ML17192A447

301 Admin Items (ADAMS-2C)- Delay Release 2 Yrs

ML17192A447
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	07/11/2017
From:	NRC/RGN-II
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Download: ML17192A447 (77)

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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/2016301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (see Note) Code*

Perform RCS Average Temperature Data Sheet and Determine Inverse Count Rate Ratio (1/M) (GP-004)

(JPM ADM-072-b)

Conduct of Operations M, R K/A G2.1.43 2016 NRC RO A1-1 Determine the amount of RCS inventory that will be drained from RCS during the performance of GP-008, Conduct of Operations D, P, R Draining the RCS (GP-008) (JPM ADM-070-a)

K/A G2.1.25 2016 NRC RO A1-2 Determine the Minimum and Maximum Allowed Indicated Flow for MCR Ventilation (OP-173)

Equipment Control (JPM ADM-052-c) Common M, R K/A G2.2.44 2016 NRC RO / SRO A2 Using Valve Maps And Survey Maps Determine Stay Times For A Clearance (PD-RP-ALL-0001)

(JPM ADM-057-a) Common Radiation Control M, R K/A G2.3.4 2016 NRC RO / SRO A3 NOT SELECTED FOR RO Emergency Procedures/Plan N/A 2016 NRC RO A4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (4)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (3)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1) 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL 1

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2016 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 05000400/2016301 Administrative Topic (see Note) Type Describe activity to be performed Code*

Perform RCS Average Temperature Data Sheet and Determine Inverse Count Rate Ratio (1/M) (GP-004)

(JPM ADM-072-c)

Conduct of Operations M, R K/A G2.1.43 2016 NRC SRO A1-1 During a loss of shutdown cooling, determine the time that the RCS will reach core boiling and core boil-off conditions (AOP-020, Curve Book) (JPM ADM-005-c)

Conduct of Operations D, P, R K/A G2.1.20 2016 NRC SRO A1-2 Determine the Minimum and Maximum Allowed Indicated Flow for MCR Ventilation (OP-173) (JPM ADM-052-c)

Equipment Control Common M, R K/A G2.2.44 2016 NRC RO / SRO A2 Using Valve Maps And Survey Maps Determine Stay Times For A Clearance (PD-RP-ALL-0001)

(JPM ADM-057-a) Common Radiation Control M, R K/A G2.3.4 2016 NRC RO / SRO A3 Classify an Event (EP-EAL) (JPM ADM-073-a)

Emergency Procedures/Plan N, R K/A G2.4.41 2016 NRC SRO A4 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (5)

(D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (1)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1) (4)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected) (1) 1 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

2016 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Revision Summary ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (bolded) Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. Initiate Emergency Boration following a Reactor Trip (AOP-002) (JPM CR-037-d)

A, D, L, S 1 K/A APE 024 AA1.17

b. Place Excess Letdown in Service (OP-107) (JPM-CR-211-a)

RO Only D, S 2 K/A 004 A4.06

c. Transfer to Hot Leg Recirculation (EOP ES-1.4)

(JPM-CR-066-d) A, D, EN, 3

L, S K/A EPE 011 EA1.11

d. Perform Max Rate Cooldown for a SG Tube Rupture (E-3)

(JPM-CR-283-c)

A, M, L, S 4S K/A 041 A4.08

e. Align the RHR System for ECCS Mode (OP-111)

(JPM-CR-290-a)

L, N, S 4P K/A 005 A4.01

f. Manually Align Containment Spray (EOP E-0)

(JPM CR-106-c)

A, D, EN, S 5 K/A 026 A4.01

g. Restoration of Offsite Power to Emergency Buses (EOP ECA-0.0) (JPM-CR-291-a) A, N, S 6 K/A 055 EA1.07

h. Restoring Control Room Area HVAC to Normal After a CRIS (OP-173) (JPM-CR-171-b) A, D, EN, 8

P, S K/A APE 067 AA1.05

2016 NRC Control Room/In-Plant JPM Revision Summary ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Harris Nuclear Plant Date of Examination: July 11, 2016 Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U (bolded) Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. Shift Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction Locally (OP-137) (JPM-IP-004-c) E, L, M, R 4S K/A 061 A1.04

j. Align UPS Instrument Bus to Bypass Power Supply (OP-156.02) (JPM-IP-254-b)

D, E 6 K/A 062 A1.03

k. Start Up A Rod Drive MG Set (OP-104) (JPM-IP-022-a)

D, L 1 K/A 001 A4.08

• All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (6 / 0 / 3)

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (7 / 0 / 3)

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (2 / 0 / 2)

(EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system) (3 / 0 / 2)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (6 / 0 / 3)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (4 / 0 / 2)

(P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected) (1 / 0 / 1)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (1 / 0 / 1)

(S)imulator The HNP 2016 License class does not have any SRO-I candidates. The count above for SRO-I has been marked 0 since there are no SRO-Is.

SCENARIOS 1 AND 2 RO List (4 total)

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 T M N O I L CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T T N I

S A B S A B I C A T M A R T O R T O L Y U N O C P O C P P M(*)

T E R I U RO - 1 RX R1 1 1 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, I4, C5 C3, C5 5 4 SRO-U MAJ M7 M6 2 2 TS 0 0 RO - 2 RX R1 1 1 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I3, C6 I2, C4 4 4 SRO-U MAJ M7 M6 2 2 TS 0 0 RO - 3 RX R1 1 1 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, I4, C5 C3, C5 5 4 SRO-U MAJ M7 M6 2 2 TS 0 0 RO - 4 RX R1 1 1 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I3, C6 I2, C4 4 4 SRO-U MAJ M7 M6 2 2 TS 0 0 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

1 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

SCENARIOS 1 AND 2 SRO Upgrade List (6 total)

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 T M L N O I I T CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N C S A B S A B I A

A T M R T O R T O L N Y U O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX R1 R1 2 0 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, I3, I4, I2, C4 7 2 C5, C6 SRO-U1 MAJ M7 M6 2 1 TS T3, T5 2 2 RO RX R1 1 0 NOR N1 N1 2 1 SRO-I I/C I2, I3, I4, C3, C5 7 2 C5, C6 SRO-U2 MAJ M7 M6 2 1

TS T3, T5 2 2 RO RX R1 R1 2 0 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, C3 I2, I4, C5 7 2 SRO-U3 C4, C5 MAJ 2 1 M7 M6 TS T2, T3, T5 3 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

2 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

SCENARIOS 1 AND 2 SRO Upgrade List (6 total)

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 T M L N O I I T CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N C S A B S A B I A

A T M R T O R T O L N Y U O C P O C P T P M(*)

E R I U RO RX R1 1 0 NOR N1 N1 2 1 SRO-I I/C I2, C3 I3, C6 6 2 C4, C5 SRO-U4 MAJ M7 M6 2 1 TS T2, T3, T5 3 2 RO RX R1 1 0 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, I3, I4, 5 2 C5, C6 SRO-U5 MAJ M7 1 1 TS T3, T5 2 2 RO RX R1 1 0 NOR N1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I2, C3 4 2 C4, C5 SRO-U6 MAJ M6 1 1 TS T2, T3, T5 3 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

3 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

SCENARIO SPARE ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 A E Scenarios P V P E 3 T M L N O I I T CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N C I A

A T M S A B L U N Y T P R T O M(*)

E O C P R I U RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR N1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C C2 , I3, C4, I5, C6 5 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 TS T4, T5 2 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C I3, C4, C6 3 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR N1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C C2 , I5 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ M7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

4 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 APPLICANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO Competencies 1 1 1 1 (RO) 1 (BOP)

Interpret / Diagnose 2, 4, 5, 7 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 4, 5, 7 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 Events 8, 9, 10 and Conditions Comply With and 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 Use Procedures (1) 9, 10 9, 10 7, 8, 9, 10 Operate Control 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 0 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 Boards (2) 9, 10 9, 10 Communicate 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 1, 3, 6, 7, 8 and Interact 9, 10 9, 10 7, 8, 9, 10 Demonstrate 0 0 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 0 0 Supervisory Ability (3) 7, 8, 9, 10 Comply With and 0 0 3, 4 0 0 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 1 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 APPLICANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO Competencies 2 2 2 2 (RO) 2 (BOP)

Interpret / Diagnose 2, 4, 6, 7 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 2, 4, 6, 7 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 Events 8, 9 and Conditions Comply With and 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 Use Procedures (1) 7, 8, 9 Operate Control 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 0 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 Boards (2)

Communicate 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 1, 2, 4, 6, 7 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and Interact 7, 8, 9 Demonstrate 0 0 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 0 0 Supervisory Ability (3) 7, 8, 9 Comply With and 0 0 2, 3, 4 0 0 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 2 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Shearon Harris Date of Exam: July 11, 2016 Operating Test No.: 05000400/2016301 APPLICANTS RO RO (BOP) SRO-U SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO Competencies 3 3 3 3 (RO) 3 (BOP)

Interpret / Diagnose 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 Events 7, 8, 9 and Conditions Comply With and 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 Use Procedures (1) 7, 8, 9 Operate Control 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 0 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 Boards (2)

Communicate 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 1, 2, 5, 7, 9 and Interact 7, 8, 9 Demonstrate 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 Supervisory Ability (3) 0 0 0 0 7, 8, 9 Comply With and 0 0 0 0 4, 5 Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

SCENARIO # 3 submitted as a SPARE Scenario Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-301, Page 27 of 27 3 06/29/2016 Rev. FINAL

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A RO Licensee noted that the words in the Topic dont match this K/A, but they do 1/1 WE05EG2.2.3 match WE05EG2.2.36. It appears that this long K/A got truncated in the 3/23/16 printout from the sample plan generator. HNP directed to use WE05G2.2.36.

Difficult to write an RO question to: Facility conditions and selection of RO appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations.

1/1 WE11EA2.1 Randomly selected a new K/A from one of the five not-sampled T1G1 topics, 5/3/16 and staying in A2 so as not to unbalance the counts across the categories.

Replaced with APE026AA2.06.

Question submitted on 5/19 was Unsat on K/A match because there wasnt a plant transient. Suggested they look at Sequoyah 2013 Q6 & North Anna RO 2006 Q22, but they were unable to make either of those ideas work because 1/1 022AK3.05 Harris doesnt have the same procedural support as those questions 6/10/16 required. Randomly selected a new K/A from the same APE and K3:

Replaced with 023AK3.02 Unable to write an operationally-valid question to nil ductility transition RO temperature (brittle fracture) of RHR. Randomly selected a new K/A from the 2/1 005K5.01 4/15/16 same system and K5:

Replaced with 005K5.05 This KA was replaced on the 2014 Harris exam because they were unable to write an operationally valid question that was significantly different than RO 007A1.03, which is also on this sample plan. (Note that K5.02 is the only one 2/1 007K5.02 of the six K5s in system 007 that has an RO Importance Rating 2.5, which 11/10/15 is why this situation keeps arising.)

Replaced with 064K3.01 Multi-unit KA and Harris is a single-unit plant.

RO Replaced with 078K4.03 078G2.2.4 This KA couldnt be written to because Harris does not have a Station Air 2/1 11/10/15 Compressor, so the Service Air System isnt affected by loss of cooling water.

&

4/14/16 Randomly chose a new KA from the same system and K4:

New KA 078K4.01 This K/A is Circulating Water System, but asks about Emergency SW pumps.

There is no functional tie between those systems at HNP. We found past RO examples where it was written to, but they seem to have forgotten about the 2/2 075A4.01 Circ Water part of the K/A. No other 075A4 has IR >2.5, so couldnt stay in 3/23/16 A.4. RO T2G2 area A2 was not sampled, so randomly chose from there:

New K/A 075A2.02 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room is not really an RO function. The SRO section samples G 2.1.8, Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room, which is something ROs do.

RO 3 Instead of replacing this KA, decided to swap 2.1.8 & 2.1.9 between the two G2.1.9 11/10/15 sections of the exam. This has the advantage of keeping these two Generic abilities on the exam for the SROs, while making it easier to write an RO question to one of them.

Swapped with G2.1.8 from SRO section.

K/A very difficult to write to (PZR level malfunction, tasks performed outside SRO the control room, during an emergency). Kept the system 028 piece, and 1/2 028AG2.4.34 3/23/16 randomly selected a new generic topic from the 43 items in ES-401 D.1.b.

New K/A 028AG2.1.32 Unable to write an SRO question to High RCS Activity - Knowledge of system set points, interlocks, and automatic actions associated with EOP SRO entry conditions because no EOPs have RCS activity as an entry condition.

1/2 076AG2.4.2 4/15/16 Kept the system 076 piece, stayed in the G2.4 series, and randomly selected from the other 49 topics.

New K/A 076G2.4.47

The generic part of this K/A includes entry conditions for EOPs/AOPs, which SRO is RO-level knowledge. System 007 is the PRT, which isnt very important to 2/1 007G2.4.4 safety, so randomly selected a new system from T2G1 and a new generic 3/23/16 topic from D.1.b.

New K/A 006G2.2.44 K/A cant be written to because Circ Water is not in EOP entry conditions, and doesnt have immediate action steps associated with it. G2.4.1, SRO Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps, does not 2/2 075G2.4.1 lend itself to an SRO question because those two things are both RO-level 3/23/16 knowledge. And given that Circ Water isnt important to safety, randomly generated a completely new T2G2 K/A:

New K/A 071G2.2.42 SRO G2.1.8 See discussion above for G2.1.9.

3 11/10/15 Swapped with G2.1.9 from RO section.

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Instructions (Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1(easy) to 5 ( difficult); (questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable)

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc.).

• T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• Cred. Dist: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

• Partial: One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

• Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• # / Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable)

6. Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any "U" Status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q LOK LOD Source Status (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Dist. Explanation Focus Link units ward K/A Only Generic/global comments:

D/A in the following comments = Distractor Analysis P after a question number denotes a pre-submittal question.

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 007EK3.01 Reactor Trip - Knowledge of the reasons for actions contained in EOP for reactor trip 1 H 3 B S Im troubled by the similarity of the concepts check for natural circ and ensure heat removal is occurring, especially when the D/A for natural circ says, since this is a goal of the procedure.

Part 2 of the Q asks why you use Tcold and not Tavg, but the answer choices are really for why you check temperature at all. But we cant really have, Because RCPs are off, plus a distractor, because that gives away the answer and hurts plausibility of Tavg.

I want to change the natural circ distractor, but dont have any good ideas. Maybe something about c/d rate?

Replaced the natural circ distractor with SG Safety Relief valves do not lift RCWH 6/3 Excellent. mgd 6/8 The LO is EOP-LP-3.1 Obj. 3.e: 1) That LP looks like its for E-1 & ES-1.1, not for ES-0.1, and 2) theres no objective 3.e in it, just 3 with no lettered bullets. mgd 5/24/16 Updated objective with EOP-LP-3.0 #6. This was the closest obj I could match with this question RCWH 6/3 Agree, I cant find a better LO. That one concerns me though because it says, Given the Step Deviation Document and WOG ERG background document But by you submitting it for the test youre telling me you expect ROs to know it, and the KA expects them to know it. mgd 6/7/16 Q is SAT 008AK2.01 PZR Vapor Space Accident - Knowledge of interrelations between this and valves 2 H 2 B S No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 009EK1.02 SBLOCA - Knowledge of operational implications of the use of steam tables as it applies to SBLOCA 3 H 4 N S Good Q that tests a number of relevant ideas. The correct answer analysis and D/A C are written to the case that ERFIS is available; in the stem Id like to remove the piece about ERFIS not being available. No need to make it harder than it already is. mgd 5/23 Removed bullet. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 011EG2.4.46 Large Break LOCA - Ability to verify that alarms are consistent with plant conditions 4 H 2 N S In stem, delete alarms after ALB-004-2-4; redundant with alarm annunciates above it. Reworded. RCWH 5/31 Consider adding LO ST-CSS-6.d, which deals with RWST Low-Low Level. mgd 5/23 Added LO. RCWH 5/31 Requested changes were made. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 022AK3.05 Loss of Rx Coolant M/U - Knowledge of the reasons for the need to avoid plant transients 5 F 2 N S A decent Q, but doesnt hit the K/A because whats the plant transient? The fact that you have to stop moving fuel doesnt affect the plant, just the schedule. Temperature is being controlled by RHR, and while you might argue a level transient, it would be very slow.

Examples of questions written to this K/A: Sequoyah 2013 Q6, N. Anna 2006-302 Q22. mgd 5/23 I understand youre trying to make the Sequoyah 2013 question work. mgd 6/7 Provided new K/A: 022AK3.02. mgd 6/10 Reviewed new Q in-office, K/A not matched. mgd 6/14 Reviewed new Q provided during prep week, appears to be satisfactory.

1CS-1 & 1CS-2 close on low PRZ level at 17%, is that correct? Would you add that to the D/A just to bolster plausibility? mgd 6/24 Revised D/A A(1): 1CS-1 and 1CS-2 automatically isolate the inlet of the Regenerative HX when PRZ level on the associated level transmitter LT-460 or LT-459 reaches 17%... RCWH 6/27 Thanks. mgd 6/27 Q is SAT 025AK2.05 Loss of RHR - Knowledge of the interrelations between Loss of RHR and the reactor building sump 6 F 3 B S Are ROs expected to know the 142 number from memory?

Yes, ROs are expected to know the indications when the CNMT sump performance is degraded. 7 of 7 validators correctly answered this question. RCWH 5/31 Okay. mgd 6/7 Can CNMT WR Sump level be read to one decimal place? Its digital, not a meter? mgd 5/24 The MCB is a meter, but the SPDS module on ERFIS indicates CNMT WR Sump Level to two decimal places.

RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 027AA1.01 PZR Pressure Control System Malfunction - Ability to operate heaters, sprays, and PORVs 7 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT 029EA1.13 ATWS - Ability to operate and monitor: manual trip of main turbine 8 F 2 B S No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT 038EK3.09 SGTR - Knowledge of the reasons for criteria for securing/throttling ECCS 9 F 2 B S D/A D: To bolster plausibility can you change maintained <125F to something like at ambient temperature, or give an average range from the logs? TS limit is 125, but I doubt it ever goes over 100F. mgd 5/24 Revised to read maintained greater than 40°F but less than 125°F RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 054AK1.02 Loss of Main Feedwater: Effects of feedwater introduction on dry S/G 10 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT 055EG2.4.21 Station Blackout: Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess status of safety functions 11 H 3 B S I understand that monitoring status trees for information only has a very specific meaning in the EOPs, but one could argue that youre essentially always monitoring CSFSTs because theyre displayed on one or more computer screens in the MCR, screens that youre either going to see a CSFST change, or are looking at for some other reason. I even saw one plant that got a computer alarm if a CSFST went Orange or Red; HNP isnt like that, is it? HNP does not have an alarm to indicate a CSFST is Red or Orange RCWH 5/31 Okay. mgd 6/7 When I first read the Q I missed the information only and read it as status trees ARE/ARE NOT being monitored. What do you think of changing it to that?

I am opposed to making that change based on your discussion above. The candidates are familiar with the terms and requirements of the EOP network and should understand in this situation the only success path is the current EOP. Revised the first WOOTF statement to read INFORMATION ONLY to add emphasis that the term is specific for the current EOP. RCWH 5/31 Agree with that change. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 056AA1.18 LOOP - Ability to operate and/or monitor control room normal ventilation supply fan 12 H 3 N S You mustve changed the 2nd-part answer choices to something else, because the Answer Analysis and D/As all talk about dampers. I cant review the Q as-is, so resubmit when the answer & distractor analyses match the 2nd-part choices. (I dont care which way you go wrt changing the answers or the analyses.) mgd 5/23 Reviewed revised question, no further comments. mgd 5/25 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 057AA2.20 Loss of IB - Ability to determine and interpret interlocks that must be bypassed to restore normal 13P F 2 B S equipment operation In the stem: Instrument Bus SI has failed. Suggest saying it has deenergized. Minor, but then no one could argue its failed in such a way that the rod stop bistable isnt in the position we want it.

Replaced failed with de-energized in bullet #2. RCWH 4/1 Plausibility of QPTR in both parts of the question is very weak. Granted, 102 is a number thats close to 103, and indeed the alarm is 1.02, but that really isnt 102% of rated thermal power. Furthermore, theres no # out of 3 or 4 coincidence for QPTR. The discussion in D/A D about the High Power Trip being normally 2 of 4, and 2 of 3 in a case like this is good. What do you think about using the High Power Trip as the first-part distractor? Is it 108%? I think its plausible enough that someone could confuse the two setpoints.

Replaced distractors A1/B1 102% with 108%, and updated D/As. RCWH 4/1 Q is SAT 058AK1.01 Loss of DC - Knowledge of operational implications of battery charger equipment & instrumentation 14 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT WE04EK2.2 LOCA Outside Containment - Knowledge of interrelations between LOCA and the facility's heat 15 H 3 B S removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT WE05EG2.2.36 Loss of Secondary Heat Sink - Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as 16 H 3 N S degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions of operations First wondered why A MDAFWP was plausible, then understood when I read the D/A. Its not terribly plausible if you read the words associated with the annunciator (because why would you then think A MD was available?),

but if you just see an AFW alarm and gloss over it, and it comes in all the time normally, I can see it.

Good hit on the K/A. mgd 5/23 Q is SAT APE026AA2.06 Loss of CCW - Ability to determine and interpret the length of time after loss of CCW flow to a 17 F 3 B S component before that component may be damaged. Bank Q, no comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT WE12EA2.2 Uncontrolled depressurization of all S/Gs - Ability to determine and interpret adherence to 18 F 3 B S appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments No comments. mgd 5/24 Q is SAT 005AA1.01 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod - Ability to operate and/or monitor CRDS 19 H 4 N S I like the Q, and think it might be hard for ROs (detailed knowledge of Att. 1), so Im calling it LOD=4. (I think theyll discount B & C, but might jump on the 9% in D.)

However, a tilt of 7.5% is HUGE, right? So if you know anything, then thats going to stand out. Can we knock that down to 1.03 or so? That would align it better with how close the other ones are to their limits.

Reduced the QPTR value from 1.075 to 1.03. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/7 D/As B & C use 1.5-3.0F from Rod Control as plausibility arguments; I dont understand how those can be compared to PR instrument deltas and AFD. I wouldnt mind if you just said theyre close to their respective limits and therefore plausible because you have to know what the limits are. Or there may be channel checks/logs/

surveillances from which you could pull numbers for plausibility. mgd 5/23 Revised D/As B & C to say theyre close to their respective limits and therefore plausible because you have to know what the limits are. RCWH 5/31 Looks good. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 032AG2.2.25 Loss of SRNI - Knowledge of the bases in TS for LCOs and safety limits 20 H 4 N S I wish I wouldve thought of this when I gave you the sample plan, but is this Basis question fair for ROs? Would we be able to defend an appeal? The learning objectives in ST-NIS dont inspire confidence, particularly LO 13, which is marked SRO only.

Assuming you want to keep the Q, Im struggling with the plausibility of rod drop. I see where you got it from the PR negative rate trip, but this is essentially just a level trip, so a rod drop means lower counts/amps so why would I expect a trip? Id like to see that be a single rod ejection accident, which is clearly wrong because its not a stated basis, but I dont know that its different enough from a bank withdrawal to withstand appeal. Help me understand how rod drop is plausible mgd 5/23 Added more information for discussion of the RO/SRO aspect of the question in LXRTest but plausibility of rod drop is that a competent operator needs to know that 10N Flux distribution does not challenge core safety in the source range and so the reactor does not need protection from a rod drop accident and the associated flux perturbations. RCWH 6/3 Alright, Im convinced. mgd 6/7 Q is SAT 033AK1.01 Loss of IRNI - Knowledge of operational implications of voltage changes on performance 21 H 3 B S Listed as a Bank Q, but where did it come from? If theres precedent I can maybe be persuaded. I found a very similar Q on the 2009A HNP exam, Q22.

I didnt think this Q matched the K/A very well (granted though, loss of voltage is a voltage change), but I talked myself into it. Until I read the 2009 Q, which nails it.

I cant convince myself that NI-31 automatically energizing is plausible. I can see NI-32 because while the 2 SRs

& 2 IRs arent train-related (as you state), they probably have the same Channel power supply? And are probably physically above/below one another? Note that the exact same words are used for both D/As; for Choice B you could say what I just said, but I dont see how you word it for Choice B.

All that was to say that if you wanted to go with the 2009 Q Id be good with that. mgd 5/24 Replaced with 2009A HNP exam Q22. RCWH 6/3 Verified Q is technically the same, just asked in the opposite order. Previous 401-9 comments (Q was New then) were incorporated, putting the Q in its present form. No post-exam comments on it. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 061AK3.02 ARM Alarms - Knowledge of the reasons for guidance contained in alarm response for ARM system 22P F 3 B S Choice B: this distractor is somewhat weak. Its certainly a valid reason, but are you REQUIRED to do it? Is there a Conduct of Ops or something that requires you to silence nuisance alarms? If we keep it, then to tighten it up and bring it more in-line with its D/A, can you add in the stem that evacuation has not been ordered by the SSO? Basically to get them cleanly past Step 3 of AOP-005 Att. 4. Revised stem to add statement for decision to remain in MCR. Improved D/A B to discuss the nuisance alarm guidance in AD-OP-ALL-1000. RCWH 4/4 There are some similarities between this question and Common Admin JPM A2. Keeping in mind that the candidates will see the JPM before the question, and that OP-OP-173 refers you to AOP-005, please discuss whether this is acceptable overlap. Overlap is acceptable because this JPM does NOT require candidate to refer to AOP-005 in order to complete the task. Candidate is directed to complete steps 9.a through 9.d. Candidate is provided all the pertinent data to perform the calculations as part of the JPM initial conditions RCWH 4/22 Agree with overlap analysis, and all modifications were made as requested. mgd 4/19 Q is SAT 074EK3.06 lnad. Core Cooling - Knowledge of reasons for confirming PORV cycles open at specified setpoint 23 F 3 N S No comments. mgd 5/23 Q is SAT WE02EG2.4.11 SI Termination - Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures 24 F 4 N S Good Q, nails the K/A. I agree there is only one answer which is a Major Action Category as defined in the front of the procedure, however it troubles me that Step 3RNO will essentially Check if a Small Break LOCA is in progress and Check if a LOCA has occurred outside Containment. The Q is tight though because it asks specifically about Major Action Categories, but those are two other things that it essentially checks for. I dont want to trick anybody. How did it validate? mgd 5/23 6 of 7 validators correctly answered this question. RCWH 6/1 Okay. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S WE03EA2.2 LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization - Ability to determine and interpret adherence to appropriate 25 F 3 N S procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments Overlap: the 1st part of this Q is the same as the 2nd part of Q3, but with the other answer being correct. Double-jeopardy for the candidates, but Im more concerned with them getting to this question, remembering Q3, then going back to look at it and seeing that the only real difference between the Qs is containment P, and that might give away the answer to Q3.

D/As for A & B have this incorrect sentence: Plausible since the SG PORVs will be used for the cooldown because the condenser is not available. The condenser IS available in this Q (but not in Q3). Suggested fix:

Plausible because the SG PORVs are used for c/d when the condenser is not available. mgd 5/24 D/A D 1st sentence is incorrect: Condenser steam dumps are not available because at 3# in Containment a MSLI actuated to shut all MSIVs. That was Q3; condenser is available in this Q. mgd 5/25 Revised D/A. RCWH 6/3 Two of two veteran Chiefs agreed that theres unacceptable overlap with Q3. The question the Qs essentially ask is, How is cooldown different if containment pressure is above or below 3psig? The 1st part of this Q will have to be changed, or the 2nd part of Q3. mgd 6/8 Revised 1st part of Q to determine if the TDAFW pump is used to supplement the RCW cooldown and separated the 2nd part in to a separate statement. RCWH 6/10 Agree with change. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT WE14EA1.2 High Containment P - Ability to operate and/or monitor operating behavior characteristics of facility 26 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/25 Q is SAT WE15EK2.2 Containment Flooding - Knowledge of the interrelations between containment flooding and the 27 H 3 S facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility Plausibility of ES-1.3: When reading the Q I thought it was going to put us at the RWST level that requires transition to ES-1.3, which would be an interesting predicament. The ES-1.3 Caution about timeliness and not implementing FRPs should make ES-1.3 the correct choice then. Q would be harder if you put them exactly at that point, 23.4% and slowly lowering, along with the Orange path, but I dont want to do that because that isnt very likely to happen. But Im struggling with the plausibility of ES-1.3. If you know the setpoint its easy, maybe LOD 1 for the 1st half. I hate to say what Im about to say, because I dont like being tricky, but what if we put the RWST at 24.3%, then maybe a guy juxtaposes 24.3 with 23.4 and chooses ES-1.3. Thoughts? mgd 5/25 Playing off the misapplication of the set point I lowered the RWST value to 24.2% which would have the student transition to ES-1.3 if they were to juxtapose the 23.4 with the 24.3 value. RCWH 5/31 Thats even better. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 003K6.02 RCPs - Knowledge of the effect a loss or malfunction of seals and seal water supply will have on RCPs 28 H 2 B S I like the question (I jumped on Failed until I read Note 2), but for the record Im not keen on the plausibility of C, since given the reference and total #1 seal flow its pretty much a direct lookup; and Blocked sounds like no flow, not 7.4 gpm.

Cueing: we tell them in the stem that temperatures are rising; lets just give the data and let them interpret.

Removed rising. RCWH 5/31 Partial: the Q hinges on the distinction between STEADILY RISING and STABLE, which can be rising, but at a lowering rate (which we have) and well below 230F (which it is), but what concerns me is the 190° in the last sentence of Note 2. With the trend given, the radial bearing temp should stabilize around 185ish, but thats awfully close to 190 and I dont think wed win that argument. So, can we shift the temps down 5° or more? Note 2 says that normal 100% power values for these two points are 140-150°, so shifting the starting points toward that would give us some margin. Reduced starting temps by 10°. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 004K3.06 CVCS - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of CVCS will have on RCS temp & pressure 29 H 2 B S Partial/No Correct Answer: Stem, 4th bullet about CS-120, instead of AND fails to reposition how about BUT fails to reposition? And maybe add, and was not noticed by the operator or Unbeknownst to the operator, when CS-120 was placed in the RHT position it failed to reposition. Just something to make it clear that it wasnt noticed, otherwise why have you proceeded? (There IS indication on the board, right?)

Revised to read in the RHT position BUT fails to reposition and was NOT noticed by the operator. RCWH 5/31 Thats good. mgd 6/8 Answer Analysis, 2nd sentence: RCS Tavg will rise due to an increase in Reactor power isnt really a correct statement and should be removed. The idea of temperature and power rising is already captured in the last sentence. Removed. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 004K5.31 CVCS - Knowledge of the operational implications of the flowpath around the BASTs 30 H 3 N S Since were using the low VCT level as plausibility for the 2nd part distractor, we should probably give a trend (and lowering), and maybe even state that Auto Makeup is not in progress. mgd 5/10 New version puts VCT at 21% and lowering, which addressed the change I asked for. Do we want to say slowly lowering? Can I assume the VCT is just doing its normal thing, or is there something else going on?

Added slowly lowering. RCWH 6/2 Q is SAT 005K5.05 RHR - Knowledge of the operational implications of plant response during solid plant operation 31 H 3 B S Distractor A, A CSIP trips is weak. D/A says plausible because its in the flowpath, but wrong because tripping would cause pressure to lower. Well yeah. Even at-power, charging is the goes-in and letdown is the goes-out, so why would I ever think that tripping a charging pump would cause pressure to rise? The D/A needs to get at why someone would think a tripped CSIP would raise RCS pressure. Im not sure thats possible to write, so we might need a different distractor. mgd 5/3 A 5/9 revision replaced the CSIP trip with raising CCW flow to the RHR HX. Thats better, but the possibility of confusing CCW flow for RHR flow seems pretty low. What if we raised RHR flow? What does that do to RCS P?

In the short term does it raise it? But in the long term it should lower T and thus P, maybe? I dont want to get into time-based effects, but think about it please. If we cant make that work, I could accept CCW flow if we obfuscated it a little by saying that you operate a certain valve or controller. mgd 5/10 I like the change you made to the CCW flow distractor, manipulating CC-146, but I dont think we need to teach them that that raises flow. Delete raising flow to the HX. I bumped up the LOD to 3. mgd 5/25 Removed raising flow to the Hx and reordered the responses from shortest to longest. RCWH 6/2 Looks good. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 006K1.02 ECCS - Knowledge of physical connections and cause-effect relationships between ECCS & ESFAS 32 F 2 B S To bolster the plausibility argument for D, can we add that the APP requires you to stop pumps at that point? If you remembered that, then maybe youd think thats when the swapover should occur also. mgd 5/25 Revised D/A D to add wording about auto swapover. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT P 007A1.03 PRT - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) 33 F 2 S 2014- associated with operating PRT controls, including monitoring quench tank temperature 302 Verified Q is exactly the same. No comments on prior 401-9, and no post-exam comments. mgd 5/25 Q is SAT Q35 B 064K3.01 EDGs - Knowledge of effect a loss or malfunction will have on systems controlled by automatic loader 34 F 3 S No comments. mgd 5/25 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 008A2.05 CCW - Ability to (a) predict the impact of loss of instrument and control air on the position of CCW 35P H 3 N S valves, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences I like this question, and agree youd get a slow dilution so power would gradually trend up and youd have to lower back to or below 100%, but what procedure directs you to do that? The (b) part of the K/A is use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate. Besides the K/A match issue, we have to be able to defend the correct answer.

Unless we can find concrete procedural direction for this situation, we wont be able to use this Q.

Reviewed HNP site and Fleet procedures and determined fleet procedure AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management provides guidance for the expectation to lower power below 100% once it is determined that actual power has exceeded 100%. This reference was added to the list of question references. RCWH 4/1 Agree that AD-OP-0203 is sufficient procedural guidance for lowering power. mgd 4/19 Need to re-work what youre REQUIRED to do. Marked Unsat on Credible Distractors because when is an operator ever REQUIRED to RAISE power, back to 100% in this case? That might be as simple as changing the word required in the fill-in-the-blank sentence.

Reworded the second part of the questions statement to remove the word required and incorporate AD-OP-ALL-0203 for procedural guidance as follows: in accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management the crew will (2) to mitigate the effects of this malfunction. RCWH 4/1 After reading AD-OP-0203 5.2.6, Abnormal Operations, I could make a pretty good argument that raise reactor power to 100% isnt the right thing to do per that procedure, and therefore there are still two non-plausible distractors. I think we to need to get at the procedural direction piece of this a different way. mgd 4/21 Reworded the second part of the question statement to read in accordance with AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management the crew will __(2)__ once control of 1CC-337 is re-established. This bounds the effects of the transient and will allow the candidate to comply with the AD-OP-ALL-0203 5.2.6.i guidance to stabilize plant conditions less than or equal to the pre-transient power level and also address the requirements identified above in step 5.2.6.c and h. See the replacement B2 and D2 distractor. RCWH 4/22 1st part plausibility of fails SHUT is marginal; if I simply asked myself how Id want TCV-144 to fail I could nuke it out. And all were basing the plausibility of SHUT on is the CCW isolations RHR sample cooler heat exchangers; how much has a student learned/studied THAT flowpath? But Im amenable to allowing it IF we beef up the D/A.

From the Student Text it looks like CC-304 & 305 to the Gross Failed Fuel Detector also fail closed, as well as DW-15, Makeup to the Surge Tank, though while not technically a CCW valve, is sort of in the system. Also, sometimes a TCV is a bypass around a HX (like the typical arrangement for cooling RHR flow), so some words in the D/A like that would improve it. Revised D/A A1. RCWH 4/1 Concur with this change. mgd 4/21 Q is SAT 010K1.06 PZR Pressure Control - Knowledge of connections and/or cause-effect relationships with CVCS 36 H 3 B S Stem Focus: Questions are usually like this, While doing something normal, something bad happens. With that mindset from 35 prior questions, one could read this Q as, While establishing a bubble, CS-38 modulates open for some unknown reason. Or, and it wasnt supposed to. I hope you see my point; I just dont want candidates reading too much into it and claiming not enough information. The fix is simple: put in Automatic at the end, or similar. Or to eliminate the redundancy of modulates open in the stem and WOOTF: The plant is drawing a bubble IAW GP-002. WOOTF describes why CS-38 modulates open in Automatic? mgd 5/25 Reworded stem to read The plant is establishing a bubble in the PRZ and the question to read Which ONE of the following describes why 1CS-38, PK-145.1 LTDN Pressure modulates open in Automatic? RCWH 5/31 Thats great, thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 010K1.08 PZR Pressure Control - Knowledge of connections and/or cause-effect relationships with PZR LCS 37 H 3 N S Very nice how you linked level and pressure control systems. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 012A3.04 RPS - Ability to monitor automatic operation of the RPS, including: circuit breaker 38 H 3 B S Is the idea here that you lose C RCP but dont trip because youre less than P-8? The Answer Analysis implies that C RCP is gone, but doesnt come right out and say it.

Updated the answer analysis to read 'C' RCP is normally powered from the 1C 6.9 kV bus which is normally cross tied to the 1A 6.9 kV Bus via Breaker 109. With Breaker 109 open the 'C' RCP will coast down due to losing power. RCWH 5/31 Excellent, thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 013K2.01 ESFAS - Knowledge of bus power supplies to ESFAS/safeguards equipment control 39 F 2 P S 2013- Can we change which answer choice the correct answer is? Its at C now, but I think it fits at B or D.

301 Swapped answer choices from C being correct to B being the correct choice. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q40 Verified Q is exactly the same as before. One comment on the prior 401-9 was addressed. No post-exam comments. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 013K6.01 ESFAS - Knowledge of the effect of loss or malfunction of sensors and detectors 40 H 3 B S No technical comments. One typo in the stem was repaired. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 022K2.01 Containment Cooling - Knowledge of power supplies to containment cooling fans 41 F 2 B S No comments. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 026A4.01 Containment Spray - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor CSS controls in the control room 42 F 2 B S A little concerned a candidate might argue B is correct if you got the right two switches. But since there are 4 combinations of two switches that DONT actuate spray (1&3, 1&4, 2&3, 2&4) and only 2 that ARE successful, I think its defensible. Just noting this, no action required. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 026G2.4.20 Containment Spray: Knowledge of operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions & notes 43 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 039A3.02 Main & Reheat Steam System - Ability to monitor automatic operation, including isolation of MRSS 44 H 3 P S 2014- Would you rearrange the answer choices? Move C & D to A & B, and vice versa.

301 Reordered answer choices such that the correct answer is now B. RCWH 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q45 No comments on the earlier 401-9 (Q was New then), and no post-exam comments. Q is substantially the same as that version. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 039A4.04 Main & Reheat Steam - Ability to operate and/or monitor in the MCR EFW pump turbines 45 H 4 B S Cueing: 3rd bullet, SG parameters have lowered to Just give the current parameters.

Revised to read Current Steam Generator parameters are the following values: RCWH 5/31 The statement, Assume NO operator actions is good, but lets delete Assume. Its a minor point, but we never want them to assume anything, so just state it. Removed Assume from student note. RCWH 5/31 The Answer Analysis talks about FCV-2071B; is that right? Yes, this is the system valve number for 1AF-130, the B S/G TDAFW Pump FCV. Added nomenclature for 1AF-130 and 1AF-143 to the answer analysis. RCWH 5/31 And in the 2nd sentence would you add the valve number its talking about? mgd 5/26 Added 1MS-70 and 1MS-72 to the answer analysis RCWH 5/31 Thanks for those 3 mods. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 059A3.03 MFW - Ability to monitor automatic operation, including feedwater pump suction flow pressure 46 H 3 B S Great Q. I wouldve answered B because I hadnt seen that design before. Q is SAT 061A2.05 AFW - Ability to predict impacts of automatic control malfunction, and use procedures to correct, 47 H 3 N S control, or mitigate the consequences. No comments. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT 062K3.02 AC Electrical Distribution - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction will have on EDG 48 F 3 B S No comments. mgd 5/26 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 063A1.01 DC Distribution - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operating the 49P H 4 N S DC electrical system controls, including battery capacity as it is affected by discharge rate Called Unsat based on Job-Link and Minutia. Maintenance is doing a discharge test, but even if it were Operations, would an RO ever be called on to do the kind of calcs it takes to answer this? And why? Youd run the test till the battery met depletion criteria; what purpose is served in trying to predict when that will be?

We need to give more bounding information. At what point do you stop the test? Reading the Q in a vacuum, we have Maintenance doing a discharge test for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />; if we raise the loading, why cant the test still go for 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />? Is anyone going to know that 292A will deplete the battery in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />? The key to this kind of test is that the discharge will be stopped when cell voltage reaches a pre-defined value, but we havent stated that. Suggest something like: Test will be terminated when any cell voltage reaches x.xxV, which is predicted to occur at 1200.

I question our ability to defend the correct answer: Battery capacity is defined in amp hours of course, so many amps for so many hours. Starting with the premise of the question, 292A for 4h depletes the battery, so there must be 292A*4h=1168 amp hours in the battery.

By 0815 weve consumed 0.25hr*292A=73A*hr, leaving 1168-73=1095.

Then we discharge at 365 amps, so we should have 1095A*hr/365A=3h left on the battery. Then 8:15+3h=11:15.

Thats using a linear discharge rate model, however we know it will discharge faster, but I dont think we can support it discharging specifically 15 minutes (or more) faster.

Revised the stem to include termination criteria of any cell voltage of 2.14 Volts. This value is based on the Surveillance requirements of TS 3.8.2.1which is 2.13 Volts. Revised WOOTF fromthe time the battery will be depleted? to now read the time the battery will reach the termination criteria? RCWH 4/4 If the correct answer were Prior to 11:15 I could support that. Then I think the distractors should become:

B. 11:15 (using a linear discharge rate)

C. After 11:15, but before 12:00 (applicant does the math wrong or something)

D. At 12:00 (the original time, the applicant not thinking that discharge rate matters at all.) This one I dont like so much, but I think its more plausible than the current after 12:00. Revised answer & distractors. RCWH 4/4 I still think the Q isnt very job-relevant, but Im okay with the other aspects of it. mgd 5/3 Q is SAT 063G2.1.20 DC Distribution - Ability to execute procedure steps 50 H 3 B S Would you cite in the TechRefs the Caution at Step 5.1.2.3? A Caution is a little stronger than a P&L. mgd 5/26 Added caution to technical references. 5/31 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 064A1.04 EDG - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) 51 H 3 N S associated with operating EDG system controls, including crankcase temperature and pressure Great hit on this K/A, really makes you think. To keep the Q operationally valid we cant tell them why crankcase pressure is rising or that debris is clogging the LO filter, because just standing at the EDG you wouldnt know those things. So just state that crankcase pressure is rising, and either LO filter dp is rising, or its inlet P is rising with outlet P stable, or similar. Revised question stem as recommended. RCWH 6/3 Good. mgd 6/8 Is stating that the diesel was started IAW OP-155 enough to absolutely mean that non-emergency trips are in service? For a PMT run you want those trips in service, but I dont want it to be contestable. (I may not be understanding your system though; at RNP you put non-emergency trips in service with a key switch, but I dont see that in OP-155.) mgd 5/26 At HNP the Non-emergency trips remain available until defeated by an emergency start signal. RCWH 6/3 Interesting design. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 073A4.02 Process Rad Monitoring - Ability to operate and/or monitor in MCR: rad monitoring system control panel 52 F 3 N S Great hit on this K/A. No comments mgd 5/27 Q is SAT 076K4.01 Service Water - Knowledge of design features and/or interlocks which provide for: conditions initiating 53 H 3 B S automatic closure of closed cooling water auxiliary building header supply and return valves Answer Analysis says and realign the header isolation valves; are those valves SW-39/40 & 274/275? Is that an automatic alignment? I ask because of K/A match, and couldnt find it in AOP-022 or ST-SWS. Would you make the Answer Analysis more specific as to which valves and if automatic? Revised Answer Analysis to include the specific system valves that realign automatically. RCWH 6/1 Much clearer now. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 078K4.01 IA - Design features and/or interlocks which provide for manual/automatic transfers of control 54 H 3 N S I see from ST-ISA that the power supply is 1D344-11: does the 1D mean the breaker is on Aux Bus 1D? Thats the part I think makes this particularly hard, but the power supply is in the ST, so its fair game.

The Importance Ratings should be 2.7/2.9. Good Q. mgd 5/27 Q is SAT 103K4.04 Containment - Design features/interlocks of personnel access hatch and emergency access hatch 55 F 3 N S No comments. mgd 5/27 Q is SAT 001K5.10 Control Rod Drive System - Knowledge of the operational implications of the effect of rod motion on 56 H 2 N S core power distribution and RCS temperatures LOD 2 as we discussed previously. Great hit on the K/A. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 015K6.02 NIs - Knowledge of the effect a loss or malfunction of discriminator/ compensation circuits has on NIs.

57 H 3 B S ST-NIS LO 8.e doesnt fit. Maybe 4 and/or 7? mgd 5/27 Updated to ST NIS LO 4 & 7. RCWH 5/31 Q is SAT 016K3.10 Non-nuclear Instrumentation - Knowledge of the effect a loss or malfunction of NNIS will have on CCS 58 H 3 N S Backward Logic: Were told what happened (flow switch failed low) and then asked the status of a light. In real-life youd get the alarm, look at the light, then deduce what happened (since the light is NOT on, then it wasnt O/L, so it was low flow [if it wasnt loss of power]). But flipping it gets tricky if we want the light to be off, because we know its not O/L, but it could be low flow OR power lost. Is there a fan On/Off indicator that would be green if it was low flow? If so then the 1st-part could become: This alarm, white light off, green light on, did the fan trip on O/L or low flow? Thoughts? mgd 5/27 Revised stem to list the S-2 1A-SA of the control switch indicating lights and revised the 1st part of the WOOTF statement to read S-2 1A-SA indicates the alarm actuated due to a failure of the (1) . RCWH 6/1 Great changes. It adds some analysis to the Q, so I changed LOK to H. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 027K2.01 Containment Iodine Removal - Knowledge of bus power supply to fans 59 F 2 B S A little concerned because the LO doesnt specifically say power supplies, but Identify the controls gets close, plus its in the text. And we have ES-401 D.1.b which says just because its not an LO is not sufficient basis to not test the K/A. Just a note to myself in case it comes up in appeal. mgd 5/27 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 028A1.01 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control System - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in 60 H 3 N S hydrogen concentration (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the HRPS controls Concerned about support for the correct answer and incorrectness of distractors. The 1st part, continuous sample mode, is absolutely correct if the Q asked, IAW E-1, the Hydrogen Monitoring System is initially aligned in what mode? But it doesnt say that (though that mightve been the intent). Surely at some point youre going to want to sample containment, so you might be in Remote Sample Dilution Panel Operation (Section 8.3). Or you might at some point want to obtain manual readings per Section 8.1. D/A C doesnt really support why remote dilution operation is incorrect. Revised 1st part of the question to ask the initial alignment of the Hydrogen monitoring system and revised D/A C to reflect the incorrectness of the distractor. RCWH 6/3 Looks good. mgd 6/8 2nd part, whether youre allowed to purge or not, the Answer Analysis doesnt support why this is correct. In fact, Id argue that an RO wouldnt know this, and possibly even SRO. This seems to come from E-1 23.c RNO:

Consultstaff for additional recovery actions (including use of hydrogen purge). As a test-taker, how do I get from that that purge is absolutely allowed? Thats not even a call the control room staff makes. ST-PAHC says the same thing near the top of p. 12. mgd 5/31 Revised 2nd part of the question to determine if placing Hydrogen purge in service is considered, which can be evaluated by both RO and SRO candidates based on the question stem and system knowledge. RCWH 6/3 Better, but almost to the point of being an implausible distractor (times 2). Youre making hydrogen in containment, so of course youre going to consider purging. The whole time from 0.5% up to 5% someone wouldve been thinking about it. So why would I ever pick, No, Im not going to consider purging.? In both versions of the Q were really asking, Is there a step in E-1 that prompts you to consider purging hydrogen from containment? And Im not sure thats an RO-level question. Lets noodle on this one some more and if we cant come up with anything then well revisit it when youre here. Lowered difficulty to 3 because the 2nd part got tremendously easier, and upgraded the Q to E. mgd 6/8 We reviewed this Q in-office and determined that consider purging was too easy, so we came up with a new 2nd part that asks if you can purge or not. Will review new Q when you have it ready. mgd 6/14 Reviewed revised Q, appears to be satisfactory. To improve the plausibility argument, are there other ventilation systems rated for higher-than-atmospheric pressure? Containment Fan Coolers, Fan Coil Units are examples of Containment ventilation systems that are designed to operate with Containment pressurized. RCWH 6/27 The normal purge thats in service all the time, does it have a pressure limit? Containment Normal Purge maintains a slight vacuum in containment of -3.75 inwc. RCWH 6/27 And you probably have a containment pressure relief system thats good up to a fairly high pressure? Whats that number? HNP only has a containment vacuum relief system which opens at -2.25 inwc to restore containment vacuum to greater than -1.0 inwc. RCWH 6/27 And whats the number for adverse conditions in containment, 3#? 3 psig. RCWH 6/27 Maybe add that to the D/A: a person could think that since P is less than that then H2 purge is okay. mgd 6/24 Revised D/A A(2): (3 psig) and other containment ventilation systems such as containment cooling are allowed to be in service when containment is above atmospheric pressure, the candidate may improperly determine operation of the hydrogen purge system is allowed. Additionally the RCWH 6/27 Good. mgd 6/27 Q is SAT 041G2.1.27 Steam Dump and Turbine Bypass Control - Knowledge of system purpose and/or function 61 F 3 B S B(2) & D(2): where does the POAH piece come from? Appears to have been added for distractor balance, replaced with verbiage directly from the FSAR. RCWH 6/3 Okay. mgd 6/8 The Purposes in the FSAR (p. 10.4.4-1) doesnt have it, nor does ST-SDS, which has the same list. Are ROs required to know whats in the FSAR? In the Answer Analysis can we replace that with, or at least add, ST-SDS?

Added ST-SDS to technical references. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Plausibility of 1st part distractor isnt great, but acceptable. Can we massage it and the D/A to get more at the idea of NOT ALL MSIVs closing? It currently reads, preventing overpressurization of the SGs after an MSIV goes shut, which I thought was interesting (an MSIV, or one), but the D/A kind of talks about all being shut.

Something like this might make them think about it a bit more: preventing overpressurization of the SG(s) if one or more MSIVs closes while at power. Or similar idea. mgd 5/31 Revised the distractor C(1) and D(1). RCWH 6/3 Good. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S 071K4.05 Waste Gas - Knowledge of design features and/or interlocks which provide for: point of release 62 F 2 B S Since 3WG-229 is normally locked closed unless youre doing a release, what do you think about adding if open to the end of correct answer B? I dont want someone to talk themselves out of it because we dont tell them a release is in progress, so they know its closed already. (I also dont want to add that a release is in progress, because that would tend to point to the correct answer.) Revised the correct answer. RCWH 6/3 Change looks good. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 072K1.04 Area Radiation Monitoring - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships 63 H 3 B S between the ARM system and control room ventilation Instead of the correct answer being maintain the respective OAI isolated, what do you think about making the words more closely match the Tech Spec language, and also refer just to the North Emergency OAI: within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> isolate the B Train North MCR Emergency OAI. Or words to that effect. As it is, maintain isolated is probably not technically correct because you havent taken the OWP actions to isolate it yet.

Revised A(2) and C(2). RCWH 6/3 Looks good. mgd 6/8 Answer Analysis says that a CRIS has occurred, but no basis. I see in ST-RMS that a lot of rad monitors provide their trip function on loss of power, but couldnt find that specifically for the OAI monitors (Emergency or Normal).

Also not stated in AOP-005-BD. We should have a rock-solid basis for stating that.

Added OP-118 P&L #12 verbiage for rad monitor response to loss of power. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Also would like to add Action 29 for the 2nd part. Added TS Table 3.3-6 action 29 to answer analysis. RCWH 6/3 B(2) has place MCR, while D(2) has maintain MCR Suggest place for both. And for those 2 D/As, would you mind adding that the guidance comes from the 2nd part or sentence of Action 29?

Revised B(2) & D(2) and added T.S. Table 3.3-6 action 29 to D/A. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 075A2.02 Circulating Water System - Ability to predict the impacts of loss of circulating water pumps, and use 64 H 3 B S procedures to correct, control, or mitigate I dont think Ive seen a procedure Q written quite like this one, WOOTF directions is the MINIMUM required IAW AOP-012. It almost implies that you could stop once you did this minimum action. Did it validate okay?

7 of 7 validators correctly answered this question during validations RCWH 6/1 What if we asked what the FIRST action taken is, or similar? And I think we should start with, Given the above conditions, WOOTF, otherwise someone could argue that they read the WOOTF as a stand-alone Q (which it kind of is) and picked turbine trip because thats the first thing youd do in some scenarios.

Revised question WOOTF statement. RCWH 6/1 I like that better. mgd 6/8 Q is SAT 086A3.01 Fire Protection - Ability to monitor automatic operation, including starting mechanisms of fire pumps 65 F 2 B S I see where OP-149 setpoints support the correct answer, but ST-FP Rev. 10 has very different numbers. (See pages 5 & 6.) Id already been thinking that the OP might not be the best basis, but couldnt find the OST that tests the auto-starts. There surely is one, or an I&C calibration procedure that has definitive numbers.

Updated technical reference to FPT-3001 for the MDFP and FPT-3010 for the DDFP and updated D/A to reflect the new references. RCWH 6/1 Looks great. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT G2.1.14 Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide announcements 66 F 2 N S In the fill-in-the-blank statement I see how load comes from AD-OP-1000, but technically its voltage and not load. What do you think about changing that? And we can probably delete the words after the 2nd blank.

Revised WOOTF statement. RCWH 6/1 D/A A last phrase (however, this is not correct since) may be talking about a prior version, because it refers to the entire switchgear room, but the distractor is just the switchgear. mgd 5/31 Updated D/A A to reflect the current version of this question. RCWH 6/1 .Thanks. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT G2.1.18 Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise logs, records, status boards, and reports 67 F 2 B S Plausibility of the delta symbol: I cant tell exactly from the D/A, but a late entry in ESOMS gets flagged with a ?

Is it like Distractor A or Distractor C, or something else? The D/A says it indicates the difference in the current time and actual time the log entry shouldve been entered, so is it something like so-many-minutes?

ESOMS requires a Late Entry to be annotated by clicking a check box to flag that the entry has a difference in the logged time verses the actual time the event occurred. The is the symbol that is used to identify for the log reviewer that log entry difference. RCWH 6/1 Understood. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT G2.1.8 Ability to coordinate personnel activities outside the control room No comments. mgd 6/1 Q is SAT 68 F 3 B S

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S G2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements 69 F 3 N S To help hit the post-maintenance operability requirements piece of the K/A would you change the stem to manually backseated using its handwheel to allow packing replacement? (Assuming thats allowed at HNP.) I think that was the intent, but the Q doesnt say that were specifically doing anything to the valve. mgd 6/1 Revised question stem. RCWH 6/1 Good changes. mgd 6/9 Answer Analysis doesnt address the energized/deenergized piece, but rather talks about Operability, so Im guessing that was an earlier version of the Q. I actually like that better because it absolutely nails the K/A, whereas the question, Can you manually operate an MOV with it energized is kind of a tack-on. Im okay with it either way, but if you stay with energized or not then massage the Answer Analysis and D/As, and add Step 8 to the Technical Reference. mgd 6/1 Updated Answer Analysis, D/A and technical reference. RCWH 6/1 Okay, were staying with energized or not; we need some wording changes I didnt mention before:

FITB, after blank (1): replace prior to with for or similar. Otherwise A(1) & B(1) read, The MOV remains energized prior to backseating, which is a true statement, depending on how long prior.

A(1) &B(1): add can to the front. Since the correct answer is must be de-energized, then the distractors should have a permission-type flavor also Can you leave it energized, or must you de-energize it? mgd 6/9 Revised FIB to read The MOV (1) . for and revised A(1) &B(1) to read can remain energized RCWH 6/10 Good changes. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT G2.2.35 Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation 70 H 3 M S Concur that 2014 Exam Q68 is Modified. No comments. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT G2.2.41 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings 71 H 4 N S Great 1st-part distractor! mgd 6/1 Q is SAT G2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency 72 H 3 B S conditions or activities LO is from an E-3 (SGTR) LP and doesnt apply. Updated LO to ST MIDS LO 4.a. RCWH 6/3 D/A C is a copy-and-paste of D/A A . Otherwise the Q is good. mgd 6/1 Updated. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT G2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey 73 F 3 P S instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

2014-301 Verified its the same Q, and same answer. No comments on the prior 401-9, where the Q was Bank. No post-Q70 exam comments. mgd 6/1 Q is SAT G2.4.17 Knowledge of EOP terms and definitions No comments. mgd 6/1 Q is SAT 74 H 3 B S

LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A B/M/N U/E/S G2.4.50 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in alarm response manual 75 F 2 N S Partial: I dont see how entering AOP-010 can be wrong: ENTRY CONDITIONS - Any Main Feedwater malfunction causing a flow transient. You would do IA step 1, RNO to step 5, then go to Continuous Action step 7, where the 3rd bullet would let you take Manual control. If not there, then step 8 RNO.

Credible Distractors: C & D are very similar. Its not stated in D, but wont the bands and limits come from the CRS? So essentially in both choices youre waiting for CRS permission. mgd 6/1 Revised question stem, distractors. Reordered distractors and updated D/A for new distractors. RCWH 6/3 I think this revision is going to work. Youve fixed the credible distractor concerns by eliminating the bands &

limits distractor. I like the AOP-038 angle, and youve provided a lot of basis for plausibility.

Youve stayed with AOP-010, but added isolate blowdown. Thats very good for making that the wrong choice, but its not discussed in the D/A. Is the only place AOP-010 isolates SGBD at Step 3 RNO, but you dont get there unless a MFP trips?

You changed the IC to 91% power and added some words to the D/A about AOP-010 requiring Rx trip on a loss of MFW flow to the SG A. What does the next sentence mean when it says this answer is incorrect because manually tripping the Reactor is the AOP IA when above 90%.?

Updated D/A C to clarify the required actions and the reason why the response is incorrect based on adjusting the IC of 88% reactor power. RCWH 6/10 Was the intent for the IC to put us <90%?

Revised question stem to have Rx power at 88%. You are correct about the intent to put the candidate at a point (above 80% but less than 90%) where the action would be correct had a MFP trip occurred. RCWH 6/10 The bullet in the stem about FCV-478 throttling shut may be ambiguous, particularly regarding its speed. How about something like, is slowly drifting SHUT in Automatic, and maybe even giving a level trend: A SG level has lowered x% in the last y minutes. Something slow enough that you had, say 5-10 minutes before reaching the low-level trip setpoint, so its clear they have time enough to react. Upgraded to E. mgd 6/9 Revised question stem bullet 3 to read has lowered to 51% over the last 5 minutes and revised bullet 5 to read is slowly throttling SHUT. RCWH 6/10 Good changes. mgd 6/13 At the in-office review we determined that distractors C & D were implausible, and B was weak, kicking this Q back to its original status of U. Found four past Qs to this K/A and forwarded to HNP. mgd 6/14 Reviewed a new Q provided during prep week, appears to be satisfactory. Please add marked-up page(s) from OP-116 that clearly show that the cleanup/purification pumps are used for inventory makeup. Added Title, TOC and purpose statement for OP-116 and OP-116.01 to list of reference pages. RCWH 6/27 Then in the Answer Analysis last sentence incorporate OP-116 somehow. Added explanation of how OP-116 has been split into multiple sections and the current purpose statement for each section OP-116, OP-116.01 and OP-116.02 to A/A page. RCWH 6/27 First bullet of stem: fuel shuffle is in progress Revised to read shuffle is in progress RCWH 6/27 2nd bullet: add a comma after HI/LO LEVEL. mgd 6/24 Revised question stem bullet 2 to read HI/LO Level, has RCWH 6/27 Thanks. mgd 6/27 OP-116.01 Section 8.3 seems to let you add water through the Purification System whether a pump is running or not (see Step 3 and the Note before it). But its an easy fix, just change the FITB to: SFP ____ Pumps are System is used Thoughts? mgd 6/27 Requested changes were made. mgd 6/28 Q is SAT SRO Section Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 011EG2.1.25 LBLOCA - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

76 H 3 N S Looks like a good Q. At 0706 do you want to maybe say that PRZ level is lowering rapidly?

Revised 0706 bullet to read PRZ level lowers rapidly. RCWH 6/1 Perfect. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT 025G2.2.25 Loss of RHR - Knowledge of the bases in TS for LCOs and safety limits 77 F 3 B S No technical comments. Im not familiar with your load blocks: does Sequencer reaches Load Block 9 mean everything worked like it should? Could someone read that as reaches but does not complete LB9?

It shouldnt be a problem. Technically speaking the statement reaches LB-9 means everything got a start signal from the sequencer and the component in LB-8 (the last component to be started) energized as required and LB-9 automatically removes any sequencer block signals allowing the manual start of equipment. RCWH 6/1 Okay. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S N S 026AA2.0.2 Loss of CCW - Ability to determine and interpret the location of a leak in the CCWS 78P H 4 Do we need to tell them its a CCW leak? Dont the indications all point to that?

A T ave change of 1.6° is a lot. Whats the envisioned time period? How long is the RHR pump run (maybe 15 minutes)? Is the pump still running at this time (subsequently)? What time in core life is it? An applicant could argue its very late in life, boron is very low, and you could pump CCW into the RCS for hours and wouldnt see 1.6°. Would like to see something in the stem about time in core life and/or boron concentration. Otherwise, possibly theres a CCW leak and something else is causing the T ave change.

And can we just state what the subsequent Tave is without using the word rising? Its somewhat leading.

Also, has power gone up?

Stem says DW-15 has been opened. Better to say it is open IAW AOP-015, so it cant be argued that its now closed. And we should give a surge tank level and trend, because an applicant could infer all kinds of things if level were, say, 5% & lowering. Revised stem to read is open IAW AOP-014, added boron concentration, reduced the second T avg value to 586.1°F vice 587.1°F for a 0.6°F change in temperature, BOL conditions and 15% CCW Surge tank level and trend. RCWH 4/4 2nd part of correct answer: is that from step 3.2.16.b.(1)? Isnt CS-318 normally open, so its already open in this scenario? A better thing that you actually do to mitigate the event is later in 16.b where you bypass and isolate the seal-water side of the SWHX, thus leaving seal water return to the VCT, but without CCW cooling. Youd want to drop or modify the words prior to isolating CCW in the WOOTF.

In the WOOTF, the words to mitigate the event, while I understand the intent (to make this an SRO Q),

hurt the plausibility of A(2) & B(2). Checking for rising sump level isnt mitigating anything, and looking for CCW water in RHR isnt either (until you feed or bleed or something, then youre mitigating).

Revised WOOTF to read ... procedure direction(s) required to for this event? Revised correct answer D(2) to read Locally bypass and isolate the Seal Water side of the Seal Water Return HX. RCWH 4/4 Not keen on distractor C(2): nowhere in AOP-014 do you open CS-321. In fact, the CVCS ST at p. 38 states: There is also a provision to route the flow to the CSIP suction header. This method is not preferred as it can lead to gases that come out of solution, primarily at the mini-flow orifices, being passed to the CSIP pump and degrade the operation of the pumps. What if it were something like, Isolate the CCW side of the seal water HX? That would accomplish the same goal of stopping the CCW leak and stopping the inadvertent dilution, it just wouldnt be right. Plausibility is that applicant might think, CCW leak? Isolate CCW. Revised distractor to read Locally isolate CCW side of Seal Water Return HX. RCWH 4/4 All modifications made as requested. mgd 5/3 Q is SAT 056AA2.76 LOOP - Ability to determine and interpret reactor makeup water pump (running) 79 H 3 N S Per our discussion before, Q does a good job hitting this awkward K/A. mgd 6/1 Q is SAT 065AG2.4.8 Loss of IA - Knowledge of how AOPs are used in conjunction with EOPs 80P H 3 N S Instead of EOP-ES-0.1 in the answer choices I was expecting to see EOP-E-0. Would it be more correct to use E-0? Because the wording of AOP-017 RNO1.a is to perform E-0 while continuing. This is still detailed procedure knowledge from a non-immediate action step, so it keeps the Q at SRO level.

Revised question procedure selections from EOP-ES-0.1 to EOP-E-0. RCWH 4/4 Can we use graphs of IA pressure & SG level? Its not realistic that the crew is only looking at pressure every 10m. Revised stem to reduce the pressure and level over a 5 minute period (1 minute intervals) vice 30 minutes to match the profile of a tubing weld initially degrading then finally rupturing to account for the rapid loss of IA pressure at the end of the 5m period. Adjusted SG level values to reflect the FRV drifting close and finally going shut. Revised the answers to reflect new times of 1018 and 1019. RCWH 4/4 Agree with change, good way of handling it. mgd 5/3 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S WE04EA2.1 LOCA outside containment - Ability to determine and interpret facility conditions and selection 81 H 3 B S of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations No 401-9 comments from 2014, and no post-exam comments. Answer choices A & B were swapped, which improves the way the Q looks on paper, but it left B as the correct answer, same as before. Id like to change that. mgd 6/1 Revised answer choices to alphabetical order. RCWH 6/1 Thanks. mgd 6/13 Notified by HNP on 6/29 that this Q had been used verbatim on the applicants audit exam. This is not allowed per Form ES-401-6 Block 5, so this Q was Unsatisfactory to submit for this exam. mgd 7/5 New Q was pulled from the McGuire exam bank. After NRC review an addition was made to the initial conditions to tighten up the correct answer. mgd 7/8 Q is SAT 028AG2.1.32 Pressurizer level control malfunction - Ability to explain & apply system limits & precautions 82 H 3 N S What do you think about adding to the 0900 bullet: placing Rod Control in Auto IAW procedural direction in GP-005, or just, IAW GP-005? That would firmly put the conditions in Mode 1 and no one could argue that youre putting rods in Auto for testing or something else.

Added in accordance with GP-005. RCWH 6/6 Thanks. mgd 6/1 In A(1) & B(1) is it better to say operable than available? Would tie more closely to the Table heading.

Revised A(1) and B(1) to read OPERABLE. RCWH 6/6 Good. mgd 6/13 Answer Analysis last sentence, would you add, Per the FSAR, the High PRZ water level trip?

Added Per the FSAR RCWH 6/6 Thanks. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT 068AA2.06 Control room evacuation - Ability to determine and interpret RCS pressure 83 H 4 B S No technical comments. D/A B: might add that RCPs are tripped by AOP-004 (step 3.11), so sprays wouldnt work even if you tried. mgd 6/2 Updated D/A B. RCWH 6/6 Thanks. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT 076AG2.4.47 High reactor coolant activity - Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and 84 H 3 N S timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material With this data I feel like I should interpolate and get 0920 for the actual time when activity = 1.0, and maybe I shouldve conservatively entered the spec at 0915. I admit that isnt an option, and the MOST CORRECT answer is 0930, but would you decrease all the activity numbers by 0.1? That would make the data be: 0.5, 0.8, 1.1, 1.3, & 1.6, thus putting any interpolation closer to the 0930 answer or the 1000 distractor. mgd 6/2 Revised data table. RCWH 6/3 That looks good. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT WE10EA2.1 Natural Circ with Steam Void in Vessel with/without RVLIS - Ability to determine and interpret 85 H 3 B S facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures during abnormal and emergency operations D/A A: why would I think RVLIS isnt available, when Im given Train A? The D/A doesnt do a good job of explaining that. Is there an analogy you can think of (I havent been able to) that would be similar to this, but you proceed as if you dont have that function?

Added DA A information: With ONLY one Train of RVLIS available a student could misapply how RVLIS readings are displayed and think that with one train inoperable the other train would AVERAGE both readings and be providing a false indication therefore the correct choice would be to transition to EOP-ES-0.4, NC w/o RVLIS. AWL 6/8 Not convinced, sorry. mgd 6/13 Answer Analysis, 2nd line, would you add this: with RVLIS available, the Foldout criteria for Added requested information. AWL 6/8 D/A D, would you add some specifics about subcooling? I calculated about 28°, so the Foldout criteria of 10°F - C isnt met. mgd 6/2 Added requested information. AWL 6/8 Q was modified during prep week to get away from the decision of whether ERFIS was available or not.

Revised question is satisfactory. mgd 6/26 Q is SAT 006G2.2.44 ECCS - Ability to interpret control room indications to verify status and operation of a system, &

86 H 2 N S understand how operator actions and directives affect plant & system conditions Ill let you walk me through this one when youre here. For now Ill say that the K/A is met, LOK is H (maybe H2 or even H3), its SRO, the LO is perfect. mgd 6/2 Using reference material that includes photos of the MCB indications and a copy of EOP-E-1 Attachment 2, an SRO should be able to determine that neither Train of RHR is available for Cold Leg Recirc. AWL 6/8 In-office, determined wed remove E-1 Att. 2 from the student references. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 005A2.02 RHR - Ability to (a) predict the impacts of Pressure transient protection during cold shutdown on 87P H 3 N S the RHRS, & (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences In D(2), why 3 square inches, when the TS number is 2.9? Might confuse people.

Revised D(2) to 2.9 vice 3 square inches. RCWH 4/4 Dont understand the assume setpoint tolerances are 5% piece. OST-1021 is only for Modes 1 & 2, so doesnt even apply here. Im not sure you can apply it like this (between indicators measuring the same parameter, yes, but not for lift setpoints).

Recommend revising question stem to remove the 5% tolerance assumption, raise the value at which the PORV lifted from 435 to 480 psig and add PLP-106 Attachment 10 to the provided references. While having PLP-106 simplifies the determination of the tolerance the candidate will have to evaluate T.S.

3.4.9.4, perform 2 math calculations to evaluate the maximum tolerance from PLP-106 Attachment 10 and correctly determine that both PORVs are out of tolerance. RCWH 4/4 I like what youve done with the question and think its pretty good now. One thing that bothers me is the interplay of Operable with What TS action, if any, is required? in Choices A & B. If somethings Operable, then therell be NO TS action required. And since the plausibility of C(2) is already playing off one PORV inop, what if we made the choices for the 1st parts be: ONE inoperable or TWO inoperable?

Would that work, and do you think it improves the question, or not? mgd 5/3 A revision was submitted on 5/9 that addresses the concerns above. mgd 5/10 Q is SAT 008G2.2.44 CCW - Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a 88 H 2 N S system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions Are C&D(1) saying theres a leak on the big CCW piping, or a leak on the transmitters sensing line(s)?

(The Figure in ST-CCW doesnt show where the FTs are.) If the former, then it would almost have to be a pipe-fell-off scenario to make flow indicate zero. But if the latter, then how do you differentiate it from a shaft shear? And I just realized it cant be just a transmitter problem because the B pump started on low pressure, not flow. And the fact that pressure is back where it was with the standby pump running seems to rule out a leak. Maybe you can explain it to me, but I dont see anyone thinking leak here.

D/A for plausibility of leak is that a leak could cause system pressure to decrease to point of auto starting of standby CCW pump (52 psig). The question is about distinguishing between a leak and a shaft shear by diagnosing the indications of before and after using multiple indicators. AWL 6/8 Got it, thanks. mgd 6/13 2nd part distractor assumes you miss the 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, but the D/A doesnt explain why you would do that, only that you do. Makes these two distractors very weak; Id be inclined to accept it, but not with the 1st part distractor how it is. I understand that TS times like this can be confusing for new SROs, but this is almost direct lookup. What would you think about asking for Cold Shutdown? Then youd have to do 72 + 6 + 30, and its at least a little more likely that youd skip the 6. (Your TS wording is pretty clear, but Ive seen people struggle with that concept, i.e., is it 30 total to CSD, or 30 + 6? Especially in a 3.0.3 situation, though again, your TS wording is pretty clear there too.)

To strengthen the TS evaluation I changed the stem per your recommendation and it now asks when the plant would be placed in Cold Shut Down. Revised answers and D/A to reflect time to CSD vs. time to HSB. AWL 6/8 Looks great. mgd 6/13 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 010A2.01 Pressurizer pressure control system - Ability to predict impacts of heater failures, and based on 89 H 3 N S those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences I like this Q, but a few suggested tweaks:

Stem, 1st bullet, do you want to add IAW GP-005? Doesnt really add value, but thats been the practice.

Reworded 1st bullet to read The unit is at 20% power with a startup is in progress in accordance with GP-005, Power Operation (Mode 2 to Mode 1). RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 4th bullet: would you know from the MCR that its de-energized due to overcurrent? Consider making that a report from the field. That information is probably needed because of the wording of the Corrective Actions in the APP. Speaking of which, the B breaker must be different from the others, so let me ask this:

we say the A bkr trips on overcurrent, but in the APP I only see the words overload or short circuit. I realize thats pretty much the same thing, but I noticed that the B breaker in 3.c gets its own action if it trips on overcurrent. So to make it as clean as possible, might want to change overcurrent on the A breaker to overload, OR switch to the B breaker, which I dont think changes the Q.

Modified 4th bullet and WOOTF statement for the B breaker. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd, 6/9 Last bullet: why is PRZ level rising? Is level even relevant to the Q?

Not relevant, removed bullet. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 TS and Bases are terrible for this event. Neither tells you that ONLY A and B groups are TS-related; you have to go to the OWP or Student Text. Can you put that in the Answer Analysis? Because just reading that I think I still have 3 groups so the spec is met. 6/14: info added during in-office visit. mgd Q is SAT 026G2.4. Containment Spray - Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of 90 H 2 B S coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies Discussed plausibility of Distractors B(2) & D(2) during Atlanta in-office visit. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT 001G2.1.25 Control Rod Drive - Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

91 H 4 N S Good Q, makes you work a bit. And great K/A hit.

Does the load reduction start at 0600? I dont know why, but I assumed it started at 100% and this was a window in time. Might consider clarifying. Added clarifying information that the indications are observed during the load reduction RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 An argument to modify B(2) & D(2) power levels: Check my math, but using 1.86 steps/% I get 67.20% for CB D at 125 steps, and 51.08% for CB D at 95 steps. If we rounded those to 67 & 51% I think it would make the distractors more plausible in that 1) someone would see those oddball numbers, calculate the power(s) required by Action b, see that the numbers are the same, and maybe choose the distractor, even though it would still be wrong because the time is 4h and not 2; and 2) they cant calculate the numbers and (using D(2) because its the worst), say, TS only requires me to go to 51%, so <45% must be wrong.

Revised Distractor B(2) and D(2). RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 D/A C: would like to capture that, yes, CB C is below the curve at this time, but CB D was out of spec earlier, so thats why its wrong. mgd 6/3 Revised D/A C. RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 034A4.02 Fuel Handling Equip. - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in control room: neutron level 92P H 3 N S Plausibility of 1st-part distractor answer is based on thinking that BOTH SRNIs are inoperable; not sure why someone would think that. However, I can see someone easily missing the asterisk and entering 3.9.2.a, suspend core alterations. Basically keep the same distractor, but strike the words about boron concentration. Thoughts? The thought process is that the bases requires action b to be entered if audible is lost. The stem identifies that N-31 is selected for audible indication, but we could enhance the plausibility by making N-32 the detector selected for audible indication or remove the boron concentration as you suggest. RCWH 4/4 I see you struck the words about boron concentration from C(1) & D(1). If youre okay with that then I am. mgd 5/3 Distractor C(2): if I suspend refueling operations in the first part (with or without the boron piece), then I cant really say that the reason is to ensure the reactor remains subcritical during Core Alterations.

Agree suspending refueling operations alone only ensures the reactivity of the core is not changing and does not ensure the reactor remains subcritical, however the bases of the refueling boron concentration per T.S. 3.9.1 is to ensure the reactor is subcritical during core Alterations which would make the distractor plausible with regard to the action to determine the boron concentration. RCWH 4/4 Distractor D.(2) I thought was weak from the start, but if we remove the boron piece from the 1st part then it becomes meaningless. Working off the misconception that the only SRNI I think I have now is N31, perhaps C(2) & D(2) become something like, loss of neutron flux monitoring capability in the half of the core not covered by NI-31, and lack of a redundant instrument could let a slow failure of NI-31 go undetected, getting at the idea of defense-in-depth. Im certainly open to other suggestions.

Revised distractors as follows:

C(2) Minimizes reactivity changes during a reduced neutron flux monitoring capability event. and D(2) Minimizes reactivity changes due to the delayed neutron flux monitoring response time from N-31.

RCWH 4/4 I like what youve done here. mgd 5/3 In the SRO Justification, how is it that the candidate must know procedural requirements associated with refueling activities, such as approvals required to amend core loading sheets etc?

Reworded SRO Justification to address 10 CFR Part 55 Content - 43(b)(2): Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases. Looks good. All modifications made as requested. mgd 5/3 Q is SAT 071G2.2.42 Waste Gas Disposal - Ability to recognize system parameters that are TS entry conditions 93 F 3 M S In the correct answer the words due to an explosion concern me because theyre not in the TS basis. I 2013 know thats probably what they meant, but it might be best if we left that out, in case someone misses it and Q61 appeals as no correct answer. Revised 2nd part of B(2) & D(2). RCWH 6/3 Thanks. mgd 6/9 The 2nd part distractor is great too, with a good write-up about the EALs. It states that the WPB contains Safe Shutdown Equipment: would you give me one example, just so I can validate that?

The safe shutdown analysis doesnt have a specific component. It only lists that the WPB contains safety related cables and trays. RCWH 6/6 Reviewed SSD analysis during in-office visit. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT G2.1.3 Knowledge of shift or short-term relief turnover practices 94P F 2 N S Credible Distractors: I dont think CRS AND SM is very plausible.

X* in Partial because CRS only is more MINIMUM than BOTH, so someone could argue that is a correct answer; in fact, the most correct. mgd 5/3 A 5/9 revision addresses the concerns about Distractors and Partial, but its still very easy, especially for an SRO Q. mgd 5/10 Q is SAT

Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.1.9 Ability to direct personnel activities inside the control room 95 F 3 B S I think the question tests the least-important half of the basis. As the Answer Analysis says (quoting the WOG), the basis is to minimize atmospheric releases from the ruptured S/G, so thats why youre raising the setpoint, to make it less likely that the PORV lifts. If we werent worried about a code safety not reseating after operating wed raise the s/p to or above 1170#. And if we truly wanted to prevent lifting of the code safety valves we wouldnt raise the setpoint at all; in fact we might even lower it. What do you think about changing the answer to that? mgd 6/6 No changes made. The original K/A this question was developed for was G2.3.14. I cant recall exactly why we didnt examine the first part of the basis. This is a bank question for this class which should be fair game. We can discuss further. RCWH 6/6 Lets. I still think its minutia. mgd 6/13 Discussed during Atlanta in-office visit. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT G2.2.1 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, including operating those controls 96 F 2 N S associated with plant equipment that could affect reactivity Support for the correct answer: would you add Step 5.1.1.2.f to the Technical Reference section (and only if you want, to the Answer Analysis section)? That seems to be where the requirement to have an RM comes from. (And I dont see how Section 4.4.4 supports the answer.) mgd 6/6 Updated A/A & Technical reference. RCWH 6/6 Reviewed during in-office visit. mgd 6/14 Q is SAT G2.2.15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control 97 H 3 N S documentation, such as drawings, line-ups, tag-outs, etc.

Just looking at the drawing and not thinking of TS implications or anything else, could I not get double-valve isolation on the discharge side by tagging closed 217&218 (or 219&220)? I realize youd have to have just A CSIP supplying seal injection and B supplying the charging header, but would that be acceptable? I dont want someone to think of that and choose the wrong answer.

If you want to use A or B pump that would simplify the clearance a little (1 switch & bkr vice 2 of each).

Would also take away the ability to get double-valve isolation (at-power anyway).

OWP-CS-03 has a Precaution about opening the casing drains, monitoring VCT level, and THEN closing the miniflow isolation valve. The clearance isnt sequenced that way.

I will have the OPS SRO review the clearance sequence again and possibly change the pump being tagged. Ive had 6 SROs review this question so far and they have not commented on the sequencing.

With that being said we do have 2 upgrades from the WCC group and they may read more into the sequence than the on-shift personnel have. RCWH 6/6 Okay. mgd 6/13 Normally every valve inside the boundary that isnt tagged would be NOT tagged on the clearance; Step 5 of 0200 Att. 19 is HNP-specific guidance on that, and I think thats what its saying. Ask your Ops guy(s) if someone very familiar with the clearance process would be looking for those. If so, I really dont want you to add them, but maybe have a note that they dont need to check for this. (The question actually asks if the required isolation boundary is satisfied, which is great, but I dont want someone to get hung up on that, or we have to answer a bunch of questions on exam day.

Added the following NOTE: For the purpose of the clearance valves inside the isolation boundary are NOT listed. To the student reference special instructions page. RCWH 6/6 Good, thanks. mgd 6/13 During Atlanta in-office visit we discussed NRC concerns with giving whats essentially an Admin JPM as a written-exam question. Licensee desired to keep the Q, but is evaluating using the A or B pump to simplify the clearance somewhat. mgd 6/14 Revised clearance to place the B CSIP under clearance vice the C CSIP to reduce the number of tagging points that must be evaluated by the candidate. RCWH 6/27 Looks okay. mgd 6/27 Q is SAT M G2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions 98 F 3 S 2013 Verified Q is the same as its predecessor, and there were no post-exam comments. Was a Bank Q in 2013, Q98 and comments on the 401-9 were incorporated, putting it in its present form. mgd 6/3 Notified by HNP on 6/29 that this Q had been used verbatim on the applicants audit exam. This is not allowed per Form ES-401-6 Block 5, so this Q was Unsatisfactory to submit for this exam. mgd 7/5 First part of Q was modified to test a different, but related, concept, and information in the stem was changed for the 2nd part of the Q. The second-part answer is the same, but the knowledge is solicited in a different way. mgd 7/8 Q is SAT G2.3.7 Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal or abnormal conditions 99 F 2 N S No technical comments. One typo in the stem was fixed. mgd 6/6 Q is SAT

Harris Nuclear Station July 2016 ILO Exam Q LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and resultant operational effects 100 H 3 B S P No problems with the Q, but D/As all have this sentence I dont understand: The RNO for 1SI-3 directs locally shut or isolate the BIT Outlet valves but the Users Guide states preferentially the BIT Outlet Valves.

Agree that the U.G. prefers the outlets, but it goes on to say that if a BIT outlet cant be shut then you can shut the inlets, 1SI-1 & 1SI-2. Shutting the inlets isnt an option in E-0, but Im okay with that being a distractor because of the discussion in the U.G. However I think the D/As should be reworked a bit:

For A, the 2nd part is correct, so just take out that sentence about the Users Guide.

For B & D, working off the first part of what you have, how about something like, The RNO for 1SI-3 directs locally shut or isolate the BIT Outlet valves, so shutting the Inlet valves is incorrect. But it is plausible because the EOP Users Guide discusses closing the Inlet valves if the Outlet valves cannot be shut.

The 5/19 revision addresses the above concerns. mgd 6/3 Q is SAT