ML072970036

July-August Exam 50-325, 324/2007301 Final Simulator Scenarios (Scenario 1 of 4) (Section 1 of 5)

ML072970036
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	01/31/2007
From:	Progress Energy Carolinas
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301 50-324/07-301, 50-325/07-301
Download: ML072970036 (52)

Text

INITIAL LICENSE EXAM 2007 SCENARIO ONE Brunswick Steam Electric Plant, Unit No.2 BRUNSWICK JULY-AUG EXAM-325,324/2007-301 FINAL SIMULATOR SCENARIO (1 OF 4)

Facility: BRUNSWICK Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2007 NRC Examiners:

Operators: (SRO)(RO)(BOP)Initial Conditions:

The plant is operating at 100%power, End of Cycle.No equipment is out of service Turnover: Swap RB Supply&Exhaust Fans from 2C to 20 for maintenance work.Maintenance personnel are standing by.Critical Task: See Scenario Summary Event Malf.No.Event Event Description No.Type'" 1 N/A N-SRO Swap RB Supply and Exhaust Fans N-BOP 2 K4522A OFF C-SRO 2C RBCCW sheared shaft, 2B fails to auto start (AOP)C-BOP 3 RC026F C-SRO Runback of 2A Recirc Pump to Limiter#2.(TS)(AOP)C-RO 4 N/A R-SRO Increase power following the runback.R-RO 5 NB014F TS-SRO Instrument Penetration X49A Line Break-Remote Shutdown Instrumentation is lost (TS)6 CN019F C-SRO AOG fails to isolate on High H2 signal CN011F I-BOP 7 EEOO9F M-ALL Loss of Offsite Power, DG3 Differential Fault, Reactor Scram (AOPs, DG026F EOPs)8 ES028F C-SRO HPCI injection valve fails to auto open C-RO 9 NBOO6F M-ALL Steam Leak in Drywell, Emergency Depressurization (EOPs)10 K1J36A C-SRO RHR Loop"B", drywell spray valve fails closed C-BOP 11 NB025F I-ALL Level instrument failure, Reference leg flashing, Reactor Flooding required...(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor***NOTES:1)Brunswick 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 1 of 2 S=Satisfactory;U-Unsatisfactory; N/O=Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments;a comment sheet is attached.2)...=Critical Task/Step

• • Brunswick 2007 NRC Scenario 1 Page 2 of 2 SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Unit 2 is operating at maximum power, End Of Cycle.A swap of RB Supply&Exhaust Fans will be required to support maintenance activities.

Following the swap of RB fans, RBCCW Pump 2C coupling fails and 2B RBCCW Pump will fail to Auto-Start on pressure, but will be able to be manually started.After restart of the 2B RBCCW Pump, Reactor Recirculation Pump 2A will runback to Limiter#2.After addressing the Technical Specifications and discussions with I&C, the 2A Recirculation Pump Limiter#2 signal will be reset and power returned to the pre-event level.A Reactor Instrument Penetration line break occurs (X49A)and the line is isolated affecting instrument N026B for Remote Shutdown Panel Level Indication R604BX.Technical Specifications must be addressed.

After TS are addressed, AOG will receive a high-high H2 signal due to a failed hydrogen detector and will fail to isolate requiring manual isolation by the BOP.Off-Site Power will be lost.DG4 will auto start and tie to E4.DG3 will auto start and briefly tie to E3, but will then trip on overcurrent and E3 will be unavailable.

E1 and E3 cannot be cross-tied due to the overcurrent lockout.If the crew attempts to crosstie E7 and E8 the cross-tie breaker at E8 will fail.The loss of E3/E7 results in loss of level transmitters N026A and N027 A.HPCI and RCIC are available for RPV level control.SRVsare available for pressure control.The HPCI injection valve will fail to auto open but can be manually opened.Additionally, RBCCW cooling will be shifted to conventional service water.120V Panels 2-AB, 2-AB-RX and 32AB will be transferred to alternate.

A steam leak will occur in the drywell.Drywell coolers will trip and the RHR Loop"B" drywell spray valve (E11-F016B) cannot be opened causing drywell temperature to rise above 300°F requiring emergency depressurization (CRITICAL TASK).Following emergency depressurization reactor pressure and drywell reference leg temperature will be in the unsafe region of the RPV saturation limit The only available level instruments (N004A.N004C, N036 and N027B)will begin to exhibit indications of reference leg flashing.With no valid indication of RPV level, the crew will enter the Reactor Flooding Procedure.

The crew will increase available injection to maximum until at least 5 SRVs are open and Reactor pressure is at least 50 psig above suppression chamber pressure (Minimum Reactor Flooding Pressure)(CRITICAL TASK).Once these conditions are established the crew will throttle flow to maintain at least the required 50 psig differential but as low as possible.When RPV flooding conditions have been established, the scenario may be terminated

.*NOTES:1)S=Satisfactory;U-Unsatisfactory; N/O=Not Observed All Unsatisfactory ratings require comments;a comment sheet is attached.2)*=Critical Task/Step

• • • PROGRESS ENERGY CAROLINAS BRUNSWICK TRAINING SECTION 2007 NRC EXAM SCENARIO#1 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1

• • • SCENARIO DESCRIPTION Unit Two (2)is operating at maximum power, End Of Cycle.A swap of RB Supply&Exhaust Fans will be required to support maintenance activities.

Following the swap of RB fans, RBCCW Pump 2C coupling fails and 2B RBCCW Pump will fail to Auto-Start on pressure, but will be able to be manually started.After starting of the 2B RBCCW Pump, Reactor Recirculation Pump 2A will run back to Limiter#2.After addressing the Technical Specifications and discussions with I&C, the 2A Recirculation Pump Limiter#2 signal will be reset and power returned to theevent level.A Reactor Instrument Penetration line break occurs (X49A)and the line is isolated affecting instrument N026B for Remote Shutdown Panel Level Indication R604BX.Technical Specifications must be addressed.

After TS are addressed, AOG will receive a high-high H2 signal due to a failed hydrogen detector and will fail to isolate requiring manual isolation by the BOP.Off-Site Power will be lost.DG4 will auto start and tie to E4.DG3 will auto start and briefly tie to E3, but will then trip on overcurrent and E3 will be unavailable.

E1 and E3 cannot be cross-tied due to the overcurrent lockout.If the crew attempts to crosstie E7 and E8 the cross-tie breaker at E8 will fail.The loss of E3/E7 results in loss of level transmitters N026A and N027 A.HPCI and RCIC are available for RPV level control.SRVs are available for pressure control.The HPCI injection valve will fail to auto open but can be manually opened.Additionally, RBCCW cooling will be shifted to conventional service water.120V Panels 2-AB, 2AB-RX and 32AB will be transferred to alternate.

A steam leak will occur in the drywell.Drywell coolers will trip and the RHR Loop"B" drywell spray valve (E11-F016B) cannot be opened causing drywell temperature to rise above 300°F requiring emergency depressurization (CRITICAL TASK).Following emergency depressurization reactor pressure and drywell reference leg temperature will be in the unsafe region of the RPV saturation limit The only available level instruments (N004A, N004C, N036 and N027B)will begin to exhibit indications of reference leg flashing.With no valid indication of RPV level, the crew will enter the Reactor Flooding Procedure.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 2

• • • SCENARIO DESCRIPTION (continued)

The crew will increase available injection to maximum until at least 5 SRVs are open and Reactor pressure is at least 50 psig above suppression chamber pressure (Minimum Reactor Flooding Pressure)(CRITICAL TASK).Once these conditions are established the crew will throttle flow to maintain at least the required 50 psig differential but as low as possible.When RPV flooding conditions have been established, the scenario may be terminated.

2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 3 SIMULATOR SETUP Initial Conditions IC 188 Scenario#1 ENP 24 for IC 14 Rx Pwr 100%Core Age EOC EVENTS EVENTS Event Trigger Trigger Description Number 1 NA NA Swap RB Supply&Exhaust Fans 2 1 Manual 2C RBCCW Pump Sheared shaft.2B fails to auto start 3 2 Manual Runback of 2A Recirculation Pump to Limiter#2 4 NA NA Increase power following runback reset 5 3 Manual Penetration X49A Line Break ,B21-N026B fails upscale12 Manual AOG Failure to isolate on high hydrogen signal 4 Manual Loss Of Off-Site Power.DG#3 Differential Fault, Reactor Scram 8 NA NA HPCI injection valve fails to auto open 9 5 Manual Steam Leak In The Drywell.Emergency Depressurization 10 RHR Loop"B" drywell spray valve fails to open 11 NA NA Level Instrument failure.Reference Leg flashing.Reactor Flooding required 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 4 SIMULATOR SETUP Interventions Summary (Shaded entries=Active)Malfunctions Summary Malf 10 Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig 10 Value Value-ES028F HPCIINJ VLV FAILS AUTO OPEN True True EE009F LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER False True 4 DG026F DG3 DIFFERENTIAL FAULT True True NB006F A MSL BREAK BEFORE FLOW 0 4.00 00:05:00 5 RESTRICTOR RC026F RECIRC PMP"A" RUNBACK TO False True 00:00:05 2 LIMITER#2 NB014F Penetration X49A Line Break False True 3 NB025F REF LEG FLASHING True True-CN019F AOG ISOL VLV FAILS TO AUTOTrueTrue CLOSE CN011F AOG B SYS ISOLATES False True 12 Remotes Summary Remf 10 Mult Description Current Target Rmptime Actime Trig 10ValueValue EP_IACS993P OW CLR A&0 OVERRIDE-NORMAL STOP 00:03:00 6 NORMAUSTOP EP_IACS994P OW CLR A&0 OVERRIDE-NORMAL STOP 00:03:00 6 NORMAUSTOP SWJAVSW193 SW-V193 MAN ISOL NSW TO RBCCW OPEN CLOSE 00:04:00 8 SW_VHSW146L CONV SW TO RBCCW HSX V146 SHUT OPEN 00:04:00 8 RP_IARPSB RESTART RPS MG SET B NORMAL RESET 00:03:00 9 RP_IAEPAMGB RPS M-G SET B EPA BKRS SET SET 00:03:00 9 ED_ZIEDH08 PNL 2AB PWR (E7=NORM/E8=AL T)NORMAL ALT 00:02:00 7 ED_ZIEDH11 PNL 2AB-RX PWR (E7=NORM/E8=AL T)NORMAL ALT 00:02:00 7 ED_ZIEDHXO PNL 32AB PWR (E7=NORM/E8=AL T)NORMAL ALT 00:02:00 7 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 5

• • • SIMULATOR SETUP Override Summary TaglD Description Position/Actual Override Rmptime Actime Dactime Trig TarqetValueValue K1J36A CONT SPRAY VLV E11-F016B AUTO OFF OFF K1J36A CONT SpRAy VLVE11-F016B

.CLOse ON ON K1J36A CONT SPRAY VLV E11-F016B OpeN OFF OFf K4522A RBCCW PMP C AUTO ON ON OFF 1 K4522LG4 RBCCW PMP C OFF G ON/OFFOFFOFF 1 K4522RR4 RBCCW PMP CON R ON/OFFONON 1 K4521A RBCCW PMP B AUTO AUTO ON OFF 1 K2712A SCOOP TUBE A RESET NORMAL ON ON K2712A SCOOP TUBE A RESET RESET OFF OFF K2712A SCOOP TUBE A RESET TRIPOFFOFF Annunciator Summary Window Description Taqname Override Type Oval AVal Actime Dactime Triq NONE Batch Files File Trigger Description NRC SCENARIO S-1.BAT NONE Special Instructions Load scenario file 2007 NRC Scenario 1.scn Ensure ENP-24 for IC-14@P603.Copy Batch File NRC SCENARIO S-1.bat from memory stick E Drive to F Drive on bsimpcOO 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 6

• • • SHIFT BRIEFING Plant StatusTheplant is operating at maximum power, End of Cycle.Equipment Out of Service No equipment is out of service Plan of the Day Maintain current power.Following shift turnover, Place the 20 RB Supply&Exhaust Fans in service and secure 2C Supply&Exhaust Fans.Maintenance personnel are standing by to perform PMs.No clearance is required.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 7

• • • SCENARIO INFORMATION Examiner Notes Procedures Used in Scenarios:

EVENT 1*OP-37.1, Sect 8.9 EVENT 2*Annunciator 2-UA-3, Window 2-5 (RBCCW Pump Disch Hdr Press Low)*OAOP-16 EVENT 3/4*Annunciator 2-A-6, Window 3-2 (Recirc Pump Runback)*2AOP-04.0 (Low Core Flow)*20P-02, Sect 5.3 (Speed/Power Increase Using the Recircirculation Pump Speed Control)*Procedure 20P-02, Section 8.3 (Recovery from Recirculation Pump Runback)*Technical Specification 3.4.1 (Recirculation Pump Runback-Single Loop)EVENT 5*Unit 2 Technical Specifications, 3.6.1.3&3.3.3.2*01-44 , Excess Flow Check Valve Position Indication Evaluation

• Annunciator 2-UA-24 1-3, Pen X49B Elev 86'-0" Azimuth 225 degrees)EVENT 6*Annunciator UA-45 2-1, Discharge H2 Conc Hi-Hi*Annunciator UA-45 2-2, Discharge H2 Conc Hi*Annunciator UA-48-5-4, AOG System Bypass*ODCM 7.3.10 EVENT 7*2EOP-01-RSP (REACTOR SCRAM PROCEDURE)

• 2EOP-01-RVCP (REACTOR VESSEL CONTROL PROCEDURE)

• OAOP-36.1*OEOP-02-PCCP EVENT 8*001-01.02, Sect 5.10.7, Conduct of Operations EVENT 9/10*OEOP-01-SEP-03, Torus Sprays*OEOP-01-SEP-02, Drywell Sprays*2EOP-01-RVCP (REACTOR VESSEL CONTROL PROCEDURE)

• OEOP-02-PCCP(PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL PROCEDURE) 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 8

• • • Procedures Used in Scenarios (continued):

EVENT 11*OEOP-01-RXFP (REACTOR FLOODING PROCEDURE)

Critical Tasks Perform emergency depressurization when drywell average temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 300°F.Establish and maintain RPV pressure at least 50 psig above suppression chamber pressure with at least 5 SRVs open.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 9

• EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER, SWAPPING OF RB SUPPLY&EXHAUST FANS***The crew swaps RB HVAC Fans per SCO direction Malfunctions required-None Objectives:

SCO-Directs BOP to shift from the 2C to the 2D RB Supply&Exhaust Fans to support Maintenance BOP-Starts 2D RB HVAC Fans&removes 2C fans from service per 20P-37.1 Section 8.9 Success Path: RB HVAC Supply&Exhaust Fans fans 2A, B, D in service, 2C secured.Simulator Operator Activities:

• When asked, as the Reactor Building Auxiliary Operator, report thatstart checks on RB HVAC Fans have been completed*When asked, as the RBAO, report that the fans appear to be operating normally.*When asked as the RBAO report that the MSIV Pit Dampers are open.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 10

• EVENT 1 SHIFT TURNOVER/SWAPPING OF RB SUPPLY&EXHAUST FANS**Required Operator Actions Normal Operation-Swapping of RB Supply&Exhaust Fans SRO*Directs BOP to shift from the 2C to the 20 RB Supply&Exhaust Fans to support Maintenance BOP*Places 20 RB HVAC Fans in service&removes 2C fans from service per37.1 Section 8.9 APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 11

• EVENT 2 START RBCCW PUMP COUPLING FAILURE/PUMP in AUTO FAILS TO AUTO**The crew responds to a problem on one of the operating RBCCW Pumps Malfunctions required:*2B RBCCW Pump will fail to auto-start on a low RBCCW discharge header pressure*Coupling failure modification Objectives:

SCO-Directs BOP to enter and execute OAOP-16.0:

RBCCW System Failure BOP-Refers to 2-UA-3 2-5 and OAOP-16.0 to respond to the 2C Pump issue and 2B Pump failure to start Success Path: 2B RBCCW Pump is manually started (by placing its control switch to ON)and RBCCW is returned to normal operation (normal discharge pressure).

Simulator Operator Activities:

• WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 1 (2C RBCCW Pump Coupling Failure)*WHEN asked, as the RBAO, report that the 2C RBCCW appears to have a broken coupling.Motor is running but pump is not turning*WHEN asked, as I&C, acknowledge request to investigate 2B RBCCW pump failure to start 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 12

• • • EVENT 2 RBCCW PUMP COUPLING FAILURE/PUMP in AUTO FAILS TO AUTO START Required Operator Actions Transient Response-Entry into OAOP-16.0:

Failure of RBCCW System SRO*Directs BOP operator to enter annunciator response and refers to16.0*Directs start of 2B RBCCW pump*Directs Maintenance to investigate 2B RBCCW pump auto start failure*Notifies Maintenance of 2C RBCCW Pump coupling failure*Directs BOP to remove 2C RBCCW Pump from service BOP*Refers to Annunciator Response 2-UA-3 2-5 (RBCCW Disch Header Press Lo)*May Reference OAOP-16*Places 2C RBCCW Pump switch to'off'*Manually starts 2B RBCCW Pump*Verifies RBCCW System is operating normally BOP/RO*Dispatches AO to investigate cause of RBCCW low pressure*2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 13

• • • EVENT 2 RBCCW PUMP COUPLING FAILURE/PUMP in AUTO FAILS TO AUTO START APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 14

• EVENT 3 2A REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP RUNBACK TO LIMITER#2*The crew responds to a spurious runback of the 2A Recirculation Pump speed controller to Speed Limiter#2.The scoop tube lockup circuit is defeated.(can not be locked up)Malfunction required:*2A Reactor Recirculation MG Set will experience a spurious runback signal to the Limiter#2 setpoint (approx 49%speed)*Lockout circuit on scoop tube will be defeated (override)

Objectives:

SCO Directs RO to enter and execute 2AOP-04.0:

Low Core Flow and refer to annunciator response for 2-A-6 3-2.Evaluates Technical Specification (T.S.3.4.1.A.)requirements for single Recirculation Loop operation (flow mismatch requires declaration of the loop with the lower speed Recirculaton Pump as Inoperable)

Following determination of the Runback signal being spurious, directs reset of the 2A Reactor Recirculation Pump Limiter#2 signal and to return power to the pre-event power level RO Enters 2AOP-04.0 to respond to the 2A Reactor Recirculation MG runback Refers to Annunciator response for 2-A-6 3-2"Recirc Flow"A" Limit (Immediate Action-diagnoses time is required)May attempt to lock scoop tube during runback if speed is still lowering.When directed by the SCO, resets the Runback signal per 20P-02, Section 8.3 Inserts control rods to get below the MELLL line per ENP-24*Success Path: The runback condition on the 2A Reactor Recirculation Pump is identified, 2AOP-04.0 is entered and executed, power level is stabilized, Technical Specification requirements are evaluated for single Recirculation Loop operation, and the Runback Signal is successfully reset per 20P-02.0 following resolution

.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 15

• EVENT 3 2A REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP RUNBACK TO LIMITER#2**SimulatorOperator Activities:

• WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 2 (2A Recirc Pump runback to Limiter#2)*WHEN asked, as the Turbine Building Auxiliary Operator (TBAO), wait 3 minutes and report that there are no apparent problems at the 2A Reactor Recirculation Motor Generator.

• WHEN asked, as I&C, wait 5 minutes and report that the cause of the Runback to Limiter#2 was due to an error in installation of a jumper during the performance of a surveillance currently in progress (the I&C technician was supposed to be on Unit One).*WHEN asked, as I&C, report that the lockout circuit has been repaired and all testing by OPERATIONS is complete, there is no additional testing required for the scoop tube lock.The runback may be reset at this time.*WHEN asked, as NE, provide guidance on moving under MELLL and state that the rod pattern does not need to be symmetrical.

2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 16

• EVENT 3 2A REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP RUNBACK TO LIMITER#2**Required Operator Actions Transient response-Entry into 2AOP-04.0:

Low Core Flow SRO*Directs RO to enter and execute 2AOP-04.0:

Low Core Flow.Also directs referring to Annunciator Response 2-A-6 3-2 Recirc Flow"A" Limit*Contacts I&C for support NOTE: SRO may direct RO to lower the unaffected Recirc Pump speed within allowable mismatch.If needed technical specification determination may be postponed until after the scenario for this event.Evaluates Technical Specification (T.S.3.4.1.A)Tech Spec 3.4.1 Two Recirc Loop operation with matched flows not met.A.Align APLHGR, MCPR, and APRM simulated Thermal Power High trip functions for single loop operation (6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />)*requirements for single Recirculation Loop operation (flow mismatch requires declaration of the loop with the lower speed Recirculaton Pump as Inoperable, Tech.Spec bases.)*Following determination of the Runback signal being spurious, directs reset of the 2A Reactor Recirculation Pump Limiter#2 signal to return of power to the pre-event power level*Directs RO to insert control rods to get below the MELLL line on the power to flow map.*Contacts NE for guidance 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 17

• • • EVENT 3 2A REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP RUNBACK TO LIMITER#2 Required Operator Actions (continued)

RO*Refers to Annunciator response for 2-A-6 3-2Recirc Flow"A" Limit*(Immediate Action-diagnoses time is required)May attempt to lock scoop tube during runback if speed is still lowering.*When directed by the SCO, resets the Runback signal per 20P-02, Section 8.3*Inserts control rods to get below the MELLL line per ENP-24 RO/BOP*Enters 2AOP-04.0 to respond to the 2A Reactor Recirculation MG runback*If greater than 15%power change, contact Chemistry for coolant samples.APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 18 The crewwill take action to restore reactor power to the pre-runback level.*EVENT 4 INCREASING POWER FOLLOWING RUNBACK SIGNAL RESET**Malfunctions required: None Objectives:SCODirects RO to raise reactor power to 90%by raising Recirculation Flow on"An Loop RO Raises reactor power per 20P-02.0, section 5.3, by raising"An Recirculation Pump Speed Success Path: Reactor power is raised to approximately the pre-runback level.Simulator Operator Activities:

WHEN asked, as the Nuclear Engineer, report that power may be raised without ramp limitations, to 90%to clear the loop mismatch, using Reactor Recirculation flow.Then, predicts will have to be run prior to pulling rods.IF the unaffected loop was lowered to clear the mismatch request raising the lower speed pump to match speeds then balanceflowadjustments to 90%, then predicts will have to be run prior to pulling rods.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 19

• • • Required Operator Actions Normal Operating Procedures

-20P-02****EVALUATOR NOTE: Alternate Power Verification is required at 10%power increments during power ascension and takes approximately 10 minutes to complete.If a change to the GainAdjustmentFactor (GAF)is required following Alternate Power Verification, an additional 15 minutes should be allowed.At the evaluator's discretion, prompt may be given stating that Alternate Power Verifications are to be completed by other members of the operating crew and are satisfactory

.SRO*Contacts Load dispatcher regarding power increase*Direct RO to raise reactor power to 90%using 20P-02 RO*When directed, raises reactor power to approximately 90%using Reactor Recirculation Flow per 20P-02.0.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 20

• • • EVENT 4 INCREASING POWER FOLLOWING RUNBACK SIGNAL RESET APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 21

• EVENT 5 INSTRUMENT LINE PENETRATION FAILS**The crew will observe and report the parameter changes impacted by the instrument failure.The SCO will diagnose the failure and evaluate the impact to plant operation, including Technical Specification action statement(s).Malfunctions required:*Penetration X49A Level instrument B21-N026B will fail.Objectives:

SCO-Diagnose the failure of the level instrument and evaluate the impact of the loss in TS (3.6.1.3-Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs), 3.3.3.1-Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)Instrumentation and 3.3.3.2-Remote Shutdown Monitoring Instrumentation-30 days).Success Path: SCO correctly evaluates the impact of the loss of the instrumentation, including the correct Technical Specification action statement.

Simulator Operator Activities:

• WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 3 (Instrument line break, B21-N026B fails).*IF directed to investigate penetration wait 3 minutes and report there is some evidence of a leak but you cannot determine the source.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 22

• • • Required Operator Actions: seo*Evaluate the plant impact and Technical Specification requirements for the instruments affected Tech Spec 3.6.1.3.C One or morepenetrationflowpaths with one PCIV Primary Containment Isolation Valve)inoperable C.1 Isolate the affected flowpath by using at least one closed automatic valve, manual valve, or blind flange (12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> for Excess Flow Check Valve)AND C.2 Verify isolated (every 31 days)Tech Spec 3.3.3.1 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM)A.1 One or more Functions with one required channel inoperable (restore to Operable in 30 days)Tech Spec 3.3.3.2 A.1 One or more required Functions inoperable (restore to Operable in 30 days)BOP*Refers to Annunciator Response UA-24 1-3"Pen X 49A ELEV 86'-0" AZIMUTH 225 degrees.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 23

• EVENT 5 INSTRUMENT LINE PENETRATION FAILS APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:**2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 24 The crew will respond to the AOG failure to isolate.*EVENT 6 AOG FAILS TO ISOLATE ON HIGH H2 SIGNAL**Malfunctions required: The H2 instrument 2-0G-AIT-4324 Stream1 will fail upscale.Objectives:

SCO Directs BOP operator to respond to annunciators Evaluates ODCM for AOG bypassed BOP Reponds to annunciators Take manual actions to isolate AOG Success Path: AOG isolated Simulator Operator Activities:

• WHEN directed by lead examiner activate TRIGGER 12(AOGfailure to isolate on high-high H2 signal).*WHEN contacted as TBAO, to investigate status of the H2 detectors acknowledge and respond in 3 minutes that H2 instrument 2-0G-AIT-4324 Stream1 has failed upscale.*WHEN contacted as I&C to investigate failure, acknowledge only.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 25

• EVENT 6 AOG FAILS TO ISOLATE ON HIGH H2 SIGNAL***Required Operator Actions: seo*Directs BOP to respond to annunciators 2-UA 45 2-1, DISCHARGE H2 CONC HI-HI 2-UA 45 2-2, DISCHARGE H2 CONC HI 2-UA 485-4, AOG SYSTEM BYPASS*Evaluates impact of AOG bypassing at power: ODCM 7.3.10 Gaseous Radwaste Treatment System A.1 Place system in service when Main Condenser Air Ejector System is in operation (7 Days)*Directs isolating AOG in accordance with the APP*Contact I&C to investigate 2-0G-AIT-4324 Stream 1 failure and AOG failure to isolate.BOP*Responds to annunciators:

2-UA 45 2-1, DISCHARGE H2 CONC HI-HI 2-UA 45 2-2, DISCHARGE H2 CONC HI 2-UA 485-4, AOG SYSTEM BYPASS*Isolates AOG by manipulating valve control switches as required in'annunciator response procedures.(XCV-148,147,143,142, and 141 closed)EXAMINER NOTE: Valves will not re-position until ALL FIVE (5)switches are in the CLOSED position.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 26

• EVENT 6 AOG FAILS TO ISOLATE ON HIGH H2 SIGNAL APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:**2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 27

• EVENT?REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**The crew will respond to a loss ofoff-sitepower resulting in a reactor scram and a corresponding failure of Emergency Diesel Generator#3 due to an electrical fault on Bus E3.Malfunctions required:*Off-site power will be lost due to a grid disturbance resulting in a reactor scram.Immediately following the starting and synchronization of#3 Emergency Diesel Generator, an electrical fault will develop on Emergency Bus E3, resulting in a trip of#3 Diesel Generator and unavailability of the Emergency Bus E3.Objectives:

SCO-Executes the Emergency Operating Procedures:

Enters 2EOP-01-RSP, Reactor Scram Procedure and, subsequently, enters 2EOP-01-RVCP, Reactor Vessel Control Procedure (if Rx Press is>1060 psig or Rx Level cannot be restored and maintained

>170")Directs the RO to control reactor and containment parameters o Control pressure using SRVs with a pressure band of 800-1000 psig o Control Level using HPCI/RCIC with a band of 170" to 200" Directs BOP to enter and execute AOP-36.1 in response to the loss ofsite power and Diesel Generator failure Contacts System Load Dispatcher to determine Distribution Grid status RO Responds to the reactor scram and takes actions to control level and pressure in the established control bands using HPCI, RCIC, and SRVs 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 28

• EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Objectives (continued):

BOP Report Electric Plant status o Loss of off-site power o DG#4 loaded to Bus E4 o DG#3 tripped due to overcurrent trip on bus o Performs AOP-36.1 actions based on transient response priorities, including but not limited to the following:

Places PCB auto-reclosers to OFF Transfers 120v panels Pursues Service Air cross-tie Ensures 2B Nuclear Service Water Pump is running, starts 2B and 2C Conventional Pumps Starts Control Room and Battery Room HVAC Direct Transfer of RBCCW Cooling to Conventional Service Water Start 2B CRD Pump Direct RPS to be restarted Success Path: SCO successfully enters 2EOP-01-RSP, Reactor Scram Procedure and, subsequently, enters 2EOP-01-RVCP, Reactor Vessel Control Procedure and directs activities relating to reactor vessel control (RPV pressure and level)and directs activities relating to the loss of electrical power.RO takes actions to control reactor level and pressure (HPCI, RCIC, SRV operation).

BOP enters OAOP-36.1 and takes actions, as directed to address the loss of electrical power.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 29

• EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Simulator Operator Activities

• WHEN directed by lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 4 (Loss of offsite power, DG#3 failure)*IF contacted as Load Dispatcher, report that there has been storm damage to the Transmission Grid and that there is, currently, not a projected time for return to service.*IF asked as Unit One (1)for permissiontocross-tie air, grant permission.

• WHEN it is requested to cross-tie air, report Unit One (1)crosstie valvePV-5071 is open.*IF asked to transfer RCC to CSW, wait 4 minutes and activate TRIGGER 8.*IF asked to restart RPS, wait 3 minutes and activate TRIGGER 9.*IF requested to transfer 2AB, 2AB-RX and 32AB to alternate, wait 2 minutes and activate TRIGGER7.*IF asked by I&C to investigate DG#3 failure, wait 3 minutes and report the EDG trip is due to an electrical lockout and is being investigated

.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 30

• EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Required Operator Actions SRO*Executes the Emergency Operating Procedures:

Enters 2EOP-01-RSP, Reactor Scram Procedure and, subsequently, enters 2EOP-01-RVCP, Reactor Vessel Control Procedure (if Rx Press is>1060 psig or Rx Level cannot be restored and maintained>

170")*Directs RO to perform Immediate Actions for SCRAM*Directs the RO to control reactor parameters o Control pressure using SRVs with a pressure band of 800-1000 psig (actions on SCRAM Hard Card)o Control Level using HPCI/RCIC with a band of 170" to 200"*Directs BOP to enter and execute AOP-36.1 in response to the loss of off-site power and Diesel Generator failure o Directs E-Bus cross-tie at the 480V Buses (E7 to E8)*Contact System Load Dispatcher to determine Distribution Grid status*Enters and executes OEOP-02-PCCP when temperature exceeds 95°F in the Suppression Pool and directs RO to maximize Suppression Pool Cooling using RHR.RO*Performs Scram Immediate Actions o Verify Scram Valves Open (full core display"Blue Lights")o All Rods In (Rod Worth Minimizer) o Trips Main Turbine o Places Reactor Mode Switch to Shutdown when total steam flow is<3Mlbm/hr) meters on RTGB with"red" lines)o Verifies Heater Drain Pumps Tripped o Inserts SRMs/IRMs (selects detectors and energizes circuit selects drive pushbutton on RTGB left of rod select matrix)2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 31

• EVENT?REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Required Operator Actions (cont.)RO (cont.)*Verifies SCRAM Hard Card Actions*Controls Reactor pressure using SRVs by placing various SRV control switches to"Open" and, subsequently, places switches back to Close/Auto to control Reactor pressure 800 psig to 1000 psig.NOTE: If HPCI injection valve, 2-E41-F006, failure is found early level will be recovered and entry into RVCP will be later in scenario*If not automatically started, Starts HPCI/RCIC using the Hard Card to provide coolant injections for level control: o RCIC*Open E51-F046*Start Barometric Vacuum Pump*Open E51-F045*Open E51-F013*Adjust RCIC flow controller to establish desired flow rateset value is 500 gpm)o HPCI*Open E41-F059*Start Vacuum Pump*Open E41-F001*Start Aux Oil Pump*Open E41-F006 (auto open on valve is failed, but valve will open when control switch is operated)*Adjust Flow Controller to desired injection rate.When directed, places"A" and"B" loops of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling per the Hard Card.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 32

• EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Required Operator Actions (cont.)RO (cont.)NOTE: Depending on availability, the BOP operator may perform the actions to place RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.*Service Water o Opens SW-V105 ("B" loop)and SW-V101 ("A" loop)o Starts RHRSW Booster Pump (places control switch to start and throttles Open E11-F068 AlB)*RHR o If E11-F015A(B) is Open, closes E11-F017 A(B)o Starts Loop A(B)RHR pump using control switch o Opens E11-F028A(B) o Throttles Open E11-F024A(B) o Throttles Closed E11-F048A(B)

BOP*Recognizes and Reports Electric Plant status-Loss of off-site power-DG#4 loaded to Bus E4-DG#3 tripped due to electrical lockout on the bus*Executes applicable steps of OAOP-36.1 in response to the loss of off-site power and failure of the#3 Emergency Diesel Generator and Emergency Bus E3.These actions include, but are not limited to the following:

o Places PCB auto-reclosers to OFF o Directs field Operator to transfer 120v panel (2AB, 2AB-RX, and 32AB)o Directs field Operator to transfer RBCCW Cooling to Conventional Service Water 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 33

• EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE**Required Operator Actions (cont.)BOP (cont.)o Places RBCCW Pump control switches to OFF o Places Condensate Pump control switches to manual o Directs field Operator to cross-tie 480V Emergency Busses (E7 to E8)*On a priority bases, executes any additional steps of OAOP-36.1 in response to the transient which might be applicable:

o Restart of RPS MG Set o Pursues Service Air cross-tie o Ensures 2B Nuclear Service Water Pump is running, starts 2B and 2C Conventional Pumps o Starts Control Room and Battery Room HVAC o Starts 2B CRD Pump 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 34

• • • EVENT 7 REACTOR SCRAM, LOSS OF OFF-SITE POWER, DG#3 FAILURE APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 35

• EVENT 8 HPCIINJECTION VALVE FAILS TO OPEN The crew will respond to a failure of the HPCI injection valve to fail to automatically open on a valid initiation signal.Malfunctions required:*The 2-E41-F006, HPCI Injection Valve, will fail to automatically open on a valid initiation signal Objectives:

SCO/RO RO Identifies that the HPCI Injection Valve has failed to open on a valid initiation signal Opens the HPCI Injection Valve by taking the control switch to the"OPEN" position and commences injection with HPCI Success Path: HPCI injection is established at rated flow by operator action to open the HPCI injection valve.*Simulator Operator Activities:

None Required Operator Actions: SRO/RO*Identifies the HPCI Injection Valve, 2-E41-F006, has failed to open on a valid initiation signal*Directs RO to Open E41-F006 RO*Opens the 2-E41-F006 by taking the control switch to the"OPEN" position and establishes injection flow to the reactor from HPCI.*2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 36

• EVENT 8 HPCIINJECTION VALVE FAILS TO OPEN APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR:**2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 37

• EVENT 9/10 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL REQUIRING EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION The crew will respond to a steam leak in the drywell in conjunction with a failure of the ability to spray the containment, subsequently leading to a requirement to Emergency Depressurize the reactor due to high drywell temperature.

Malfunctions required:*A steam leak will occur in the drywell, resulting in elevated drywell temperatures*A failure will be inserted, preventing the opening of the"B" Loop Drywell Spray injection valve*Cross tie of E7 to E8 will not function Objectives:

• SCO Recognize conditions of the steam leak in the drywell (elevated temperatures and pressures) and provide direction to the RO and BOP.Direct execution of applicable steps of OEOP-02-PCCP (Primary Containment Control Procedure).

• • • • CRITICAL TASK***When drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained

<300°F, direct Emergency Depressurization of the reactor Refer to Caution 1 and determine that the Reactor Saturation Graph will enter the"Unsafe" region during the depressurization

• RO/BOP Continue to maintain control of Reactor Water Level and Pressure, as directed by the SCO Must manually trip RCIC when High level trip setpoint is reached (206")Place"B" Loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling when directed Attempt to place"B" Loop in Suppression Chamber (SEP-03)and Drywell Sprays (SEP-02)when directed Identify and report failure of"B" Loop Drywell Spray valve to open and take actions to attempt to open the valve When directed, Emergency Depressurize the reactor (high drywell temperature)

Control injection from Low Pressure systems to maintain reactor water level during depressurization.

Success Path: When 300°F is exceeded in the drywell, the reactor is Emergency Depressurized and level is restored/maintained in the normal band (170" to 200")2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 38

• • • EVENT 9/10 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL REQUIRING EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Simulator Operator Activities:

• WHEN directed by the lead examiner, activate TRIGGER 5 (Steam leak in drywell)*IF asked, report that the breaker for the 2-E11-F016B appears to have normal indication

..*IF asked, indicate reset of the thermal overload for 2-E11-F016B appears to have had no impact.*IF asked to manually open the 2-E11-F016B, report that the 2-E11-F016B is mechanically bound and will not open.*WHEN requested to lock-out drywell coolers, activate TRIGGER 6.*IF requested to support E7 to E8 cross-tie, acknowledge request.AFTER 5 minutes report racking mechanism on E7 cross-tie breaker has failed, maintenance has been notified for help.Required Operator Action SRO*Recognize primary containment conditions (temperature rise and pressure rise)indicate a steam leak in the drywell.*Direct execution of applicable steps of OEOP-02-PCCP (Primary Containment Control Procedure).

o Prior to Suppression Chamber Pressure exceeding 11.5 psig*Directs RO/BOP to perform Suppression Pool Spray per SEP-03 o When Suppression Chamber exceeds 11.5 psig,*Directs RO/BOP to perform Drywell Sprays per SEP-02 o Monitors Pressure Suppression Pressure to maintain in the SAFE region of the graph (utilizes ERFIS)o When Drywell air temperature exceeds 150°F*Directs RO/BOP to start all available drywell coolers (SEP-1 0 allowed)o Prior to Drywell air temperature exceeding 300°F*Directs RO/BOP to initiate Drywell Spray per SEP-02 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 39

• • • EVENT 9/10 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL REQUIRING EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Required Operator Action (continued)

SRO (cont.)*****CRITICAL TASK****When drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained

<300°F, direct Emergency Depressurization of the reactor*Refer to Caution 1 and determine that the Reactor Saturation Graph will enter the"Unsafe" region during the depressurization

• Other Primary Containment Control actions may be directed, but areconsequential to the event.RO/BOP*Continue to maintain control of Reactor Water Level and Pressure, as directed by the SCO.*When directed place"B" Loop of RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling o Service Water*Opens SW-V105 ("B" loop)and SW-V101 ("A" loop)*Starts RHRSW Booster Pump (places control switch to start and throttles Open E11-F068 AlB)o RHR*If E11-F015B is Open, closes E11-F0178*Starts Loop B RHR pump using control switch*Opens E11-F028B*Throttles Open E 11-F0248*Throttles Closed E11-F048B 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 40

• • • EVENT 9/10 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL REQUIRING EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION Required Operator Action (continued)

RO/BOP (cont.)*When directed place RHR in Suppression Chamber Sprays (SEP-03)o Places 2/3 Core Height Override Position to ON o Place Containment Spray Valve Control Switch to Manual o If E11-F015B is Open and RHR injection is not necessary, close E11-F017B o Start/Ensure a loop RHR pump is running o Open E 11-F028B o Open E11-F027B o Ensure Loop is aligned to one of the following:

LPCI, Suppression Pool Cooling, or Drywell Spray.*When directed to spray the Drywell per SEP-02 o Ensure Recirc Pumps are tripped o Ensure Drywell Coolers not running o Close E11-F024B o Verify in Safe region of Drywell Spray Initiation Graph o Ensure"B" loop RHR pump running o Open E11-F021 B o Open E11-F016B*Notifies SRO when it is recognized that the E11-F016B will not open*****CRITICAL TASK****When directed, Emergency Depressurize the Reactor by placing 7 ADS valve control switches to Open.*As Reactor pressure lowers, controls injection systems (RHR, Core Spray)to prevent overfilling by throttling loop injection valves and/or securing pumps as necessary.

o RHR E11-F017A(B) o Core Spray E21-F005B NOTE: Indicated level will exceed 200 inches due to Emergency Depressurization swell.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 41

• • • EVENT 9/10 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL REQUIRING EMERGENCY DEPRESSURIZATION APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 42

• EVENT 11 LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE DUE TO REFERENCE LEG FLASHING-REACTOR FLOODING REQUIRED The crew will respond to indications of Reactor Pressure Vessel Level reference leg flashing, resulting in inability to determine reactor water level (entry condition for Reactor Flooding Procedure).

Objectives:

SCO As the reactor depressurizes, recognize indications of reference leg flashing resulting in no level instrumentation being available****CRITICAL TASK****Enter and execute EOP-01-RxFP,Reactor Flooding Procedure, and establish Minimum Reactor Flooding Pressure.RO/SOP Implement directions given by SCO to establish required Reactor Flooding Conditions to ensure adequate core cooling**Success Path: Reactor Pressure Vessel Injection has been established resulting in at least 5 safety relief valves (SRVs)being open with at least 50 psid (but as low as possible)between the Reactor and Suppression Chamber Pressure.Simulator Operator Activities:

• None 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 43

• • • EVENT 11 LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE DUE TO REFERENCE LEG FLASHING-REACTOR FLOODING REQUIRED Required Operator Actions: EOP Action-Entry into and Execution of Reactor Flooding Procedure SCO****CRITICAL TASK*****As the reactor depressurizes,correctlyevaluate indications to determine Level Instrument Reference Leg Flashing is occurring*Enter and execute EOP-01-RxFP, Reactor Flooding Procedure to ensure adequate core cooling*Determines 5 or more SRVs can be opened o Directs RO/80P to close 821 F022A-D (inbd MSIV's), 821-F028A-D (otbd MSIVs), E51-F0078 (RCIC), 821-F016/F019 (Drain bypasses)o Directs RO/80P to inject with RHR, Core Spray, CRD, and Alternate Cooling InjectionSystemsat maximum irrespective of NPSHNortex limits NOTE: If 5 or more SRVs can be Opened is answered NO, same steps, as above, except steam valve isolations arenotdirected.

o When Reactor pressure is at least 50 psig above Suppression Chamber Pressure, direct that injection be controlled to maintain at least 5 SRVs open.RO/BOP*Observe and report indications of Reactor Vessel Level indication reference leg flashing**When directed, Close821-F022A-D,821-F028A-D, E51-F008, 821-F016/F019 by placing their control switches to Closed.*When directed starts some/all of the following systems in any order to establish 5 SRVs open and 50 psid between Reactor Vessel and Suppression Chamber.o"8" Core Spray Pump;ensures E21-F0048/F0058 opens o"C" RHR Pump;ensures E11-F015A1F017 A opens o"8" and"D" RHR pumps;ensures E11-F0158/F0178 opens o If required, (ECCS pumps do not result in SRV opening)then starts01 systems (SLC injection) o Controls injection by throttling Core Spray Injection ValveF0058/RHR Injection Valves E11-F017A18) to maintain 5 SRVs open.2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 44

• • • EVENT 11 LEVEL INSTRUMENT FAILURE DUE TO REFERENCE LEG FLASHING-REACTOR FLOODING REQUIRED APPLICANT'S ACTIONS OR BEHAVIOR: 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 45

• • • Simulator Operator Activities:

WHEN directed by the lead examiner, place the simulator in FREEZE.CAUTION DO NOT RESET THE SIMULATOR PRIOR TO RECEIPT OF CONCURRENCE TO DO SO FROM THE LEAD EXAMINER 2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 46

• RPV Level Transmitters (FIGURE 01.2-4 from SO-01)Ot0210-U CR P604 1 P601 A I I I I I I I I I I I ,_,

0 50-'0550-P60W

I ,__I@'R615 CR 5977 P601 213 CORE HEIGHT.J I INTERLOCK I I I I I

, I R606 CR B P6D3*

...2/3 CORE HEIGHT..INTERLOCK---

LI RSi0-150-to+150'" CR*CONTROL ROOM*2007 NRC Examination Scenario#1 47

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