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Category:Inspection Report Correspondence
MONTHYEARIR 05000237/20224012022-11-30030 November 2022 – Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2022401 and 05000249/2022401 (Cover Letter Only) IR 05000237/20214032022-01-26026 January 2022 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2021403 and 05000249/2021403 IR 05000237/20214042021-08-0909 August 2021 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2021404 and 05000249/2021404 IR 05000237/20200102020-02-28028 February 2020 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000237/2020010 and 05000249/2020010 ML19281D2032019-10-0808 October 2019 Information Request to Support Upcoming Temporary Instruction 2515/194 Inspection; Inspection Report 05000237/2019011; 05000249/2019011 (DRS-I.Hafeez) ML18003A2112018-01-0303 January 2018 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 ML17313B1912017-11-0707 November 2017 Information Request for an NRC Triennial 10 CFR 50.59 Baseline Inspection Report 05000237/2018011; 05000349/2018011 (DRS-A.Shaikh) RS-17-007, Request for Improvements in NRC SPAR Model and RASP Handbook Use2017-01-12012 January 2017 Request for Improvements in NRC SPAR Model and RASP Handbook Use IR 05000237/20155012016-02-0303 February 2016 NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report No. 05000237/2015501; 05000249/2015501 SVPLTR 15-0055, Notification of Readiness for NRC 95001 Inspection2015-08-25025 August 2015 Notification of Readiness for NRC 95001 Inspection ML15020A0952015-01-15015 January 2015 Ltr 2014 Dresden EP Annual Closeout (Rdj) ML14045A1482014-02-12012 February 2014 EP Annual Closeout (Rdj) IR 05000237/20135022014-02-12012 February 2014 Ltr 02/12/14 Dresden EP Annual Closeout (RDJ) ML13101A4382013-04-11011 April 2013 Ti 186 Notice of Inspection IR 05000237/20085012009-02-13013 February 2009 IR 05000237-08-501, IR 05000249-08-501, on 01/01/200 Through 12/31/2008, Dresden Nuclear Power Station - NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection Report; NRC Security Annual Inspection Report IR 05000237-08-401, IR 05000249-08-401 IR 05000237/20084082008-10-0707 October 2008 IR 05000237-08-408, & IR 05000249-08-408, 08/25/2008 - 08/29/2008, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Routine Security Baseline Inspection IR 05000237/20075012008-02-14014 February 2008 IR 05000237-07-501, IR 05000249-07-501, and IR 05000237-07-403, IR 05000249-07-403, on 01/01/2007 - 12/31/2007, Dresden NRC Emergency Preparedness Annual Inspection and NRC Security Annual Inspection Reports IR 05000237/20072012007-12-21021 December 2007 IR 05000237-07-201, and IR 05000249-07-201, Preliminary Greater than Green for Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 ML0702905882007-01-29029 January 2007 Information Request for NRC Biennial Baseline Component Design Basis Inspection, IR 05000249-07-006, (Drs); 05000249-07-006 (DRS) IR 07200037/20060012006-12-20020 December 2006 IR 07200037-06-001, on 12/12/2006, Dresden, Units 2 and 3 IR 05000010/20050152006-09-28028 September 2006 IR 05000010-05-015, on 06/01/2006 & 09/20/2006, Dresden, Unit 1 ML0619906072006-07-11011 July 2006 Final Letter Report for Analytical Results for Fifty-five Water Samples, Batch Five, from the Vicinity of the Dresden Generating Station, Dresden, Illinois (Inspection Report No. 050-00237/2006-007) ML0617200952006-06-16016 June 2006 Orise - Interim Letter Report for Analytical Results for Four of Eight Water Samples, Batch Four, from the Vicinity of the Dresden Generating Station, Dresden, Illinois (Inspection Report No. 050-00237/2006-007) (Rfta No. 06-001) ML0500600382005-01-0505 January 2005 Re Information Request for an NRC Biennial Modification and 10 CFR 50.59 (MOD/50.59) Baseline Inspection IR 05000237/20020092002-05-0606 May 2002 IR 05000237/2002-009(DRS), IR 05000249/2002-009(DRS), on April 12, 2002, Exelon Generation Company, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. Physical Protection. Non-cited Violations Identified IR 05000237/20020042002-04-26026 April 2002 IR 05000237/2002-004(DRP), IR 05000249/2002-004(DRP), Exelon Generation Company, Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, Inspection on 02/08/2002-03/31/2002 Re Identification and Resolution of Problems IR 05000249/19760201976-12-23023 December 1976 Letter Regarding Steps Taken by Commonwealth Edison to Correct Noncompliance Identified in 10/20/1976 Letter - Dresden Unit 3 Inspection Report 05000249/1976020 2022-11-30
[Table view] Category:Letter type:RS
MONTHYEARRS-24-104, Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Document Revision2024-11-0101 November 2024 Nuclear Radiological Emergency Plan Document Revision RS-24-126, Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4)2024-10-31031 October 2024 Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in Accordance with 10 CFR 2.390(b)(4) RS-24-103, Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2024-10-21021 October 2024 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-24-102, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-5912024-10-21021 October 2024 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b, and TSTF-591 RS-24-080, Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in .2024-10-16016 October 2024 Request to Replace Formerly Submitted Documents Available in the Agency Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) with Documents Redacted in . RS-24-093, Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests2024-10-10010 October 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information - Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests RS-24-073, Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations – Additional Information Supporting Request to Withhold Security-Related Information2024-07-31031 July 2024 Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations – Additional Information Supporting Request to Withhold Security-Related Information RS-24-061, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2024-06-14014 June 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2024-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations RS-24-063, Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-222024-06-14014 June 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-22 RS-24-056, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2024-05-28028 May 2024 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors RS-24-055, 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report2024-05-17017 May 2024 2023 Corporate Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report RS-24-041, Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests2024-04-30030 April 2024 Alternative Request to Utilize Code Case OMN-32, Alternative Requirements for Range and Accuracy of Pressure, Flow, and Differential Pressure Instruments Used in Pump Tests RS-24-021, Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-222024-04-0202 April 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information for 10 CFR 50.55a Request No. I5R-22 RS-24-002, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Annual Property Insurance Status Report2024-04-0101 April 2024 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Annual Property Insurance Status Report RS-24-023, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding.2024-03-22022 March 2024 Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding. RS-24-016, Request for Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations2024-03-14014 March 2024 Request for Alternative Schedule to Complete Decommissioning Beyond 60 Years of Permanent Cessation of Operations RS-24-022, Response to Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Material Safeguards and Safety to Support Review of a Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.2142024-03-0808 March 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information by the Office of Nuclear Material Safeguards and Safety to Support Review of a Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.214 RS-24-017, Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.214 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station – Holtec MPC-68MCBS2024-02-23023 February 2024 Request for Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10 CFR 72.212 and 10 CFR 72.214 for Dresden Nuclear Power Station – Holtec MPC-68MCBS RS-23-121, Sixth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program2023-11-30030 November 2023 Sixth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program RS-23-119, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023 Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information RS-23-107, Relief Request I5R-22, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval2023-11-0808 November 2023 Relief Request I5R-22, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval RS-23-102, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-16016 October 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-23-071, Application to Adopt TSTF-564, Safety Limit MCPR2023-08-30030 August 2023 Application to Adopt TSTF-564, Safety Limit MCPR RS-23-080, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs2023-08-30030 August 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs RS-23-078, Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times2023-06-16016 June 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations RS-23-042, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling2023-05-25025 May 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling RS-23-070, Supplement to License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel2023-05-16016 May 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel RS-23-057, Supplement to License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel2023-04-17017 April 2023 Supplement to License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel RS-23-049, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations2023-03-23023 March 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Report on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Reactors and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations RS-23-041, Response to Request for Additional Information for Alternative Request RV-23H2023-03-14014 March 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information for Alternative Request RV-23H RS-23-045, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Submittal of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Reports for 2022 Per 10 CFR 26.717(c) & 10 CFR 26.2032023-02-28028 February 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Submittal of Fitness for Duty Performance Data Reports for 2022 Per 10 CFR 26.717(c) & 10 CFR 26.203 RS-23-003, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Summary of Changes to Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, and Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, NO-DC-102023-01-31031 January 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Summary of Changes to Quality Assurance Topical Report, NO-AA-10, and Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, NO-DC-10 RS-23-004, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel License Amendment Request2023-01-23023 January 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel License Amendment Request RS-22-126, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI2022-11-30030 November 2022 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI RS-22-121, Notice of Intent to Pursue Subsequent License Renewal Applications2022-11-0909 November 2022 Notice of Intent to Pursue Subsequent License Renewal Applications RS-22-117, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies2022-11-0303 November 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies RS-22-116, Submittal of Relief Requests Associated with the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval2022-11-0101 November 2022 Submittal of Relief Requests Associated with the Sixth Inservice Testing Interval RS-22-115, Annual Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors2022-10-19019 October 2022 Annual Report of Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Model Changes and Errors RS-22-092, Nine and Quad Cities - Application to Revise Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Technical Specifications in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration2022-10-0303 October 2022 Nine and Quad Cities - Application to Revise Primary Containment Isolation Instrumentation Technical Specifications in Accordance with TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration RS-22-066, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times2022-08-25025 August 2022 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.1.4, Control Rod Scram Times RS-22-093, Advisement of Leadership Changes for Constellation Energy Generation, LLC and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2022-08-18018 August 2022 Advisement of Leadership Changes for Constellation Energy Generation, LLC and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans RS-22-065, License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel2022-08-18018 August 2022 License Amendment Request Regarding Transition to GNF3 Fuel RS-22-101, Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Relief Request I6R-01 Associated with the Sixth Inservice Inspection Interval2022-08-10010 August 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information Related to Relief Request I6R-01 Associated with the Sixth Inservice Inspection Interval RS-22-099, Submittal of Upcoming Sixth Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Requests I6R-09 and I6R-102022-07-19019 July 2022 Submittal of Upcoming Sixth Inservice Inspection Interval Relief Requests I6R-09 and I6R-10 RS-22-082, Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Revision 112022-06-22022 June 2022 Defueled Safety Analysis Report Update, Revision 11 RS-22-080, Withdrawal and Proposed Alternative I6R-08 Associated with Code Case N-921 for Sixth Inservice Inspection Intervals2022-06-0909 June 2022 Withdrawal and Proposed Alternative I6R-08 Associated with Code Case N-921 for Sixth Inservice Inspection Intervals RS-22-064, License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies with Proposed Change to Technical Specifications Section 4.3.12022-06-0808 June 2022 License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies with Proposed Change to Technical Specifications Section 4.3.1 RS-22-051, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Update to Correspondence Addressees and Service Lists2022-04-12012 April 2022 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Update to Correspondence Addressees and Service Lists 2024-07-31
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Exelon Generation 4300 W1nf1eld Road Warrenville. IL 60555 www exe loncorp com RS-17-007 January 12, 2017 Mr. William M. Dean Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:
Request for Improvements in NRG SPAR Model and RASP Handbook Use
Reference:
Letter from J. F. Lara (NRG) to B. C. Hanson (Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG)), "Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit 3 - NRG Report 05000249/2016010 and Preliminary White Finding,"
dated December 5, 2016 In the referenced letter, the NRG documented a finding preliminarily determined to be of White significance concerning the Dresden, Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system.
The finding is related to a June 27, 2016, failure of the HPCI auxiliary oil pump (AOP). Exelon Generation Company, LLC (EGG) acknowledges that the NRG followed its processes to reach a preliminary significance of White. However, those processes - namely, the existing Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) modeling and Risk Assessment of Operational Events (RASP) Handbook- drove the NRG to obtain risk results that are unnecessarily conservative and unrepresentative of actual risk. As explained below, other recent examples of findings that the NRG evaluated have also resulted in unnecessarily conservative risk significance results.
The NRG has long embraced the use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PAA) methods to enhance safety, increase the efficient use of resources, and eliminate unnecessary conservatism and unnecessary burdens on licensees. 1 In furtherance of the NRC's policy on the use of PAA, EGG requests several improvements to NRG SPAR modeling and the RASP Handbook, which are detailed in this letter. The improvements would provide the NRG greater flexibility in use of the SPAR models and the RASP Handbook to achieve more accurate risk outcomes, ultimately resulting in NRG risk tools that produce more realistic risk characterizations of plant events and performance deficiencies. Moreover, the enhancements would bolster safety by eliminating unnecessary conservatisms and fostering the more efficient use of both agency and industry resources.
1 NRC Policy Statement, "Use of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methods in Nuclear Regulatory Activities," 60 Fed. Reg. 42,622 (Aug. 16, 1995).
January 12, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page2 EGC is committed to maintaining a clear focus on issues important to safety. To that end, we are taking this opportunity to identify some areas in the Significance Determination Process (SOP) that are causing the NRC and industry to unduly focus resources on issues of low safety significance. These observations have been developed during the analysis phase of several actual SOP cases within the EGC fleet over the past several years. EGC agrees with the NRC that the goal of risk-informed regulation is to allow the NRC and the industry to best focus attention on issues most important to safety. The NRC's Reactor Oversight Process has brought a welcomed objectivity to the assessment of inspection findings and event assessment through the application of a risk-informed approach. However, some of the NRC's practices in applying risk techniques hampers their full utilization and leads to unnecessary diversion of resources to issues of little or no safety significance. These practices include undue reliance on inadequately detailed SPAR models and conservatism in the RASP Handbook.
For the examples below, these practices greatly overestimated the risk significance of the performance deficiencies and caused both the NRC and the industry to expend effort not commensurate with safety significance. These SDPs include the December 2016 Dresden White finding concerning the HPCI AOP, the pending finding concerning an electromatic relief valve (EMRV) failure at an EGC station located in NRC Region I, and the August 2013 Nine Mile Point White finding concerning the loss of shutdown cooling. In one of these cases, the SOP was ultimately resolved as being of low safety significance, but only after expenditure of undue effort. Based on our experiences, EGC proposes four specific recommendations for your consideration in an effort to enhance the realism of the SOP:
- 1. Use the Best Available Model: When the SPAR model and the licensee's PAA model differ significantly and the licensee's peer reviewed PAA model is more detailed, the licensee's PAA model should be used to determine the risk significance of a performance deficiency.
In many cases, a licensee's PAA model is more detailed, refined, and representative of the as-built, as-operated plant than the SPAR model. Further, many of these models have been through a detailed peer review process consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.200; thereby, establishing the technical adequacy of the model. When the SPAR model lacks the detail available in the licensee's PAA, the licensee's peer reviewed PAA model should be used to determine the risk significance of the performance deficiency as it provides a better tool than the necessarily simplified SPAR model. We fully respect the NRC's need to perform independent assessments, but using a less accurate tool is not the solution. The SOP process could easily be amended to allow a meeting to be held with the NRC's and licensee's risk experts early in the SOP process to discuss the applicability of the SPAR model to the issue at-hand before a decision is made on safety significance. Over time, this may allow the NRC to better understand the licensee's PAA model, potentially increasing the efficiency of risk-informed licensing reviews. EGC would be interested in piloting this approach at any of its plants.
January 12, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page3
- 2. Realistically Treat Failure Events: The RASP Handbook should be enhanced to provide sufficient guidance for treating the failure of an auxiliary or sub-system, similar to the HPCI AOP, whose mission time (on the order of seconds) is substantially shorter than the HPCI system mission time (24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) it supports.
Current PAA models are necessarily binary in their consideration of failures of modeled components (success/failure). Unfortunately, in the real world, "failures" do not always neatly fall into such simple categorizations. The RASP Handbook drives the NRG PAA Analyst to treat all performance deficiencies in a binary form by fitting them into the construct of the PAA model.
This can lead to a misleading characterization of the significance of an event. Improved guidance is needed to better characterize the relationship between the observed condition and related components, system functions, and operator actions. In the case of the Dresden HPCI system, the AOP caught fire during in-service testing after the HPCI pump successfully reached steady-state operation. The fire was then extinguished before affecting the HPCI pump. The AOP is only required to start the HPCI pump but not required for the pump's continuous operation. The only possible impact from failure of the AOP once the HPCI pump was started would be preventing restart of the HPCI pump if it were secured or tripped after steady-state operation is achieved. However, by only having two ways of classifying equipment failure in the RASP Handbook, failure of the AOP after the HPCI pump reached steady-state was equated to failure of the HPCI pump to run. This is analogous to the situation where the starter motor of a car breaks after the car is running and then concluding "the car won't run" even though it is already running. As a result, the risk significance of the performance deficiency was substantially overestimated, and a White finding was issued.
- 3. Rely on Fact-Based Common Cause Failure (CCF) Treatment: The RASP Handbook guidance should be enhanced to allow the as-found conditions and extent of condition to factor into the determination of CCF multipliers.
When determining the risk significance of equipment failure, it is important to question the potential for CCF. The current RASP Handbook guidance represents a bounding quantitative application of common cause factors, and often controls the risk significance of the performance deficiency. In some cases where the failure mechanism/extent of condition cannot be known, simplified approaches are warranted. In situations where the failure mechanism is known and the extent of condition can be clearly assessed, it would be more appropriate to use the actual as-found condition to assess significance. At an EGG station located in NRG Region I, one of five EMRVs was found failed during shutdown due to missing hinge pin lock star washers.
Investigation of the extent of condition identified the other four EMRVs had the washers in place and would have operated as designed. In this case, using the guidance in the RASP Handbook, rather than the as-found condition of the valves and other supporting information available, the CCF probability was increased from that used in the base model by approximately two orders of magnitude, with a similar increase in core damage frequency. The RASP Handbook essentially uses a "guilty until proven innocent beyond a reasonable doubt" philosophy with no consideration of how to modify such a significant risk penalty if found innocent.
January 12, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page4
- 4. Eliminate the Arbitrary Human Reliability Analysis Minimum Probability: The RASP Handbook should not prescribe a minimum joint human error probability (HEP) of 1E-6 for all circumstances. Additional guidance should be provided to assess HEP in cases where operating crew failure is "practically inconceivable" in order to avoid arbitrary assignment of safety significance based on a prescriptive assumption.
The RASP Handbook drives the NRC PAA Analyst to assume a "floor" value for human actions of 1E-6, regardless of the benignity of the circumstances. This assumption, by itself, can be the entire cause of a safety significant finding by setting the minimum risk level to be above the Green-White SDP threshold. It is inappropriate for an arbitrary "limit," selected in the abstract and independent of the situation being assessed, to drive safety significance. Some consideration must be given to situations where procedures, cues, training, timing, and circumstances indicate that human failure is not a credible contributor to risk.
Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 experienced a loss of shutdown cooling due to a trip of the operating Shutdown Cooling (SDC) pump. Because there were many systems available for event mitigation, the risk significance was based on the reliability assigned to operator recognition and response. The RASP Handbook states that, "a joint human error probability of less than 1E-6 should not be used for any circumstance." This guidance should be revised to allow HEP values below 1E-6 in certain cases where failure is "practically inconceivable," such as when there is an abundance of time, a variety of independent cues, straightforward actions with clear procedures, adequate personnel, and direct relevant training. In the Nine Mile Point, Unit 1 example, for the core to have been damaged, two dozen sequential annunciated alarms would have had to be ignored or incorrectly evaluated, and two separate crews of licensed operators would have had to fail to recognize and respond to the loss of SDC until the core was uncovered. Although the SDP of this event was finalized as Green, using floor values of HEP could elevate the risk significance of operational events, particularly during shutdown conditions.
In each of these cited cases, the limitations of the current models and guidance led to overstated significance and inefficient expenditure of NRC and industry resources. As the NRC and the industry continue to benefit from the application of risk-informed methods, it is vital to continue enhancing the realism of the processes in order to focus on truly safety significant situations: not those driven by model limitations, assumptions, or arbitrary rules. These particular events highlight areas where the current NRC guidance caused the significance of performance deficiencies to be substantially overestimated. Accordingly, we suggest it would be appropriate to modify the White finding at Dresden and consider this perspective as the NRC evaluates matters in the future including those identified in this letter. EGC would be happy to discuss these four recommendations with you at your convenience.
January 12, 2017 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 5 This letter does not contain any new regulatory commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Patrick Simpson, Licensing Manager, at (630) 657-2823.
Res~ectf ully, -
Cetey ~ew II ~
Senior Vice President Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation Company, LLC cc: NRC Document Control Desk Regional Administrator, NRC Region I Regional Administrator, NRC Region Ill Senior Resident Inspector, Dresden Nuclear Power Station