Information Notice 1994-13, Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555June 28, 1994NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT 1: UNANTICIPATED AND UNINTENDEDMOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES ANDOTHER COMPONENTS DUE TO IMPROPEROPERATION OF REFUELING EQUIPMENT
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 28, 1994 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT
 
1: UNANTICIPATED
 
===AND UNINTENDED===
MOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES
 
AND OTHER COMPONENTS
 
DUE TO IMPROPER OPERATION
 
OF REFUELING
 
EQUIPMENT


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
All holders of operating
 
licenses or construction
 
permits for nuclear power reactors.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this informationnotice supplement to alert addressees to an event involving unauthorizedmovement of a defective spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients willreview the information for applicability to their facilities and consideractions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestionscontained in this information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore, nospecific action or written response is required.BackgroundThe NRC issued Information Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated and UnintendedMovement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation ofRefueling Equipment," to alert addressees to problems that could result frominadequate oversight of refueling operations and inadequate performance on thepart of refueling personnel. IN 94-13 described various refueling events thatoccurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach BE'ttom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.These events demonstrate the importince of proper controls over, and operationof, refueling equipment during use. A recent event at the Waterford SteamElectric Station (Waterford) demonstrates the potential for fuel damage orpersonnel hazards which could result from fuel-handling equipment that is notproperly stored and not secured from unauthorized use.DescriDtion of CircumstancesOn February 18, 1994, the Waterford plant was operating at 100-percent powerwhen a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from thefuel-handling machine in the fuel-handling building. Health physicstechnicians measured radiation levels in the spent fuel pool area and foundthem to be normal. Licensee personnel remotely secured the object with visegrips and determined that underwater radiation levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters [6 inches] from the object. A CombustionEngineering employee identified the object as a fuel rod encapsulation tube.No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a securityguard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.9406220075 PD9 XIT 9t q ./I.3  
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
,- A 94-13, Supplement 1-June 28, 1994 'The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined that the tube.contained 'a defective fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated fuelassembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in acenter guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licenseereviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling area and interviewedrelevant personnel about the event. Personnel who may have had access to thefuel-handling machine completed questionnaires regarding the event.- Thelicensee determined that the refueling director had used the fuel-handlingmachine the day before the object was discovered and had parked thefuel-handling machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulationtube. However, the refueling director had not used the hoist and was not surethat he would have noticed if the encapsulation tube was hanging from thehoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance records indicated thatthe fuel rod encapsulation tube must have become attached to the fuel-handlingtool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation tube showed that theouter diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end ofthe fuel-handling tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in thefuel-handling tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuelrack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely removed from thegrid cage.Although contractors had performed the fuel-handling operations for previousrefueling outages, Waterford personnel were scheduled to perform the fuelhandling for the March 1994 refueling outage. The licensee speculated thatone of the people assigned to fuel-handling activities for the March outagemay have inadvertently lifted the encapsulation tube while practicing the useof the hoist. Personnel were required to notify health physics staff beforeaccessing the refueling machine; however, health physics records showed thatno one had made such a notification during this time. No keys or specialknowledge was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling machine.Electrical power could be obtained by closing two electrical breakers andpushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questionedseveral employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized use of thefuel-handling machine.As an interim corrective action, the licensee deenergized the computer thatcontrols the fuel-handling machine by opening a breaker in a locked powercontrol center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent thefuel rod encapsulation tube from being inadvertently lifted by thefuel-handling tool, (2) add a precaution to the operating procedure warningoperators not to lower the fuel-handling tool over the storage location, and(3) add hoist manipulations to the lesson plans for proficiency training.DiscussionProcedures governing the use of equipment for handling fuel and corecomponents may not prevent unauthorized or unintended operation of thatequipment. Precautions such as locking out breakers that energize thefuel-handling equipment and the placement of placards in highly visible areasdeclaring that unauthorized operation of fuel-handling equipment is forbidden
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice supplement
 
to alert addressees
 
to an event involving
 
unauthorized
 
movement of a defective
 
spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients
 
will review the information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
===However, suggestions===
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background
 
The NRC issued Information
 
Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated
 
and Unintended
 
Movement of Fuel Assemblies
 
and Other Components
 
Due to Improper Operation
 
of Refueling
 
Equipment," to alert addressees
 
to problems that could result from inadequate
 
oversight
 
of refueling
 
operations
 
and inadequate
 
performance
 
on the part of refueling
 
personnel.
 
IN 94-13 described
 
various refueling
 
events that occurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach BE'ttom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.These events demonstrate
 
the importince
 
of proper controls over, and operation of, refueling
 
equipment
 
during use. A recent event at the Waterford
 
Steam Electric Station (Waterford)  
demonstrates
 
the potential
 
for fuel damage or personnel
 
hazards which could result from fuel-handling
 
equipment
 
that is not properly stored and not secured from unauthorized
 
use.DescriDtion
 
of Circumstances
 
On February 18, 1994, the Waterford
 
plant was operating
 
at 100-percent
 
power when a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from the fuel-handling
 
machine in the fuel-handling
 
building.
 
Health physics technicians
 
measured radiation
 
levels in the spent fuel pool area and found them to be normal. Licensee personnel
 
remotely secured the object with vise grips and determined
 
that underwater
 
radiation
 
levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters
 
[6 inches] from the object. A Combustion
 
Engineering
 
employee identified
 
the object as a fuel rod encapsulation
 
tube.No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a security guard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.9406220075 PD9 XIT 9t q ./I.3  
,- A 94-13, Supplement
 
1-June 28, 1994 'The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined
 
that the tube.contained
 
'a defective
 
fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated
 
fuel assembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in a center guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licensee reviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling
 
area and interviewed
 
relevant personnel
 
about the event. Personnel
 
who may have had access to the fuel-handling
 
machine completed
 
questionnaires
 
regarding
 
the event.- The licensee determined
 
that the refueling
 
director had used the fuel-handling
 
machine the day before the object was discovered
 
and had parked the fuel-handling
 
machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulation
 
tube. However, the refueling
 
director had not used the hoist and was not sure that he would have noticed if the encapsulation
 
tube was hanging from the hoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance
 
records indicated
 
that the fuel rod encapsulation
 
tube must have become attached to the fuel-handling
 
tool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation
 
tube showed that the outer diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end of the fuel-handling
 
tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in the fuel-handling
 
tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuel rack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely
 
removed from the grid cage.Although contractors
 
had performed
 
the fuel-handling
 
operations
 
for previous refueling
 
outages, Waterford
 
personnel
 
were scheduled
 
to perform the fuel handling for the March 1994 refueling
 
outage. The licensee speculated
 
that one of the people assigned to fuel-handling
 
activities
 
for the March outage may have inadvertently
 
lifted the encapsulation
 
tube while practicing
 
the use of the hoist. Personnel
 
were required to notify health physics staff before accessing
 
the refueling
 
machine; however, health physics records showed that no one had made such a notification
 
during this time. No keys or special knowledge
 
was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling
 
machine.Electrical
 
power could be obtained by closing two electrical
 
breakers and pushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questioned
 
several employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized
 
use of the fuel-handling
 
machine.As an interim corrective
 
action, the licensee deenergized
 
the computer that controls the fuel-handling
 
machine by opening a breaker in a locked power control center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent the fuel rod encapsulation
 
tube from being inadvertently
 
lifted by the fuel-handling
 
tool, (2) add a precaution
 
to the operating
 
procedure
 
warning operators
 
not to lower the fuel-handling
 
tool over the storage location, and (3) add hoist manipulations
 
to the lesson plans for proficiency
 
training.Discussion
 
Procedures
 
governing
 
the use of equipment
 
for handling fuel and core components
 
may not prevent unauthorized
 
or unintended
 
operation
 
of that equipment.
 
Precautions
 
such as locking out breakers that energize the fuel-handling
 
equipment
 
and the placement
 
of placards in highly visible areas declaring
 
that unauthorized
 
operation
 
of fuel-handling
 
equipment
 
is forbidden
 
* ~ 94-13, Supplement
 
1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment
 
is not used without-proper
 
authorization.
 
Additionally, storing the fuel-handling'machine
 
in an area where accidental
 
movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other components
 
may contribute
 
to the prevention
 
of inadvertent
 
fuel movement or damage. Management
 
attention
 
and oversight
 
of the operation
 
of fuel and core component
 
handling equipment
 
is important
 
to ensure that fuel and core components
 
are protected'from
 
damage or unauthorized
 
movement and that plant personnel
 
are protected
 
from unnecessary
 
exposure to radiation.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director'Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices
 
D kachment IN 94-13, Supp. *1 June 28, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 94-47 94-46 94-45 94-44 94-43 Accuracy of Information
 
Provided to NRC during the Licensing
 
Process NonConservative
 
===Reactor Coolant System Leakage Calculation===
Potential
 
Common-Mode
 
Failure Mechanism
 
for Large Vertical Pumps Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close on Demand because of Inadequate
 
Maintenance
 
and Testing Determination
 
of Primary-to-Secondary
 
Steam Generator
 
Leak Rate Cracking in the Lower Region of the Core Shroud in Boiling-Water
 
Reactors Problems with General Electric Type CR124 Overload Relay Ambient Compensation
 
Failure of a Rod Control Cluster Assembly to Fully Insert Following
 
a Reactor Trip at Braidwood
 
Unit 2 Identified
 
===Problems in Gamma Stereotactic===
Radiosurgery
 
06/21/94 06/20/94 06/17/94 06/16/94 06/10/94 06/07/94 06/07/94 05/26/94 05/31/94 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
Material Licensees.
 
All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized
 
water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling-water
 
reactors (BWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
 
reactors (PWRs).All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
Teletherapy
 
Medical Licensees.
 
94-42 94-41 94-40 94-39 OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
SIN 94-13, Supplement
 
1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment
 
is not used without proper authorization.
 
Additionally, storing the fuel-handling
 
machine in an area where accidental
 
movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other components
 
may contribute
 
to the prevention
 
of inadvertent
 
fuel movement or damage. Management
 
attention
 
and oversight
 
of the operation
 
of fuel and core component
 
handling equipment
 
is important
 
to ensure that fuel and core components
 
are protected
 
from damage or unauthorized
 
movement and that plant personnel
 
are protected
 
from unnecessary
 
exposure to radiation.
 
This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices* See Previous Concurrence
 
OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH
 
C/HHFB:DRCH
 
D/DRCH:NRR
 
NAME RSanders*
DDesaulniers*
MMSlosson*
BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 06/01/94 06/01/94 [06/02/94 OFFICE _ C/MB:DRS:RIV
 
OGCB:DORS:NRR
 
AC/OGCB:NRR
 
l D/Dji;RR NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham*
RJKiessel*
BKGfm'es I DATE 06/03/94 06/03/94 06/07/94 06/IA3/94 Document Name: 94-13SP1.IN
 
In 94-XX June xx, 1994 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices* See Previous Concurrence
 
OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH
 
C/HHFB:DRCH
 
D/DRCH:NRR
 
NAME RSanders*
DDesaulniers*
MMSlosson*
BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 I06/01/94
[06/01/94
106/02/94 OFFICE C/MB:DRS:RIV
 
OGCB:DORS:NRR
 
AC/OGCB:NRR ,D/DORS:NRR
 
NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham
 
RJKiessel
 
BKGrimes DATE 06/03/94 I06/03/94
06/y /94 06/ /94 nM .-__ -__. ...... rWv-or .w4x)uocument name: U:\WIKWKU.JLb
 
In 94-XX June xx, 1994 This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below or the appropriate
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating
 
===Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation===
Technical
 
contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information
 
Notices* c-- D -----------
_^.__u. W1.4- C ri ev iuub %oUncUFrrene
 
e--r OFFICE DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH
 
D/DRCH:NRR
 
NAME RSanderF .X d MMSlosso'^Oi.


* ~ 94-13, Supplement 1June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without-proper authorization.Additionally, storing the fuel-handling'machine in an area where accidentalmovement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or othercomponents may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement ordamage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and corecomponent handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and corecomponents are protected'from damage or unauthorized movement and that plantpersonnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director'Division of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV(817) 860-8195Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DATE 05/26/94 06// /94 06/ //94 06_Z__494 OFFICE C/MB:9RS<<R


D kachmentIN 94-13, Supp. *1June 28, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to94-4794-4694-4594-4494-43Accuracy of InformationProvided to NRC duringthe Licensing ProcessNonConservative ReactorCoolant System LeakageCalculationPotential Common-ModeFailure Mechanism forLarge Vertical PumpsMain Steam IsolationValve Failure to Closeon Demand because ofInadequate Maintenanceand TestingDetermination of Primary-to-Secondary SteamGenerator Leak RateCracking in the LowerRegion of the CoreShroud in Boiling-WaterReactorsProblems with GeneralElectric Type CR124Overload Relay AmbientCompensationFailure of a Rod ControlCluster Assembly to FullyInsert Following a ReactorTrip at Braidwood Unit 2Identified Problems inGamma StereotacticRadiosurgery06/21/9406/20/9406/17/9406/16/9406/10/9406/07/9406/07/9405/26/9405/31/94All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission MaterialLicensees.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized waterreactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor boiling-water reactors(BWRs).All holders of OLs or CPsfor nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPsfor pressurized-waterreactors (PWRs).All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission TeletherapyMedical Licensees.94-4294-4194-4094-39OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
V OGCB:DORS:NRR


SIN 94-13, Supplement 1June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment is not used without proper authorization.Additionally, storing the fuel-handling machine in an area where accidentalmovement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or othercomponents may contribute to the prevention of inadvertent fuel movement ordamage. Management attention and oversight of the operation of fuel and corecomponent handling equipment is important to ensure that fuel and corecomponents are protected from damage or unauthorized movement and that plantpersonnel are protected from unnecessary exposure to radiation.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact:Dale A. Powers, RIV(817) 860-8195Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* See Previous ConcurrenceOFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 06/01/94 06/01/94 [06/02/94OFFICE _ C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR l D/Dji;RRNAME DPowers* JLBirmingham* RJKiessel* BKGfm'es IDATE 06/03/94 06/03/94 06/07/94 06/IA3/94Document Name: 94-13SP1.IN
AC/OGCB:NRR


In 94-XXJune xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV(817) 860-8195Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* See Previous ConcurrenceOFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanders* DDesaulniers* MMSlosson* BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 I06/01/94 [06/01/94 106/02/94OFFICE C/MB:DRS:RIV OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR ,D/DORS:NRRNAME DPowers* JLBirmingham RJKiessel BKGrimesDATE 06/03/94 I06/03/94 06/y /94 06/ /94nM .-__ -__. ...... rWv-or .w4x)uocument name: U:\WIKWKU.JLb
D/DORS:NRR


In 94-XXJune xx, 1994 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contactthe technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of NuclearReactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, DirectorDivision of Operating Reactor SupportOffice of Nuclear Reactor RegulationTechnical contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV(817) 860-8195Attachment:List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices* c-- D -----------_^.__u. W1.4- C ri ev iuub %oUncUFrrene e--rOFFICE DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH D/DRCH:NRRNAME RSanderF .X d MMSlosso'^Oi.DATE 05/26/94 06// /94 06/ //94 06_Z__494OFFICE C/MB:9RS<<R V OGCB:DORS:NRR AC/OGCB:NRR D/DORS:NRRNAME DPoWersZ;~ -J JLBirmingham BKGrimesDATE 06/os/94 06/d)/94 06/ /94 06/ /94Document Name: G:\WTRFRD.JLB
NAME DPoWersZ;~ -J JLBirmingham


}}
BKGrimes DATE 06/os/94 06/d)/94 06/ /94 06/ /94 Document Name: G:\WTRFRD.JLB}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:57, 31 August 2018

Unanticipated and Unintended Movement of Fuel Assemblies and Other Components Due to Improper Operation of Refueling Equipment
ML031070002
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/28/1994
From: Grimes B K
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-94-013, Suppl 1, NUDOCS 9406220075
Download: ML031070002 (20)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 June 28, 1994 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 94-13, SUPPLEMENT

1: UNANTICIPATED

AND UNINTENDED

MOVEMENT OF FUEL ASSEMBLIES

AND OTHER COMPONENTS

DUE TO IMPROPER OPERATION

OF REFUELING

EQUIPMENT

Addressees

All holders of operating

licenses or construction

permits for nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice supplement

to alert addressees

to an event involving

unauthorized

movement of a defective

spent fuel rod. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Background

The NRC issued Information

Notice (IN) 94-13, "Unanticipated

and Unintended

Movement of Fuel Assemblies

and Other Components

Due to Improper Operation

of Refueling

Equipment," to alert addressees

to problems that could result from inadequate

oversight

of refueling

operations

and inadequate

performance

on the part of refueling

personnel.

IN 94-13 described

various refueling

events that occurred at Vermont Yankee, Peach BE'ttom, Susquehanna, and Nine Mile Point.These events demonstrate

the importince

of proper controls over, and operation of, refueling

equipment

during use. A recent event at the Waterford

Steam Electric Station (Waterford)

demonstrates

the potential

for fuel damage or personnel

hazards which could result from fuel-handling

equipment

that is not properly stored and not secured from unauthorized

use.DescriDtion

of Circumstances

On February 18, 1994, the Waterford

plant was operating

at 100-percent

power when a senior reactor operator found an unknown object hanging from the fuel-handling

machine in the fuel-handling

building.

Health physics technicians

measured radiation

levels in the spent fuel pool area and found them to be normal. Licensee personnel

remotely secured the object with vise grips and determined

that underwater

radiation

levels were .2 to .7 Sv/hr[20 to 70 R/hr] at 15 centimeters

[6 inches] from the object. A Combustion

Engineering

employee identified

the object as a fuel rod encapsulation

tube.No visual damage was apparent on the tube. The licensee posted a security guard in the spent fuel pool area and reported the event to the NRC.9406220075 PD9 XIT 9t q ./I.3

,- A 94-13, Supplement

1-June 28, 1994 'The licensee reviewed fuel storage records and determined

that the tube.contained

'a defective

fuel rod that had been removed from an irradiated

fuel assembly several years earlier. At that time, the tube had been placed in a center guide tube in a grid cage stored in the spent fuel racks. The licensee reviewed computer access records for the fuel-handling

area and interviewed

relevant personnel

about the event. Personnel

who may have had access to the fuel-handling

machine completed

questionnaires

regarding

the event.- The licensee determined

that the refueling

director had used the fuel-handling

machine the day before the object was discovered

and had parked the fuel-handling

machine at a location directly over the fuel rod encapsulation

tube. However, the refueling

director had not used the hoist and was not sure that he would have noticed if the encapsulation

tube was hanging from the hoist at the time he used the machine. Surveillance

records indicated

that the fuel rod encapsulation

tube must have become attached to the fuel-handling

tool sometime between February 11 and 18, 1994.Design drawings of the cap of the fuel rod encapsulation

tube showed that the outer diameter of the cap was about equal to the inner diameter of the end of the fuel-handling

tool. Apparently, the cap had become bound in the fuel-handling

tool when the hoist was lowered to the top of the spent fuel rack and, when the hoist was raised, the tube was completely

removed from the grid cage.Although contractors

had performed

the fuel-handling

operations

for previous refueling

outages, Waterford

personnel

were scheduled

to perform the fuel handling for the March 1994 refueling

outage. The licensee speculated

that one of the people assigned to fuel-handling

activities

for the March outage may have inadvertently

lifted the encapsulation

tube while practicing

the use of the hoist. Personnel

were required to notify health physics staff before accessing

the refueling

machine; however, health physics records showed that no one had made such a notification

during this time. No keys or special knowledge

was needed to access the controls of the fuel-handling

machine.Electrical

power could be obtained by closing two electrical

breakers and pushing one switch that were located on the machine. The licensee questioned

several employees, but no one admitted to unauthorized

use of the fuel-handling

machine.As an interim corrective

action, the licensee deenergized

the computer that controls the fuel-handling

machine by opening a breaker in a locked power control center. The licensee planned to (1) develop a means to prevent the fuel rod encapsulation

tube from being inadvertently

lifted by the fuel-handling

tool, (2) add a precaution

to the operating

procedure

warning operators

not to lower the fuel-handling

tool over the storage location, and (3) add hoist manipulations

to the lesson plans for proficiency

training.Discussion

Procedures

governing

the use of equipment

for handling fuel and core components

may not prevent unauthorized

or unintended

operation

of that equipment.

Precautions

such as locking out breakers that energize the fuel-handling

equipment

and the placement

of placards in highly visible areas declaring

that unauthorized

operation

of fuel-handling

equipment

is forbidden

  • ~ 94-13, Supplement

1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment

is not used without-proper

authorization.

Additionally, storing the fuel-handling'machine

in an area where accidental

movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other components

may contribute

to the prevention

of inadvertent

fuel movement or damage. Management

attention

and oversight

of the operation

of fuel and core component

handling equipment

is important

to ensure that fuel and core components

are protected'from

damage or unauthorized

movement and that plant personnel

are protected

from unnecessary

exposure to radiation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director'Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices

D kachment IN 94-13, Supp. *1 June 28, 1994 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 94-47 94-46 94-45 94-44 94-43 Accuracy of Information

Provided to NRC during the Licensing

Process NonConservative

Reactor Coolant System Leakage Calculation

Potential

Common-Mode

Failure Mechanism

for Large Vertical Pumps Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close on Demand because of Inadequate

Maintenance

and Testing Determination

of Primary-to-Secondary

Steam Generator

Leak Rate Cracking in the Lower Region of the Core Shroud in Boiling-Water

Reactors Problems with General Electric Type CR124 Overload Relay Ambient Compensation

Failure of a Rod Control Cluster Assembly to Fully Insert Following

a Reactor Trip at Braidwood

Unit 2 Identified

Problems in Gamma Stereotactic

Radiosurgery

06/21/94 06/20/94 06/17/94 06/16/94 06/10/94 06/07/94 06/07/94 05/26/94 05/31/94 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Material Licensees.

All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized

water reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for boiling-water

reactors (BWRs).All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors.All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water

reactors (PWRs).All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

Teletherapy

Medical Licensees.

94-42 94-41 94-40 94-39 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

SIN 94-13, Supplement

1 June 28, 1994 may help ensure that the equipment

is not used without proper authorization.

Additionally, storing the fuel-handling

machine in an area where accidental

movement of the hoist or grapple will not impact stored fuel or other components

may contribute

to the prevention

of inadvertent

fuel movement or damage. Management

attention

and oversight

of the operation

of fuel and core component

handling equipment

is important

to ensure that fuel and core components

are protected

from damage or unauthorized

movement and that plant personnel

are protected

from unnecessary

exposure to radiation.

This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Dale A. Powers, RIV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices* See Previous Concurrence

OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH

C/HHFB:DRCH

D/DRCH:NRR

NAME RSanders*

DDesaulniers*

MMSlosson*

BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 06/01/94 06/01/94 [06/02/94 OFFICE _ C/MB:DRS:RIV

OGCB:DORS:NRR

AC/OGCB:NRR

l D/Dji;RR NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham*

RJKiessel*

BKGfm'es I DATE 06/03/94 06/03/94 06/07/94 06/IA3/94 Document Name: 94-13SP1.IN

In 94-XX June xx, 1994 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices* See Previous Concurrence

OFFICE RPB:ADM HHFB:DRCH

C/HHFB:DRCH

D/DRCH:NRR

NAME RSanders*

DDesaulniers*

MMSlosson*

BABoger*DATE 05/26/94 I06/01/94

[06/01/94

106/02/94 OFFICE C/MB:DRS:RIV

OGCB:DORS:NRR

AC/OGCB:NRR ,D/DORS:NRR

NAME DPowers* JLBirmingham

RJKiessel

BKGrimes DATE 06/03/94 I06/03/94

06/y /94 06/ /94 nM .-__ -__. ...... rWv-or .w4x)uocument name: U:\WIKWKU.JLb

In 94-XX June xx, 1994 This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below or the appropriate

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.Brian K. Grimes, Director Division of Operating

Reactor Support Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical

contact: Dale A. Powers, Region IV (817) 860-8195 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information

Notices* c-- D -----------

_^.__u. W1.4- C ri ev iuub %oUncUFrrene

e--r OFFICE DRCH C/HHFB:DRCH

D/DRCH:NRR

NAME RSanderF .X d MMSlosso'^Oi.

DATE 05/26/94 06// /94 06/ //94 06_Z__494 OFFICE C/MB:9RS<<R

V OGCB:DORS:NRR

AC/OGCB:NRR

D/DORS:NRR

NAME DPoWersZ;~ -J JLBirmingham

BKGrimes DATE 06/os/94 06/d)/94 06/ /94 06/ /94 Document Name: G:\WTRFRD.JLB


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