not been during the walkdowns, the
the manufacturer's specifications. The large number installed in accordance with
prompted the licensee to expand these walkdown of observed deficiencies
THERMO-LAG fire barriers. Hourly fire watches inspections to include all
safety-related areas pending completion of all were posted in all affected
any deficiencies found. The licensee attributedinspections and correction of
the subcontractor installation and quality controlthe deficiencies to failure of
inspection program.
During maintenance activities in early 1989, the
deficiencies indicating an apparent deficiency licensee found-additional
control inspection program. The subcontractor in the installation and quality
who
fire barriers at RBS was approved by TSI as a qualified installed the THERMO-LAG
during the installation at RBS, the subcontractor installer. However, components of the THERMO-LAG called "stress skin" removed the factory-installed
stress skin component, a wire mesh, is critical and structural ribbing. The
the fire product during fire exposure. The RBS to the structural integrity of
considered that all barriers were degraded because fire protection personnel
inside Layer of the stress skin that had been of the many sections of the
tion at RBS. removed during initial installa- The discrepancies identified between the manufacturer's
actual site installation manual and qualification installation manual, licensee conducting additional fire endurance fire tests resulted in the
tested a U-shaped 30-inch wide aluminum ladder testing. In October 1989, SwRI
back cable tray enclosed in a
3-hour fire-rated barrier constructed of THERMO-LAG
constructed the cable tray protective envelope material. RBS personnel
in accordance with the
manufacturer's published installation instructions.
IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 During the 3-hour fire endurance test, all thermocouples inside the THERMO-LAG
protected tray reached failure temperatures (>3251F) in times ranging from
approximately 45 minutes to 80 minutes. Conductor-to-ground failure occurred
in the power cable at 60 minutes. The THERMO-LAG enclosure disintegrated at
77 minutes, and the cable tray collapsed at 82 minutes. The SwRI test results
on the as-designed THERMO-LAG configuration prompted RBS to institute a fire
watch patrol in all areas that depend on THERMO-LAG barriers for protection of
safe shutdown capability.
Additional deficiencies, such as small holes, cracks and unfilled seams, were
found in the THERMO-LAG material during walkdowns conducted in early 1990.
The licensee conducted additional testing of as-installed barriers in November
and December 1990. Certain 1-hour and 3-hour cable tray and conduit envelope
tests failed. The envelopes were upgraded and tests of the upgraded barriers
passed with the exception of the 3-hour cable tray envelope. Final resolution
of the 3-hour envelope may include replacing existing fire wrap materials with
fully qualified fire wrap, repairing and then qualifying in-plant fire wrap
assemblies by supplemental fire tests, or rerouting the cables into acceptable
enclosures.
Additionally, other fire barrier wrap design and installation concerns have
been reported by RBS that indicate the possibility that NRC requirements for
fire protection were not being met in all aspects. The type of concerns
identified to date include the following:
1. Lack of documentation of qualification tests which demonstrate that
aluminum conduits penetrating the THERMO-LAG protective envelope have
been tested.
2. Lack of documentation of qualification tests for different joint
installations that demonstrate that varying fitup methods (i.e., dry
fitting) are qualified.
3. Lack of documentation of qualification tests of THERMO-LAG installations
applicable to large cable trays. The licensee questioned the validity of
extrapolating results from small cable tray tests to its 30-inch wide
trays.
The NRC is particularly interested in obtaining information on fire barriers
that have been found with deficiencies similar to those described in this
notice. Documentation, in as much detail as practicable, of any such
deficiencies discovered, especially in cases where a fire barrier may have
been improperly installed or tested is important. Licensees may communicate
the availability of information of this type by telephone to the NRC technical
contact listed below. Information Notice No. 88-04, "Inadequate Qualification
and Documentation of Fire Barrier Penetration Seals," provides additional
discussion and considerations regarding qualification of installed fire
barriers.
IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact
the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. o S,Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Ralph Architzel, NRR
301-492-0804 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
. I
Attachment
IN 91-47 August 6, 1991 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
89-56, Questionable Certification 07/19/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 2 of Material Supplied to for nuclear power reactors.
the Defense Department by
Nuclear Suppliers
91-46 Degradation of Emergency 07/18/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Diesel Generator Fuel Oil for nuclear power reactors.
Delivery Systems
91-45 Possible Malfunction of 07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Westinghouse ARD, BFD, and for nuclear power reactors.
NBFD Relays, and A200 DC
and DPC 250 Magnetic Con- tactors
91-44 Improper Control of 07/08/91 All nuclear fuel facilities.
Chemicals in Nuclear Fuel
Fabrication
91-43 Recent Incidents Involving 07/05/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Rapid Increases in Primary- for pressurized-water
to-Secondary Leak Rate reactors (PWRs).
91-42 Plant Outage Events 06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Involving Poor Coordina- for nuclear power reactors.
tion Between Operations
and Maintenance Personnel
During Valve Testing and
Manipulations
91-41 Potential Problems with 06/27/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
The Use of Freeze Seals for nuclear power reactors.
88-63, High Radiation Hazards 06/25/91 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 2 from Irradiated Incore for nuclear power reactors, Detectors and Cables research reactors, and
test reactors.
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
|
---|
|
list | - Information Notice 1991-01, Supplier of Misrepresented Resistors (4 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1991-02, Brachytherapy Source Management (7 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1991-03, Management of Wastes Contaminated with Radioactive Materials (Red Bag Waste & Ordinary Trash) (7 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1991-04, Reactor Scram Following Control Rod Withdrawal Associated with Low Power Turbine Testing (28 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty)
- Information Notice 1991-05, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking in Pressurized Water Reactor Safety Injection Accumulator Nozzles (30 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Hydrostatic, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1991-06, Lock-up of Emergency Diesel Generator and Load Sequencer Control Circuits Preventing Restart of Tripped Emergency Diesel Generator (31 January 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy, Overspeed)
- Information Notice 1991-07, Maintenance Deficiency Associated with General Electric Horizontal Custom 8000 Induction Motors (4 February 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1991-08, Medical Examinations for Licensed Operators (5 February 1991, Topic: Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1991-09, Counterfeiting of Crane Valves (25 September 2007)
- Information Notice 1991-10, Summary of Semiannual Program Performance Reports on Fithess-For-Duty (FFD) in the Nuclear Industry (12 February 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-12, Potential Loss of Net Positive Suction Head (NPSH) of Standby Liquid Control System Pumps (15 February 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-13, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators (Edgs) (4 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-13, Inadequate Testing of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) (4 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-14, Recent Safety-Related Incidents at Large Irradiators (5 March 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Coatings, Incorporated by reference, Brachytherapy, Uranium Hexafluoride, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1991-15, Incorrect Configuration of Breaker Operating Springs in General Electric AK-Series Metal-Clad Circuit Breakers (6 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-16, Unmonitored Release Pathways from Slightly Contaminated Recycle and Recirculation Water Systems at a Fuel Facility (6 March 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1991-17, Fire Safety of Temporary Installation or Services (11 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-18, High-Energy Piping Failures Caused by Wall Thinning (18 December 1991, Topic: Feedwater Heater)
- Information Notice 1991-19, Steam Generator Feedwater Distribution Piping Damage (12 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-20, Electrical Wire Insulation Degradation Caused Failure in a Safety-Related Motor Control Center (19 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-21, Inadequate Quality Assurance Program of Vendor Supplying Safety-Related Equipment (19 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-22, Four Plant Outage Events Involving Loss of AC Power or Coolant Spills (19 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-23, Accidental Radiation Overexposures to Personnel Due to Industrial Radiography Accessory Equipment Malfunctions (26 March 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1991-24, Recent Operating Experience Involving Reactor Operation Without a Licensed Reactor Operator or Senior Reactor Operator Present in the Control Room (26 March 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-25, Commercial-Grade Structural Framing Components Supplied As Nuclear Safety-Related Equipment (1 April 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-25, Commercial-Grade Structural Framing Components Supplied as Nuclear Safety-Related Equipment (1 April 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-26, Potential Nonconservative Errors in the Working Format Hansen-Roach Cross-Section Set Provided with Keno and Scale Codes (2 April 1991, Topic: Fitness for Duty, Brachytherapy)
- Information Notice 1991-27, Incorrect Rotation of Positive Displacement Pump (10 April 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-28, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping (15 April 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-29, Deficiencies Identifie During Electrical Distribution System Functional Inspections (15 April 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-30, Inadequate Calibration of Thermoluminescent Dosimeters Utilized to Monitor Extremity Dose at Uranium Processing and Fabrication Facilities (23 April 1991, Topic: Brachytherapy, Uranium Hexafluoride, Depleted uranium)
- Information Notice 1991-31, Nonconforming Magnaflux Magnetic Particle (14AM) Prepared Bath (9 May 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-32, Possible Flaws in Certain Piping Systems Fabricated by Associated Piping and Engineering (15 May 1991, Topic: Hot Short, Intergranular Stress Corrosion Cracking, Liquid penetrant)
- Information Notice 1991-33, Reactor Safety Information for States During Exercises and Emergencies (31 May 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-34, Potential Problems in Identifying Causes of Emergency Diesel Generator Malfunctions (3 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-35, Labeling Requirements for Transporting Multi-Hazard Radioactive Materials (7 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-36, Nuclear Plant Staff Working Hours (10 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-37, Compressed Gas Cylinder Missile Hazards (10 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-38, Thermal Stratification in Feedwater System Piping (13 June 1991, Topic: Unanalyzed Condition)
- Information Notice 1991-39, Compliance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance. (17 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-40, Contamination of Nonradioactive System and Resulting Possibility for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to the Environment (19 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-41, Potential Problems with the Use of Freeze Seals (27 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-42, Plant Outage Events Involving Poor Coordination Between Operations and Maintenance Personnel During Valve Testing and Manipulations (27 June 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-43, Recent Incidents Involving Rapid Increases in Primary-To-Secondary Leak Rate (5 July 1991, Topic: Grab sample)
- Information Notice 1991-45, Possible Malfunction of Westinghouse Ard, Bfd, & Nbfd Relays, & A200 DC & DPC 250 Magnetic Contactors (5 July 1991, Topic: Commercial Grade)
- Information Notice 1991-46, Degradation of Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Delivery Systems (18 July 1991)
- Information Notice 1991-47, Failure of Thermo-Lag Fire Barrier Material to Pass Fire Endurance Test (6 August 1991, Topic: Safe Shutdown, Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1991-48, False Certificates of Conformance Provided by Westinghouse Electric Supply Company for Refurbished Commercial-Grade Circuit Breakers (9 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1991-49, Enforcement of Safety Requirements for Radiographers (15 August 1991, Topic: High Radiation Area, Fire Barrier, Overexposure)
- Information Notice 1991-50, a Review of Water Hammer Events After 1985 (20 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier, Water hammer)
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