ML070170460: Difference between revisions
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{{#Wiki_filter:FAIRBANKS MORSE 701 White Avenue Beloit, Wisconsin 53511 Tel: 608.364.8132 Fax: 608.364.8480 Dominic.Dedolph@fairbanksmorse.com January 8, 2007 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 | {{#Wiki_filter:FAIRBANKS MORSE 701 White Avenue Beloit, Wisconsin 53511 Tel: 608.364.8132 Fax: 608.364.8480 Dominic.Dedolph@fairbanksmorse.com January 8, 2007 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 | ||
==Subject:== | ==Subject:== | ||
1 0CFR21 for FMEA and Pre-installation Setup of Woodward Digital Reference Unit (DRU);Fairbanks Morse Engine reporting ID# 06-05 As a follow up to SCE&G verbal notification (EN # 43031), dated 12/5/06 and written notification (Docket 50/395), dated12/22/06, Fairbanks Morse Engine has performed an evaluation and has determined a potential safety hazard exists due to an unevaluated failure mode for one of the engine speed control components, the Digital Reference Unit (DRU). The FM PIN for the DRU is 12998236 (Woodward P/N 9903-439). | 1 0CFR21 for FMEA and Pre-installation Setup of Woodward Digital Reference Unit (DRU); | ||
Fairbanks Morse Engine reporting ID# 06-05 As a follow up to SCE&G verbal notification (EN # 43031), dated 12/5/06 and written notification (Docket 50/395), dated12/22/06, Fairbanks Morse Engine has performed an evaluation and has determined a potential safety hazard exists due to an unevaluated failure mode for one of the engine speed control components, the Digital Reference Unit (DRU). The FM PIN for the DRU is 12998236 (Woodward P/N 9903-439). | |||
This condition was found during pre-installation testing of a DRU by SCE&G. FME has received no reports of this problem occurring with any installed equipment at any nuclear (or commercial) plant with FME provided equipment. | This condition was found during pre-installation testing of a DRU by SCE&G. FME has received no reports of this problem occurring with any installed equipment at any nuclear (or commercial) plant with FME provided equipment. | ||
An FMEA generated by FME and provided to SCE&G did not consider the following: | An FMEA generated by FME and provided to SCE&G did not consider the following: | ||
: 1) Loss of power to the DRU only without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A. The result would be a speed command below rated.2) Loss of power to the DRU without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A and subsequent regaining power. The result would be a speed command to the low speed setting (below rated).Because these two conditions were not considered in the FMEA, FM generated a pre-installation setup procedure that only considered set-up adjustments in the powered configuration. | : 1) Loss of power to the DRU only without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A. The result would be a speed command below rated. | ||
: 2) Loss of power to the DRU without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A and subsequent regaining power. The result would be a speed command to the low speed setting (below rated). | |||
Because these two conditions were not considered in the FMEA, FM generated a pre-installation setup procedure that only considered set-up adjustments in the powered configuration. | |||
FM has subsequently determined that the above detrimental conditions can be eliminated with a modified pre-installation setup procedure. | FM has subsequently determined that the above detrimental conditions can be eliminated with a modified pre-installation setup procedure. | ||
The utilities that FM has supplied DRU's, FMEA and setup procedures to include the following: | The utilities that FM has supplied DRU's, FMEA and setup procedures to include the following: | ||
Utility Site Ameren Callaway Constellation Calvert Cliffs Detroit Edison Fermi First Energy BV-2 FP&L Seabrook FP&L Duane Arnold SCE&G VC Summer WCNOC Wolf Creek The above utilities are being provided this same notification as well as an updated FMEA and pre-installation setup procedure which corrects the failure mode reported by SCE&G on December 22, 2006.Sincerely, Dominic Dedolph Manager, Quality Assurance an EnPro Industries company}} | Utility Site Ameren Callaway Constellation Calvert Cliffs Detroit Edison Fermi First Energy BV-2 FP&L Seabrook FP&L Duane Arnold SCE&G VC Summer WCNOC Wolf Creek The above utilities are being provided this same notification as well as an updated FMEA and pre-installation setup procedure which corrects the failure mode reported by SCE&G on December 22, 2006. | ||
Sincerely, Dominic Dedolph Manager, Quality Assurance an EnPro Industries company}} | |||
Latest revision as of 11:29, 23 November 2019
| ML070170460 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley, Calvert Cliffs, Fermi, Wolf Creek, Summer, Seabrook, Callaway  |
| Issue date: | 01/08/2007 |
| From: | Dedolph D Fairbanks Morse Engine |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| Download: ML070170460 (1) | |
Text
FAIRBANKS MORSE 701 White Avenue Beloit, Wisconsin 53511 Tel: 608.364.8132 Fax: 608.364.8480 Dominic.Dedolph@fairbanksmorse.com January 8, 2007 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
Subject:
1 0CFR21 for FMEA and Pre-installation Setup of Woodward Digital Reference Unit (DRU);
Fairbanks Morse Engine reporting ID# 06-05 As a follow up to SCE&G verbal notification (EN # 43031), dated 12/5/06 and written notification (Docket 50/395), dated12/22/06, Fairbanks Morse Engine has performed an evaluation and has determined a potential safety hazard exists due to an unevaluated failure mode for one of the engine speed control components, the Digital Reference Unit (DRU). The FM PIN for the DRU is 12998236 (Woodward P/N 9903-439).
This condition was found during pre-installation testing of a DRU by SCE&G. FME has received no reports of this problem occurring with any installed equipment at any nuclear (or commercial) plant with FME provided equipment.
An FMEA generated by FME and provided to SCE&G did not consider the following:
- 1) Loss of power to the DRU only without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A. The result would be a speed command below rated.
- 2) Loss of power to the DRU without simultaneous loss of power to the electronic speed control module 2301A and subsequent regaining power. The result would be a speed command to the low speed setting (below rated).
Because these two conditions were not considered in the FMEA, FM generated a pre-installation setup procedure that only considered set-up adjustments in the powered configuration.
FM has subsequently determined that the above detrimental conditions can be eliminated with a modified pre-installation setup procedure.
The utilities that FM has supplied DRU's, FMEA and setup procedures to include the following:
Utility Site Ameren Callaway Constellation Calvert Cliffs Detroit Edison Fermi First Energy BV-2 FP&L Seabrook FP&L Duane Arnold SCE&G VC Summer WCNOC Wolf Creek The above utilities are being provided this same notification as well as an updated FMEA and pre-installation setup procedure which corrects the failure mode reported by SCE&G on December 22, 2006.
Sincerely, Dominic Dedolph Manager, Quality Assurance an EnPro Industries company