NRC-04-0061, Request for Enforcement Discretion with Respect to the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Related to Emergency Diesel Generator-12

Request for Enforcement Discretion with Respect to the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Related to Emergency Diesel Generator-12

ML042300616
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	08/10/2004
From:	O'Conner W DTE Energy
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NRC-04-0061
Download: ML042300616 (12)

Text

William T. O'Connor, Jr.

Vice President, Nuclear Generation Fermi 2 6400 North Dixe Hwy., Newport, Michigan 48166 Tel: 734-586-5201 Fax: 734-5864172 DTE Energy August 10, 2004 NRC-04-0061 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington D C 20555-0001

References:

1) Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 NRC License No. NPF-43

2) NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-20, "Revisions to Staff Guidance for Implementing NRC Policy on Notices of Enforcement Discretion,"

dated November 14, 2001

3) NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900, "Technical Guidance, Operations - Notices of Enforcement Discretion,"

dated November 2, 2001

Subject:

Request for Enforcement Discretion with Respect to the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Related to Emergency Diesel Generator-12 On Sunday, August 8, 2004, Detroit Edison orally requested a Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) with respect to the Completion Time requirements contained in the Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating," Action A.6, for a single Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) in one division inoperable. The NRC orally denied the NOED request during the telephone call, prior to the expiration of the TS LCO. The purpose of this letter is to document the NOED request, including information and discussion provided to NRC during that telephone call.

?ooV

USNRC NRC-04-0061 Page 2 EDG-12 was removed from service at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on August 2, 2004 to perform routine maintenance, including the eighteen-month inspection, and preventive and corrective maintenance tasks. On August 6, 2004 at 1042 hours0.0121 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.96481e-4 months <br />, EDG-12 was started as part of surveillance test 24.307.46, Emergency Diesel Generator 12 - Fast Start Followed by Load Reject. Following successful completion of the load reject, the EDG was being cooled down for restoration to operable status. Approximately 2.5 minutes into the cool down run, personnel in the area noted abnormal engine noise.

The local operator tripped the EDG promptly at 1311 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.988355e-4 months <br />. Subsequent inspection determined that the scavenging blower had failed, which led to damage of the scavenging blower drive gear as well.

LCO 3.8.1, Condition A for the inoperable EDG-12 was entered at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on August 2, 2004 when the EDG was removed from service for routine maintenance.

Hence, the required 7-day Completion Time for Required Action A.6 expired at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on August 9, 2004. Due to the extensive work necessary to inspect the engine for damage, replace the scavenging blower, and complete post maintenance testing, this work extended beyond the current required Completion Time of 7 days.

Therefore, Detroit Edison has shut down the reactor as required by the Technical Specification Required Actions.

The Attachment to this letter contains the details and information provided to NRC before the telephone call to support Detroit Edison's request for enforcement discretion. This information was developed using the information provided in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2001-20, "Revisions to Staff Guidance for Implementing NRC Policy on Notices of Enforcement Discretion" (Reference 2).

During the telephone call, Detroit Edison provided background information about the plant design relative to onsite and offsite power sources and discussed conditions of the electrical grid, including the contract with the grid operator to provide adequate power to the plant in the event of planned or unplanned shutdown. Detroit Edison indicated that there were no current or forecast conditions with these electrical supplies that could adversely impact their ability to provide necessary power.

Additionally, Detroit Edison described major work being conducted at the facility, including construction activities related to the 120kV electrical switchyard intended to improve maintainability, address obsolescence, and facilitate demolition activities for Fermi 1. Detroit Edison indicated that these conditions and activities have not adversely impacted the reliability of the 120kV switchyard; compensatory measures governing the control of these activities during the proposed time extension were also discussed.

In requesting this NOED, Detroit Edison provided quantitative and qualitative information supporting its conclusion that the requested NOED would not involve

USNRC NRC-04-0061 Page 3 any net increase in risk. This material and Probabilistic Risk Assessment model (PRA) quality were discussed, and NRC indicated that they were uncomfortable with the quantitative information, principally because this information relied on use of industry estimates of transition risk that have not yet been endorsed by NRC.

During the discussion of the qualitative information, Detroit Edison provided additional explanation of the increased likelihood of certain plant transients during plant shutdown evolutions as compared with steady state operation. Detroit Edison concluded that the transition risk of shutting down the plant while EDG-12 was out of service exceeded the risk that would be associated with steady state operation while repairs were being completed.

Due to the extent of damage to the scavenging blower, it could not be readily disassembled onsite. Detroit Edison was concerned that aggressive effort to disassemble the blower could potentially impede ultimate determination of the root causes of the failure. Therefore, Detroit Edison elected to ship the damaged blower to a vendor facility for disassembly and evaluation in order to best preserve the opportunity to determine the root cause of the failure. Consequently, there was not sufficient information available to confidently develop the apparent root cause information described for a NOED in Reference 3. Discussion on this subject covered operating and performance history of EDG-12 and the other EDGs, and it also included the other factors considered by Detroit Edison in concluding that the other EDGs were not susceptible to this type of blower failure. In denying the requested NOED, the NRC indicated that the lack of apparent root cause information was the principal consideration due to their procedural requirements for this information.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Mr. Norman KI Peterson of my staff at (734) 586-4258.

Sincerely, LW&Q 9.

Attachment cc: D. P. Beaulieu E. R. Duncan NRC Resident Office Regional Administrator, Region m Supervisor, Electric Operators, Michigan Public Service Commission

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 1 Request for Enforcement Discretion with respect to the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation Related to Emergency Diesel Generator 12

1. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) or LICENSE CONDITION THAT WOULD BE VIOLATED:

Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1, "AC Sources

- Operating," requires two emergency diesel generators (EDGs) per division (two divisions) to be OPERABLE during MODES 1 (Power Operation), 2 (Startup), and 3 (Hot Shutdown). With one or both EDGs in one division inoperable, Condition A applies and Required Action A.6 requires restoring the inoperable EDG(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days. Otherwise, Condition C is entered which requires that the plant be in MODE 3 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Required Action C. 1, and in MODE 4 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> per Required Action C.2.

With EDG-12 inoperable for greater than 7 days, a violation of TS LCO 3.8.1 would occur if actions were not taken to initiate a plant shutdown. Thus, a notice of enforcement discretion (NOED) is needed to allow continued plant operation, utilizing an extension of the 7-day Completion Time specified for one inoperable EDG per Required Action A.6 of TS LCO 3.8.1.

2. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE SITUATION, INCLUDING APPARENT ROOT CAUSES, NEED FOR PROMPT ACTION AND RELEVANT HISTORICAL EVENTS:

EDG-12 was removed from service at 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on August 2, 2004 to perform routine maintenance, including the eighteen-month inspection, preventive and corrective maintenance tasks. The work had been completed and testing was underway. Testing had identified a problem with the performance of the EDG-12 output breaker, and it had been resolved.

On August 6, 2004 at 1042 hours0.0121 days <br />0.289 hours <br />0.00172 weeks <br />3.96481e-4 months <br />, EDG-12 was started as part of surveillance test 24.307.46, Emergency Diesel Generator 12 - Fast Start Followed by Load Reject.

Following successful completion of the load reject, the EDG was being cooled down for restoration to operable status. Approximately 2.5 minutes into the cool down run, personnel in the area noted abnormal engine noise. The local operator promptly tripped the EDG at 1311 hours0.0152 days <br />0.364 hours <br />0.00217 weeks <br />4.988355e-4 months <br />. An attempt to hand bar the engine in accordance with procedures at

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 2 1430 hours0.0166 days <br />0.397 hours <br />0.00236 weeks <br />5.44115e-4 months <br /> was unsuccessful, only about a half inch of travel occurred and further attempts failed.

Investigation revealed that failure of the EDG scavenging blower had occurred, which led to damage to the scavenging blower drive gear as well. The failure of the scavenging blower resulted from a loss of running clearance and subsequent metal to metal contact between the cast aluminum scavenging blower impellers and contact between the impellers and impeller housing. A root cause evaluation is currently underway and will consist of a complete failure evaluation of the scavenging blower assembly. However, based on preliminary inspections of the partially disassembled scavenging blower, there is extensive collateral damage that may mask the determination of the initiating failure mechanism.

Preliminary inspection of the partially disassembled scavenging blower assembly indicates the following:

• Damage on the internal surface of the housing between the end plates

• Impeller damage from rubbing impeller to impeller and impeller to housing

• Aluminum transfer to bearing end plates

• Scored rollers on the lower thrust bearing

• Partially sheared pinion to shaft key

• Potential scavenging blower shaft seal damage

• Sheared bolts on flex drive gear (as expected per design)

• Sheared flex drive gear to shaft key The scavenging blower had been inspected during the system outage in accordance with the vendor's recommendations and site procedures. It had been found to be in satisfactory condition during the inspection. The gear drive had also been checked and found to be in good condition and proper alignment. Therefore, the failure of the scavenging blower was catastrophic in nature and would not have been detected or predicted by routine maintenance practices. No other maintenance activities were performed on the scavenging blower during this outage.

There is a 10 CFR Part 21 report (dated March 25, 2004) on a limited number of this type blower. This Part 21 report discusses the possibility that the aluminum rotors can slip on the steel shaft and cause rotor-to-rotor or rotor-to-housing contact which could cause blower failure based upon a manufacturing problem. This particular scavenging blower is not listed among the subject population, and was not manufactured within the suspect time frame.

The scavenging blower for EDG-12 has been replaced once since the EDGs were placed into service in the early 1980's. The scavenging blower on EDG-12 was replaced in June 2003 due to an impeller to impeller clearance (also referred to as scavenging blower peek

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 3 hole clearance) being found out of tolerance on the original scavenging blower during an eighteen month preventive maintenance (PM) inspection in early June 2003. The left and right impeller to impeller clearances are required to be 0.046" +/- 0.010". The left impeller to impeller clearance was found out of tolerance and measured to be 0.028". The inspection also revealed that the right impeller to impeller clearance was out of tolerance and measured to be 0.070". Based on these as found out of tolerances and other clearance checks and recommendations from the vendor, the scavenging blower on EDG-12 was subsequently replaced.

During the EDG-12 eighteen month PM inspection in August 2004 (just prior to the scavenging blower failure), the scavenging blower impeller to impeller clearance was found well within tolerance. The left impeller to impeller clearance was 0.044" and the right impeller to impeller clearance was 0.046". There is no indication that activities conducted during this outage or previous maintenance contributed to this scavenging blower failure.

Proper Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) practices were used and the nature of the failure is not indicative of an FME issue. Prior to this failure, the scavenging blower installed on EDG-12 in June 2003 ran well with no issues. This included a successful load reject test surveillance on EDG-12 in June 2003 and a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> load run surveillance in March 2004 in addition to monthly surveillance tests. In addition, EDG- 12 successfully ran for approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> (at a load of approximately 850 Kw) during the August 14, 2003 loss of power event.

EDG-1 1, EDG-13, and EDG-14 still have the original scavenging blowers from when they were placed into service in the early 1980's, and there have been no issues with the scavenging blowers.

In accordance with TS LCO 3.8.1, Action A.4.1, a common cause failure evaluation was performed. This evaluation concluded that this failure was isolated to EDG-12.

3. SAFETY BASIS FOR REQUEST, INCLUDING EVALUATION OF SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REQUESTED ACTION.

An extension of the allowed Completion Time from 7 days to 14 days for Required Action A.6 of LCO 3.8.1 will allow the required repairs and post-maintenance testing for EDG-12 to be completed without subjecting the Fermi 2 plant to an unnecessary shutdown and startup cycle. Although there is a certain risk associated with the increased allowed Completion Time, most challenges to plant systems, such as an increased potential for plant transients or disturbances, occur during startup and shutdown evolutions, and not during steady state operation. By eliminating the plant shutdown and startup cycle that would be required under the current TS requirements, the plant will not be subjected to the consequent risk associated with a shutdown and startup cycle, thus offsetting the risk

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 4 associated with the increased Completion Time. Therefore, extending the Completion Time meets the requirement for being classified as risk neutral.

The incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) resulting from extending the EDG Completion Time from 7 days to 14 days was determined. The value obtained for the ICCDP (7.6E-08) demonstrates that the risk associated with the proposed Completion Time change is lower than the estimated transitional risk associated with plant shutdown and startup. Industry estimates of the ICCDP associated with a potential plant trip during a shutdown evolution with no systems out of service is 1E-7 (the value would be greater with risk significant systems, such as EDG-12, out of service). The calculated value for ICCDP for a 14-day EDG-12 outage is below the value for the estimated transitional ICCDP.

Furthermore, the calculated value for ICCDP for a 14-day EDG-12 outage does not take into account any benefit from the compensatory measures proposed in Section 7. It is expected that these compensatory measures and the associated increased vigilance by plant staff and management would further reduce the risk associated with the proposed Completion Time extension.

The values calculated for ICCDP and incremental conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) for a 14-day outage fall within the LOW risk category under the Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule. The ICLERP was calculated at 1.8E-9 for a 14-day EDG Completion Time. The thresholds for this categorization are based upon industry guidelines for temporary maintenance configurations where normal work control practices would be adequate to maintain an appropriate level of risk management.

In conclusion, eliminating the plant shutdown and startup cycle that would be required under the current TS requirements will offset any risk associated with the increased Completion Time, and this one-time change will remain risk neutral.

4. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE DURATION OF THE NONCOMPLIANCE The focus of our activities has been on procuring and installation of a replacement scavenging blower. A definitive timeline has been developed for the replacement of the scavenging blower. Replacement of the scavenging blower can be accomplished in approximately 40 hours4.62963e-4 days <br />0.0111 hours <br />6.613757e-5 weeks <br />1.522e-5 months <br /> following its receipt on site. It is expected to arrive on site the evening of August 8, 2004. In addition, we have been examining the implications of the blower failure on the engine. There is limited experience on the impact of blower failures, which are rare. Based on review of industry operating experience, input from the vendor engineering manager, who is onsite, and discussions with other industry experts, we consider it prudent to perform an extensive disassembly and internal inspection of the engine to ensure future reliability. An inspection plan has been developed and a detailed implementation plan is in progress. It is expected to take approximately 5 days to complete the inspections and re-assembly. Additional time may be required depending what is identified during inspection. Therefore a 7-day extension is requested. If during the

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 5 extension period it is determined that EDG-12 cannot be restored within the extended period, the unit will be shutdown in accordance with TS LCO 3.8.1, Action C.1 and C.2.

Without this discretion, plant shutdown will have to be commenced by 0200 hours0.00231 days <br />0.0556 hours <br />3.306878e-4 weeks <br />7.61e-5 months <br /> on August 9, 2004. Maintaining the plant in Mode 1 will allow the organization to be appropriately focused on the repair of EDG-12 without the further distractions associated with plant shutdown and restart.

5. BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT NONCOMPLIANCE WILL NOT BE OF POTENTIAL DETRIMENT TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY AND THAT NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION IS INVOLVED.

The Fermi onsite AC power sources consist of four EDGs, two in Division 1, and two in Division 2, and one combustion turbine generator (CTG) 11-1, aligned to Division 1 for station blackout purposes. TS LCO 3.8.1 permits continued plant operation for a limited period of time with one or more EDGs inoperable. Specifically, if one or both EDGs in one division are inoperable, both EDGs must be restored to an operable status within 7 days, otherwise, a plant shutdown is required. With EDG-12 inoperable, the remaining operable EDGs are sufficient for performing the safety functions assumed in the safety analyses.

CTG 11-1 is also available for station blackout considerations.

Technical Specification Completion Times are limited because of the inability to meet single-failure criteria during the period of time that required equipment is not available.

The current 7-day Completion Time for restoring both EDGs in one division to Operable status is based upon a consideration of the capacity and capability of the remaining AC power sources, as well as the additional reliability afforded by the availability of CTG 11-1, and the low probability of a design basis accident (DBA) occurring during this period.

Given these considerations, supported by the results of the risk evaluation described in the discussion for Criterion 3 above, Detroit Edison has concluded that extending the LCO 3.8.1 Required Action A.6 Completion Time from 7 days to 14 days is risk neutral.

Basis for No Significant Hazards Consideration A proposed deviation from the Operating License (Technical Specifications) in accordance with Reference 2 involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed change would not (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident than previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The proposed change, i.e., the request for enforcement discretion to extend the Completion Time specified in TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.6 from 7 days to 14 days for EDG-12 is evaluated against each of these criteria as follows.

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 6 (1) The proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change affects the Completion Time for TS LCO 3.8.1, Required Action A.6. The proposed change allows a one-time extension of the current Completion Time for the inoperable EDG-12 from 7 days to 14 days.

The proposed change does not affect the design of the EDGs, the operational characteristics or function of the EDGs, the interfaces between the EDGs and other plant systems, or the reliability of the EDGs. Required Actions and their associated Completion Times are not considered initiating conditions for any accident previously evaluated, nor are the EDGs considered initiators of any previously evaluated accidents. The EDGs are provided to mitigate the consequences of previously evaluated accidents, including a loss of offsite power. The consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be significantly affected by the extended EDG Completion Time because a sufficient number of onsite AC power sources will continue to remain available to perform the accident mitigation functions associated with the EDGs, as assumed in the accident analyses. Thus the consequences of accidents previously evaluated are not affected by the proposed change in Completion Time.

To fully evaluate the effect of the proposed EDG Completion Time extension, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) methods and a deterministic analysis were utilized. The results of the analysis show, as discussed in Section 3 above, that the effects of this change are risk neutral. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

(2) The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed change does not involve a change in the design, configuration, or method of operation of the plant. The proposed change will not alter the manner in which equipment operation is initiated, nor will the functional demands on credited equipment be changed. The changes do not alter assumptions made in the safety analysis. No alteration in the procedures, which ensure that the plant remains within analyzed limits, is being proposed, and no changes are being made to the procedures relied upon to respond to an off-normal event. As such, no new failure modes are being introduced. Therefore, these proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 7 The proposed change does not alter the plant design, nor does it affect the assumptions contained in the safety analyses. Specifically, there are no changes being made to the EDG design, including instrument setpoints. The proposed changes have been evaluated both deterministically, and using risk-informed methods. Based upon these evaluations, as discussed in Section 3 above, the effects of this change are risk neutral.

Therefore, margins of safety ascribed to EDG availability and to plant risk have been determined to be not reduced. The evaluation has concluded that applicable regulatory requirements will continue to be met, adequate defense-in-depth will be maintained, sufficient safety margins will be maintained, and any increases in CDF and LERF are small and are offset by the increased risks associated with plant shutdown and startup.

The evaluation provided above shows that the proposed changes will not significantly increase the probability or the consequences of any accident previously evaluated, create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Therefore, the proposed change meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.92(c) and no significant hazard consideration is involved.

6. BASIS FOR CONCLUDING THAT THE NONCOMPLIANCE WILL NOT INVOLVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES TO THE ENVIRONMENT.

The proposed request for enforcement discretion will allow a one-time extension of the Completion Time for the inoperable EDG-12. It will not change any of the plant process limits or the manner in which plant systems are operated. The plant will continue to be required to be operated within the limits, conditions and provisions of the current Operating License. On that basis, the proposed request will have no impact on the plant's current licensing basis with respect to environmental impact. Thus, the proposed request involves no adverse consequences to the environment.

7. PROPOSED COMPENSATORY MEASURES In accordance with Fermi 2 Maintenance Rule Conduct Manual, Chapter 12 (MMR12),

"Equipment out of Service Risk Management," risk recommendations have been made. As such, the plant is currently in a "LOW" risk status, and will remain in this category for the extended period. The following equipment protections will be in effect until EDG-12 is restored to an Operable status.

a) No elective maintenance will be performed on EDGs 11, 13, or 14 during the extended EDG Completion Time.

b) No elective maintenance will be performed on CTG 11-1, which can be used to supply power to the Division I busses, during the extended EDG Completion Time.

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 8 c) No elective maintenance will be scheduled within the 120 kV and 345 kV switchyards that would challenge the offsite power connection or offsite power availability during the extended EDG Completion Time.

d) No elective work will be performed on protected equipment or any emergency core cooling system (ECCS) equipment during the extended EDG Completion Time.

e) An operational briefing concerning the operation of the 480v cross-tie will be conducted during each shift turnover.

f) Shiftly calls to offsite load dispatcher will be made to verify no unusual conditions that could affect reliability of offsite circuits.

g) A temporary diesel to permit black starting of CTG 11-2, CTG 11-3 or CTG 11-4 as a backup to CTG 11-1 is in place.

h) Shiftly tours of 120 kV and 345 kV mats will be conducted.

i) Spotters will be in place for all outside crane and lifting activities. There is a significant amount of crane and lifting activities associated with the site security modifications.

While in the extended EDG Completion Time period, overall plant risk will be managed by the existing Configuration Risk Management Program (CRMP) in accordance with the Fermi 2 Technical Requirements Manual. The CRMP program evaluates increases in risk posed by potential combinations of equipment out-of-service and potential increases in initiating events (e.g., offsite power supply stability, including potential weather-related affects, and switchyard work) and requires risk recommendations be implemented as appropriate for the configuration.

8. FACILITY REVIEW GROUP REVIEW The Fermi 2 Onsite Review Organization (OSRO) has reviewed and approved this request for enforcement discretion on August 8, 2004.

9. NOED CRITERIA SATISFIED FOR THE CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS As of the date of this request, the plant continues to operate in Mode 1, at or near full power. Approval of this request is appropriate and necessary to avoid the undesirable transients of shutdown and startup that would result from forced compliance with the Actions for a Limiting Condition for Operation, thus, minimizing potential adverse safety consequences and operational risks (Criterion 2.1.1.a of Reference 3).

Attachment to NRC-04-0061 Page 9

10. IF A FOLLOW-UP LICENSE AMENDMENT IS REQUESTED, THE NOED REQUEST MUST INCLUDE MARKED-UP TS PAGES SHOWING THE PROPOSED TS CHANGES AND A COMMITMENT TO SUBMIT THE ACTUAL LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST WITHIN 48 HOURS.

A follow-up License Amendment is not being requested in relation to this enforcement discretion request.

11. FOR WEATHER RELATED EVENTS, THE LICENSEE'S REQUEST MUST BE SUFFICIENTLY DETAILED FOR THE STAFF TO EVALUATE THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE EVENT COULD AFFECT THE PLANT, THE CAPABILITY OF THE ULTIMATE HEAT SINK, ON-SITE AND OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS STATUS, ACCESS TO AND FROM THE PLANT, ACCEPTABILITY OF ANY INCREASED RADIOLOGICAL RISK TO THE PUBLIC AND THE OVERALL PUBLIC BENEFIT.

This criterion is not applicable to this request.