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{{#Wiki_filter:ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: | {{#Wiki_filter:ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: S:k- Lv...C.... L Date of Examination: ~luID~ | ||
S:k-Lv...C. ... L Date of Examination: | Examinations Developed by: ~/ NRC (circle one) | ||
Examinations Developed by: NRC (circle one) Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) | Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials | ||
Examiner's Initials -180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) | -180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) ~/JJH, | ||
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) | -120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e) | ||
-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) | ~/M.l | ||
J/.JJ, -120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) | -120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) 1~Jk./J/.JJ, | ||
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] | -120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d) | ||
-75 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) -70 7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e) -45 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d) -30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.1; C.2.g; ES-202) -14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; | ~/Mi | ||
[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)] | |||
* Target dates are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. | ~.kJ~ | ||
[ ] Applies only to examinations prepared by the NRC. ES-201, Page 24 of 27 ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES*201*2 Facility: | -75 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) ~JMI, | ||
Sr L"-Ic-tG I Date of Examination: | -70 7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e) | ||
? -2..3 -Oa Initials Item Task Description a b* C# 1. a. Verify that the outline(s) fit{s) the appropriate model, In accordance with ES*401. ia N | ~/~ | ||
T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolulions, or generic topics. | -45 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms | ||
~P--I ~ | |||
(1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and In-plant tasks W dlstrlbuted among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is wilhln the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit lest(s) (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form. b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1: | ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d) | ||
(1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations | ~1Mf> | ||
-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.1; C.2.g; ES-202) | |||
G | ~1k / MIJ | ||
N Ensure that KiA importance raUngs (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. U | -14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202) | ||
IU-N' | -14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) ~/~ | ||
: f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). -1\1 a. Author .L # rrr-g Printe 1-It-t'};{ | -14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g) | ||
~Jt fltrl> | |||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) d. NRC Supervisor | ~/1d | ||
\'.\1\0\ A ,'B-..-rS'S> | -7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h) | ||
/' iY//Jl a. T ........" 6'1U'l/Pg Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column *c"; chief examiner concurrence required. | -7 14. Final applications reviewed; examination approval and waiver letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-204) | ||
* Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist | +5k- / ~ | ||
S T LUu':' Date of Examination: | -7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k) ~JA-{UJ1, | ||
( | |||
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) ~/jI4f) | |||
orgeneric topics. d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate. | * Target dates are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter. | ||
: a. Using Form ES-301-5. | They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. | ||
verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions. | [ ] Applies only to examinations prepared by the NRC. | ||
instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and major transients. | ES-201, Page 24 of 27 | ||
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in'plant tasks distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit testes) (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of altemate path, low-power. | ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES*201*2 Facility: Sr L"-Ic-tG I Date of Examination: ? - 2..3 - Oa Initials Item Task Description a b* C# | ||
emergency. | 1. | ||
and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form. b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria speCified on Form ES*301*1: | w | ||
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form | : a. Verify that the outline(s) fit{s) the appropriate model, In accordance with ES*401. ia N 1~.1 R | ||
Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling Is appropriate. | I | ||
Ensure that KJA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. | : b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KJA categories are appropriately sampled. It- I(V ~~ | ||
Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. | T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolulions, or generic topics. 7;1 If\! fhL~ | ||
Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). a. Author b. Facility Reviewer (*) c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) d. NRC Supervisor | I~ I~, ~ | ||
- | E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate. | ||
* Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines | : 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S | ||
I of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and mejor transients. witt .fJ~ 41\- | |||
/ Clt'as of the date of my signature. | M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested USing A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit lest(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days. | ||
I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. | 0 To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative c. | ||
I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). | R and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D. | ||
Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. | : 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through oulline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2: | ||
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised. | (1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and In-plant tasks W dlstrlbuted among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is wilhln the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit lest(s) | ||
: 2. Post-Examination S-vLy LI -Alvs I ) 2-o(hf To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) | (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form. | ||
..f. .......... | : b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1: | ||
I .. -,:.r:,-. | (1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix c. | ||
I agree that f will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. | of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. | ||
f understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). | 1'(t7 ? ~/ | ||
Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. | : 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered In the appropriate exam sections. ~ It! ~~ | ||
I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised. | ~ IV ~~ | ||
: 2. Post-Examination | G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41143 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. | ||
-:svLy 23-Avs ) ) <.0'09 To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of""" . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC. PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE DATE NOTE 1. ,J7'1c.! cJ&tv! | N E | ||
c, Ensure that KiA importance raUngs (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. U V~ ~~ | |||
R A | |||
: d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. IU- N' ~~ | |||
L e, Check the en lire exam for balance of coverage. ~ I\' ~~ | |||
: f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). ~ -1\1 ~ | |||
: a. Author | |||
.L# rrr-g . ,,- ~rr' Printe N~natu~ 1-It-t'};{ | |||
~t,~~i | |||
-,: | |||
: b. Facility Reviewer (*) "TIXtffi IJ\ ""1\,U(r~.r~ .",'('~ II J'I;; ('-- | |||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) Ht~h"C~'WL. ~~<.,~ .s:~A4~ | |||
: d. NRC Supervisor \'.\1\0\ A,'B-..-rS'S> /' iY//Jl a. T~ ........" 6'1U'l/Pg Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column *c"; chief examiner concurrence required. | |||
* Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines | |||
ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES*201*2 Facility: S T LUu':' Date of Examination: | |||
rLU-)1l o"j | |||
., jJ | |||
( | |||
Initials Item Task Description a b" c# | |||
St. Lucie Date of Examination: | 1. | ||
July 2008 Examination Level (circle one): RO@ Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code* A-1 Conduct of Operations N,R Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle KIA 2.1.42 (3.4) A-2 Conduct of Operations N,R Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. | W | ||
: a. Verify that the outllne(s) flt(s) the appropriate model. in accordance with ES401. II/A . .rJ,l\.. tvft: | |||
R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared In accordance with I Section 0.1 of ES*401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled. | |||
T T c. Assess whether the oulline over-emphasizes any systems. evolutions. orgeneric topics. | |||
E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate. | |||
: 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5. verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions. instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients. | |||
I M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using t~rr MP~ | |||
L A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days. | |||
o R | |||
: c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria speCified on Form ES*301*4 and described in Appendix D. U/l tY ~"~fI | |||
: 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301*2: | |||
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in'plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form | |||
/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit testes) | |||
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of altemate path, low-power. emergency. and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form. | |||
: b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria speCified on Form ES*301*1: | |||
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one tas~ is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations | |||
: c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. | |||
: 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities'(includlng PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections. | |||
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling Is appropriate. | |||
N c. Ensure that KJA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. | |||
E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. | |||
A L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage. | |||
: f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). | |||
: a. Author | |||
: b. Facility Reviewer (*) | |||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) | |||
: d. NRC Supervisor Note: | |||
- | |||
# Independent NRC reviewer Initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required. | |||
* Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines | |||
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-l | |||
: 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of ft/~Gf" / Clt'as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised. | |||
: 2. Post-Examination | |||
~ S-vLy LI - Alvs I ) 2-o(hf To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) o f ' " . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC. | |||
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE | |||
..EX4A? ,0~/~ | |||
nA1HW"/~ | |||
..f........... I .. -,:.r:,- | |||
,(l trMAN :J | |||
\ lLt ll.s-A~ | |||
...-- | |||
#-- | |||
ES-201, Page 26 of 27 | |||
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3 | |||
: 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week( s) of ::Jvly /01 as of the date of my signature. I agree that f will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. f understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised. | |||
: 2. Post-Examination -:svLy 23- Avs ) ) <.0'09 To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of""" . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC. | |||
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE DATE NOTE | |||
: 1. ,J7'1c.! ~~~ | |||
p[~~': A0l\lC cJ&tv! | |||
bj(~ | |||
1/~/{)ltTv;e ...~I | |||
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1 {;~ | |||
2. | |||
: 3. Ji1: __ 'v?-k | |||
: 4. tJAL;r ' AIJr,.J.Tr/t~ IrA 5(r(w.1'.; | |||
/112m / "A~c.cve.e= | |||
r ES("I"./: | |||
-~ ~. _ _ | |||
, | |||
~ | |||
"7-.2.P--t' | |||
'/niCb 7-Z#". ~r1~ | |||
']-11-_°_ | |||
: 5. _ _ _- ¥_ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
6._~------ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-:--_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 7. _---"~----- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 8. _ _ _.---------- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 9. _ _ _--"1._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
10.,_ _ _- - - - ' T - _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
11.,_ _ _ _ _r - - - - _ _ __ | |||
: 12. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 13. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 14. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
: 15. _ _ _ _ _ __ | |||
NOTES: ---- | |||
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: St. Lucie Date of Examination: July 2008 Examination Level (circle one): RO@ Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code* | |||
A-1 Conduct of Operations N,R Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle KIA 2.1.42 (3.4) | |||
A-2 Conduct of Operations N,R Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. | |||
KIA 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2) | KIA 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2) | ||
A-3 Equipment Control N,R Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump KIA 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9) | A-3 Equipment Control N,R Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump KIA 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9) | ||
A-4 Radiation Control N,R Use a survey map, determine Radiological hazards. KIA 2.3.7 (3.5/3.6) | A-4 Radiation Control N,R Use a survey map, determine Radiological hazards. | ||
A-5 Emergency Plan D, R or S Determine PAR's KIA 2.4.44 (4.4) NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required. , *Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (:::; 3 for ROs; :::; for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank 1) (P)revious 2 exams (:::; 1; randomly selected) | KIA 2.3.7 (3.5/3.6) | ||
NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE JPM | A-5 Emergency Plan D, R or S Determine PAR's KIA 2.4.44 (4.4) | ||
NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required. , | |||
*Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (:::; 3 for ROs; :::; for SROs & RO retakes) | |||
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1) | |||
(P)revious 2 exams (:::; 1; randomly selected) | |||
NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 | |||
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE JPM | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
A 1: Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle. Applicant will be given the Refueling Machine coordinates during an in-core fuel shuffle. They will need to determine if the stated coordinates are appropriate for the required fuel movements. | |||
Some coordinates are not within procedure requirements and must be identified. | A 1: Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle. Applicant will be given the Refueling Machine coordinates during an in-core fuel shuffle. They will need to determine if the stated coordinates are appropriate for the required fuel movements. Some coordinates are not within procedure requirements and must be identified. | ||
A2: Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. | A2: Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. Applicant will calculate SDM lAW 2-NOP-1 00.04, Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin; Modes 2,3,4,and 5 (Subcritical)" and determine SDM not met. Direct emergency boration to meet T.S. 3.1.1.1 A3: Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump. Applicant will be required to review P&ID's and determine valves and breakers to remove 2B LPSI pump for maintenance. Applicant will also be required to determine appropriate Technical Specifications for removal of 2B LPSI pump. | ||
Applicant will calculate SDM lAW 2-NOP-1 00.04, Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin; Modes 2,3,4,and 5 (Subcritical)" and determine SDM not met. Direct emergency boration to meet T.S. 3.1.1.1 A3: Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump. Applicant will be required to review P&ID's and determine valves and breakers to remove 2B LPSI pump for maintenance. | A4: Using a survey map, determine Radiological Hazards. The Candidate will be given a radiation survey map of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms. His stated task will be to determine Radiological hazards in each of the Charging Pump rooms. | ||
Applicant will also be required to determine appropriate Technical Specifications for removal of 2B LPSI pump. A4: Using a survey map, determine Radiological Hazards. The Candidate will be given a radiation survey map of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms. His stated task will be to determine Radiological hazards in each of the Charging Pump rooms. A5: Determine Protective Action Recommendations. | A5: Determine Protective Action Recommendations. The Candidate will be given a set of conditions and directed to determine protective action recommendations. | ||
The Candidate will be given a set of conditions and directed to determine protective action recommendations. | NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 | ||
NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: | |||
St. Lucie Date of Examination: | ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: St. Lucie Date of Examination: July 2008 Exam Level (circle one): RO, SRO(I), SRO(U) Operating Test No.: NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U) | ||
July 2008 Exam Level (circle one): RO, SRO(I), SRO(U) Operating Test No.: NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U) | Type Code* Safety Function System / JPM Title S-1 Restore AFW flow to the 2A SG using 2C AFW pump N,A,S,L 45 All S-2 Respond to loss of RCP Controlled Bleed Off and failed RCP E, N, A, S 4p Seals All S-3 Align ECCS for Hot and Cold Leg Injection M,E,A,S 2 All S-4 Establish Alternate Charging flowpath to RCS through 'A' HPSI D,S,E 1 Header. | ||
* Type Codes Criteria for RO 1 SRO-I 1 SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 1 4-6 1 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (L)ow-Power | S-5 Respond to alarms on Spent Fuel Monitors P, E, A, S, D 7 C-6 Place LTOP In Service Unit 1 P,C,D,E 3 S-7 Align 2C CCW pump to supply the 'B' CCW header N,E,S 8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U) | ||
:?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A) :? | P-1 Local Operation of Boron Concentration Control Unit ~ 2- E,N,R 1 All P-2 Unit 2 CST to supply the 1C AFW pump D,E 45 P-3 Disconnect 1B Instrument Inverter from Service Unit -1 D 6 All NUREG-1021, Revision 9 | ||
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 | |||
@ All control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room. | |||
* Type Codes Criteria for RO 1 SRO-I 1 SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 1 4-6 1 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ~9/~8/~4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (L)ow-Power :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) :?: 2 I:?:: 2 I:?:: 1 (P)revious 2 exams ~ 3 1 ~ 3 1 ~ 2 (randomly selected) | |||
(R)CA :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (S)imulator JPM | |||
==SUMMARY== | ==SUMMARY== | ||
DESCRIPTION S-1 New. At low power, the Applicant will be required to start and initiate AFW flow from the 2C AFW pump to the 2A SG and remove the 2A AFW pump form service. Upon starting the 2C AFW pump, it will trip on electrical overspeed. | DESCRIPTION S-1 New. At low power, the Applicant will be required to start and initiate AFW flow from the 2C AFW pump to the 2A SG and remove the 2A AFW pump form service. Upon starting the 2C AFW pump, it will trip on electrical overspeed. The Candidate will be required to reset the overspeed trip and initiate flow to the 2A SG. Alternate path S-2 S-2 New. Respond to loss of RCP Controlled Bleed Off and failed RCP Seals. The Applicant will be directed to respond to loss of RCP controlled seal bleed off at 100% power. Candidate will be required to recognize V2505 is closed and will be required to open V 2507, to the QT. Upon opening V2507 three seals will fail requiring a manual Reactor trip and stopping the RCP post trip. Alternate path. | ||
The Candidate will be required to reset the overspeed trip and initiate flow to the 2A SG. Alternate path S-2 S-2 New. Respond to loss of RCP Controlled Bleed Off and failed RCP Seals. The Applicant will be directed to respond to loss of RCP controlled seal bleed off at 100% power. Candidate will be required to recognize V2505 is closed and will be required to open V 2507, to the QT. Upon opening V2507 three seals will fail requiring a manual Reactor trip and stopping the RCP post trip. Alternate path. S-3 Modified Bank #0821158. | S-3 Modified Bank #0821158. The Applicant is required to align the 'B' train for Hot and Cold leg Injection. V3523 will not open and the 'A' train will be required for lineup for Hot and Cold leg injection. | ||
The Applicant is required to align the 'B' train for Hot and Cold leg Injection. | S-4 Bank #0821115. Candidate will line-up 2A Charging pump to the 'A' HPSI header for emergency boration post trip. | ||
V3523 will not open and the 'A' train will be required for lineup for Hot and Cold leg injection. | S-5 Bank # 0821117A (2004 NRC Exam). Respond to alarms on Spent Fuel Monitors. Spent Fuel Pool radiation monitors go into high alarm during refueling operations. Candidate is required to verify ventilation system. Alternate path. | ||
S-4 Bank #0821115. | C-6 Bank #0821021. (2004 NRC exam) Unit 1 Control Room. Unit 1 is experiencing a LOCA. 1-EOP-03 is being implemented. RCS temperature is 290 degrees and pressure is 500 psia. The Applicant is directed to place LTOP in service lAW 1-GOP-305. | ||
Candidate will line-up 2A Charging pump to the 'A' HPSI header for emergency boration post trip. S-5 Bank # 0821117A (2004 NRC Exam). Respond to alarms on Spent Fuel Monitors. | S-7 New. Applicant will be required to align the 2C CCW to the 'B' CCW header. Prior to starting the 2C CCW the AB 4.16KV bus is required to be aligned to the B side. | ||
Spent Fuel Pool radiation monitors go into high alarm during refueling operations. | NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 | ||
Candidate is required to verify ventilation system. Alternate path. C-6 Bank #0821021. | |||
(2004 NRC exam) Unit 1 Control Room. Unit 1 is experiencing a LOCA. 1-EOP-03 is being implemented. | ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 P-1 New. A blend is to be performed to the VCT. Proper flow rates cannot be achieved from the control room. The Applicant is required to use Appendix A to locally blend to the VCT with communication to the control room. | ||
RCS temperature is 290 degrees and pressure is 500 psia. The Applicant is directed to place | P-2 Bank #0821062. During a Unit 1 total loss of feedwater, Applicant will align the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to supply Unit 1 'C' AFW pump. | ||
S-7 New. Applicant will be required to align the 2C CCW to the 'B' CCW header. Prior to starting the 2C CCW the AB 4.16KV bus is required to be aligned to the B side. NUREG-1 021, Revision 9 ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 P-1 New. A blend is to be performed to the VCT. Proper flow rates cannot be achieved from the control room. The Applicant is required to use Appendix A to locally blend to the VCT with communication to the control room. P-2 Bank #0821062. | P-3 Bank #0821067. The 1B 120V Instrument Inverter is to be removed from service for maintenance. The Applicant is instructed to place the bus on maintenance bypass. | ||
During a Unit 1 total loss of feedwater, Applicant will align the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to supply Unit 1 'C' AFW pump. P-3 Bank #0821067. | NUREG-1021, Revision 9 | ||
The 1B 120V Instrument Inverter is to be removed from service for maintenance. | |||
The Applicant is instructed to place the bus on maintenance bypass. NUREG-1021, Revision 9 ES*301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Facilit: LLLC. ,e Date of Examination: | ES*301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES*301*3 Facilit: ~ LLLC. ,e Date of Examination: 1 Test Number: | ||
Initials | |||
: c. The 0 eratin test shall not du licate items from the a plicants' audit test s. see Section 0.1.a. d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acce table limits. e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent a licants at the desi nated license level. | : 1. General Criteria a. | ||
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include: detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the se uence of ste s, if a licable b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2. | : b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered durin this examination. | ||
: c. The 0 eratin test shall not du licate items from the a plicants' audit test s. see Section 0.1.a. | |||
: d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acce table limits. | |||
: e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent a licants at the desi nated license level. | |||
: 2. Walk-Throu h Criteria | |||
: a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable: | |||
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include: | |||
detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the se uence of ste s, if a licable | |||
: b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2. | |||
: 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a co is attached. | : 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a co is attached. | ||
: a. Author b. Facility Reviewer(*) | : a. Author | ||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) d. NRC Supervisor NOTE: | : b. Facility Reviewer(*) | ||
* The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests. # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence re uired. | : c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) | ||
PSL Date of Exam:7/23/0S Scenario Numbers: 1/2/3 Operating Test No.: QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c# 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out | : d. NRC Supervisor NOTE: | ||
l | * The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests. | ||
# Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence re uired. | |||
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 I=acilty: PSL Date of Exam:7/23/0S Scenario Numbers: 1/2/3 Operating Test No.: | |||
QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c# | |||
: 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. 1;.A( .~~ | |||
: 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. !4", /\/ \ | |||
~;W!l | |||
: 3. Each event description consists of | |||
* the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated | * the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated | ||
* the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event ! | * the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event ! | ||
~, "vn-~~l | |||
* the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew | * the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew | ||
* the expected operator actions (by shift position) | * | ||
* the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable) b | |||
: 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario | : 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. I:.Ii.* :t"" ~~,~ | ||
without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. .Ii .* 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. i \/ | : 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. 4~ i \/ 'IP}t{A~ | ||
: 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain | : 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. ~/ AI/ ~~: | ||
\ 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. | \ | ||
: 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. | |||
Cues are given. ... S. The simulator modeling is not altered. 9. The scenarios have been validated. | Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. | ||
Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. . 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 | Cues are given. 110: | ||
./ -.;. ,il! 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events .I specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. | ~ ... I~/ ~t S. The simulator modeling is not altered. Il~':1. ~I/' ~~~ | ||
It<---Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes | Iz:~ ~/'~L~fr\ | ||
------1. Total malfunctions (5-S) 6/5/7 ,/ | : 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. | ||
: 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/1/2 'V 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4/4/4 /L--rv | . | ||
: 4. Major transients (1-2) 1/ 1 /1 /}i.-. ;I '1 | : 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. | ||
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. ~~. ~/~ | |||
: 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). 12;1/ lA- ~It . / -.;. ,il! | |||
~~ | |||
: 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events .I specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). ~,~- | |||
: 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. It<--- | |||
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- -- -- | |||
: 1. Total malfunctions (5-S) 6/5/7 t~. | |||
,/ | |||
~I~J | |||
: 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/1/2 ~./ 'V ~fh | |||
: 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4/4/4 /L-- rv ~O(,\ | |||
: 4. Major transients (1-2) 1/ 1 /1 /}i.-. ;I '1 ~h~~\ | |||
5. | |||
6. | |||
EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) | |||
EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1/ 1 /1 0/0/0 kt./ 11<'1 AI'" | |||
: 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2/2/2 t;£- tv I | |||
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 | |||
. Facilty: PSL Date of Exam:7/23/0B Scenario Numbers: 4 Operating Test No.: | |||
QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c# | |||
: 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. | |||
: 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. | |||
: 3. Each event description consists of I * | |||
* the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated | * the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated | ||
* the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event | * the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event | ||
| Line 163: | Line 297: | ||
* the expected operator actions (by shift position) | * the expected operator actions (by shift position) | ||
* the event termination point (if applicable) | * the event termination point (if applicable) | ||
No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. | : 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. | ||
Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. | : 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. | ||
If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. | : 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. | ||
: 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates. | |||
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. | Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. | ||
Cues are given. The simulator modeling is not altered. The scenarios have been validated. | Cues are given. | ||
Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. | B. The simulator modeling is not altered. | ||
Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. | : 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios. | ||
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). | : 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario. | ||
Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). | All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. | ||
The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. | : 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). | ||
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes Total malfunctions (5-B) 7 | : 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). | ||
: 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. | |||
St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A A T L N Y S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-1 I/C 2,4, 2,3,4 3,5 8 4 4 2 ,6 MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2 ,5 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 SROI-2 I/C 3,4, 2,3 3,4, 9 5, 6 4 4 2 6A MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 1 ' 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-3 I/C 2,4 | Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes '-- | ||
St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-6 IIC 2,3, 2,3 3,4, 8 5, | : 1. Total malfunctions (5-B) 7 | ||
St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 272008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-1 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-2 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-3 IIC 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, 2 1 1 1 6A I/C 3,5, 6,8, 5 4 4 2 9 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 I/C 5 1 4 4 2 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, | : 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 | ||
: 1. Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. | : 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 | ||
ROs must service in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunction and one major transient in the ATC position. | : 4. Major transients (1-2) 2 | ||
If an instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position. | : 5. EOPs entered/requiring SUbstantive actions (1-2) 2 | ||
: 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis. 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns. NUREG 1021 Revision 9 ES*301 Competencies Checklist Form ES*301*6 Facility: | : 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1 | ||
PSL Date of Examination: | : 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2 | ||
July 23.2008 Operating Test No.: APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO D SRO-I X SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I D SRO-U SRO-U X SRO-U SRO-U D | |||
?- | ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N | ||
Specs. (3) ,3 Notes: (1 ) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an SRO-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs. Instructions: | -*t~~ 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A | ||
A T L N Y S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-1 I/C 2,4, 2,3,4 3,5 8 4 4 2 | |||
,6 MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2 | |||
,5 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 SROI-2 I/C 3,4, 2,3 3,4, 9 5, 6 4 4 2 6A MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 1' 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 | |||
2,3,4 SROI-3 I/C 2,4 3,5 8 4 4 2 | |||
,6 MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2 | |||
,5 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-4 I/C 3,4, 2,3 3,4, 9 5, 6 4 4 2 6A MAJ 8 5 68 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 2 1 1 1 1 | |||
2,3,4 SROI-5 I/C 2,4, 3,5 4 4 2 | |||
,6 9 8 | |||
MAJ 7 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2 | |||
,5 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 | |||
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N | |||
*~~Par4W 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A | |||
A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-6 IIC 2,3, 2,3 3,4, 8 5, 4 4 2 5 | |||
6A MAJ 7 5 68 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 | |||
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 272008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A | |||
A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-1 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 | |||
MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-2 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 | |||
MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-3 IIC 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 | |||
MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, 2 1 1 1 6A I/C 3,5, 6,8, 5 4 4 2 9 | |||
MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 I/C 5 1 4 4 2 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, 2 1 1 1 6A IIC 3 1 4 4 2 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 NUREG 1021 Revision 9 | |||
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Instructions: | |||
: 1. Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)" | |||
positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunction and one major transient in the ATC position. If an instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position. | |||
: 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis. | |||
: 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns. | |||
NUREG 1021 Revision 9 | |||
ES*301 Competencies Checklist Form ES*301*6 Facility: PSL Date of Examination: July 23.2008 Operating Test No.: | |||
APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO D SRO-I X SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I D | |||
\ | |||
SRO-U SRO-U X SRO-U SRO-U D Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2-9 lA 2-9 2-7 Events and Conditions ,-?- | |||
6 Comply With and 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 Use Procedures (1) | |||
Operate Control 1,2,3, 1- 3,4 Boards (2) 4,6,7, 4,6 ,5, 9,10 ,7 6B Communicate 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 and Interact Demonstrate 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 Supervisory Ability (3) | |||
Comply With and 4,5 lA 2,4 2,5 Use Tech. Specs. (3) ,3 Notes: | |||
(1 ) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. | |||
(2) Optional for an SRO-U. | |||
(3) Only applicable to SROs. | |||
Instructions: | |||
Check the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. | Check the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. | ||
St. Lucie Plant Date of Exam: July 21 2008 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G' Total | ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: St. Lucie Plant Date of Exam: July 21 2008 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K | ||
1 K | |||
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements. | 2 K | ||
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution. | 3 K | ||
: 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. | 4 K | ||
5 K | |||
6 A | |||
1 A | |||
2 A | |||
3 A | |||
4 . | |||
G Total A2 G' Total | |||
: 1. 1 2 2 5 4 3 2 18 3 3 6 Emergency & | |||
Abnormal Plant 2 2 1 2 N/A 2 1 N/A 1 9 3 1 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 3 7 6 4 3 27 6 4 10 1 2 1 3 5 2 1 2 3 3 4 2 28 2 3 5 2. | |||
Plant 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 2 4 6 2 2 3 4 4 5 3 38 4 4 8 | |||
: 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 3 2_ 2 3 ~ 2 1 1 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two). | |||
: 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. | |||
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. | |||
The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points. | |||
: 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements. | |||
: 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution. | |||
: 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. | |||
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively. | Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively. | ||
: 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories. | : 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories. | ||
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected froni Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs. 8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. | 7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected froni Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs. | ||
Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. | : 8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams. | ||
Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43. | : 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43. | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions | |||
-Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# I | ||
~ ~~t | |||
Components, and functions E02 I Reactor Trip Recovery 11 x I EK2.1 of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, 3.3 signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. | ~ 2l'4~~ | ||
0081 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident I 3 x v" I Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they | ~ 2t4:~$ | ||
HPI pump 4.1 I 2 to control PZR level I pressure. | ~ B'A2t0tt | ||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 009 I Small Break LOCA I 3 x EK3.21 they apply to the small break LOCA Actions contained in 4.2 I 3 EOP for small break LOCA I leak. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 011 I Large Break LOCA I 3 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA : 4.1 I 4 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor 015 117 I RCP Malfunctions I 4 x AK2.10 Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the 2.8 I 5 following: | ~ 21~;t?Q | ||
RCP indicators and controls. | ~~ ~:{Oj; | ||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as | 'L ~ 9,.,<c\ | ||
Ability to detenmine and interpret the following as they 025 I Loss of RHR System I 4 x AA2.06 apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: 3.2 I 7 Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. | .; | ||
Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 0261 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 I x AA1.03 apply to the Loss of component Cooling Water: SWS as 3.6 I 8 a backup to the CCWS. | Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: Components, and functions E02 I Reactor Trip Recovery 11 x I EK2.1 of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, 3.3 signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. | ||
. | 0081 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident I 3 x AA 1.02 v" I Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: HPI pump 4.1 I 2 to control PZR level I pressure. | ||
-Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function jG I K11 K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# ! 027 I Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they | Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 009 I Small Break LOCA I 3 x EK3.21 they apply to the small break LOCA Actions contained in 4.2 I 3 EOP for small break LOCA I leak. | ||
3.7 9 Tech Spec limits for RCS Pressure. | Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 011 I Large Break LOCA I 3 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA : 4.1 I 4 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling. | ||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 038 I Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 x EK3.01 they apply to the SGTR: Equalizing pressure on primary 4.1 10 and secondary side of the ruptured S/G. Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they CE/E05 I Excess Steam Demand I 4 x EA1.3 apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating 3.4 11 results during abnormal and emergency situations. | Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor 015 117 I RCP Malfunctions I 4 x AK2.10 Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the 2.8 I 5 following: RCP indicators and controls. | ||
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they | Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: | ||
022 I Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 x AK3.02 3.5 I 6 Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging. | |||
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 055 I Station Blackout I 6 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: | Ability to detenmine and interpret the following as they 025 I Loss of RHR System I 4 x AA2.06 apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: 3.2 I 7 Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. | ||
Effects of 3.3 13 battery discharge rates on capacity. | Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 0261 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 I x AA1.03 apply to the Loss of component Cooling Water: SWS as 3.6 I 8 a backup to the CCWS. | ||
Equipment Control I Ability to interpret control room 057 I Loss of Vital AC Inst bus x 2.2.44 | . | ||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 058 I Loss of DC Power I 6 x AK3.02 they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in 4.0 16 EOP for loss of dc power. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 062 I Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 x Ak3.03 | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function jG I K11 K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# ! | ||
VARs outside the capability curve .. KIA Category Point Totals: Group Point 2/3 2 2 5 4 3/3 | 027 I Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they x AA2.04 apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: 3.7 9 3 | ||
-Tier 1 Group | Tech Spec limits for RCS Pressure. | ||
PZR 3.4 I 20 level indicators and alarms. 032 I Loss of Source Range Nil 7 x I 2.2.40 | Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 038 I Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 x EK3.01 they apply to the SGTR: Equalizing pressure on primary 4.1 10 and secondary side of the ruptured S/G. | ||
Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 068 I Control Room Evac I 8 x I AA1.21 I apply to the control room evacuation: | Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they CE/E05 I Excess Steam Demand I 4 x EA1.3 apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating 3.4 11 results during abnormal and emergency situations. | ||
transfer of controls 3.9 I 23 from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply 076 I High Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 x AK3.06 to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: | Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): Facility conditions and CE/E06 I Loss of Feedwater 14 x EA2.1 2.8 12 selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. | ||
Actions contained 3.2 I 24 in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. | Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 055 I Station Blackout I 6 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Effects of 3.3 13 battery discharge rates on capacity. | ||
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: | Conduct of Operations I Knowledge of the purpose and 056 I Loss of Off-site Power I 6 x 2.1.28 4.1 14 function of major system components and controls. | ||
Facility*s heat CE/A13I Natural Circulation 14 x AK2.2 | Equipment Control I Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, 057 I Loss of Vital AC Inst bus x 2.2.44 4.2 15 and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. | ||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 058 I Loss of DC Power I 6 x AK3.02 they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in 4.0 16 EOP for loss of dc power. | |||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the loss of nuclear service water: Guidance 062 I Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 x Ak3.03 4.0 17 actions contained in EOP for loss of nuclear service water. | |||
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 0771 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances I x AA2.04 apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.5 18 6 | |||
Disturbances: VARs outside the capability curve .. | |||
KIA Category Point Totals: | |||
Group Point 2/3 2 2 5 4 3/3 18/6 Total: | |||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE # I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) I Im~Q#J | |||
~ R'~§ lc' ~g g ~""11 8'~ | |||
~ | |||
,Ae 13.1 | |||
!I | |||
~ ~~ | |||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 003 I Dropped Control Rod 11 I X AK3.04 I they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Actions contained 3.8 I 19 in EOP for dropped control rod. | |||
Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 0281 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction I 2 x I AA2.01 apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: PZR 3.4 I 20 level indicators and alarms. | |||
Equipment Control I Ability to apply Technical 032 I Loss of Source Range Nil 7 x I 2.2.40 Specifications for a system. | |||
3.4 I 21 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 037 I Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 x AA1.13 apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: S/G blowdown 3.9 I 22 radiation monitors. | |||
Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 068 I Control Room Evac I 8 x I AA1.21 I apply to the control room evacuation: transfer of controls 3.9 I 23 from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. | |||
Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply 076 I High Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 x AK3.06 to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Actions contained 3.2 I 24 in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. | |||
Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency CE/A13I Natural Circulation 14 x AK2.2 coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations 3.4 I 25 between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. | |||
Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage): | Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage): | ||
CE/A16I Excessive RCS Leakage 12 x AK1.3 I Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and 3.2 I 26 remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage) | CE/A16I Excessive RCS Leakage 12 x AK1.3 I Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and 3.2 I 26 remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage) | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions | |||
-Tier 1 Group | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE #I Name Safety Function IG-rK1 1 K2 r K3 1A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) I Imp*-l-Q# I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery): | ||
CE/E09 1 Functional Recovery x EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures 3.2 27 associated with Functional Recovery KIA Category Point Total: 1/1 2 1 2 | |||
_. | |||
.. _. --------------- | 2 1/3 Group Point Total:L_ 9/4 | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-21 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 . I System #/Name G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# | .. ------------------ .. _. - -------- ------ | ||
I 2.6 I 29 004 Chemical and Volume I Knowledge of the operational implications of the | |||
RCS. | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-21 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 . | ||
I System #/Name G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# I | |||
3.2 I 34 Recirculation flowpath of reactor building sump. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench I I malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on | ~ §g | ||
Stuck-open PORV or code safety. | ~ ~~ | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 | !tJ:[li1li8lt\rum~iJl>J:m ~ sa x a.~ | ||
Automatic 3.1 36 start of standby pump. Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, 008 Component Cooling Water x A3.05 including: | ~~.~it91~e.l.m t~ ~Q Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-003 Reactor Coolant Pump I x I K1.03 effect relationships between the RCPS and the following I 3.3 I 2S systems: RCP seal system. | ||
Control of the electrically operated, automatic 3.0 37 isolation valves in the CCWS. | Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the 003 Reactor Coolant Pump x I K6.14 following will have on the RCPS Starting requirements. | ||
CROS. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based 012 Reactor Protection x A2.02 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.6 40 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | I 2.6 I 29 004 Chemical and Volume Control x | ||
Loss of instrument power. 013 Engineered Safety Features | I K5.16 I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Source of T-ave and T-ref signals to control and RPS I 3.2 30 004 Chemical and Volume Ability to manually operate and / or monitor in the x A4.15 control room: boron concentration 3.6 31 Control Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 005 Residual Heat Removal x K3.01 3.9 32 RHRS will have on the following: RCS. | ||
Input channels and logic. | Conduct of Operations / Ability to explain and apply 005 Residual Heat Removal x I 2.1.32 3.S 33 system limits and precautions Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or 006 Emergency Core Cooling I x I K4.0S interlock(s) which provide for the following: 3.2 I 34 Recirculation flowpath of reactor building sump. | ||
Prevention of path for 3.7 43 escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) 039 Main and Reheat Steam x A3.02 | Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank I Ix A2.01 I malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or I 3.9 I 35 operations: Stuck-open PORV or code safety. | ||
Isolation of the MRSS. | |||
RCS. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based 059 Main Feedwater x A2.12 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.1 46 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 I System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A 1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics limp. I Q# I Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or 008 Component Cooling Water x K4.01 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic 3.1 36 start of standby pump. | ||
Failure of feedwater regulating valves. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 061 Auxiliary/Emergency | Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, 008 Component Cooling Water x A3.05 including: Control of the electrically operated, automatic 3.0 37 isolation valves in the CCWS. | ||
S/G level. | Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control x A4.01 3.7 38 room: PZR spray valve. | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 1 | Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 012 Reactor Protection x K3.01 3.9 39 RPS will have on the following: CROS. | ||
2.7 49 Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). | Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based 012 Reactor Protection x A2.02 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.6 40 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of instrument power. | ||
013 Engineered Safety Features Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS x A3.01 including: Input channels and logic. 3.7 41 Actuation Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 022 Containment Cooling x A4.01 3.6 42 room: CCS fans. | |||
Trips for 3.9 51 ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). | Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Prevention of path for 026 Containment Spray x K4.09 3.7 43 escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) | ||
073 Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict 073 Process Radiation Monitoring x A1.01 | Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, 039 Main and Reheat Steam x A3.02 3.1 44 including: Isolation of the MRSS. | ||
radiation levels. | Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 059 Main Feedwater x K3.04 3.6 45 MFW will have on the following: RCS. | ||
2.7 53 Service water Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-078 Instrument Air x K1.02 effect relationships between the lAS and the following 2.7 54 systems: Service Air. Equipment Control I Knowledge of the bases in 103 Containment x 2.2.25 Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for 3.2 55 operations and safety limits. KIA Category Point Totals: 2/3 2 1 3 5 2 1 2 3/2 3 4 Group Point Total: I 28/5 | Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based 059 Main Feedwater x A2.12 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.1 46 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of feedwater regulating valves. | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 2 | Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 061 Auxiliary/Emergency (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 47 x A1.01 3.9 Feedwater operating the AFW controls including: S/G level. | ||
Rod 3.5 56 control logic. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in 002 Reactor Coolant I x I A1.04 | Knowledge of the operational implications of the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency x K5.01 following concepts as the apply to the AFW: 3.6 48 Feedwater Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer. | ||
Subcooling Margin. | |||
3.1 58 Pressurizer Heaters. Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on 015/ Nuclear Instrumentation I x I K6.01 the following will have on the NIS: Sensors, 2.9 59 detectors and indicators. | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 I System #/Name G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# | ||
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the 029 / Containment Purge I x I A3.01 I Containment Purge System including: | Knowledge of ac distribution system design feature(s) 062 AC Electrical Distribution x K4.05 and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: 2.7 49 Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). | ||
CPS | Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 063 DC Electrical Distribution x A4.01 2.8 50 room: Major breakers and control power fuses. | ||
3.8 60 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the | Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or 064 Emergency Diesel Generator x K4.02 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Trips for 3.9 51 ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). | ||
Emergency Procedures | 073 Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design 073 Process Radiation Monitoring x A1.01 3.2 52 limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: radiation levels. | ||
/ Ability to perform without 045 / Main Turbine Generator I x I 2.4.49 | Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: | ||
Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of 055 Condenser Air Removal I x I K3.01 the CARS will have on the following: | 076 Service Water X K2.01 2.7 53 Service water Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-078 Instrument Air x K1.02 effect relationships between the lAS and the following 2.7 54 systems: Service Air. | ||
Main 2.5 63 condenser. | Equipment Control I Knowledge of the bases in 103 Containment x 2.2.25 Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for 3.2 55 operations and safety limits. | ||
Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 056 / Condensate I x I K1.03 cause-effect relationships between the Condensate 2.6 64 System and the following systems: MFW. | KIA Category Point Totals: 2/3 2 1 | ||
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems -Tier 2 Group 2 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number KIA Topics Imp. Q# Ability to predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water | . | ||
Loss of circulating water pumps. KIA Category Point Totals: 1/1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1/2 1 1 Group Point Total: I 10/3 ES-401 | 3 5 2 | ||
-- | |||
1 | |||
Knowledge of radiological safety procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as | ----- | ||
2 3/2 | |||
'----- | |||
PSL | 3 4 Group Point Total: I 28/5 | ||
PSL does not have | |||
2. | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 I System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics Imp. Q# | ||
x ~~ | |||
x §t~ | |||
~ ~~ | |||
Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or 001 I Control Rod Drive I x I K4.03 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod 3.5 56 control logic. | |||
Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) 002 Reactor Coolant I x I A1.04 3.9 57 associated with operating the RCS controls including: Subcooling Margin. | |||
FROM | Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: | ||
011 Pressurizer Level Control x I K2.02 3.1 58 Pressurizer Heaters. | |||
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on 015/ Nuclear Instrumentation I x I K6.01 the following will have on the NIS: Sensors, 2.9 59 detectors and indicators. | |||
Ability to monitor automatic operation of the 029 / Containment Purge I x I A3.01 I Containment Purge System including: CPS 3.8 60 isolation. | |||
041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam header pressure. 3.1 61 Control Emergency Procedures / Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require 045 / Main Turbine Generator I x I 2.4.49 4.6 62 immediate operation of system components and controls. | |||
: | Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of 055 Condenser Air Removal I x I K3.01 the CARS will have on the following: Main 2.5 63 condenser. | ||
: | Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 056 / Condensate I x I K1.03 cause-effect relationships between the Condensate 2.6 64 System and the following systems: MFW. | ||
: | |||
: | ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number KIA Topics Imp. Q# | ||
Ability to predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictionsolJse 075 Circulating Water X A2.02 2.5 65 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | |||
Loss of circulating water pumps. | |||
Bank use meels limits (no more than 75 percent from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); | KIA Category Point Totals: 1/1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1/2 1 1 Group Point Total: I 10/3 | ||
enter the actual RO I SRO-only Question dislribulion(s} | |||
at riQht. . | ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier3) I Form ES-401-3 I Facility: St. Lucie NRC Exam Date of Exam: 7/2008 RO Category KIA # Topic IR Q# [g ~1 4i'JZ elJ | ||
analysis level; the 5RO exam may exceed 60 percent If the randomly selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO | ~~ | ||
~ | |||
Question psychometric quality and format meet the lluldelines in ES Appendix B. The exam contains the required number of one-point. | : 1. ibilities during all Conduct of 4.1 66 Operations 2.1.26 3.4 67 2.1.37 4.3 68 Subtotal 3 ~ | ||
multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. | f4~ gz Q1\ | ||
* The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations. | 2. | ||
# Independent NRC reviewer Initial items In Column "c*; chief examiner concurrence required. | of the design, procedural, and Equipment Control 3.8 69 differences between units. | ||
3.7 70 2 g | |||
~ | |||
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under 2.3.4 3.2 71 normal or conditions. | |||
Knowledge of radiological safety procedures | |||
: 3. pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as Radiation Control response to radiation monitor alarms, 2.3.13 3.4 72 containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas filters etc. | |||
Subtotal 2 Knowledge of crew responsibilities during EOP 2.4.13 4.0 73 | |||
: 4. Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety Emergency 2.4.22 functions during abnormallemergency 3.6 73 Procedures I Plan Knowledge unciator alarms, indications, or 2.4.31 4.2 75 res. | |||
Subtotal 3 Tier 3 Point Total 10 | |||
I ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs I Form ES-401-4 I Tier 1 Group De-selected KA Reason for Rejection Operate I Monitor Feedwater Pumps during Pzr. Vapor space 1/1 (008) AA1.04 accident. No relationship between feedwater pumps and Pzr. Vapor space accident. | |||
3.02 Knowledge of opening excess letdown isolation valves during SBLOCA. PSL does not have excess letdown valves. | |||
1/1 (009) EK3.02, EK3.27 3.27 Manual depress, or HPI recirc for sustained high pressure. | |||
PSL doe not have positive displacement HPI pumps. RCS depress. Is preformed by spray or Charging and Letdown PZR PCS malfunction, ability to interpret Seal return flow. PSL 1/1 (027) AA2.13 does not have seal return flow. Rep seal injection is ONLY placed in service during RCS fill and vent, Mode 5. | |||
SGTR RCS loop isolation valves. PSL does not have Loop isolation 1/1 (038) EK3.07 valves. | |||
3.01 Dropped CEA when ICS logic has failed. PSL does not have Integrated Control System. | |||
AK3.01, AK3.02, 3.02 Dropped CEA reactor runback. PSL does not have reactor 1/2 (003) | |||
Ak3.03 runback 3.03 Dropped CEA turbine runback. PSL doen not have turbine runback 2.03 Pzr Level control malfunction ability to determine Charging subsystem flow indo And controller. PSL does not have Charging subsystem flow or controller. | |||
1/2 (028) AA2.03, AA2.05 2.05 Pzr Level control malfunction ability to determine flow control valve isolation valve indicator. PSL does not have flow control valve 1.09 CR Evacuation, ability to operate I monitor synch. Key. PSL does not have Sync Key switch 1/2 (068) AA 1.09, AA 1.22 1.22 Flow control valve for RCS charging header. PSL does not have Charging Flow control valve. | |||
High RCS activity, knowledge of reasons, orifice controls for 1/2 (076) AK3.03 minimum letdown. PSL does not have letdown flow orfices. | |||
CVCS, deborating demin. Selector valve and control switch. PSL 2/1 (004) A4.20 Ion Exchanger lineup is all manual valves, no selector switch or control switch. | |||
4.22 ECCS, interlocks between RCP seal flow rate and standby HPI pp. PSL RCP seal injection is from Charging pump header, not 2/1 (006) K4.22, K4.29 HPI and only used during fill and vent. Mode 5. | |||
4.29 ECCS, BIT recirculation. PSL does not recirc. Safety Injection Tanks. | |||
2.06 MFW, loss of steam flow. PSL does not have Steam Driven Main Feedwater pumps. | |||
2/1 (059) A2.06, A2.07 2.07 MFW, tripping of MFW pump turbine. PSL does not have Steam Driven Main Feedwater pumps. | |||
SWS, power supply to reactor building closed cooling water. PSL 2/1 (076) K2.04 SWS is an open system. | |||
SOS, ICS voltage inverter. PSL does not have Integrated Control 2/2 (041) A4.01 System. | |||
I ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As I Form ES-401-4 I As discussed with Chief Examiner changed KIA due to like KIA to RO question 35. Changed KIA TO AA 1.02 000008 I Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: HPI pump to control 1/1 (08) AA1.08 PZR level I pressure. FROM AA 1.08 KIA Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level pressure and temperature. | |||
As discussed with Chief Examiner Changed KIA due difficulty writing SRO only question. Changed KIA TO AA2.01: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: | |||
1/1 (065) AA2.06 Cause and effect of low pressure instrument air pressure. FROM AA2.06 000065 I Loss of Instrument Air 18 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: | |||
When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing | |||
ES*401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES*401-6 Facility: 51. Lucie Date of Exam: 7/231108 Exam Level: RO"l/ SRO "1/ | |||
Initial Item Description | |||
: 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility. | |||
: 2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions. | |||
: b. Facility leaming obiectives are referenced as available. | |||
: 3. 5RO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of E5-401 | |||
: 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC llcensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office). | |||
: 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as£.t:licated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate: | |||
the audit exam was systemattcally and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or | |||
_ the examinations were developed independently; or | |||
= the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain) | |||
: 6. Bank use meels limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRO-only 14/2 2/0 59/23 Question dislribulion(s} at riQht. . | |||
: 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory CIA exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the 5RO exam may exceed 60 percent If the randomly 3115 44/20 selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO 1SRO Question distrlbution(s) at right. | |||
: 8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination 01 distractors. | |||
: 9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are iustified. | |||
: 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the lluldelines in ES Appendix B. Ijrt- / ~ | |||
: 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point. multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet. | |||
B. Author | |||
: b. Facility Reviewer (*) | |||
: c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) | |||
: d. NRC Regional Supervisor Note: | |||
* The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations. | |||
# Independent NRC reviewer Initial items In Column "c*; chief examiner concurrence required. | |||
ES-401, Rev. 9 Saint Lncie 2008-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 | |||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 7. | |||
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Explanation Focus Instructions | |||
[Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.] | [Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.] | ||
: 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 -5 (easy -difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 -4 range are acceptable). | : 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. | ||
: 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified: | : 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable). | ||
: 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified: | |||
* The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). | * The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). | ||
* The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). | * The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). | ||
* The answer choices are a collection of umelated true/false statements. | * The answer choices are a collection of umelated true/false statements. | ||
* The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. | * The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. | ||
* One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem). 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | * One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem). | ||
: 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | |||
* The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). | * The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). | ||
* The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). | * The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). | ||
* The question contains data with an umealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). | * The question contains data with an umealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). | ||
* The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. | * The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. | ||
: 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). | : 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). | ||
: 6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory? | : 6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory? | ||
: 7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met)'. | : 7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met)'. | ||
" { l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO UlE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shovm in red | |||
Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. The question requires knowledge of EOP entry condition. | " { ~- | ||
This is RO knowledge. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
No selection of appropriate procedure is required. | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UlE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shovm in red E02 1 Reactor Trip Recovery 1 EA2.1: Facility Conditions and 76 H 3 selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and X U emergency operations. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. | ||
Does not meet | E The question requires knowledge of EOP entry condition. This is RO knowledge. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. Rev 1: | ||
Rev 1: Some stem statements have periods, others don't. Reword stem to add another bullet, the svrA's have been completed. | Some stem statements have periods, others don't. Reword stem to add another bullet, the svrA's have been completed. The SRO will now transition to ...........~.. and direct the eRO (BOP) to___ 7 A & D contain RO Knowledge. This enables an RO to arTlve at answer using just RO Knowledge. AFAS signal not present. Eliminates A & D. EOP-2 Entry RO knowledge makes B the only conecl: answer using only RO knowledge. Rev 2. | ||
The SRO will now transition to ........... .. and direct the eRO (BOP) | Change to say "After the SPTAs are compiete:"Missing , | ||
This enables an RO to arTlve at answer using just RO Knowledge. | commas uher pmcedrure ft. | ||
AFAS signal not present. Eliminates A & D. EOP-2 Entry RO knowledge makes B the only conecl: answer using only RO knowledge. | NEW H 2 X E 0000111 Large Break LOCA 13 Emergency Procedures 12.4.6: | ||
Rev 2. Change to say "After the SPTAs are compiete:"Missing , commas uher pmcedrure ft. NEW | 77 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. Appears to match KIA. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. Is psia units read in control room? | ||
Appears to match KIA. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. | Shutdown cooling requirements in psia? Appears conect answer should be B "in any 1 hr period" for no RCPs running. (Less than min. subcooling criteria per curve, therefore all RCPs oft). | ||
No selection of appropriate procedure is required. | Rev] : Proposed answer still shows "1)". Conect answer is "B". Also. the EOP is given in the stem of the question and is not selected based on plant conditions as required by the I OCFR55.43 criteria. "Refer to" appear's to be the conect verb per the EOP. Rev 2: L;ilSt bullet should have units as mrem/hr. or mR/hr. Distractor D srll)uld be 100 degrecs/hr. Is [he EOP reference for use with this question ,;orrect? | ||
Does not meet | NEW H 3 ;x: ;x: y 026 1 Loss of Component Cooling Water 1 Emergency 78 Procedures 1 Plan: 2.4.35: Knowledge of local auxiliary | ||
Is psia units read in control room? Shutdown cooling requirements in psia? Appears conect answer should be B "in any 1 hr period" for no RCPs running. (Less than min. subcooling criteria per curve, therefore all RCPs oft). Rev] : Proposed answer still shows "1)". Conect answer is "B". Also. the EOP is given in the stem of the question and is not selected based on plant conditions as required by the I OCFR55.43 criteria. "Refer to" appear's to be the conect verb per the EOP. Rev 2: L;ilSt bullet should have units as mrem/hr. or mR/hr. Distractor D srll)uld be 100 degrecs/hr. | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Is [he EOP reference for use with this question ,;orrect? | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Job- 1Minutia I #/ IBack-1 Q= I SRO 1UIE/S Explanation Focus Link unitsl ward IKiAI Only Rev 1 sho\Vl1 in red S./E loperator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational S effects. Distractors C & D do not appear to be plausible. Why would anyone choose these? Also not SRO only as this can be answered based just on system knowledge. Change to ask lAW with what procedure, need another viable procedure selection choice. Rev 1; questlclD, i.e. Given the plant conditions: A SGTR has occurred ouA SG, bullet should be "affected" SQ, The conect answer has an statement Should read: Attach the flex hose to the male disconnect fitting in the air line. Teachim:: m the stem of the question, Loss of air doses the valve. Is | ||
NEW | '*documented'* the correct action? | ||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) | NEW Rev. :2 LooKs OK ilflcr cham!?s made. | ||
Why would anyone choose these? Also not SRO only as this can be answered based just on system knowledge. | H 3 x x x U 1000038/ Steam Generator Tube Rupture / EA2,01 Ability to 79 determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: | ||
Change to ask lAW with what procedure, need another viable procedure selection choice. Rev 1; questlclD, i.e. Given the plant conditions: | When to isolate one or more steam generator. Does not appear to match KIA Answer is for an ESD not a SGTR. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. No selection ofappropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. | ||
A SGTR has occurred ouA SG, bullet should be "affected" SQ, The conect answer has an statement Should read: Attach the flex hose to the male disconnect fitting in the air line. Teachim:: | Rev 1; Stll1 does not meet I OCFR55.43 criteria, FOP should not be in the stem. Give conditions so that a SGTR must be This a statement for the SRO POltiOIL No FRP addressed in the stem. C & D not I. | ||
m the stem of the question, Loss of air doses the valve. Is '*documented'* | plaUSIble NEW ReF. 2 LOOKS OK after made, H 3 x x U 000058/ Loss of DC Bus / 2.1.20 Conduct of Operations: | ||
the correct action? NEW Rev. :2 LooKs OK ilflcr cham!?s made. U 1000038/ Steam Generator Tube Rupture / EA2,01 Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: | 80 S Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. Does not meet KIA. Does not meet 10CFR55.43 criteria. Add two other safety functions to choice B & D. | ||
Does not appear to match KIA Answer is for an ESD not a SGTR. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. | NEW Rev, 2 edih'rfai errors to 11x, n disiractor has incorrect >>referenced, | ||
No selection | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Does not meet | Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only F I X Y 000065 / Loss of Instrument Air / AA2.06 Ability to determine 81 Ii S/1! and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing. This is not SRO Only. RO is required to know trip criteria. Also proposed answer does not agree with correct answer statement. | ||
Rev 1; Stll1 does not meet I OCFR55.43 criteria, FOP should not be | IResamp new KIA: AA2.0! Cause and effect of low pressure instrument air alarm. needed after "UniC Capitalize "MV" in stem. Put "ONE" after "Which" in stem of Should it say "F46" vs '"F4S" in stem of question to match alarm Igl NEW F 2 X X U 000024/ Emergency Boration / AA2.05 Ability to determine 82 H E and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Amount of boron to add to achieve required SDM. | ||
Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. Does not meet KIA. Does not meet | Appears to match KIA. Not SRO Only. Direct look up. | ||
Add two other safety functions to choice B & D. NEW Rev, 2 edih'rfai errors to 11x, n disiractor has incorrect | Reference for use in question not attached with question. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFRS0.43 .b(5) criteria. | ||
>> referenced, | New (jlw;;linn written. Distractor D is not with choice R ChoicesA. & B do not appear to be plausible. A'rWS criteria would not allow normal Rx Trip .:UVCly NEW Rev. ] ediU,rial othenvise OK. 'j'here sflPuld be no rd"rt'nce provided j(W this question. | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only | H 2 X Y 000036/ Fuel Handling Accident / AA2.01 Ability to determine, 83 I E and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system indications. Teaching in the stem of the question by telling the candidate that the rod dropped. Also not relevant to the question. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. | ||
This is not SRO Only. RO is required to know trip criteria. | 151 part of distractors is RO Knowledge and Y2 of second part is also RO knowledge. | ||
Also proposed answer does not agree with correct answer statement. | Revised 2M part of c!istractors. Distractof plausibility 110t updated. Gaseous repeated twke on A & c. NEW | ||
IResamp new KIA: AA2.0! Cause and effect of low pressure instrument air alarm. needed after "UniC Capitalize "MV" in stem. Put "ONE" after "Which" in stem of Should it say "F46" vs '"F4S" in stem of question to match alarm Igl NEW | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Amount of boron to add to achieve required SDM. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO Only. Direct look up. Reference for use in question not attached with question. | Q# LOK LOD (FfH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO VIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only C 3 X- V 000067 I Plant Fire Onsite I 2.2.37 Ability to determine 84 S operability and I or availability of safety related equipment. | ||
No selection of appropriate procedure is required. | Does not match KIA. Question is based on a loss of fire protection not a Plant Fire Onsite and the correct response does not involve an operability or availability of safety related equipment. Are SROs expected to know this from memory? | ||
Does not meet | New written. Reps is LA., RO Ifirain isRO lhen this is not SRO IOnly. | ||
New (jlw;;linn written. Distractor D is not with choice R ChoicesA. | NEW Licensee staled that tdpiJlnQ: Reps is NOT an lA. | ||
& B do not appear to be plausible. | F 2 E 000069 I Loss of Containment Integrity I AA2.02 Ability to 85 determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity. Appears to match KIA. Distractor "D" not plausible. No coma is after "closed", | ||
A'rWS criteria would not allow normal Rx Trip .:UVCly NEW Rev. ] ediU,rial othenvise OK. 'j'here sflPuld be no rd"rt'nce provided j(W this question. | NEW H 2 V 005 12.1.25 Residual Heat Removal Ability to interpret 86 reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. Is not a SRO only question. Appears to be a direct lookup. Question revised to include a l'S calL No! sure if it is still a direct Ilook NEW H 4 :g 022 I 2.2.37 Containment Cooling Equipment Control I Ability 87 S to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. Appears to match KIA. Distractors C&D not plausible. | ||
NEW H 1 £ 026 I 2.2.42 Containment Spray Equipment Control lAbility to 88 U recognize system parameters that are entry level conditions for Technical Specifications. Meets the KIA. 'rhis is a math calc from the reference provided, Tile part of the answer is given on the data sheet. No interprelation | |||
ARM system indications. | ,L- _ NEW | ||
Teaching in the stem of the question by telling the candidate that the rod dropped. Also not relevant to the question. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. 7. | ||
Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. | Q# ILOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia I UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I | ||
Revised 2M part of c!istractors. | :g 89 I H | ||
Distractof plausibility 110t updated. Gaseous repeated twke on A & c. NEW | I 3 I s 064 I A2.16 Emergency Diesel Generator Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of offsite power during full-load testing ofED/G. Meets KIA. Not SRO Only. EOP entry condition. RO knowledge. NEW Revised to add to address SRO knowledce. 'rhe 2nd half of the 2 response is not needed to answer the nd needs to be HldCkout & LO/\FEOP RO Licens('c upon review stated that it is nOi RO to know Blackuu.t conditioll entry. | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FfH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO VIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only | F 2 s 076 I A2.01 Service Water Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 90 u the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SWS. Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO Only or an accumulation of RO Knowledge? Is marked Fundamental Knowledge and linked to 55.43. Doesn't correlate. | ||
Does not match KIA. Question is based on a loss of fire protection not a Plant Fire Onsite and the correct response does not involve an operability or availability of safety related equipment. | IChange stem, remove "Mode I ", this is Add "ONE" after "Which" in the Guestion statement to ONE co free! answer. | ||
Are SROs expected to know this from memory? New written. Reps is LA., RO Ifirain isRO lhen this is not SRO IOnly. NEW Licensee staled that tdpiJlnQ: | NEW is Ullsat. RO F 2 x U 017 I A2.02 Incore Temperature Monitor Ability to (a) predict 91 C the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Core damage. RO Knowledge. | ||
Reps is NOT an lA. | No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFRS0.43.b (5) criteria. Is fig. 2 required to answer this question? Bank New written. Is the anached qjll to | ||
Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Appears to match KIA. Distractor "D" not plausible. | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only F 2 X E 033 A2.02 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Ability to (a) predict the 92 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SFPCS. Second part of KA number missing. Distractor "D" does not appear plausible. Is the only distractor that uses clarity as a choice. A is a subset of C. Does not meet 10CFR50.43.b(5) criteria. NEW Need new distractor for i half of distraetor Nt Not realistic H 2 X .g 072 / 2.1.20 Area Radiation Monitoring: Ability to interpret and 93 S execute procedure steps. Distractor "A" not plausible. Isn't "c" always correct if personnel are in me area? NEW Based on pnJcetiun:- review wil:£""""" A & Care phmsible. | ||
No coma is after "closed", NEW | H 3 U 2.1.7 Conduct of Operation: Ability to evaluate plant 94 S performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. RO Knowledge for Rx Trip and EOP entry condition. NEW H 2 X E 2.1.34 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of primary and 95 secondary plant chemistry limits. Distractor "D" not plausible. | ||
Appears to be a direct lookup. Question revised to include a l'S calL No! sure if it is still a direct Ilook NEW | NEW C 2 X U 2.1.32 Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply 96 S system limits and precautions. Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO only. See pg 4 of SRO Only guidance. NEW New qm~stion \vritten. | ||
Appears to match KIA. Distractors C&D not plausible. | H 3 E 2.2.14 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for 97 controlling equipment configuration or status. Appears to meet KIA. Distractor "c" does not seem plausible. Availability not addressed by T.S. | ||
NEW | MODIFIED This is BANK Question, | ||
Meets the KIA. 'rhis is a math calc from the reference provided, Tile part of the answer is given on the data sheet. No interprelation | |||
, | |||
Loss of offsite power during full-load testing ofED/G. Meets KIA. Not SRO Only. EOP entry condition. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
RO knowledge. | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #t Back- Q= SRO u/EtS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only F 2 U 2.2.21 Equipment Control: Knowledge of pre- and post-98 maintenance operability requirements. Appears to meet KIA. | ||
NEW Revised to add to address SRO knowledce. | Distractors "An & "c" does not seem plausible. If amperage and discharge press don't stabilize, leave running? You have to potentially contact SP group for a routine oil change? NEW i | ||
'rhe | F 2 U 2.3.6 Radiation Control: Ability to approve release permits. | ||
Loss of SWS. Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO Only or an accumulation of RO Knowledge? | 99 Meets the KIA. A & B do not seem plausible. "A" implies a PCR is required every time you perform a release with the Rad Monitor OOS. "B" implies a 50.59 review every time. | ||
Is marked Fundamental Knowledge and linked to 55.43. Doesn't correlate. | Modified H 3 E 2.4.29 Emergency Procedures t Plan: Knowledge of the 100 emergency plan. Meets the KIA. Appears that there are potentially two correct answers. NEW? | ||
IChange stem, remove "Mode I ", this is after "Which" in the Guestion statement to co free! answer. NEW is Ullsat. RO | 3 Sats 16 Unsats 6 Enhancement | ||
Core damage. RO Knowledge. | |||
No selection of appropriate procedure is required. | " | ||
Does not meet | ?Jr ES-401, Rev. 9 Saint Lucie 2008-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 | ||
Is fig. 2 required to answer this question? | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Bank New written. Is the anached qjll to | Q# LOK LODr---r---r---r---r---;---r----.--.---~ | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only | (FIII) (1-5) Stern SRO I u/E/S Explanation Focus Only Instructions | ||
Loss of SFPCS. Second part of KA number missing. Distractor "D" does not appear plausible. | |||
Is the only distractor that uses clarity as a choice. A is a subset of C. Does not meet | |||
NEW Need new distractor for i half of distraetor Nt Not realistic | |||
Ability to interpret and S execute procedure steps. Distractor "A" not plausible. | |||
Isn't "c" always correct if personnel are in me area? NEW Based on pnJcetiun:- | |||
review wil:£""""" A & Care phmsible. | |||
Ability to evaluate plant S performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. | |||
RO Knowledge for Rx Trip and EOP entry condition. | |||
NEW | |||
Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits. Distractor "D" not plausible. | |||
NEW | |||
Ability to explain and apply S system limits and precautions. | |||
Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO only. See pg 4 of SRO Only guidance. | |||
NEW New | |||
\vritten. | |||
Availability not addressed by T.S. MODIFIED This is BANK Question, | |||
, l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job-Minutia #t Back-Q= SRO u/EtS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only | |||
Appears to meet KIA. Distractors "An & "c" does not seem plausible. | |||
If amperage and discharge press don't stabilize, leave running? You have to | |||
" ?Jr ES-401, Rev. 9 Saint Lucie 2008-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet | |||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. Q# LOK (FIII) (1-5) Stern | |||
[Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.] | [Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.] | ||
: 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 -5 (easy -difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 -4 range are acceptable). | : 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level. | ||
: 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified: | : 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable). | ||
: 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified: | |||
* The stern lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). | * The stern lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information). | ||
* The stern or distractors contain cues (Le., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). | * The stern or distractors contain cues (Le., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc). | ||
* The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. | * The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements. | ||
* The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. | * The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable. | ||
* One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stern). 14. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | * One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stern). | ||
: 14. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified: | |||
* The question is not linked to the job requirements (Le., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). | * The question is not linked to the job requirements (Le., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content). | ||
* The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). | * The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory). | ||
* The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). | * The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons). | ||
* The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. | * The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements. | ||
: 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). | : 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable). | ||
Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory? | Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory? | ||
At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met). | At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met). | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shown in red Rev 2 shovm in greICn I F 3 S E02 / EK2.1 Reactor Trip Recovery / Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shown in red Rev 2 shovm in greICn I F 3 S E02 / EK2.1 Reactor Trip Recovery / Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. | ||
NEW 2 H 3 X U 000008/ iV,J.08 Al\1.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident S Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: | NEW 2 H 3 X U 000008/ iV,J.08 Al\1.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident S Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level pressure and temperature. Ask for tailpipe temp. not PRT temp. Does not appear to match KIA. No explanation given as to how the distractors were reached. (plausibility) What elTors are made to make A & D plausible? Add "ONE" to stem. 3rd bullet add "identified as PZR ... " 3rd bullet also has a period at the end. | ||
PRT level pressure and temperature. | The other 2 bullets do not. Is NOPINOT needed? Seems like additional info that is not needed. New KIA was selected based on similarity to other KA wli the same system. NEW 3 F I X U 009/ EK3.21 Small Break LOCA / Knowledge of the reasons E for the following responses as they apply to the small break S LOCA: Actions contained in EOP for small break LOCA / leak. | ||
Ask for tailpipe temp. not PRT temp. Does not appear to match KIA. No explanation given as to how the distractors were reached. (plausibility) | Add EOP titles. Distractor "c" does not appear plausible. | ||
What elTors are made to make A & D plausible? | Would heat input be a concern on a LOCA? Question is a direct lookup with the Figure given. LOD is 1. Suggest use of steam table to determine subcooling is lost instead. NEW Changed distractor "e" to "fue! uplifl crHlsiderations from low ReS " ('luHlg"ri distrn<fo.f "C'. to "maintain min liCP NPSH j ., | ||
Add "ONE" to stem. | ., tcHn:IU:> | ||
Would heat input be a concern on a LOCA? Question is a direct lookup with the Figure given. LOD is 1. Suggest use of steam table to determine subcooling is lost instead. NEW Changed distractor "e" to "fue! uplifl crHlsiderations from low ReS " ('luHlg"ri distrn<fo.f "C'. to "maintain min liCP NPSH ., | * c..... n':ljull | ||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | |||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws | Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 ShOW11 in red RI':'v 2 shown in green 4 H 3 E 009 1 EK1.0 1 Large Break LOCA 1 Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Natural circulation and cooling, including retlux boiling. Why is Fig. 1A & lB needed for this question? If used it would answer question 3. NEW Requested licensee to black out curve labels on Figures. | ||
5 H 3 ~ g 015/0171 AK2.10 1 RCP Malfunctions Knowledge of the S interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Flow) and the following: RCP indicators and controls. Distractor "A" does not appear plausible. NEW L_ .. | |||
If used it would answer question 3. NEW Requested licensee to black out curve labels on Figures. 5 H 3 g 015/0171 AK2.10 1 RCP Malfunctions Knowledge of the S interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Flow) and the following: | Distractor "A" plausible for only I seal failing. | ||
RCP indicators and controls. | |||
Distractor "A" does not appear plausible. | I. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
NEW L_ .. Distractor "A" plausible for only I seal failing. | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 6 H 3 S 022/ AK3.02 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging. Appears to match KIA. | ||
I. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws | NEW 7 F 3 X U 025 / Loss of RHR System / AA2.05 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. Doesn't match KIA. No loss ofRHR. Teaching in the stem. States Mode 4 (Not necessary) No analysis is required. | ||
LOK incorrect. Memory NEW Revised stem to Include "Loss of 5J)C" as witiating event 8 F 3 g 025/ AAl.03 Loss of Component Cooling Water / Ability to S operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: SWS as a backup to the CCWS. | |||
Appears to match KIA. NEW 7 F 3 X U 025 / Loss of RHR System / AA2.05 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. | Appears to meet KIA if there is no backup for ICW to CCWS. | ||
Doesn't match KIA. No loss ofRHR. Teaching in the stem. States Mode 4 (Not necessary) | NEW 9 H 3 S 027 / AA2.04 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction | ||
No analysis is required. | / Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure. Appears to match KIA. NEW 10 H 3 S 038/ EK3.01 Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: | ||
LOK incorrect. | Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G. | ||
Memory NEW Revised stem to Include "Loss of 5J)C" as witiating event 8 F 3 g 025/ AAl.03 Loss of Component Cooling Water / Ability to S operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: SWS as a backup to the CCWS. Appears to meet KIA if there is no backup for ICW to CCWS. NEW 9 H 3 S 027 / AA2.04 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction | Appears to match KIA. NEW 11 H 3 S CElE05 / EAI.03 Excess Steam Demand / 4 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations. \ | ||
/ Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: | BANK | ||
Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure. | - | ||
Appears to match KIA. NEW 10 H 3 S 038/ EK3.01 Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G. Appears to match KIA. NEW 11 H 3 S CElE05 / EAI.03 Excess Steam Demand / 4 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 12 F 2 E CElE06 1 EA2.1 Loss of Feedwater 1 4 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): | |||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 12 F 2 E CElE06 1 EA2.1 Loss of Feedwater 1 4 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): | Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. "C "implies that you stay in EOP6 concurrently. Needs to be reworded. NEW Editorial remarks corrected liCensee. | ||
Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. "C "implies that you stay in EOP6 concurrently. | 13 F 2 U 0000551 EKl.Ol Station Blackout 1 Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity. This does not require the candidate to know anything about the battery capacity. This is a straight math calculation. | ||
Needs to be reworded. | Rewrite the question so that the candidate has to know the rating of the battery to determine when the battery is completely discharged, i.e. 1800 amp-hr rating. 225amps of load, the battery will last 8 hrs. NEW Question rewritten per to meet requirements ab(wc. | ||
NEW Editorial remarks corrected liCensee. | 14 F 3 S 05612.1.28 Loss of Offsite Power 1 Conduct of Operations 1 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 15 H 5 g 000057 1 2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Inst bus 1 Equipment Control 1 S Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. Appears to match KIA. Reference material does not support answer. Is the RO expected to know from memory that a rapid downpower is required for this event? Yes 16 H 3 X U 0000581 AK3.02 Loss of DC Power 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power. Does not meet KIA statement. No actions are listed. The action is closing the PORV. NEW New question written to match KIA. | ||
13 F 2 U 0000551 EKl.Ol Station Blackout 1 Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: | |||
Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity. | i | ||
This does not require the candidate to know anything about the battery capacity. | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
This is a straight math calculation. | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 17 F 3 g 0651 AK3.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of S the reasons as they apply to loss of nuclear service water: | ||
Rewrite the question so that the candidate has to know the rating of the battery to determine when the battery is completely discharged, i.e. 1800 amp-hr rating. 225amps of load, the battery will last 8 hrs. NEW Question rewritten per to meet requirements ab(wc. 14 F 3 S 05612.1.28 Loss of Offsite Power 1 Conduct of Operations 1 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. | Guidance actions contained in EOP for loss of nuclear service water. Does not appear to match KIA. Question is written for loss ofICW, not CCW (NSW).Licensee clarified that leW is equivalent to NSW at most other plants. NEW 18 H 2 E 0000771 AA2.04 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid S Disturbances 1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: VARs outside the capability curve. Distractor "A" not plausible. Distractor "B" missing a coma. Is 'in the lag' normal terminology? NEW Distractor "A" {'h'HW,vl 19 H 3 X E 003 1 AK3.04 Dropped Control Rod 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod. | ||
Appears to meet KIA. NEW 15 H 5 g 000057 1 2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Inst bus 1 Equipment Control 1 S Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. | Cueing in the stem. Omit the COLR statement. It is not needed. | ||
Appears to match KIA. Reference material does not support answer. Is the RO expected to know from memory that a rapid downpower is required for this event? Yes 16 H 3 X U 0000581 AK3.02 Loss of DC Power 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power. Does not meet KIA statement. | If the RO is expected to know the recovery time of <60 min. | ||
No actions are listed. The action is closing the PORV. NEW New question written to match KIA. | This should also be removed. At a timeline approach instead. | ||
i 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 17 F 3 g 0651 AK3.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of S the reasons as they apply to loss of nuclear service water: Guidance actions contained in EOP for loss of nuclear service water. Does not appear to match KIA. Question is written for loss ofICW, not CCW (NSW).Licensee clarified that leW is equivalent to NSW at most other plants. NEW 18 H 2 E 0000771 AA2.04 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid S Disturbances 1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: | Appears to meet KIA. NEW Licensee removed COLR info from rhe question stem. | ||
20 H 3 E 0000281 AA2.01 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction/Ability S to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: PZR level indicators and alarms. Appears to meet KIA. A & B not symmetrical with C & D. Possibly change to say RR Tref signal failed high, low for A & B distractors. NEW? | |||
Distractor "B" missing a coma. Is 'in the lag' normal terminology? | Licensee made to enhance of A &13 distractor. | ||
NEW Distractor "A" {'h'HW,vl 19 H 3 X E 003 1 AK3.04 Dropped Control Rod 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod. Cueing in the stem. Omit the COLR statement. | 21 F 2 S 000032 1 2.2.40 Loss of Source Range NI 1 Equipment Control 1 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. Verify TS. NEW | ||
It is not needed. If the RO is expected to know the recovery time of <60 min. This should also be removed. At a timeline approach instead. Appears to meet KIA. NEW Licensee removed COLR info from rhe question stem. 20 H 3 E 0000281 AA2.01 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction/Ability S to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
PZR level indicators and alarms. Appears to meet KIA. A & B not symmetrical with C & D. Possibly change to say RR Tref signal failed high, low for A & B distractors. | II Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 22 H 3 S 000037 I AA1.13 Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: S/G blowdown radiation monitors. | ||
NEW? Licensee made to enhance of A &13 distractor. | Appears to meet KIA. NEW 23 F 3 S 068 I AA1.21 Control Room Evacuation 18 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the control room evacuation: transfer of controls from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 24 H 2 S 076 I AK3.06 Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. Is "a plant shutdown is not required" necessary? NEW 25 H 3 S CEIAI3 I AK2.2 Natural Circulation I 4 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. Appears to meet KIA. | ||
21 F 2 S 000032 1 2.2.40 Loss of Source Range NI 1 Equipment Control 1 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. Verify TS. NEW | NEW F 3 S AKI.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 26 following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage): | ||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. II Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 22 H 3 S 000037 I AA1.13 Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: S/G blowdown radiation monitors. | Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage), NEW 27 F 3 S CElE09 I EKI.I Functional Recovery Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Functional Recovery. | ||
Appears to meet KIA. NEW 23 F 3 S 068 I AA1.21 Control Room Evacuation 18 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the control room evacuation: | BANK 28 H 3 S 003 KI.03 Reactor Coolant Pump Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: RCP seal system. BANK | ||
transfer of controls from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 24 H 2 S 076 I AK3.06 Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only | ||
Is "a plant shutdown is not required" necessary? | . . . 29 <.F .? ...* ******i .. i' 1<" . . *. 1 *. (..,','/........ **. * * **.*.**...IOO3K6.1Li "-0_. '.' *****;.,~()IJl~t~"i."f ..;. .2. "'~e.Qf the effeGtof*.~ | ||
NEW 25 H 3 S | I .'. ....../ 1'.'/ hl;~ .. . . _;i;h!ciHif'i;*' ;""1"" "~;:;",., gk." .. "/Uti 11 | ||
Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. | ,;;, ,~~f~*;,;';~. .i~'t'~:!Cf~iil"i:;t;;~~hth;**llr'ps' | ||
Appears to meet KIA. NEW | ! | ||
Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage), NEW 27 F 3 S CElE09 I EKI.I Functional Recovery Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery): | I '..**i-i 1 ..*. 'iI iii 1/' .." ..............;.,;> | ||
Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Functional Recovery. | * .. .. . . 'I' . . .*.* ii . iii . * . i.i I:ii.i :. . . . | ||
BANK 28 H 3 S 003 KI.03 Reactor Coolant Pump Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: RCP seal system. BANK | .*.*.**.**.*.i I, | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #1 Back-Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only | . . . . . . . . *. *. . . . | ||
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' | 30 F 2 S 004 K5.16 Chemical and Volume Control I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Source of T -ave and T -ref signals to control and RPS. NEW 31 S 004 A4.15 Chemical and Volume Control Ability to manually operate and I or monitor in the control room: boron concentration. NEW 32 H 3 U 005 K3.01 Residual Heat Removal I Knowledge of the effect S that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: RCS. Is A & C plausible? NEW BANK Question replaced with a BANK question. | ||
33 F 2 S 005 2.1.32 Residual Heat Removal I Conduct of Operations I Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. | |||
NEW 34 F2 S 006 K4.08 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interIock(s) which provide for the following: Recirculation t10wpath of reactor building sump. | |||
NEW 35 C 3 S 007 A2.0l Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Stuck-open PORV or code safety. | |||
NEW 1- | |||
NEW 32 H 3 U 005 K3.01 Residual Heat Removal I Knowledge of the effect S that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
RCS. Is A & C plausible? | Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 36 F 2 E 008 K4.0 1 Component Cooling Water Knowledge of CCWS S design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic start of standby pump. BANK Could modify question by adding a fault condition to B 4KV bus. This would change the answer and make other choices more plausible. | ||
NEW BANK Question replaced with a BANK question. | Licensee madc recommended changes (0 increase of distfactor. | ||
33 F 2 S 005 2.1.32 Residual Heat Removal I Conduct of Operations I Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. | 37 C 2 E 008 A3.05 Component Cooling Water Ability to monitor S automatic operation of the CCWS, including: Control of the electrically operated, automatic isolation valves in the CCWS. | ||
NEW 34 F2 S 006 K4.08 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interIock(s) which provide for the following: | B does not appear plausible, i.e ONLY response and no handjackfor valve. | ||
Recirculation t10wpath of reactor building sump. NEW 35 C 3 S 007 A2.0l Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | Licensec changed Disrractor "If', More plausible. | ||
Stuck-open PORV or code safety. NEW 1- | 38 C 3 X E 010 A4.0 1 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to manually S operate and/or monitor in the control room: PZR spray valve. | ||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 36 F 2 E 008 K4.0 1 Component Cooling Water Knowledge of CCWS S design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: | Is distractor B & D plausible. No reason to suspect loss of Aux spray. Add charging pump OOS or loss of a train of 125 vdc. | ||
Automatic start of standby pump. BANK Could modify question by adding a fault condition to B 4KV bus. This would change the answer and make other choices more plausible. | Licensee question stem 10 add a loss of a ecp. 'fhis makes B & D distractors more plausible. | ||
Licensee madc recommended changes (0 increase of distfactor. | 39 C 4 E 012 K3.01 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a S loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: | ||
37 C 2 E 008 A3.05 Component Cooling Water Ability to monitor S automatic operation of the CCWS, including: | CRDS. | ||
Control of the electrically operated, automatic isolation valves in the CCWS. B does not appear plausible, i.e ONLY response and no handjackfor valve. Licensec changed Disrractor "If', More plausible. | Does placing the RPS BIS in bypass place the logic in a trip condition or does it prevent a trip condition? | ||
38 C 3 X E 010 A4.0 1 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to manually S operate and/or monitor in the control room: PZR spray valve. Is distractor B & D plausible. | Licensee changed question slem to corree! RPS Lmlt logic 40 C 3 S 012 A2.02 Reactor Protection Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of instrument power. 2MA inverter failure on scenario #1. Should be OK to use this question since it is a unit difference. | ||
No reason to suspect loss of Aux spray. Add charging pump OOS or loss of a train of 125 vdc. Licensee question stem 10 add a loss of a ecp. 'fhis makes B & D distractors more plausible. | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
39 C 4 E 012 K3.01 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a S loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: | Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 41 C 3 S 013 A3.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS including: Input channels and logic. | ||
CRDS. Does placing the RPS BIS in bypass place the logic in a trip condition or does it prevent a trip condition? | NEW 42 F 2 S 022 A4.01 Containment Cooling Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans. BANK not Modified 43 C 3 S 026 K4.09 Containment Spray Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: | ||
Licensee changed question slem to corree! RPS Lmlt logic 40 C 3 S 012 A2.02 Reactor Protection Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | |||
Loss of instrument power. 2MA inverter failure on scenario #1. Should be OK to use this question since it is a unit difference. | |||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 41 C 3 S 013 A3.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS including: | |||
Input channels and logic. NEW 42 F 2 S 022 A4.01 Containment Cooling Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans. BANK not Modified 43 C 3 S 026 K4.09 Containment Spray Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: | |||
Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) | Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) | ||
NEW 44 C 3 X Y 039 A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the MRSS, including: | NEW 44 C 3 X Y 039 A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the MRSS, including: Isolation of the MRSS. C & | ||
Isolation of the MRSS. C & D not plausible. | D not plausible. Break is outside containment. BANK C&D are plausible. Nozzle is in containment. | ||
Break is outside containment. | 45 C 3 X Ii, 059 K3.04 Main Feedwater Knowledge of the effect that a loss S or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: RCS. | ||
BANK C&D are plausible. | Appears B could also be considered correct. NEW Licensee stated ".13" could not be correct. | ||
Nozzle is in containment. | 46 C 2 S 059 A2.12 Main Feedwater Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of feed water regulating valves. BANK 47 C 3 S 061 Al.0! AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: S/G level. NEW | ||
45 C 3 X Ii, 059 K3.04 Main Feedwater Knowledge of the effect that a loss S or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: | ------ | ||
RCS. Appears B could also be considered correct. NEW Licensee stated ".13" could not be correct. 46 C 2 S 059 A2.12 Main Feedwater Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Failure of feed water regulating valves. BANK 47 C 3 S 061 Al.0! AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 48 C 2 X E 061 K5.0 1 AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer. Answer is given in the stem of the question. NEW Licensee stem to remove AFW t10w referencc. | ||
S/G level. NEW ------ | 49 F 1 X U 062 K4.05 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of ac | ||
: 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 48 C 2 X E 061 K5.0 1 AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer. | .1 S distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which i provide for the following: Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). Does not meet KIA. No interlock knowledge tested. This is testing knowledge of procedure guidance. NEW Question revised to include interlock component. | ||
Answer is given in the stem of the question. | ! | ||
NEW Licensee stem to remove AFW t10w referencc. | 50 C 3 063 A4.0 1 DC Electrical Distribution Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major breakers and control power fuses. Appears to meet the 1st part of the KIA. | ||
49 F 1 X U 062 K4.05 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of ac .1 S distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which i provide for the following: | Review to verify procedure steps match with answer. NEW 51 F 2 S 064 K4.02 Emergency Diesel Generator Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Trips for ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). NEW 52 F 2 E 073 A1.0I Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: | ||
Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). | radiation levels. D not plausible. SS conditions. Gross activity levels don't go up. NEW Disrractor "I)" changed to make more plausible. | ||
Does not meet KIA. No interlock knowledge tested. This is testing knowledge of procedure guidance. | 53 F 3 X U 076 K2.01 Service Water Knowledge of bus power supplies to S the following: Service water. Doesn't appear to meet KIA. This is asking about interlocks, not power supply. Add "ONE" to stem of question. NEW New written 10 match KilL | ||
NEW Question revised to include interlock component. | '-- | ||
50 C 3 063 A4.0 1 DC Electrical Distribution Ability to manually | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Trips for ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TfF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 54 F 3 B 078 KI.02 Instrument Air Knowledge of the physical S connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the lAS and the following systems: Service Air. NEW 55 F 2 S 103 2.2.25 Containment Equipment Control/Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. Capitalize "ONE". NEW 56 C 3 S 00 I / K4.03 Control Rod Drive Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: | ||
NEW 52 F 2 E 073 A1.0I Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: | Rod control logic. Add "ONE" to stem. BANK 57 F 3 E 002 Al.04 Reactor Coolant: Ability to predict and/or monitor S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls including: | ||
radiation levels. D not plausible. | Subcooling Margin. Add "ONE" to stem. Extra period on D distractor. D is also correct as written. Need to add qualifier, "indicated T-hot" NEW \: ' change made. | ||
SS conditions. | 58 C 3 S 011 K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Pressurizer Heaters. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 59 C 3 S 015/ K6.0l Nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: | ||
Gross activity levels don't go up. NEW Disrractor "I)" changed to make more plausible. | Sensors, detectors, and indications. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 60 C 3 X E 029/ A3.0l Containment Purge: Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the Containment Purge System including: CPS isolation. Add "ONE" to stem. Change to say "reload of the core". Is recently irradiated fuel your terminology or "Once burned"? Remove "severely". Distractor B, explain plausibility. MODIFIED Changed distractor *'B". | ||
53 F 3 X U 076 K2.01 Service Water Knowledge of bus power supplies to S the following: | 61 C 3 S 041 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam header pressure. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW | ||
Service water. Doesn't appear to meet KIA. This is asking about interlocks, not power supply. Add "ONE" to stem of question. | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. 7. | ||
NEW New written 10 match KilL '-- | Q# 1 LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Explanation s Dist. I 62 F I 2 I S 1045 / 2.4.49 Main Turbine Generator: Emergency Procedures / | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TfF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 54 F 3 B 078 KI.02 Instrument Air Knowledge of the physical S connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the lAS and the following systems: Service Air. NEW 55 F 2 S 103 2.2.25 Containment Equipment Control/Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. Capitalize "ONE". NEW 56 C 3 S 00 I / K4.03 Control Rod Drive Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: | Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and I | ||
Rod control logic. Add "ONE" to stem. BANK 57 F 3 E 002 Al.04 Reactor Coolant: Ability to predict and/or monitor S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls including: | controls. NEW 63 C I 3 I S 64 C 3 S 65 F 3 E 075 A2.02 Circulating Water: Ability to predict the impacts of S the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of circulating water pumps. | ||
Subcooling Margin. Add "ONE" to stem. Extra period on D distractor. | Since no action is required for distractor D. Make the delta T value >30 degrees. This will make distractor D more plausible. | ||
D is also correct as written. Need to add qualifier, "indicated T-hot" NEW \: ' change made. 58 C 3 S 011 K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: | NEW Licensee made the 66 F 2 E S | ||
Pressurizer Heaters. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 59 C 3 S 015/ K6.0l Nuclear Instrumentation: | "ion exchanger". | ||
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: Sensors, detectors, and indications. | question. If it was used on a it IS now public domain accessible from the NRC web site via ADAMS. | ||
Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 60 C 3 X E 029/ A3.0l Containment Purge: Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the Containment Purge System including: | Change D to state: "No action is required unless the highest indicated nuclear power exceeds 100.0%." | ||
CPS isolation. | Licensee made the | ||
Add "ONE" to stem. Change to say "reload of the core". Is recently irradiated fuel your terminology or "Once burned"? Remove "severely". | : l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
Distractor B, explain plausibility. | Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 67 F 2 S 2.1.26 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). Annunciator alarm missing "GAS" from title. | ||
MODIFIED Changed distractor | Missing the word "tank" from 'A' response. What makes "B" plausible? What or where is the 'Gas Surge Tank'? Add "ONE" to stem of question. NEW "B" plausible. Surge Tank is pumped to the Decay Tank. | ||
*'B". 61 C 3 S 041 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam header pressure. | 68 C 3 S 2.1.37 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. NEW 69 F 2 E 2.2.3 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the design, procedural, S and operational differences between units. Is distractor "c" also correct? No support info provided for distractor viability. | ||
Add "ONE" to stem. NEW | Distractor "B" can be used to eliminate distractor "c" for RO | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws Q# 1 LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia s Dist. I 62 F I 2 I | : 73. NEW Licensee changed distractors "B" & "C'. to correct above concerns. | ||
70 F 3 E 2.2.12 Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance S procedures. Add coma after procedure #, Add "ONE" after which. Add "an" prior to inaccurate and remove "s" from calculations. Missing period at the end of B distractor. NEW 71 C 2 S 2.3.4 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. Add space between sentences (2 spaces between each sentence). Units should be mRlhr not Mrlhr. NEW L-- | |||
NEW | , | ||
Loss of circulating water pumps. Since no action is required for distractor D. Make the delta T value >30 degrees. This will make distractor D more plausible. | : 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. | ||
NEW Licensee made the "ion exchanger". | Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 72 F 2 E 2.3.13 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiological safety S procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response. to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Is "pegged" the proper terminology or should it be "a CIS monitor IDGH-IDGH alarm is received on ... "? Add "ONE" to stem. Is there a rad monitor alarm response for this condition? Add to distractors that HP is evaluating "radiological conditions". NEW 73 F 3 Y 2.4.13 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of crew roles S and responsibilities during EOP usage. Add "ONE of' to the stem. Add coma after procedure #. Distractor "c" can be used to eliminate distractor "B" for RO Q#69. The plausibility for D implies it is correct also (App J is done after the SFSC). NEW Licensee (~hanged distractor in Q69. Histractor '"0" is plausible aud incorrect as written. | ||
question. | 74 C 4 S 2.4.22 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations. Spell out EOP title. Is this RO Knowledge? Yes NEW 75 F 2 E 2.4.31 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. B needs to be more specific. What amber lights are you talking about? | ||
If it was used on a it IS now public domain accessible from the NRC web site via ADAMS. Change D to state: "No action is required unless the highest indicated nuclear power exceeds 100.0%." Licensee made the | MODIFIED This is a BANK question. | ||
: l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 67 F 2 S 2.1.26 Conduct of Operations: | . . Licensee changed distractor 'oR" to be more specific . | ||
Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). | i 39 Sats 10 Unsats 21 Enhancement I | ||
Annunciator alarm missing "GAS" from title. Missing the word "tank" from 'A' response. | |||
What makes "B" plausible? | ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: St. Lucie Date of Exam: July 31,2008 Exam Level(RO~RO) | ||
What or where is the 'Gas Surge Tank'? Add "ONE" to stem of question. | - | ||
NEW "B" plausible. | Initials a b c Item Description | ||
Surge Tank is pumped to the Decay Tank. 68 C 3 S 2.1.37 Conduct of Operations: | : 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading | ||
Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. | ~¥-- N/4 ~ | ||
NEW 69 F 2 E 2.2.3 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the design, procedural, S and operational differences between units. Is distractor "c" also correct? No support info provided for distractor viability. | : 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented ~ ~ | ||
Distractor "B" can be used to eliminate distractor "c" for RO 73. NEW Licensee changed distractors "B" & "C'. to correct above concerns. | : 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations) ~ /h6 | ||
70 F 3 E 2.2.12 Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance S procedures. | ~ | ||
Add coma after procedure | : 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail ~ | ||
#, Add "ONE" after which. Add "an" prior to inaccurate and remove "s" from calculations. | ~. | ||
Missing period at the end of B distractor. | : 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are justified I4!J | ||
NEW 71 C 2 S 2.3.4 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. | : 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions missed by half or more of the applicants | ||
Add space between sentences (2 spaces between each sentence). | ~JY- ,,~ ;Wi Printed Name/Signature Date | ||
Units should be mRlhr not Mrlhr. NEW L-- | : a. Grader Phillip G. Capehartl'i>J~-- 9/05108 | ||
, 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job-Minutia #/ Back-Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 72 F 2 E 2.3.13 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiological safety S procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response. | : b. Facility Reviewer(*) N/A N/A | ||
to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Is "pegged" the proper terminology or should it be "a CIS monitor IDGH-IDGH alarm is received on ... "? Add "ONE" to stem. Is there a rad monitor alarm response for this condition? | : c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Richard S. Baldwin~- T'?""/:(-'/""'- =:::. | ||
Add to distractors that HP is evaluating "radiological conditions". | 9/05/08 | ||
NEW 73 F 3 Y 2.4.13 Emergency Procedures | ~, | ||
/ Plan: Knowledge of crew roles S and responsibilities during EOP usage. Add "ONE of' to the stem. Add coma after procedure | : d. NRC Supervisor (*) Malcolm T. Widm~nn/I thiiJb(1 Ill--- tI/~/JI l/ | ||
#. Distractor "c" can be used to eliminate distractor "B" for RO Q#69. The plausibility for D implies it is correct also (App J is done after the SFSC). NEW Licensee distractor in Q69. Histractor | (*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.}} | ||
'"0" is plausible aud incorrect as written. 74 C 4 S 2.4.22 Emergency Procedures | |||
/ Plan: Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations. | |||
Spell out EOP title. Is this RO Knowledge? | |||
Yes NEW 75 F 2 E 2.4.31 Emergency Procedures | |||
/ Plan: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. | |||
B needs to be more specific. | |||
What amber lights are you talking about? MODIFIED This is a BANK question. | |||
Licensee changed distractor | |||
'oR" to be more specific . i | |||
St. Lucie Date of Exam: July 31,2008 Exam | |||
-Initials | |||
: 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors | |||
: 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades I4!J | |||
: 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training | |||
9/05108 b. Facility Reviewer(*) | |||
N/A N/A c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Richard S. | |||
T'?""/:(-'/""'- | |||
=:::. 9/05/08 | |||
: d. NRC Supervisor | |||
(*) thiiJb(1 Ill---l/ (*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.}} | |||
Revision as of 08:58, 14 November 2019
| ML090780280 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/21/2008 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Florida Power & Light Co |
| References | |
| Download: ML090780280 (56) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:ES-201 Examination Preparation Checklist Form ES-201-1 Facility: S:k- Lv...C.... L Date of Examination: ~luID~ Examinations Developed by: ~/ NRC (circle one) Target Chief Date* Task Description (Reference) Examiner's Initials
-180 1. Examination administration date confirmed (C.1.a; C.2.a and b) ~/JJH,
-120 2. NRC examiners and facility contact assigned (C.1.d; C.2.e)
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-120 3. Facility contact briefed on security and other requirements (C.2.c) 1~Jk./J/.JJ,
-120 4. Corporate notification letter sent (C.2.d)
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[-90] [5. Reference material due (C.1.e; C.3.c; Attachment 2)]
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-75 6. Integrated examination outline(s) due, including Forms ES-201-2, ES-201-3, ES-301-1, ES-301-2, ES-301-5, ES-D-1's, ES-401-1/2, ES-401-3, and ES-401-4, as applicable (C.1.e and f; C.3.d) ~JMI,
-70 7. Examination outline(s) reviewed by NRC and feedback provided to facility licensee (C.2.h; C.3.e)
~/~
-45 8. Proposed examinations (including written, walk-through JPMs, and scenarios, as applicable), supporting documentation (including Forms
~P--I ~
ES-301-3, ES-301-4, ES-301-5, ES-301-6, and ES-401-6), and reference materials due (C.1.e, f, g and h; C.3.d)
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-30 9. Preliminary license applications (NRC Form 398's) due (C.1.1; C.2.g; ES-202)
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-14 10. Final license applications due and Form ES-201-4 prepared (C.1.1; C.2.i; ES-202)
-14 11. Examination approved by NRC supervisor for facility licensee review (C.2.h; C.3.f) ~/~
-14 12. Examinations reviewed with facility licensee (C.1.j; C.2.f and h; C.3.g)
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-7 13. Written examinations and operating tests approved by NRC supervisor (C.2.i; C.3.h)
-7 14. Final applications reviewed; examination approval and waiver letters sent (C.2.i; Attachment 4; ES-204)
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-7 15. Proctoring/written exam administration guidelines reviewed with facility licensee (C.3.k) ~JA-{UJ1,
(
-7 16. Approved scenarios, job performance measures, and questions distributed to NRC examiners (C.3.i) ~/jI4f)
- Target dates are keyed to the examination date identified in the corporate notification letter.
They are for planning purposes and may be adjusted on a case-by-case basis in coordination with the facility licensee. [ ] Applies only to examinations prepared by the NRC. ES-201, Page 24 of 27
ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES*201*2 Facility: Sr L"-Ic-tG I Date of Examination: ? - 2..3 - Oa Initials Item Task Description a b* C# 1. w
- a. Verify that the outline(s) fit{s) the appropriate model, In accordance with ES*401. ia N 1~.1 R
I
- b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared in accordance with Section 0.1 of ES-401 and whether all KJA categories are appropriately sampled. It- I(V ~~
T T c. Assess whether the outline over-emphasizes any systems, evolulions, or generic topics. 7;1 If\! fhL~ I~ I~, ~ E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate.
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5, verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number S
I of normal evolutions, instrument and component failures, technical specifications, and mejor transients. witt .fJ~ 41\- M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule L without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested USing A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit lest(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days. 0 To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative c. R and quantitative criteria specified on Form ES-301-4 and described in Appendix D.
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through oulline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-2:
(1 ) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and In-plant tasks W dlstrlbuted among the safety functions as specified on the form I (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is wilhln the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit lest(s) (4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of alternate path, low-power, emergency, and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301-1:
(1 ) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one task is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix c. of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days. 1'(t7 ? ~/
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities (including PRA and IPE insights) are covered In the appropriate exam sections. ~ It! ~~
~ IV ~~
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41143 and 55.45 sampling is appropriate. N E c, Ensure that KiA importance raUngs (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. U V~ ~~ R A
- d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. IU- N' ~~
L e, Check the en lire exam for balance of coverage. ~ I\' ~~
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO). ~ -1\1 ~
- a. Author
.L# rrr-g . ,,- ~rr' Printe N~natu~ 1-It-t'};{
~t,~~i
-,:
- b. Facility Reviewer (*) "TIXtffi IJ\ ""1\,U(r~.r~ .",'('~ II J'I;; ('--
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#) Ht~h"C~'WL. ~~<.,~ .s:~A4~
- d. NRC Supervisor \'.\1\0\ A,'B-..-rS'S> /' iY//Jl a. T~ ........" 6'1U'l/Pg Note: # Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column *c"; chief examiner concurrence required.
- Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
ES*201 Examination Outline Quality Checklist Form ES*201*2 Facility: S T LUu':' Date of Examination: rLU-)1l o"j
., jJ
( Initials Item Task Description a b" c# 1. W
- a. Verify that the outllne(s) flt(s) the appropriate model. in accordance with ES401. II/A . .rJ,l\.. tvft:
R b. Assess whether the outline was systematically and randomly prepared In accordance with I Section 0.1 of ES*401 and whether all KIA categories are appropriately sampled. T T c. Assess whether the oulline over-emphasizes any systems. evolutions. orgeneric topics. E N d. Assess whether the justifications for deselected or rejected KJA statements are appropriate.
- 2. a. Using Form ES-301-5. verify that the proposed scenario sets cover the required number of normal evolutions. instrument and component failures, technical specifications, S and major transients.
I M b. Assess whether there are enough scenario sets (and spares) to test the projected number U and mix of applicants in accordance with the expected crew composition and rotation schedule without compromising exam integrity, and ensure that each applicant can be tested using t~rr MP~ L A at least one new or significantly modified scenario, that no scenarios are duplicated T from the applicants' audit test(s), and that scenarios will not be repeated on subsequent days. o R
- c. To the extent possible, assess whether the outline(s) conform(s) with the qualitative and quantitative criteria speCified on Form ES*301*4 and described in Appendix D. U/l tY ~"~fI
- 3. a. Verify that the systems walk-through outline meets the criteria specified on Form ES-301*2:
(1) the outline(s) contain(s) the required number of control room and in'plant tasks W distributed among the safety functions as specified on the form
/ (2) task repetition from the last two NRC examinations is within the limits specified on the form T (3) no tasks are duplicated from the applicants' audit testes)
(4) the number of new or modified tasks meets or exceeds the minimums specified on the form (5) the number of altemate path, low-power. emergency. and RCA tasks meet the criteria on the form.
- b. Verify that the administrative outline meets the criteria speCified on Form ES*301*1:
(1) the tasks are distributed among the topics as specified on the form (2) at least one task is new or significantly modified (3) no more than one tas~ is repeated from the last two NRC licensing examinations
- c. Determine if there are enough different outlines to test the projected number and mix of applicants and ensure that no items are duplicated on subsequent days.
- 4. a. Assess whether plant-specific priorities'(includlng PRA and IPE insights) are covered in the appropriate exam sections.
G E b. Assess whether the 10 CFR 55.41/43 and 55.45 sampling Is appropriate. N c. Ensure that KJA importance ratings (except for plant-specific priorities) are at least 2.5. E R d. Check for duplication and overlap among exam sections. A L e. Check the entire exam for balance of coverage.
- f. Assess whether the exam fits the appropriate job level (RO or SRO).
- a. Author
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
- d. NRC Supervisor Note:
-
# Independent NRC reviewer Initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence required.
- Not applicable for NRC-prepared examination outlines
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-l
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of ft/~Gf" / Clt'as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination
~ S-vLy LI - Alvs I ) 2-o(hf To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) o f ' " . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE
..EX4A? ,0~/~
nA1HW"/~
..f........... I .. -,:.r:,-
,(l trMAN :J \ lLt ll.s-A~
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ES-201, Page 26 of 27
ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3
- 1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week( s) of ::Jvly /01 as of the date of my signature. I agree that f will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. f understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensee's procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.
- 2. Post-Examination -:svLy 23- Avs ) ) <.0'09 To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of""" . From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.
PRINTED NAME JOB TITLE / RESPONSIBILITY DATE DATE NOTE
- 1. ,J7'1c.! ~~~
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- 8. _ _ _.---------- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- 9. _ _ _--"1._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
10.,_ _ _- - - - ' T - _ _ _ _ _ __ 11.,_ _ _ _ _r - - - - _ _ __
- 12. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- 13. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- 14. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
- 15. _ _ _ _ _ __
NOTES: ----
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: St. Lucie Date of Examination: July 2008 Examination Level (circle one): RO@ Operating Test Number: NRC Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code* A-1 Conduct of Operations N,R Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle KIA 2.1.42 (3.4) A-2 Conduct of Operations N,R Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. KIA 2.1.25 (3.9/4.2) A-3 Equipment Control N,R Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump KIA 2.2.41 (3.5/3.9) A-4 Radiation Control N,R Use a survey map, determine Radiological hazards. KIA 2.3.7 (3.5/3.6) A-5 Emergency Plan D, R or S Determine PAR's KIA 2.4.44 (4.4) NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required. ,
- Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (:::; 3 for ROs; :::; for SROs & RO retakes)
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (~ 1) (P)revious 2 exams (:::; 1; randomly selected) NUREG-1 021, Revision 9
ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ADMINISTRATIVE JPM
SUMMARY
A 1: Identify Refueling Machine Positioning During In-Core Fuel Shuffle. Applicant will be given the Refueling Machine coordinates during an in-core fuel shuffle. They will need to determine if the stated coordinates are appropriate for the required fuel movements. Some coordinates are not within procedure requirements and must be identified. A2: Determine Shutdown Margin Criteria. Applicant will calculate SDM lAW 2-NOP-1 00.04, Surveillance Requirements for Shutdown Margin; Modes 2,3,4,and 5 (Subcritical)" and determine SDM not met. Direct emergency boration to meet T.S. 3.1.1.1 A3: Develop ECO for 2B LPSI pump. Applicant will be required to review P&ID's and determine valves and breakers to remove 2B LPSI pump for maintenance. Applicant will also be required to determine appropriate Technical Specifications for removal of 2B LPSI pump. A4: Using a survey map, determine Radiological Hazards. The Candidate will be given a radiation survey map of the Unit 2 Charging Pump rooms. His stated task will be to determine Radiological hazards in each of the Charging Pump rooms. A5: Determine Protective Action Recommendations. The Candidate will be given a set of conditions and directed to determine protective action recommendations. NUREG-1 021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: St. Lucie Date of Examination: July 2008 Exam Level (circle one): RO, SRO(I), SRO(U) Operating Test No.: NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U) Type Code* Safety Function System / JPM Title S-1 Restore AFW flow to the 2A SG using 2C AFW pump N,A,S,L 45 All S-2 Respond to loss of RCP Controlled Bleed Off and failed RCP E, N, A, S 4p Seals All S-3 Align ECCS for Hot and Cold Leg Injection M,E,A,S 2 All S-4 Establish Alternate Charging flowpath to RCS through 'A' HPSI D,S,E 1 Header. S-5 Respond to alarms on Spent Fuel Monitors P, E, A, S, D 7 C-6 Place LTOP In Service Unit 1 P,C,D,E 3 S-7 Align 2C CCW pump to supply the 'B' CCW header N,E,S 8 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U) P-1 Local Operation of Boron Concentration Control Unit ~ 2- E,N,R 1 All P-2 Unit 2 CST to supply the 1C AFW pump D,E 45 P-3 Disconnect 1B Instrument Inverter from Service Unit -1 D 6 All NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 @ All control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO 1 SRO-I 1 SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 1 4-6 1 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank ~9/~8/~4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (L)ow-Power :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) :?: 2 I:?:: 2 I:?:: 1 (P)revious 2 exams ~ 3 1 ~ 3 1 ~ 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA :?::1 I:?:: 1 I:?:: 1 (S)imulator JPM
SUMMARY
DESCRIPTION S-1 New. At low power, the Applicant will be required to start and initiate AFW flow from the 2C AFW pump to the 2A SG and remove the 2A AFW pump form service. Upon starting the 2C AFW pump, it will trip on electrical overspeed. The Candidate will be required to reset the overspeed trip and initiate flow to the 2A SG. Alternate path S-2 S-2 New. Respond to loss of RCP Controlled Bleed Off and failed RCP Seals. The Applicant will be directed to respond to loss of RCP controlled seal bleed off at 100% power. Candidate will be required to recognize V2505 is closed and will be required to open V 2507, to the QT. Upon opening V2507 three seals will fail requiring a manual Reactor trip and stopping the RCP post trip. Alternate path. S-3 Modified Bank #0821158. The Applicant is required to align the 'B' train for Hot and Cold leg Injection. V3523 will not open and the 'A' train will be required for lineup for Hot and Cold leg injection. S-4 Bank #0821115. Candidate will line-up 2A Charging pump to the 'A' HPSI header for emergency boration post trip. S-5 Bank # 0821117A (2004 NRC Exam). Respond to alarms on Spent Fuel Monitors. Spent Fuel Pool radiation monitors go into high alarm during refueling operations. Candidate is required to verify ventilation system. Alternate path. C-6 Bank #0821021. (2004 NRC exam) Unit 1 Control Room. Unit 1 is experiencing a LOCA. 1-EOP-03 is being implemented. RCS temperature is 290 degrees and pressure is 500 psia. The Applicant is directed to place LTOP in service lAW 1-GOP-305. S-7 New. Applicant will be required to align the 2C CCW to the 'B' CCW header. Prior to starting the 2C CCW the AB 4.16KV bus is required to be aligned to the B side. NUREG-1 021, Revision 9
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 P-1 New. A blend is to be performed to the VCT. Proper flow rates cannot be achieved from the control room. The Applicant is required to use Appendix A to locally blend to the VCT with communication to the control room. P-2 Bank #0821062. During a Unit 1 total loss of feedwater, Applicant will align the Unit 2 Condensate Storage Tank to supply Unit 1 'C' AFW pump. P-3 Bank #0821067. The 1B 120V Instrument Inverter is to be removed from service for maintenance. The Applicant is instructed to place the bus on maintenance bypass. NUREG-1021, Revision 9
ES*301 Operating Test Quality Checklist Form ES*301*3 Facilit: ~ LLLC. ,e Date of Examination: 1 Test Number: Initials
- 1. General Criteria a.
- b. There is no day-to-day repetition between this and other operating tests to be administered durin this examination.
- c. The 0 eratin test shall not du licate items from the a plicants' audit test s. see Section 0.1.a.
- d. Overlap with the written examination and between different parts of the operating test is within acce table limits.
- e. It appears that the operating test will differentiate between competent and less-than-competent a licants at the desi nated license level.
- 2. Walk-Throu h Criteria
- a. Each JPM includes the following, as applicable:
initial conditions initiating cues references and tools, including associated procedures reasonable and validated time limits (average time allowed for completion) and specific designation if deemed to be time-critical by the facility licensee operationally important specific performance criteria that include: detailed expected actions with exact criteria and nomenclature system response and other examiner cues statements describing important observations to be made by the applicant criteria for successful completion of the task identification of critical steps and their associated performance standards restrictions on the se uence of ste s, if a licable
- b. Ensure that any changes from the previously approved systems and administrative walk-through outlines (Forms ES-301-1 and 2) have not caused the test to deviate from any of the acceptance criteria (e.g., item distribution, bank use, repetition from the last 2 NRC examinations) specified on those forms and Form ES-201-2.
- 3. Simulator Criteria The associated simulator operating tests (scenario sets) have been reviewed in accordance with Form ES-301-4 and a co is attached.
- a. Author
- b. Facility Reviewer(*)
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
- d. NRC Supervisor NOTE:
- The facility signature is not applicable for NRC-developed tests.
# Independent NRC reviewer initial items in Column "c"; chief examiner concurrence re uired.
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 I=acilty: PSL Date of Exam:7/23/0S Scenario Numbers: 1/2/3 Operating Test No.: QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events. 1;.A( .~~
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events. !4", /\/ \
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- 3. Each event description consists of
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event !
~, "vn-~~l
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
*
- the expected operator actions (by shift position) the event termination point (if applicable) b
- 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event. I:.Ii.* :t"" ~~,~
- 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics. 4~ i \/ 'IP}t{A~
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives. ~/ AI/ ~~:
\
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given. 110:
~ ... I~/ ~t S. The simulator modeling is not altered. Il~':1. ~I/' ~~~
Iz:~ ~/'~L~fr\
- 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
.
- 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301. ~~. ~/~
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios). 12;1/ lA- ~It . / -.;. ,il!
~~
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events .I specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios). ~,~-
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position. It<---
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes -- -- --
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-S) 6/5/7 t~.
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- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2/1/2 ~./ 'V ~fh
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 4/4/4 /L-- rv ~O(,\
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 1/ 1 /1 /}i.-. ;I '1 ~h~~\
5. 6. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1/ 1 /1 0/0/0 kt./ 11<'1 AI'"
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2/2/2 t;£- tv I
ES-301 Simulator Scenario Quality Checklist Form ES-301-4 . Facilty: PSL Date of Exam:7/23/0B Scenario Numbers: 4 Operating Test No.: QUALITATIVE ATTRIBUTES Initials a b* c#
- 1. The initial conditions are realistic, in that some equipment and/or instrumentation may be out of service, but it does not cue the operators into expected events.
- 2. The scenarios consist mostly of related events.
- 3. Each event description consists of I *
- the point in the scenario when it is to be initiated
- the malfunction(s) that are entered to initiate the event
- the symptoms/cues that will be visible to the crew
- the expected operator actions (by shift position)
- the event termination point (if applicable)
- 4. No more than one non-mechanistic failure (e.g., pipe break) is incorporated into the scenario without a credible preceding incident such as a seismic event.
- 5. The events are valid with regard to physics and thermodynamics.
- 6. Sequencing and timing of events is reasonable, and allows the examination team to obtain complete evaluation results commensurate with the scenario objectives.
- 7. If time compression techniques are used, the scenario summary clearly so indicates.
Operators have sufficient time to carry out expected activities without undue time constraints. Cues are given. B. The simulator modeling is not altered.
- 9. The scenarios have been validated. Pursuant to 10 CFR 55.46(d), any open simulator performance deficiencies or deviations from the referenced plant have been evaluated to ensure that functional fidelity is maintained while running the planned scenarios.
- 10. Every operator will be evaluated using at least one new or significantly modified scenario.
All other scenarios have been altered in accordance with Section 0.5 of ES-301.
- 11. All individual operator competencies can be evaluated, as verified using Form ES-301-6 (submit the form along with the simulator scenarios).
- 12. Each applicant will be significantly involved in the minimum number of transients and events specified on Form ES-301-5 (submit the form with the simulator scenarios).
- 13. The level of difficulty is appropriate to support licensing decisions for each crew position.
Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d) Actual Attributes '--
- 1. Total malfunctions (5-B) 7
- 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2
- 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3
- 4. Major transients (1-2) 2
- 5. EOPs entered/requiring SUbstantive actions (1-2) 2
- 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 1
- 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N
-*t~~ 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A
A T L N Y S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 S A 8 T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-1 I/C 2,4, 2,3,4 3,5 8 4 4 2
,6 MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2
,5 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 SROI-2 I/C 3,4, 2,3 3,4, 9 5, 6 4 4 2 6A MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 1' 1 2 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1
2,3,4 SROI-3 I/C 2,4 3,5 8 4 4 2
,6 MAJ 8 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2
,5 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-4 I/C 3,4, 2,3 3,4, 9 5, 6 4 4 2 6A MAJ 8 5 68 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 2 1 1 1 1
2,3,4 SROI-5 I/C 2,4, 3,5 4 4 2
,6 9 8
MAJ 7 5 68 3 2 2 1 TS 1A,3 3 0 2 2
,5 NUREG 1021 Revision 9
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 27 2008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N
*~~Par4W 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A
A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 1 SROI-6 IIC 2,3, 2,3 3,4, 8 5, 4 4 2 5 6A MAJ 7 5 68 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 NUREG 1021 Revision 9
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: St. Lucie 1 & 2 Date of Exam: July 272008 Operating Test No.: NRC A E Scenarios P V P E 1 (100%) 2 (5%) 3 (100%) 4 (45%) T L N 0 I T T MINIMUM C CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION A A T L N Y S A B S A B S A B S A B T P R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R T 0 R I U E 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P 0 C P RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-1 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-2 I/C 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SROU-3 IIC 2,3, 3 4 4 2 5 MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, 2 1 1 1 6A I/C 3,5, 6,8, 5 4 4 2 9 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 I/C 5 1 4 4 2 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 0 NOR 1, 2 1 1 1 6A IIC 3 1 4 4 2 MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 NUREG 1021 Revision 9
ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Instructions:
- 1. Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the "at-the-controls (ATC)" and "balance-of-plant (BOP)"
positions; Instant SROs must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunction and one major transient in the ATC position. If an instant SRO additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.
- 2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1-for-1 basis.
- 3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicant's competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicant's license level in the right-hand columns.
NUREG 1021 Revision 9
ES*301 Competencies Checklist Form ES*301*6 Facility: PSL Date of Examination: July 23.2008 Operating Test No.: APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO D SRO-I X SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I D
\
SRO-U SRO-U X SRO-U SRO-U D Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Interpret/Diagnose 2-9 lA 2-9 2-7 Events and Conditions ,-?- 6 Comply With and 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 Use Procedures (1) Operate Control 1,2,3, 1- 3,4 Boards (2) 4,6,7, 4,6 ,5, 9,10 ,7 6B Communicate 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 and Interact Demonstrate 1-10 1-7 1-10 1-7 Supervisory Ability (3) Comply With and 4,5 lA 2,4 2,5 Use Tech. Specs. (3) ,3 Notes: (1 ) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO. (2) Optional for an SRO-U. (3) Only applicable to SROs. Instructions: Check the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.
ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: St. Lucie Plant Date of Exam: July 21 2008 RO KIA Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K 1 K 2 K 3 K 4 K 5 K 6 A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 . G Total A2 G' Total
- 1. 1 2 2 5 4 3 2 18 3 3 6 Emergency &
Abnormal Plant 2 2 1 2 N/A 2 1 N/A 1 9 3 1 4 Evolutions Tier Totals 4 3 7 6 4 3 27 6 4 10 1 2 1 3 5 2 1 2 3 3 4 2 28 2 3 5 2. Plant 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 3 2 4 6 2 2 3 4 4 5 3 38 4 4 8
- 3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 3 2_ 2 3 ~ 2 1 1 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the "Tier Totals" in each KIA category shall not be less than two).
- 2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.
The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.
- 3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.
- 4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.
- 5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those KlAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.
Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.
- 6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.
7.* The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected froni Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KlAs.
- 8. On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics' importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G' on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.
- 9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to KlAs that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# I
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Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: Components, and functions E02 I Reactor Trip Recovery 11 x I EK2.1 of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, 3.3 signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. 0081 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident I 3 x AA 1.02 v" I Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: HPI pump 4.1 I 2 to control PZR level I pressure. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 009 I Small Break LOCA I 3 x EK3.21 they apply to the small break LOCA Actions contained in 4.2 I 3 EOP for small break LOCA I leak. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 011 I Large Break LOCA I 3 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA : 4.1 I 4 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling. Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor 015 117 I RCP Malfunctions I 4 x AK2.10 Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the 2.8 I 5 following: RCP indicators and controls. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: 022 I Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup I 2 x AK3.02 3.5 I 6 Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging. Ability to detenmine and interpret the following as they 025 I Loss of RHR System I 4 x AA2.06 apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: 3.2 I 7 Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 0261 Loss of Component Cooling Water I 8 I x AA1.03 apply to the Loss of component Cooling Water: SWS as 3.6 I 8 a backup to the CCWS.
.
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 E/APE # I Name Safety Function jG I K11 K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) limp. I Q# ! 027 I Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I Ability to determine and interpret the following as they x AA2.04 apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: 3.7 9 3 Tech Spec limits for RCS Pressure. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 038 I Steam Gen. Tube Rupture I 3 x EK3.01 they apply to the SGTR: Equalizing pressure on primary 4.1 10 and secondary side of the ruptured S/G. Ability to operate and lor monitor the following as they CE/E05 I Excess Steam Demand I 4 x EA1.3 apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating 3.4 11 results during abnormal and emergency situations. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): Facility conditions and CE/E06 I Loss of Feedwater 14 x EA2.1 2.8 12 selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following 055 I Station Blackout I 6 x EK1.01 concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Effects of 3.3 13 battery discharge rates on capacity. Conduct of Operations I Knowledge of the purpose and 056 I Loss of Off-site Power I 6 x 2.1.28 4.1 14 function of major system components and controls. Equipment Control I Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, 057 I Loss of Vital AC Inst bus x 2.2.44 4.2 15 and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 058 I Loss of DC Power I 6 x AK3.02 they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in 4.0 16 EOP for loss of dc power. Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the loss of nuclear service water: Guidance 062 I Loss of Nuclear Svc Water I 4 x Ak3.03 4.0 17 actions contained in EOP for loss of nuclear service water. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 0771 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances I x AA2.04 apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.5 18 6 Disturbances: VARs outside the capability curve .. KIA Category Point Totals: Group Point 2/3 2 2 5 4 3/3 18/6 Total:
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE # I Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) I Im~Q#J
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Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as 003 I Dropped Control Rod 11 I X AK3.04 I they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Actions contained 3.8 I 19 in EOP for dropped control rod. Ability to determine and interpret the following as they 0281 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction I 2 x I AA2.01 apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: PZR 3.4 I 20 level indicators and alarms. Equipment Control I Ability to apply Technical 032 I Loss of Source Range Nil 7 x I 2.2.40 Specifications for a system. 3.4 I 21 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 037 I Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 x AA1.13 apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: S/G blowdown 3.9 I 22 radiation monitors. Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they 068 I Control Room Evac I 8 x I AA1.21 I apply to the control room evacuation: transfer of controls 3.9 I 23 from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply 076 I High Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 x AK3.06 to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Actions contained 3.2 I 24 in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: Facility*s heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency CE/A13I Natural Circulation 14 x AK2.2 coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations 3.4 I 25 between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage): CE/A16I Excessive RCS Leakage 12 x AK1.3 I Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and 3.2 I 26 remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage)
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 E/APE #I Name Safety Function IG-rK1 1 K2 r K3 1A1 I A2 I Number I KIA Topic(s) I Imp*-l-Q# I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery): CE/E09 1 Functional Recovery x EK1.2 Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures 3.2 27 associated with Functional Recovery KIA Category Point Total: 1/1 2 1 2 _. 2 1/3 Group Point Total:L_ 9/4
.. ------------------ .. _. - -------- ------
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-21 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 . I System #/Name G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# I
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~~.~it91~e.l.m t~ ~Q Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-003 Reactor Coolant Pump I x I K1.03 effect relationships between the RCPS and the following I 3.3 I 2S systems: RCP seal system.
Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the 003 Reactor Coolant Pump x I K6.14 following will have on the RCPS Starting requirements. I 2.6 I 29 004 Chemical and Volume Control x I K5.16 I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Source of T-ave and T-ref signals to control and RPS I 3.2 30 004 Chemical and Volume Ability to manually operate and / or monitor in the x A4.15 control room: boron concentration 3.6 31 Control Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 005 Residual Heat Removal x K3.01 3.9 32 RHRS will have on the following: RCS. Conduct of Operations / Ability to explain and apply 005 Residual Heat Removal x I 2.1.32 3.S 33 system limits and precautions Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or 006 Emergency Core Cooling I x I K4.0S interlock(s) which provide for the following: 3.2 I 34 Recirculation flowpath of reactor building sump. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank I Ix A2.01 I malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or I 3.9 I 35 operations: Stuck-open PORV or code safety.
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 I System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A 1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics limp. I Q# I Knowledge of CCWS design feature(s) and/or 008 Component Cooling Water x K4.01 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic 3.1 36 start of standby pump. Ability to monitor automatic operation of the CCWS, 008 Component Cooling Water x A3.05 including: Control of the electrically operated, automatic 3.0 37 isolation valves in the CCWS. Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control x A4.01 3.7 38 room: PZR spray valve. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 012 Reactor Protection x K3.01 3.9 39 RPS will have on the following: CROS. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based 012 Reactor Protection x A2.02 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.6 40 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of instrument power. 013 Engineered Safety Features Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS x A3.01 including: Input channels and logic. 3.7 41 Actuation Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 022 Containment Cooling x A4.01 3.6 42 room: CCS fans. Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Prevention of path for 026 Containment Spray x K4.09 3.7 43 escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, 039 Main and Reheat Steam x A3.02 3.1 44 including: Isolation of the MRSS. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the 059 Main Feedwater x K3.04 3.6 45 MFW will have on the following: RCS. Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based 059 Main Feedwater x A2.12 on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, 3.1 46 or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of feedwater regulating valves. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters 061 Auxiliary/Emergency (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with 47 x A1.01 3.9 Feedwater operating the AFW controls including: S/G level. Knowledge of the operational implications of the 061 Auxiliary/Emergency x K5.01 following concepts as the apply to the AFW: 3.6 48 Feedwater Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer.
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 I System #/Name G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics I Imp. I Q# Knowledge of ac distribution system design feature(s) 062 AC Electrical Distribution x K4.05 and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: 2.7 49 Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control 063 DC Electrical Distribution x A4.01 2.8 50 room: Major breakers and control power fuses. Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or 064 Emergency Diesel Generator x K4.02 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Trips for 3.9 51 ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). 073 Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design 073 Process Radiation Monitoring x A1.01 3.2 52 limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: radiation levels. Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: 076 Service Water X K2.01 2.7 53 Service water Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-078 Instrument Air x K1.02 effect relationships between the lAS and the following 2.7 54 systems: Service Air. Equipment Control I Knowledge of the bases in 103 Containment x 2.2.25 Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for 3.2 55 operations and safety limits. KIA Category Point Totals: 2/3 2 1
.
3 5 2
--
1
-----
2 3/2
'-----
3 4 Group Point Total: I 28/5
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 I System #/Name I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I K4 I K5 I K6 I A1 I A2 I A3 I A4 I Number I KIA Topics Imp. Q# x ~~ x §t~
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Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or 001 I Control Rod Drive I x I K4.03 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod 3.5 56 control logic. Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) 002 Reactor Coolant I x I A1.04 3.9 57 associated with operating the RCS controls including: Subcooling Margin. Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: 011 Pressurizer Level Control x I K2.02 3.1 58 Pressurizer Heaters. Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on 015/ Nuclear Instrumentation I x I K6.01 the following will have on the NIS: Sensors, 2.9 59 detectors and indicators. Ability to monitor automatic operation of the 029 / Containment Purge I x I A3.01 I Containment Purge System including: CPS 3.8 60 isolation. 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam header pressure. 3.1 61 Control Emergency Procedures / Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require 045 / Main Turbine Generator I x I 2.4.49 4.6 62 immediate operation of system components and controls. Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of 055 Condenser Air Removal I x I K3.01 the CARS will have on the following: Main 2.5 63 condenser. Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 056 / Condensate I x I K1.03 cause-effect relationships between the Condensate 2.6 64 System and the following systems: MFW.
ES-401 St. Lucie USNRC License Exam Form ES-401-2 PWR BOTH Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2 System #/Name G K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 Number KIA Topics Imp. Q# Ability to predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictionsolJse 075 Circulating Water X A2.02 2.5 65 procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of circulating water pumps. KIA Category Point Totals: 1/1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1/2 1 1 Group Point Total: I 10/3
ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier3) I Form ES-401-3 I Facility: St. Lucie NRC Exam Date of Exam: 7/2008 RO Category KIA # Topic IR Q# [g ~1 4i'JZ elJ
~~
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- 1. ibilities during all Conduct of 4.1 66 Operations 2.1.26 3.4 67 2.1.37 4.3 68 Subtotal 3 ~
f4~ gz Q1\ 2. of the design, procedural, and Equipment Control 3.8 69 differences between units. 3.7 70 2 g
~
Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under 2.3.4 3.2 71 normal or conditions. Knowledge of radiological safety procedures
- 3. pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as Radiation Control response to radiation monitor alarms, 2.3.13 3.4 72 containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas filters etc.
Subtotal 2 Knowledge of crew responsibilities during EOP 2.4.13 4.0 73
- 4. Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety Emergency 2.4.22 functions during abnormallemergency 3.6 73 Procedures I Plan Knowledge unciator alarms, indications, or 2.4.31 4.2 75 res.
Subtotal 3 Tier 3 Point Total 10
I ES-401 Record of Rejected KIAs I Form ES-401-4 I Tier 1 Group De-selected KA Reason for Rejection Operate I Monitor Feedwater Pumps during Pzr. Vapor space 1/1 (008) AA1.04 accident. No relationship between feedwater pumps and Pzr. Vapor space accident. 3.02 Knowledge of opening excess letdown isolation valves during SBLOCA. PSL does not have excess letdown valves. 1/1 (009) EK3.02, EK3.27 3.27 Manual depress, or HPI recirc for sustained high pressure. PSL doe not have positive displacement HPI pumps. RCS depress. Is preformed by spray or Charging and Letdown PZR PCS malfunction, ability to interpret Seal return flow. PSL 1/1 (027) AA2.13 does not have seal return flow. Rep seal injection is ONLY placed in service during RCS fill and vent, Mode 5. SGTR RCS loop isolation valves. PSL does not have Loop isolation 1/1 (038) EK3.07 valves. 3.01 Dropped CEA when ICS logic has failed. PSL does not have Integrated Control System. AK3.01, AK3.02, 3.02 Dropped CEA reactor runback. PSL does not have reactor 1/2 (003) Ak3.03 runback 3.03 Dropped CEA turbine runback. PSL doen not have turbine runback 2.03 Pzr Level control malfunction ability to determine Charging subsystem flow indo And controller. PSL does not have Charging subsystem flow or controller. 1/2 (028) AA2.03, AA2.05 2.05 Pzr Level control malfunction ability to determine flow control valve isolation valve indicator. PSL does not have flow control valve 1.09 CR Evacuation, ability to operate I monitor synch. Key. PSL does not have Sync Key switch 1/2 (068) AA 1.09, AA 1.22 1.22 Flow control valve for RCS charging header. PSL does not have Charging Flow control valve. High RCS activity, knowledge of reasons, orifice controls for 1/2 (076) AK3.03 minimum letdown. PSL does not have letdown flow orfices. CVCS, deborating demin. Selector valve and control switch. PSL 2/1 (004) A4.20 Ion Exchanger lineup is all manual valves, no selector switch or control switch. 4.22 ECCS, interlocks between RCP seal flow rate and standby HPI pp. PSL RCP seal injection is from Charging pump header, not 2/1 (006) K4.22, K4.29 HPI and only used during fill and vent. Mode 5. 4.29 ECCS, BIT recirculation. PSL does not recirc. Safety Injection Tanks. 2.06 MFW, loss of steam flow. PSL does not have Steam Driven Main Feedwater pumps. 2/1 (059) A2.06, A2.07 2.07 MFW, tripping of MFW pump turbine. PSL does not have Steam Driven Main Feedwater pumps. SWS, power supply to reactor building closed cooling water. PSL 2/1 (076) K2.04 SWS is an open system. SOS, ICS voltage inverter. PSL does not have Integrated Control 2/2 (041) A4.01 System.
I ES-401 Record of Rejected KI As I Form ES-401-4 I As discussed with Chief Examiner changed KIA due to like KIA to RO question 35. Changed KIA TO AA 1.02 000008 I Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: HPI pump to control 1/1 (08) AA1.08 PZR level I pressure. FROM AA 1.08 KIA Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level pressure and temperature. As discussed with Chief Examiner Changed KIA due difficulty writing SRO only question. Changed KIA TO AA2.01: Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: 1/1 (065) AA2.06 Cause and effect of low pressure instrument air pressure. FROM AA2.06 000065 I Loss of Instrument Air 18 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing
ES*401 Written Examination Quality Checklist Form ES*401-6 Facility: 51. Lucie Date of Exam: 7/231108 Exam Level: RO"l/ SRO "1/ Initial Item Description
- 1. Questions and answers are technically accurate and applicable to the facility.
- 2. a. NRC KlAs are referenced for all questions.
- b. Facility leaming obiectives are referenced as available.
- 3. 5RO questions are appropriate in accordance with Section D.2.d of E5-401
- 4. The sampling process was random and systematic (If more than 4 RO or 2 SRO questions were repeated from the last 2 NRC llcensing exams, consult the NRR OL program office).
- 5. Question duplication from the license screening/audit exam was controlled as£.t:licated below (check the item that applies) and appears appropriate:
the audit exam was systemattcally and randomly developed; or the audit exam was completed before the license exam was started; or _ the examinations were developed independently; or
= the licensee certifies that there is no duplication; or other (explain)
- 6. Bank use meels limits (no more than 75 percent Bank Modified New from the bank, at least 10 percent new, and the rest new or modified); enter the actual RO I SRO-only 14/2 2/0 59/23 Question dislribulion(s} at riQht. .
- 7. Between 50 and 60 percent of the questions on the RO Memory CIA exam are written at the comprehension/ analysis level; the 5RO exam may exceed 60 percent If the randomly 3115 44/20 selected KlAs support the higher cognitive levels; enter the actual RO 1SRO Question distrlbution(s) at right.
- 8. References/handouts provided do not give away answers or aid in the elimination 01 distractors.
- 9. Question content conforms with specific KIA statements in the previously approved examination outline and is appropriate for the tier to which they are assigned; deviations are iustified.
- 10. Question psychometric quality and format meet the lluldelines in ES Appendix B. Ijrt- / ~
- 11. The exam contains the required number of one-point. multiple choice items; the total is correct and agrees with the value on the cover sheet.
B. Author
- b. Facility Reviewer (*)
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (#)
- d. NRC Regional Supervisor Note:
- The facility reviewer's initials/signature are not applicable for NRC-developed examinations.
# Independent NRC reviewer Initial items In Column "c*; chief examiner concurrence required.
ES-401, Rev. 9 Saint Lncie 2008-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Explanation Focus Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of umelated true/false statements.
- The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).
- 4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- The question contains data with an umealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
- 6. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?
- 7. At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met)'.
" { ~-
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UlE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shovm in red E02 1 Reactor Trip Recovery 1 EA2.1: Facility Conditions and 76 H 3 selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and X U emergency operations. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. E The question requires knowledge of EOP entry condition. This is RO knowledge. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. Rev 1: Some stem statements have periods, others don't. Reword stem to add another bullet, the svrA's have been completed. The SRO will now transition to ...........~.. and direct the eRO (BOP) to___ 7 A & D contain RO Knowledge. This enables an RO to arTlve at answer using just RO Knowledge. AFAS signal not present. Eliminates A & D. EOP-2 Entry RO knowledge makes B the only conecl: answer using only RO knowledge. Rev 2. Change to say "After the SPTAs are compiete:"Missing , commas uher pmcedrure ft. NEW H 2 X E 0000111 Large Break LOCA 13 Emergency Procedures 12.4.6: 77 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. Appears to match KIA. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. Is psia units read in control room? Shutdown cooling requirements in psia? Appears conect answer should be B "in any 1 hr period" for no RCPs running. (Less than min. subcooling criteria per curve, therefore all RCPs oft). Rev] : Proposed answer still shows "1)". Conect answer is "B". Also. the EOP is given in the stem of the question and is not selected based on plant conditions as required by the I OCFR55.43 criteria. "Refer to" appear's to be the conect verb per the EOP. Rev 2: L;ilSt bullet should have units as mrem/hr. or mR/hr. Distractor D srll)uld be 100 degrecs/hr. Is [he EOP reference for use with this question ,;orrect? NEW H 3 ;x: ;x: y 026 1 Loss of Component Cooling Water 1 Emergency 78 Procedures 1 Plan: 2.4.35: Knowledge of local auxiliary
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Job- 1Minutia I #/ IBack-1 Q= I SRO 1UIE/S Explanation Focus Link unitsl ward IKiAI Only Rev 1 sho\Vl1 in red S./E loperator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational S effects. Distractors C & D do not appear to be plausible. Why would anyone choose these? Also not SRO only as this can be answered based just on system knowledge. Change to ask lAW with what procedure, need another viable procedure selection choice. Rev 1; questlclD, i.e. Given the plant conditions: A SGTR has occurred ouA SG, bullet should be "affected" SQ, The conect answer has an statement Should read: Attach the flex hose to the male disconnect fitting in the air line. Teachim:: m the stem of the question, Loss of air doses the valve. Is
'*documented'* the correct action?
NEW Rev. :2 LooKs OK ilflcr cham!?s made. H 3 x x x U 1000038/ Steam Generator Tube Rupture / EA2,01 Ability to 79 determine or interpret the following as they apply to a SGTR: When to isolate one or more steam generator. Does not appear to match KIA Answer is for an ESD not a SGTR. The EOP is given in the stem of the question. No selection ofappropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFR55.43.b(5) criteria. Rev 1; Stll1 does not meet I OCFR55.43 criteria, FOP should not be in the stem. Give conditions so that a SGTR must be This a statement for the SRO POltiOIL No FRP addressed in the stem. C & D not I. plaUSIble NEW ReF. 2 LOOKS OK after made, H 3 x x U 000058/ Loss of DC Bus / 2.1.20 Conduct of Operations: 80 S Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. Does not meet KIA. Does not meet 10CFR55.43 criteria. Add two other safety functions to choice B & D. NEW Rev, 2 edih'rfai errors to 11x, n disiractor has incorrect >>referenced,
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only F I X Y 000065 / Loss of Instrument Air / AA2.06 Ability to determine 81 Ii S/1! and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: When to trip reactor if instrument air pressure is de-creasing. This is not SRO Only. RO is required to know trip criteria. Also proposed answer does not agree with correct answer statement. IResamp new KIA: AA2.0! Cause and effect of low pressure instrument air alarm. needed after "UniC Capitalize "MV" in stem. Put "ONE" after "Which" in stem of Should it say "F46" vs '"F4S" in stem of question to match alarm Igl NEW F 2 X X U 000024/ Emergency Boration / AA2.05 Ability to determine 82 H E and interpret the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration: Amount of boron to add to achieve required SDM. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO Only. Direct look up. Reference for use in question not attached with question. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFRS0.43 .b(5) criteria. New (jlw;;linn written. Distractor D is not with choice R ChoicesA. & B do not appear to be plausible. A'rWS criteria would not allow normal Rx Trip .:UVCly NEW Rev. ] ediU,rial othenvise OK. 'j'here sflPuld be no rd"rt'nce provided j(W this question. H 2 X Y 000036/ Fuel Handling Accident / AA2.01 Ability to determine, 83 I E and interpret the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: ARM system indications. Teaching in the stem of the question by telling the candidate that the rod dropped. Also not relevant to the question. Appears to match KIA. Not SRO only. 151 part of distractors is RO Knowledge and Y2 of second part is also RO knowledge. Revised 2M part of c!istractors. Distractof plausibility 110t updated. Gaseous repeated twke on A & c. NEW
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FfH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO VIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only C 3 X- V 000067 I Plant Fire Onsite I 2.2.37 Ability to determine 84 S operability and I or availability of safety related equipment. Does not match KIA. Question is based on a loss of fire protection not a Plant Fire Onsite and the correct response does not involve an operability or availability of safety related equipment. Are SROs expected to know this from memory? New written. Reps is LA., RO Ifirain isRO lhen this is not SRO IOnly. NEW Licensee staled that tdpiJlnQ: Reps is NOT an lA. F 2 E 000069 I Loss of Containment Integrity I AA2.02 Ability to 85 determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Containment Integrity: Verification of automatic and manual means of restoring integrity. Appears to match KIA. Distractor "D" not plausible. No coma is after "closed", NEW H 2 V 005 12.1.25 Residual Heat Removal Ability to interpret 86 reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. Is not a SRO only question. Appears to be a direct lookup. Question revised to include a l'S calL No! sure if it is still a direct Ilook NEW H 4 :g 022 I 2.2.37 Containment Cooling Equipment Control I Ability 87 S to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. Appears to match KIA. Distractors C&D not plausible. NEW H 1 £ 026 I 2.2.42 Containment Spray Equipment Control lAbility to 88 U recognize system parameters that are entry level conditions for Technical Specifications. Meets the KIA. 'rhis is a math calc from the reference provided, Tile part of the answer is given on the data sheet. No interprelation
,L- _ NEW
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. 7.
Q# ILOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia I UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I
- g 89 I H
I 3 I s 064 I A2.16 Emergency Diesel Generator Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ED/G system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of offsite power during full-load testing ofED/G. Meets KIA. Not SRO Only. EOP entry condition. RO knowledge. NEW Revised to add to address SRO knowledce. 'rhe 2nd half of the 2 response is not needed to answer the nd needs to be HldCkout & LO/\FEOP RO Licens('c upon review stated that it is nOi RO to know Blackuu.t conditioll entry. F 2 s 076 I A2.01 Service Water Ability to (a) predict the impacts of 90 u the following malfunctions or operations on the SWS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SWS. Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO Only or an accumulation of RO Knowledge? Is marked Fundamental Knowledge and linked to 55.43. Doesn't correlate. IChange stem, remove "Mode I ", this is Add "ONE" after "Which" in the Guestion statement to ONE co free! answer. NEW is Ullsat. RO F 2 x U 017 I A2.02 Incore Temperature Monitor Ability to (a) predict 91 C the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ITM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Core damage. RO Knowledge. No selection of appropriate procedure is required. Does not meet 10CFRS0.43.b (5) criteria. Is fig. 2 required to answer this question? Bank New written. Is the anached qjll to
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only F 2 X E 033 A2.02 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Ability to (a) predict the 92 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of SFPCS. Second part of KA number missing. Distractor "D" does not appear plausible. Is the only distractor that uses clarity as a choice. A is a subset of C. Does not meet 10CFR50.43.b(5) criteria. NEW Need new distractor for i half of distraetor Nt Not realistic H 2 X .g 072 / 2.1.20 Area Radiation Monitoring: Ability to interpret and 93 S execute procedure steps. Distractor "A" not plausible. Isn't "c" always correct if personnel are in me area? NEW Based on pnJcetiun:- review wil:£""""" A & Care phmsible. H 3 U 2.1.7 Conduct of Operation: Ability to evaluate plant 94 S performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. RO Knowledge for Rx Trip and EOP entry condition. NEW H 2 X E 2.1.34 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of primary and 95 secondary plant chemistry limits. Distractor "D" not plausible. NEW C 2 X U 2.1.32 Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply 96 S system limits and precautions. Appears to meet KIA. Not SRO only. See pg 4 of SRO Only guidance. NEW New qm~stion \vritten. H 3 E 2.2.14 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the process for 97 controlling equipment configuration or status. Appears to meet KIA. Distractor "c" does not seem plausible. Availability not addressed by T.S. MODIFIED This is BANK Question,
,
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #t Back- Q= SRO u/EtS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only F 2 U 2.2.21 Equipment Control: Knowledge of pre- and post-98 maintenance operability requirements. Appears to meet KIA. Distractors "An & "c" does not seem plausible. If amperage and discharge press don't stabilize, leave running? You have to potentially contact SP group for a routine oil change? NEW i F 2 U 2.3.6 Radiation Control: Ability to approve release permits. 99 Meets the KIA. A & B do not seem plausible. "A" implies a PCR is required every time you perform a release with the Rad Monitor OOS. "B" implies a 50.59 review every time. Modified H 3 E 2.4.29 Emergency Procedures t Plan: Knowledge of the 100 emergency plan. Meets the KIA. Appears that there are potentially two correct answers. NEW? 3 Sats 16 Unsats 6 Enhancement
"
?Jr ES-401, Rev. 9 Saint Lucie 2008-301 SRO Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LODr---r---r---r---r---;---r----.--.---~ (FIII) (1-5) Stern SRO I u/E/S Explanation Focus Only Instructions [Refer to Section D of ES-40 1 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts.]
- 1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.
- 2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question using a 1 - 5 (easy - difficult) rating scale (questions in the 2 - 4 range are acceptable).
- 3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:
- The stern lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).
- The stern or distractors contain cues (Le., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc).
- The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.
- The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.
- One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stern).
- 14. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:
- The question is not linked to the job requirements (Le., the question has a valid KIA but, as written, is not operational in content).
- The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).
- The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).
- The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.
- 5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved KIA and those that are designated SRO-only (KIA and license level mismatches are unacceptable).
Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory? At a minimum, explain any "U" ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 shown in red Rev 2 shovm in greICn I F 3 S E02 / EK2.1 Reactor Trip Recovery / Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features. NEW 2 H 3 X U 000008/ iV,J.08 Al\1.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident S Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: PRT level pressure and temperature. Ask for tailpipe temp. not PRT temp. Does not appear to match KIA. No explanation given as to how the distractors were reached. (plausibility) What elTors are made to make A & D plausible? Add "ONE" to stem. 3rd bullet add "identified as PZR ... " 3rd bullet also has a period at the end. The other 2 bullets do not. Is NOPINOT needed? Seems like additional info that is not needed. New KIA was selected based on similarity to other KA wli the same system. NEW 3 F I X U 009/ EK3.21 Small Break LOCA / Knowledge of the reasons E for the following responses as they apply to the small break S LOCA: Actions contained in EOP for small break LOCA / leak. Add EOP titles. Distractor "c" does not appear plausible. Would heat input be a concern on a LOCA? Question is a direct lookup with the Figure given. LOD is 1. Suggest use of steam table to determine subcooling is lost instead. NEW Changed distractor "e" to "fue! uplifl crHlsiderations from low ReS " ('luHlg"ri distrn<fo.f "C'. to "maintain min liCP NPSH j .,
., tcHn:IU:>
- c..... n':ljull
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only Rev 1 ShOW11 in red RI':'v 2 shown in green 4 H 3 E 009 1 EK1.0 1 Large Break LOCA 1 Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Large Break LOCA: Natural circulation and cooling, including retlux boiling. Why is Fig. 1A & lB needed for this question? If used it would answer question 3. NEW Requested licensee to black out curve labels on Figures. 5 H 3 ~ g 015/0171 AK2.10 1 RCP Malfunctions Knowledge of the S interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss ofRC Flow) and the following: RCP indicators and controls. Distractor "A" does not appear plausible. NEW L_ .. Distractor "A" plausible for only I seal failing.
I. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 6 H 3 S 022/ AK3.02 Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Actions contained in SOPs and EOPs for RCPs, loss of makeup, loss of charging, and abnormal charging. Appears to match KIA. NEW 7 F 3 X U 025 / Loss of RHR System / AA2.05 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection. Doesn't match KIA. No loss ofRHR. Teaching in the stem. States Mode 4 (Not necessary) No analysis is required. LOK incorrect. Memory NEW Revised stem to Include "Loss of 5J)C" as witiating event 8 F 3 g 025/ AAl.03 Loss of Component Cooling Water / Ability to S operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: SWS as a backup to the CCWS. Appears to meet KIA if there is no backup for ICW to CCWS. NEW 9 H 3 S 027 / AA2.04 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction
/ Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Tech-Spec limits for RCS pressure. Appears to match KIA. NEW 10 H 3 S 038/ EK3.01 Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR:
Equalizing pressure on primary and secondary sides of ruptured S/G. Appears to match KIA. NEW 11 H 3 S CElE05 / EAI.03 Excess Steam Demand / 4 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the (Excess Steam Demand): Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations. \ BANK
-
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 12 F 2 E CElE06 1 EA2.1 Loss of Feedwater 1 4 Ability to determine and S interpret the following as they apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): Facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations. "C "implies that you stay in EOP6 concurrently. Needs to be reworded. NEW Editorial remarks corrected liCensee. 13 F 2 U 0000551 EKl.Ol Station Blackout 1 Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Effect of battery discharge rates on capacity. This does not require the candidate to know anything about the battery capacity. This is a straight math calculation. Rewrite the question so that the candidate has to know the rating of the battery to determine when the battery is completely discharged, i.e. 1800 amp-hr rating. 225amps of load, the battery will last 8 hrs. NEW Question rewritten per to meet requirements ab(wc. 14 F 3 S 05612.1.28 Loss of Offsite Power 1 Conduct of Operations 1 Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 15 H 5 g 000057 1 2.2.44 Loss of Vital AC Inst bus 1 Equipment Control 1 S Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. Appears to match KIA. Reference material does not support answer. Is the RO expected to know from memory that a rapid downpower is required for this event? Yes 16 H 3 X U 0000581 AK3.02 Loss of DC Power 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of DC Power: Actions contained in EOP for loss of dc power. Does not meet KIA statement. No actions are listed. The action is closing the PORV. NEW New question written to match KIA.
i
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 17 F 3 g 0651 AK3.03 Loss of Nuclear Service Water: Knowledge of S the reasons as they apply to loss of nuclear service water: Guidance actions contained in EOP for loss of nuclear service water. Does not appear to match KIA. Question is written for loss ofICW, not CCW (NSW).Licensee clarified that leW is equivalent to NSW at most other plants. NEW 18 H 2 E 0000771 AA2.04 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid S Disturbances 1 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: VARs outside the capability curve. Distractor "A" not plausible. Distractor "B" missing a coma. Is 'in the lag' normal terminology? NEW Distractor "A" {'h'HW,vl 19 H 3 X E 003 1 AK3.04 Dropped Control Rod 1 Knowledge of the reasons S for the following responses as they apply to the Dropped Control Rod: Actions contained in EOP for dropped control rod. Cueing in the stem. Omit the COLR statement. It is not needed. If the RO is expected to know the recovery time of <60 min. This should also be removed. At a timeline approach instead. Appears to meet KIA. NEW Licensee removed COLR info from rhe question stem. 20 H 3 E 0000281 AA2.01 Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction/Ability S to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunctions: PZR level indicators and alarms. Appears to meet KIA. A & B not symmetrical with C & D. Possibly change to say RR Tref signal failed high, low for A & B distractors. NEW? Licensee made to enhance of A &13 distractor. 21 F 2 S 000032 1 2.2.40 Loss of Source Range NI 1 Equipment Control 1 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. Verify TS. NEW
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
II Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 22 H 3 S 000037 I AA1.13 Steam Generator Tube Leak 13 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: S/G blowdown radiation monitors. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 23 F 3 S 068 I AA1.21 Control Room Evacuation 18 Ability to operate and I or monitor the following as they apply to the control room evacuation: transfer of controls from the control room to shutdown panel or local control. Appears to meet KIA. NEW 24 H 2 S 076 I AK3.06 Reactor Coolant Activity I 5 Knowledge of the reasons for the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Actions contained in EOP for high reactor coolant activity. Is "a plant shutdown is not required" necessary? NEW 25 H 3 S CEIAI3 I AK2.2 Natural Circulation I 4 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Natural Circulation Operations) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility. Appears to meet KIA. NEW F 3 S AKI.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of the 26 following concepts as they apply to the (Excess RCS Leakage): Annunciators and conditions indicating signals and remedial action associated with the (Excess RCS Leakage), NEW 27 F 3 S CElE09 I EKI.I Functional Recovery Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the (Functional Recovery): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with Functional Recovery. BANK 28 H 3 S 003 KI.03 Reactor Coolant Pump Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the RCPS and the following systems: RCP seal system. BANK
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #1 Back- Q= SRO UIEIS Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only
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30 F 2 S 004 K5.16 Chemical and Volume Control I Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the CVCS: Source of T -ave and T -ref signals to control and RPS. NEW 31 S 004 A4.15 Chemical and Volume Control Ability to manually operate and I or monitor in the control room: boron concentration. NEW 32 H 3 U 005 K3.01 Residual Heat Removal I Knowledge of the effect S that a loss or malfunction of the RHRS will have on the following: RCS. Is A & C plausible? NEW BANK Question replaced with a BANK question. 33 F 2 S 005 2.1.32 Residual Heat Removal I Conduct of Operations I Ability to explain and apply system limits and precautions. NEW 34 F2 S 006 K4.08 Emergency Core Cooling Knowledge of ECCS design feature(s) and/or interIock(s) which provide for the following: Recirculation t10wpath of reactor building sump. NEW 35 C 3 S 007 A2.0l Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Stuck-open PORV or code safety. NEW 1-
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 36 F 2 E 008 K4.0 1 Component Cooling Water Knowledge of CCWS S design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Automatic start of standby pump. BANK Could modify question by adding a fault condition to B 4KV bus. This would change the answer and make other choices more plausible. Licensee madc recommended changes (0 increase of distfactor. 37 C 2 E 008 A3.05 Component Cooling Water Ability to monitor S automatic operation of the CCWS, including: Control of the electrically operated, automatic isolation valves in the CCWS. B does not appear plausible, i.e ONLY response and no handjackfor valve. Licensec changed Disrractor "If', More plausible. 38 C 3 X E 010 A4.0 1 Pressurizer Pressure Control Ability to manually S operate and/or monitor in the control room: PZR spray valve. Is distractor B & D plausible. No reason to suspect loss of Aux spray. Add charging pump OOS or loss of a train of 125 vdc. Licensee question stem 10 add a loss of a ecp. 'fhis makes B & D distractors more plausible. 39 C 4 E 012 K3.01 Reactor Protection Knowledge of the effect that a S loss or malfunction of the RPS will have on the following: CRDS. Does placing the RPS BIS in bypass place the logic in a trip condition or does it prevent a trip condition? Licensee changed question slem to corree! RPS Lmlt logic 40 C 3 S 012 A2.02 Reactor Protection Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the RPS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of instrument power. 2MA inverter failure on scenario #1. Should be OK to use this question since it is a unit difference.
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIR) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 41 C 3 S 013 A3.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation Ability to monitor automatic operation of the ESFAS including: Input channels and logic. NEW 42 F 2 S 022 A4.01 Containment Cooling Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: CCS fans. BANK not Modified 43 C 3 S 026 K4.09 Containment Spray Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Prevention of path for escape of radioactivity from containment to the outside (interlock on RWST isolation after swapover) NEW 44 C 3 X Y 039 A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the MRSS, including: Isolation of the MRSS. C & D not plausible. Break is outside containment. BANK C&D are plausible. Nozzle is in containment. 45 C 3 X Ii, 059 K3.04 Main Feedwater Knowledge of the effect that a loss S or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: RCS. Appears B could also be considered correct. NEW Licensee stated ".13" could not be correct. 46 C 2 S 059 A2.12 Main Feedwater Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Failure of feed water regulating valves. BANK 47 C 3 S 061 Al.0! AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the AFW controls including: S/G level. NEW
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- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 48 C 2 X E 061 K5.0 1 AuxiliarylEmergency Feedwater Knowledge of the S operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the AFW: Relationship between AFW flow and RCS heat transfer. Answer is given in the stem of the question. NEW Licensee stem to remove AFW t10w referencc. 49 F 1 X U 062 K4.05 AC Electrical Distribution Knowledge of ac
.1 S distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which i provide for the following: Paralleling of ac sources (synchroscope). Does not meet KIA. No interlock knowledge tested. This is testing knowledge of procedure guidance. NEW Question revised to include interlock component.
!
50 C 3 063 A4.0 1 DC Electrical Distribution Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Major breakers and control power fuses. Appears to meet the 1st part of the KIA. Review to verify procedure steps match with answer. NEW 51 F 2 S 064 K4.02 Emergency Diesel Generator Knowledge of ED/G system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Trips for ED/G while operating (normal or emergency). NEW 52 F 2 E 073 A1.0I Process Radiation Monitoring Ability to predict S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: radiation levels. D not plausible. SS conditions. Gross activity levels don't go up. NEW Disrractor "I)" changed to make more plausible. 53 F 3 X U 076 K2.01 Service Water Knowledge of bus power supplies to S the following: Service water. Doesn't appear to meet KIA. This is asking about interlocks, not power supply. Add "ONE" to stem of question. NEW New written 10 match KilL '--
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TfF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 54 F 3 B 078 KI.02 Instrument Air Knowledge of the physical S connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the lAS and the following systems: Service Air. NEW 55 F 2 S 103 2.2.25 Containment Equipment Control/Knowledge of the bases in Technical Specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. Capitalize "ONE". NEW 56 C 3 S 00 I / K4.03 Control Rod Drive Knowledge of CRDS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: Rod control logic. Add "ONE" to stem. BANK 57 F 3 E 002 Al.04 Reactor Coolant: Ability to predict and/or monitor S changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the RCS controls including: Subcooling Margin. Add "ONE" to stem. Extra period on D distractor. D is also correct as written. Need to add qualifier, "indicated T-hot" NEW \: ' change made. 58 C 3 S 011 K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control: Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: Pressurizer Heaters. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 59 C 3 S 015/ K6.0l Nuclear Instrumentation: Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the NIS: Sensors, detectors, and indications. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW 60 C 3 X E 029/ A3.0l Containment Purge: Ability to monitor automatic S operation of the Containment Purge System including: CPS isolation. Add "ONE" to stem. Change to say "reload of the core". Is recently irradiated fuel your terminology or "Once burned"? Remove "severely". Distractor B, explain plausibility. MODIFIED Changed distractor *'B". 61 C 3 S 041 Steam DumplTurbine Bypass Control: Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Main steam header pressure. Add "ONE" to stem. NEW
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws I 5. Other I 6. 7.
Q# 1 LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Explanation s Dist. I 62 F I 2 I S 1045 / 2.4.49 Main Turbine Generator: Emergency Procedures / Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and I controls. NEW 63 C I 3 I S 64 C 3 S 65 F 3 E 075 A2.02 Circulating Water: Ability to predict the impacts of S the following malfunctions or operations on the circulating water system; and (b) based on those predictions use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Loss of circulating water pumps. Since no action is required for distractor D. Make the delta T value >30 degrees. This will make distractor D more plausible. NEW Licensee made the 66 F 2 E S
"ion exchanger".
question. If it was used on a it IS now public domain accessible from the NRC web site via ADAMS. Change D to state: "No action is required unless the highest indicated nuclear power exceeds 100.0%." Licensee made the
- l. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cue TIF Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. I Link units ward KIA Only 67 F 2 S 2.1.26 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen). Annunciator alarm missing "GAS" from title. Missing the word "tank" from 'A' response. What makes "B" plausible? What or where is the 'Gas Surge Tank'? Add "ONE" to stem of question. NEW "B" plausible. Surge Tank is pumped to the Decay Tank. 68 C 3 S 2.1.37 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management. NEW 69 F 2 E 2.2.3 Equipment Control: Knowledge of the design, procedural, S and operational differences between units. Is distractor "c" also correct? No support info provided for distractor viability. Distractor "B" can be used to eliminate distractor "c" for RO
- 73. NEW Licensee changed distractors "B" & "C'. to correct above concerns.
70 F 3 E 2.2.12 Equipment Control: Knowledge of surveillance S procedures. Add coma after procedure #, Add "ONE" after which. Add "an" prior to inaccurate and remove "s" from calculations. Missing period at the end of B distractor. NEW 71 C 2 S 2.3.4 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions. Add space between sentences (2 spaces between each sentence). Units should be mRlhr not Mrlhr. NEW L--
,
- 1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7.
Q# LOK LOD (FIH) (1-5) Stem Cue TIP Credo Partia Job- Minutia #/ Back- Q= SRO UIE/S Explanation Focus s Dist. 1 Link units ward KIA Only 72 F 2 E 2.3.13 Radiation Control: Knowledge of radiological safety S procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response. to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Is "pegged" the proper terminology or should it be "a CIS monitor IDGH-IDGH alarm is received on ... "? Add "ONE" to stem. Is there a rad monitor alarm response for this condition? Add to distractors that HP is evaluating "radiological conditions". NEW 73 F 3 Y 2.4.13 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of crew roles S and responsibilities during EOP usage. Add "ONE of' to the stem. Add coma after procedure #. Distractor "c" can be used to eliminate distractor "B" for RO Q#69. The plausibility for D implies it is correct also (App J is done after the SFSC). NEW Licensee (~hanged distractor in Q69. Histractor '"0" is plausible aud incorrect as written. 74 C 4 S 2.4.22 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing safety functions during abnormal/emergency operations. Spell out EOP title. Is this RO Knowledge? Yes NEW 75 F 2 E 2.4.31 Emergency Procedures / Plan: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures. B needs to be more specific. What amber lights are you talking about? MODIFIED This is a BANK question.
. . Licensee changed distractor 'oR" to be more specific .
i 39 Sats 10 Unsats 21 Enhancement I
ES-403, Rev. 9 Written Examination Grading Form ES-403-1 Quality Checklist Facility: St. Lucie Date of Exam: July 31,2008 Exam Level(RO~RO)
-
Initials a b c Item Description
- 1. Clean answer sheets copied before grading
~¥-- N/4 ~
- 2. Answer key changes and question deletions justified and documented ~ ~
- 3. Applicants' scores checked for addition errors (reviewers spot check> 25% of examinations) ~ /h6
~
- 4. Grading for all borderline cases (80 +/-2% overall and 70 or 80, as applicable, +/-4% on the SRO-only) reviewed in detail ~
~.
- 5. All other failing examinations checked to ensure that grades are justified I4!J
- 6. Performance on missed questions checked for training deficiencies and wording problems; evaluate validity of questions missed by half or more of the applicants
~JY- ,,~ ;Wi Printed Name/Signature Date
- a. Grader Phillip G. Capehartl'i>J~-- 9/05108
- b. Facility Reviewer(*) N/A N/A
- c. NRC Chief Examiner (*) Richard S. Baldwin~- T'?""/:(-'/""'- =:::.
9/05/08
~,
- d. NRC Supervisor (*) Malcolm T. Widm~nn/I thiiJb(1 Ill--- tI/~/JI l/
(*) The facility reviewer's signature is not applicable for examinations graded by the NRC; two independent NRC reviews are required.}}