RS-14-006, Clinton, Unit 1, Updated Safety Analysis Report, Revision 16, Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems
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CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-1 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3 PROCESS AUXILIARIES 9.3.1 Compressed Air Systems The compressed air system is divided into three subsystems, service air (SA), instrument air (IA), and breathing air (RA). The Breathing Air Compressors, Filter Train and associated instrumentation have been abandoned/retired in place. The Control Room Emergency Breathing Air System is still operable. 9.3.1.1 Design Bases 9.3.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases Certain IA system pressure regulators perform a safety-related function. These regulators are non-ASME,Section III. Only the following portions of the compressed air system are designed to the requirements of ASME,Section III. a. Those portions of the SA, IA, and RA systems which penetrate the containment and drywell walls are of Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 design. These portions are equipped with Seismic Category I, Safety Class 2 designed isolation valves to satisfy single-failure criteria as discussed in Subsection 6.2.4. b. The portion of the IA system from the inside Containment isolation valves to the accumulators which provides air to the automatic depressurization system (ADS) accumulators is classified as Seismic Category I, Safety Class 3. c. The ADS accumulator backup air supply piping from the compressed air tank farm to the outside containment isolation v alve is Seismic Cat I, Safety Class 3 except for the compressed air tank farms and air filters which are Seismic Category I, Safety Class Other. d. The portion of RA piping which is connected to the Control Room Emergency Breathing Air Storage System is classified as Seismic Category I, Safety Class
Other. Breathing air is purified to grade D standards as listed in ANSI/CGA G-7.1, "Commodity Specification for Air". 9.3.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The service air system provides oil free, filtered and dried air for service and maintenance use throughout the plant. The SA system is the source of air for the IA system. Pressure reducing devices are provided where needed. b. The IA system provides oil free, filtered, and dried air to instruments and controls throughout the plant, including ADS function safety/relief valves. 9.3.1.2 System Description
- a. The service air system is shown in Drawing M05-1048. The SA system consists of three air compressors, two volume tanks for moisture separation, three CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-2 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 heatless air dryers complete with prefilter and after-filter, two air receivers, and necessary piping, valves, and instrumentation. System component performance data are given in Table 9.3-1. Service air is distributed to the plant after compressing to 110 psig, drying to a dew point of -40
° F and being filtered to remove all particles 0.9 micron and larger. Two compressors and two dryers are required for normal plant operation.
One compressor runs continuously, the second compressor starts automatically when the discharge pressure falls below a preset value. A third compressor and dryer are provided as spares. Each building has a main header. Hose stations are connected to the main header for service and maintenance use. The hose stations are located throughout the plant. Equipment requiring frequent use of service air is connected directly to the service air header. Air receivers are located in the screen house and the makeup water pump house to ensure a supply of air in these buildings in the event that a break occurs in the line to these buildings. b. The instrument air system is shown in Drawing M05-1040. The IA system is used by one unit. Instrument Air receivers are provided in the screenhouse and makeup water pump house. Air receivers are not used in the main plant since a large storage capacity is provided by the piping system. Twelve air amplifiers are provided, for 100% redundancy. Each SRV utilized for automatic depressurization is equipped with an air accumulator and check valve arrangement. Two air bottle tank farms consisting of 8 bottles each are provided as a backup air supply for the ADS function and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. The IA system consists of the above-mentioned equipment and necessary piping, valves, and instrumentation. System component performance data are given in Table 9.3-1. The IA system takes filtered and dried air from the SA system and distributes it to air operated valves and instrumentation throughout the plant. Air for the ADS function and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves is required to be between 140 psig (to ensure the ADS valves are capable of two actuations at 70% of drywell design pressure) and 200 psig (valve upper limit).
Air amplifiers are provided to boost the pressure to approximately 160 psig at normal instrument air system operating pressure. The air supply for the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety relief valves is split into two divisions. One division supplies air to the ADS safety/relief valves and the medium LLS-SRV on the A and C steamlines side of the reactor pressure vessel, and the other division supplies air to the valves (ADS and the low and LLS-SRV) on the B and D side.
Each safety/relief valve is provided with a pneumatic accumulator sized to provide sufficient capacity to ensure an adequate supply pressure to the valve actuator. Each air supply line to an accumulator is provided with a check valve to prevent air loss back out of the accumulat or. Each ADS safety/relief valve is provided with additional accumulator volume to provide sufficient air to perform
the ADS function.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-3 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Two redundant solenoid valves are provided for each ADS safety/relief valve and are arranged so that only one is required to operate to provide pneumatic supply to the actuating cylinder. Storage bottles provide a Seismic Category I backup supply of air for the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. A filter downstream of the storage bottles provides secondary IA filtration. A filter is also installed upstream on the IA supply to the MSIV's for the same purpose. Additional information on the requirements for the ADS air supply is provided in USAR section 5.2.2.4.1. 9.3.1.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The service air system have no safety-related function as discussed in Section 3.2. Failure of the SA system will not compromise any nuclear safety-related system or component and will not prevent the safe shutdown of the reactor. b. The instrument air supply to the ADS and the low and medium LLS-SRV safety/relief valves has been designed such that the failure of any one component will not result in the loss of instrument air to more than one nuclear safety-related division of ADS and LLS-SRV safety/relief valves. The loss of instrument air to one division of ADS and LLS-SRV safety/relief valves will not prevent the safe shutdown of the unit. A component failure analysis of the instrument air system is given in Table 9.3-2. Each accumulator or receiver has a check valve in the inlet line to prevent backflow due to compressor or amplifier failure. Other pneumatic-operated devices are designed for the fail-safe mode and do not require air supply under abnormal or postulated accident conditions.
The compressors are not safety-related and the amplifiers do not require
electricity. Therefore, there are no diverse sources of electric power. c. Certain IA system pressure regulators have been designed such that failure of any one regulator will not compromise the redundant capability of the Control Room HVAC Cooling Water System. 9.3.1.4 Test and Inspections During the preoperational test phase, the air dryers were checked to ensure that the equipment was performing properly in every respect, the service air compressors were tested to ensure that the assembled package was properly balanced, and the compressors were also tested to determine equipment rating for flow and pressure. The system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. The element in the prefilter to the dryer is to be replaced at least once for every 12 months of operations. The element in the afterfilter is to be replaced every
6 months. The air for the Instrument Air System will be tested, at least annually, at the system filter discharge for a dew point of -40
°F and particulate content in excess of 3 microns. In the event of any particulate greater than 3 microns in size at the filter discharge, the need for additional testing at selected test points downstream in the system will be determined. The results of the additional testing will be evaluated to determine the extent of the problem and corrective action CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-4 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 needed. The acceptance criteria for this additional testing at designated test points will be based upon the recommendation of the component vendor for the particulate contamination of
the Instrument Air. 9.3.1.5 Instrumentation Application Compressed air for the service air (SA) and instrument air (IA) systems is supplied by three automatically-controlled air compressors. Compressors are equipped with load and unload mode of control. In the load mode of control, system pressure is maintained by modulating or throttling the inlet and/or blowoff valve as necessary. The unload mode is used to start the compressor and to manually unload it if necessary. In the unload mode, the blow-off or bypass valve is fully open, and the inlet valve is in the minimum throttled or modulated position. An adequate supply of compressed air is assured by a pressure switch located in the compressed air discharge header, which will auto start a second compressor if the discharge pressure falls below a preset value. The starting of the third compressor is locked out at the main control board. This arrangement allows the greatest flexibility in the use of the compressors during normal and standby operations. Each compressor has interlocks and/or alarms for important variables, such as high lubricating oil temperature, high interstage air temperature, low cooling water pressure, surge, low lubricating oil pressure, and high vibration. Local pressure indicators are provided to measure the compressor discharge and several building header pressures. The compressor discharge is fed to the air dryers which are equipped with pre and after filters. The filters come equipped with differential pressure indicating switches. These switches are used for local alarm indication and a common trouble alarm in the main control room for high differential pressure. They are also used for local indication of the differential pressure across the filter. The dryer outlets are monitored by moisture elements for alarm on the common trouble alarm and local indication. The dryer chambers have pressure switches which activate the common trouble alarm on increasing chamber pressure. The outlet flow of the air dryers is monitored by pressure switches which give local and common trouble alarms on low outlet pressure. A pressure indicator is also provided in the main control room to indicate air dryer discharge header pressure. Pressure switches in the Service Air ring headers located in the radwaste, turbine, auxiliary, fuel and control buildings isolate the applicable ring headers and provide low header pressure alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below 70 psig in the applicable header.
Similarly, the pressure switches in the Instrument Air ring headers located in the radwaste and control buildings isolate the applicable ring headers and provide low header pressure alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below 70 psig in the applicable header. The automatic isolation feature prevents the entire system from being loaded down or lost if a pipe ruptures or excessive air usage occurs in those ring headers. Service Air in the diesel generator building is supplied from the service air ring header in the control building. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the diesel generator building would result in automatic isolation of the control building Service Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the control building ring header falls below 70 psig.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-5 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Instrument Air in the diesel generator building is supplied from the Instrument Air ring header in the control bulding. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the diesel generator building would result in automatic isolation of the control building Instrument Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the control building ring header falls below 70 psig. Service Air and Instrument Air in the Makeup Water Pump House and the Screen House is supplied from Service Air ring header in the turbine building. A pipe rupture or excessive air usage in the Makeup Water Pump House or the Screen House would result in automatic isolation of the turbine building Service Air header and alarm in the main control room in the event that the turbine building Service Air ring header falls below 70 psig. Air is supplied to the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) through the Instrument Air ring headers in the turbine and auxiliary building. These ring headers do not have automatic isolation features on low pressure. This precludes the loss of air supply to the ADS from inadvertent actuation of automatic isolation features. Check valves in the Instrument Air supply to the ADS prevent a back flow of air from the ADS into the Instrument Air ring headers in the turbine and auxiliary buildings in the event of low pressure in those headers. Low pressure in the ADS supply lines alarms in the main control room when the pressure falls below its required setpoint. The control room emergency breathing air storag e system is monitored and low pressure is alarmed in the main control room. 9.3.2 Process Sampling System 9.3.2.1 Design Bases 9.3.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases The process sampling system is not required to ensure safe shutdown of the plant. The only sample line connected to the reactor pressure boundary is provided with isolation valves which close upon receiving a LOCA signal. 9.3.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The objective of the process sampling system is to monitor station operation and equipment performances and to provide information for making corrections or adjustments to process system operations. Representative liquid and steam samples are obtained through the sampling system either for on-line or laboratory analyses. On-line continuous radiation monitoring of gaseous and liquid processes is provided by equipment described in Section 11.5 and Subsection 12.3.4. The sampling system is designed to minimize contamination of samples, minimize radiation exposure at the sample station and reduce sample line plate-out as much as possible. 9.3.2.2 System Description The systems that require intermittent or continuous analytical sampling are located to permit the drawing of samples during normal station operation or shutdown periods. Sample take-off points are arranged to obtain valid and representative samples. On process lines 2-1/2 inches and larger, sample probes are inserted into the pipe whenever possible without causing a flow CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-6 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 restriction to obtain a representative sample except for liquid radwaste discharge radiation monitor 0PR40S where the sample probe is replaced by 1" diameter pipe. Wherever possible samples are taken at least 10 diameters downstream from the last input to the process line. Where the contents of a tank are recirculated, the sample is taken from the line downstream from the recirculation pump. Sample lines are stainless steel, and are sized to deliver samples at a rate sufficient to maintain turbulent flow. The routing of sample lines will be as short and direct as possible to minimize purge volume but long enough to provide decay time where applicable. Fittings are minimized and bends are at least 15 diameters. Purge and some sample flow rates are read on a flow indicator and manually adjusted with a control valve by the operator at the sample panel. Purge time is determined by the operator to ensure adequate purging for representative samples. As sample lines were installed, a record was made of the length of each. After they were installed, the volume of each sample line was calculated and the required flow and duration were determined to ensure sufficient purge of stagnant lines. This information was incorporated into the CPS sampling procedures. To facilitate proper sample line purging, flow meters are installed in some sample lines at the sample panels. For those sample lines not provided with flow meters, administrative methods will be used to determine appropriate purge flow rates. (Q&R 281.3) Sample lines which are equipped with continuous analyzers are provided with bypass lines for flushing. Those radwaste process lines which have a high particulate content are equipped with flush lines which purge the sample line with cycled condensate from the process connection to the sample panel. A discussion of the post accident sampling and analysis system is contained in Appendix D. (Q&R 281.4) 9.3.2.3 Safety Evaluation The sampling system is classified non-safety-related and non Seismic Category I in accordance with Section 3.2. The process sampling system which does not connect to the reactor coolant pressure boundary is classified as Quality Group D from the sample sink up to the root valve located near the main process line. The root valve and piping upstream up to the connection on the main process line have the same classification as the process line except that process sample lines 3/4 inch NPS and smaller are not classified greater than Class B. The only sample line connected to the primary coolant pressure boundary is the reactor recirculation water sample line. That line is provided with two air-operated isolation valves, one located inside and one outside the drywell which receive an isolation signal. They fail closed on loss of air supply or electric power. For information regarding containment isolation, see Subsection 6.2.4. Other sample lines handling radioactive fluids are connected to nonreactor coolant pressure boundary systems and are provided with manual and/or solenoid operated valves. Air-operated valves will fail closed on loss of air or electric power. Grab sample lines for systems having a nominal pressure rating of 600 psi or higher are provided with two valves in series to reduce the potential for leakage. Radioactive lines are routed to minimize radiation exposure to plant personnel. Where practical lines are routed near ceilings and away from accessible areas. High radiation lines in sample CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-7 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 panels are shielded to reduce radiation exposure to acceptable limits consistent with the plant access requirements including plant oper ation, shutdown, and maintenance. 9.3.2.4 Tests and Inspections The process sampling system is proved operable by its use during normal plant operation. Grab samples are taken to calibrate and verify the proper operation of the continuous analyzers. Portions of the system normally closed to flow can be tested to ensure the operability and integrity to the system. Each sample line will be provided with isolation valve to permit testing and maintenance. 9.3.2.5 Instrumentation Application Temperature indicators located after the sample heat exchangers, determine the sample temperature before it is analyzed and drawn in the sample sink. Pressure reducing devices and pressure relief valves are provided for certain high-pressure sample lines in order to protect the equipment and operators. Local pressure indicators are provided after each pressure reducing
device. Recorders are provided for on-line analyzers, to monitor fluid sample characteristics. Appropriate annunciators are furnished to indicate and alarm abnormalities in the sampling system. Recorders and annunciators are mounted on their respective local sampling panels for the secondary system sample panels, and on main control room panels for the reactor sample station. The local annunciators transmit alarm signals to the main control room. In order to avoid flashing in sample lines containing saturated water, the lines are routed downward to their respective sample panel. All gaseous samples are taken in accordance with ANSI N13.1-1969 and are explained further in Section 11.5. High-temperature, high-pressure liquid and steam samples pass through primary coolers, pressure reducing and regulating devices (the reactor sample station utilizes two manual valves in series to reduce pressure and adjust flow), secondary coolers, and then to analyzers. Grab samples are taken after the primary coolers. The temperature of the continuously analyzed conductivity samples at the reactor water sample station are maintained at 24
°C to 26°C to minimize temperature compensation errors. Gas samples and other liquid process samples are also conditioned at their respective sampling
stations. Each sample station is furnished with an exhaust hood, sink, sample coolers, pressure regulators, demineralized water supply, analyzers, and necessary instrumentation. Where practical, most sample drains are recycled to their respective source or routed to the condenser hotwell. The balance of the sample drains are sent to the appropriate equipment or floor drain tanks for processing. Table 9.3-3 lists sample points, sample conditions, and types of analyses. The process sampling system is shown in Drawing M05-1045, Sheets 1 through 11.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-8 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Drainage System 9.3.3.1 Design Bases 9.3.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The equipment and floor drainage system (EFDS) is designed to preclude cross-flooding of nuclear safety-related ECCS compartments. b. EFDS sump fill and pumpout rates are utilized for the detection of leakage from safety-related equipment or piping located in the drywell, containment, and the ECCS cubicle areas. This subject is addressed in detail in Subsections 5.2.5 and 7.6.1.4. c. EFDS is not a safety-related system. However, all EFDS pipelines located within the Seismic Category I buildings are seismically supported to preclude potential damage to the safety system. EFDS piping penetrating drywell and containment structures is nuclear safety-related, designed in accordance with the ASME Section III Code, Class 2, and is provided with air-operated valves for containment and drywell isolation. d. EFDS piping is designed to preclude inadvertent transfer of contaminated fluids to noncontaminated drainage systems by elimination of cross-connections of these systems. e. Loop seals/traps are provided in drainage piping between the contaminated and general access areas for maintaining ventilation boundaries, and to prevent cross-contamination of room atmosphere. f. Passive failures, i.e., pump seals and valve stem packing leaks, can be detected by the ECCS equipment room sumps. Leak detection sensitivity and alarm functions are discussed in detail in Subsection 5.2.5. 9.3.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases The equipment and floor drainage system is designed to collect radioactive and potentially radioactive waste liquids from their points of origin in the drywell, containment, fuel building, auxiliary building, turbine building, radwaste building, and control building, and to transfer them to the collecting vessels of the radwaste treatment system for processing for reuse or disposal. For evaluation of radiological considerations for normal plant operation and for postulated spills and accidents see Sections 11.2 and 12.3. The nonradioactive chemical waste liquids from the Makeup Demin Area are drained into a separate sump from which they are pumped out of the radwaste building to the reaction (waste neutralization treatment) tanks. The waste chemicals are then pH adjusted and sent to a sediment pond, either directly or via the makeup demineralizer floor drain sump. The waste water in the sediment pond is processed through the sediment pond filter house treatment facility prior to being discharged back into the lake.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-9 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.3.2 System Description 9.3.3.2.1 General Description Generally, all drainage originating from either the equipment or process piping and consisting of chemically clean water, is drained to the equipment drainage system. All waste liquids from the floors that may or may not be contaminated with oil or grease. (such as pump baseplates) are drained into the floor drainage system. Special purpose drainage sumps/tanks are provided for draining chemical waste liquids emanating from high and low conductivity portions of the condensate polishing system, condensate filter, radwaste chemical waste area, laundry area, station laboratories, equipment decontamination, and personnel decontamination areas. All these drainage systems are independent and physically separated. They collect waste liquids by gravity into sumps and/or tanks from where they are pumped to the appropriate liquid radwaste collecting tanks for further processing. The wastes from the demineralizer water makeup system are discharged to the waste sedi mentation ponds. From there the wastes are pumped through waste treatment equipment in the demineralizer waste filter house and finally discharged into the cooling lake. The possible spillage from the diesel-generator oil tanks together with other nonradioactive equipment and floor drain waste is discharged into the storm sewer system via an oil separator. The drainage of these two types of nonradioactive wastes is arranged within structural barriers to preclude contamination from neighboring radioactive areas. Roof drainage is generally discharged to the storm sewer. Nonradioactive drains from the Auxiliary Building Ventilation Supply Air Cooling Coil, Containment Building Ventilation Supply Air Cooling Coil and Control Building Area Cooler 0WO08SM are discharged to the lake, via the Sewage Treatment System. 9.3.3.2.2 Component Description
- a. Sumps and Sump Pumps For general drainage each sump is fitted with two 100% capacity sump pumps. The pumps are designed to operate alternately to ensure their reliability. The initiation and the termination of pump operation is controlled by an alternating device. On "high" sump level, the alternator will start one pump. On high-high sump level, the alternator will start the second pump, boosting the total capacity to approximately 150% or more. On "low" sump level, the operating pump(s) will stop. In general, sumps and sump pumps are sized to handle all anticipated normal and transient draining requirements. The wastes from the floor drainage systems typically pass through the oil separators before entering the sumps. Oil substances are diverted to oil reservoirs. The low conductivity sump is used as a receiver tank for filter backwash contents from the condensate filters in addition to the normal sump collection activities.
The sump is equipped with a float level switch controller and modified level control circuitry for backwash operation. Prior to a filter backwash discharge to the sump, a sump pump down initiation signal is sent from the remote filter system. This starts one of the pumps to pump the sump down to the "low" level setpoint. This pump down allows enough sump capacity to receive the filter backwash discharge volume without exceeding the high-high sump level.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-10 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 b. Water Seals Traps are provided in EFDS piping where necessary to prevent airborne radioactive contamination from radioactive areas sharing the same drain piping system. 9.3.3.3 Safety Evaluation The equipment and floor drain system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: a. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or
- b. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in safe shutdown condition. A failure analysis has not been provided since this system is not nuclear safety-related. 9.3.3.4 Tests and Inspection The station equipment and drainage floor systems are proved operable during normal station operation. Preoperational tests of the systems were made by introducing water into the sumps and collecting tanks and observing the operation. 9.3.3.5 Instrumentation Application Alternators are provided for each sump as described in Subsection 9.3.3.2.2.a. In addition, each sump contains a level detecting device which will actuate an annunciator in the main control room or radwaste operations center at high-high level. For sumps in ECCS and RCIC cubicles, two redundant high-high level switches are provided for the annunciation. Handswitches are provided in the main control room for controlling sump pumps in the containment and drywell. For these sumps, low level switches are provided to stop the pumps on low sump level when in manual control. For sumps in high radiation areas, local handswitches outside the high radiation area are provided for manual control of the sump pumps. For some sumps in general access areas, the alternator may be manually operated. Floor and equipment drain tanks are provided with controls to start and stop the associated transfer pumps. The controls consist of an air bubbler type level sensin g system. The system starts the pump on high tank level and stops the pump on low level. A local pump handswitch is provided for manual pump control. Pressure gauges are provided locally at most sump and transfer pumps to monitor pump performance. An elapsed run time meter is provided in the radwaste operations center for each sump pump whose discharge is routed to the liquid radwas te system. The meters are provided for operator information as to which sump(s) are having high inleakage. Pump timers for actuation of alarms are provided for leak detection as described in Subsection 5.2.5.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-11 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 9.3.4 Chemical and Volume Control System The Clinton Power Station is a boiling water reactor and therefore, this section is not applicable.
9.3.5 Standby Liquid Control System 9.3.5.1 Design Bases 9.3.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases The standby liquid control system (SLCS) is an independent backup system for the control rod drive system. The standby liquid control system meets the following safety design bases: a. Backup capability for reactivity control is provided, independent of normal reactivity control provisions in the nuclear reactor, to be able to shut down the reactor if the normal control ever becomes inoperative. b. The backup system has the capacity for controlling the reactivity difference between the steady-state rated operating condition of the reactor with voids and the cold shutdown condition, including shutdown margin, to assure complete shutdown from the most reactive condition at any time in core life. c. The time required to actuate the effect of the backup control is consistent with the nuclear reactivity rate of change predicted between rated operating and cold shutdown conditions. A scram of the reactor or operational control of fast reactivity transients is not specified to be accomplished by this system. d. Means are provided by which the functional performance capability of the backup control system components can be verified periodically under conditions approaching actual use requirements. Demineralized water, rather than the actual neutron absorber solution, can be injected into the reactor to test the operation of all components of the redundant control system. e. The neutron absorber is dispersed within the reactor core in sufficient quantity to provide a reasonable margin for leakage or imperfect mixing. f. The possibility of unintentional or accidental shutdown of the reactor by this system shall be minimized. The system is designed to be a reliable safety system. The SLCS is also credited with buffering the pH of the Suppression Pool following a LOCA involving fuel damage. 9.3.5.2 System Description The standby liquid control system (See Drawing M05-1077, Figure 9.3-6, and Figure 9.3-7) is manually started from the main control room to pump a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor if the operator believes the reactor cannot be shutdown or kept shut down with the control rods or following a LOCA involving fuel damage for pH control of the Suppression Pool. The system is composed of the standby liquid control storage tank, the test water tank, the two positive displacement injection pumps, the two explosives valves, the two motor-operated pump suction valves, and associated local valves and controls and is located in the containment.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-12 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The preferred flow path of the boron neutron absorber solution to the reactor vessel is by the HPCS sparger. The SLC piping is connected to the HPCS system just downstream of the HPCS manual injection isolation valve. An alternate flow path to the reactor vessel is provided by the SLC sparger near the bottom of the core shroud. This flow path is normally locked out of service by the SLC manual injection valve. The boron neutron absorber solution absorbs thermal neutrons and thereby terminates the nuclear fission chain reaction. The specified neutron absorber solution is sodium pentaborate (Na 2 B 10 O 16
- 10H 2O). It is prepared by dissolving sodium pentaborate decahydrate crystals in demineralized water. An air sparger is provided in the tank for mixing. To prevent system plugging, the tank outlet is located above the bottom of the tank. The standby liquid control system is able to deliver enough sodium pentaborate solution into the reactor to assure reactor shutdown. This is accomplished by placing sodium pentaborate in the standby liquid control tank and filling the tank with demineralized water to at least the low level alarm point. The solution can be diluted with water up to a minimum concentration of 10.8 wt.% to allow for evaporation losses or to lower the solubility/saturation temperature. The allowable concentration of the sodium pentaborate within the tank is dependent upon the solution volume, per Technical Specification 3.1.7, Figure 3.1.7-1. The minimum temperature of the fluid in the tank and piping (70
°F per Technical Specifications) ensures that the sodium pentaborate remains in solution throughout the entire range of concentrations, as seen from Figure 9.3-7. The equipment containing the solution is installed in the containment in which the air temperature is to be maintained within the range of 65
°F to 104°F during normal plant operation. An electrical resistance heater system provides a backup heat source which maintains the solution temperature between 75
° F and 85° F to prevent precipitation of the sodium pentaborate from the solution during storage. High or low liquid temperature or high or low liquid level cause an alarm to be annunciated in the control room. Each positive displacement pump is sized to inject the solution into the reactor at a rate of 43 gpm. (41.2 gpm. minimum). To prevent bypass flow from one pump in case of relief valve failure in the line from the other pump, a check valve is installed downstream from each relief valve line in the pump discharge pipe. The two explosive-actuated injection valves provide assurance of opening when needed and ensure that boron will not leak into the reactor even when the pumps are being tested. Each explosive valve is closed by a plug in the inlet chamber. The plug is circumscribed with a deep groove so the end will readily shear off when pushed with the valve plunger. This opens the inlet hole through the plug. The sheared end is pushed out of the way in the chamber; it is shaped so it will not block the ports after release. The shearing plunger is actuated by an explosive charge with dual ignition primers inserted in the side chamber of the valve. Ignition circuit continuity is monitored by a trickle current, and an alarm occurs in the control room if either circuit opens. Indicator lights show which primary circuit opened. The standby liquid control system is actuated by both of the two keylocked, spring-return switches on the control room benchboard. The keylocked feature assures that changing the system status is a deliberate act. Changing either switch status to "run" starts an injection CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-13 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 pump, actuates an explosive valve, opens a tank outlet valve, and closes one reactor cleanup system isolation valve to prevent loss or dilution of boron. A green light in the control room indicates that power is available to the pump motor contactor and that the contactor is deenergized (pump not running). A red light indicates that the contactor is energized (pump running). Instrumentation consisting of solution temperature indication and control, solution level, and heater system status is provided locally at the storage tank. Table 9.3-4 contains the process data for the various modes of operation of the SLC. Storage tank liquid level, tank outlet valve position, pump discharge pressure, and loss of continuity on the explosive valves indicate that the system is functioning. The control room keyswitches may actuate the standby liquid control system, regardless of the position of the control switches on the local panel in the containment. Pump discharge pressure and valve status are indicated in the control room. Should the boron solution ever be injected into the reactor, either intentionally or inadvertently, then after making certain that the normal reactivity controls will keep the reactor subcritical, the boron is removed from the reactor coolant system by flushing for gross dilution followed by operating the reactor clean up system. There is very little effect on reactor operation when the boron concentration has been reduced below approximately 50 ppm, except near end of cycle condition. Equipment drains and tank overflow may be routed to separate drums that can be removed and disposed of independently to prevent any trace of bor on from inadvertently reaching the reactor. Alternatively, this drainage and overflow may be routed to the radwaste system where boron is removed and clean effluent returned to the cycled condensate system. 9.3.5.3 Safety Evaluation The standby liquid control system is designed to bring the reactor from rated power to a cold shutdown at any time in core life, with the control rods remaining withdrawn in the rated power pattern. It includes the reactivity gains that result from complete decay of the rated power xenon inventory. It also includes the positive reactivity effects from eliminating steam voids, increasing water density due to cooling, reduced Doppler effect in uranium, reducing neutron leakage, and decreasing control rod worth as the moderator cools. The SLC system is also credited with buffering the pH of the Suppression Pool following a LOCA involving fuel damage. The standby liquid control system is maintained in an operable status whenever the reactor is critical. To assure the availability of the SLC system, two sets of the components required to actuate the system, pumps and explosiv e valves, are provided. The minimum average concentration of natural boron in the reactor to provide adequate shutdown margin is 1000 ppm. An evaluation of the standby liquid control system capability is performed each cycle utilizing the reload core configuration. The results of this evaluation for
the current cycle are provided in Appendix 15D, Reload Analysis. Calculation of the minimum quantity of sodium pentaborate to be injected into the reactor is based on the required CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-14 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 1000 ppm average boron concentration in the reactor coolant including the water volume in the residual heat removal shutdown cooling piping and in the recirculation loop piping, at 68
° F and reactor normal water level. The increase in the isotopic concentration of the boron (>
30 atom % boron 10) in the SLC tank produces an equivalent 1000 ppm in the reactor vessel at 68°F. The result is increased by 25% to allow for imperfect mixing and leakage. Additional sodium pentaborate is provided to accommodate dilution by the RHR system in the shutdown cooling mode. This concentration is achieved when the solution is prepared as defined in Subsection 9.3.5.2 and maintained above saturation temperature.The specified boron injection rate is limited to the range of 8 to 20 ppm per minute. The lower rate assures that the boron is injected into the reactor in approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. This resulting negative reactivity insertion is considerably greater than positive reactivity caused by the cooldown. The upper limit injection rate assures that there is sufficient mixing so that boron does not recirculate through the core in uneven concentrations that could possibly cause reactor power to rise and fall cyclically. The essential system equipment for injection of neutron absorber solution into the reactor is designed as Seismic Category I to withstand the specified earthquake loadings (see Chapter 3). The system piping and equipment is designed, installed, and tested in accordance with requirements stated in Section 3.7. The system is required to be operable in the event of a plant offsite power failure; therefore the pumps, valves, and controls are connectable to the standby a-c power supply. Heaters are powered by normal non-Class 1E power source. The pumps and valves are powered and controlled from separate buses and circuits so that a single-failure will not prevent system operation. The standby liquid control system and pumps have sufficient pressure margin to assure solution injection up to the system relief valve setting of approximately 1400 psig. The nuclear system relief and safety valves begin to relieve pressure above approximately 1100 psig. Therefore, the standby liquid control system positive displacement pumps cannot overpressurize the nuclear system. 9.3.5.3.1 Evaluation Against General Design Criteria The standby liquid control system is evaluated against the applicable general design criteria as follows: a. Criterion 2 The standby liquid control system is located in the area outside of the drywell in primary containment and below the refueling floor. In this location it is protected by the containment and compartment walls from external natural phenomena such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and internally from effects of such events and as well as other postulated internal events (e.g., DBA-LOCA). b. Criterion 4 The standby liquid control system is designed for the expected environment in the containment and specifically for the compartment in which it is located. In this compartment, it is not subject to the more violent conditions postulated in this criterion such as missiles, whipping pipes, and discharging fluids.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-15 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 c. Criterion 26 The recirculation flow control system is the second reactivity control system required by this criterion (see Subsection 5.4.1.4.1). d. Criterion 27 This criterion applies no specific requirements to the standby liquid control system, and therefore is not applicable. See the general design criteria section for discussion of combined capability. e. Criterion 29 The standby liquid control system pumps and valves outboard of the isolation valves are redundant. Two suction valves, two pumps, and two injection valves are arranged and crosstied such that operation of either one of each results in successful operation of the system. The standby liquid control system also has test capability. A special test tank is supplied for providing test fluid for the injection test. Pumping capability and suction valve operability may be tested at any time. A trickle current continuously monitors continuity of the firing mechanisms of the injection squib valves. 9.3.5.3.2 Evaluation Against Regulatory Guides The standby liquid control system is evaluated against the applicable regulatory guides as follows: a. Regulatory Guide 1.26 Because the standby liquid control system is a reactivity control system, all mechanical components are at least Quality Group B. Those portions which are part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary are Quality Group A. This is shown in Table 3.2-1 Section V. b. Regulatory Guide 1.29 All components of the standby liquid control system which are necessary for injection of neutron absorber into the reactor are Seismic Category I. This is shown in Table 3.2-1. Since the standby liquid control system is located within the primary containment, it is adequately protected from flooding, tornadoes, and internally and externally generated missiles.
SLCS equipment is protected from pipe break by providing adequate distance between the seismic and nonseismic SLC system equipment where such protection is necessary. In addition, appropriate distance is provided between the SLCS and other piping systems. This system is used in some special plant capability demonstration events cited in Appendix 15A, specifically Events 51 and 53 which are extremely low probability non-design basis postulated incidents. The analyses given there are to demonstrate additional plant safety consideration far beyond reasonable and conservative assumptions.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-16 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 A system level, qualitative-type failure mode and effects analysis relative to this system's ability to meet single failure criterion is discussed in Subsection 7.4.2.2. 9.3.5.4 Testing and Inspection Requirements During a refueling or maintenance outage, the injection portion of the system can be functionally tested by valving the suction line to the test tank and actuating the system from the control room. The test tank contains demineralized water for approximately 3 minutes of pump operation. System operation is indicated in the control room. After functional tests, the injection valve shear plugs and explosive charges must be replaced and all the valves returned to their normal positions as indicated. Testing of the SLC pumps without firing the explosive primers may be accomplished by the use of locally mounted control switches. Operation of a pump in the test mode does not prevent a manual initiation of boron injection from the control room, should it be required. After closing a local locked-open valve to the reactor, leakage through the injection valves can be detected by opening valves at a test connection in the line between the drywell isolation check valves. Leakage from the reactor through the first check valve can be detected by opening the same test connection in the line between the drywell isolation check valves when the reactor is pressurized. The concentration of the sodium pentaborate in the solution tank is determined periodically by chemical analysis. The pump suction piping temperature is checked periodically to verify the temperature is high enough to prevent precipitation. The standby liquid control system preoperational test is described in Subsection 14.2.12.1.3. 9.3.5.5 Instrumentation Requirements The instrumentation and control system for standby liquid control is designed to allow the injection of a boron neutron absorber solution into the reactor and to maintain the solution well above the saturation temperature. A further discussion of the standby liquid control instrumentation may be found in Section 7.4. 9.3.6 Suppression Pool Cleanup System 9.3.6.1 Design Bases 9.3.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases The suppression pool cleanup system (SPCUS) serves no safety function. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown of the plant. Containment penetrations, including associated piping and valves up to the isolation valves are designed to Seismic Category I and ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 requirements. The remaining piping and valves, including those common with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup and condensate cleanup systems, are classified non safety.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-17 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.3.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases During normal plant operation, the suppression pool cleanup system is designed to provide continuous cleanup of the suppression pool water at a rate of 1000 gpm through one of three standby fuel pool cleaning and cleanup filter demineralizers. When required, the system is capable of providing cleanup of the suppression pool water at a rate of 3500 gpm. The system is designed to maintain the suppression pool water quality compatible with ECCS vessel makeup and containment spray requirements. The system is designed to remove radioactive iodine from the suppression pool water following a Safety/Relief Valve (SRV) blowdown at a rate sufficient to allow normal access for plant personnel to the containment within a reasonable time after the blowdown. 9.3.6.2 System Description The primary purpose of the SPCU system is to remove radioactive contaminants, including iodine, from the containment suppression pool water and to maintain the suppression pool water quality to meet plant operation requirements. There are two modes of operation for the suppression pool cleanup system, and they are defined by the flow path of the water to be cleaned. Since leakage through the safety/relief valves during normal operation causes radioactive iodine to accumulate in the suppression pool, the system is operated to minimize personnel exposure during containment access. This may be done continuously or on an "as required" basis to maintain airborne radioiodine in the containment below the Derived Air Concentration (DAC). A non-safety related plate heat exchanger, cooled by the WO system, may be placed in service in parallel with the deminerializers to cool the suppression pool. During normal operation, either of the two suppression pool cleanup transfer pumps takes suction from the suppression pool, transferring pool water through the SPCU system piping and then to the inlet of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers. The fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers remove iodine and other impurities from the water. The processed water is then returned to the suppression pool. The design-basis transient for the SPCU system is a MSIV isolation event at power. Following a SRV blowdown, both transfer pumps may be operated to process suppression pool water through the fuel pool cooling and cleanup filter-demineralizers. Four filter-demineralizers are installed, one of which will normally be in use in the FPC&C system. Therefore, three filter-demineralizers are available for suppression pool cleanup. This condition allows suppression pool water to be processed at a maximum flow rate of 3000 gpm. The RHR heat exchangers are available for cooling the suppression pool if the pool water exceeds the upper temperature limit of the filter-demineralizers. When the maximum suppression pool cleanup flow rate is desired or when the fuel pool cleanup system is unavailable for suppression pool cleanup, the condensate cleanup system may be used. Both transfer pumps operate to process 3500 gpm through one condensate CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-18 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 demineralizer vessel and back to the suppression pool. Connections are made to only one condensate polisher to reduce the possibility of mixing suppression pool water with the
condensate feedwater. The suppression pool cleanup system consists of piping, valves, equipment and instrumentation as shown in Drawing M05-1060. The suppression pool cleanup transfer pumps are the only unique major components of the SPCU system. Refer to Drawings M05-1037 and M05-1007 for interconnection with the fuel pool cooling and cleanup and condensate cleanup systems. The SPCU system may be used to transfer water from the suppression pool to the upper containment pool in Mode 5. Water is transferred through the SF system piping to the "J" Condensate Polisher. After passing through the polisher, it can be valved into the condensate system to be transferred to the upper containment pool via the condensat e feedwater systems and reactor vessel rather than returning to the suppression pool. 9.3.6.3 Safety Evaluation The suppression pool cleanup system has no nuclear safety-related function as defined in Section 3.2. Failure of the system will not comp romise any safety-related system or component and will not prevent safe reactor shutdown. The system incorporates features that assure reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations. These features consist primarily of instrumentation which monitors and/or controls its respective processes. Piping and valves, on both the suction and discharge legs, from the suppression pool to the motor-operated isolation valves outside the containment, form a part of the containment boundary and are classified as Safety Class 2, Seismic Category I. The remaining piping and components of the system are classified as nonsafety. 9.3.6.4 Tests and Inspections NOTE: The following paragraph is historical:
All Class B piping and components, as described in Section 3.2, are hydrostatically tested prior to plant startup. Nondestructive testing is performed in accordance with the ASME Section III Code, Class 2 requirements where applicable. The suppression pool cleanup system is proven operable by its use during normal plant operation. 9.3.6.5 Instrumentation Application The operation of the suppression pool cleanup system valves and pumps is controlled from the main control room by their respective selector and control switches. Locally mounted gauges provide the capability to monitor the differential pressure across the pump suction strainers and to monitor the pump discharge pressure.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-18a REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 9.3.7 Post Accident Sample System (PASS) 9.3.7.1 Design Basis 9.3.7.1.1 Safety Design Basis The PASS serves no safety function. Failure of the system will not compromise any safety-related systems or prevent safe shutdown of the plant.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-19 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 Containment penetrations, including associated piping and valves up to and including the isolation valves are designed to safety-related, Seismic Category I and ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 requirements. The remaining piping and valves are classified non-safety. 9.3.7.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis The Post Accident Sampling System may be used to obtain highly radioactive samples of reactor coolant, suppression pool and containment atmosphere. Regulatory Requirements
which had been associated with the design basis of the panel (NUREG-0737 and Reg Guide 1.97) have been eliminated per Clinton Power Station License Amendment 155. The PASS is considered a commercial grade sample station. Accident conditions assume a Regulatory Guide 1.3 release of fission products. The sampling system is designed to minimize contamination of samples, minimize personnel radiation exposure at the sample station, minimize volume of fluid removed from containment, and minimize plate-out. 9.3.7.2 System Description The PASS consists of two panels; a sample analysis panel (SAP) and a sample monitor panel (SMP) located in the diesel generator building at El. 737 ft. 0 in. The panels are located close to the containment building to minimize radiation exposure during sampling and purge time. The sample lines are stainless steel. The sy stem is shown in Drawing M05-1045-12. The SAP is divided into two sections, one for liquids and one for gases. The liquid sample routed to the panel consist of: 1. Reactor coolant via a reactor vessel jet pump instrument line 2. RHR Pump 1A or 1B Effluent (Reactor Coolant or Suppression Pool Water) NOTE: Drywell and Containment Equipment and Floor Drain sump sample lines are also supplied but are not normally utilized. The gas samples routed to the panel consist of: 1. Containment Atmosphere (2 sample locations at El. 740 ft. 0 in. and 790 ft. 0 in.)
- 2. Drywell Atmosphere (2 sample locations at El. 740 ft. 0 in. and 790 ft. 0 in.) Only one gas sample and one liquid sample can be taken and analyzed at a time. Table 9.3-5 lists the sample points, sample conditions and types of analyses. The operator has control and indication of the sampling process at the SMP. This panel is provided with a color coded mimic flow diagram indicating all remote operated valve locations and statuses, analyzer locations, process pressures, and sample flow paths. Isolation valves for sample lines penetrating containment are the only valves with their status indicated but not controlled at the SMP. These valves are controlled by the operator in the Main Control Room.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-20 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The SAP is also provided with a mimic which includes manually operat ed hand valves used to route sample flows within the SAP.
Liquid Sampling When a liquid sample is routed to the SAP, it is cooled and passed near a radiation detector to inform the operator at the SMP of the radiation level. The SAP will provide access to liquid grab samples collected in a portable, lead shielded, sealed vial. The panel is shielded to protect personnel when taking a grab sample such that resulting radiation exposure is below the levels specified in GDC-19. Off-line radionuclide analysis can be performed on liquid samples (at an offsite lab). Liquid sample analysis may be performed to quantify iodines and cesiums which indicate high fuel temperature, and nonvolatile isotopes which indicate fuel melting. A liquid sample may also be analyzed for boron content and chloride concentration. The reactor coolant sample for the PASS may be obtained from a reactor jet pump instrumentation sensing line until the reactor is depressurized. After the reactor is depressurized, the reactor coolant sample may be taken from either RHR A or RHR B pump discharge to assure that a sample representative of the core condition is obtained. During normal operation, a liquid sample may be taken at the sample sink. The sink drain and line pressure relief valve drain to the fuel building floor drain tank. When high level radiation is present, the liquid sample return is directed to the suppression pool. The operator at the SMP selects the valves to open or close to determine the appropriate path, and the control room operator controls the containment isolation valves. A suppression pool sample can be taken when a RHR pump is on and suction is taken from the suppression pool, such as during the suppression pool cooling mode, or low pressure coolant injection mode. The sample lines are flushed with demineralized water (except during loss of offsite power) to minimize plate out and contamination of the next sample. The flushing water is manually routed to the fuel building floor drain tank when radiation levels are low and to the suppression pool when levels are high.
Gas Sampling Gas samples are passed near a radiation detector to inform the operator at the SMP of the radiation level. Gases from the drywell and containment are obtained at the gas section of the SAP manually by opening a valve wh ich injects the gas via a hypodermic needle into a vial. The unused gas is returned to containment. After a sample has been taken, the operator purges the system to clear the lines and eliminate contamination of the next gas sample taken. Purging gas is returned to containment.
A separate system, the containment monitoring system, will be used for on-line hydrogen and oxygen analysis.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-21 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 PASS provides a grab sample capability for offline analysis of the containment and drywell atmosphere. Heat tracing of gas sample lines is provided to minimize condensation and plugging or losing soluble gases. Off-line radionuclide analysis can be performed on drywell atmospheric and containment atmospheric samples. Drywell and containment analysis may be performed to quantify the noble gases which indicate cladding failure. See Table 7.1-13 and Appendix D, Item II.B.3 for additional information on post-accident sampling capabilities. 9.3.7.3 Safety Evaluation The PASS is classified non-safety-related and non-seismic, except for the containment isolation portion of the system. In the event of a containment isolation signal, the containment isolation valves that supply samples to the PASS panel and the return valves to containment from the PASS close automatically. In order for a sample to be taken, the operator in the Main Control Room must open the appropriate containment isolation valves on the sample and return lines by bypassing the containment isolation signal. This bypass switch can only be operated with a key. A main control room annunciator is initiated whenever this switch is in the bypass position.
All other control of the PASS is provided at the PASS local panels.
The SAP is provided with shielding. Any gases vented within the panel are removed by the Auxiliary Building HVAC system during normal operation and by the drywell purge system after a LOCA. The latter ventilation system is provided with charcoal absorbers and HEPA filters. The PASS and the HVAC systems are designed to limit radiation exposure to levels specified in GDC-19. The PASS is designed to be supplied with emergency power. Loads in the PASS are electrically isolated from the diesel generator bus in the event of a LOCA through either a shunt trip or two fuses or circuit breakers in series as described in Subsection 8.1.6.1.14. Power is restored to the PASS when the operator, thr ough administrative procedures, manually bypasses the LOCA shunt trip signal.
9.3.7.4 Deleted 9.3.7.5 Deleted 9.3.7.6 Instrumentation Application The PASS is provided with local pressure, temperature, and flow gauges to check the operation of the system. Alarms such as sample cooling water flow, sample effluent temperature from coolers, etc., are annunciated on the local panel. Indicating lights on the local panel are provided for all hand switch controlled valve positions, including the containment isolation valves, and all pump motors. Indicating lights are provided to show the position of the probe which injects high radiation liquid samples into the shielded portable cart.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-22 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The SMP is provided with two annunciators for high radiation level in the liquid and gaseous sampling lines. Heat tracing is provided for the containment and drywell gas samples.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-23 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA SERVICE AIR COMPRESSORS Quantity 3 Capacity, each ICFM 2500 Discharge Pressure, psig 110
Discharge Temperature, °F 120 Efficiency, % 71 Driver Voltage, Volts 4000 Driver, hp 600 Motor Speed (rpm) 3560
Two volume tanks of 660 gallons each are located in the compressor discharge piping for moisture removal upstream of the service air dryer/filter package.
SERVICE AIR DRYER/FILTER PACKAGE Quantity 3 Dryer Type Dual Chamber Desiccant Desiccant Type Activated Alumina Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig Rated Inlet Flow 2100 scfm Rated Discharge Flow 1836 scfm Guaranteed Dew Point
-40° F at 115 psig Prefilters per Package 1 Prefilter Rated Flow 2772 scfm Number of Prefilter Cartridges 21 Prefilter Removal Rating 98% Removal Rating 0.04 microns 100% Removal Rating 0.6 microns Nominal Rating 0.04 microns Prefilter Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig Afterfilters per Package 1 Afterfilter Rated Flow 2772 scfm Number of Filter Cartridges 21 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-24 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA (Continued)
Afterfilter Removal Rating 98% Removal Rating 0.07 microns 100% Removal Rating 0.9 microns Nominal Rating 0.07 microns Afterfilter Vessel Design Pressure 150 psig
MAKEUP WATER PUMP HOUSE AIR RECEIVERS Quantity 1 - Service Air 1 - Instrument Air Capacity 11 ft 3 Design Temperature 120° F Design Pressure 150 psig SCREEN HOUSE AIR RECEIVERS Quantity 1 - Service Air 1 - Instrument Air Capacity 11 ft 3 Design Temperature 120° F Design Pressure 150 psig
IA Storage Bottle Secondary Filters Quantity 2 Capacity 30 SCFM each (min.) Housing Design Pressure 2500 psig (min.) 100% Removal Rating 0.1-50 micron
MSIV Secondary IA Filters Quantity 2 Capacity 3000 SCFM each Housing Design Pressure 150 psig 100% removal rating 23 microns
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-25 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-1 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM COMPONENT DATA (Continued)
ADS AIR AMPLIFIERS Quantity 12 Type Double Acting Capacity, scfm 20 Outlet Pressure, regulated, psig 160
ADS COMPRESSED AI R STORAGE BOTTLES Quantity 16 Type High Pressure Cylinders Capacity 264 scf/cylinder Design Pressure, psig 4000
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-26 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-2 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT FAILURE COMMENTS Service Air Compressor Loss of Compressor Three service air compressors are installed. Normally one is running, another in standby to autostart on low air header pressure, and the third in PULL-TO-LOCK, where it may be manually started. Additional protection is provided by utilizing air receiver tanks and equipping nuclear safety-related air component systems with individual accumulators. The air accumulators are of sufficient capacity to safely perform their shutdown function in the event that the air
supply system is lost.
Instrument
Air Amplifier
160 psig, ADS Valve Operation Loss of Compressor Twelve air amplifiers are provided for 100% redundancy. Also, storage bottles are
provided and each ADS valve has its own air accumulator with sufficient capacity to safely shutdown the unit.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-27 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1C1 Reactor Water Recirculation 1325 554 1550 575 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity
- 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 H 1C2 Reactor Water Cleanup Inlet Header 1208 120 1410 150 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity
- 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 H 1C3A 1C3B Reactor Water Cleanup Demineralizer 1A & 1B Outlet 1141 120 1410 150 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1C4 1G33-Z020 (Reactor Sample Station) Control Rod Drive 1860 135 2000 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity
- 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 1T2A thru D Condenser -14 130 014.7 212 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity H Eductors required 1T15 Cond. Storage Tank 30 100 50 150 Grab sample only L 1T16 Makeup Cond. Storage Tank 30 90 50 90 Grab sample only L 1T18 1PL22J (Hotwell Process) Circulating Water 30 105 30 105 Grab sample only L 1T19A 1T19B 1T19C 1T19D 1T19E 1T19F Condensate Filter A, B, C, D, E, F Effluent 220 135 275 140 Grab sample only L 1T12A 1T12B Feedwater Heater Drain 2A & 2B 15 175 100 350 Grab sample only M Eductors required 1T13A 1PL32J (Turbine Bldg. Process) Feedwater Heater Drain 1A -8 175 50 300 Grab sample only M Eductors required 1C6A 1C6B Component Cool. Water HX 1A & 1B Outlets 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C8A 1C8B RHR Heat Exchng. 1A &
1B Outlet 381 300 500 358 Grab sample only H 1C9 1PL33J (Aux. Bldg. Process) RHR System Flush to Radwaste 25 148 125 200 Grab sample only M CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-28 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued)
OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1R4 Unit 1 Flr Drn Surge Tank Recirc Line 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 1R3 Unit 1 Flr Drn Collector Tank Recirc Line 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 1R5 Unit 1 Flr Drn Evap Feed Tank Recirc. Line 90 140 115 180 Grab sample only M 1R7 2R7 Unit 1 & 2 Chemical Wast Coll. Tank Recirc. 85 140 115 180 Grab sample only H 1R8 2R8 Unit 1 & 2 Chemical Wast Proc Tank Recirc 85 140 115 180 Grab sample only H 1R13 2R13 Unit 1 & 2 FP Demin Sludge Tk Slurry Recirc 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped. 1R15 2R15 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Recirc Line 30 227 60 300 Grab sample only H 1R16 2R16 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Distillate 50 130 75 195 Grab sample only L 0R8 Spent Resin Tank Slurry Recirc Line 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only H 0R9A 0R9B Waste Sludge Tank A & B Slurry Recirc Line 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped 0R12 Chem Waste Evap Recirc 7 227 10 300 Grab sample only H 0R2A 0R2B 0R2C Waste Demin A, B, & C Effluent Lines 155 140 233 210 Grab sample only H 0R1A 0R1B 0R1C Waste Filter A, B, & C Effluent Lines 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H 0PL33JA (Radwaste Bldg. Process) Reboilers A & B 5 95 25 150 Grab sample only L
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-29 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued)
OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 0R6A 0R6B Laundry Drain Coll Tank A&B Recirc Line 40 105 60 180 Grab sample only L 0R7A 0R7B Laundry Drain Sample Tank A&B Recirc Line 70 100 105 150 Grab sample only L 2R3 Unit 2 Flr Drn Coll. Tk 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 2R4 Unit 2 Flr Drn Surge Tk 130 140 160 180 Grab sample only M 2R5 Unit 2 Flr Drn Evap Feed Tk 90 140 115 180 Grab sample only M 1R1 2R1 Unit 1 & 2 Waste Collector Tank 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H 1R9 2R9 Unit 1 & 2 Phase Separator Slurry Recirc 100 120 150 150 NONE H Sample lines capped. 0R17A 0R17B Aux Steam Reboiler A & B Individual Discharge Line 85 328 150 366 Grab sample only L 1R2 2R2 Unit 1 & 2 Waste Surge Tank Recirc 155 120 235 140 Grab sample only H Aux Steam Electrode Boilers 110 345 150 365 Grab sample only L 0R16 Reboiler Discharge Header 85 328 150 366 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Conductivity L On-line conductivity no longer actively in use. 0R18 Auxiliary Steam Deaerator 120 300 200 388 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Dissolved O 2 3. On-line pH L On-line oxygen & pH no longer actively in
use. 0R19 0PL33JB (Radwaste Bldg Process)
Radwaste Return to Cond Storage Tank 1. Grab sample 2. On-line Conductivity L On-line conductivity no longer actively in use.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-30 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued)
OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1R6 2R6 Unit 1 & 2 Flr Drn Evap Monitor Tank 85 130 100 195 Grab sample only L 0R3A 0R3B 0R3C Waste Sample Tank A, B, & C Recirc Line 60 140 90 210 Grab sample only H 0R4A 0R4B Excess Wtr Tank A&B Recirc Line 60 140 90 210 Grab sample only L 0R5 Chem Waste Evap Mon Tank 75 130 100 195 Grab sample only L 0R11A 0R11B Concentrated Waste Tank A & B Recirc Line 110 180 150 250 Grab sample only H 0R13 0PL33JC (Radwaste Bldg Process) Chem Waste Evap Distillate 50 130 75 195 Grab sample only L 1R10A 1R10B Fuel Pool Filter Demin.
Individual Effluent 1A,1B 110 120 155 150 Grab sample only L 2R10A 2R10B Fuel Pool Filter Demin.
Individual Effluent 2A,2B 110 120 155 150 Grab sample only L 1R11 Fuel Pool Filter Demin. Inlet Header 110 120 1550 150 Gram sample only M 1R12 0PL33JD (Radwaste Bldg Process) Supp Pool Inlet Header to Fuel Pool Fltr Demin 101 95 150 150 Grab sample only M 1C7AA Comp. Cool. Wtr Inlet Non. Reg. HX 1A 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7AB Comp. Cool. Wtr Outlet Non. Reg. HX 1A 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7BA Comp. Cool. Wtr Inlet Non. Reg. HX 1B 100 105 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C7BB 1PL42J (Contain. Bldg Sample Panel)
Comp. Cool. Wtr Outlet Non. Reg. HX 1B 100 120 140 150 Grab sample only L 1C5 None Standby Liquid Control System 14.7 100 24 185 Grab sample only L Grab samples from tank and pump suction.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-31 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-3 PROCESS SAMPLE TABULATION (Continued)
OPERATING CONDITIONS Max. Operating Design NO. SAMPLE PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press (psig) Temp (°F) Press (psig) Temp (°F) SAMPLING CAPABILITY Activity (Note 1) REMARKS 1T3 Condensate Pump Discharge Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 4. On-line Sodium M On-line sodium no longer actively in use. 1T4 Condensate Demineralizer Inlet Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1T5A thru J Condensate Demineralizer Individual Effluent 1A thru 1J 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity L 1T6 Condensate Demineralizer Outlet Header 210 135 275 140 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 4. On-line Sodium L On-line sodium no longer actively in use. 1T7 Feedwater 2100 425 2200 450 1. Grab Sample 2. On-line Conductivity 3. On-line Dissolved O 2 L 1T8A 1T8B Feedwater Heater Drain 6A & 6B 350 400 400 450 Grab sample only L 1T9A 1T9B Feedwater Heater Drain 5A & 5B 225 350 300 450 Grab sample only M 1T10A 1T10B Feedwater Heater Drain 4A & 4B 125 315 150 450 Grab sample only M 1T17 1PL88J (Feedwater Sample Panel) Turbine Bldg Closed Cool Wtr 83 105 150 150 Grab sample only L Note: 1. The potential activi ty levels are as follows: H: Activity >0.1 Ci/ml M: 10-3 Ci/ml<Activity<0.1 Ci/ml L: Activity < 10-3 Ci/ml
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-32 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS TEST MODES (a)
STANDBY MODE (a) CIRCULATION TEST INJECTION TEST (b) OPERATING MODE (a) PIPING PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F PRESS. PSIG (c) TEMP.°F Pump Suction Inlet to Tank
Shutoff Valve Makeup Water Pressure 70/100 (d)Test Tank Static Head (e) 70/100 (d)Test Tank Static Head (e) 70/100 (d)Storage Tank Head 70/110 (d)Pump Discharge
To Explosive Valve Inlet Makeup Water Pressure 70/1000/1220 70/10070 Plus Reactor Static Head 70/100(70 Plus Reactor Static Head) to 1220 70/110 Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/100Reactor Static Head
to 1150(f) 70/100<70 Plus Reactor Static Head 70/100(<70 Plus Reactor Static
Head) to
<1220 70/110 First Isolation Check Valve To
The Reactor Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560 (g)Reactor Static Head
to 1150 70/560 (g)Reactor Static Head (b) 125 (b)Reactor Static Head to 1150 (f) 70/560 (g)
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-33 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-4 STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATING PRESSURE/TEMPERATURE CONDITIONS (Continued)
(a) The pump flow rate will be zero (pump not operatinq) during the standby mode and at rated during the test and operating modes. (b) Reactor to be at 0 psig and 125
° F before changing from the standby mode to the Injection Test mode. (c) Pressures tabulated represent pressure at the points identified below. To obtain pressure at intermediate points in the system, the pressures tabulated must be adjusted for elevation difference and pressure drop between such intermediate points and the pressure points identified below:
Piping Pressure Point Pump Suction: Pump Suction Flange Inlet Pump Discharge To Explosive Valve inlet: Pump Discharge Flange Outlet Explosive Valve Outlet To But Not Including First Isolation Check Valve: Explosive Valve Outlet First Isolation Check Valve To The Reactor: Reactor Sparger Outlet (d) During chemical mixing, the liquid in the storage tank will be at a temperature of 150
° F maximum. (e) Pump suction piping will be subject to demineralized water supply pressure during flushing and filling of the piping and during any testing where suction is taken directly from the demineralized water supply line rather than a test tank. (f) Maximum reactor operating pressure is 1150 psig at reactor standby liquid control sparger outlet. (g) 560° F represents maximum sustained operating temperature.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.3-34 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.3-5 POST ACCIDENT SAMPLE SYSTEM Note: Post Accident Sampling System Requirements have been eliminated per License Amendment 155. This table retained for historical purposes. SAMPLE LINE OPERATING CONDITIONS MAX OPER DESIGN SAMPLE ANALYSIS PANEL SAMPLE MONITOR PANEL SAMPLE IDENTIFICATION Press Psig Temp.°F Press Psig Temp°F pH Range BORON RANGE*** CHLORIDE RANGE** RADIO- NUCLIDE GRAB SAMPLECAPABILITY 1PS02J 1PS03J Containment Atmos. (Gas) 15 185 150 350 -- -- --
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Drywell Atmos. (Gas) 30 330 150 350 -- -- --
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Spare (Gas) -- -- 150 350 -- -- --
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Water Clean-Up Effluent 1400 120 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Coolant 1250 575 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Sample (RHR Pump 1A Outlet) or Suppression Pool Sample 381 341 500 350 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Reactor Sample (RHR Pump 1B Outlet) or Suppression Pool Sample 381 341 500 350 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
- Yes 1PS02J 1PS03J Spare (Liquid) -- -- 1500 700 0-14 500-1500ppm* 0-20ppm*
- Yes
- Off-Line Analysis ** Complies with Regulatory Guide 1.97 *** For a worst case accident NOTE: Drywell and Containment Equipement and Floor Drain sump sample lines are also supplied. Since these samples are not required by NUREG-0737, these lines are not normally utilized.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-1 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4 HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR-CONDITIONING (HVAC) SYSTEMS Compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.140 as it is applicable to the following non-safety-related filter units is described in Section 1.8. a. drywell purge filter units, b. radwaste exhaust filter units, c. laboratory exhaust filter units,
- d. machine shop exhaust filter unit,
- e. weld shop exhaust filter unit, and
- f. equipment decontamination room exhaust filter unit. (Q&R 460.4) Both safety and non-safety related HVAC systems are designed to a 1972 American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) standard. The summer design outside air temperature of 96
°F dry bulb used in the HVAC design calculations corresponds to 1% summer maximum design temperature for Champaign/Urbana from 1972 ASHRAE Fundamentals Handbook. The winter design temperature of -2
°F corresponds to the 99% winter design temperature of Peoria. The summer design temperature being the highest among the three neighboring areas and the winter design temperature being the lowest among the three neighboring areas. These standard design basis temperatures may be exceeded by extreme weather conditions with -22
°F and 112°F once observed in the Springfield area and recorded in Table 2.3-1. The 1987 ASHRAE HVAC Systems and Applications Handbook has added specific cautions on using 1% summer maximum design temperature rather than extreme design temperatures for building like Diesel-Generator Facility, where a complete air change occurs in less than a minute. Since the Diesel-Generator Facility requires 100% outside air for cooling and a complete air change in less than a minute, the effectiveness of its HVAC system is evaluated in accordance with 1987 ASHRAE Handbook. Other plant ventilation systems are either recirculation type or draw minimum outside air for personnel ventilation or area pressurization. The design bases of each plant HVAC system is discussed separately in the applicable section for the system. 9.4.1 Control Room HVAC System The control room HVAC system serves the control room and surrounding equipment and personnel support areas shown on Drawing M01-1108-6. 9.4.1.1 Design Bases The control room HVAC system is an engineered safety feature, is designed to provide habitability in the control room under abnormal station conditions. In addition, the control room HVAC system is designed to support actions required from the control room for safe operation of the plant under normal and abnormal station conditons.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-2 REV. 14, JANUARY 2011 9.4.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The control room HVAC system is an engineered safety feature and is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure operation and habitability under any accident conditions, and to ensure operation under normal or abnormal station conditions. The system is designed to meet single-failure criteria with the exception of heating and humidification equipment. The heating and humidification provided in the control room HVAC system are not essential for the safety of operating personnel of the function of the safety related equipment. b. The control room HVAC system is designed to maintain the following temperature and humidity ranges: Area Temperature Range Humidity Range Main Control Room 71°F to 75°F 35% to 55%
Computer Room 68°F to 72°F 35% to 55%
TMI Panel Room 71°F to 75°F 35% to 55% Techinical Support Center 71°F to 75°F 35% to 55%
Control Panel Area 71°F to 75°F No humidity control Misc. offices & locker rooms 73°F to 77°F No humidity control Operations Support Area 55°F to 104°F No humidity control c. The system is designed to maintain a positive pressure within the control room envelope with respect to the adjacent areas to preclude infiltration of unconditioned air, during all the operating modes except when the system is in recirculation mode or when the system is in the maximum outside air purge mode. Maintaining positive pressure during normal mode is not a safety function. d. The system is provided with radiation monitors to monitor radiation levels at the minimum outside air intakes and upon detecting a radiation level exceeding a
preset value automatically limits the introduction of contaminants into the system by filtering the contaminated air. This ventilation system design coupled with the control room shielding assures that the dose to the operators inside the control room is within the limits specified by Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A for the duration of a design-basis
accident. e. There is no chlorine detection system. The chlorine detectors are retired in place. f. Provision is made in the system to clean up the inside environs upon smoke detection in the return air or at the minimum outside air intakes.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-3 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 g. The system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Safety classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. h. The safety-related equipment is powered from redundant essential buses, and the instrumentation and power supply to the system are designed to meet IEEE 308 and IEEE 279. 9.4.1.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the control room HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1102. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed on Table 9.4-1. b. The control room HVAC system is comprised of two full-capacity, redundant HVAC equipment trains. Each train has a 100% capacity high-efficiency air filter, an absorber for fume and odor removal (normally bypassed), a humidification system, a supply air fan, and a blow-through type air-handling unit comprised of cooling coil, heating coil, and zone mixing dampers. Individual zone ducts from each train are cross-connected to common ducts and supply air to the corresponding zone. Return air ducts from each zone are connected through a duct silencer to two 100% capacity redundant return air fans discharging into their respective mixing plenum upstream of the supply air filters on each air-handling equipment train. This system also provides an exhaust fan serving the locker room area. Provision is made to exhaust all the system air through the return air fan to the atmosphere when operating in the maximum outside air purge mode. The control room HVAC system provides independent temperature control to the following seven zones: 1. control room;
- 2. TMI Panel Room;
- 3. control panel area;
- 4. old Technical Support Center; 5. computer room; 6. locker and office areas; and 7. operations administration area The control room HVAC system provides independent humidity control to the following four zones: 1. Control room;
- 2. TMI Panel room; 3. old Technical Support Center; and 4. Computer room CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-4 REV. 14, JANUARY 2011 c. The outside air is normally brought in through one of two minimum outside air intakes and supplied to the operating return air fan suction. These two intakes are physically separated by over 375 feet, and are called "minimum" outside air intakes since one of them is used to supply the minimum required makeup air during normal and abnormal conditions. Wall openings for these intake ducts are missile protected. A third missile-protected air intake is provided to introduce 100% outside air to permit purging of the control room, if required. The minimum quantity of outside air required to provide makeup air for expected leakages (Table 6.4-1) and locker room exhaust fan operation and still maintain not less
than 0.125 inch H 20 positive pressure in the control room with respect to the adjacent areas is introduced under all station operating conditions. This positive pressure is not maintained during running of the chlorine mode during which all intakes are closed or when the system is in the maximum outside air purge mode. The control room makeup air maintains control room pressure at a positive 0.125 inch H 2O or greater relative to the adjacent areas. During normal operating conditions, the makeup flow rate (up to approximately 4000 cfm design, 1000 cfm of which is exhausted to atmosphere by the locker room exhaust fan) will vary as doors are opened and closed. Maintaining positive pressure during normal mode is not a safety function. d. The two minimum outside air intakes are located on the east and west sides of the plant respectively such that advantages can be derived from the outside wind direction in the event contaminants are present in one outside air intake. e. Chilled water is supplied to the cooling coils in each air-handling equipment train from one of two separate water circuits from the control room chilled water system which is discussed in Subsection 9.2.8.1. Each is comprised of one 100% capacity refrigeration unit, one 100% capacity chilled water pump, associated piping, and specialties. Condensers are cooled by plant service water or shutdown service water as discussed in Subsections 9.2.1.1 and 9.2.1.2. f. All 100% redundant equipment is physically separated by missile walls.
- g. High radiation measured at either minimum outside air intake automatically closes the normal intake damper (by sending closure signals to dampers 0VC03YA, 0VC115YA, 0VC03YB, and 0VC115YB) and initiates operation of one of two 100% standby makeup air filter trains. This depends upon which HVAC system is operating. This in turn sends a signal to open the appropriate makeup filter train inlet and outlet dampers (inlet: 0VC02YA or 0VC02YB; outlet:
0VC06YA or 0VC06YB). The recirculation air filter trains are automatically placed in service upon receiving the same high radiation signal. This is accomplished by sending closure signals to dampers 0VC10YA and 0VC10YB, and by sending a signal to open the appropriate recirculation filter train inlet and outlet dampers (inlet: 0VC09YA or 0VC09YB; outlet: 0VC11YA or 0VC11YB). For the removal of radioactive contaminants, minimum outside air is thus introduced through demister, electric heater, medium filter, HEPA filter, iodine
adsorbing beds, and downstream HEPA filter. The prefilter limits large particulate loading of the HEPA filter, and the single-stage electric heater assures no higher than 70% relative humidity air entering the charcoal. The makeup air filter trains are capable of removing 99.95% of all particulate matter larger than 0.3 microns and no less than 99% of all forms of iodine. The recirculation CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-5 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 charcoal filter trains are capable of removing no less than 70% of all forms of iodine. The high radiation signal also closes the locker room exhaust dampers, which trips the exhaust fan. h. In the event of ionization detection (i.e., fire detection) in the control room air, all of the makeup and recirculation air is automatically directed through the normally bypassed recirculation charcoal filter for fume and odor removal. Provision is made to manually purge all the room air by introducing 100% outside air inside the conditioned space, if required. System interlocks will not allow (or will stop) purging if radiation is detected at the minimum outside air intakes. i. The control room HVAC system instrumentation and controls are treated in detail in Subsections 7.1.2.1.15, 7.3.1.1.6, and 7.6.2.2.5. Each redundant control room HVAC system has a local control panel, and each is independently controlled.
Important operating functions are controlled and monitored in the main control
room. Instrumentation is provided to monitor important variables associated with normal operation. Instruments to alarm abnormal conditions are provided in the control room. Radiation detectors are provided to monitor the radiation levels at the system minimum outside air intakes and to automatically isolate the normal mode makeup air path, initiate one of the makeup air filter trains, trip the locker room exhaust fan and route the supply air stream through the recirculation air filter upon the detection of a radiation level exceeding a predetermined value. The high radiation signal is also alarmed on the main control board. Manual control of minimum outside air intakes by operation of dampers 0VC01YA and 0VC01YB from the main control room is provided. Smoke detectors are provided in the control room return air path and in the minimum outside air intakes. Smoke detection is annunciated on the main control board. The control room HVAC system is designed for automatic environmental control with manual starting of supply fans from the main control room or local control panel. The refrigeration equipment is manually started by a control switch located on the chiller control panel, but is interlocked to supply fan operation via a running signal from the supply fan to the chilled water pump. The controls are electric and electronic. j. Deluge valves connected to the fire water and shutdown service water systems are provided for all charcoal adsorber beds. (See Subsection 7.3.1.1.6.10) 9.4.1.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The control room HVAC system is designed to ensure the operability of all the components in the control room under all the station operating and accident conditions. In addition, the control room HVAC system is designed to maintain a habitable environment under accident conditions by providing adequate CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-6 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 protection against radiation and toxic gases. The system is provided with redundant equipment to meet the single failure criteria. The power for the redundant equipment is supplied from separate essential power sources and is therefore operable during loss-of-offsite power. The power supply, control, and instrumentation meets the criteria of IEEE 279, IEEE 308, and IEEE 323. All of the HVAC equipment and surrounding structure is designed for Seismic
Category I. All control equipment in the control room are rated for continuous operation at 86°F and 104°F temperatures, nevertheless, the control room ambient temperature is maintained at less than 86
° F by the control room HVAC system. Total loss of control room HVAC system is anticipated during a Station Blockout event and is expected to raise the control room temperature to higher than 104° F but less than 120
° F. This transient condition is not considered to affect the integrity of the control equipment. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-2. b. An equipment fire in the control room will not cause the abandonment of the control room and will not prevent a safe shutdown of the station because early ionization detection is assured, fire fighting apparatus is available, and filtration and purging capability are provided (see Subsection 9.5.1). c. In the event of smoke or products of combustion in the control room return air, ionization detectors will annunciate in the main control room and air will be automatically routed through the recirculation filter units. d. A radiation monitoring system is provided to detect high radiation at the two minimum outside air intakes and in the control room area. These monitors alarm in the control room upon detection of high radiation conditions. One of the two full-capacity standby makeup air filter trains and one of the two recirculation air filters designed to remove particulates and absorb iodine from the minimum quantity of outside air, are valved-in and the locker room exhaust fan is tripped upon receiving either of the following signals: 1. high radiation at either of two minimum outside air intake louvers, or 2. manual handswitch operation.
When one of these signals is initiated, the makeup train associated with the operating HVAC train automatically initiates. The normal air intake dampers 0VC03YA(B) and 0VC115YA(B) are given closure signals (as well as the maximum outside air purge dampers), the makeup air filter train isolation dampers 0VC02YA(B) and 0VC06YA(B) are given open signals and the makeup air fan starts. The locker room exhaust fan is also tripped. Provision is made for the operator to select either one of the two minimum outside air intakes for processing through the active makeup filter train. Additionally, there is a normally bypassed recirculation charcoal filter train through which all of the control room supply air is filtered upon receipt of a high radiation signal.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-7 REV. 14, JANUARY 2011 e. The makeup filter trains and the recirculation filter, in conjunction with other plant features, are designed and maintained to limit the occupational dose below levels required by Criterion 19 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. f. The introduction of the minimum quantity of outside air maintains the control room, and other areas served by the control room HVAC system, at a positive pressure (with respect to adjacent areas) during all plant operating conditions and therefore precludes infiltration of unfiltered air into the control room. The only exceptions to this are during chlorine mode operation when no makeup air is used and when the system is in the maximum outside air purge mode.
Maintaining positive pressure during normal mode is not a safety function. g. The physical separation of two minimum outside air intakes (i.e., on the east and west sides of the plant) allows the operator to choose the intake with the lowest radiation level. h. The control room HVAC system operates year-round on a minimum outdoor air cycle, that is, only a maximum of 4000 ft 3/min of air (1000 cfm of which is exhausted to the atmosphere by the locker room exhaust fan) is introduced from outdoors during normal operation. During radiation mode operation, locker room exhaust fan is tripped and makeup air is reduced to 3000 ft 3/min. In the chlorine mode, dampers 0VC01YA, 0VC01YB, 0VC02YA, 0VC02YB, 0VC03YA, 0VC03YB, 0VC115YA, and 0VC115YB (shown in Drawing M05-1102) will be closed to prohibit outside air makeup and the locker room exhaust fan will be
tripped. If the system is in the maximum outside air purge mode, the purge air dampers will also close. The opposed blade isolation dampers listed above are supplied with tight blade seals and were factory tested to verify acceptable leakage rates.
Any damper leakage which would occur passes through the recirculation charcoal adsorber after an accident, therefore there is no deleterious effect on the control room habitability. Dampers 0VC01YA, 0VC03YA, 0VC03YB, and 0VC01YB are able to close in 2 seconds after receiving an isolation signal. i. Each of the two gas operated control room station blackout cooling fans are 100% capacity designed to exhaust a minimum of 5000 CFM. The fans are portable and are stored in the Turbine Bldg. at EL. 800'-0". 9.4.1.4 Testing and Inspection The following paragraph is considered historical: All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages to assure compliance with all applicable standards. Construction tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system will be balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-8 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 temperature survey was performed to verify the system's ability to maintain the space temperature inside the control room envelope. Temperature within the control room envelope is continuously monitored. Provisions are made for periodic inservice testing of the system is discussed in Section 6.4. The maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations. Operation of each redundant equipment train is periodically rotated to provide on-line checking and testing. The standby makeup filter trains and the recirculation charcoal filters are subjected to the factory, preoperational, and subsequent periodic tests described in Subsection 6.5.1. Since air leakage through dampers 0VC03YA/B and 0VC115YA/B has been included in the control room operator dose analysis, the in-place leak test of these dampers is not required. However, the 0VC03YA/B dampers are included in the boundary of the periodic negative pressure ductwork leak testing on the control room HVAC system. The control room ventilation smoke mode of operation is tested at least once per 18 months to verify that on a control room ventilation smoke detector actuation, the system automatically switches to the smoke mode of operation. If the system fails to automatically switch to the smoke mode of operation, the system is then verified to go into the smoke mode of operation on manual actuation, and corrective actions are initiated to correct the deficiency. If the system cannot be manually put into the smoke mode of operation, then the ability of the control room ventilation system to operate in the radiation mode is not ensured. Consequently, the action statements and LCO requirements of the control room ventilation technical specifications are reviewed for applicability. 9.4.1.5 Instrumentation Application The control room HVAC system instruments and controls are described in detail in Subsections 7.1.2.1.15, 7.3.1.1.6, and 7.3.2.6. The control room HVAC system is designed for automatic environmental control, after one of the two redundant equipment trains has been manually started from the control room or local control panel. Failure of a component (fans, chiller, pump, etc.) of an operating equipment train is alarmed in the control room where the operator may start the redundant equipment train. Each of the two redundant equipment trains has an independent local control panel from which individual components of the train may be operated independently. Important operating variables are monitored and alarmed both on the local control panel and in the control room. Each of the two redundant minimum outside air intake ducts has two independent divisional radiation detectors which provide alarms to the control room on high radiation. The standby makeup air filter train will automatically start, the recirculation air charcoal adsorber will be placed into service and the locker room exhaust fan tripped (via damper closure) by either both radiation monitors in one division, or by both radiation monitors in one intake. The operator may manually select the alternate minimum outside air intake by damper controls in the control room CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-9 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Manual initiation of the chlorine recirculation system will automatically close dampers isolating the HVAC system from the outside air and trip the locker room exhaust fan. Ionization detectors located in all return air paths and in the outside air intakes detect ionization and actuate an alarm on the main control board. Handswitches in the control room enable the operator to select 100% outside air supply and 100% exhaust in order to purge the control room air of smoke and odors. The control room HVAC system has all electrically operated controls and control dampers. The two redundant systems each have a separate electric power source. 9.4.2 Fuel Building HVAC System The fuel building HVAC system is designed to provide ventilation air to the general areas and cubicles in the fuel building and the ECCS equipment cubicles (during normal operating conditions). 9.4.2.1 Design Bases The non-safety-related system is designed to limit the inside temperature range in conformance with equipment requirements. 9.4.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The fuel building HVAC system is not required to function in any but normal station operating conditions. However, the fuel building ventilation isolation dampers are required to close on any signal which initiates the Standby Gas Treatment System or upon failure of the instrument air supply. b. The ventilation supply and exhaust ducts are provided with automatic redundant isolation dampers at the fuel building boundary wall to effect fuel building HVAC system isolation on any signal initiating the standby gas treatment system startup. During system isolation, the standby gas treatment system maintains a negative pressure within the fuel building as described in Subsection 6.2.3. c. Safety related radiation monitors are located on the fuel pool main exhaust air plenum. These monitors measure the radiation levels of air exhausted from over the spent fuel, fuel cask storage, and fuel transfer pools as well as from other general areas. If excessive airborne radiation levels are detected, alarms are actuated in the main control room and locally. The fuel building HVAC system is automatically isolated and the standby gas treatment system is started. The radiation monitors are described in Section 7.6. d. The isolation dampers and the adjoining ductwork are designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Safety classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. 9.4.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The fuel building HVAC system is designed to limit the maximum temperature to 104° F in clean, accessible areas, and to 122
°F in potentially contaminated cubicles in accordance with equipment ambient temperature requirements.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-10 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 b. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective. c. The system provides filtered and tempered or cooled outdoor air to purge the building of odors and potential contamination. d. Ventilation air is routed from accessible, clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting it to the common station HVAC vent. e. The system exhausts air from over the spent fuel storage, fuel cask storage, and fuel transfer pools by entraining gaseous effluents rising from the pools and exhausting them to the common station HVAC vent, thus minimizing personnel exposure to airborne radiation. f. The system exhausts air from the ECCS equipment rooms during normal operating conditions. Purge air is supplied by the fuel building HVAC system at normal operating conditions. 9.4.2.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the fuel building HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1104. Nominal size and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-3. b. The fuel building HVAC system function is to supply filtered, tempered, or cooled outside air to the accessible areas through a central fan system consisting of outside air intake, filters, heating and cooling coils, and two 100% capacity fans. c. Ventilation air flows from clean, accessible areas to areas of greater potential contamination by induction action of one of the system exhaust fans. The exhaust air is released directly to the outdoors via the common station HVAC vent. Two 100% capacity exhaust fans are provided. d. Air supplied to the fuel handling floor is exhausted through numerous intakes located around the periphery and just above the water level of the spent fuel storage, fuel cask storage, and fuel transfer pools. The air velocity across the surface of the pools varies as a function of distance from the exhaust vents. The exhaust air velocity in the intakes will be ranged approximately between 900 and 1500 fpm. The exhaust air is routed directly to the system exhaust fans.
This arrangement minimizes the possibility of gaseous effluents from the pools escaping the exhaust system. Radiation monitors in the fuel handling area are indicated in Tables 11.5-1 and 11.5-2. The fuel building exhaust duct radiation monitoring system is located on the fuel building exhaust duct inside the fuel building and upstream of building isolation dampers. Upon detection of high radiation by this monitoring system the fuel building exhaust and supply ducts are isolated and the SGTS is started. Isolation CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-11 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 dampers have a maximum closure time of not greater than 4 seconds and are designed to be safety-related, Seismic Category I. This helps prevent the release of contaminated air. e. Area coolers located in various areas remove heat generated by process equipment and lighting. Chilled water is supplied to each area cooler from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. f. The fuel building is maintained at minimum 0.25-inch H 2 O negative pressure with respect to outdoors during all station normal operating conditions. g. More air is exhausted from the fuel handling floor than is supplied to draw air from adjacent areas to minimize the possibility of contaminated air flowing from this floor to adjacent areas. h. The ventilation of the ECCS pump room is described in Subsection 9.4.5.3. i. Chilled water is circulated through the ventilation air cooling coil to provide additional system cooling capacity. j. Building isolation dampers are spring loaded and air operated to ensure closure on loss of station air. k. Controls and instrumentation: each fan is controlled by hand switches located on the main control board and on the local control panel. Local handswitches and instruments are provided on locally mounted control panels. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are indicated on the local control panels. Redundant fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of a single fan.
Tripped radiation monitors, described previously and in Section 7.6, alarm in the main control room and initiate fuel building HVAC system isolation, fan systems shutdown, and standby gas treatment system startup. Controls are pneumatic and electric.
Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. The loss of air flow, high and low system temperature, high differential pressure across the supply filter, and high and low building differential pressures are annunciated on the local control panel. Trouble on the local panel is annunciated on the main control board. 9.4.2.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The operation of the fuel building HVAC system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: 1. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or 2. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-12 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 b. The operation of the fuel building isolation dampers is required to assure that the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. c. The system is designed with redundant, safety-related, Seismic Category I, spring-loaded, air operated fail-closed isolation dampers at the fuel building boundary walls to ensure building isolation in the event of a fuel handling accident. In addition, the ventilation exhaust ducts are sized and routed such that the building will be isolated before the airborne radioactivity released by a postulated fuel drop accident reaches the isolation boundary. d. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to assure its reliability for personnel safety and power generation. e. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-4. 9.4.2.4 Testing and Inspection NOTE: The following paragraph is considered historical:
All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Construction tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressure. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to ve rify the system performance. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system s ability to maintain space temperature. Leak tests are performed on the fuel building as part of secondary containment to assure that the standby gas treatment system can maintain the secondary containment at 1/4-inch negative pressure with respect to the atmosphere with no more than the design-basis leakage. Tests are made on the isolation dampers to verify the closure times and the damper leakage is included in the secondary containment leakage testing. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.3 Auxiliary Building HVAC System The auxiliary building HVAC system is designed to provide ventilation air requirements to the auxiliary building and to the control building (except for the control room). 9.4.3.1 Design Bases 9.4.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases The auxiliary building HVAC system is not required to function in any but normal station operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety design bases.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-13 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The auxiliary building HVAC system is designed to limit the maximum temperature in accessible areas (HVAC equipment rooms, hallways, and other miscellaneous equipment rooms) of the auxiliary and control buildings to 104
°F. The design basis normal temperature for generally accessible areas is 90
°F. The inaccessible areas (shielded cubicles or areas which typically have no electric motor driven equipment) are limited to a maximum of 122
°F. b. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective. c. The system provides a quantity of filtered and heated or cooled outdoor air to purge the building of odors and potential contamination. d. Ventilation air is routed from accessible, clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC vent. 9.4.3.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the auxiliary building HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1101. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-5. b. The auxiliary building HVAC system functions to supply filtered outside air to the accessible areas through a central fan system consisting of outside air intake, filters, heating and cooling coils and two 100% of full capacity fans. c. Ventilation air flows from clean, accessible areas to areas of greater potential contamination by induction action of one of the system exhaust fans. The exhaust air is released directly to the outdoors via the common station HVAC vent. Two 100% of full capacity exhaust fans are provided. d. The auxiliary building HVAC system provides ventilation air to the switchgear rooms on elevation 762 feet 0 inch in the auxiliary building, switchgear room on elevation 781 feet 0 inch in the auxiliary and control buildings, and cable spreading area on elevation 781 feet 0 inch in the control building. The supplied air quantity is enough to make up for the battery rooms exhaust in the auxiliary building and the control building, and to maintain these areas at slightly positive pressure with respect to the surroundings. e. Area coolers located in various areas remove heat generated by process equipment and lighting. Chilled water is supplied to each area cooler from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. f. Chilled water is also circulated through the ventilation air cooling coil to provide additional system cooling capacity. g. Controls and instrumentation: each fan is controlled by handswitches located on the local control panel. Local handswitches and instruments are provided in CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-14 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 locally mounted control panels. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are indicated on the local control panels. Redundant fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of a single fan. Controls are pneumatic and electric. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. The loss of air flow, high and low system temperature, high and low building differential pressure and differential pressure across the supply air filter are annunciated on the local control panel. 9.4.3.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The operation of the auxiliary building ventilation system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: 1. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; or
- 2. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-6.
- c. However, the system incorporates features that assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. 9.4.3.4 Testing and Inspection The following paragraph is considered historical:
All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Construction tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify sy stem performance. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.3.5 Instrumentation Application The auxiliary building HVAC system instrumentation and controls are described in detail in Subsections 7.7.1.13 and 7.7.2.13. Either of the two supply or two main exhaust fans may be manually started from the local supply fan control panel; the exhaust fans may also be started by control switches at the exhaust fan local control panel. The isolation damper for each fan opens on fan start and closes on fan CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-15 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 stop; the outside air intake damper opens when either supply fan starts and closes when both supply fans stop. After the fans are started, supply air temperature control is automatic; differential air pressure between various areas in the auxiliary, control, and diesel-generator buildings is automatically controlled by modulation of exhaust air dampers. In the event of failure of either a supply fan or an exhaust fan, the remaining fan starts automatically, unless the building air pressure requires either supply or exhaust fans to trip. Supply air temperature, supply and exhaust flow rates, differential pressure across filters, various building air differential pressures, and operating conditions of equipment are all indicated on the local control panels. Fan trip, loss of air flow, high and low air temperatures, high filter differential pressure, and high and low building air differential pressures are alarmed on the local control panels. Any system malfunction which is alarmed locally actuates a common auxiliary building HVAC system tr ouble alarm in the main control room. The controls and instrumentation are pneumatic and/or electric. The control dampers are pneumatically actuated. With the exception of the post accident sample room air handling unit, the electric power source is not safety-related; on loss of power, the auxiliary building HVAC system will shut down. 9.4.4 Turbine Building Area HVAC System This system serves all areas of the turbine building. This system operates during all normal station conditions. 9.4.4.1 Design Bases 9.4.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases The turbine building HVAC system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating condition and, therefore, has no safety design bases. 9.4.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The turbine building HVAC system is designed to limit the maximum temperatures in generally accessible areas to 104
° F. The potentially contaminated cubicles are limited at 122
° F, except the turbine building steam tunnel between columns N-K, Rows 109-116, and from elevation 762 ft 0 in to 796 ft 0 in shall be 150
° maximum. The temperature maintained in each area conforms to the equipment ambient requirement in that area. b. The system provides a quantity of filtered outdoor air to purge the building of possible contamination. Ventilation air is routed from accessible clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC
vent. c. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-16 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. Both the supply air system and the exhaust air system operate continuously. The lead supply and exhaust fans are manually started, and the standby fan can automatically start upon trip of the running fan. Isolation dampers at each supply and exhaust fan close when the respective fan is not running. There is an additional isolation damper at the supply air inlet which closes when the supply air system is not operating. An automatic damper in the supply system ductwork regulates the flow of air to maintain the turbine building at approximately 0.25 inch water gauge negative pressure with respect to atmosphere. e. One fixed CAM is located in the turbine building to monitor exhaust air for radiation before discharge to the common station HVAC vent. f. In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the turbine building ventilation system is shut down. 9.4.4.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design and nominal flow rates of the turbine building HVAC system are shown on Drawing M05-1113.
Principal system component types and ratings are listed in Table 9.4-7. b. The turbine building HVAC system supplies filtered and heated or cooled air to the general areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, filters, a heating coil, a cooling coil, two 100% of full capacity supply air fans, and supply air ductwork. c. The ventilation air is supplied to accessible areas in the main, mezzanine, grade, and basement floors and induced to areas of greater contamination potential. d. The potentially contaminated cubicles are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding accessible areas and, therefore, the air flows from the accessible areas to these shielded cubicles before it is exhausted. e. One of the two 100% capacity exhaust fans pulls the ventilation air through exhaust ducts from potentially contaminated areas and discharges the air to the
common station HVAC vent. f. By exhausting more air than is provided by the supply fan, a negative differential pressure of approximately 0.25 inch water gauge is maintained in the turbine building with respect to outdoors. This is done to preclude leakage of contaminated air to the outside atmosphere. g. Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown. h. Fan coil units are located in appropriate areas to remove generated heat and to maintain temperatures within the required ranges. Chilled water is supplied to each fan coil unit from the plant chilled water system described in
Subsection 9.2.8.3.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-17 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 i. Each fan coil unit consists of a fan and a cooling coil enclosed in a sheet metal housing. Supply air ducts are provided for air distribution wherever required.
Return air to the units is unducted. j. Chilled water is circulated through the central ventilation unit cooling coil to provide cooling for the supply air system. k. The relief line from the oxygen injection portion of the condensate system inputs into the exhaust ductwork, should the relief valve lift. l. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Each fan is controlled by handswitches located on local control panels. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are also indicated on the local control panels. The main control board has alarms which indicate when there are alarm indications on the local control panels. 2. Standby fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of the companion operating fan. 3. Controls are pneumatic and electric.
- 4. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. The loss of airflow, high and low system temperature, high and low turbine building differential pressure, and high differential pressure across the supply air filter are annunciated on the local control panel. 9.4.4.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The turbine building HVAC system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-8.
- c. The ventilation air supplied in accessible areas is induced through potentially contaminated cubicles by a mechanical exhaust system. Isolation dampers of the fail-closed type are provided in the airflow path to the potentially contaminated areas to preclude backflow of contaminated air into clean areas on loss of the ventilation system. d. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station conditions. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. 9.4.4.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. Systems ductwork and erection of equipment was inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests were performed on all system components CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-18 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system-operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. The system is in operation during normal plant operation. Operation of the standby equipment is rotated periodically to provide on-line checking and testing of performance. 9.4.5 Engineered Safety Feature Ventilation Systems The ventilation systems for engineered safety feature systems are designated as Essential Auxiliary Support (EAS) syst ems and include the following: a. diesel-generator facilities ventilation system,
- b. switchgear heat removal system,
- c. ECCS equipment area cooling system,
- d. SSW pump room cooling system, and
- e. combustible gas control system equipment cubicle cooling system. 9.4.5.1 Diesel-Generator Facilities Ventilation System The diesel-generator ventilation system provides year-round ventilation for three diesel-generator rooms, three day tank rooms, and three diesel oil storage tank rooms. Each diesel-generator room is provided with an independent ventilation system. 9.4.5.1.1 Design Bases This system is designated as an EAS system and limits the room temperatures in order to conform to equipment requirements, and to provide ventilation. 9.4.5.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The diesel-generator facilities ventilation systems are designed to operate under normal and abnormal plant operating conditions. b. The systems are designed to Seismic Category I requirements and safety classifications are in Table 3.2-1. c. With the exception of the day tank room and oil tank room temperature instrumentation, which have no control functions, the components of each diesel-generator room and oil tank room are powered from the essential bus corresponding to the diesel-generator it is serviing. The controls, instrumentation, and power supply for the system are designed to meet
IEEE 279, IEEE 308, and IEEE 323 criteria.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-19 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. The air intake and exhaust openings are located a sufficient distance apart to preclude reintroduction of exhaust air into the room. e. A separate ventilation fan, mixing dampers and duct are provided for each of the three diesel-generator rooms. This design ensures adequate heat removal from the diesel-generator rooms whenever the diesels are running. 9.4.5.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The diesel-generator facilities three individual room ventilation fans typically do not run unless their respective diesel generator is running. The two common make-up supply fans operate continuously all year around to supply ventilation air through the diesel-generator rooms, dies el oil day tank rooms, and diesel fuel storage tank rooms when the diesel generators are not operating. This is done independent of the diesel-generator operation to prevent the possible accumulation of oil fumes. The diesel-generator oil room exhaust fans operate year round under all plant operating conditions. b. Each diesel-generator facility ventilation system is designed to limit the maximum temperature to 130
°F corresponding to a summer design outside temperature of 96°F in the diesel-generator room. c. Each system uses outside air for heat removal and ventilation.
- d. Each diesel-generator facility ventilation system is capable of operating in an extreme weather conditions that are identified in USAR Table 2.3-1. Introduction of 112°F outside air to ventilate the running diesel-generator may raise the room temperature to 140
°F maximum and exceeds the design temperature for 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The diesel-generator and associated components are capable of operating during and after this transient condition. During extreme outside winter temperature of -22
°F, the heat generated from the diesel-generator will maintain the diesel-generator and oil tank rooms at greater than the minimum design temperature of 65
°F. 9.4.5.1.2 System Description
- a. The schematic diagram of the diesel-generator facility ventilation system for Unit 1 is shown in Drawing M05-1103. Equipment parameters of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-9. b. The diesel-generator facility ventilation system consists of three 100% capacity ventilation fans, one for each diesel-generator room, three 100% capacity exhaust fans, one for each day tank and oil storage tank room, and two 50%
makeup supply fans. c. When a diesel generator operates, outside air is induced through a missile-protected intake, mixed with recirculated room air to limit the minimum supply temperature to 65
° F and then ducted to the respective diesel-generator room. The exhaust air is forced through ducts by positive room pressure to the outdoors through a missile-protected exhaust outlet or back into the suction of the ventilation fan. A portion of ventilation air going to the diesel-generator room is CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-20 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 ducted to the day tank and oil storage tank rooms to purge them of potentially combustible fumes and limit room temperatures to 120
° F. An exhaust fan discharges air drawn from the day tank and oil storage rooms to the outdoors. d. During normal plant operation conditions, when the diesel generators are not operating, a nominal quantity of ventilation air is supplied continuously by a diesel-generator makeup ventilation system to the three diesel-generator rooms and their corresponding day tank and oil storage tank rooms to maintain the room temperature between 65
° F and 104
° F. Outside air is induced through a missile-protected intake, filtered, heated or cooled, and ducted to the three diesel-generator rooms. The diesel oil rooms are maintained at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the balance of the facility to induce diesel-generator room air to the oil rooms to purge them of potentially combustible fumes and limit their temperatures to 104
°F. e. Fire dampers with fusible links are utilized in ducts penetrating fire walls. Backdraft dampers are installed at the outlet of each exhaust fan for the day tank and oil storage tank rooms. A signal from the carbon dioxide fire protection system in the respective diesel-generator room automatically shuts down the oil tank room exhaust fan thereby closing the backdraft damper and isolating the rooms; this signal also shuts down the diesel-generator ventilation fans. f. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Each diesel-generator room ventilation fan is interlocked to start when its respective diesel generator starts and can be controlled by handswitches located on the main control board. 2. Temperature controllers located in each room control the ventilation systems supply, recirculation and exhaust air motor-operated dampers, and thereby, the room temperatures. 3. The temperature of each room is indicated locally and high room temperature is annunciated on the main control board. 4. All controls are electric/electronic (except for the makeup air fan dampers and chilled water flow through the cooling coil). 9.4.5.1.3 Safety Evaluation
- b. All equipment and surrounding structures are designed for Seismic Category I.
- c. The loss of any ventilating fan does not affect the safe shutdown capability of the station, since a ventilation fan is provided for each diesel generator. d. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-10. e. The ventilation system, and the safety related equipment inside the diesel-generator rooms and tank rooms are capable of operating during and after the CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-21 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> transient condition with peak temperature of approximately 140
°F during diesel-generator operation coincident with extreme outside air temperature of 112
°F. 9.4.5.1.4 Inspection and Testing
- a. The inspections and testing discussed within Paragraph "a" are considered historical. All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages to assure compliance to engineering installation specifications. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performanc
- e. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. b. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. c. System and equipment operation is monitored during periodic testing of the diesel-generator units. 9.4.5.2 Switchgear Heat Removal System The system serves Division 1, 2, and switchgear areas and battery rooms in the auxiliary and control building; it also serves the cable spreading area, BOP battery rooms, and Division 1, 2, and 4 inverter rooms under normal and abnormal operating conditions. 9.4.5.2.1 Design Bases The system removes heat to maintain temperatures in accordance with equipment requirements. Portions of the system are designated as an EAS system. The safety-related cooling system consists of a heat removal coil cabinet, a fan, and a condensing unit. The battery room exhaust fans are also safety-related. The balance of the system is non-safety-related and consists of a heat removal coil cabinet with a chilled water coil and a fan. 9.4.5.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The safety design basis is applicable to the safety-related switchgear heat removal systems, each of which consists of a condensing unit and a switchgear heat removal coil cabinet with a refrigerant evaporator coil. The safety-related design basis is also applicable to all the battery room exhaust fans. b. The switchgear heat removal system is designed with redundancy to ensure adequate heat removal from all three switchgear divisions under any normal or CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-22 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 abnormal station conditions. The system is designed to meet single failure criteria. c. The system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Safety classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. d. Each safety-related switchgear heat removal system is powered from the Class 1E bus serving the associated Class 1E switchgear. The controls, instrumentation, and power supply for the system are designed to meet IEEE 308
and IEEE 279 criteria. e. The system exhausts sufficient air from the battery rooms to alleviate any possibility of the formation of an explosive atmosphere. f. The system supplies sufficient air to Division 1, 2, 3, and 4 battery rooms in order to maintain these rooms between 74
°F and 80°F for maximum battery life during normal plant operation. The BOP battery rooms are maintained between 87
°F to 93°F during normal plant operation. 9.4.5.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The switchgear heat removal system is designed to limit the maximum temperatures inside the switchgear rooms to 95
°F during normal plant operation and to 104
°F during abnormal plant operation in conformance with equipment ambient temperature ratings and requirements. However, cooling system equipment will be sized to maintain a nominal room temperature of 95
°F under normal and abnormal operating conditions. b. A minimum quantity of outside air is supplied from the auxiliary building HVAC system to each essential switchgear room to provide makeup air for battery room exhausts and to maintain the switchgear rooms at a positive pressure with respect to surrounding areas. 9.4.5.2.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the switchgear heat removal system is shown in Drawings M05-1115 and M05-1121, Sheets 1 and 2. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-11. b. The switchgear heat removal system for each division consists of two independent switchgear heat removal coil cabinets connected to a common supply duct system. Each switchgear heat removal coil cabinet consists of a filter, cooling coil, and fan. One switchgear heat removal coil cabinet has a chilled water coil fed from the plant chilled water system and utilized for cooling during normal station operating conditions only. The other switchgear heat removal coil cabinet is a standby and has a refrigerant evaporator coil fed from a water-cooled condensing unit located within the switchgear room. This coil is to be utilized during abnormal operating conditions or upon failure of the chilled water switchgear heat removal coil cabinets. The condenser heat is removed by CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-23 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 shutdown service water or plant service water as discussed in Subsections 9.2.1.2 and 9.2.1.1, respectively. c. Supply air is ducted throughout each switchgear area and battery room.
- d. Return air from the cable spreading area and Division 4 inverter room is ducted and returned to the corresponding switchgear room by means of a switchgear heat removal return fan, and then to switchgear heat removal coil cabinet by the suction action of the cabinet fan. e. During normal operating conditions, air supplied to each battery room is exhausted to the turbine building by one of the exhaust fans provided for each room. No less than six air changes per hour of air are exhausted to ensure the dilution of hydrogen generated by the batteries. Each battery room is held at a negative pressure with respect to the switchgear rooms. f. Under normal operating conditions, makeup air is provided by the auxiliary building HVAC supply system. Under abnormal operating conditions, provision is made for outside air to be inducted to the switchgear room to make up for the
battery room exhaust requirements. g. Fire dampers with fusible links are provided in any duct penetrations and any ventilation openings in fire walls. h. Physical segregation is accomplished by virtue of equipment location in separate switchgear areas. i. Instrumentation and controls: Control switches, auxiliary relays, and other controls necessary for the operation and monitoring of the switchgear heat removal system are located either on the main control board or on local panels. Battery room temperature indication and high battery room temperature alarms are provided on a local HVAC control panel. Handswitches for manual starting of supply and exhaust fans are provided on the main control board. Handswitches for refrigeration units are provided on the
local control panels. Except for the chilled water flow through the non-safety-related cooling coils, the controls are electric and electronic. Design details and logic of the instrumentation are described in Chapter 7. 9.4.5.2.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. All power and control circuits for each switchgear heat removal coil cabinet condensing unit combination, battery room exhaust fans and switchgear heat removal return fans meet IEEE 308 and IEEE 279 criteria. b. All equipment meets the criteria of the appropriate system Quality Group Classification listed in Subsection 3.2.2.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-24 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 c. All equipment and surrounding structure is designed for Seismic Category I. d. The loss of any single heat removal standby switchgear heat removal coil cabinet/condensing unit combination does not affect the safe shutdown capability of the station, since an independent unit is provided for each division of switchgear. e. The failure analysis is provided in Table 9.4-12. 9.4.5.2.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment was inspected during various construction stages to assure compliance with engineering specifications. Construction tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures.
Controls, interlocks and safety devices on each system were cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A
temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.5.3 ECCS Equipment Area Cooling System This system is designated as an EAS system and serves the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment cubicles on elevations 707 feet 6 inches and 712 feet 0 inch in the auxiliary building when the ECCS equipment is required for service. 9.4.5.3.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.3.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The ECCS equipment area cooling system consists of a fan and coil cabinet for each ECCS equipment cubicle which is available for removing equipment heat under all station operating conditions. b. Each fan and coil cabinet is capable of dissipating the heat produced by the operation of corresponding ECCS equipment and limiting the cubicles temperature to less than 150
° F after a loss of coolant accident (see Table 3.11-7). c. Each fan cooler, except MSIV inboard, MSIV outboard, and HPCS room coolers are capable of operating in an ambient temperature of 250
° F maximum in conformance with Table 3.11-7 and 2 psig pressure saturated steam atmosphere for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after an accident in case of a local pressure steam leak. d. Each fan and coil cabinet is capable for operating at the parameters specified in Table 3.11-7 after an accident.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-25 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 e. The ECCS equipment is designed for redundancy, thus the respective cubicle coolers are composed of singular components, with no component redundancy required, (except for HPCS, which has two coolers which work in parallel). f. Each fan and coil cabinet is powered from essential buses serving the associated ECCS equipment. The instrumentation and power supply for the system are designed to meet IEEE 279, IEEE 308, and IEEE 323 criteria. g. The system is designed to Seismic Category I requirements. Safety Classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. h. Each fan and coil cabinet is housed in a Seismic Category I structure.
- i. The fan and coil cabinet in each cubicle is separated from others by missile barriers so that a single missile cannot affect more than one fan and coil cabinet (except for the HPCS room, which has two coolers which work in parallel). j. Each coil is supplied by plant service water or shutdown service water discussed in Subsections 9.2.1.1 and 9.2.1.2. k. Under normal operating conditions, a small quantity of ventilation air is induced to the ECCS cubicles from the containment gas control boundary and exhausted from the cubicles by the fuel building HVAC system. A radiation monitor is located in the fuel building common exhaust duct. Upon detection of high radiation, an alarm is actuated in the main control room, the secondary containment is isolated, and the standby gas treatment system is started. 9.4.5.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The ECCS equipment area cooling system is required to operate during normal station operating conditions. Also, it is required to operate when the ECCS equipment or the ECCS equipment area cooling system itself is in the "test" mode. b. A small quantity of ventilating air is purged through each ECCS equipment cubicle during normal station operation by the fuel building HVAC system described in Subsection 9.4.2. 9.4.5.3.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of ECCS equipment area cooling system, piping, and instrumentation is indicated in Draw ing M05-1116. Nominal size and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-13. b. A supply air duct is provided for the air distribution in each cubicle. The air is recirculated and cooled by the fan and coil cabinet. c. Shutdown service water with a maximum design basis inlet water temperature of 95°F and minimum inlet water temperature of 32
°F is used in the cooling coils. Cooling coils are designed to deliver the required cooling capacity with 95
°F water.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-26 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. Ventilation in the cubicles during normal station operating conditions is provided by the fuel building HVAC system. e. All the ECCS equipment area fans and coil cabinets are physically separated by virtue of their location in separate cubicles, which are located in a Seismic Category I structure. f. Instruments and controls: 1. The flow of water in each cooling coil is maintained at all times during ECCS equipment operation and is not modulated. With the exception of the RHR heat exchanger rooms, each fan is electrically interlocked with the respective ECCS equipment operation. Except for the MSIV rooms, the fans and coil cabinets can also be operated manually by switches provided on the main control board. The MSIV room fan and coil cabinet control switches are located on a local panel. 2. The room cooler fans are controlled as follows: a. The RHR heat exchanger room cool er is operated automatically by a temperature switch located in the cubicle. b. The MSIV Inboard, MSIV Outboard and HPCS room coolers are interlocked to operate automatically in conjunction with the equipment located in the respective cubicle. c. The LPCS, RHR and RCIC pump room coolers are interlocked to operate automatically on either room temperature or in conjunction with the ECCS equipment located in the respective cubicle. Operation of the respective ECCS equipment overrides the temperature switch shutdown of the coolers. 3. Instrumentation is provided to monitor the temperature of air entering and leaving the cooling coil. The temperature inside each cubicle is indicated and high and low temperature annunciated on the main control board except the MSIV inboard and MSIV outboard room. 4. All the controls and instruments are electric and electronic, except for the fail-open, air-operated shutdown service water valves, which open to allow flow through the cooling coils. 9.4.5.3.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. All power and control circuits for each fan meet IEEE 279, IEEE 308, IEEE 323, IEEE 336, IEEE 344, IEEE 338, and IEEE 384 criteria. b. All the fans, coil cabinets, and piping meet the criteria of the appropriate system quality Group Classification listed in Section 3.2. c. All equipment and surrounding structures are designed for Seismic Category I.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-27 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. High temperature inside each ECCS cubicle is alarmed on the main control board. The loss of an ECCS equipment area fan and coil cabinet causing high temperature inside the cubicle does not preclude equipment operation and the operator may continue to operate the corresponding ECCS equipment or may start a standby ECCS equipment or system, with the corresponding fan and coil cabinet. e. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-14. 9.4.5.3.4 Testing and Inspection NOTE: The following two paragraphs are considered historical:
All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages to assure compliance with engineering specifications. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system design pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each fan and coil cabinet are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. The ECCS equipment area cooling system fan motors are qualified by objective evidence or a qualification test on a similar motor with identical class of insulation, type of enclosure, and bearing design under test conditions identical to or in excess of abnormal ambient conditions described in Subsection 9.4.5.3.1.1, Items b, c, and d. The cooling coils have wide fin spacing, eight per inch of tube, to preclude air flow restriction under high water vapor condensation rates. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.5.4 Shutdown Service Water Pump Room Cooling System This system is designated as an EAS system an d serves the shutdown service water (SSW) pump rooms on elevation 699 feet 0 inch in the circulating water screen house when the SSW pumps are required for service. 9.4.5.4.1 Design Bases 9.4.5.4.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The shutdown service water (SSW) pump room cooling system consists of a fan and coil cabinet for each pump room. Each coil is cooled by SSW and is available under all station operating conditions. b. Each fan and coil cabinet is capable of dissipating the heat produced by the operation of the corresponding pump and motor to limit the inside room temperature to 122
°F.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-28 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 c. The SSW pumps are designed for redundancy, thus the respective fan and coil cabinet are comprised of singular components with no component redundancy
required. d. Each fan and coil cabinet is powered from essential buses serving the associated SSW pumps. The instrumentation and power supply for the system is designed to meet IEEE 279, IEEE 308, and IEEE 323 criteria. e. The system is designed to Seismic Category 1 requirements. Safety classification is provided in Table 3.2-1. f. Each fan and coil cabinet is housed in a Seismic Category I structure.
- g. Each fan and coil cabinet is capable of continuous operation in an ambient temperature of 122
° F. h. Each coil is supplied by shutdown service water as discussed in Subsection 9.2.1.2. i. Under normal operating conditions, a small quantity of ventilation air is induced to the SSW pump rooms from the circulating water screen house ventilation system. 9.4.5.4.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The SSW pump room cooling system is not required during normal station operating conditions except when the SSW pumps are in the "test" mode. b. An electric unit heater is provided for each SSW pump room to prevent the possible freezing of any water lines when the SSW pump is not operating. The unit is sized to provide sufficient capacity to keep a minimum room temperature of 65° F. 9.4.5.4.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the SSW pump room cooling system is indicated on Drawing M05-1106, Sheets 1 and 2. Nominal size and type of principal components are listed in Table 9.4-15. b. A supply air duct is provided for the air distribution in each room. The air is recirculated and cooled by the fan and coil cabinet. c. Shutdown service water with a maximum inlet temperature of 95
° F and a minimum inlet temperature of 32
° F is used in the cooling coils. Cooling coils are designed to deliver the required cooling capacity with 95
° F water. d. All the SSW pump room fans and coil cabinets are physically separated by virtue of their location in separate pump rooms which are Seismic Category I
structures.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-29 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 e. Ventilation in the pump rooms during normal station operating conditions is provided by the circulating water screen house ventilation system. f. Instruments and controls: 1. The flow of water in each cooling coil is maintained all the time during SSW pump operation and is not modulated. The fan is electrically interlocked with respective SSW pump operation, such that with the handswitch in auto position, an auto start signal from the pump will start the fan. The fan and coil cabinet can also be operated manually by switches provided on the main control board. If the manual switch is in "PULL-TO-LOCK" or is held in the "STOP" position, the autostart signal will not override the manual switch. This is not a design deficiency. 2. Each fan and coil cabinet is shut down by a temperature switch located in the respective room. The switch is interlocked with the SSW pump to preclude fan and coil shutdown when the pump is operating. 3. Instrumentation is provided to monitor the temperature of air entering and leaving the cooling coil. The temperature inside each cubicle is indicated and high and low temperature annunciated on the main control board. 4. All the controls and instruments are electric and electronic, except for the fail-open, air-operated shutdown service water valves, which open to allow flow through the cooling coils. 9.4.5.4.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. All power and control circuits for each fan meet IEEE 279, IEEE 308, and IEEE 323 criteria. b. Unit heaters conform to the National Electric Code.
- c. All the fans, coil cabinets, and piping meet the criteria of the appropriate system Quality Group Classification listed in Section 3.2. d. All equipment and surrounding structures are designed for Seismic Category I. e. High temperature inside any pump room is alarmed on the main control board. The failure of the SSW pump room cooling equipment will cause high temperature inside the cubicle but will not preclude pump operation. The operator may continue to operate the this SSW pump or he may start a standby pump with its corresponding cooling equipment. f. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-16. 9.4.5.4.4 Testing and Inspection NOTE: The following paragraph is considered historical:
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-30 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages for compliance with engineering specifications. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system design pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each fan and coil cabinet are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure proper operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify system performance. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.5.5 CGCS Equipment Cubicle Cooling System This system serves the combustible gas control system (CGCS) equipment cubicles when the CGCS system is required for service. Each CGCS cubicle is provided with an independent cooling system. 9.4.5.5.1 Design Bases This system removes equipment heat from the CGCS equipment cubicles and maintains temperature within equipment limits. The CGCS equipment cubicle cooling system is designated as an EAS system. 9.4.5.5.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The CGCS equipment cubicle cooling system consists of a fan-coil unit for each CGCS equipment cubicle and is designed to remove equipment heat during the operation of the CGCS equipment under all normal and abnormal operating conditions. b. Each system is designed to conform to Seismic Category I requirements.
- c. Each fan-coil unit is powered from sa fety-related buses serving its associated CGCS equipment. The instrumentation and power supply for the system are designed to meet IEEE 279 and IEEE 308 criteria. d. The CGCS system is designed with redundancy. Thus, the fan coil unit provided for each cubicle is comprised of singular components. e. Each CGCS fan-coil unit is provided with cooling water from the shutdown service water system, which is discussed in Subsection 9.2.1.2. f. Each fan-coil unit is capable of dissipating the heat produced by the operation of corresponding CGCS equipment and limiting the inside temperature to a maximum of 185
°F during all station conditions. Each fan and coil is capable of continuous operation in an ambient temperature of 185
°F.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-31 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.5.5.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The CGCS equipment cubicle cooling system is required to operate when the corresponding CGCS equipment is operating. b. The CGCS equipment cooling system is designed to operate independently of the corresponding CGCS in the test mode only. 9.4.5.5.2 System Description
- a. The schematic diagram of the CGCS equipment cubicle cooling system is shown in Drawing M05-1111-4. Equipment parameters of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-17. b. Each of the CGCS equipment cubicle fan-coil units consists of a cooling coil contained in a housing and a fan. Supply air ducts are provided for air distribution in each cubicle. The air circulated through each cubicle is cooled by its respective fan-coil unit. c. Water from the shutdown service water system with a maximum inlet water temperature is 95
°F and minimum inlet temperature of 32
°F is used in cooling coils. d. During all station operating conditions, when the CGCS equipment is operating, the fan-coil units operate to circulate air through the cooling coils. e. Controls and instrumentation: 1. A motor-operated valve controlling the flow of water in each fan-coil unit can be operated remote manually and opens automatically when its respective CGCS equipment starts. The fan in each fan-coil unit is electrically interlocked to start when the respective CGCS equipment starts. The fan-coil units can also be operated remote manually by switches provided on the local control panel. 2. All the controls and instruments are electric or electronic. 9.4.5.5.3 Safety Evaluation
- b. All the fan-coil units and piping meet the criteria of the appropriate Quality Group Classification listed in Section 3.2. c. All equipment and surrounding structures are designed for Seismic Category I.
- d. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-18. 9.4.5.5.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-32 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 equipment are inspected during various construction stages for compliance with engineering specifications. Construction tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the air and water flows and system design pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each fan-coil unit are cold checked and tested to ensure their proper operation. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature.
Maintenance is performed on a basis generally in accordance with the equipment manufacturer's recommendations and station practices. Equipment operation and performance are observed during functional testing of the CGCS system. 9.4.6 Containment Building Ventilation and Continuous Containment Purge Systems These systems serve the containment building and consist of containment building ventilation and continuous containment purge systems. These systems are independent with the exception that they share common supply and exhaust ducts/air piping as shown in Drawings M05-1110 and M05-1111, Sheets 1, 2, 3 and 5. The continuous containment purge system is normally used during plant modes 1, 2 and 3 (power operation, startup, and hot shutdown) and may also be used in Modes 4 and 5 (cold shutdown and refueling). Preferably, the high volume containment building ventilation system may be used on an unlimited basis during cold shutdown (mode 4)and refueling (mode 5) and within limitations specified in the Technical Specifications during plant modes 1, 2 and 3 (on an as needed basis to control containment airborne radioactivity concentrations). Administrative controls will be implemented so that the high volume ventilation system and continuous purge system are not used simultaneously. General Electric Mark III Containments are designed to be accessible and ventilated during normal reactor operation and during normal shutdown and refueling operation. Continuous accessibility to a Mark III containment is necessary to perform maintenance, testing and surveillance on various equipment inside containment that is vital to continued safe operation of the plant. To provide ventilation during normal reactor operation and during normal shutdown and refueling operation, Clinton Power Station has two 12-inch diameter penetrations in the containment (one for supply and one for exhaust). To provide ventilation during cold shutdown, plant refueling,and normal operating conditions (within limitations specified in the Technical Specifications), Clinton Power Station has two 36-inch diameter penetrations in the containment (one for supply and one for exhaust). Redundant containment isolation valves are provided on each containment ventilation penetration. These containment isolation valves close on any one of the following signals: a. High Drywell Pressure
- b. Low Reactor Water Level
- c. High Radiation in the Containment Building Exhaust Duct
- d. High Radiation in the Containment Building Refueling Pool Exhaust Duct
- e. High Radiation in the Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-33 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Normal ventilation in the containment is needed to control the concentrations and the spread of airborne radioactivity in the areas of the containment, as discussed in Subsection 12.3.3. In addition, it is used for controlling the containment pressure with respect to atmosphere. Radiological consequences due to the occurrence of a postulated LOCA when the containment is being ventilated/purged during normal operation is given in detail in Subsection 9.4.6.3, Paragraph h (Q&R 480.17). The design of the containment ventilation system has been revised to include the continuous containment purge system and the containment building ventilation system. Two 12-inch continuous containment purge syst em penetrations, with two redundant isolation valves (1VR006A and 1VR006B) in the suppl y line (1VR09C12) and two redundant isolation valves (1VR007A and 1VR007B) in the exhaust line (1VR14A12) are provided for continuous containment purge. Two 36-inch containment penetrations, with two redundant containment isolation valves (1VR001A and 1VR001B) in the supply line (1VR01B36) and two redundant containment isolation valves (1VQ004A and 1VQ004B) in the exhaust line (1VQ02B36) are provided for containment ventilation during cold shutdown, plant refueling, and normal plant operating conditions (on an as-needed basis within limitations specified in the Technical Specifications to control containment airborne radioactivity concentrations). Each of these four (normally closed) 36-inch containment isolation valves has 4-inch bypass valves (1VR002A, 1VR002B, 1VQ006A, and 1VQ006B) which are used post-LOCA when the Standby Gas Treatment System may be used as a backup to the hydrogen recombiners. These bypass valves are normally closed and can be opened post-LOCA. These penetrations and valves are identified in Drawings M05-1111 and M05-1110. One penetration provides the supply air and the other is used for exhaust. 9.4.6.1 Design Bases 9.4.6.1.1 Safety Design Bases 9.4.6.1.1.1 Containment Building Ventilation System Safety Design Bases
- a. The containment building ventilation system is used during plant refueling operations and cold shutdown. Its use during normal operation is limited to an as-needed basis within limitations specified in the Technical Specifications to control containment airborne radioactive concentrations. Therefore this system has no safety design bases except fo r the containment building penetration isolation valves. b. The supply air penetration through the containment wall is equipped with two redundant isolation valves in series to ensure containment isolation. Mechanical stops restrict the opening (36-inch) of these valves to 50
°. In addition, there is a 4-inch valved bypass line around each of these valves. This is also true of the
exhaust air even though the exhaust air uses the drywell purge system penetration through the containment building. The containment building ventilation system isolation valves at the containment penetration and the CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-34 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 intermediate pipe between the valves are required during and after all abnormal station operating conditions to maintain the containment boundary integrity. The main isolation valves are spring loaded, air operated, and fail closed on loss of electric power or station air. This part of the system is designed for Seismic Category I Classification and Safety Class 2. The isolation valves close upon receiving a LOCA signal, or a high radiation signal from any of the following radiation monitoring system, thus preventing an accidental release of radioactivity: 1. containment building exhaust duct radiation monitors;
- 2. containment building fuel pool vent plenum radiation monitors; 3. continuous containment purge system exhaust duct radiation monitors. c. Safety classification for containment isolation is provided in Table 3.2-1.
- d. Debris screens are provided to protect containment isolation valves from material that may become entrained in the ductwork. A total of 8 debris screens are installed in the containment building ventilation systems, as shown in Drawings M05-1110 and M05-1111, Sheets 1, 2, 3, and 5. One screen is located upstream of containment outboard isolation valve 1VR001A on the 36-inch inlet line to the containment. Another screen is installed downstream of containment inboard isolation valve 1VR001B on the same line to protect the isolation valves in the event air flow is reversed due to containment pressure being higher than that in the ductwork outside the containment. Three screens are installed on the exhaust side to protect the isolation valves 1VQ004A and 1VQ004B and the 4-inch bypass valve 1VQ006B. One screen is located in the 36-inch line 1VQ05A just upstream of valve 1VQ003. The second screen is located in the 24-inch line 1VQ02A near the junction of the 24-inch line 1VQ02A near the junction of the 24-inch and 36-inch lines. The third screen is located upstream of bypass valve 1VQ006B. The screens are designed to the following criteria: 1. Screens are installed as close as reasonably possible (1 to 6 pipe diameters) to their respective isolation valves, given the physical arrangement of the ductwork. There are no normally open piping taps or internal components located between the screens and the isolation valves. 2. Screens are Seismic Category I and are able to withstand LOCA pressures. 3. The piping between the valve and screen is Seismic Category I, ASME Section III, Class 2. 4. The size of the openings in the debris screens is 1" in diameter (except debris screen 1VQ03M which has 1/2 inch diameter openings).
(Q&R 480.19)
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-35 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.6.1.1.2 Continuous Containment Purge System Safety Design Bases
- a. The continuous containment purge system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating conditions to limit airborne radioactivity and maintain proper pressure boundaries in the contai nment. Therefore, this system has no safety design bases except for the containment building penetration isolation valves. b. The supply air penetration through the containment wall is equipped with two redundant isolation valves in series to ensure containment isolation. This is also true of the exhaust air. The continuous containment purge system isolation valves at the containment penetration and the intermediate pipe between the valves are required during and after all abnormal station operating conditions to maintain the containment boundary integrity. The main isolation valves are spring loaded, air operated, and fail closed on loss of electric power or station air.
This part of the system is designed for Seismic Category I Classification and Safety Class 2. The isolation valves close upon receiving a LOCA signal, or a high radiation signal from any of the following radiation monitoring design systems, thus preventing an accidental release of radioactivity: 1. containment building exhaust duct radiation monitors;
- 2. containment building fuel pool vent plenum radiation monitors;
- 3. continuous containment purge system exhaust duct radiation monitors. c. Safety classification for containment isolation is provided in Table 3.2-1.
- d. Three debris screens are installed on the 12-inch continuous containment vent and purge system as shown on Drawing M05-1111, Sheets 1, 2, 3 and 5. On the inlet line, one screen is installed upstream of containment outboard isolation valve 1VR006A and another screen is installed downstream of containment inboard isolation valve 1VR006B. On the exhaust line a screen is installed upstream of containment inboard isolation valve 1VR007B. The screens are designed to the same criteria established in Subsection 9.4.6.1.1.1, Paragraph d. (Q&R 480.19) 9.4.6.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases 9.4.6.1.2.1 Containment Building Ventilation System Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The containment building ventilation system includes fan-coil cooling units supplied with cooling water from the plant chilled water system and is designed to limit the maximum temperatures in generally accessible areas of the containment building to 104
°F. The potentially contam inated cubicles will be limited to a maximum of 122
°F, with the exception of the steam tunnel which will be limited to a maximum of 142
°F. The temperature maintained in each area conforms to the equipment ambient requirements in that area. The fan coil cooling units are to be used continuously.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-36 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 b. The system provides up to 16,270 cfm of filtered outdoor air to purge the building of possible contamination. Ventilation air is routed from accessible clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC vent. c. The system transfers air from the fuel transfer pool periphery and exhausts it to the common station HVAC vent. An option is provided to exhaust air from the
containment dome area if required. d. The system components are designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective. e. The containment building ventilation supply air system operates manually prior to and during drywell occupancy, during a normal plant refueling shutdown, and as required upon operator initiation except when the containment building is isolated or the continuous containment purge system is in operation. The exhaust air system operates manually prior to an dur ing drywell occupancy, during a normal plant refueling shutdown, and as required upon operator initiation except when the containment building is isolated or when the drywell purge system or the continuous containment purge system is operating. Isolation dampers at each supply and exhaust fan close when their respective fans are not running. There is an additional isolation damper at the supply air inlet which closes when the supply air system is not operating. The purpose of this damper is to protect the system cooling coil from freezing when the system is not operating. A control damper in the supply stream ductwork regulates the flow of air to maintain the containment building at a negative pressure with respect to the outside. f. The exhaust air is not normally treated. Airborne radioactivity is monitored at the main containment building exhaust before it exits at the common station HVAC vent using the continuous air monitoring system. Upon an indication of high airborne particulate or iodine activity, the operator can filter the exhaust air through the drywell purge filter train A, B, and C (one or two standby). 9.4.6.1.2.2 Continuous Containment Purge System Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The continuous containment purge system is designed to prevent the spread of airborne contamination by maintaining the areas where contamination may originate, such as the radiation cubicles, at a negative pressure compared to the general areas. The system is sized so as to maintain the airborne radiation levels in containment general areas at or below thirty percent of the derived air concentration under the design basis conditions of operation. Individual fan-coil cooling units (local recirculation type) served by the plant chilled water system limit the maximum temperatures in generally accessible areas of the containment building to 104
°F. The temperature in potentially contaminated cubicles is similarly limited to a maximum of 122
°F, except for the steam tunnel which is limited to 142
°F. The temperature maintained in each area conforms to the equipment ambient or environmental qualification requirements in that area. b. The system provides up to 8000 cfm of filtered, tempered as necessary, outdoor supply air to purge the building of possible contamination. Purge air is routed CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-37 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 from accessible clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC vent. Air is not exhausted from the refueling pool
periphery and the dome area when this system is in use. c. The system components are designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective. d. The supply and exhaust sides of the continuous purge system are designed to operate manually and continuously except when the containment building is isolated or when the high volume containment ventilation system is operating.
The supply and exhaust systems also operate when the system is operating in filtered mode and either drywell purge filter train fan A or B is operating at a reduced capacity of 8000 cfm. Isolation dampers at each supply and exhaust fan close when their respective fans are not running. There is an additional isolation damper at the supply air inlet which closes when the supply air system is not operating. A control damper in the supply air path regulates the flow of air to maintain the containment building at a negative pressure with respect to the
outside. e. The exhaust air is normally not treated. Airborne radioactivity is monitored in the continuous containment purge exhaust before it exits at the common station HVAC vent using the continuous air monitoring system. Upon an indication of high airborne particulate or iodine activity, the operator can select to route the exhaust through either drywell purge filter train A or B to filter the exhaust before releasing it to the outside. 9.4.6.2 System Description 9.4.6.2.1 Containment Ventilation System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the containment building ventilation system is shown in Drawing M05-1111, Sheets 1, 2, 3, and 5.
The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-19. b. When in operation, the containment building ventilation system supplies filtered, heated, or cooled air to the general areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, filters, a heating coil, a cooling coil, two 100% of full capacity supply air fans, and supply air ductwork. c. The ventilation air is supplied to accessible areas on elevations 755 feet 0 inch and 789 feet 1 inch and on the operating floor and is induced to areas of greater contamination potential. d. The potentially contaminated cubicles are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding accessible areas and, therefore, the air flows from the accessible areas to these shielded cubicles before it is exhausted. e. One of the two 100% capacity exhaust fans provides the ventilation air through exhaust ducts from potentially contaminated areas and discharges the air to the common station HVAC vent.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-38 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 f. The air from the refueling floor is exhausted through the exhaust boxes provided at approximately 4-foot intervals around the periphery of the fuel pool. These exhaust boxes are connected to common exhaust ducts leading outside the containment building to the exhaust fans. g. The exhaust duct from the refueling floor is provided with radiation monitors which will automatically initiate containment building ventilation isolation and standby gas treatment startup on high radiation detection. The maximum time required to completely close the isolation valve after high radiation is detected is specified to be 6 seconds.
The average velocity of potentially contaminated effluents inside the exhaust duct is designed to have a travel time of a minimum of 9.9 seconds. On this basis, the length of the exhaust duct from the refueling floor radiation monitors to the isolation valves is such that the release of contaminated air to the outside atmosphere is either precluded or is insignificant. h. The containment building ventilation isolation valves are designed for fail-safe operation. These valves are operated by spring-loaded air cylinders which fail closed on loss of station air or electric power. The containment building ventilation isolation valves are sized as small as practical. The main valves (not the bypass valves) close on high drywell pressure, low reactor water level, high radiation in the ventilation exhaust duct, high radiation in the refueling pool exhaust duct, and high radiation in the continuous containment purge exhaust duct. The bypass valves are normally closed and can only be opened with a keylocked switch. i. The containment building is maintained at a minimum of 1/4-inch H 2 O negative pressure with respect to outdoor atmosphere by the containment building ventilation system when it is operating. j. More air is exhausted from the operating floor than is supplied to draw air from adjacent accessible areas, thereby minimizing the possibility of potentially contaminated air from the operating floor migrating to clean areas of the containment building. k. Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown. l. Fan-coil units are located in accessible and inaccessible areas to remove generated heat and to maintain temperatures within the required ranges. Chilled water is supplied to each fan-coil unit from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. m. Each fan-coil unit consists of a fan and a cooling coil enclosed in a sheet metal housing. Supply air ducts are provided for air distribution wherever required. Return air to the units is unducted in most cases.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-39 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 n. Chilled water is circulated through the central ventilation unit cooling coil to provide cooling for the supply air system. o. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Each fan and isolation valve is controlled by hand switches on the main control board. Other instruments are provided in a locally mounted control panel. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are indicated on the local control panel and alarmed on the main control board. 2. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables. High system temperature and high differential pressure across the supply air filters are annunciated on the local control board. Loss of airflow, low system temperature, and high and low containment building differential pressure are annunciated on the main control board. 3. The process radiation monitoring system provided for the fuel transfer pool and containment building exhausts is covered under Section 7.6. 4. Standby fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of the companion operation fan. 5. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 9.4.6.2.2 Continuous Containment Purge System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the continuous containment purge system is shown in Drawing M05-1111, Sheets 1, 2, 3, and 5. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-19A. b. The continuous containment purge system supplies filtered, heated, or cooled air to the general areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, filters, a heating coil, a cooling coil, a secondary cooling coil, two 100% of full capacity supply air blowers, and supply air piping and ductwork. c. The purge air is supplied, via the continuous containment purge/containment building ventilation common supply air ductwork in the containment, to accessible areas on elevations 755 feet 0 inch and 789 feet 1 inch and on the operating floor elevation 828 feet 3 inches and is induced to areas of greater contamination potential. Normally, no air is exhausted from the operating floor whenever the continuous containment purge system is operating. d. The potentially contaminated cubicles are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding accessible areas and, therefore, the air flows from the accessible areas to these shielded cubicles before it is exhausted. e. One of the two 100% capacity exhaust blowers provided exhausts the ventilation air through exhaust ducts from potentially contaminated areas and discharges the air to the common station HVAC vent. Alternately, the operator has the option to CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-40 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 exhaust the air through the drywell purge filter units (A or B) before being discharged to the common station HVAC vent. f. The continuous containment purge system isolation valves are designed for fail-safe operation. These valves are operated by spring-loaded air cylinders which fail closed on loss of station air or electric power. The continuous containment purge system isolation valves are sized as small as practical. These valves close on high drywell pressure, low reactor water level, high radiation in the ventilation exhaust duct, high radiation in the refueling pool exhaust duct, and high radiation in the continuous containment purge exhaust. g. The containment building is maintained at a minimum of 1/4-inch H 2 O negative pressure with respect to the outdoor atmosphere by the continuous containment purge system during normal station operating conditions. h. Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown. i. Fan-coil units are located in accessible and inaccessible areas to remove generated heat and to maintain temperatures within the required ranges. Chilled water is supplied to each fan-coil unit from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. j. Each fan-coil unit consists of a fan and a cooling coil enclosed in a sheet metal housing. Supply air ducts are provided for air distribution wherever required. Return air to the units is unducted in most cases. k. Chilled water is circulated through the central ventilation unit primary cooling coil and secondary cooling coil to provide cooling for the supply air system. l. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Each blower and isolation valve is controlled by hand switches on the main control board. Other instruments are provided in a locally mounted control panel. 2. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. Pertinent system flow rates, fan and filter differential pressure, and temperatures are indicated on the local control panel. Abnormal system flow rates and temperatures are alarmed on the main control board. Abnormal filter differential pressures are alarmed on the local control panel, which gives a common trouble alarm on the main control board. 3. The process radiation monitoring system provided for the continuous containment purge exhaust duct is covered under Section 7.6.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-41 REV. 14, JANUARY 2011 4. Standby fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of the companion operation fan. 5. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 9.4.6.3 Safety Evaluation 9.4.6.3.1 Containment Ventilation System Safety Evaluation
- a. The containment building ventilation system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown
condition. b. The operation of the containment building penetration isolation valves is required to assure that the offsite dose rates in 10 CFR 100, or, for the accidents analyzed using Alternative Source Terms, the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded.
Redundant, air-operated, spring-loaded, fail-closed valves are provided to assure isolation. The small bypass line valves are motor operated, normally closed, and can only be opened by a keylocked switch on the main control board. c. The ventilation air supplied in accessible areas is induced through potentially contaminated cubicles by a positive exhaust system. Isolation dampers of the fail closed type are provided in the air flow path to the potentially contaminated areas to preclude backflow of contaminated air into clean areas during system operation on loss of the ventilation system. d. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of required operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. e. The isolation valves at the containment building ventilation supply and exhaust duct penetrations fail closed on a loss of electric power or station air. Operator action is required to reopen these valves. The normally closed motor-operated 4-inch bypass valves fail as positioned on a loss of electric power. f. Potentially contaminated effluent rising from the surface of the fuel transfer pool is entrained in the normal ventilation air and drawn into the exhaust openings located above the water level. Redundant process radiation monitors in the pool's exhaust duct and in the main exhaust duct leaving the containment building trip when high radiation is detected. This causes isolation of the containment building and activation of the standby gas treatment system. The size and length of the fuel transfer pool exhaust duct is designed to assure that the travel time of effluents from the process radiation monitor to the isolation valve is a minimum of 9.9 seconds, which is greater than the closing time of 6 seconds for the isolation
valve. g. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-20.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-42 REV. 14, JANUARY 2011 This Page Deleted Intentionally
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CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-43 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 9.4.6.3.2 Continuous Containment Purge System Safety Evaluation
- a. The continuous containment purge system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. The operation of the continuous containment purge system penetration isolation valves is required to assure that the offsite dose rates in 10 CFR 100, or, for the accidents analyzed using Alternative Source Terms, the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. Redundant, air-operated, springloaded, fail-closed valves are provided to assure isolation. c. The purge air supplied in accessible areas is induced through potentially contaminated cubicles by a positive exhaust system. Isolation dampers of the fail closed type are provided in the air flow path to the potentially contaminated areas to preclude backflow of contaminated air into clean areas on loss of the continuous purge system. d. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. e. The isolation valves at the continuous containment purge supply and exhaust pipe penetrations fail closed on loss of electric power or station air. A switch is provided on the main control board to reopen the valves. f. Redundant process radiation monitors in the continuous containment purge exhaust pipe leaving the containment building trip when high radiation is detected. This causes isolation of the containment building and activation of the standby gas treatment system. g. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-20A.
- h. Radiological consequences due to the occurrence of a postulated LOCA when the containment is being purged during normal operation have been examined on a pre-AST basis to determine compliance with the dose criteria set forth in BTP CSB 6-4. The calculated exclusion area boundary doses are 3.5 x 10
-4 rem and 6.0 x 10-7 rem for the thyroid and whole body, respectively. These doses are a small fraction of the 10 CFR 100 guideline values. Major assumptions used in the dose analysis are:
- 1. A double-ended guillotine break of the recirculation line is assumed to occur instantaneously. This accident was chosen because it represents the worst break for purposes of core performance and cladding integrity and consequently the highest doses. 2. Closure of the isolation valves in the purge system will isolate the containment within 7 seconds.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-44 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 3. Iodine specific activity in the reactor coolant was conservatively assumed to be 0.2
µCi/g of I-131 dose equivalent. 4. Containment air was assumed to be released through two 12-inch purge lines for 7 seconds. 5. No credit was allowed for iodine removal by charcoal adsorbers on the containment exhaust lines. 6. Exclusion area boundary X/Q of 1.78 x 10
-4 seconds per cubic meter as given in CPS-FSAR Subsection 15.6.5 was used in the dose calculation. 9.4.6.4 Testing and Inspection 9.4.6.4.1 Containment Ventilation System Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specification, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system
performance. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. The standby equipment is operated occasionally to provide on-line checking, testing of performance, or equalize wear. 9.4.6.4.2 Continuous Containment Purge System Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specification, quality assurance requirements, and codes. System piping, ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system
performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. The system is in operation during normal plant operation. The standby equipment is operated occasionally to provide on-line checking, testing of performance, or equalize wear. 9.4.7 Drywell HVAC Systems The drywell HVAC systems are comprised of the drywell cooling system and drywell purge system.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-45 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.7.1 Drywell Cooling System The drywell cooling system serves the drywell area during normal plant operating conditions. 9.4.7.1.1 Design Bases The system, which is non-safety-related, maintains temperatures of the various drywell zones within limits of equipment requirements. 9.4.7.1.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The drywell cooling HVAC system is not required to function during abnormal plant operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety design-basis. b. The drywell cooling HVAC system co mponents for Unit 1 and the ductwork are supported in accordance with Seismic Category I criteria to preclude damage to a safety-related system after a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE). c. The safety design basis for the chilled water system serving the drywell cooling HVAC system is discussed in Subsection 9.2.8.2. 9.4.7.1.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The drywell cooling HVAC system for Unit 1 is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure continuous operation under normal plant operating conditions. b. The drywell cooling HVAC system is designed to limit the operating temperature in various areas of the drywell in conformance with equipment ambient temperature
ratings. c. The design of the system permits periodic inspection and testing of the principal system components. d. The power supply to the drywell cooling unit fans is designed to allow uninterrupted operation if the normal a-c power is not available. 9.4.7.1.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the drywell cooling HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1109. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-21. b. The drywell cooling HVAC system for Unit 1 continuously circulates drywell air through fancoil units to limit the maximum temperature in the following areas: Maximum Temperature
- 1. Vicinity of recirculation pump motors 135° F CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-46 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 2. CRD area (during reactor scram) 135° F 185° F 3. Balance of drywell 150° F (1) (1)Temperatures in localized areas may exceed 150
°F provided equipment qualification and component/structure integrity are maintained. The design includes four 50% capacity fan-coil units for each station unit located within the drywell with two fan-coil units normally operating and two serving as standby. Each fan-coil unit consists of a supply fan and chilled water cooling
coils. Air is distributed through ductwork and around the reactor pressure vessel support skirt and up through the annular space between the reactor vessel insulation and the reactor shield wall. A minimum supply air temperature of 80
°F is required for cooling the reactor pressure vessel skirt area.
Air is also supplied to the recirculating pump areas, CRD area, bellows area, vessel head area, and area of main steam isolation valves. The return air flows unducted back to the operating fan-coil units. c. System description for chillers and chilled water piping, which provide chilled water to the chilled water coils, is discussed in Subsection 9.2.8.2. For a description of plant chilled water supplied to two supplemental drywell cooling units, refer to Subsection 9.2.8.3. d. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Control switches are provided for each fan-coil unit on the main control board. Instrumentation is located on the main control board and on local
panels. 2. Standby equipment is operated manua lly from the main control room. 3. Temperature of various areas are indicated in the main control room. 4. Controls are electric or electronic. 9.4.7.1.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The drywell cooling HVAC system is not safety-related.
- b. The system incorporates features to ensure its reliable operation over the full range of normal plant operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. c. Fan motor trip for the original HVAC system is alarmed on the main control board. Fan motor trip is alarmed for the supplemental units.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-47 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. Instrumentation is provided to monitor air temperature in various zones in the drywell. Leakage detection system instrumentation also includes an indication of chilled water temperature differential across the upper drywell cooling coils on the main control board, with high differential temperature annunciated on the main control board. e. The drywell cooling HVAC system components and ductwork are supported to conform to Seismic Category I requirements. f. The failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-22. 9.4.7.1.4 Testing and Inspection
- a. All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of were are inspected during various construction stages. Construction tests were performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A temperature survey is performed to verify the system's ability to maintain space temperature. b. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. c. The system is in operation during normal plant operation. Operation of standby equipment is occasionally rotated to provide on-line checking and testing of performance. 9.4.7.2 Drywell Purge System This system serves all areas of the drywell and containment.
9.4.7.2.1 Design Bases 9.4.7.2.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The drywell purge system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating condition and, therefore, has no safety bases except for the containment building penetration isolation valves. b. Each (36-inch or 12-inch) system air penetration through the containment building boundary is equipped with two redundant isolation valves in series to ensure containment isolation. In addition, there is a small 4-inch valved line bypassing each 36-inch isolation valve. These bypass valves are used post-LOCA when the
standby gas treatment system is used as a backup to the hydrogen recombiner. These isolation valves and the intermediate pipe between them are required during and after all abnormal station operating conditions to maintain the containment boundary integrity. For a detailed description of these valves, see Subsection 6.2.4. The 36-inch and 12-inch isolation valves are spring loaded, air-operated, and fail closed on loss of electrical power or instrument air. This part of CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-48 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 the system is designed for Seismic Category I classification and Safety Class 2. The main 36-inch or 12-inch valves (not the bypass) close on high drywell pressure, low reactor water level, and high radiation in the ventilation or purge exhaust or refueling pool exhaust duct.
The bypass valves are normally closed and can be opened post-LOCA by a keylocked switch. c. The system air penetrations through the drywell boundary are provided with redundant isolation valves. Mechanical stops restrict the opening (24-inch) of these valves to 50
°. d. The purge lines are interconnected to the containment ventilation exhaust lines for purging containment after a LOCA when the containment atmosphere is below 3 psig. This line within the secondary containment is designed for Seismic Category
I. 9.4.7.2.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. Drywell purging for airborne activity control is not permissible during plant operating modes 1, 2 or 3 since drywell supply air penetration/isolation valves 1VQ01A and 1VQ01B must remain closed during normal power operation, startup, or hot shutdown conditions. A slight differential pressure, between the drywell and the containment, is anticipated to occur during temperature transients in the drywell (e.g. during reactor startup). Control of drywell pressure during these time is needed to prevent an unwarranted reactor scram. Therefore, to accommodate the need for drywell pressure control during such transients or for other reasons as allowed by the Technical Specifications, the exhaust line of the drywell purge system may be opened during operating modes 1, 2 and 3 with the following restrictions: 1. While venting the drywell, the containment shall not be vented or purged; and 2. The drywell purge supply line shall be sealed closed (as defined by the Standard Review Plan, Section 6.2.4, Item II.6.f). Drywell purging during plant operating modes 4 and 5 (cold shutdown and refueling) is unlimited and will be performed prior to personnel access as required under these conditions. b. The drywell purge system is designed to purge the drywell at a nominal rate of greater than three air changes per hour (using the containment building ventilation system) and filter the air to the allowable release limits before it is exhausted to the atmosphere. The 8000 cfm continuous containment purge system will not normally be used to purge the drywell prior to drywell access. c. The drywell purge system is designed to filter containment building air following a release of radioactivity in the building. This filtration will only be allowed when the containment building pressure is below 3 psig because of equipment design limitations.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-49 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to provide alternate and equivalent purge capability in case a system component is inoperative during
drywell purge. e. The design of the system permits periodic inspection and testing of the principal system components. f. Isolation dampers at each filter train close when the respective equipment is not operating. g. In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the drywell purge is shutdown, except for the low-flow fans which are connected to the diesel generators. h. Provision has been made to use the Drywell Purge System to evacuate potentially radioactive gases from the reactor vessel head area prior to removal of the reactor head if determined to be warranted by Radiation Protection Supervision. 9.4.7.2.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design, including nominal system flow rates, of the drywell purge system is shown in Drawing M05-1110. The type and rated capacity of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-23. b. The number of operating dampers and valves in the drywell are kept to a minimum to assure reliability. c. The system consists of three full-capacity filter trains, associated duct, dampers, and controls. d. Each filter train consists of the following components listed in the direction of full air flow: 1. moisture separator, 2. prefilter,
- 3. heating coil,
- 4. upstream HEPA filter,
- 5. charcoal filter,
- 6. downstream HEPA filter, and 7. exhaust fan. e. The drywell is purged by shutting down the normal containment building exhaust fans, starting the purge exhaust fan on one filter train and opening the appropriate exhaust and inlet valves on the drywell purge connections. The exhaust air removed from the drywell is made up by allowing some ventilation air from the containment building to flow into the drywell through isolation valves.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-50 REV. 12, JANUARY 2007 To minimize the containment airborne radioactivity contribution due to removal of the reactor pressure vessel head, the head may be ventilated by the drywell purge
exhaust system. If the drywell purge system is used, RPV head purging is accomplished by removing the blind flange on N-8 nozzle and connecting the head to a purge line via a flexible hose. The purged air is removed from the vessel head, mixed with exhausted drywell air, and is routed to the drywell purge filter units for
treatment. The purge air is exhausted from the drywell, mixed with exhausted containment building ventilation air, and is routed to the purge filter units for treatment before release to the common station HVAC vent. f. After an accidental release of radioactivity in the containment building, and when conditions permit, one or two drywell purge filter trains can be started to filter the containment ventilation air. g. The containment building isolation valves are designed for fail-safe operation. These valves are operated by spring-loaded air cylinders which fail closed on loss of electrical power or instrument air. The containment building isolation valves are sized as small as practical. The specification for these valves satisfies the lifetime radiation exposure requirements listed in Table 3.11-5. h. Controls and instrumentation 1. Each fan is controlled by handswitches on the main control board.
- 2. Controls are pneumatic and electric.
- 3. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. Pertinent filter train pressure drops and temperatures are indicatated locally, System purge flow is indicated both locally and in the main control room. High system temperature and purge exhaust low flow are annunciated on the main control board. High pressure difference across the filters is annunciated on local panels. 9.4.7.2.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The drywell purge system is not safety-related and is not required to operate to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition except for the
containment isolation valves. The dryw ell purge valves are normally closed fail closed valves. b. The operation of the containment building penetration isolation valves is required to assure that the offsite dose rates in 10 CFR 100, or, for the accidents analyzed using Alternative Source Terms, the limits of 10 CFR 50.67 are not exceeded. Redundant, air-operated, spring-loaded, fail closed valves are provided to assure isolation. c. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-51 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The drywell purge isolation valves cl ose on any of the following signals: 1. containment exhaust duct high radiation, or
- 2. containment building refueling pool exhaust duct high radiation, or
- 3. high drywell pressure (2 psig), or 4. low reactor water level (Level 2), or 5. continuous containment purge exhaust high radiation. d. The containment isolation valves fail closed on a loss of control power or control air. Operator action is required to reopen the valves. e. The purge lines and valves connected to the containment will meet the criteria of the Quality Group Classification of those components listed in Subsection 3.2.2. f. High-temperature and high-high temperature signals from each charcoal adsorber are transmitted to the main control room for annunciation. The high-high temperature signal also provides a permissive signal that allows that station operator to flood the adsorber by opening a deluge valve with a control switch on the main control board. g. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-24. 9.4.7.2.4 Testing and Inspection
- a. Equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork, piping and erection of equipment was inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on system components and the system is balanced for the design air flows and system operating pressure. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. b. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. c. Operation of the standby equipment is rotated periodically to provide on-line checking and testing of performance. d. Provisions are made for periodic testing of each filter train. The tests will include differential pressure measures on filter, dioctyl phthalate (DOP) testing of HEPA filters, and Freon bypass testing of charcoal adsorbers. 9.4.8 Off-Gas Vault Refrigeration System The system serves the off-gas charcoal adsorber vault and the air handling units room.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-52 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.8.1 Design Bases 9.4.8.1.1 Safety Design Bases The off-gas vault refrigeration system is not required to operate in any but normal station operating conditions and therefore has no safety design bases. 9.4.8.1.2 Power Generation Objectives
- a. The off-gas vault refrigeration system is designed to maintain the charcoal adsorber vault in the range between -20
° F and +50
° F, and to maintain the air handling units room in the range of 0
°F to +70°F. b. The radwaste building HVAC system exhausts a small amount of air from the charcoal adsorber vault to maintain it at -0.1 in.(min.) H 2 0 under normal operating conditions. c. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objectives. 9.4.8.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the off-gas vault refrigeration system is shown in Drawings M05-1108 and M05-1121-3. Nominal size and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-25. b. The off-gas vault refrigeration system can function to initially reduce the charcoal adsorber vault ambient and its contents from the inital temperature (as high as 150°F) to less than 50
°F. c. The refrigeration system operates only when the supply air fan is running and the proper air flow is established. d. The charcoal adsorber vault is refrigerated by two completely independent refrigeration loops. Each loop consists or a refrigeration skid (two compressors, one common condenser, heat exchangers, and interconnecting piping) and an air handling unit skid (cooling coils, defrost heaters, drain pan electric heater, supply air fan, and housing). The two air handling unit skids are interconnected with ductwork. The water-cooled condensers and the compressor oil coolers are cooled by the plant chilled water system. Chilled water flow to the condenser is modulated by a water regulating valve to maintain the design head pressure. Water flow to the compressor oil coolers is modulated by a water regulating valve to maintain the oil temperature at the operating point. e. The system is shut down when the defrost timer initiates the cooling coil electric defrost heater by means of shutting off the supply fan. f. The off-gas system is equipped with a gas cooler defrost heater to assist in defrosting the gas cooler upon detection of high differential pressure on the gas side which indicates frost buildup within the cooler piping. However, in order to prevent a possible fire in the charcoal beds, this heater shall not be used.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-53 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Alternate defrost methods are procedurally controlled and consist of shutting down the vault cooling system and using the vault electric blast heater and heat-circulating fan. g. The system defrost cycle is terminated by a temperature sensor when the cooling coil temperature reaches 50
°F. h. The charcoal adsorber vault is designed for -20
°F to 150°F as it may occasionally be necessary to heat the vault to 150
°F by using an electric-blast coil and a heating-circulating fan interconnected to the refrigeration system ductwork. The purpose of the heating cycle is to facilitate deicing the cooler and drying the
charcoal. i. Controls and instrumentation: Each refrigeration skid is controlled by handswitches located on local control panel furnished with the skid. Instruments are located on the ductwork and the local control panel. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 9.4.8.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The operation of the off-gas vault refrigeration system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: 1. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and 2. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-26.
- c. However, the system incorporates features that assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station operations. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. 9.4.8.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment was inspected during various construction stages. Construction tests were performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. A heat balance is made on all cooling components to verify specified capacity. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-54 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.9 Machine Shop Area HVAC System This system serves all areas of the machine shop, including the equipment decontamination room, cold tools room, personnel decontamination change facility, hot tools room, weld shop, change room, loading dock, truck aisle, and controlled material storage. This system operates during all normal station conditions. 9.4.9.1 Design Bases 9.4.9.1.1 Safety Design Bases The machine shop HVAC system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety bases. 9.4.9.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The machine shop HVAC system is designed to maintain a quality environment suitable for personnel health and safety in the machine shop. The machine shop HVAC system, in conjunction with the station heating and the plant chilled water systems, shall maintain inside temperatures within a range of 65
°F to 85°F. The temperature in each area conforms to the equipment requirement in that area. b The system provides a quantity of filtered outdoor air to purge the area of noxious odors, harmful fumes, and any possible contamination. Ventilation air is routed from accessible, clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC vent. c. The machine shop exhaust is designed to induce most of the ventilation air through the areas of noxious fumes, harmful odors, and possible contamination. This air is processed through dust collectors, prefilters, and HEPA filters (as required) before it is monitored for radioactivity and released to the atmosphere. d. Both the supply air system and t he exhaust air system operate manually and continuously. Isolation dampers at each supply fan, each exhaust fan, and each filter package close when the respective equipment is not operating. There is an additional isolation damper at the supply air inlet which closes when the supply air system is not operating. An automatic damper in the supply system ductwork regulates the flow of air to maintain the machine shop at negative 0.125 inches
w.g. with respect to atmosphere. e. In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the machine shop ventilation system is shut down. 9.4.9.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the machine shop ventilation system is shown on Drawing M05-1107. Vendor rated capacity and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-27. b. The machine shop ventilation system supplies filtered, heated or cooled air to the general areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-55 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 filters, a heating coil, a cooling coil, two 50%-of-full-capacity supply air fans, and supply air ductwork. c. The ventilation air is supplied to the accessible areas of the machine shop and induced to areas of greater contamination potential. d. The potentially contaminated areas are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding clean areas and, therefore, the air flows from the clean areas to these potentially contaminated cubicles before it is exhausted. e. The two 50% capacity exhaust fans induce the ventilation air through the exhaust ducts from the potentially contaminated areas and discharge the air to the
common station HVAC vent. f. Air exhausted directly from the machinery may be routed through a dust collector, prefilters, and high-efficiency particulate filters (HEPA) before being routed to the exhaust fans. g. Air exhausted directly from the equipm ent decontamination room, hot tools room, and the weld shop may be routed through prefilters and high efficiency particulate
filters (HEPA) before being routed to the exhaust fans. The Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) requires these filters to be used only when the projected doses due to gaseous effluent releases to areas at and beyond the site boundary would exceed a specified limit. h. Air exhausted from the machine shop general area, cold tools room, change room, and the toilets is routed directly to the exhaust fans. i. A packaged plant chilled water air handling unit is provided for the controlled material storage, truck aisle, and loading dock areas. j. Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown. k. Fan coil units are located in accessible and inaccessible areas to remove generated heat and to maintain temperatures within the required ranges. Chilled water is supplied to each fan-coil unit from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. l. Each fan-coil unit consists of a fan and a cooling coil enclosed in a sheet metal housing. m. Chilled water is circulated through the central ventilation unit cooling coil to provide cooling for the supply air system. n. Controls and instrumentation CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-56 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 1. Each fan and each exhaust filter package is controlled by handswitches located on local control panels. Pertinent system operating parameters are also indicated locally and on the local control panels. Trouble on local control panels is annunciated on the main control board. 2. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 3. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. The loss of airflow; high and low system temperature; and high differential pressure across the supply air filter, dust collector and exhaust filter package filters are annunciated on the local control panel. Trouble on the local panel is annunciated on the main control board. 9.4.9.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The machine shop ventilation system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. The ventilation air supplied in clean areas is induced through potentially contaminated areas by a mechanical exhaus t system. Isolation dampers of the fail-closed type are provided in the airflow path to the potentially contaminated areas to preclude backflow of contaminated air into clean areas on loss of the
ventilation system. c. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station conditions. d. A failure analysis is provided in Table 9.4-28. 9.4.9.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. The system is in operation during normal plant operation. Operation of the standby equipment is rotated occasionally to provide on-line checking and testing of performance. 9.4.10 Circulating Water Screen House Ventilation System This system serves all areas of the circulating water screen house. This system operates during all normal station operating conditions.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-57 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.10.1 Design Bases 9.4.10.1.1 Safety Design Bases The screen house ventilation system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety bases. 9.4.10.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The screen house ventilation system is designed to limit the maximum temperature in the screen house to 122
° F. The temperature maintained in this area conforms to the equipment ambient requirements. b. Some ventilation air is routed from the screen house to the chlorinator room before being exhausted to the atmosphere. c. The fire pump room exhaust fans are designed to limit the maximum temperature in the fire pump rooms to 122
° F when the fire pump is activated. The temperature in this area conforms to the fire pump ambient requirement. d. The system operates manually and continuously. Isolation dampers at each supply fan close when its respective fan is not running. An automatic damper in the supply system regulates the flow of outside air, based upon outsided ambient air temperature. Automatic dampers control the temperature of the air in winter by mixing return and outdoor air. e. In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the screen house ventilation system is shut down. f. All of the air is either directly exhausted to the atmosphere, or returns unducted to the mixing plenum. 9.4.10.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the circulating water screen house ventilation system is shown on Drawing M05-1106-3. Vendor ratings and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-29. b. The circulating water screen house ventilation system supplies air to the general areas through a central fan system in one of two modes. During periods with high outside air temperature, one or two exhaust fans operate. Each main intake louver is associated with an exhaust fan and thus opens when its exhaust fan starts. During periods with low outside air temperature, both supply fans operate, neither of the two exhaust fans operates and both of the main intake louvers are also closed. In this mode, the supply air temperature is regulated by mixing outdoor air with return air. c. One of the main exhaust fan dampers will always be open when any supply fan is running, to keep the screen house pressure at approximately atmospheric.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-58 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 d. The fire pump room louver and exhaust fan damper open when the temperature in the room reaches 90
° F. The fan will start when the temperature reaches 115
° F. The fan will stop when the temperature falls to 105
° F, and the louver and exhaust fan damper will close when the temperature falls to 80
° F. e. The chlorinator room is maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the screen house and, therefore, the air flows from the screen house to the chlorinator room before it is exhausted. Both chlorinator room exhaust fans operate manually and
continuously. f. A pressure control damper is employed between the screen house and the chlorinator room and it is of the backflow type and fails closed. This minimizes the backflow of chlorine to the screen house when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan shutdown. g. Controls and Instrumentation 1. Each fan is controlled by handswitches located on local control panels. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are also indicated on the local control panels. The main control board has no control interface with
this system. 2. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 3. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. Abnormal conditions are annunciated on the local control panel. 9.4.10.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The screen house ventilation system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. The ventilation air supplied to the screen house is induced through the chlorinator room by a positive exhaust system. Isolation dampers of the fail-closed type are provided in the air flow path to the chlorinator room to preclude backflow of chlorine into the screen house on loss of the ventilation system. c. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-30. 9.4.10.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment was inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests were performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-59 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.11 Laboratory HVAC System The laboratory HVAC system serves the laundry area, laboratory area, bioassay area (including storage rooms, laboratory, and office), and the counting room on elevation 737 feet 0 inch in the control building. 9.4.11.1 Design Bases 9.4.11.1.1 Safety Design Bases
- a. The laboratory HVAC system is not required to function in any but normal plant operating conditions. b. Safety related temperature detectors are located at El. 751'-0" above Laboratory humidification steam lines. These temperature detectors detect any increase in temperature due to failure of humidifier boiler steam lines. High temperature shuts off humidifier boiler and alarms. 9.4.11.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The laboratory HVAC system is designed to maintain an environment suitable for personnel comfort, health, and safety in the laboratories, laundry rooms, and offices. b. The system maintains the laboratory area at approximately 75
°F and 40% to 50% relative humidity. The system maintains the washer-dryer maintenance area to a maximum of 104
° F. The system maintains the laundry area at 70
°F to 80°F and 40% to 60% relative humidity. c. The system induces air through fume hoods and the washer-dryer maintenance area. The air is then filtered for particulates prior to being released to the atmosphere via the common station HVAC vent. d. The counting room has dedicated HVAC components which are designed to maintain an environment suitable for personnel comfort, health, and safety. e. The system maintains the counting room at approximately 70
° F and 43% to 47%
relative humidity. f. On loss of offsite power, the system is shut down. g. Radiation monitors are provided in the exhaust air ductwork downstream of the union of the separate exhaust paths from the laundry area and laboratory fume
hoods.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-60 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.11.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the laboratory HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1118. Vendor rating and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-31. b. The laboratory HVAC system is an outside air system with recirculation from clean areas and consists of the following equipment: 1. Laboratory supply train: The supply train consists of an outside air intake, filters, electric preheating coil, two 50% capacity makeup air fans (centrifugal), a humidifier with a humidification steam boiler, two 50% capacity supply fans (centrifugal), and a dual-duct air-conditioning unit with an electric heating coil and a chilled water cooling coil. The dual-duct system distributes conditioned air through locally mounted mixing boxes. Some outside air passes through an electric heating coil and is supplied as auxiliary air to the laboratory fume hoods and washer-dryer maintenance area. 2. Laboratory exhaust train: The exhaust train consists of a lint filter, two 50% filter packages consisting of a prefilter and HEPA filter, and two 50% capacity centrifugal fans. c. The HVAC system for the counting room is a 100% outside air system and consists of the following equipment: 1. Counting room supply train: The supply train consists of an outside air intake and two 100% capacity equipment trains. Each equipment train consists of a filter package containing a prefilter and HEPA filter, an electric heating coil, and a centrifugal fan. In addition, train A contains a chilled water coil train B contains a refrigerant coil, and both trains share a humidifier and an electric reheat coil. 2. Counting room exhaust train: The exhaust train consists of two 100% capacity centrifugal fans. d. The chilled water coils are served by the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. e. The counting room, offices, and instrument storage rooms are kept at a slightly positive pressure, while the laundry rooms, high level laboratory, and radiation chemistry laboratory are kept at a slightly negative pressure with respect to the adjacent area. A pressure control damper is used to maintain the counting room positive pressure.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-61 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 f. An electric preheating coil warms the supply air. A second electric heating coil further heats some of the supply air which is auxiliary air for the fume hoods and washer-dryer maintenance area. The majority of the supply air is heated to the final supply temperature by the electric heating coil in the dual duct system. g. Control and instrumentation: 1. System handswitches and controls are provided locally, or on either of the two local control panels (LCP). Pertinent system operating parameters are indicated either locally or on these panels. 2. Failure of a function important to the system operation such as high differential pressures across filters, low differential pressure across the fan, and chilled water coil freeze conditions is annunciated on the LCP. 3. Two indicator lights are provided in the radiation chemistry office to indicate which LCP has an alarm condition. 4. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 9.4.11.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The operation of the laboratory HVAC system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: 1. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or
- 2. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is not presented since the laboratory HVAC system is not safety-related. 9.4.11.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment was factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment were inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests were performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test was conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.12 Service Building HVAC System The service building HVAC system serves the service building during normal plant operation conditions.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-62 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 9.4.12.1 Design Bases 9.4.12.1.1 Safety Design Bases The service building HVAC system is not required to function in any but normal plant operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety design bases. Backup cooling systems for security related areas in the Service Building are capable of operating during a loss of off-site power or when normal HVAC systems are undergoing maintenance. 9.4.12.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The service building HVAC system is designed to maintain a quality environment suitable for personnel comfort, health, and safety in the service building. b. Records held in long-term vault st orage by Records Management or in vendor provided archival storage are subject to the following: - Temperature: 70
°F maximum temperature for film, 40
°F - 75°F for paper or radiographs - Relative Humidity: 30-40% for film, 30-60% for paper or radiographs. c. The areas served by this system are provided with a minimum quantity of outside air for odor dilution and to offset exhaust and exfiltration air flows. 9.4.12.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the service building HVAC system is shown in Drawing M05-1112, Sheets 10 through 12. Vendor rating and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-32. b. The service building HVAC system is comprised of six independent subsystems which serve their respective areas as follows: 1. The service building exterior zone HVAC system serves exterior offices and classrooms on the first and second floors of the service building. 2. The service building interior Zone 1 HVAC system serves first floor interior spaces, and the conditioned basement areas. 3. The service building interior Zone 2 HVAC system serves second floor interior spaces. 4. The locker room HVAC system serves the first floor locker room.
- 5. The record storage facility has an independent HVAC system.
- 6. The backup security area cooling systems serve each Computer Equipment room in the basement, the Security Control room, Electrical Equipment room, and Battery room on the first floor.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-63 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 c. The first three service building HVAC systems are comprised of an outside air louver, a mixing plenum, a supply air filter, a blow-through type of air handling unit, a hot air duct, a cold air duct, individual zone mixing boxes and return air fan.
The air handling unit consists of a fan, a chilled water cooling coil, and an electric heating coil. The locker room HVAC system is comprised of an outside air louver, a supply air filter, a draw-through type of air handling unit, and a shared exhaust air fan. The air handling unit consists of a fan, an electric heating coil, and a chilled water cooling coil. The record storage facility HVAC system is comprised of a recirculation HVAC system with direct expansion cooling coil (with condensing unit on the roof) and electric reheat coils. The system receiv es a small amount of air from interior Zone 2 HVAC system to maintain the records storage facility at positive pressure with respect to surrounding areas. The backup security area cooling system consists of four independent outdoor air cooled condensers and four indoor direct expansion fan coil units. The Security Control room and each Computer Equipment room have separate, independent cooling units. The Electrical Equipment room and Battery room are cooled by a single independent fan-coil unit. Two isolation dampers are provided in the normal HVAC supply ducts to the Security Control room, Battery room and Electrical Equipment room to prevent circulation of warm air to these areas during shutdown of the Service Building chilled water system. d. The cooling coils for all systems except the record storage facility and the backup security area cooling system are served by chilled water from the service building chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.4. e. Exhaust fans for conference rooms, toilets, showers, supply fans, and locker rooms are provided as necessary. f. The service building is maintained at a slightly positive pressure to preclude infiltration. g. The minimum outside air quantity replaces all mechanical exhaust and exfiltration.
- h. Controls and instrumentation - system handswitches and controls are provided locally or in a locally mounted control panel. Pertinent system operating parameters are monitored and displayed locally or on this panel. Controls are pneumatic and electric. 9.4.12.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The operation of the service building HVAC system is not required to assure either of the following conditions: 1. the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, or CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-64 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 2. the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is not presented since the service building HVAC system is not safety-related. 9.4.12.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specifications and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all mechanical components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures.
Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are cold checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. 9.4.13 Radwaste Building Area Ventilation System This system serves the radwaste building except for the machine shop during normal station operation conditions. This system operates during all normal station conditions. 9.4.13.1 Design Bases 9.4.13.1.1 Safety Design Bases The radwaste building ventilation system is not required to function in any but the normal station operating conditions and, therefore, has no safety bases. 9.4.13.1.2 Power Generation Design Bases
- a. The radwaste building ventilation system is designed to limit the maximum temperature in generally accessible areas to 104
° F and potentially contaminated cubicles to 122
° F. The temperature maintained in each area conforms to the equipment ambient requirement in that area. b. The system provides a quantity of filtered outdoor air to purge the building of possible contamination. Ventilation air is routed from accessible clean areas to areas of potential contamination before exhausting to the common station HVAC vent stack. c. The system is designed with sufficient redundancy to ensure the power generation objective. d. The radwaste building exhaust system is designed to induce ventilation air through the potentially contaminated areas and process this air through prefilters and HEPA filters prior to being released to the atmosphere via the common
station HVAC vent.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-65 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 e. In the event of a loss of offsite electric power, the radwaste building ventilation system is shut down. f. The radwaste building ventilation system is designed to maintain the temperature in the radwaste monitoring area at approximately 73
° F. g. A minimum quantity of outdoor air is continuously provided to maintain a positive pressure in the radwaste operations center with respect to the surrounding areas to preclude the infiltration of potentially contaminated air. h. An automatic damper in the supply system duct work regulates the flow of air to maintain the Radwaste building at approximately 0.25 inch w.g., with the exception of the machine shop area which is maintained at 0.125 inch w.g., and the storeroom area which is maintained at 0.00 inch w.g., negative pressure with respect to atmospheric pressure. 9.4.13.2 System Description
- a. The schematic design of the radwaste building ventilation system is shown on Drawing M05-1114. Vendor rating and type of principal system components are listed in Table 9.4-33. b. The radwaste building ventilation system supplies filtered, heated, or cooled air to the general areas through a central fan system consisting of an outside air intake, filters, a heating coil, a cooling coil, two 100%-of-full-capacity supply air fans, and supply air ductwork. c. The ventilation air is supplied to accessible areas in the mezzanine, grade, intermediate, and basement floors, and induced to areas of greater contamination
potential. d. The potentially contaminated cubicles are maintained at a slightly lower pressure than the surrounding accessible areas and, therefore the air flows from the accessible areas to these shielded cubicles before it is exhausted. e. The radwaste building ventilation system functions to maintain the radwaste monitoring areas at a temperature of approximately 73
° F through a central system consisting of a packaged water-cooled air-conditioning unit. A slight positive pressure in this area is maintained with respect to adjacent areas to preclude the infiltration of potentially contaminated air. f. Air vented from contaminated tanks is ducted through a charcoal filter to the exhaust system where necessary. g. One of the two 100% capacity exhaust fans provided induces the ventilation air through exhaust ducts from potentially contaminated areas. This air is then processed through prefilters and HEPA filters before being discharged to the common station HVAC vent. h. By exhausting more air than is being supplied, a negative differential pressure with respect to outdoors of 0.25 inch w.g. is maintained in the Radwaste building CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-66 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 with the exception of the machine shop, which is maintained at negative 0.125 inch w.g. with respect to outdoors. The storeroom area is maintained at
atmospheric pressure. i. Pressure control dampers are employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas and are of the backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas when there is a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown. j. Fan coil units are located in appropriate areas to remove generated heat and to maintain temperatures within the required ranges. Chilled water is supplied to each fan-coil unit from the plant chilled water system described in Subsection 9.2.8.3. k. Each fan-coil unit consists of a fan and a cooling coil enclosed in a sheet metal housing. Supply air ducts are provided for air distribution whenever required.
Return air to the units is unducted. l. Chilled water is circulated through the central ventilation unit cooling coil to provide cooling for the supply air system. m. Controls and instrumentation: 1. Each exhaust filter package and the radwaste building and storeroom supply and exhaust fans are controlled by handswitches located on local control panels and in the radwaste operations center. Pertinent system flow rates and temperatures are indicated on the local control panels.
Trouble on local panels is annunciated on the radwaste operation center board. 2. Standby fans are interlocked to start automatically on loss of the companion operating fan. 3. Controls are pneumatic and electric.
- 4. Instrumentation is provided for monitoring system operating variables during normal station operating conditions. The loss of air flow, high and low system temperature, high and low radwaste building differential pressure, and high differential pressure across the supply air and exhaust air filters are annunciated on the local control panel. 9.4.13.3 Safety Evaluation
- a. The radwaste building ventilation system is not safety-related and is not required to assure either the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary or the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition. b. A failure analysis is presented in Table 9.4-34.
- c. The ventilation air supplied in accessible areas is induced through potentially contaminated cubicles by a positive exhaust system. Isolation dampers of the fail-CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-67 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 closed type are provided in the airflow path to the potentially contaminated areas to preclude backflow of contaminated air into clean areas on loss of the ventilation system. d. The system incorporates features to assure its reliable operation over the full range of normal station conditions. These features include the installation of redundant principal system components. 9.4.13.4 Testing and Inspection All equipment is factory inspected and tested in accordance with the applicable equipment specification and codes. System ductwork and erection of equipment is inspected during various construction stages. Preoperational tests are performed on all system components and the system is balanced for the design air and water flows and system operating pressures. Controls, interlocks, and safety devices on each system are checked, adjusted, and tested to ensure the proper sequence of operation. A final integrated preoperational test is conducted with all equipment and controls operational to verify the system performance. Maintenance is performed on a scheduled basis based on manufacturer's recommendations, plant operating experience, and good engineering practice. Provisions are made to allow changeout of exhaust filters when the system is in operation.
Provisions are made to allow periodic testing of HEPA filters including injection and sampling apparatus for dioctyl phthalate (DOP) testing. The system is in operation during normal plant operation. Operation of the standby equipment is rotated occasionally to provide on-line checking and testing of performance. 9.4.13.5 Instrumentation Application The radwaste building ventilation system instrumentation and controls are described in detail in Subsections 7.7.1.18 and 7.7.2.18. Either of the two redundant supply fans or the two redundant exhaust fans can be manually started from either the radwaste monitoring area or from their respective local control panels.
The isolation damper for each fan opens on fan start and closes on fan stop. After the fans are started, radwaste building supply air temperature and building air pressure are controlled automatically. In the event of failure of either a supply fan or exhaust fan, the respective standby fan starts automatically, unless the building air pressure requires either supply or exhaust fans to
trip. Air differential pressures at various locations within the radwaste building and storeroom are averaged and indicated in the radwaste monitoring area. The radwaste building average differential pressure is also indicated on the local control panels. Supply and exhaust air filters differential pressures and various air temperatures are indicated locally or on the local control panels. Loss of air flow, high and low air temperature, high filter differential pressures, and high
and low building air pressures are alarmed on the local control panels. Any system malfunction which is alarmed locally actuates common radwaste building ventilation system trouble alarms in the radwaste operation center.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-68 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 The controls and instrumentation are pneumatic or electric. The control dampers are pneumatically actuated. The electric power source is not safety-related; on loss of power, the radwaste building ventilation system will shut down.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-69 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 TABLE 9.4-1 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Air Handling Equipment Trains Type Built-up Quantity 2 Components of each air-handling equipment train
- 1. Coil Cabinet 0VC10SA 0VC10SB Type Blow-through Quantity 2 a. Cooling Coil 0VC06AA, 0VC06AB Type Chilled Water Capacity (Btu/hr) 2,175,000
- b. Heating Coil 0VC01AA, 0VC01AB Type Electric Capacity (kW) 70 2. Supply Air Fans 0VC03CA 0VC03CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .071 lbs/ft 3 density) 75,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 7.78 Motor (hp) 150
- 3. Supply Air Filter Packages 0VC07SA 0VC07SB Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 filter bank per package Media Class fiber (waterproof, fire retardant) Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 85 Capacity (scfm) 71,000 Pressure drop (clean) (in. H 2O) 0.35 Pressure drop (dirty) (in. H 2O) 1.0 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-1 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-70 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY 4. Recirculation Charcoal Filters Type 2-in.-thick vertical bed Media Impregnated charcoal Quantity of Media (lb) 5325 Assigned iodine decontamination removal efficiency (%)
70 Capacity (scfm) 71,000 5. Return Air Fans 0VC04CA 0VC04CB Type Vaneaxial Drive Direct Quantity 2 Capacity (cfm @ .071 lbs/ft 3 density & blade setting of 39) 75,032 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 6.87 Motor (hp) 125
- 6. Minimum Outside Air Intake dampers 0VC01YA, 0VC01YB, 0VC03YA, 0VC03YB, 0VC115YA, 0VC115YB Type Opposed Blade Quantity 6 Capacity (scfm) 4000
Leakage at 10 inch w.g. P (scfm) Vendor Specification:
104 (for 0VC03YA/YB
& 0VC115YA/YB)*
97 (for 0VC01YA/YB)* Closure Time (seconds) 2 7. Makeup Air Filter Package Isolation Dampers 0VC02YA, 0VC02YB, 0VC06YA, 0VC06YB Type Opposed Blade Quantity 4 Capacity (scfm) 4000 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-1 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-71 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY Leakage at 10 inch w.g. P(cfm) Vendor Specification:
104 (for 0VC06YA/YB)*
97 (FOR 0VC02YA/YB)* Closure Time (seconds) 2 B. Refrigeration Units See Table 9.2-19 C. Chilled Water Circulating Pumps See Table 9.2-19 D. Makeup Air Filter Packages 0VC09SA 0VC09SB Type Package Quantity 2 Components of makeup air filter trains 1. Fans 0VC05CA 0VC05CB Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 2 Capacity (scfm) 3000 Static Pressure (in. H 2O) 11.3 Motor (hp) 30
- 2. Prefilters-Medium Filter Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 85 Media Glass Fiber Pressure drop (clean) (in. H 2O) 0.2 Pressure drop (dirty) (in. H 2O) 1.0 3. Heating Coil 0VC02AA 0VC02AB Type Electric Quantity 1 Capacity (kW) 16 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-1 CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-72 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY 4. HEPA Filters Type High Efficiency Quantity 2 filter banks per train Media Glass Fiber, Waterproof, Fire Resistant Efficiency (% by DOP test method) 99.97 Pressure drop (clean) (in. H 2O) 1.0 Pressure drop (dirty) (in. H 2O) 2.0 5. Charcoal Adsorber Bed Type Gasketless Quantity of Media (lb) 1260 per train Media Impregnated Charcoal Efficiency (%) 99.8 elemental iodine 99 of methyl iodine Capacity (scfm) 4000 Depth of Bed (in.) 4
- Post installation tests results indicated all leakage was below 95.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-73 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-2 CONTROL ROOM HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or return fans Failure of fan Motor auto-trip and low fan DP actuates alarms. The operator manually start the standby
equipement train. Chiller unit Failure of chiller unit resulting in loss of cooling capacity Following loss of chiller unit, air temperature on discharge of a-c unit fan increases and actuates high temperature alarm in control room. Defective unit would be manually shut down; standby air-handling and chiller unit, fans started. Failure of cooling water to chiller condenser resulting in loss of cooling capacity Chiller automatically shuts down and actuates alarm in control room.
Standby air-handling and chiller unit, fans are manually started. Supply air filter unit High pressure drop due to heavy particulate loading Pressure differential switch trips causing visual and audible alarm in
the main control room. Standby air handling units, fans and chillers
manually started. Standby make-up filter train Failure resulting in high pressure differential across
filter High pressure differential across filter will actuate alarm in control room. Defective filter train would be manually isolated and standby train brought into service. Failure of fan Motor auto-trip and low fan DP actuates alarms. The operator manually starts the standby
equipment train.
Radiation monitor at outside air intake Failure resulting in loss of radiation monitoring capability, low scale trip Redundant radiation monitors are provided HVAC equipment room cooler fan Failure of fan resulting in loss of cooling capacity Following loss of cooling fan, temperature in HVAC equipment room increases and actuates high
temperature alarm, standby train is
manually started Both HVAC trains and associated chiller units Station blackout event. Failure of all on site and off site power Two 100% capacity gas operated fans are provided to exhaust air from MCR CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-74 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-3 FUEL BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Fuel Building HVAC Supply
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components
- a. Fans 1VF03CA and 1VF03CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 22,000 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 5.4 Motor (hp) 30
- b. Filter 1VF01F Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 55 Media Glass Fiber Capacity (scfm) 22,000
- c. Heating Coils 1VF02A Type Electric Quantity One 4-stage heater with a total of 13 coils Capacity (kW) 480
- d. Cooling Coil 1VF05A Type Chilled water Quantity Chilled water Capacity (Btu/hr) 1,342,500 Chilled water (gpm) 191 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-3 FUEL BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-75 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) B. Fuel Building HVAC Exhaust Exhaust Fans 1VF04CA/CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 24,000 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 7.7 Motor (hp) 60 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-76 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-4 FUEL BUILDING HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or Exhaust Fan Failure of a fan resulting in loss of air flow Should an operating fan fail, an alarm is actuated on the local control panel and the main control board. Total loss of system air flow to power failure Pressure control damper utilized between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in case of a loss of a-c
power and subsequent system fan
shutdown.
Flow control damper on main supply Fail closed Building pressure is detected by a pressure differential transmitter that results in supply fan and subsequent exhaust fan shutdown. High building pressure High fuel building pressure trips supply fan and subsequent exhaust fan shutdown. Fuel building isolation dampers Loss of power supply or air supply Fail closed The closure of these dampers causes low flow which is alarmed on the local control panel. Supply and exhaust fans are shutdown.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-77 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-5 AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Auxiliary Building HVAC Supply
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components
- a. Fans 0VA04CA and 0VA04CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) (for blade setting of 17) 34,600 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 6.0 Motor (hp) 50
- b. Filter 0VA01F Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 55 Capacity (scfm) 34,600 Media Glass Fiber
- c. Heating Coils 0VA02A Type Electric Quantity One heater bank Capacity (kW) 740 d. Cooling Coil 0VA03A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Capacity (Btu/hr) 2,102,000 Chilled water (gpm) 267 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-5 AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-78 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) B. Auxiliary Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans 0VA05CA and 0VA05CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) (for blade setting of 25) 22,200 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 6.5 Motor (hp) 50 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-79 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-6 AUXILIARY BUILDING HEATING, VENTILATING, AND AIR CONDITIONING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or exhaust fans Failure of a fan resulting in loss of air flow Should an operating fan fail, an alarm is actuated on the local control panel. A redundant fan will be started automatically. Total loss of system air flow due to power failure Pressure control dampers utilized between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of backflow type and fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in case of a loss of a-c
power and subsequent system fan
shutdown. Pressure control damper on main exhaust Fail closed High differential pressure, with respect to outside air, within the Control, Auxiliary, or Diesel Generator Buildings will trip the supply fan, resulting in a low building to outside air differential pressure, which will trip the main exhaust fans.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-80 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-7 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Turbine Building Ventilation Supply System
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components
- a. Fans 1VT03CA 1VT03CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .074 lbs/ft 3 & blade setting of 35) 44,443 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 7.75 Motor (hp) 75
- b. Filter 1VT04F Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 45 to 55 Capacity (scfm) 43,550 Media Glass fiber c. Heating Coil 1VT01A Type Electric Quantity One heater bank Capacity (kW) 930 Air quantity (scfm) 43,350
- d. Cooling Coil 1VT02A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Bank Capacity (Btu/hr) 2,584,000 Chilled water (gpm) 294 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-7 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-81 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) B. Turbine Building Ventilation Exhaust
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Fans 1VT06CA 1VT06CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .066 lbs/ft 3 & blade setting of 33) 59,205 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 7.38 Motor (hp) 100 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-82 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-8 TURBINE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or exhaust fan Failure of a fan resulting in loss of duct pressure Should an operating fan fail, an alarm will be actuated on the local control panel. The alarm on the local control panel will also actuate
an alarm in the main control room. A redundant fan will be started automatically. Total loss of system air flow due to power failure Pressure control dampers employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of the
backflow type and fail close. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in the case of a loss of a-c power and subsequent fan system shutdown.
Flow control damper on main supply Fail closed Low flow is detected by a pressure switch through a duct mounted air
flow element and alarmed on the local control panel. Supply fans will be manually shutdown and an exhaust fan kept operational to maintain building negative pressure. Fail open causing possible loss of building pressure
control Low turbine building pressure differential pressure switch causes alarm on the local control panel.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-83 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-9 DIESEL-GENERATOR FACILITIES VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY A. Diesel-Generator Room Supply Air Fans 1VD01CA 1VD01CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 80,020 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 5.0 Diesel-Generator Room Supply Air Fans 1VD01CC Type Vaneaxial Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 48,520 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 5.0 B. Diesel Oil Room Exhaust Fans 1VD02CA 1VD02CB 1VD02CC Type Centrifugal Quantity 3 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 3,020 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 3.7 C. Diesel-Generator Room Makeup Supply Air Fans 1VD03CA 1VD03CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 4,530 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 3.8 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-9 DIESEL-GENERATOR FACILITIES VENTILATION SYSTEM EQUIPM ENT PARAMETERS (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-84 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY D. Diesel-Generator Makeup Supply Air Filter 1VD26F Type One filter bank, with 6 filter elements (3 wide by 2 high) Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 9,060 Efficiency (% based on ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 45 to 55 Media Glass fiber E. Diesel-Generator Makeup Supply Cooling Coils 1VD05A Type Chilled Water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 550,000 Water quantity (gpm) 70 F. Diesel-Generator Makeup Supply Heating Coils 1VD04A Type Electric Quantity One 4-stage heater with a total of 7 coils Capacity (kW) 220 Air quantity (cfm) 9,060
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-85 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-10 DIESEL-GENERATOR FACILITIES VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Diesel-Generator Room Ventilation Loss of air flow or fan motor trip An air flow switch sensing low differential pressure across the fan actuates an alarm on the main control room panel after a time delay of 30 seconds. A fan motor
trip actuates an alarm on the main control room panel instantaneously. Diesel Oil Room Exhaust
Fans Loss of air flow or fan motor trip An air flow switch sensing low differential pressure across the fan actuates an alarm on the main control room panel (after a time delay of 30 seconds). A fan motor
trip actuates an alarm on the main control room panel instantaneously.
Diesel-Generator Room Makeup Supply fans Loss of air flow or fan motor trip An air flow switch sensing low differential pressure across the fan actuates an alarm on the main control room panel after a time delay of 30 seconds. A fan motor
trip actuates an alarm on the main control room panel instantaneously.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-86 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-11 SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Standby Switchgear Heat Removal Coil Cabinet/Condensing Unit 1VX02SA/1VX06CA 1VX02SB/1VX06CB 1VX02SC/1VX06CC 1. Type Split 2. Quantity 3
- 3. Components for each switchgear room
- a. Supply Air Fans 1VX03CA 1VX03CB 1VX03CC Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Centrifugal Quantity 1 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Direct Capacity (Switchgear Division) (cfm @ .074 lbs/ft 3 density) 1-24,324 2-24,324 3-5,068 Static pressure (Switchgear Division) (in. H 2O) 1-5.32 2-5.32 3-3.29 Motor (Switchgear Division) (hp) 1-40 2-40 3-5
- b. Filters 1VX09FA 1VX09FB 1VX09FC Type Medium efficiency Medium efficiency Medium efficiency Quantity 1 1 1 Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 60 60 60 Capacity (Switchgear Division) (cfm) 1-24000 2-24000 3-5000 Media Glass fiber Glass fiber Glass fiber CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-11 SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-87 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) c. Condensing Units 1VX06CA 1VX06CB 1VX06CC Type Water-cooled Water cooled Water-cooled Quantity 1 1 1 Capacity (Switchgear Division) (tons) 1-50 2-50 3-12 Power (Switchgear Division) (kW) (Design Input Power/Total Maximum Power Input) 1-47.6/61.9 2-47.6/61.9 3-11.9/18.3 d. Cooling Coil 1VX08AA 1VX08AB 1VX08AC Type Direct expansion Direct expansion Direct expansion Quantity 1 1 1 Capacity (Switchgear Division (tons) 1-54.5 2-54.5 3-11 B. Switchgear Heat Removal Coil Cabinet 1VX01SA 1VX01SB 1VX01SC 1. Type Package Package Package
- 2. Quantity 1 1 1 3. Components of each unit a. Fans 1VX04CA 1VX04CB 1VX04CC Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Centrifugal Quantity 1 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Direct Capacity (Switchgear Division) (cfm @ .074 lbs/ft 3 density) 1-24,324 2-24,324 3-5,068 Static pressure (Switchgear Division) (in. H 2O) 1-7.0 2-7.0 3-3.55 Motor (Switchgear Division) (hp) 1-40 2-40 3-5 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-11 SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-88 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) b. Filters 1VX10FA 1VX10FB 1VX10FC Type Medium efficiency Medium efficiency Medium efficiency Quantity 1 1 1 Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 60 60 60 Capacity (Switchgear Division) (cfm) 1-24000 2-24000 3-5000 Media Glass fiber Glass fiber Glass fiber c. Cooling Coil 1VX07AA 1VX07AB 1VX07AC Type Chilled water Chilled water Chilled water Quantity 1 1 1 Capacity (Switchgear Division (tons) 1-60 2-60 3-19.5 C. Battery Room Exhaust Fans 1VX05CA 1VX05CB 1VX05CC Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Centrifugal Quantity 1 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Direct Capacity (cfm @ .071 lbs/ft 3 density) 634 634 634 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 1.48 1.48 1.48 Motor (hp) 0.5 0.5 0.5 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-11 SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-89 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) D. Battery Room Exhaust Fans 1VX11CA 1VX11CB Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Quantity 2 2 Drive Direct Direct Capacity (cfm @ .071 lbs/ft 3 density) 3,169 3,169 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 2.39 2.39 Motor (hp) 3.0 3.0 E. Switchgear Heat Removal Return Fan 1VX12CA 1VX12CB Type Centrifugal Centrifugal Quantity 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Capacity (cfm @ .070 lbs/ft 3 density) 5,500 5,500 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 3.2 3.2 Motor (hp) 5.0 5.0
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-90 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-12 SWITCHGEAR HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION RESULTS Non-Safety-Related Switchgear Heat Removal Fan Fan motor trip A fan motor trip actuates an alarm on the main control board and the
standby safety-related fan starts
automatically, upon high
temperature in the switchgear room. Safety-Related
Switchgear Heat Removal Fan Fan motor trip A fan motor trip actuates an alarm on the main control board. Switchgear Room Area High temperature in the switchgear room High temperature is annunciated on the main control board and the
safety-related fan starts
automatically.
Safety and Non-Safety-Related Switchgear HeatRemoval Fans Low pressure differential after fan start Low pressure differential is annunciated either on the main control board (safety-related fans), or on a local panel which then annunciates trouble alarms on the
main control board (non-safety-related fans). Battery Rooms Exhaust Fans No air flow No flow, indicated by low fan pressure differential, is annunciated either directly on the main control board, or on local panels which then annunciate trouble alarms on the
main control board. Return Air Fans No air flow No flow, indicated by low fan pressure differential, is annunciated on local panels which then annunciate trouble alarms on the
main control board.
CPS/USAR NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-91 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-13 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY A. LPCS Pump Room Cubicle
- 1. Supply Fan 1VY01C Type Vaneaxial Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 13,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.6 Motor (hp) 7.5 2. Cooling Coil Cabinet 1VY01S Each cabinet shall consist of the following:
Cooling coils 1VY01AA, 1VY01AB Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 2 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) of coil cabinet 472,480 Air quantity (scfm) 13,000 Water quantity (gpm) 90 B. RHR Pump Room Cubicles A B C 1. Supply Fan 1VY02C 1VY06C 1VY07C Type Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Quantity 1 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Direct Capacity (scfm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.4 1.4 1.4 Motor (hp) 5 5 5 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-13 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-92 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY 2. Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VY02S 1VY06S 1VY07S Each cabinet shall consist of the following: Cooling coils 1VY02AA 1VY02AB 1VY06AA 1VY06AB 1VY07AA 1VY07AB Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 2 2 2 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 375,000 375,000 375,000 Air quantity (scfm) 12,000 12,000 12,000 Water quantity (gpm) 60 60 60 C. RHR Heat Exchanger Rooms A B 1. Supply Fan 1VY03C 1VY05C Type Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Quantity 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Capacity (scfm) 12,000 12,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.4 1.4 Motor (hp) 5 5
- 2. Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VY03S 1VY05S Each cabinet shall consist of the following:
Cooling coils 1VY03AA 1VY03AB 1VY05AA 1VY05AB Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant
Service Water Shutdown Service Water or Plant
Service Water Quantity 2 2 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 375,000 375,000 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-13 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-93 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY Air quantity (scfm) 12,000 12,000 Water quantity (gpm) 60 60 D. RCIC Pump Room Cubicle
- 1. Supply Fan 1VY04C Type Vaneaxial Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 3,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.0 Motor (hp) 2
- 2. Cooling Coil Cabinet 1VY04S Each cabinet shall consist of the following:
Cooling coil 1VY04A Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 103,000 Air quantity (scfm) 3,000 Water quantity (gpm) 18 E. HPCS Pump Room Cubicle
- 1. Supply Fans 1VY08CA, 1VY08CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm) 12,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.4 Motor (hp) 5 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-13 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-94 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY 2. Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VY08SA, 1VY08SB Each cabinet shall consist of the following: Cooling coils 1VY08AA 1VY08AC 1VY08AB 1VY08AD Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 2 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 375,000 Air quantity (scfm) 12,000 Water quantity (gpm) 60 F. MSIV Inboard Room
- 1. Supply Fan 1VY09C Type Vaneaxial Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 3,000 Total Pressure (in. H 2O) .65 Motor (hp) .75
- 2. Cooling Coil 1VY09S Each cabinet shall consist of the following: Cooling Coils 1VY09A Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) of Coil Cabinet 110,000 Air Quantity (scfm) 3,000 Water Quantity (gpm) 60 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-13 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-95 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY G. MSIV Outboard Room
- 1. Supply Fan 1VY10C Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 810 Total Pressure (in. H 2O) .80 Motor (hp) .5 2. Cooling Coil Cabinet 1VY10S Each cabinet shall consist of the following:
Cooling Coils 1VY10A Type Shutdown Service Water or Plant Service Water Quantity 1 Cooling Coil (Btu/hr) of Coil Cabinet 30,000 Air Quantity (cfm) 810 Water Quantity (gpm) 60
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-96 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-14 ECCS EQUIPMENT AREA COOLING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENTS MALFUNCTION RESULTS ECCS Cubicle Cooling Fan Fan motor trip A fan motor trip actuates an alarm on the main control panel Fan failure With the exception of the MSIV and HPCS cubicle fans, low fan differential pressure actuates an
alarm on the main control panel. ECCS Cubicle Cooling Coil Cooling water valve does not open A high temperature switch actuates an alarm on the main control panel
CPS/USAR NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-97 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-15 SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM COOLING SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY A. SSW Pump Rooms A B 1. Supply Fan 1VH01CA 1VH01CB Type Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Quantity 1 1 Drive Direct Direct Capacity (scfm) 30,000 30,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 2.0 2.0 Motor (hp) 15 15 2. Cooling Coil Cabinet 1VH07SA 1VH07SB Each cabinet shall consist of the following:
Cooling coils 1VH01AA 1VH01AB 1VH02AA 1VH02AB Type Shutdown Service water Shutdown Service water Quantity 2 each 2 each Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 388,800 388,800 Air quantity (scfm) 30,000 30,000 Water quantity (gpm) 82 82 B. SSW Pump Room C Supply Fan 1VH01CC Type Vaneaxial Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 6,000 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 1.5 Motor (hp) 3 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-15 SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM COOLING SYSTEM (Continued)
NOTE: The listed capacities are vendor specification values. Refer to the appropriate calculation for actual design requirements.
CHAPTER 09 9.4-98 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND NOMINAL CAPACITY 2. Cooling Coil Cabinet 1VH07SC Each cabinet shall consist of the following: Cooling coil 1VH03A Type Shutdown Service water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 77,760 Air quantity (scfm) 6,000 Water quantity (gpm) 16
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-99 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-16 SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER PUMP ROOM COOLING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION RESULTS SSW Cubicle Cooling Fan Fan motor trip A fan motor trip actuates an alarm on the main control panel.
SSW Cubicle Cooling
Coil Cooling water valve does not open A high temperature switch actuates an alarm on the main control panel.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-100 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-17 CGCS EQUIPMENT CUBICLE COOLING SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Supply Fans 1VR08C, 1VR11C Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (acfm) 2,000 Static Pressure (inches water) 5.2 Motor (hp) 3.0 B. Coil Cabinets 1VR09S, 1VR12S 1. Type Built-up 2. Components (Cooling Coil) 1VR10A, 1VR13A Type Shutdown Service Water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 100,000 Water Quantity (gpm) 36 Air Flow (scfm) 3,400
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-101 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-18 CGCS EQUIPMENT CUBICLE COOLING SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION RESULTS CGCS Cubicle Fan Fan motor trip A fan motor trip actuates an alarm on the main control panel.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-102 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-19 CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Containment Building Ventilation Supply
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components a. Fans 1VR03CA and 1VR03CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ 0.74 lb/ft 3 density, for blade setting of 15) 30,405 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 6.58 Motor (hp) 50
- b. Cooling Coil 1VR02A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 1,791,200 Air quantity (cfm) 30,000 Water Quantity (gpm) 275
- c. Heating Coil 1VR01A Type Electric Quantity 1 bank Capacity (kW) 780 Air quantity (cfm) 30,000
- d. Filter 1VR05F Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 50 Capacity (cfm) 30,000 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-19 CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-103 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY B. Containment Building Ventilation Exhaust Fans 1VR04CA, 1VR04CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .066 lb/ft 3, for blade setting of 18) 34,090 Total pressure (inches water) 8.9 Motor (hp) 75
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-104 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-19A CONTINUOUS CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Continuous Containment Purge Supply Train
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components a. Blowers 1VR06CA, 1VR06CB Type High Pressure, Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .071lb/ft 3 density) 8,450 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 37 Motor (hp) 100
- b. Cooling Coils Primary Cooling Coil 1VR06A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 571,140 Air quantity (scfm) 8,000 Water quantity (gpm) 80 Secondary cooling coil 1VR07A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 359,000 Air quantity (scfm) 8,000 Water quantity (gpm) 44
- c. Heating Coil 1VR05A Type Electric Quantity 1 Bank Capacity (kW) 133 Air quantity (scfm) 8,000 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-19A CONTINUOUS CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-105 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY d. Filter 1VR06F Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 50 Capacity (scfm) 8,000 B. Continuous Containment Purge Exhaust Blowers 1VR07CA, 1VR07CB Type High Pressure, Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .068 lb/ft 3 density) 8,860 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 44.5 Motor (hp) 125
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-106 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-20 CONTAINMENT BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or Exhaust Failure of a fan resulting in low air flow Should an operating fan fail, an alarm will be actuated in the main
control room. A redundant fan will be started automatically. Total loss of system air flow due to power failure Pressure control dampers employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of the backflow type which fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in the case of loss of a-c power and subsequent fan system shutdown.
Flow Control Damper on Main Supply Fail closed Low supply air flow is detected by a pressure switch fed from a duct mounted air flow element. An alarm is received in the main control room.
Supply fans trip on low air flow, and exhaust fans trip due to no running
supply fan. Fail open causing possible loss of building pressure control High or low containment building pressure causes an alarm in the main control room.
Containment Building Isolation Valve Loss of power supply or air supply. Fail close The closure of these dampers will cause low flow to be detected by a pressure switch fed from a duct
mounted air flow element and alarmed in the main control room.
Supply and exhaust fans will be
shutdown.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-107 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-20A CONTINUOUS CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or Exhaust Blower Failure of blower resulting in loss of air flow Should an operating blower fail, an alarm will be actuated in the main
control room. A redundant blower will be started automatically. Total Loss of system air flow due to power failure Pressure control dampers employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of the backflow type which fail closed. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in the case of loss of a-c power and subsequent blower system
shutdown.
Flow Control Damper on Main Supply Fail closed Low supply air flow, detected by a pressure switch fed from a pipe mounted air flow element, is alarmed
in the main control room. The supply blowers trip on low flow, and the exhaust blowers trip due to no running supply blower. Fail open causing possible loss of building pressure
control High containment building pressure switch causes an alarm in the main
control room.
Continuous Containment Purge System Containment Isolation Valve Loss of power supply or air supply. Fail closed The closure of an isolation valve will cause low flow to be detected by a pressure switch fed from a pipe mounted air flow element and alarmed in the main control room.
Supply and exhaust fan will be
shutdown.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-108 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-21 DRYWELL COOLING HVAC SYSTEM EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Drywell Cooling Supply Air Fans 1VP01CA 1VP01CB 1VP01CC 1VP01CD Type Vaneaxial Vaneaxia l Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Drive Direct Direct Direct Direct Capacity (cfm) 25,000 25,000 36,486 36,486 Total Pressure (in H 2O) 2.74 3.8 4.05 4.05 Air density for rated conditions (lb/ft
- 3) .069 .069 .074 .074 Blade setting for rated condition 14 19 39 39 Fan motor (hp) 20 25 30 30 B. Drywell Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VP02SA 1VP02SB Type Drywell chilled water Quantity 2 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 993,600 Air quantity (scfm) 23,000 Chilled water flow (gpm) 200 Drywell Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VP02SC 1VP02SD Type Drywell chilled water Quantity 2 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 4,300,000 Air quantity (scfm) 36,000 Chilled water flow (gpm) 830 C. Refrigeration Units 1VP04CA 1VP04CB Type of unit Water Chiller Quantity 2 Type of compressor Centrifugal hermetic Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 6,000,000 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-21 DRYWELL COOLING HVAC SYSTEM EQUIPMENT PARAMETERS (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-109 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY D. Supplemental Drywell Cooling Supply Air Fans 1VP01CE 1VP01CF 1VP01CG 1VP01CH Type Vaneaxial Vaneaxia l Vaneaxial Vaneaxial Drive Direct Direct Direct Direct Capacity (cfm) 6,918 6,918 10,236 10,236 Total Pressure (in H 2O) 2.33 2.33 2.79 2.79 Air density for rated conditions (lb/ft
- 3) .074 .074 .074 .074 Blade setting for rated condition 27 27 50 50 Fan motor (hp) 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 E. Supplemental Drywell Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VP02SE 1VP02SF Type Drywell chilled water Quantity 2 Cooling capacity* (Btu/hr) 693,517 Air quantity (acfm) 7,565 Chilled water flow (gpm) 80 Supplemental Drywell Cooling Coil Cabinets 1VP02SG 1VP02SH Type Plant chilled water Quantity 2 Cooling capacity* (Btu/hr) 876,200 Air quantity (acfm) 11,480 Chilled water flow (gpm) 85.7
- Corresponding to entering air dry/wet bulb of 130
°F/85°F.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-110 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-22 DRYWELL COOLING HVAC SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION RESULTS Supply Air Fans Fan motor automatic trip Fan motors automatic trips are alarmed on a main control room
panel. Refrigeration Loss of refrigeration unit Operator starts the standby refrigeration unit.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-111 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-23 DRYWELL PURGE SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Drywell Purge Filter Trains 0VQ01SA 1 , 0VQ01SB 1 , 0VQ01SC 1. Prefilter 0VQ04FA 1 , 0VQ04FB 1 , 0VQ04FC Type Disposable cartridge units Quantity 1 Bank per train Capacity (scfm) 15,000 2 Efficiency (% based on ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 85 Media Glass fibers 2. Upstream HEPA Filters 0VQ06FA 1 , 0VQ06FB 1 , 0VQ06FC Type High efficiency Quantity 1 Bank per train Capacity (scfm) 15,000 2 Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron dioctyl phthalate smoke) 99.97 3. Heating Coil 0VQ05AA 1 , 0VQ05AB 1 , 0VQ05AC Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater per train Air quantity (scfm) 15,000 2 Capacity (kW) 75 4. Moisture Separator 0VQ09SA 1 , 0VQ09SB 1 , 0VQ09SC Type Impingement Quantity 1 Separator per train Capacity (scfm) 15,000 2 5. Charcoal Adsorber Bed 0VQ07FA 1 , 0VQ07FB 1 , 0VQ07FC Type Gasketless Quantity 3 (1 per train) Media Impregnated charcoal Depth of Bed (in) 4 Decontainmination efficiency (%) 90/70 3 Capacity (scfm) 15,000 2
CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-23 DRYWELL PURGE SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-112 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY 6. Preheating Coil 0VQ10AA 1 , 0VQ10AB 1 , 0VQ10AC Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater per train Capacity (kW) 2 Air Quantity (scfm) 300
- 7. Downstream HEPA Filters 0VQ08FA, 0VQ08FB, 0VQ08FC Type High Efficiency Quantity 1 Bank per train Capacity (scfm) 15 000 2 Media Glass fiber Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron dioctyl phthalate smoke) 99.97 8. Exhaust Fans 0VQ02CA 1 , 0VQ02CB 1 , 0VQ02CC Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Fan per train Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 15,000 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 16.5 Motor (hp) 100 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-23 DRYWELL PURGE SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-113 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY 9. Low Flow Exhaust Fans 0VQ03CA, 0VQ03CB, 0VQ03CC Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Fan per train Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 300 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 4.55 Motor (hp) 1.5
NOTE 1. Drywell purge filter use during continuous containment purge. Only two filter packages, 0VQ01SA and B (one standby), are used for continuous containment purge. The flow rate during continuous containment puge is 8,000 scfm. 2. The filter train original design flowrate of 15,000 cfm has been raised to 16,270 cfm maximum (one filter train operating and two standby). 3. Efficiency of 90% assumed for flows below 15,333 cfm, and efficiency of 70% assumed for flows greater than 15,333 cfm, due to reduction of residence time within the charcoal beds.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-114 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-24 DRYWELL PURGE SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Exhaust Fan Automatic trip of fan motor, or failure of fan resulting in loss
of flow Should an operating fan fail, an alarm will be actuated on the main control panel. A redundant purge unit will be started. Total loss of main system air flow due to power failure Even though the main system is lost, the system still has the capability to act as a backup to the redundant containment combustible gas control system since the low flow exhaust fans are connected to the diesel generators. Package Filter Unit Isolation Dampers Fail close Low flow is detected by a flow switch on a duct mounted air flow element
and alarmed in the main control room. A redundant purge unit will be started. Containment Building Isolation valve Loss of power supply or air supply. Fail close. The closure of this valve will cause low flow to be detected by a flow switch on a duct mounted air flow
element and alarmed on the main control panel. The exhaust fans will be shut down.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-115 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-25 OFF-GAS VAULT REFRIGERATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Refrigeration Skids 1VO01SA, 1VO01SB 1. Type Built-up 2. Quantity 2
- 3. Capacity (Btu/hr) 240,000 (each skid)
- 4. Components
- a. Compressors 1VO01CA, 1VO02CA, 1VO01CB, 1VO02CB Type Open reciprocating Quantity 4 Power (hp) 60 (each compressor)
Drive Direct
- b. Compressor Oil Coolers 1V008AA, 1V009AA, 1V008AB, 1V009AB Type Water-cooled Quantity 4
- c. Condenser 1V002AA, 1V002AB Type Water-cooled Quantity 2 B. Air Handling Unit Skids 1VO02SA, 1VO02SB 1. Type Built-up 2. Quantity 2
- 3. Components
- a. Supply Air Fans 1VO05CA, 1VO05CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Air flow (scfm) 15,000 External static pressure (in. H 2O) 3.0 Drive Belt Motor (hp) 15
- b. Cooling Coil 1VO06AA, 1VO12AA, 1VO06AB, 1VO12AB CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-25 OFF-GAS VAULT REFRIGERATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-116 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) Type Direct Expansion Quantity 4 Sensible heat capacity (Btu/hr) 102,000 (per coil)
Air Flow (cfm) 7,500 (per coil)
- c. Electric Defrost Heater 1VO10AA, 1VO10AB Type Electric Quantity 2 Capacity (kW) 45
- d. Drain Pan Electric Heater 1VO11AA, 1VO1AB Type Electric Quantity 2 Capacity (kW) 9 C. Heating Circulating Fan 1VO01C Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Air flow (cfm @ .061 .b/ft 3 density) 6,148 External static pressure (in. H 2O) 2.95 Drive Direct Motor (hp) 7.5 D. Electric Blast Coil 1VO03A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 100
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-117 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-26 OFF-GAS VAULT REFRIGERATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION RESULTS Supply Air Fan Fan motor trip Fan motor auto trip is annunciated on the local control panel and gives a permissive signal to allow the
standby fan to be manually started.
Charcoal Vault
Temperature High temperature High charcoal vault temperature is annunciated on the main control
board. Charcoal Vault Temperature Low temperature Low charcoal vault temperature is annunciated on the main control board. Refrigeration Compressor Compressor motor trip Compressor motor trip is annunciated on the local control
panel. Heating Circulating Fan Fan motor trip Fan motor auto trip is annunciated on the local control panel.
Drain Pan Electric Heater Heater trip Heater trip is annunciated on the local control panel.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-118 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-27 MACHINE SHOP AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Machine Shop Ventilation Supply
- 1. Fans 0VJ01CA 0VJ01CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .074 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of 31) 14,189 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 5.82 Motor (hp) 20
- 2. Cooling Coil 0VJ09A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 1,673,700 Water quantity (gpm) 205 3. Heating Coil 0VJ08A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 608 Air quantity (scfm) 28,000 4. Filter 0VJ10F Type Medium efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Capacity (scfm) 28,000 Efficiency (% based on ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 55 Media Glass fiber CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-27 MACHINE SHOP AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-119 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY B. Machine Shop Ventilation Exhaust
- 1. Fans 0VJ02CA 0VJ02CB Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .070 lb/ft 3 density) 15,080 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 9.75 Motor (hp) 40
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-120 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-27 MACHINE SHOP AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY, AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY 2. Exhaust Filter Trains 0VJ03S 0VJ04S 0VJ06S Type Machine Shop Exhaust Decon. Room Exhaust Weld Shop Exhaust Capacity (scfm) 5000 8000 7500
- a. Dust Collector Yes N/A N/A
- b. Moisture Separator N/A Yes N/A
- c. Prefilter Quantity 1 Bank 1 Bank 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Glass Fiber Glass Fiber Efficiency (based on ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 85 85 85
- d. HEPA Filter Quantity 1 Bank 1 Bank 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Glass Fiber Glass Fiber Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron dioctyl phthalate) 99.97 99.97 99.97
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-121 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-28 MACHINE SHOP VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or exhaust fan Failure of a fan resulting in loss of duct pressure Should an operating fan fail, an alarm will be actuated on the local control panel. The alarm on the local control panel will also activate
an alarm in the main control room. Total loss of system air flow due to power failure Pressure control dampers employed between clean and potentially contaminated areas are of the backflow type and fail close. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in the case of a loss of power and subsequent fan system shutdown.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-122 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-29 CIRCULATING WATER SCREEN HOUSE VENTILATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Circulating Water Screen House Supply Fans 1VH02CA 1VH02CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .068 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of
- 16) 17,647 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 2.76 Motor (hp) 15 B. Circulating Water Screen House Chlorinator Room Exhaust Fans 0VH06CA 0VH06CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 1,500 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 0.5 Motor (hp) 0.33 C. Circulating Water Screen House Fire Pump Room Exhaust Fans 1VH03CA 1VH03CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Belt Capacity (scfm) 6,000 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 0.375 Motor (hp) 0.75 D. Circulating Water Screen House Exhaust Fans 1VH04CA 1VH04CB Type Propeller Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 25,000 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 0.375 Motor (hp) 5.0 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-29 CIRCULATING WATER SCREEN HOUSE VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-123 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY E. Circulating Water Screen House Fire Pump Room Minimum Flow Exhaust Fan 1VH08C Type Centrifugal Quantity 1 Drive Direct Capacity (scfm) 250 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 0.375 Motor (hp) 0.25
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-124 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-30 CIRCULATING WATER SCREEN HOUSE VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply fan Failure of a fan resulting in loss of duct pressure Should an operating fan fail, fan trip is alarmed on the local control panel.
Flow control damper on
main supply Fail closed Failed closed damper causes a fan trip and is alarmed on the local control panel.
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-125 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-31 LABORATORY HVAC SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Laboratory Supply 0VL12S 1. Type Dual duct 2. Components a. Heating Coil 0VL05A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 228
- b. Cooling Coil 0VL04A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 2,244,300 Air quantity (scfm) 28,750 B. Laboratory Supply Fans 0VL01CA 0VL01CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .068 lb/ft 3 density) 15,855 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 7.51 C. Laboratory Supply Air Filter 0VL08F Type Medium efficiency Quantity 1 Filter Bank Capacity (scfm) 28,750 Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 55 Media Glass fiber D. Laboratory Makeup Air Fans 0VL02CA 0VL02CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-31 LABORATORY HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-126 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY Capacity (cfm at .068 lb/ft 3 density) 18,005 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 6.07 E. Laboratory Preheat Coil 0VL07A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 550 F. Laboratory Exhaust Fans 0VL03CA 0VL03CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm @ .069 lb/ft 3 density) 17,880 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 11.01 G. Laboratory Auxiliary Air Heating Coil 0VL06A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 65 H. Laboratory Makeup Air Filter 0VL09F Type Medium efficiency Quantity 1 Filter Bank Capacity (scfm) 32,650 Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 55 Media Glass fiber I. Laundry Exhaust Lint Filter 0VL10F Type Low efficiency Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 9,000 Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 12 Media Glass fiber CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-31 LABORATORY HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-127 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY J. Laboratory Exhaust Air Filter Packages 0VL11SA 0VL11SB 1. Type Builtup 2. Components
- a. Prefilter Type Medium efficiency Quantity 1 Bank, per filter package Capacity (scfm) 16,450 Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 85 Media Glass fiber b. HEPA filter Type High efficiency Quantity 1 Bank, per filter package Capacity (scfm) 16,450 Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron and larger) 99.97 Media Glass fiber K. Laboratory Humidification Steam Boiler 0VL13B Type Electric Quantity 1 Capacity (lb/hr) 1867 Operating pressure (psig) 10 L. Laboratory Humidifier 0VL14M Type Steam Quantity 1 Capacity (lb/hr) 850 Air Quantity (scfm) 28,750 Steam pressure (psig) 10 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-31 LABORATORY HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-128 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY M. Counting Room Coil Cabinet 0VL13SA 0VL13SB Type Builtup Builtup 2. Components
- a. Cooling Coil 0VL13AA 0VL13AB Type Chilled water Direct expansion Quantity 1 1 Cooling capacity (Btu/hr) 314,000 323,000 Air quantity (scfm) 3,100 3,100 b. Heating Coil 0VL15AA 0VL15AB Type Electric Electric Quantity 1 Heater 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 65 65 N. Counting Room Reheat 0VL14A Type Electric Quantity 1 Capacity (kW) 15 O. Counting Room Supply Air Filter 0VL16FA 0VL16FB 1. Type Built-up 2. Components a. Prefilter 0VL23FA,B Type Medium efficiency Quantity 2 Capacity (scfm) 3,100 Efficiency (% by ASHRAE Test Standard 52-68) 60-65 Media Glass fiber b. HEPA Filter 0VL24FA,B Type High efficiency Quantity 2 Capacity (scfm) 3,100 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-31 LABORATORY HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-129 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron and larger) 99.97 Media Glass fiber P. Counting Room Supply Fan 0VL17CA 0VL17CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .071 lb/ft 3 density) 3,275 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 6.1 Q. Counting Room Humidifier 0VL19M Type Steam Quantity 1 Capacity (lb/hr) 115 Air quantity (scfm) 3,100 Steam pressure (psig) 10 R. Counting Room Exhaust Fan 0VL18CA 0VL18CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .069 lb/ft 3 density) 2,828 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 5.9 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-130 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY A. Service Building Exterior Zone Air Handling Unit 0VS01S 1. Type Built-up 2. Components a. Filter 0VS01F Type Medium Efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE 52-68 Test Std) 45-55 Capacity (cfm) 14,590 b. Cooling Coil 0VS05A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 570,300 Water Quantity (gpm) 140 Air Flow (scfm) 13,460
- c. Heating Coil 0VS02A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 140 d. Supply Fan 0VS08C Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 14,590 Static Pressure (inches water) 5.5 Motor (hp) 25 B. Service Building Exterior Zone Return Fan 0VS10C Type Vaneaxial Drive Direct Quantity 1 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-131 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY Capacity (cfm at .072 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of 43) 15,198 Static Pressure (inches water) 3.01 Motor (hp) 15 C. Service Building Interior Zone 1 Air Handling Unit 0VS03S 1. Type Built-up
- 2. Components a. Filter 0VS02F Type Medium Efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE 52-68 Test Std) 45-55 Capacity (cfm) 16,900 b. Cooling Coil 0VS06A Type Chilled Water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 770,900 Water Quantity (gpm) 170 Air Flow (scfm) 15,600 c. Heating Coil 0VS03A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 130
- d. Supply Fan 0VS09C Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 16,900 Static Pressure (inches water) 5.5 Motor (hp) 30 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-132 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY D. Service Building Interior Zone -1 Return Fan 0VS11C Type Vaneaxial Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm at .072 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of 50) 17,604 Static Pressure (inches water) 2.8 Motor (hp) 15 E. Service Building Interior Zone - 2 Air Handling Unit 0VS02S 1. Type Built-up
- 2. Components
- a. Filter 0VS02F Type Medium Efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE 52-68 Test Std) 60 Capacity (cfm) 24,190 b. Cooling Coil 0VS07A Type Chilled Water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 902,300 Water Quantity (gpm) 200 Air Flow (scfm) 22,640
- c. Heating Coil 0VS04A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 190
- d. Supply Fan 0VS06C Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-133 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY Capacity (scfm) 24,560 Static Pressure (inches water) 5.5 Motor (hp) 40 F. Service Building Interior Zone - 2 Return Fan 0VS12C Type Vaneaxial Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm at .072 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of 44) 25,198 Static Pressure (inches water) 2.61 Motor (hp) 20 G. Service Building Locker Room Air Handling Unit 0VS05S 1. Type Built-up 2. Components a. Filter 0VS05F Type Medium Efficiency Quantity 1 Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% by ASHRAE 52-68 Test Std) 45-55 Capacity (cfm) 4,130 b. Cooling Coil 0VS08A Type Chilled Water Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (Btu/hr) 306,655 Water Quantity (gpm) 62 Air Flow (scfm) 4,130
- c. Heating Coil 0VS14A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 100 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-134 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY d. Supply Fan 0VS16C Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 Capacity (scfm) 4,130 Static Pressure (inches water) 3.85 Motor (hp) 7.5 H. Service Building Locker Room Exhaust Fan 0VS13C Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 8,680 Static Pressure (inches water) 1 Motor (hp) 3 I. Record Storage Facility HVAC System 0VS28S 1. Type Draw Through
- 2. Components
- a. Filter Type Med Efficiency Quantity 1 Media Glass Fiber Efficiency 80%
- b. Cooling Coil Type Direct Expansion R-22 Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity 52,200 BTU/hr c. Heating Coil Type Electric Quantity 1 Capacity 51,180 BTU/hr CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-135 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY d. Fan Type Centrifugal Drive Belt Quantity 1 Capacity 1500 CFM Static Pressure (inches water) 4.3 Motor HP 3 J. Deleted K. Deleted L. Service Building HP Counting Room Supply
- 1. HEPA Filter 0VS06F Type High Efficiency Quantity 1 Media Glass Fiber Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron and larger) 99.97 Capacity (cfm) 2,710
- 2. Fan 0VS21C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 3,200 Static Pressure (inches water) 1.5 Motor (hp) 1.5 M. Service Building West Conference Room Exhaust Fan 0VS22C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 670 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.25 Motor (hp) 1/20 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-136 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY N. Service Building Kitchen Exhaust Fan 0VS24C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 350 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.5 Motor (hp) 1/22 P. Service Building East Conference Room Exhaust Fan 0VS23C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 660 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.5 Motor (hp) 1/11 Q. Service Building Halon Purge Fan 0VS25C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 1,540 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.75 Motor (hp) 1/3 R. Service Building Security Area Battery Room Exhaust Fan 0VS26C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 270 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.625 Motor (hp) 1/4 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-137 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY S. Service Building Exterior Zone Exhaust Fan 0VS27C Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (cfm) 1,540 Static Pressure (inches water) 0.75 Motor (hp) 1/3 T. Security Control Room Backup Air Handling Unit 0VS30S 1. Type Packaged
- 2. Components
- a. Filter Type Disposable Efficiency 30% minimum
- b. Cooling Coil Type Direct Expansion Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (BTU/hr) 14,500
- c. Supply Fan Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (CFM) 950 External Static Pressure (in. w.g.) .23 Motor (hp) 1/4 U. Computer Equipment Rooms Backup Air Handling Units 0VS31SA, 0VS31SB 1. Type Packaged 2. Components
- a. Filter Type Disposable Efficiency 30% minimum CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-32 SERVICE BUILDING HVAC SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-138 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY b. Cooling Coil Type Direct Expansion Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (BTU/hr) 37,700
- c. Supply Fan Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (CFM) 1500 External Static Pressure (in. w.g.) .65 Motor (hp) 1/2 V. Electrical Equipment Room and Battery Room Backup Air Handling Unit 0VS32S 1. Type Packaged 2. Components
- a. Filter Type Disposable Efficiency 30% minimum
- b. Cooling Coil Type Direct Expansion Quantity 1 Cooling Capacity (BTU/hr) 36,700
- c. Supply Fan Type Centrifugal Drive Direct Quantity 1 Capacity (CFM) 1500 External Static Pressure (in. w.g.) .65 Motor (hp) 1/2
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-139 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-33 RADWASTE BUILDING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) A. Radwaste Building Ventilation Supply
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components
- a. Fans 0VW03CA, 0VW03CB Type Vaneaxial Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .074 lb/ft 3 density, blade setting of 25) 42,466 Total pressure (in. H 2O) 6.08 Motor (hp) 60
- b. Filter 0VW05F Type Medium efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 55 Capacity (scfm) 41,900 Media Glass fiber
- c. Heating Coil 0VW01A Type Electric Quantity 1 Heater Capacity (kW) 876
- d. Cooling Coil 0VW02A Type Chilled water Quantity 1 Capacity (Btu/hr) 2,526,000 Chilled water (gpm) 351 Air Flow (scfm) 41,900 CPS/USAR TABLE 9.4-33 RADWASTE BUILDING AREA VENTILATION SYSTEM (Continued)
CHAPTER 09 9.4-140 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 NAME OF EQUIPMENT NUMBER, TYPE, QUANTITY AND VENDOR RATED CAPACITY (PER COMPONENT) B. Radwaste Building Ventilation Exhaust
- 1. Type Built-up 2. Components
- a. Fans 0VW04CA, 0VW04CB Type Centrifugal Quantity 2 Drive Direct Capacity (cfm at .067 lb/ft 3 density) 50,989 Static pressure (in. H 2O) 11.5 Motor (hp) 150
- b. Filter Package 0VW06SA, 0VW06SB (1) Prefilter 0VW42FA, 0VW42FB Type Disposable cartridge Quantity 1 Bank Efficiency (% by NBS dust spot method) 85 Capacity (scfm) 21,400 Media Glass fiber (2) HEPA Filters 0VW41FA, 0VW41FB Type High efficiency Quantity 1 Bank Capacity (scfm) 21,400 Media Glass fiber, water-proof fire resistant Efficiency (% minimum 0.3 micron dioctyl phthalate smoke) 99.97 CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 9.4-141 REV. 11, JANUARY 2005 TABLE 9.4-34 RADWASTE BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSIS COMPONENT MALFUNCTION COMMENTS Supply or Exhaust Fan Failure of a fan resulting in loss of duct pressure Failure of an operating fan will actuate an alarm on the supply or exhaust system local control panel (SSLCP or ESLCP). If fan is operated from remote radwaste
operations center (ROC), the alternate fan will automatically start. If fan is operated from SSLCP or ESLCP, the alternate fan will be
started manually. Total loss of system air flow due to power failure Backdraft dampers are employed between clean and potentially
contaminated areas. This minimizes the backflow of contaminated air to clean areas in the case of a loss of a-c power and subsequent fan
system shutdown. Exhaust Filter High particulate loading resulting in reduced air
capacity Pressure differential switches measuring pressure drop across filters will cause local alarm indicating need for filter change long before filters are completely loaded. Filter Failure Any particulate break-through in the exhaust filters, which could cause offsite dose problems, will be detected by the radiation monitors located in the common station HVAC vent stack.
Flow Control Damper on Main Supply Fail closed Low flow is detected by pressure switch on duct mounted air flow
element and alarmed on the local control panel. Supply fan will trip and an exhaust fan allowed to operate to maintain building negative
pressure. Fail open causing possible loss of building pressure
control Low radwaste building pressure differential pressure switch could alarm on the local control panel.
CPS/USAR FIGURE 9.1-2a FUEL STORAGE RACK ARRANGEMENT FOR THE SPENT FUEL POOL CHAPTER 09 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009
36'-0"
32'-2" NORTH 15 X 10 15 X 12 15 X 12 12 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 10 15 X 10 15 X 10 11 X 10 15 X 12 15 X 12 15 X 12 11 X 12 15 X 12 15 X 12 15 X 12 11 X 12 (+12) 15 X 12 15 X 12 11 X 10 11 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 10 12 X 10 11 X 10 11 X 10
CPS/USAR FIGURE 9.1-2c FUEL STORAGE RACK ARRANGEMENT FOR THE CASK STORAGE POOL (AS NEEDED)
CHAPTER 09 REV. 13, JANUARY 2009
13'-9"
17'-0"
- Up to two (2) Racks may be placed in the Fuel Cask Storage Pool, as needed, to extend core offload capacity.
11 X 12* 11 X 12*
CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002
Figure 9.1-4 Deleted
CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002
Figure 9.1-10 Deleted
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 12, JAN 2007
FIGURE 9.1-13 HAS BEEN DELETED
CPS/USAR REV. 13, JANUARY 2009 FIGURE 9.1-15 PLANT REFUELING AND SERVICING SEQUENCE CHAPTER 09
NOTES: 1. CONTAINMENT BUILDING CRANE REQUIRED DURING OPERATION
- 2. ADDITIONAL NON-ROUTINE OPERATION TO BE PERFORMED AS REQUIRED 3. HEAVY LINE BETWEEN OPERATIONS INDICATES ANTICIPATED CRITICAL PATH DURING NORMAL OUTAGE 4. ADDITIONAL TRANSFER OF NEW AND SPENT FUEL BETWEEN FUEL AND CONTAINMEN T BUILDINGS IS NECESSARY 5. THESE ACTIONS ARE NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRED TO BE PERFORMED IN THE SPECIFIC ORDER SHOWN SHUTDOWN - TURBINE OFF-LINE INSTALL REACTOR CAVITY GATES REACTOR COOLDOWNREMOVE DRYWELL HEAD COVER DRYWELL SEAL SURFACE INSTALL SEALS & STUD HOLE PROTECTO RREMOVE RPV HEAD REMOVE RPV INSULATION & PIPING SRV M AINTENANC EFLOOD REACTOR CAVITY INSTALL STEAM LINE PLUGS REMOVE DRYER FLOOD REACTO R WELL REMOVE SEALS & STUD HOLE PROTECTO R INSTALL DRYWELL HEAD INSTALL RPV HEAD, STUDS & NUTS REMOVE REACTOR CAVITY GATES REPLACE INCORE DETECTOR REMOVE & REPLACE DRIVES DRAIN REACTOR CAVITY TRANSFER NEW FUEL TO CNMT CRD TESTS SIP FUEL IF REQUIREDREMOVE S EPARATO R& SHROUD HEAD SEAL VENTS DRAIN REACTOR CAVITY INSTALL REACTOR CAVITY GATES CORE VERIFICA-TION REMOVE STEAM LINE PLUGSREMOVE DRYWELL SEAL COVERINGOPEN VENTS INSTALL S EPARATO R& SHROUD HEAD CRD TESTS REACTOR WELL WALL DECONTAM / WETTING INSTALL DRYER REMOVE LIGHTS & IN-VESSEL RACKS REMOVE SPENT FUEL REPLACE CONTROL BLADES CRD GUIDE TUBE SERVICE ORIFICE SERVICE INSTALL NEW FUEL JET PUMP SERVICE SHUFFLE FUEL INSTALL LIGHTS & IN-VESSEL RACKS START UP -
TURBINE OFF-LINE POWER ASCENSIONREMOVE REACTOR CAVITY GATES TESTS FUEL TRANSFER BETWEEN BUILDINGS SRV M AINTENANC E PRESS TEST RPV TRANSFER SPENT FUEL TO FUEL BLDG A C INSTALL RPV HEAD, INSULATION& PIPING A B D D E E B C CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002
Figure 9.1-16 Deleted
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 12, JAN 2007
FIGURES 9.2-1 THROUGH 9.2-3 HAVE BEEN DELETED
CPS/USAR CHAPTER 09 REV. 11, JAN 2005
FIGURES 9.2-8 AND 9.2-9 HAVE BEEN DELETED
CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002
Figures 9.3-1 through 9.3-6 Deleted
CPS/USAR REV. 10, November 2002
Figures 9.5-1 through 9.5-6 Deleted