ML18113A434

LER 1976-028-00 for St. Lucie Unit 1, Review of the Testing Proposed for Unit 2 Hydrogen Sampling System Isolation Valves Led to Examination of Purchase Order for the Identical Unit 1 Valves

ML18113A434
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/18/1976
From:	Schmidt A Florida Power & Light Co
To:	Moseley N NRC/IE, NRC/RGN-II
References
PRN-LI-76-150 LER 1976-028-00
Download: ML18113A434 (12)

Text

r NRC FORM 195 I2.1E) S -3 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORV COMMISSION DOCKET NUMBER FILE NUMBER NRC DISTRIBUTION FoR PART 50 DOCKET'MATERIAL INCIDENT REPORT Florida~Pwr 6 Light DATE OF DOCUMENT Mr Moseley Co giami, Fla 6-18-76 A D Scfimidt . DATE RECEIVED 7 6 76

@LETTER QNOTOR IZED PROP INPUT FORM NUMSER OF COPIES RECEIVED 0 ORIGINAL IIUN CpLASS F I E D I

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DESCRIPTION ENCLOSURE S.i J

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Ltr trans the, following: Licensee Event Report (R08'76-28) on 6-4-76 concerning failure of hydrogen sampling sampling system isolat on valves.........

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1It ~'~IIi Kt Lucie 81 NOTE: IF PERSONNEL EXPOSURE IS INVOLVED SEND DIRECTLY TO KREGER/J, COLLINS FOR ACTION/INFORMATION 7 NCH CH EF' CYS FOR AC ON I LIC ~ ASST ~ '.

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P.O, IIOX 013100, NIIAMI, Ft.ORIDA 33101 r E ~

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FLORIOA FOVJFR & LIGHT COMPANY June 18, 1976 PRN-LI-7 6-15 0 Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director, Region II Office of Inspection and, Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.N., Suite 818 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-28 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OP OCCURRENCE: JUNE 4, 1976 C'YDROGEN SAMPLING SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specificaiton 6.9 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours,

>sr .

D. Schmidt Vice President Power Resources

.MAS/ao Attachment cc: Jack R. Newman, Esquire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)

'irector, Of fice of Management Information and Program Control (3) iQg/~(~

HELPING BUILD FLORIDA

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT r

CONTROL SLOCK:~ (~BE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 1 UCENSEE UCENSE EVENT NAME, UCENSE NUMBER TYPE TYPE

[oa~] S L S 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 l.'1 1 1 ~01 89

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14 15 25 26 30 31 32 REPORT. REPORT

'f CATEGORY TYPE SOURCE 'OCKET NUMBER EVENT GATE REPORT OATE "rQO71 CON'T T L. 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 0 6 0 4 7 6 G 6 1 8 7 6 7 8 '57 . 58 .59 60 61 68 69 74 75 . 80 EVENT OESCRIPTION'g R the tes'tin ro osed for Unit 2 h drogen sampling system*isola-7 8'9 80 t00$ tion valVOs led to an examination of the, purchase .order for the identical

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7 8 9 80

~04 1 valves Unit 1 FSAR Section 3.11 classifies these valves as 7 8 9 Qg 7 8.9

'ronmental'ate or lA. 'owever, it has been determined that the 80 7

Q~ g Unit 1 valves have not been 8 9 t *e tested for the proposed environment in 80 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COBE COOE COMPONENT COOE MANUFACIUPER VQULTQN

[OOTI ~BE ~A' A L V E X A X 9 9 9 N 7 8 910 11 12 17 43 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION 7

Qg8 9 Unit 1 h dio en sam lin s stem isolation valves were not tested -for 80 (oa>] ate or 1A environmental conditions in accordance with IEEE-323 {1971) 7 8 9 because the re uirement to do so was not specified in the purchase order. 80'Qg 7 89 80 FACIUTY METHOO OF STATUS  % POWER OTHER STATUS OISCOVERY OISCOVERY OESCRIPTION

[111'B .10

~05 0 N/A ~d Purchase order review 7 8 9 12 13 44 45 46 80 FORM OF ACTIVITY C0ATENT RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY LOCATION OF RELEASE

[rig ~z ~z N/A N/A 7 'S .S 10 11 44 45 80 .

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE OESCR{PTION

~s ~oo o ~z N/A 7 8 9, 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES OESCR{PTION N/A 7 8 9 11 12 80

• PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES t11g N/A 7 8 9 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCR{PTION uz. N/A 7>> 8 9 ~ 10 80 PUBLICITY N/A 7 89 '0 AOOITIONAL FACTORS

~18 See page two (2) for continuation of Event Description.,

7 8 9 80 Component Manufacturer Circle Seal Corporation 7 89 NAME'AN'HONE. 305/552-3779 CPO 80 ddI r dd7

REPORTABLE OCCURANCE 335-76-28 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE'TWO Event Descri tion (Continued) accordance with 'IEEE-323(1971) because the requirement to do so was not specified in the purchase order. As an interim corrective action, administrative guidelines have been written to inform appropriate personnel of the action to be taken if the valves wild not operate under post-accident conditions. Operations personnel have been informed that they'hould actuate the hydrogen recombiners if a containment hydrogen sample cannot be taken. Based on FSAR hydrogen generation analysis for the existing pl'ant design, the operator has 45 days to actuate either hydrogen recombiner before the hydrogen concentration reaches 4%. An investigation of possible long-term corrective action is being conducted and a follow-up report will be submitted upon completion of the investigation.

This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-28)-

P.O. BOX 013100, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101 FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY June 18, 1976 PRN-LI-76-150 Mr. Norman C. Moseley,,Director, Region II Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 230 Peachtree Street, N.W., Suite 818 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. Moseley:

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-76-28 ST. LUCIE UNIT 1 DATE OF OCCURRENCE: JUNE 4, 1976 HYDROGEN SAMPLING SYSTEM ISOLATION VALVES The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted in accordance with Technical Specificaiton 6.9 to provide prompt notification of the subject occurrence.

Very truly yours, D. Schmidt Vice President Power Resources

,MAS/ao Attachment CC Jack R. Newman, Esquire Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (40)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3)

HELPING BUILD FLORIDA

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 4

~ 'I CONTROL BLOCK: RASE PRINT ALL REQUIRED INFDRMATIDN) 6 UCENSEE UCENSE EVENT NAME UCENSE NUMBER TYPE TYPE

[oaf S L S 1 0 O OOO O 0 0 4 111 1 ~01 89

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7 14 15 25 26 30 31 32 060476061876 REPORT. AEPOAT CATEGORY TYPE SOURCE OOCKET NUMBEA ~ EVENT OATE REPORT OATE

[001IcoN T E L 0 5 0 0 3 3 5 7 8 '57 . 58 .59 60 61 69 74 75 80 I

EVENT OESCRIPTION QOg. R . w of the testin ro osed for. Unit 2 h drogen sampling system isola-7 8 9 80

. tion valVhs led to an examination of the purchase:order for the identical 7 89 80 1 valves Unit 1 FSAR Section 3.11 classifies these'alves as 7 8 9 7

Qg 8.9

'ronmental'ate or lA. 'owever, it has been determined that the 60 80 IH 7 89

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h FAME 80 SYSTEM CAUSE COMPONENT COMPONENT COOE COO E COMPONENT COOE SUPPLER

'3 MANUFACTURER VQEATCIN 7 8 9 10

~SE ~A V A L V E X A X 999 N 11 12 17 44 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION gg8 9 Unit 1 h dro en sam lin s stem isolation valves were not tested for 7 80 Qg ate or 1A environmental conditions in accordance with IEEE-323(1971) 7 8 9 ~

80

,Q~O because the re uirement to do so was not specified in the purchase order.

7 89 FACILIIY 80 METHOO OF STATUS '%OWER OTHER STATUS OISCOVEAY DISCOVERY OESCAIPTION

~E ~OZ O N/A ~d Purchase order review 7 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 FORM OF ACTIVITY COATENT RELEASEO OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTNITY LOCATION OF RELEASE Q1g ~Z . Z

• N/A N/A 7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE OESCRIPTION Qg ~oo 0 ~z N/A 7 89 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES OESCRIPTION

~4 0 0 N/A 7 8 9 11 12 80 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES Qg N/A 7 89 80 LOSS OR OAMAGE TO FACILITY TYPE OESCAIPTION

~Z- N/A 7 89- 10 80 PU8UCITY

[iirJ N/A 7 8 9 ~ 80 AOOITIONAL FACTORS

~18 See page two (2) for continuation of Event Description.

7 89 Component Manufacturer Circle Seal Corporation 80'0 7 89 NAME'MAN PHONE.305/552-3779 dFO ddt 4 ddT

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'I REPORTABLE OCCURANCE 335-76-28 LXCENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Event Descri tion (Continued) accordance with 'XEEE-323(1971) because. the requirement to do so was not'pecified in the purchase order. =

As an interim corrective action, administrative guidelines have been written to inform appropriate personnel of the action to be taken if the valves will not operate under post-accident conditions. Operations personnel have been informed that they'hould actuate the hydrogen recombiners if a containment hydrogen sample cannot be taken. Based on PSAR hydrogen generation analysis for the existing plant design, the operator has 45 days to actuate either hydiogen recombiner before the hydrogen concentration reaches 4%. An investigation of possible long-term corrective action is being conducted and a follow-up report will be submitted upon completion of the investigation.

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This was the first occurrence of this type (335-76-28)-

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