U-602705, Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/96-16.Corrective Actions:All Personnel That Had Access to Screenhouse Vital Area Were Directed to Present Adequate Justification for Continued Access

Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/96-16.Corrective Actions:All Personnel That Had Access to Screenhouse Vital Area Were Directed to Present Adequate Justification for Continued Access

ML20136B504
Person / Time
Site:	Clinton
Issue date:	03/03/1997
From:	Connell W ILLINOIS POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
U-602705, NUDOCS 9703110007
Download: ML20136B504 (4)

Text

e lilinois Power Company j Clinton Power S?: tion l P.o. Box 678 l Clinton. IL 61727 I Tel 217 935-8881 P9WER - .- .

.U-602705 1 A.120 WC-130 March 3, 1997 Docket No. 50-461 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Reply to Notices of Violation Contained in Inspection Report 50-461/96016

Dear Sir or Madam:

4 The attachments to this letter contain the Illinois Power (IP) response to the two ,

j violations of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements documented in NRC I i Inspection Report 50-461/96016. IP admits that both violations occurred. The first i violation describes a failure to maintain proper control of factory sealed packages that entered the protected area. The second violation describes the failure to ensure only i.- those contractors with a work-related need to enter the vital area of the screenhouse i were given access to that area.

Attachment A of this letter contains the response to the failure to properly maintain control of factory sealed packages. Attachment B contains the response to the failure to ensure that only those contractors with a work-related need to enter the screenhouse vital area were given access to that area. IP is confident that these responses address the concerns identified in these violations.

Sincerely yours, fy hmW 1

Wilf d Connell Vice President MRS/lar D Attachments cc: NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office, V-690 g l Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC '

Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 9703110007 970303 DR ADOCK0500g1 ggg

. .. - . . ~ . . .- . _ .- , -- .- . . .

ATTACHMENT A

,. - U-602705

• i I A.120 l l -

Page 1 of 2 1 Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/96616 l

. l l The Notice of violation states in part:

i "Section 3.2.2.1.1 of the approved Clinton Security Plan allows that packages and material sealed in the manufacturing process be permitted into the protected area without search, but requires they be stored in a locked area until open. I 1

j Contrary to the above, on December 18,1996, the inspector identified that some factory j scaled packages were permitted access into the protected area without search and were j routinely not stored in a locked area until opened."

l Reason for the Violation 4

The factory-sealed packages contained food items such as candy bars and potato chips for )

lunch room vending machines. The reason the violation occurred was the personnel 1

[ delivering material to the plant in factory sealed packages were unaware of the i requirement for controlling these materials once they were allowed into the protected area.

Also, contributing to this violation was that security did not ensure that the proper ,

a controls were followed once the materials were released from the search area. i Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved J Once it was identified that factory sealed materials had been allowed into the protected area and were not controlled in accordance with Clinton Power Station (CPS) procedure y' 1032.03 " Incoming Package and Material Control" and the Clinton Security Plan security force members were instructed on the required controls for factory sealed materials and to notify security supervision of any materials that were not searched or searchable. This was done to ensure that proper controls were arranged for the item that was determined to be exempt from search. This was maintained until all security force members could be trained on the proper controls for these materials. No further instances of failure to properly control factory sealed packages have been observed since this problem was identified.

Corrective Steos Taken to Avoid Further Violations CPS procedure 1032.07F006 " Vehicle Operator Briefing Card," and CPS procedure 1032.07F008 "L.icensee Designated Vehicle (LDV) Briefing Card," have been revised to require security supervision to provide special instructions to vehicle operators entering the protected area with packages that are exempt from search. These special instructions will include how the packages are to be controlled while they are in the prcaected area.

Also, CPS procedure 1032.03 " Incoming Package and Material Control," was revised to provide information on what action to take when items being brought into the plant are exempt from search requirements through the warehouse transfer cage or the sallyport vehicle gate.

.f .

ATTACHMENT A 4 e U-602705 I 1A.120 Page 2 of 2 Date When Full Comoliance Will be Achieved Illinois Power is now in full compliance with the Clinton Security Plan with respect to j control of factory sealed packages entering the protected area 4

J 1

l 1

4

.. . ... - - - _ . - _ . - . - - . _ . - - ~. -- .

O ATTACHMENT B o U-602705 f'i 1 A.120 ,

Page1of1 i l

Response to Notice of Violation 50-461/96 l

The Notice ofviolation states in part: I "Section 1.7.1 of the approved Clinton Security Plan requires that personnel access to vital areas be based on a work-related need. Section 5.1.1.1 of the approved Clinton  !

Security Plan identifies the Screenhouse as a vital area.

Contrary to the above, between December 16, 1996, and January 6,1997, inspector

~

I review of contractor personnel vital area status levels showed forty-one contractor personnel were granted access to the Screenhouse (vital area) even though their duties (work-related need) did not require such access."

Reason for the Violdion The reason for this iolation was the difficulty contract coordinators had in determining l what security access zones individuals would need at the time they were given access. In order to ensure that contractors would be able to work where needed, many contractors were given access to the vital area of the screenhouse without a planned work-related need for access. Contract coordinators did this knowing work was scheduled for the ,

screenhouse area. ,

i Corrective Steps Taken and Results Achieved On December 19,1996 the forty-one contract personnel that were identified as not having a work-related need to access the vital area of the screenhouse had their access to the screenhouse vital area terminated. Thirty-four other contract personnel had their access to the vital area of the screenhouse terminated until their work-related need for access to that area could be determined. Also, all personnel that had access to the screenhouse vital area were directed to present adequate justification for continued access to the screenhouse vital area. If adequate justification could not be determined then the individuals access to the screenhouse vital area was removed.

Corrective Steps Taken to Avoid Further Violations Nuclear Support Services (NSS) procedure 3.94 " Access Processing" will be changed to require the Supervisor-Security or Supervisor-Personnel Processing or their designee's permission be obtained before individuals are given access to the vital area in the screenhouse. The procedure will also be changed to clearly state that granting access to vital areas of the plant is based on a work-related need to enter those areas. These changes to NSS procedure 3.94 will be complete by April 15,1997.

Date When Full Compliance Will be Achieved Illinois Power is now in full compliance with the Clinton Security Plan with respect to control of access ofindividuals to the vital area of the screenhouse.

.