ML18096A676

LER 92-009-00:on 920406,blackout Loading Occurred on 1B Vital Bus.Caused by Personnel Error.A Night Order Book Entry Has Been Made re-stressing Self Verification Techniques & Need to Maintain Attention to detail.W/920430 Ltr

ML18096A676
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	04/30/1992
From:	POLLACK M J, VONDRA C A Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-92-009, LER-92-9, NUDOCS 9205070042
Download: ML18096A676 (5)

Text

• Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO.* 1. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 92-009-00 April 30, 1992 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant t6 the requirements of the* Code of Federal Regulations lOCFR 50.73(a) (2) (iv}. This report is required to be. issued within thirty (30) days of event discovery.

MJP:pc Distribution Sincerely yours, ,-/ l . ..

I j 1 * *. / I /(,,.,:{ / ,./ /ii C. A Vondra General Manager -Salem Operations

/"! \1 /, . / l *. *' . 9205070042 920430 PDR ADOCK 05000272 / 1: v I I I fli'ilC FORM 366 16-89) U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVE'1 OMB NO. 3150*0104 EXf*IRES:

4130/92 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WTH THIS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE RECORDS . AND REPORTS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IP*530J, U.S. NUCLEAR J REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 20555, AND TO THE .PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150-0104), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20503. FACILITY NA.ME (11. I DOCKET NUMBER 121 I PAGE 131 Salem Generating Station ,.... Unit 1 o ts t o t o t o t 2 17 I 2 1 l oi= 0.14 -TITLE 141 ESF Actuation:

Blackout Loading On lB Vital.Bus Undervoltage Due To Personnel Error* . . EVENT DATE 151 LER NUMBER (61 REPORT DATE 171 . OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 MONTH D.AY YEAR YEAR :() SEQUENTIAL

!t\ REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBERISI NUMBER NUMBER 0 1 5 \ o to I o 1 I I 0J4 oJ 6 9 2 9 12 -o I 019 -ojo ol 4 3Jo 91-.2 0 I 5 I 0 I 0* I O 1 I I OPERATING THI& REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE RtQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check on* or moro of rh* following}

1111 MODE (9) 5 20.402lbJ 20.405.lcJ x 50.73(ol(2J(ivl 73.711bl ---POWER 20.405(olf1 lfil 50.38(cll1 I 50.731o1121M 73.71 (cl LEVEL o,o 0-*---1101 20.405(0)(1 Jliil 50.38(cJl2J 50.73(o112Jlviil

• OTHER tn Abstr*ct 11111 I :: ---

• nd in Ttutr, NRC Form 20.405(o)(1 lfiiil 50.73(oJ(2JliJ 50.731oll2HviiiJIAI J66AJ --20.405(oJl1 lll*I 50.73(oll2lliil 50.73101 (21 (viii I (Bl --20.40filol11 IM 50.731*112lliii) 50.731*11211*1 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER 112! NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE M. J. Pollack -LER Coordinator 61 0 I 313 19 I 12 10 I 212 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 1131 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC* REPORTABLE 1:::*:.::

MANUFAC* REPORTABLE

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TUR ER TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUR ER TQ NPRDS .;:::;:;:::;:;:-:;:;

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c< :::: SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 EX.PECTED MONTH DAY YEAR I YES (If vos. compl*r* EXPECTED SUBMISSION DA TEI SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I AB_STRACT fllmir ro 1400 S(JaC8S i fl .* a(Jpro}l(im*rety fifreen smgltJ*SJ)lJCtl ry(Jt!Wrirren lines/ Ori April 6, 1992, at 2213 hours0.0256 days <br />0.615 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.420465e-4 months <br />, a* ,blackout loading occurred on lB Vital Bus. At the time of the event,. the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) were being. started to facilitate Reactor coolant System (RC_S) cleanup (i.e. r "crud burst" operations).

The lB Diesel Generator (D/G) started and loaded per design. The root cause of this event has been attributed to personnel error as a result of inattention to detail. The Control Room reviewed procedure -oI II-1.3.1,. "Reactor Coolant Pump prior to putting the No. 14 RCP in service but did not complete the required procedure steps. The procedure requires the operator to depress "Defeat 2nd* Level Undervoltage" bezel pushbuttons prior to starting ari RCP, which the operator did not After initiating partial action to start No. 14 RCP, the operator had to respond to an alarm. When he returned to start the No. 14 RCP, he failed to recognize that he had not pushed the manual defeat bezel pushbuttons thereby resulting in the II B II Vital Bus experiencing a valid undervoltage condition.

This event has been reviewed by Operations Department management.

Appropriate corrective disciplinary.

action with the individual(s) involved has been completed.

A Night Order Book (NOB) entry has been made re-stressing self verification techniques and the need to maintain attention to detail when performing work. The 'lB 4KV Vital Bus was returned to service at 0053 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> on April 7, l992. NRC. Form 366 16-891 1-. . . *

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER} TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER .

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse*

Pressurized Water Reactor PAGE 2 of 4. Energy Industry Identification (EIIS) codes in the text as *[xx} IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Engineered Safety Actuation; Blackout Loading on lB Vital Bus Due To Personnel Error Event Date:

Report Date: 4/30/92 This *report was initiated by Incident Report No.92-228. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown);

lQth Refueling Outage in progress . DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On April 6, 1992, at 2213 hours0.0256 days <br />0.615 hours <br />0.00366 weeks <br />8.420465e-4 months <br />, a* blackout loading occurred on lB Vital Bus {EB}. At the time of the event, the Reactor Coolant Pumps (RCP) [AB} were being started to facilitate Reactor Coolant System (RCS) {AB} cleanup "crud burst" operations).

The lB biesel Generator (D/G) JEKI. started and loaded per design. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was notified of the inadvertent actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) [JEI, loading, at 2300 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.0038 weeks <br />8.7515e-4 months <br /> on *April 6, 1992, in with Code of Federal Reguiations lOCFR so. 72 (b) ( 2) (ii) *

• APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE*:

The root of this event has been attributed to personnel error as a result of inattention to detail. The Control Room Operator reviewed procedure OI Coolant Pump Operation", prior to putting the No. 14 RCP in service but did not complete the required procedure procedure the operator*

to depress the "Defeat 2nd Level Undervoltage" bezel pushbuttons prior to starting an RCP, which the operator did not do. As stated above, the RCPs were being* cycled to facilitate RCS cleanup during crud burst operations.

Prior to this event, the Nos. 11 and 12 RCPs had successfully initiating partiai action to start No. 14 RCP, the operator had to respond to a Spent Fuel Pool low level alarm.

he returned to start the No. 14 RCP, he failed to recognize that he had not pushed the mariual defeat bezel pushbuttons for the Vital Busses thereby resulting-in the "B" Vital _Bus a valid undervoltage The "A" and

• ** LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Generating Station Unit 1 APPARENT CAUSE OF.OCCURRENCE:

DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 (cont'd) LER NUMBER 92-009-00 PAGE 3 of 4 "C" Vital did not experience a valid undervoltage since they were being powered from the other Station Power Transformer at the time of this event. ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Prior to RCS and Generator work, in of refueling/

maintenance outages*, "crud burst" operations are performed to minimize dose received in support of work. This operation includes . the addition of hydrogen peroxide which breaks. up' a_ccumulated corrosion-products (i.e.,.crud).

The RCPs run. to help facilitate crud . When a RCP is started I procedure OI II-1. 3 .1 requires defeating the vital busses' secondary level undervoltage protection which set at less than 91.6% of 4160 for 13 seconds. 'Thia prevents blackout loading on the vital busses due to the momentary undervoltage . condition caused by the start of a RCP motor.

• The undervoltage protection automatically reinstates within 2 minutes of depressing the. pushbuttons.

In Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), both the Group Busses and the Vital are powered from the Station Pqwer Transformers.

The RCPs are powered from the Group Busses. Therefore, undervoltage conditions on the Group Busses, caused by a RCP start, are also seen on the Vital Busses. The lB 4KV Vital Bus specifically provides load to the lB 460 VAC Vital Bus; _the lB 230 VAC Vital Bus and the following safety related pumps: No. 12 Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater* (MDAFW) Pump {BAI No. 11 Centrifugal Charging Pump No. 13 Service Water Pump No. 14 Service Water Pump No. 12 Residual Heat Removal Pump No. 12 Cqmponent Cooling Pump Nos. 11 and 12 Steam Generators (S/Gs) are fed with the automatic start of the No.* 12 MDAFW Pump. Prior to this event, No. 12 MDAFW Pump had been put in service for chemical*

addition to No. *11 S/G. During this event, Generator level was automatically per program. In this event, the lB Vital Bus undervoltage protection functioned as designed.

The SEC {JC} received a valid bus undervoltage signal resulting in the successful blackout loading of the lB Vital Bus. The lB D/G started and loaded per design .. Therefore, this event did not affect the health-or safety of the public. It is reportable, due to actuation of an ESF system, in accordance with Code of Federal Regulation lOCFR 50.73(a) (2j

" ** -*. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER} TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station. Unit 1 ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

DOCKET NUMBER 5000272 (cont'd} LER NUMBER 92-009-00 PAGE 4-of 4 On 7, 1989 (reference LER 272/89-008-00),

of a Vital Bus, due to the start of a RCP, had occurred.

Although *the initiating circumstances were different (i.e.,* Unit was in Mode 3 and functional testing was in progress}

the root cause was to this everit. -CORRECTIVE ACTION: This* event has been reviewed by Operations Department management.

Appropriate correc_tive disciplinary action with the individual (s} involv.ed has been . completed.

A Night Order Book (NOB) entry has been made re-stressing self verification techniques and the need to maintain.

attention to detail when performing work. The 1B 41\V Vital Bus was returned to service at 0053 hours6.134259e-4 days <br />0.0147 hours <br />8.763227e-5 weeks <br />2.01665e-5 months <br /> on April 7, 1992. .. MJP :pc SORC Mtg.92-054 &p:_ General Manager -Salem Operations