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| {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3160-0104 14-1161 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTWATED l!IURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH 1lU MANDATORY INFORMATION COll.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO 1lE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. | | {{#Wiki_filter:NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3160-0104 14-1161 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTWATED l!IURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH 1lU MANDATORY INFORMATION COll.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO 1lE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. |
| FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO 1lE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC (See reverse for required number of 20555-0001. | | FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO 1lE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC (See reverse for required number of 20555-0001. |
| AND TO THE PAPSIWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150* 01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC digits/characters for each block) 20503. FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE (:ii SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 8 TITLE 141 INOPERABLE 230 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS DUE TO FAILED BUS BAR BOLTING EVENT DATE 161 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 YEM I FACIUTY NAM& OOC:KEr NUWIBI MONTH DAY YEM SEQUENTIAL I llUEVlllON MONTH DAY YEM NlN8DI Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 05000311 09 14 95 95 020 00 10 13 95 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMaER ----OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR I: !Check one or morel 1111 MODE 191 N 20.2201(bl 20.2203(all2llvl | | AND TO THE PAPSIWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150* 01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC digits/characters for each block) 20503. FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE (:ii SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 8 TITLE 141 INOPERABLE 230 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS DUE TO FAILED BUS BAR BOLTING EVENT DATE 161 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 YEM I FACIUTY NAM& OOC:KEr NUWIBI MONTH DAY YEM SEQUENTIAL I llUEVlllON MONTH DAY YEM NlN8DI Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 05000311 09 14 95 95 020 00 10 13 95 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMaER ----OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR I: !Check one or morel 1111 MODE 191 N 20.2201(bl 20.2203(all2llvl |
| : 50. 731all2llil | | : 50. 731all2llil |
| : 50. 731all211viiil POWER 20.2203(all1 l 20.2203(all311il x 50. 73(all2lllil | | : 50. 731all211viiil POWER 20.2203(all1 l 20.2203(all311il x 50. 73(all2lllil |
| : 50. 731all211xl LEVEL 1101 000 20.22031all2llil 20.2203lall311iil | | : 50. 731all211xl LEVEL 1101 000 20.22031all2llil 20.2203lall311iil |
| : 50. 73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71 -20.22031*112)(ii) 20.22031111141 | | : 50. 73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71 -20.22031*112)(ii) 20.22031111141 |
| : 50. 73(all2lllvl OTHER 20.2203(all211iiil 50.36(c)(1 I 60. 731a)(2)(v) | | : 50. 73(all2lllvl OTHER 20.2203(all211iiil 50.36(c)(1 I 60. 731a)(2)(v) |
| SpecHy In Abetntct below 20.22031*112111vl | | SpecHy In Abetntct below 20.22031*112111vl |
| : 50. 73(a112llviil or In NRC Fonn 366A 50.361cll21 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (lndudoo AIM Codel Mr. M. Mortarulo. | | : 50. 73(a112llviil or In NRC Fonn 366A 50.361cll21 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (lndudoo AIM Codel Mr. M. Mortarulo. |
| Controls and Electrical Supervisor. | | Controls and Electrical Supervisor. |
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| PSE&G contacted Brunswick to obtain additional information on their analysis and received a copy of their metallurgical evaluation, which indicated Stress Corrosion Cracking as the failure mechanism. | | PSE&G contacted Brunswick to obtain additional information on their analysis and received a copy of their metallurgical evaluation, which indicated Stress Corrosion Cracking as the failure mechanism. |
| Based upon a review by the Engineering Analysis staff including the newly obtained Brunswick failure information, a follow-up assessment of operability concluded on September 14, 1995 that the MCCs could not be considered operable due to concerns regarding the MCC bus bar connections' ability to retain their integrity during a seismic event. NRC FORM 366A (+85) 1.: NRC FORM 368A 14-1151 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL j .-w NINBBI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT llf more apace le required. | | Based upon a review by the Engineering Analysis staff including the newly obtained Brunswick failure information, a follow-up assessment of operability concluded on September 14, 1995 that the MCCs could not be considered operable due to concerns regarding the MCC bus bar connections' ability to retain their integrity during a seismic event. NRC FORM 366A (+85) 1.: NRC FORM 368A 14-1151 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL j .-w NINBBI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT llf more apace le required. |
| use additional coplH of NRC Form 366AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 5 of 8 The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were declared inoperable at 2105 on September 14, 1995 for both Salem Generating Station Units #1 and #2. Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 for Salem Unit #2 was applicable as well as multiple other Technical Specifications based on equipment supplied by the affected MCCs for both units. The Salem Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) placed a four hour report call to the US NRC Operations Center at 2302 hours on 9/14/95 informing them of this condition per 10CFR50.72(b) | | use additional coplH of NRC Form 366AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 5 of 8 The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were declared inoperable at 2105 on September 14, 1995 for both Salem Generating Station Units #1 and #2. Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 for Salem Unit #2 was applicable as well as multiple other Technical Specifications based on equipment supplied by the affected MCCs for both units. The Salem Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) placed a four hour report call to the US NRC Operations Center at 2302 hours on 9/14/95 informing them of this condition per 10CFR50.72(b) |
| (2) (i). Containment integrity was established for Salem Unit #2 at 0345 on September 15, 1995, thus satisfying Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 action requirements. | | (2) (i). Containment integrity was established for Salem Unit #2 at 0345 on September 15, 1995, thus satisfying Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 action requirements. |
| APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The root cause for the bolt failure is Corrosion Cracking. | | APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The root cause for the bolt failure is Corrosion Cracking. |
Similar Documents at Salem |
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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3160-0104 14-1161 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTWATED l!IURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH 1lU MANDATORY INFORMATION COll.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO 1lE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO 1lE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC (See reverse for required number of 20555-0001.
AND TO THE PAPSIWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150* 01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC digits/characters for each block) 20503. FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE (:ii SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 8 TITLE 141 INOPERABLE 230 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS DUE TO FAILED BUS BAR BOLTING EVENT DATE 161 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 YEM I FACIUTY NAM& OOC:KEr NUWIBI MONTH DAY YEM SEQUENTIAL I llUEVlllON MONTH DAY YEM NlN8DI Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 05000311 09 14 95 95 020 00 10 13 95 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMaER ----OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR I: !Check one or morel 1111 MODE 191 N 20.2201(bl 20.2203(all2llvl
- 50. 731all2llil
- 50. 731all211viiil POWER 20.2203(all1 l 20.2203(all311il x 50. 73(all2lllil
- 50. 731all211xl LEVEL 1101 000 20.22031all2llil 20.2203lall311iil
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71 -20.22031*112)(ii) 20.22031111141
- 50. 73(all2lllvl OTHER 20.2203(all211iiil 50.36(c)(1 I 60. 731a)(2)(v)
SpecHy In Abetntct below 20.22031*112111vl
- 50. 73(a112llviil or In NRC Fonn 366A 50.361cll21 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (lndudoo AIM Codel Mr. M. Mortarulo.
Controls and Electrical Supervisor.
Salem Station 609-339-2741 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU:ACTURSI llEPORT ABlE }ikl1! CAUSE SY&TENI COMPONENT MANIFACTUliR REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS dt B ED BU GOSO NO ., *=:::-: '
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR 'YES xlNO SUBMISSION (If yea, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE 1161 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 ap*cn. I.e .. approximately 16 aingle-apaced typewritten lines) (161 On 9/14/95 all Salem Unit #1 and Unit #2 Vital 230 Volt motor control centers (MCC) were declared inoperable due to a lack of assurance that the MCCs could withstand a seismic event. During an inspection of 230 Volt lB West Vital MCC, 5 of 48 5/16 inch diameter silicon bronze carriage bolts connecting the vertical cubicle bus bars to the horizontal main bus failed when attempts were made to torque the bolts. Following the discovery of the failed bolts, an operability assessment resulted in all related MCCs being declared inoperable.
A design change was implemented to replace all of the silicon bronze bolts with carbon steel bolts. The safety significance for this event was determined to be low. The apparent root cause for the bolting failure was stress corrosion cracking.
This was reported in accordance with lOCFRSO. 72 (b) (2) (i) within four hours of discovery and also within thirty days per lOCFRSO. 73 (a) (2) (ii) (B), any operation or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant. ----. -----*-----9510200228 951013 NRC FORM 368 14-961 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR
\ { " ---**---------) NRC FORM 368A 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 181 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I llM!ION NUMBER N'-""BER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 -020 --00 TEXT IH more *pace is required.
UH additional coplu of NRC Form 388AI 1171 PLANT .AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse
-Pressurized Water Reactor 230 Volt Motor Control Center {ED/BU}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {SS/CCC}.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE PAGE 131 2 of 8 On September 14, 1995, following an engineering review of failed bolts found in the lB West vital 230 Volt bus, the affected MCC and all related MCCs were declared inoperable as there was no assurance that the MCCs could continue to perform their function following a seismic event. Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.2 requires that when in modes 5 and 6 that a minimum of two AC electrical bus trains shall be operable with each train consisting of at least one 230 Volt vital bus and associated MCCs operable (applicable only to Unit #2 at the time since Unit #1 was defueled).
Event Date: September 14, 1995 Discovery Date: September 14, 1995 Report Date: October 13, 1995 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Defueled, Reactor Power 0% for Unit #1 Mode 5, Reactor Power 0% for Unit #2 The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were energized.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On April 7, 1988, the US NRC issued NRC Information Notice 88-11 discussing potential loss of motor control center and/or switchboard function due to faulty bus tie bolts in GE 7700 series MCCs. This Information Notice as well as INPO Significant Event Report 12-88 (SER), were subsequently reviewed by PSE&G for applicability to Salem Generating*
Station, Units #1 and #2. The review concluded that a limited inspection was appropriate to determine the significance of the bus bar bolting connection concerns identified in both documents.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 368A 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I l'IMSION NUM8Bt NUMBEl'I SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT (If more *pace 18 required, u .. additional copiu of NRC Form 366AI I 1 71 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 3 of 8 On July 8, 1988, a 230 Volt non-vital MCC (GE 7700 series) in the Fuel Handling Building was removed from service and visually examined by removing all bolted fasteners.
No cracking or material degradation was documented from the July 8, 1988 visual inspection.
Based on the determination that silicon bronze bolts were confirmed to be in 230 Volt MCCs, it was decided to pursue inspections of a sample of other 230 Volt MCCs. This follow-up examination was planned to sample four vital MCCs in each unit. MCCs were designated to be inspected from three different environments by targeting MCCs in the Service Water Intake Structure, Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building.
Since no previous bolting failures had been identified, it was planned to inspect only a sample of bolts in the targeted MCCs. However because of the potential that a visual inspection might not be adequate for assessing Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), a microscopic examination by a iaboratory was deemed appropriate.
Thus, replacement silicon bronze bolting materials were identified as being required to provide for replacement bolts before the examination work could be authorized.
The examination requirement was tracked in the Salem Generating Station Action Tracking System (ATS). The action item provided direction to remove and conduct a laboratory examination of bolts in four MCCs during Unit #1 outage lRlO (planned for 4/4/92 to 6/15/92) and Unit #2 outage 2R7(planned for 3/27/93 to 5/20/93).
The task required removal, replacement, and examination of one dozen silicon bronze bolts of every type and size for each of the selected MCCs. In preparation for* the planned bolt sampling plan, the System Engineer for the 230 Volt buses requested that replacement silicon bronze bolts be procured.
Procurement activities were never completed, and as a result, the bolt removal and examination was deferred since replacement bolts had not been received.
Thus the task was not performed in the outages identified in the initial plans described above. Prior to the initiation of the Salem System Readiness reviews, the task had been rescheduled to be performed in the 1996 refueling outages. NRC FORM 366A (4-115)
L.' NRC FORM 368A 14-1161 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 11 I DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (81 YEMI I= SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT (If more *p*ce 18 ,.qulr*d, UH addition*!
cople* of NRC Form 386AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 4 of 8 Salem System Readiness Reviews, conducted in July and August of 1995, which were being performed to establish the readiness of Salem Units 1 and 2 for restart, identified that the 230 Volt vital MCCs had not been inspected for the bus bar bolting concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 88-11. It was also identified that the Maintenance Procedure (SC.MD-PM.ZZ-OOlO(Q)-
GE Series 7700 Line Motor Control Center) did not specify a torque value for the silicon bronze carriage bolts. The procedure previously only required that the connections be verified hand tight and was last used on the lB West vital bus on March 6, 1991. This procedure was then revised to add a torque value of 9 ft-lbs. This inspection and torquing was listed as a requirement for completion prior to Salem Units 1 2 restart. The revised procedure was used for the first time when the lB West vital bus maintenance began on September 5, 1995. The first MCC to be inspected was the 230 Volt lB West vital MCC. Five of a total of 48 bolts in this MCC failed when a torque of less than 20 inch-lbs was applied. The remaining bolts were successfully torqued to 9 ft-lbs. In each instance of encountering a failed bolt, the second bolt at the connection was intact. A Service Water MCC being examined in parallel with the lB West vital MCC indicated a similar failure rate. Two of 18 bolts torqued failed in this MCC. Based upon the high rate of failure (10%) of the bus bar bolts, the preventive maintenance on the vital MCCs was halted to initiate an investigation.
NRC Information Notice 88-11 was reviewed during the preliminary investigation.
This Information Notice indicated that at Brunswick Units 1&2, GE Series 7700 Motor Control Centers experienced numerous 5/16 inch silicon bronze bolt connecting bus bar failures.
PSE&G contacted Brunswick to obtain additional information on their analysis and received a copy of their metallurgical evaluation, which indicated Stress Corrosion Cracking as the failure mechanism.
Based upon a review by the Engineering Analysis staff including the newly obtained Brunswick failure information, a follow-up assessment of operability concluded on September 14, 1995 that the MCCs could not be considered operable due to concerns regarding the MCC bus bar connections' ability to retain their integrity during a seismic event. NRC FORM 366A (+85) 1.: NRC FORM 368A 14-1151 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL j .-w NINBBI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT llf more apace le required.
use additional coplH of NRC Form 366AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 5 of 8 The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were declared inoperable at 2105 on September 14, 1995 for both Salem Generating Station Units #1 and #2. Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 for Salem Unit #2 was applicable as well as multiple other Technical Specifications based on equipment supplied by the affected MCCs for both units. The Salem Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) placed a four hour report call to the US NRC Operations Center at 2302 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.00381 weeks <br />8.75911e-4 months <br /> on 9/14/95 informing them of this condition per 10CFR50.72(b)
(2) (i). Containment integrity was established for Salem Unit #2 at 0345 on September 15, 1995, thus satisfying Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 action requirements.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The root cause for the bolt failure is Corrosion Cracking.
Specifically, the presence of apparent corrodents (chlorine, sulfur, and sodium) at the fracture area, the morphology of the cracking (predominantly intergranular), and the presence of stress (strain lines in the grains) at the bolt head suggests that the "short" silicon bronze bolts failed by stress corrosion cracking.
The ductile type fracture observed in the "long" failed bolt apparently occurred due to applied stress (load) at the bolt head. The presence of corrodents (chlorine and sulfur) and some intergranular cracking observed at the fracture suggests that the failure may have been initiated by stress corrosion cracking.
The root cause for the delay in completing the MCC examinations was ineffective system engineer action to complete in a timely manner, i.e. a personnel error. Contributing to the event was inadequate management oversight into the extension of task due dates. PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES There are no prior similar occurrences for bolting failures of this type at Salem Station. NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
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- NRC FORM 366A 14-961 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I l'EIBDN NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT IH more *pace i. raqulr*d.
UH additional copiH of NRC Form 366AI 11 71 PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (cont'd) PAGE 131 6 of 8 The failure to complete tasks coupled with ineffective management oversight is related to other recent events that have been the subject of a Notice .of Violation regarding failures in meeting 10CFR50 Appendix B requirements.
This event represents a condition which occurred as a result of the programmatic breakdowns cited in the Notice of Violation.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The purpose of the 230 Volt distribution system is to provide a reliable source of power to the 230 Volt plant auxiliaries necessary for the generation of power by the main turbine-generator unit and as required for plant safety during normal, shutdown, and emergency modes of plant operation.
Section 8.3 of the Salem UFSAR describes Onsite Power Systems and the requirements of the Electrical Power System. Section 8.3.1.3 states that the 230 Volt system feeds smaller loads and for convenience of operation, a few motors larger than 15 hp. The 4160 Volt system feeds the 230 Volt system via step down transformers.
Each vital instrument bus Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) receives as its normal source, vital 230 Volt AC (VAC) power. The 230 VAC power is then rectified to DC and then reconverted to AC power. In the event of a 230 VAC power loss or a UPS malfunction, 125 VDC vital station battery power will automatically supply power to the UPS inverters via an auctioneering circuit to maintain the uninterruptible power.
460 Volt and 230 VAC switchgear loads in Elevation 84' Switchgear Room are not affected by this bolting failure mode since the switchgear is ITE K-Line with carbon steel bolts. For the original 5/16"-18 silicon bronze bolt (ASTM F-468 No.651, having 70 ksi minimum tensile strength and 53 ksi minimum yield stress, 0.0524 square inches tensile stress area and 0.0454 square inches area of minor diameter) the calculated pre-tension is 1728 lbs. due to 9 ft.-lbs. torque, and allowable shear is 540 lbs. NRC FORM 368A (4-95)
- NRC FORM 366A 14-1161 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER) TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 11 DOCKET NUMBER 121
- LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTUU.
I ll'BoWDN NUWISI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 TEXT IH more mpece i. required, u .. additional copiea of NRC Form 366AI I 1 71 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (cont'd) PAGE 131 7 of 8 The forces applied at a single bolt connection due to the anticipated design basis earthquake are 50 lbs. tension and 82 lbs. shear. These applied forces are significantly less than the allowable forces at the connection.
This assures that the bus bars would have remained clamped together during and after a design basis earthquake event, assuming a single bolt with complete integrity in place per bus bar connection.
Thus, with at least one bolt per phase, the degraded bus bar connections would have survived a design basis earthquake event without jeopardizing the safety of the plant. In each of the two buses with failed bolts, each connection had at least one bolt that held the correct torque. A visual examination of 284 bolts (entire population of bolts inspected to date, not including nine bolts sent to the PSE&G Testing Laboratory for examination) revealed that 16 bolts had exhibited cracking.
Varying degrees of corrosive attack were evident on all bolts examined.
Of the 16 cracked bolts, seven bolts were in configurations that could have rendered the associated equipment inoperable if the bolts had failed during a design basis seismic event. The affected electrical loads are: 1) motor operated valve lRHl, isolation of RHR suction from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), 2) motor operated valve 21RH29, a minimum flow valve for one of the two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps for Unit #2, and 3) the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Vital Motor Control Center. During power operations, lRHl is closed and the breaker tagged out, thus loss of the breaker is not safety significant.
If lRHl was open during a reactor cooldown and rendered inoperable, 1RH2 serves as a backup isolation.
Loss of the power supply to 21RH29 could allow the 21 RHR pump to overheat if the pump is deadheaded for an extended period of time. This would result in the loss of one of two RHR pumps which is within the design basis for Salem ECCS requirements.
The loss of the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Vital MCC would cause the loss of the 2A diesel. In the event of a sustained loss of off site power, loads fed from the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator would not be powered. However, the design basis for Salem Station is that any two of the diesel generators and their associated vital buses can supply sufficient power for operation of the required safeguards equipment for a design basis LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power. NRC FORM 366A (4-95) j:.
- NRC FORM 366A 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I 1 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I NMSION NUMBER NUMBBl PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --020 --00 a ot a TEXT (If more *pace 18 r*qulred, uu additional copla of NRC Form 3&6AI I 1 71 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (cont'd) Therefore, based upon the evidence available, the safety significance is believed to be low since each bus (except as noted previously) would have maintained its integrity during a seismic event. However, it is recognized that the programmatic failure in management oversight coupled with the hardware deficiencies had the potential for significant common mode failures had the deficiencies gone undetected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 1. Design Change Package DCP-lER-0098 was implemented and completed on Unit #2 Vital 230 Volt MCCs to replace all bus bolts with carbon steel bolts. This action was completed on September 25, 1995. 2. Design change package (DCP-lER-0098) for Unit #1 Vital 230 Volt MCCs to replace all bus bolts with carbon steel bolts will be completed by December 31, 1995. 3. Non Vital bus bolt replacement for Unit #1 will be completed by December 3i, 1995. 4. Non Vital Bus bolt replacement for Unit #2 will be completed by March ' 31, 1996. 5. Improve the Operating Experience Program (OEP) by March 31, 1996 to ensure that action items coming from industry events are addressed and closed in a timely manner. As specific tasks are developed from an operating experience issue, these tasks will be monitored until closure by the OEP. Thus the program will be equipped with an effective feedback link which will assure that the scheduling and execution of specific tasks are accomplished without undue delay. 6. The following corrective actions have been implemented as part of PSE&G's response to address the basic issue of timely corrective actions in meeting the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. These initiatives are relevant to this LER in addition to their broader role in improving operations at Salem Station. a. Reducing the backlog of open issues by examining those issues and taking effective action prior to Salem units restart. b. Improved Salem Station management oversight, expectations, and standards with new Station and Nuclear Business Unit management.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95) --..-., .. -:-*-.**--
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