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NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3160-0104 14-1161 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTWATED l!IURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH 1lU MANDATORY INFORMATION COll.ECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
REPORTED LESSONS LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO 1lE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY.
FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO 1lE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (T*6 F33J, U.S. NUCLEAR REGUlATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC (See reverse for required number of 20555-0001. AND TO THE PAPSIWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13150*
01041. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC digits/characters for each block) 20503.
FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE (:ii SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 1 of 8 TITLE 141 INOPERABLE 230 VOLT MOTOR CONTROL CENTERS DUE TO FAILED BUS BAR BOLTING EVENT DATE 161 LER NUMBER 161 REPORT DATE 171 OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 181 YEM I FACIUTY NAM&
OOC:KEr NUWIBI MONTH DAY YEM SEQUENTIAL I llUEVlllON MONTH DAY YEM NlN8DI N~
Salem Generating Station, Unit 2 05000311 09 14 95 95 020 00 10 13 95 FACIUTY NAME DOCKET NUMaER OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR I: !Check one or morel 1111 MODE 191 N
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- 50. 731all2llil
- 50. 731all211viiil POWER 20.2203(all1 l 20.2203(all311il x
- 50. 73(all2lllil
- 50. 731all211xl LEVEL 1101 000 20.22031all2llil 20.2203lall311iil
- 50. 73(a)(2)(iiil 73.71 20.22031*112)(ii) 20.22031111141
- 50. 73(all2lllvl OTHER 20.2203(all211iiil 50.36(c)(1 I
- 60. 731a)(2)(v)
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- 50. 73(a112llviil or In NRC Fonn 366A
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50.361cll21 LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (121 NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (lndudoo AIM Codel Mr. M. Mortarulo. Controls and Electrical Supervisor. Salem Station 609-339-2741 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE
SYSTEM COMPONENT MANU:ACTURSI llEPORT ABlE }ikl1!
CAUSE
SY&TENI COMPONENT MANIFACTUliR REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS dt B
ED BU GOSO NO
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 1141 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR
'YES xlNO SUBMISSION (If yea, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).
DATE 1161 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 ap*cn. I.e.. approximately 16 aingle-apaced typewritten lines) (161 On 9/14/95 all Salem Unit #1 and Unit #2 Vital 230 Volt motor control centers (MCC) were declared inoperable due to a lack of assurance that the MCCs could withstand a seismic event. During an inspection of 230 Volt lB West Vital MCC, 5 of 48 5/16 inch diameter silicon bronze carriage bolts connecting the vertical cubicle bus bars to the horizontal main bus failed when attempts were made to torque the bolts. Following the discovery of the failed bolts, an operability assessment resulted in all related MCCs being declared inoperable. A design change was implemented to replace all of the silicon bronze bolts with carbon steel bolts. The safety significance for this event was determined to be low. The apparent root cause for the bolting failure was stress corrosion cracking.
This was reported in accordance with 10CFRSO. 72 (b) (2) (i) within four hours of discovery and also within thirty days per 10CFRSO. 73 (a) (2) (ii) (B), any operation or condition that resulted in the nuclear power plant being in a condition that was outside the design basis of the plant.
9510200228 951013 NRC FORM 368 14-961 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S
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NRC FORM 368A 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 181 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I llM!ION NUMBER N'-""BER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 -
020 --
00 TEXT IH more *pace is required. UH additional coplu of NRC Form 388AI 1171 PLANT.AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor 230 Volt Motor Control Center {ED/BU}*
- Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes and component function identifier codes appear in the text as {SS/CCC}.
IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE PAGE 131 2
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On September 14, 1995, following an engineering review of failed bolts found in the lB West vital 230 Volt bus, the affected MCC and all related MCCs were declared inoperable as there was no assurance that the MCCs could continue to perform their function following a seismic event. Technical Specifications section 3.8.2.2 requires that when in modes 5 and 6 that a minimum of two AC electrical bus trains shall be operable with each train consisting of at least one 230 Volt vital bus and associated MCCs operable (applicable only to Unit #2 at the time since Unit #1 was defueled).
Event Date: September 14, 1995 Discovery Date: September 14, 1995 Report Date: October 13, 1995 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Defueled, Reactor Power 0% for Unit #1 Mode 5, Reactor Power 0% for Unit #2 The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were energized.
DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE On April 7, 1988, the US NRC issued NRC Information Notice 88-11 discussing potential loss of motor control center and/or switchboard function due to faulty bus tie bolts in GE 7700 series MCCs. This Information Notice as well as INPO Significant Event Report 12-88 (SER), were subsequently reviewed by PSE&G for applicability to Salem Generating* Station, Units #1 and #2. The review concluded that a limited inspection was appropriate to determine the significance of the bus bar bolting connection concerns identified in both documents.
NRC FORM 368A 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I l'IMSION NUM8Bt NUMBEl'I SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
020 --
00 TEXT (If more *pace 18 required, u.. additional copiu of NRC Form 366AI I 1 71 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
PAGE 131 3
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On July 8, 1988, a 230 Volt non-vital MCC (GE 7700 series) in the Fuel Handling Building was removed from service and visually examined by removing all bolted fasteners. No cracking or material degradation was documented from the July 8, 1988 visual inspection. Based on the determination that silicon bronze bolts were confirmed to be in 230 Volt MCCs, it was decided to pursue inspections of a sample of other 230 Volt MCCs.
This follow-up examination was planned to sample four vital MCCs in each unit. MCCs were designated to be inspected from three different environments by targeting MCCs in the Service Water Intake Structure, Turbine Building and Auxiliary Building. Since no previous bolting failures had been identified, it was planned to inspect only a sample of bolts in the targeted MCCs. However because of the potential that a visual inspection might not be adequate for assessing Stress Corrosion Cracking (SCC), a microscopic examination by a iaboratory was deemed appropriate.
Thus, replacement silicon bronze bolting materials were identified as being required to provide for replacement bolts before the examination work could be authorized.
The examination requirement was tracked in the Salem Generating Station Action Tracking System (ATS). The action item provided direction to remove and conduct a laboratory examination of bolts in four MCCs during Unit #1 outage lRlO (planned for 4/4/92 to 6/15/92) and Unit #2 outage 2R7(planned for 3/27/93 to 5/20/93).
The task required removal, replacement, and examination of one dozen silicon bronze bolts of every type and size for each of the selected MCCs.
In preparation for* the planned bolt sampling plan, the System Engineer for the 230 Volt buses requested that replacement silicon bronze bolts be procured. Procurement activities were never completed, and as a result, the bolt removal and examination was deferred since replacement bolts had not been received. Thus the task was not performed in the outages identified in the initial plans described above. Prior to the initiation of the Salem System Readiness reviews, the task had been rescheduled to be performed in the 1996 refueling outages.
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NRC FORM 368A 14-1161 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 11 I DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER (81 YEMI ~AL I=
SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
020 --
00 TEXT (If more *p*ce 18,.qulr*d, UH addition*! cople* of NRC Form 386AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
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Salem System Readiness Reviews, conducted in July and August of 1995, which were being performed to establish the readiness of Salem Units 1 and 2 for restart, identified that the 230 Volt vital MCCs had not been inspected for the bus bar bolting concerns identified in NRC Information Notice 88-11. It was also identified that the Maintenance Procedure (SC.MD-PM.ZZ-OOlO(Q)- GE Series 7700 Line Motor Control Center) did not specify a torque value for the silicon bronze carriage bolts. The procedure previously only required that the connections be verified hand tight and was last used on the lB West vital bus on March 6, 1991. This procedure was then revised to add a torque value of 9 ft-lbs. This inspection and torquing was listed as a requirement for completion prior to Salem Units 1
~nd 2 restart.
The revised procedure was used for the first time when the lB West vital bus maintenance began on September 5, 1995.
The first MCC to be inspected was the 230 Volt lB West vital MCC.
Five of a total of 48 bolts in this MCC failed when a torque of less than 20 inch-lbs was applied.
The remaining bolts were successfully torqued to 9 ft-lbs. In each instance of encountering a failed bolt, the second bolt at the connection was intact. A Service Water MCC being examined in parallel with the lB West vital MCC indicated a similar failure rate.
Two of 18 bolts torqued failed in this MCC. Based upon the high rate of failure (10%) of the bus bar bolts, the preventive maintenance on the vital MCCs was halted to initiate an investigation.
NRC Information Notice 88-11 was reviewed during the preliminary investigation.
This Information Notice indicated that at Brunswick Units 1&2, GE Series 7700 Motor Control Centers experienced numerous 5/16 inch silicon bronze bolt connecting bus bar failures. PSE&G contacted Brunswick to obtain additional information on their analysis and received a copy of their metallurgical evaluation, which indicated Stress Corrosion Cracking as the failure mechanism.
Based upon a review by the Engineering Analysis staff including the newly obtained Brunswick failure information, a follow-up assessment of operability concluded on September 14, 1995 that the MCCs could not be considered operable due to concerns regarding the MCC bus bar connections' ability to retain their integrity during a seismic event.
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NRC FORM 368A 14-1151 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL j.-w NINBBI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
020 --
00 TEXT llf more apace le required. use additional coplH of NRC Form 366AI 1171 DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE (cont'd)
PAGE 131 5
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The 230 Volt Vital MCCs were declared inoperable at 2105 on September 14, 1995 for both Salem Generating Station Units #1 and #2. Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 for Salem Unit #2 was applicable as well as multiple other Technical Specifications based on equipment supplied by the affected MCCs for both units. The Salem Senior Nuclear Shift Supervisor (SNSS) placed a four hour report call to the US NRC Operations Center at 2302 hours0.0266 days <br />0.639 hours <br />0.00381 weeks <br />8.75911e-4 months <br /> on 9/14/95 informing them of this condition per 10CFR50.72(b) (2) (i).
Containment integrity was established for Salem Unit #2 at 0345 on September 15, 1995, thus satisfying Technical Specification 3.8.2.2 action requirements.
APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The root cause for the bolt failure is Str~ss Corrosion Cracking.
Specifically, the presence of apparent corrodents (chlorine, sulfur, and sodium) at the fracture area, the morphology of the cracking (predominantly intergranular), and the presence of stress (strain lines in the grains) at the bolt head suggests that the "short" silicon bronze bolts failed by stress corrosion cracking. The ductile type fracture observed in the "long" failed bolt apparently occurred due to applied stress (load) at the bolt head. The presence of corrodents (chlorine and sulfur) and some intergranular cracking observed at the fracture suggests that the failure may have been initiated by stress corrosion cracking.
The root cause for the delay in completing the MCC examinations was ineffective system engineer action to complete ~asks in a timely manner, i.e. a personnel error.
Contributing to the event was inadequate management oversight into the extension of task due dates.
PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES There are no prior similar occurrences for bolting failures of this type at Salem Station.
- 14-961 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I l'EIBDN NUMBER N~El'I SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
020 --
00 TEXT IH more *pace i. raqulr*d. UH additional copiH of NRC Form 366AI 11 71 PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES (cont'd)
PAGE 131 6
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The failure to complete tasks coupled with ineffective management oversight is related to other recent events that have been the subject of a Notice.of Violation regarding failures in meeting 10CFR50 Appendix B requirements.
This event represents a condition which occurred as a result of the programmatic breakdowns cited in the Notice of Violation.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
The purpose of the 230 Volt distribution system is to provide a reliable source of power to the 230 Volt plant auxiliaries necessary for the generation of power by the main turbine-generator unit and as required for plant safety during normal, shutdown, and emergency modes of plant operation.
Section 8.3 of the Salem UFSAR describes Onsite Power Systems and the requirements of the Electrical Power System. Section 8.3.1.3 states that the 230 Volt system feeds smaller loads and for convenience of operation, a few motors larger than 15 hp. The 4160 Volt system feeds the 230 Volt system via step down transformers. Each vital instrument bus Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS) receives as its normal source, vital 230 Volt AC (VAC) power. The 230 VAC power is then rectified to DC and then reconverted to AC power. In the event of a 230 VAC power loss or a UPS malfunction, 125 VDC vital station battery power will automatically supply power to the UPS inverters via an auctioneering circuit to maintain the uninterruptible power.
Oth~r 460 Volt and 230 VAC switchgear loads in Elevation 84' Switchgear Room are not affected by this bolting failure mode since the switchgear is ITE K-Line with carbon steel bolts.
For the original 5/16"-18 silicon bronze bolt (ASTM F-468 No.651, having 70 ksi minimum tensile strength and 53 ksi minimum yield stress, 0.0524 square inches tensile stress area and 0.0454 square inches area of minor diameter) the calculated pre-tension is 1728 lbs. due to 9 ft.-lbs. torque, and allowable shear is 540 lbs.
NRC FORM 368A (4-95)
- 14-1161 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER)
TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME I 11 DOCKET NUMBER 121
- LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTUU. I ll'BoWDN NUWISI NUMBER SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
020 --
00 TEXT IH more mpece i. required, u.. additional copiea of NRC Form 366AI I 1 71 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (cont'd)
PAGE 131 7
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The forces applied at a single bolt connection due to the anticipated design basis earthquake are 50 lbs. tension and 82 lbs. shear. These applied forces are significantly less than the allowable forces at the connection. This assures that the bus bars would have remained clamped together during and after a design basis earthquake event, assuming a single bolt with complete integrity in place per bus bar connection. Thus, with at least one bolt per phase, the degraded bus bar connections would have survived a design basis earthquake event without jeopardizing the safety of the plant.
In each of the two buses with failed bolts, each connection had at least one bolt that held the correct torque. A visual examination of 284 bolts (entire population of bolts inspected to date, not including nine bolts sent to the PSE&G Testing Laboratory for examination) revealed that 16 bolts had exhibited cracking. Varying degrees of corrosive attack were evident on all bolts examined.
Of the 16 cracked bolts, seven bolts were in configurations that could have rendered the associated equipment inoperable if the bolts had failed during a design basis seismic event. The affected electrical loads are: 1) motor operated valve lRHl, isolation of RHR suction from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS), 2) motor operated valve 21RH29, a minimum flow valve for one of the two Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pumps for Unit #2, and 3) the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Vital Motor Control Center. During power operations, lRHl is closed and the breaker tagged out, thus loss of the breaker is not safety significant. If lRHl was open during a reactor cooldown and rendered inoperable, 1RH2 serves as a backup isolation. Loss of the power supply to 21RH29 could allow the 21 RHR pump to overheat if the pump is deadheaded for an extended period of time. This would result in the loss of one of two RHR pumps which is within the design basis for Salem ECCS requirements. The loss of the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator Vital MCC would cause the loss of the 2A diesel. In the event of a sustained loss of off site power, loads fed from the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator would not be powered. However, the design basis for Salem Station is that any two of the diesel generators and their associated vital buses can supply sufficient power for operation of the required safeguards equipment for a design basis LOCA coincident with a loss of offsite power.
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- 14-861 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME I 1 I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 YEM I SEQUENTIAL I NMSION NUMBER NUMBBl PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 95 --
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00 a
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TEXT (If more *pace 18 r*qulred, uu additional copla of NRC Form 3&6AI I 1 71 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE (cont'd)
Therefore, based upon the evidence available, the safety significance is believed to be low since each bus (except as noted previously) would have maintained its integrity during a seismic event. However, it is recognized that the programmatic failure in management oversight coupled with the hardware deficiencies had the potential for significant common mode failures had the deficiencies gone undetected.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
- 1. Design Change Package DCP-lER-0098 was implemented and completed on Unit
- 2 Vital 230 Volt MCCs to replace all bus bolts with carbon steel bolts.
This action was completed on September 25, 1995.
- 2. Design change package (DCP-lER-0098) for Unit #1 Vital 230 Volt MCCs to replace all bus bolts with carbon steel bolts will be completed by December 31, 1995.
- 3. Non Vital bus bolt replacement for Unit #1 will be completed by December 3i, 1995.
- 4. Non Vital Bus bolt replacement for Unit #2 will be completed by March 31, 1996.
- 5. Improve the Operating Experience Program (OEP) by March 31, 1996 to ensure that action items coming from industry events are addressed and closed in a timely manner. As specific tasks are developed from an operating experience issue, these tasks will be monitored until closure by the OEP. Thus the program will be equipped with an effective feedback link which will assure that the scheduling and execution of specific tasks are accomplished without undue delay.
- 6. The following corrective actions have been implemented as part of PSE&G's response to address the basic issue of timely corrective actions in meeting the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI. These initiatives are relevant to this LER in addition to their broader role in improving operations at Salem Station.
a. Reducing the backlog of open issues by examining those issues and taking effective action prior to Salem units restart.
b. Improved Salem Station management oversight, expectations, and standards with new Station and Nuclear Business Unit management. --..-.,.. -:-*-.**-- "!"-* *-~--
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| 05000311/LER-1995-001, :on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities |
- on 950212,manually Initiated Esfa to Effect MSIS in Order to Increase RCS T-avg Above 541 Degrees F. Caused by Less than Conservative Decision Making.Temporary Hold Placed on Startup Activities
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-001-01, :on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed |
- on 950201,both Ssps Trains Declared Inoperable After Discovery That AC Power Distribution within Ssps Susceptible to Common Mode Failure.Caused by Aged Components.New Power Supplies Installed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-002-01, :on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken |
- on 950224,required TS 1 H Timeframe Not Met Re Closing Associated Block Valve.Caused by Personnel Error. Positive Discipline Has Been Taken
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-003-01, :on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made |
- on 950228,four Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maintenance Analog Rod Position Indication Drift.Drift Caused by Mfg,Design,Const/Installation.Internal Adjustments to Rods Made
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-02, :on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited |
- on 950311,three Planned TS 3.0.3 Entries Occurred During Maint to Correct Analog RPI Drift Affecting Rod 2SB4.Caused by Design Mfg Const/Installation.Ts 3.0.3 Was Exited
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-003-03, :on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures |
- on 890309,failed to Perform Type C Local Leak Rate Testing Following Piping Mod to 21 Containment Spray Piping Sys Due to Not Identifying Need to Perform Required Testing.Enhanced Business Procedures
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-004-01, :on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR |
- on 790515,used Ten Containment Air Temp Points to Determine Primary Containment Average Air Temp.Caused by Mgt/Qa Defeciency.Implemented Procedure Revs to Satisfy TS SR
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004-02, :on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers |
- on 950607,ESFA RT Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by RHR Sys Inoperability.Replaced All SBF-1 Failed Protection Relays on 500 Kv Breakers
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-004, :on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators |
- on 950607,EFS Actuation Occurred During Unit 2 Controlled Shutdown Per TS 3.0.3.Caused by Inadequate Mgt Oversight of Operability Determination Process.Trained All Licensed Operators
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000311/LER-1995-005-02, :on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample |
- on 950705,failure to Analyze Second Sample W/ Radiation Monitor Inoperable Occurred.Caused by Personnel Error.Second Sample Analyzed & Determined to Be in Agreement W/First Sample
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-005-01, :on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause |
- on 900508,seven Occurrences Noted That Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Util Supplemented Rept W/Results of Vendor Conducted Root Cause
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-005, Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | Forwards LER 95-005-00 Re Failure to Analyze Second Sample W/Radiation Monitor Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-005, :on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved |
- on 950508,eight Occurrences Revealed Lift Settings of Pressurizer Code Safety Valves on Both Units Out of Required Tolerance.Caused by Testing Intrument Error. Counseled Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006, Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | Revises Corrective Action Due Date in LER 95-006-00 to Correspond W/Due Dates in Restart Action Plan,Consisting of 960501 for Reviews & 960630 for Applicable Procedure Revs | | | 05000272/LER-1995-006-01, :on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed |
- on 950404,TS 3.0.3 for Both Units Was Entered Due to Inability of CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys to Automatically Actuate.Operability Determination Has Been Completed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-006-02, :on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept |
- on 950822,surveillance Was Missed & Charcoal Absorber Testing Exceeded TS SR Time Limit.Caused by Informal Process to Monitor Charcoal Absorber Run Time Hs Being Used.Assigned Responsibility to Operations Dept
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000311/LER-1995-007-02, :on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency |
- on 900503,diesel Surveillance Required by TS Was Missed.Revised Process for Modifying EDG Surveillance Frequency
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-007, :on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised |
- on 950505,EDGs 1A,1B & 1C Simultaneously Paralleled to Electrical Grid,Resulting in Potential for Common Mode Failure of All Three Edgs.Caused by Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Procedures Revised
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000311/LER-1995-008-02, :on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised |
- on 951215,Tech Spec 4.9.9 Missed Isolation Testing Discovered.Caused by Lack of Adequate Controls to Ensure All Testing Requirements Addressed.Procedure S2.IC-FT.RM--0088(Q) Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-008-01, :on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced |
- on 950517,controlled Shutdown Completed Due to Inoperability of Switchgear & Penetration Area Ventilation Sys (Spavs).Three Spavs Supply Fans Will Be Inspected & Fan Motors Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-009, :on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability |
- on 950601,valid Test of 1B EDG & Subsequent Inoperability of 1B & 1C EDGs Identified.Caused by Inadequate Vibration Tolerant Design of Original Equipment. Cracked Nipple Replace to Restore EDG 1B Availability
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010-01, :on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs |
- on 950615,RHR Pumps for long-term Flow Requirements for Both Units Declared Inoperable Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Evaluated EOPs
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) | | 05000272/LER-1995-010, :on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation |
- on 950615,both Units RHR Pumps Inoperable for long-term Flow Requirements Due to RHR Flow Instrument Uncertainties.Further Evaluated New EOP Setpoint for RHR Pump Operation
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000272/LER-1995-011, :on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review |
- on 880222,inconsistency Between WCAP-11634 Analysis Used for Postulated Steam Line Breaks Outside Containment & Updated FSAR Was Discovered Due to Inadequate Design Review
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) | | 05000272/LER-1995-012, :on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed |
- on 761211,adequacy of Turbine Driven Auxiliary FW Pump Encls Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Verification of Assumptions in Calculations Performed to Evaluate Previously Identified.Calculation Assumptions Reviewed
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-012-01, :During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed |
- During Nov 1995,TDAFWP Encl Not Matching as- Built Conditions of 761211.Caused by Inadequate Verification of as-build Design Deficiency Calculations.Helb Calculations Reviewed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Submit an LER 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-013-01, :on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved |
- on 950703,surveillance Testing of Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Was Performed Approx Six & One Half Hr Late Due to Personnel Error.Provides Appropriate Levels of Discipline to Personnel Involved
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-014-01, :on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup |
- on 951211,SI Throttle Valve Was Inoperable. Caused by Inadequate Deficiency.Installed Orifice in Cold Leg Branch Lines Prior to Startup
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-015-01, :on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures |
- on 950711,failed to Complete Documentation of EDG TS Surveillance.Caused by Lack of Procedural Clarity Re Method of Timing EDG Start & Standby Performance.Developed Special Surveillance Testing Procedures
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-016-01, :on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS |
- on 950720,difference Between Containment Design Parameters & Accident Analysis Was Discovered.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 SEs for Changes in Containment Temp Profiles.Changed UFSAR & TS
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-016, Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | Informs That Revised Date for Submission of Suppl to LER 95-016 Will Be 960329 | | | 05000272/LER-1995-017, :on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied |
- on 950718,CR Emergency Air Conditioning Sys Failed to Meet GDC 19 Criteria.Performed Calculactions to Identify Alternative Operating Mode for Eacs to Ensure That Requirements of GDC 19 Satisfied
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-018, :on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731 |
- on 950720,improper Range Gauges Used for Ist. Caused by Inadequate IST Program & Lack of IST Program Maint & Implementation Processes & Associated Controls.Issued Stop Work Order by QA 950731
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-019, :on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6 |
- on 950726,operability Functional Test Was Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry.Caused by Lack of Managerial Oversight & Organizational Breakdowns.Entered Tracking as for 1VC1 & 1VC2 for Mode 6
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) | | 05000272/LER-1995-020, Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | Forwards LER 95-020-00 Re Inoperable Volt Motor Control Ctrs Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Attachment a Contains Commitments Currently Outstanding Related to Issue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000272/LER-1995-020-01, :on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts |
- on 950914,vital 230 Volt MCCs Declared Inoperable Due to Failed Bus Bar Bolting.Caused by Stress Corrosion Cracking.Design Change Package DCP-1ER-0098 Implemented to Replace Bus Bolts W/Carbon Steel Bolts
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-021-01, :on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired |
- on 930403,both Reactor Vessel Level Indication Sys Trains Inoperable Due to Inadvertent CO2 Actuation Due to Water Intrusion.Completed RVLIS & Cabinet Sealing Repaired
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | | 05000272/LER-1995-022, :on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced |
- on 950916,ABV Sys Exceeded Allowable Bypass Leakage Due to Tear in Expansion Joint Fabric.Caused by Equipment Failure.Expansion Joint Fabric Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023-01, Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | Forwards Supplemental LER 95-023-01 Re Failure to Plug SG Tubes Due to Missed Eddy Current Indications.Suppl Being Submitted to Discuss Cause & Safety Significance of Event | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-023, :on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed |
- on 940106,failed to Plug SG Tubes.Caused by Lack of Contractor Oversight in Area of Eddy Current Testing.Analyst Guidelines Specific to Salem,Units 1 & 2 & Performance Demonstration Program Were Developed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-024, :on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed |
- on 950911,determined Fuel Handling Bldg Low Differential Pressure Surveillance Testing Did Not Ensure Compliance W/Ts Requirements.Caused by Inadequate Design Basis Info.Fuel Handling Bldg Changed
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000272/LER-1995-025, :on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised |
- on 951012,identified Plant Procedures Did Not Contain Specific Instructions to Limit Sys Flow for Pump Accident Alignments.Caused by Limited Appreciation of Significance of Operating.Baseline Document Revised
| | | 05000272/LER-1995-026, :on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination |
- on 951023,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Cause Under Investigation.Appropriate Enhancements Will Be Made to Safety Valve Program Based on Results of Root Cause Determination
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1) | | 05000272/LER-1995-026-01, :on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits |
- on 951023,main Steam Safety Valves Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Use of Furmanite Trevitest Equipment That Had Inaccuracies.Rebuilt MSSV That Failed Lift Setpoint Test or Exceeded Allowable Seat Leakage Limits
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2) | | 05000272/LER-1995-027-01, :on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr |
- on 761211,doses During LOCA Exceeded Plant Licensing Basis Due to Inaccurate Assumptions in Dose Calculations.Revised Procedures in August 1994.W/forwarding Ltr
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-028-01, :on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied |
- on 950920,effective Leakage Monitoring Program Did Not Meet TS 6.8.4a Requirements Due to Mgt/Qa Deficiency.Consolidated Program Under Single Organization to Assure Plant Design Basis Satisfied
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii) | | 05000272/LER-1995-029, :on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear |
- on 951219,all 4 Kv Vital Busses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.Replaced All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000272/LER-1995-029-01, :on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced |
- on 951219,4 Kv Vital Buses Declared Inoperable.Caused by Inadequate Initial Design of GE Type SBM Switches by Mfg.All Suspect Switches in 4 Kv Switchgear, Vital & Group Busses Replaced
| 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability |
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